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THE POST-AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST
F O R E I G N A F F A I R S .C O M
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Beyond Counterterrorism 11
Washington Needs a Real Middle East Policy
Daniel Byman
Iraq in Pieces 33
Breaking Up to Stay Together
Ali Khedery
Digital Counterinsurgency 52
How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online
Jared Cohen
November/December 2015
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Bridging the Gulf 59
How to Fix U.S. Relations With the GCC
Ilan Goldenberg and Melissa G. Dalton
ESSAYS
Help Refugees Help Themselves 84
Let Displaced Syrians Join the Labor Market
Alexander Betts and Paul Collier
Littler England 93
The United Kingdoms Retreat From Global Leadership
Anand Menon
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High Hopes for Hydrogen 117
Fuel Cells and the Future of Energy
Matthew M. Mench
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Volume 1, Number 1 September 1922
November/December 2015
November/December 2015 Volume 94, Number 6
Published by the Council on Foreign Relations
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KEVIN P. RYAN, MARGARET G. WARNER, DANIEL H. YERGIN
A
fter generations of authoritar- explain the economic policy changes the
ian stagnation punctuated by Islamic Republic needs to enact in order
moments of domestic repres- to reap lasting benefits from the lifting
sion and interstate war, in recent years, of international sanctions.
the Middle East has begun to move. Ali Khedery reports on the ongoing
The rise of radical Islamism, the inva- disintegration of Iraq, arguing that decen-
sion of Iraq and its chaotic aftermath, tralization presents the least bad alterna-
the uprisings of the Arab Spring and tive for the countrys future, and Stephen
their bloody issue, and now a sustained Walt and Jared Cohen offer strategies
drop in oil prices and successful nego- for dealing with the Islamic State on the
tiations with Irantogether these have ground and in cyberspace, respectively.
opened up what could be an unsettling And Ilan Goldenberg and Melissa
new era for all involved. Dalton, Michael Wahid Hanna, and
What are the contours of this new Natan Sachs trace the contours of the
Middle East? Will Washington continue new dynamics between the United
to pull back from actively managing the States and the Gulf Cooperation Council,
region, or will it develop an appetite for Egypt, and Israel, respectively.
renewed intervention? And how will The old Middle East has been
recent developments reshuffle alignments seriously shaken; where it persists or has
and allegiances? These are the questions been restored, such as in Saudi Arabia
this package tries to answer, delving deep and Egypt, it limps on without confi-
into the current turmoil and its impli- dence or permanence. The new Middle
cations for U.S. policy. East remains a work in progress; from
To start, Steven Simon and Jonathan Iraq and Syria to Libya and Yemen,
Stevenson argue that the U.S. shift to an nobody knows how things will look when
offshore balancing approach, shunning the dust settles. And whether, after the
ground operations and state building in nuclear deal kicks in, Iran will choose
the region, has been driven by a sensible conflict, integration, or a mixture of the
recognition that Washington has dramati- two remains a mystery. Stay tuned.
cally reduced scope for successful inter- Gideon Rose, Editor
vention these days. But Daniel Byman
says that counterterrorism from a distance
is not enough and that renewed attempts
at state building are necessary.
Michael Mandelbaum thinks that in
order to deter Tehran from going nuclear,
the Iran deal should be supplemented by
an explicit threat of U.S. military action
in response to significant cheating, and
Cyrus Amir-Mokri and Hamid Biglari
The long period of American primacy
in the Middle East is ending.
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson
T
he Obama administration has policy initiatives, especially the recent
clearly pulled back from the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear
United States recent interven- program, have distanced Washington
tionism in the Middle East, notwith- from its traditional Middle Eastern allies;
standing the rise of the Islamic State in other words, the United States isnt
(also known as ISIS) and the U.S.-led pulling back so much as pushing away.
