NATURAL Law WN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 63 seems to have ever been manifested, on the gart ofthe courts, to cag. to the advantages of constaney and stably which natural hw al- fords, abandoning pertieslar grounds only when their inadeguacy Deere obvious and apparent It is never easy to determine just where one tendency becomes predenizant and others obsolete. Peshaps a system of satura Iw, hnaving onca become fixed in a jurisprudence, never completely lapses into desustude. Its influences, at times obvious, at cers subi, may cada long aftr its premises have bean discarded for eonocious we. fn deciding concrete cases. Just how far reatan, for example, ax!" understood by Grotius, was iafluenced by the “sature of ma,” or by the “nature of lav,” aa dotormived by logal exparience, may be tho subject of conjecture and disagreement. Undoubtedly the two cannot ‘be divorced." General tendencies, however, can be detected, and a recognition of uch tendeccse mast terve come uoofal purpose ia understanding the history and growth ofthe lew—pethars in predict- ing something of the fanure (Of the contributions which Rudolf Stamler has made t» legal philosophy, perbage acne ie more important than the ditineton wich be never tines of making between mattor and form He has attempted to poiat aut the validity aud sigaicancs of his distincions st rome length? Whether he hat successfully demonstrated their applicability in what he calls "The Practice of Jast Law,” is pethags ‘question upon vhich his readers and students may differ. It is beloved hy some, however, that his philrephy bas « peculiar applica tion to certain phases of American law. Wetter it can throw ada dou Muinaiion upon American constitudional theory, 2s mani featod ly the persistent recurrence of some phase of masta Ian, is the purpose of this study to investigate One might expect from a philosophy which recognizes the social lite of man as the underiying problem vith which its concerned, * op, Stamey, Theory of Juste, Huse Transition (19), 1878 See, eg. Theory of Fash sua, 13 Be See i his sph 7. See Profewor Dias cerew of The Theory of Jean im Ancient Bak ASScANON Joona, July Toa 476 Ch leo 35 Miche Ee “Decolabeimer, Wort’s Lagel Philsoophive (:o%a), 98399. 6 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW significant application to a corstitutioral lew which must measure and ‘raluate ‘the wide vacety of socal interests which che Fourteenth ‘Asmendient to our Federal Conetitution demands. In any conser ‘Gon of mataral law, one might expect ealightenment {ram a plile- sopher who restates the fundamental issue raised Ly natural law, ia ages, nancy, tie probien of detcraiing the ercrion of the legal ideal.® And finally, one might expect illumination ago any system of lew from jurist whe has developed anything like a eital theory of law. It may be that something akin to Stamler’ juistc ieatism has found its way into our Constitutional law, ia is lter sages, as 2 working substitute for some of the older notions of pataral lew which tine hae rendered obsolete and void. Whother this be true or not, it cannot help but proit to aralyze apparent tunudencon with ears in uch light 20 plocoshy adforde, whither 1 femenates fram Continental or Anglo-Americm sources. It may caify the situation and. faclinte the tranzpociion of Stammlers octrines to our body of constitutional principles to review, briefly, the successive stages through which natural law has pasted ia cor neecion with ts growth in oar constittional jrisprudence 1 Tu the early history ofthe Constitution, tong before the Fourteenth Amendment, jutstic philosophy, following the prevailing. poiical theory of the gesied, assumed decide! natural ln tendencies, The idea of individual Iberty had steadily developed in English constitu- tonal listory since Joln's concessions in Magax Carts. Whea the Fifth Amendment was atlached to the Consttction, it was eight ‘eet century law of ths land thet war contemplated rather than, ‘thirteenth century ler terrae, Political theory also was intensely individualistic. The Declaration of Independence, if it has no other significance, stands as memorial to the devout baie that the science of pois had forever inlubitably proved that & goveromst of laws had for its one and only objective the protection of indivdaal rights agalnst both pulvate and socal interference Legal philosophy was not ow to reflect this conviction inthe jurisprudence that it developed 10, 22 Cf. Constteton of Wastngton, Art, se. Ip wince the purist of somravent & dedarel to be Ge jotcien of te flaNATURAL LAtY IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 6 stout the Constittion. Natural law based upon de interest nature of government and upon the rights ad privileges of free men become 4 premise frem which to reson in all cas involving the integrity of individual interests The American colonists hd resisted the smother counnry according tothe bes canon of orthodox canstiotiona Sheory as loug a8 theiepatieae cadured. Convinced of dae Fat of such mearure:, Hy at last abandoned even + chek of legally and, in open revolatcn, reserted to the non-censtitationtl theory of ‘me natural sighes of ma in general" For the time, the natural right of Baglistinen were forgotten ia the acw enthusiaan fr the right: of man scserding to the law of Cod and of ratire “This legal doc tine emanating from thes» nor logal asuimptions, boing at # yas the peogery of the American end French revolutions?’ eventually 52 cured such a firm hold upon Juristc thinking that ote needs bat t look at many a twentieth century decision to seaize that this pha of aataral law ill constitte, in zany instances, the “nsrcwat major promise” of act a few freedem of contract opinions.” ‘Tax CCourte found that shore exated cartsin peiate righty which wen completely tuyond the control of the Sinte; that these limitstion rote cut of the “essenial mature of all free government.” and wer ‘respected by all governmens “entitle tothe pam." When the nineteenth century was well advanced, the historia school began to displace this older tural law, grounded upon th ratare of a government of men bers free and egal, with 2 natara law with a Wistoric couteat** ‘The philoopty of Hegel with it Cf, Poway reduction w te Raosepty of Law (2), St See Malin, The Amercin Revlon (0p) 82 cme, James Ou, Toe Highs ofthe Bish Colon p26 17s Whée the role piosoples whith ented Ge American abd Feene celts are amuly tango tent} th fot et wtb Speed the ‘he plea palsopy of ratie with nade helt so yrfvandy fe in th ‘American rvoliten as, ts cae, Morons Boelsh, coming thew fe well howe Jeera Leste Mosler rote Set Deter, The Deets of Indepndene (022),78 bor smal Lace v New Vols o8 U, S. a5 (rps); Prosi x Witnay 1997150 iar) Ives ula ety 208 NX. 37 Cat) Be ho Hales, The Taw of Notre In Sate and ederat Judie Deosbas Gog) 25 See LI. 67, as ® Loan Assen. Top 2 Wal O55, 6-05 (8), per ALE, Se Pow, Law nid Mare (op), 16 Ca sICHIGAM Law Rays sfoliing of the idea of Hberty made ise felt ia legal story" "The sights of the Past became the natural law of the Provent A philosophy of history became the cove of the system of nataral Ia. and the rights of the individual were messured by the guarantees of the common le. Alter the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment into the Constitution, thas making duc proces of law = chede upon state legislation, there wat soon precipitated a tremendous amount of ign sion involving infringements upon indivicual interests. Around suc cs, stall sare of which turaed upon the protection (9 frcedora of contract which the Amendment affords, netural haw with a He toric content has developed an impressive pilosephy. Courts have resorted 10 the origin of the due proces of law else to Justify the sasurpsion that what has recived the eatston of time, by eastern and usage, is protected by the guarantee of due process. When the reluctant Lacktand made the concessions Inckided ia the ler feorae provisions cf Magna Carte there i Htle doabt but that he was assuring the barons that thse ives and property wold be respected according tothe law of the land, cusiom and sage. C. H MetIiwaia observes “There cen be litle doabe tha: these changes wore in the direction of « more devcloged feutalism, but thee is nothing Jn this inconsistent with the view thatthe ex so amended wat in ts origin in pert ancient Hnglsh eastomary fa. In 1379 it was charged that one tried end ined in one county for an offense which tooe place in ancther county was depeived of his property contrary tothe ls tore Tt was contrary t the eas- tom and tradition of English trial. Bigelow aayo that che low tora provision of the Groat Charter was an attemgt to insore the aafaty of the person and his preperty from