air war against it. Critics pin the change In actuality, however, the main driver
on the administrations aversion to U.S. of the U.S. pullback is not whats happen-
activism in the region, its unwillingness ing in Washington but whats happening
to engage in major combat operations, in the region. Political and economic
or President Barack Obamas alleged developments in the Middle East have
ideological preference for diminished reduced the opportunities for effective
global engagement. But the reality is American intervention to a vanishing
that Washingtons post-9/11 interven- point, and policymakers in Washington
tions in the regionespecially the one have been recognizing that and acting
in Iraqwere anomalous and shaped accordingly. Given this, the moderate
false perceptions of a new normal of U.S. pullback should be not reversed but
American intervention, both at home rather continued, at least in the absence of
and in the region. The administrations a significant threat to core U.S. interests.
unwillingness to use ground forces in
Iraq or Syria constitutes not so much a BACK TO NORMAL
Between World War II and the 9/11
STEVEN SIMON is a Visiting Lecturer at attacks, the United States was the quin-
Dartmouth College and served as Senior Director
for Middle Eastern and North African Affairs at
tessential status quo power in the Middle
the White House from 2011 through 2012. East, undertaking military intervention
JONATHAN STEVENSON is Professor of in the region only in exceptional circum-
Strategic Studies at the U.S. Naval War College stances. Direct U.S. military involvement
and served as Director for Political-Military was nonexistent, minimal, or indirect in
Affairs for the Middle East and North Africa on
the U.S. National Security Council staff from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the 1956 Suez
2011 to 2013. crisis, the Six-Day War in 1967, the Yom
2 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
The End of Pax Americana
Kippur War in 1973, and the Iran-Iraq fossil fuel. Although Gulf producers will
War in the 1980s. The 198284 U.S. keep determining the world price of oil
peacekeeping mission in Lebanon was and U.S. companies will continue to have
a notorious failure and gave rise to the a stake in the Gulfs wells, the United
overwhelming force doctrine, which States will enjoy greater policy discretion
precluded subsequent U.S. interventions and flexibility.
until Saddam Husseins extraordinarily The spread and intensification of
reckless invasion of Kuwait forced jihadism have also weakened the strategic
Washingtons hand in 1990. links between the United States and its
Washington didnt need a forward- regional partners. A decade ago, a combi-
leaning policy because U.S. interests nation of American pressure and the
largely coincided with those of its strate- shock of large-scale al Qaeda attacks
gic allies and partners in the region and inside Saudi Arabia convinced the Saudis
could be served through economic and and their neighbors to clamp down on
diplomatic relations combined with a jihadist activities within their own
modest military presence. The United borders. Yet today, the Gulf Arab states
States and the Gulf Arab states shared have subordinated the suppression of
a paramount need to maintain stable oil jihadism to the goal of overthrowing
supplies and prices and, more broadly, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and
political stability. Since the Iranian hobbling his patrons in Iran. They are
Revolution in 1979, the United States, doing this by backing Sunni extremist
Israel, and the Gulf Arab states have had rebels in Syria despite Washingtons
the mutual objective of containing Iran. exhortations to stop and Saudi Arabias
Beginning with the Camp David accords own desire to avoid a post-Assad Syria
in 1978, American, Egyptian, and Israeli ruled by radicals. The United States
interests converged, and their trilateral regional partners see themselves as less
relationship was reinforced by substantial and less answerable to Washington, and
U.S. aid to Egypt and Israel alike. And Washington feels less obligated to protect
even after 9/11, the United States, Israel, the interests of those partners, which
and the Gulf Arab states had shared seem increasingly parochial and remote
priorities in their fights against terrorism. from American interests and values. In
Over the past decade, however, several addition, widespread Islamic radicaliza-
factors largely unrelated to Washingtons tion has driven the emergence of a genu-
own policy agenda have weakened the ine pan-Islamic identity that complicates
bases for these alliances and partnerships. Western involvement in the Middle East.
First, the advent of hydraulic fracturing Consider, for example, the unwillingness
has dramatically reduced direct U.S. of many moderate Sunni Syrian oppo-
dependence on Gulf oil and diminished nents of Assad to accept European or
the strategic value and priority of the U.S. help, which they believe will
U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia and disqualify them in the eyes of Islamists.
the smaller Gulf Arab states: indeed, the Meanwhile, from the United States
United States will soon overtake Saudi standpoint, the Middle East has become
Arabia as the worlds largest producer a highly dubious place to invest owing
of crude oil and will need to import less to systemic political and economic
November/December 2015 3
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson
dysfunction. The region features little of the Muslim Brotherhood will almost
water, sparse agriculture, and a massive certainly lead to an increase in jihadist
oversupply of labor. Of the Middle violence and thus expose the United States
Eastern countries that still function, to the very blowback that its assistance to
most run large fiscal and external deficits, Egypt is intended to prevent. Hopes in
maintain huge and inefficient civil service the 1950s and 1960s for the ascendance of
payrolls, and heavily subsidize fuel and a secular, technocratic, Western-oriented
other necessities for their populations; Arab elite that would bring their societies
lower oil revenues will probably limit the with them have long since faded.