infringment except “by judicial proceedings senording tothe mature of the cese."" Tt did act neoes- ‘See Pound, Ierpctions of Laat Kiaury (10), 222%, 454 Cf. Becdahenes, Worlds Legal Pitsoohis (sts), 316 ‘8eDue Prose of Taw in Magen Ct” (014), 44 Can L- Bev 3 Mlowstoh v; Yarmouth Se Gelct Carer before the King's Camel, sagb-ifes ml. Palestine of te Suen Soc ‘lictory of Procedure (e880), 158 =NATURAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY sarily asure a tral by jury for tls was not always in accord » ‘easiom and feudal tradition Some courts of hiek repute, howe ave fel thatthe fer terrae inched jury trial, «judge of no tess tinetion than Chief Justice Shew bolding to such view.*" ‘Due process of law hat astemed, in our constitutional deot ‘a meaning simar the lex terree of de Great Charter. Both ssiusly and unecnscioesly the court have ceme to regnrd the F tecath Amendment aad the Fifth Amendment as incorporating & tection to the rights gradually evolved by tradition and custom, sunationed by the common law. Atan ely date the Supreme Ce ‘through Mr. Justice Carts, announced: The words ‘due process of law; were undoubtedly ‘ended to convey the same meaning as the words “by the i ‘he and? in Magwa Carta. Lord Cole in his coment. those words (2 Inst. go) says they mear ‘due process of | © = To what principles, then, are we to resort to escet whether this proces enacted by Congress is due process * ‘We must examine the Constitution itself, to see whether process be in coal with any of ts provisions, If not fc to be so, we must lock to these setled usages and mode proceedings exiiting in the common and statute Inw of 1 land, before the emigration of our aacestors, and which shown not to have been ursuited to their civil and poli condition by having been acted on by them after the seitler in this countey."*" Ta commentiog on Union Refrigerator Co, v. Kestack fessor Beale observed that “itis cifieult to peeve that a pra ‘hich has prevailed in half the Staes of the Union fora century contrary to due process of law” ‘The Supreme Court reatcertae octrne that castoms sanctioned by usege were protested by due WaeChue, Das Proce of Law (1908), 26 Bee Pontete Fer Tntcbon erie vel or legen Tera, Maga | ‘Commemoration Essy (917) 96,103 “yee Kaba, 8 Gra (AS) 52, 24 hues: Leseev. Hoboken Land ce Co, 18 Hove. 272296 (1855 ie U.S 19 (209). Juransn to Tex Gon), 39 Haw L. ee 8, eo No ancmicay Law Review principles Foquired a State to maintain the line with which we ere familiar be- ‘These fu tween the Fonction of she jury and those of the court. Dust even “which fa Justise Holmes is deply impresed with the relationship between duce {3 offence 00s of law and long estabhed sight, Thus he observes, law, ora “Te would be 2 surprising extension of the Fourteenth® resent sr ‘Amondment if ¢ were held to probit the continuance of one osu acct of the most universal and best known distinctions of thes and the yedieal law ?™" 4 when cxt hoes wh, The reat preponderance of Holmes’ opinions, however, indicate? ree without outs that be has no! ten the sand that long etebiehed™ inks ts ions Ae protected wit qualiaion by dae proces of hw Sete tla enc whee he lan eppatenlyasved at ech wre 8h dane nen tech rong frm eel eres pres, sw ah Fee euuendy ie indiesed » Gout by The resus of bot the eater and Inter tread of natural tan which which developed shout the Connon and especialy te °F Tori warané Paurtenth Amendment, have ben rated demvnstiated 1 could be be inadequate to meet the demande which ecesty places upon that” Sele woinsrument Economic an socal Cereopments of lte yeae Inve tain opiamade inevitable « ocaled view of the hw. Since Jaerng, Oet- tc to oneal altade toward jarspradesce has begun io race the et) tnbocyinworm inividalom of peeing exturce™ Taw us safeguard Im command 2 guardian of soa interests mets Inw asa garanee of the Sage ae integriy of india interes, ape is this true of Contr, Gagan Seti under tho Pourtweth Amendment. Th ssl brie tethng toning vat amen of socal and economic datas repiced the ui jeune nolons of “cout saderstesng™ sl “ganraly mr, Bs sean, mine : iM TSG.E Techn ean for the inadequacy ofthe salir pee of netra Jaw. See low, derived from the nature of goverment snd the inerent tehts™ EEECMfor ree mea, was thet it eonduced to the development of what Jher- tal desis ® Ghee thas Grant Tinferc Co Gry, 295 8.1.24 (ot) a Mibeeul) SC