Gulf states ability to finance those creaky
mechanisms. Active conflicts in many POWERFUL BUT POWERLESS
Middle Eastern states have displaced At the same time that the salience of the
large proportions of their populations and Middle East to U.S. policy is waning and
deprived their young people of educational the interests of the United States and its
opportunities and hope for the future. traditional partners in the Middle East
These conditions have produced either are diverging, the potential for American
abject despair or, what is more ominous, military power to effect major change
political and religious radicalization. The in the region is also diminishing. The
effort to remake the Middle East as an decentralization of al Qaeda and the
incubator of liberal democracy that would emergence of ISIS, a jihadist expedition-
pacify young Muslims failed even when ary force and quasi state, have increased
the United States had plenty of cash to the asymmetries between U.S. military
throw at the project and more reasons for capabilities and the most urgent threats
optimism about its prospects, in the years facing the region. As U.S.-occupied Iraq
immediately following the 9/11 attacks. slid toward civil war in 2006, the Penta-
Finally, groups within Middle Eastern gon moved toward improving U.S.
societies that were once reliable bastions of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice,
pro-Western sentimentsuch as national revamping the militarys structure to
militaries, oil-industry elites, and secular emphasize irregular warfare and special
technocratshave generally seen their operations. But liberal and accountable
influence wane. And in instances where democratic governments find it difficult
traditional pro-Western elements have to marshal either the staying power or
retained power, their interests and policies the savagery that is usually required
now increasingly diverge from American to suppress an unruly and committed
ones. The Egyptian military, for example, indigenous groupespecially a region-
served for decades as a pillar of the wide social movement such as ISIS, which
U.S.-Egyptian relationship. Thanks to does not recognize physical or political
the coup it launched in 2013 that placed boundaries. This is particularly true when
the former army general Abdel Fattah el- outside powers have no local partners
Sisi at the top of a new authoritarian with substantial bureaucratic cohesion or
regime, the military now exerts more popular legitimacy. The United States
control than ever in Egypt. But this hardly still has the resources and resilience to
augurs well for Washington: if past is sustain wars against modern nationalist
prologue, the militarys brutal suppression states that would end with clear victors
4 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
The End of Pax Americana
and enforceable outcomes. But Ameri- wasnt able to put together the last two
cans have learned the hard way that a times it launched major military inter-
transnational clash of ethnicities turbo- ventions in the Middle East, with the
charged by religious narratives is vastly invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the NATO
harder to navigate, let alone manipulate. air campaign against Libya in 2011. Put
A U.S.-led military operation against simply, the United States would likely
ISIS, for instance, would no doubt pro- lose another war in the Middle East for
duce impressive and gratifying battlefield all the same reasons it lost the last two.
victories. But the aftermath of the conflict Even a less intensive, counterterrorism-
would drive home the ultimate futility of based approach to ISIS, which would
the project. Solidifying any tactical gains involve steady drone strikes and periodic
would require political will backed by the commando operations, would carry grave
support of the American public; a large risks. Collateral damage from U.S. drone
cadre of deployable civilian experts in attacks, for example, has made it harder
reconstruction and stabilization; deep for the Pakistani government to extend
knowledge of the society for whose fate deeper cooperation to the United States.
a victorious United States would take Five years ago, U.S. military officials
SCOT T PETE RSON / G ET TY IMAG ES
November/December 2015 5
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson
6 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
The End of Pax Americana
provoke or deter a potential adversary Iranian mischief but hardly a platform for
can never be answered with complete controlling the region. In short, even with
confidence, since decision-makers often the nuclear deal in place, Iran wont be able
misjudge the perceptions and tempera- to do much more nowand possibly even
ment of their rivals. lessthan it was able to do in the past.
Whether rapprochement is a promis- The nuclear deal has produced a
ing paradigm for U.S.-Iranian relations genuine split between the Americans and
remains to be seen. Iran clearly seeks to the Israelis, who believe that the deals
exert its influence wherever it can, but terms are too lenient and wont prevent
its far from clear that it can dominate the Iranians from developing a nuclear
the region. Iranian influence in Iraq was weapon. But the divide is unlikely to
aided by the vacuum created by the U.S. have dire practical consequences. Wash-
invasion but stems more broadly from ington has an obligation to maintain its
the demographic and political primacy unique relationship with Israel and has a
of Iraqs Shiites and is thus unavoidable. strategic interest in preserving bilateral
As long as Baghdad remains dependent links with the Israeli military, which is
on the United States for countering ISIS, by far the regions most powerful fighting
Washington should retain sufficient force. The nuclear deal with Iran also
leverage to moderate Iraqi politics and upset the Gulf Arab states. But Washing-
limit Irans sway. Iranian support for the tons global economic responsibilities and
Houthi rebels in Yemen and for dissident its substantial counterterrorist interests
Shiites in Bahrain is more opportunistic still require the United States to safe-
than strategic and therefore unlikely to guard its strategic relationship with those
permanently shift the balance of power countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. And
in either place. Tehrans meddling in the the Gulf Arab states retain a stronger
Israeli-Palestinian conflict doesnt rise cultural connection with the United
to the level of a strategic challenge: the States than with any other major power:
Palestinian militant group Hamas has not Gulf elites send their children to Ameri-
been able to translate Iranian largess into can universities as opposed to Chinese,
a serious advantage over Israel, let alone Russian, or European ones.
Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, all The Israelis and the Gulf Arabs need
of which oppose Hamas. Irans footholds not panic: prudence dictates a serviceable
in Lebanon and Syria go back decades, regional U.S. military presence to prevent
but even though its proxies in both places ISIS from expanding further (into Jordan,
have steadily increased their commit- for example) and to deter Iranian breaches
ment to defend the Assad regime, they of the nuclear deal and respond to any
have been unable to avert Syrias de facto destabilizing Iranian moves, such as a
partition. Even if Iran chooses to make major ground intervention in Iraq.
Syria its Vietnam, the best it could The American military footprint in the
probably manage against an externally region should not change. At least one
supported anti-Assad opposition would U.S. carrier battle group should remain
be to consolidate the status quo while assigned to the Arabian Sea. The structure
sharing the meager rewards with Moscow. and personnel strength of U.S. military
Syria, then, would be a springboard for bases in the Middle East should stay
November/December 2015 7
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson
the same. The air campaign against ISIS The United States should always
should continue, and American troops support the goals of democratization
will still need to be deployed occasion- and Israeli-Palestinian peace. But in the
ally on a selective basis to quell terrorist medium term, rather than unrealistically
threats or even respond in a limited way clinging to those aims, Washington should
to large-scale atrocities or environmental try to capitalize on the Iran nuclear deal
disasters. But a resolute policy of restraint to improve relations with Tehran. If the
requires that any major expeditionary implementation of the deal gets off to a
military ground intervention on the relatively smooth start, Washington
part of the United States in the Middle should probe Tehrans flexibility in other
East be avoided and that regional part- areas with an eye to fostering a kind of
ners be encouraged to take on more modus vivendi between the Iranians and
responsibility for their own security. the Saudissomething that looks very
unlikely now, as it has for years. One way
AIM LOWER, SCORE HIGHER to do so would be to bring Iran and other
In addition to affirming its pullback governments together in an effort to end
from the military interventionism of the Syrian civil war through a political
the post-9/11 era, Washington needs to agreement. The emerging recognition
recalibrate its diplomatic priorities. The among the major playersthe United
aftermath of the Arab revolts of 2011 States, Russia, Iran, and the Gulf Arab
especially those in Egypt, Libya, and statesis that, although ISIS dream of a
Syriademonstrated that most Middle border-busting caliphate remains out of
Eastern societies are not ready to take the groups reach, the ongoing conflict in
significant steps toward democracy, and Syria risks dangerously empowering ISIS
so American attempts to promote further and accelerating the propagation of its
political liberalization in the region should extremist ideology.