Pow “ovps and Porpoe 9f Gocsogial Jorepratece” (9zt} Revelaicn’s Hace Za 12, 10 ° ‘Shot ‘85ee Baler v. Orepe, 208 U.S. 4:2 (18). Cf. Compl of the exo Soot in Bele» Sehucle Pres a4 N,V. so (ote) 2 to the irae of ™ ‘ig euch dts Penge Willa, 89 1, 398 (ey), i gure cota eyerv. Nebrsie, 0 U. 5.360 (92). =n tos,BATURAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIOMAL, THROR? TATURAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY sprece: Teast mew solve the ever new and novel problams hich «comple society coef ey edly stantly raises. Stanmiler employs the distinction to darify the philotes pee sophy of law 28 applied to the entire legal system. ‘The immediate ran phi problem herewith is to test sts appiteaton only to such portion Of cents jy fc ‘oor constitutional jurspradence as has developed under the due pro-inad® gma ‘cess of law clause in respect to legislation of the several States, When eres gt ‘Stammler, then, speaks of “law” consistency demands that we cot-my stent fine the ues ofthe term, for our immediate purpoce, to Constitutions seme qn, be Brust Form is ceseribed 28 the “uniform method of ordering,”* thatthen, orga is, in Constimional law, the element which gives eonstaney and f proc ‘unfeation 10 our jarisprudenoe—ihe aniversal element thereof. ™80i indy Aerie cam be only those concrete decisions which have manifested "=I Lect themselves from tive to tine asthe Couct bas had occasion to pass'21 that spon the valiity of statutes of the Stas under the Améadment. # ‘The strat mast not be confused with the concreta®® Neither mast it be thought thatthe pre form can be fully expressed in the com 3 amen crete; the aisstract ideal can never be expressed or fashionad into ons, seq concrete, positive being. On the other hand the form and the metier and 4 judg ‘cancot be entirely separated. “They are always found united,” Fran alle sys Stammier* “nsither exists price to the other. * * * Sinct on meyer ‘the contrary, as hs been ssid, they make their appearance only at jgeq; cont the same time and in union with one another, their discovery neces rig lea sarily invelves a critical analysis of an already existent synthesis and 7 cha ‘How this synthesis cars does not bear on the question of systematic this and analysis as suck. * * * For gurgoses of the present discussion, we defec EV" have to start from the proposition that throughoat our entice experi. pila: ther fence ur impressions and aspirations are synthesized and that in these —, 0 ‘compesite experiences com be distinguished the anifomly determining "i ‘Sey “Fondant Condesa” are, Ba ‘sSer ti, 88, forte onfaen Deveen abstract AY aaa te pioreal stienon of for ont Sittin told Be mde ate He I and» 24 [eye This war te Goat wilh gheath ceturynetiel Inyo te Cine : tne when the sng ae mae te mal ptr Iw (Cede) elec ' ‘withthe aburae raeption of lanyas 8 etaton priv fou of : the same Cf. Seniors cts of the Rrecy “CHn! Code, Bil Ge f-sn the cleo apie to the Cae I, Tae Thess of Jao 10h ‘agp dhe clrticoea applied to the Canoe law, Tia ern Jorigeedane™ gay), 24 Mica. 1. Rar. 8b MICHIGAN Law RELEW smethed of ordering, on the one hand, and the particular facts deter- sinod thereby on he other: Wemuct dtinguich, then, in our thinking, between thoce uniform methods of ordering which, in Constittiona lw, lend continuity to ‘the fabric which he decisions have woves, ané the parcicuar conch sions in concrete cases which constitute the matter ordered thereby. ‘Yat we are o lok for thse two elameats together, forthe one dees not exist withost the other, Distinct irom these two elements, for philosophical purposes, there is sila third element involved, namely the reletoaship between the wrivereul,enifying clment and the co cto matter, Staramler has called this relationship the content By intoucing into constitutional jurisprudence the unchangeable and inmuable elemer: of reason as standard, we have provided 8 ned and wavarying wliity. Tes here that oor natural low becomes truly philosophical, "It (legal philesophy),” says Pound “has had faith that it ootlé Gnd the everlasting, un- langeable legal realty in whlch we might rest cod could enable us te ceablich perfect law by which human relations might bs ordered {erewer withost uncertainty and freed from need of change.” is thus that our standard of reason provides a genuine pillocopbical basis for an enduring Constitutional jusispredence ‘A sumbor of years ago Mr. Justice Holos eaid of the dctrine of seasonchleness, as applied in private law: “When we rule on evidence of negligence we are ruling om a standard of eondect, a standard which we hold the patios, bound te know beforehand, and acick in theory ie alenys the seme upon the fact ad not a matter dependene gon the whim fof a particular jury or the eloquence of « particular advo ‘Anil as to this same element of ressou in publle nw, where the See it, 88, Cont, they “olding wih" or boing oer” cumujtono. Pye Germ i Tne. with 2 siniae etymdasy.fokhelon ‘Se Tatodstio othe Pavey of Law (ass), a7. ts am ent over sting rea of mann tne here fps, it end snctangele Taw" Garcia nrodsation 1 the Seasce of Taw (ipa), Tension 16 ‘Lar im Scie ané Since La, Coltcted Papers (192), 210 236 Tate sre mine CF Common Ese (80),NATURAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 7p rolce power of the State was involved, the words of Br. Justice skin i Steller v, O'Hare have a far reaching sigiicance: “Tere have been many tiompte te define ths polis power sri is zope; But beensse of confusing the power ital? with the changing conditions caling for is application, many of the definitions are ineeaet and unsatisfactory. The courts have lartrlyeliisaved ruc of the confusion by pointing out iat, fstexd of the power being expended to meet new cen (tions, the new conditions are, os Hacy arise, brought siti ‘he immadeble ond rwnchouging principles underying the poston” So the constitutional questoa presented in due process of law, as poled to statues under the potce power, i esentialy a pilosopaic ‘question, Because i involves te elemene of achanging valcity. A great deal has been said by the courts about the question of reason bleness, whether i¢ was 4 question of law or a question of fact ‘Auati, long ago, pointe out thet it was miter, bat ether a question Savaving the rlatonship Bohan the given los aad the given fats? what Stummier calls the covient. ‘This question, involving = pere intellecaml process, is privarily 2 moral one® ‘This, it must be, is ‘what Mr. Justice Holmes has in mind when he dedires that the ‘standard of the reasonable men is nota gal standard at all, Tn so far as the standard becomes incorporated into the law, many jurists ‘wl cal (ca legal standards but its application implies the excercise of what is fuadareatally « woval judgment °* Starve, spicing of the philosophy of Iw, 7s, “By the plibsophy of law we understand the theory of that which in judicial disession, is assumed to be of uncon Aitioned, universal validity." (ip Oregon sm, 592 (94), antag, Tale ae min. ‘Sfecgrse (885), 28 Se Fou, Law and Sora C02), €, ‘See Theory of Jusca poo, fo. Tenumadh othe moe pins Irvotved infenes an cone eon ay De sl bs fp. TC. Salen, Jarisprenee (7s a 121), 20 WUahcbadh det Rechopaiovnbie § 8 MICHIGAN Law REVUE Scientiie propositions do not involve elements of conditioned, ceniersal voltty; scence ig concerned primarily with the general ‘Tuas Stazamler defnce what he conceives «o be the fondamestsl ‘qeestons with which the philosophy of law is concemed, namely, (2) What ie law; (2) way dows it bind; (3) upon what principles are lems just?" ‘These, he declres,carmot he solved hy the con- serstion merely of detnite histerical lave. They are questions in- volving 2 consideration of that which i “assumed to be of unccnd- onod, univonel vali.” ‘The various anawora which the courts Ihave made to these three questions, at they have arten andar the police power and the Foarteenth Amendment, indicate the reletion of the docttine of reasoasbleness to exch.” The answer to each ‘question Iavolves couderatiors, for the treaumeat of which scene: Js jejune ond empty, bt to which philosophy is gemmane end pert rent. Ssienoe has its place in Constitutional I, ‘ion of the fzeis for the eration of the matric, in order that the ranient may be establisted, but with the Pare form, ohilosopty alone is concerned ‘Tous satura lw with ite pilorophic element mast be lapt di since from the facts determination involved in the matter. in the latter, the Sst question is ene for seienee, Hire there i no drawing ofthe line, and no pore form is involved, bat only the most expedii ous methed of determing the factual foundation for the cenerts :manifestaton of the law inthe partenar ese. Tn arriving atthe pa ‘iotar conclusion, however, an intellect process