be more subdued. U.S. officials should But each player has also come to
also recognize that a lasting peace be- realize that its preferred method of
tween Israel and the Palestinians is highly solving the Syrian crisis is probably
unlikely to take shape in the medium unworkable. For the United States and
term. The United States dogged determi- its Gulf partners, supporting forcible
nation to accomplish that objective, even regime change by Syrian rebels who are
in the least propitious circumstances, has increasingly infiltrated or co-opted by
created a moral hazard. Successive Israeli ISIS appears counterproductive as well as
governments have been able to thwart operationally dubious. At the same time,
Washingtons peacemaking efforts with after more than four years of a military
near impunity, confident that the Ameri- stalemate, it is clear that Irans ongoing
cans would continue to try no matter support for Assad and Russias recent
what. In turn, the United States inability intensification of its aid to the regime
to facilitate an agreement has contributed can merely help maintain the status quo
to perceptions of Washington as a declin- but cannot decisively swing conditions in
ing powereven as some U.S. allies in the Assads favor. Both Tehran and Moscow
Gulf see U.S. pressure on Israel as another seem to understand that regardless of
example of U.S. faithlessness as an ally. their support, Assads regime is weaker
8 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
The End of Pax Americana
than ever and it will probably prove initial step might be to reconvene the
impossible to reconstitute a unitary Syria Geneva II conference, which foundered
ruled exclusively by the regime. For in February 2014, gathering the original
mainly these reasons, both Iran and parties and adding Iran to the mix.
Russia have recently shown more interest Russias insistence that Assads departure
in exploring a negotiated settlement. cannot be a precondition to political
Although Russias protestations that it is talks should not be a deal breaker and in
not wedded to Assad are disingenuous, fact could be an enticement for Iran to
Moscow has supported the UN Security participate, which U.S. Secretary of State
Councils investigation of the regimes John Kerry might now be able to facilitate
apparent use of indiscriminate barrel through a direct appeal to Iranian Foreign
bombs filled with poisonous chlorine gas Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The
and has backed the Security Councils Gulf Arab states cautious endorsement of
August 2015 statement reinvigorating the the nuclear agreement and Saudi Arabias
quest for a political transition in Syria. participation in trilateral talks with the
Tehran, with Hezbollahs support, has United States and Russia on Syria in
been pushing a peace plan involving a early August suggest that the Gulf Arabs
national unity government and a revised are growing more comfortable with
constitution, although one under which diplomacy as a means of easing strategic
Assad or his regime would remain in tensions with Iran. On account of their
power at least in the short term. heightened perception of the ISIS threat,
A realistic mechanism for taking Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey might
advantage of these tenuously converging now drop their insistence that Assad
interests has not materialized. But the depart prior to negotiations.
Iran nuclear deal has demonstrated the The hardest part, of course, will
potential of diplomacy to ameliorate be arriving at plausible transitional
regional crises. In addition to countering arrangements. One possibility would
the spread of jihadism, a U.S.-brokered be to create a power-sharing body with
agreement to end the Syrian civil war executive authority that could marginal-
would mitigate and eventually end the ize ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syria-
worlds most pressing humanitarian based militant group affiliated with al
crisis and restore much of the American Qaeda, as implicitly contemplated in
prestige that has waned in the region. the August UN Security Council state-
Effective and inclusive conflict resolution ment. Another would be to partition
on Syria would also validate the rap- the country to some degree and estab-
prochement with Iran and might help lish a confederacy of sorts to replace
convince the Israelis of the efficacy of central rule from Damascus. Tactical
the United States new approach. cease-fires reached between the regime
Washington should leverage the new and moderate opposition forces could
diplomatic bonds that the nuclear nego- serve as the building blocks for those
tiations forged among the major powers kinds of broader political arrangements
and, in particular, between U.S. and and might also allow the parties to focus
Iranian officialsto reinvigorate multi- on fighting the jihadist factions, which
national talks on Syrias transition. An represent a common enemy.
November/December 2015 9
Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson
10 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
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The U.S. counterterrorist effort has
Beyond been particularly successful against the
W
hen the Obama administra- where Obama has been aggressive; it
tion looks at the Middle East, also explains the limits of where he acts.
it does so through the lens of Obama withdrew forces from Iraq in
counterterrorism. A systematic emphasis 2011, for example, and initially resisted
on the subject has underscored not just intervening in Syria. In his second term,
the administrations relentless pursuit he has not significantly increased the
of al Qaeda and its new focus on the U.S. role in Libya or Yemen, even as
self-proclaimed Islamic State (or ISIS) the violence has mounted and allies,
but also a wider swath of its foreign policy, such as Saudi Arabia, have begun to
from its drone campaign in northwestern doubt the United States commitment
Pakistan to its maintenance of the deten- to the region. In 2014, when the United
tion facility in Guantnamo Bay, Cuba. States bombed Iraq and Syria, it did so
Building on the post-9/11 efforts of to fight the Islamic State, not the Syrian
the Bush administration, U.S. President leader Bashar al-Assad.
Barack Obama has established a national Counterterrorism is not the only U.S.
security machine adept at identifying priority in the Middle East, but it ranks
and disrupting terrorist networks. Much as the most important, explaining most
of the U.S. strategy is based on an intel- interventions and noninterventions.
ligence campaign that involves partner- Even when Washington deprioritizes
ing with countries around the world to terrorism in order to pursue something
gather information on suspected top else, terrorism is invoked; the Iran nuclear
terrorists. In cases in which the U.S. deal, for example, controversially set aside
government cannot arrest terrorists, it Irans support for terrorism yet was
kills them in drone strikes or through defended in part as a way to keep nuclear
other direct actions. weapons out of the hands of terrorists.
The administrations strategy has a
DANIEL BYMAN is a Professor at Georgetown political logic. The American people,
Universitys Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service and a Senior Fellow and Research generally skeptical of intervention abroad
Director at the Center for Middle East Policy at and particularly skeptical of intervention
the Brookings Institution. He is the author of in the Middle East, consistently make
Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global
Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to exceptions for efforts to fight terrorists,
Know. Follow him on Twitter @dbyman. whom they see as existential threats to
November/December 2015 11
Daniel Byman
the United States. By limiting the U.S. solve deeper problems, it can at least
role in the region to counterterrorism, reduce or contain violence in the region.
U.S. leaders can avoid costly occupa-
tions and wars and concentrate on other YOU SAY TERRORIST, I SAY . . .
critical regions, such as Asia. By keeping The terrorist label came into vogue in
the U.S. footprint light, officials hope the late 1960s and 1970s, when the term
terrorist groups will turn their guns was used to refer to groups, such as
on one another and on local regimes, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
reducing the threat to the U.S. home- Palestine, that hijacked airplanes, took
land. Counterterrorism is therefore hostages, and otherwise used terror as
likely to drive U.S. policy in the Mid- the primary instrument for achieving
dle East even after Obama leaves office. their goals. Today, however, the label is
But despite some notable successes, insufficient to describe most of the
an overwhelming focus on counter- jihadist groups in the Middle East, which
terrorism has led the United States to rely on tactics that go beyond terrorism.
miss the broader regional trends under- Hamas and Hezbollah have long battled
mining U.S. interests in the Middle Israel in more conventional ways, launch-
East. Terrorist networks are dangerous ing rockets and ordering commando-style
not just because they might attack the raids, with Hezbollah fighting the Israeli
United States but also because they military with something approaching a
destabilize already fragile states and modern army. Al Qaeda affiliates, such
create the breeding ground for ever as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
more radical groups. By fixating on (AQAP), are embroiled in bitter civil wars
counterterrorism, the United States in which they employ a mix of guerrilla
overlooks opportunities to prevent or tactics and conventional military opera-
mitigate civil wars and regional conflicts tions. And the Islamic State even uses
steps that would address the problem tanks and massed formations.
at its core. And it antagonizes allies Many of these groups also govern,
and distorts the public perception of running hospitals and schools, fight-
U.S. strengths and vulnerabilities. ing crime, and picking up trash. Hamas
The United States should move is the de facto government of Gaza;
beyond its standard counterterrorist Hezbollah controls much of Lebanon.