iavoiing the af- plcation of a norm, forever unchangeable and inuputable upon the facts, is employed. Tt thus thatthe content is etabished So it may {ellow thatthe content of thie natural law maybe inconveet e may be oor law, and yet the standard applied be always 2 just one, ad be good Jaw. Just as mathematicians make errors in handling univers conceptions, so juisis err ia the exercise of the standard of reason Bence, ba the iden undergoes ro change or 20 modifeation. The ideal harmony which iti the sim of Constitutional law t edeet be ‘nPbe Theary of Jno, 8 Cf, Racghiovohig, tra B ar Cf the lnguaze of he court in Commonweath % alge, 7 Cok. (afer), g3 80 (obe); heslwar es Now Wore ap! C'S 42 49 (pe), Holmes, cneing; Cie, B&Q... v. Dalage Ganesan 29 1.8. sir, soa (1908); Siefilerv. O'Hara supra. 32.NATURAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 8 in the standard appli, but solely by the conditions to wich it wasp ‘applied. ‘To asaumne Hat the proces of the Court was correct in the Lochner cave may be eificatt to do, but this explanation car ined justify, or ot lest explain the face that both decisions are gondlt of law, theoretisaly, td. bere When cous ae resented wit a prod ofthe ki in aes tn ty tropic wbh oc fe ma enna te ir Be law affords. In each case the general principles are usually not the tne of agrnct” Noone dut tt the Poet ‘nent my be ad vpn w pote pe gis On ea ot Str ton te pe ower conde bes power gout tushy hp rn df inte pong ory Song onl pope oit este pea unary ee seta de ple wma” Ise nod of Tose omnes “hoe asap te aowa psc, He quotes vier thas lnontentetGewarcata wad mei waste, or Laue cn bteg eipicag fag lin ica ta ee lowe sry, nil he try oft wi at fae forte deen Solon sn chermavechecr ures it Ts tn lcd on etter for women an rst reabh crest the ice fever" bat io en hear omni wes trey teuomiie Tuten tren ee Sanus wo crore ana rt wp tees Of or alowed ye a= oe ‘he gaat pines ing are apo, flys dat eS aout of cai nd eee of ops espana o Stained eo! de naiol cf pts te a ey tae Sen warocie esate wah hoc of ping stead at Temwafteandtenat eral alae Da ice eae tec pono noted ne mre i ie on Teen pa bea ape a ms eP ROSS METRE RSE SG a tom. SRT A ache SESE eae, TAPE Ws ES SS, ses pean w tsar wi DAL mr of Mune gto arabes ah tet ce rest aes a ea an - Tet fm i a ac a of vi no ‘Sonn a ners Se ae > mrcnican Law Review Foareentn Amencment especially contains eviderees of this dual nat on ‘tat & aUCHIGAN LAW REVIEW c tent ie born, or the eating body of dogms it hrs crrci,as Hobe ed, says “into highest generalizations bythe hep of jeriapraence Science is asefal and so is history, but a cenuine shilosonhy isp indopemable comple the legal geocee in groleme werd ‘he cession, Scene can aif ascenaning te facts gartearly whereins tsonomic snd socal phenemenn are Sovlte. Kiso is servcabieos to Hota how roles end principles have been ppleé to conertich Suntons inthe past and io thereby asst meting stich nd i->0- ler sitatins inthe ature. but never as sdicientpreises fromthe whith to Goes, by ellogitc loge, nko govern every cae thet OY hnay arse" Science an History supplement wn sgment cach ther. le “The tendenr of our Cenattoal law in the pest to follow, exe \S+ sively, the path of history hs, a ws hve cen, feed fr fw eamnat be developed as Summler say, “by cntal historical observation,” ee nor yt erivcaly! On the other hand the conent of just law— nao! be derived elely from ace or moral, even when fod int fd attlgarated with hw only the fom canbe thereby ate. When covets epalied, with science, history ard pileseph dein xt thei party porhpe this mate law with His versle content my 2 recent the two great demands mage ‘pon ary jerspradenc aly, the need for Sty and saifty and the necessity for flex- wet bility that the tor may not be stted in a growth and deriop- mest. Regardes of the ultinete results ataled by the preset, tendencs, tis servile to examine oar Consthutonal lw i ther Tight of vali critical theory, ditingising form and mater ac le- comient; “because,” in the words of Dal Vecchio, “eriticism tas" taught 0s t dstnauth the tath of pheromenen from that of the iy ‘er norm which govern while efring sa means of reeaguising its gradual reeoncintion in sony." mt tie Ph of te tan Gael Pan ape 1, ‘ston “Soe and Faroe of Scere france” Com), 2.8 WSice bukieine: Worfs Lal Pitaskss Gor), as ‘tte aves of Ta, Lise’ Trnaon (ie), 33