repertoire and embrace a broader set The territorial control of al Qaedas
of strategies. Energetic diplomacy could regional affiliates varies: AQAPs power
lessen the tensions that lead states to is growing as Yemens government
support violent groups. Investment in collapses, and the political influence of
conflict-resolution programs could al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has
reduce the scale and scope of the civil waxed and waned with the strength of
wars on which jihadist groups feed. governments in the Sahel. The Islamic
Building up the defense and governance State, for its part, has carved out parts
capabilities of states such as Iraq and of Iraq and Syria where it enforces its
Yemen could help them fight jihadists, twisted vision of law and order, issues its
either alone or with U.S. assistance. And own currency, and provides its own
even when the United States is unable to social services.
12 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Beyond Counterterrorism
These groups tend to view terrorism abroad, but only one, AQAP, has aggres-
not as an end in itself but as part of a sively done so, albeit with limited
broader strategy of war. Rebel groups success. In contrast to the other leading
consistently rely on tactics associated groups, al Qaeda does not directly control
with terrorism: they attack civilians, territory or govern, instead establishing
force humanitarian workers to flee, itself in places where local allies provide
provoke ethnic or sectarian backlash, sanctuary, such as the Federally Admin-
and destroy confidence in governance. istered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Yet
Some groups, the Islamic State in par- even al Qaeda is not just a terrorist
ticular, also use terrorism to spread organization; in fact, it spends much
their war into neighboring countries of its limited budget attempting to
and attract new recruits. support its affiliates and other groups
Of the groups of most concern to engaged in guerrilla wars in the region.
the United States, al Qaeda, in its use The terrorist label thus ignores how
of terrorism, is the most stereotypical. terrorist groups operate. It is not terror-
REUTE RS / AHMAD MASOO D
The organization, now led by Ayman al- ism on its own that is most dangerous;
Zawahiri, prioritizes terrorism as a way the real threat comes from terrorist
to attack the so-called far enemythe groups that transition into insurgencies
United States and the Westand to or quasi states. Even if such groups fail to
undermine what it considers apostate achieve their ultimate goals, they can still
governments in the Middle East. It has plunge already weak states into chaos.
urged its affiliates to carry on this war Consider Libya and Yemen, where Ansar
November/December 2015 13
Daniel Byman
al-Sharia and AQAP, among others, helped securing the free flow of oil to global
undermine confidence in the govern- markets, protecting Israel, and prevent-
ment and fomented domestic strife that ing nuclear proliferation. In addition,
eventually became full-on wars. the United States seeks to prevent
The U.S. approach to counterterrorism anti-American terrorism, particularly
also suffers from several logical fallacies. as it threatens U.S. territory. In practice,
Crudely put, it assumes that because all many of these interests depend on the
terrorists are bad guys, all bad guys must security and stability of U.S. allies. If
be terroristsnever mind that even allies become unstable, whether as a
though Hitler, Stalin, and Mao killed result of internal strife or some other
tens of millions of people, calling them conflict, oil production will be disrupted
terrorists doesnt offer much insight. and terrorist groups can more easily
The U.S. approach also assumes that proliferate. If hostile regimes seize
because al Qaeda embraces terrorism, power, they might seek nuclear weapons,
all the groups linked to al Qaeda are hijack oil supplies, threaten Israel, or
best labeled terrorists, too, even when otherwise undermine core U.S. interests.
some affiliates behave more like insur- In formulating policy in the Middle
gents than jihadists. And it assumes East, Washington needs to recognize
that if a group employs terrorist tactics, that not all terrorist groups threaten
everything the group does should be the United States and that those that
labeled terrorism, even if the other do threaten it pose threats of varying
actions include more traditional military degrees and kinds. Some groups, such
operations or even governance. as al Qaeda and, to a lesser degree,
Such fallacies are particularly pro- AQAP, seek to attack the United States
nounced in analyses of the Islamic State, directly, and if their capabilities grow,
which, owing to its stomach-churning they will do so. Other groups are
tactics and historical ties to al Qaeda, plausibly anti-American but are more
automatically gets classified as a terrorist immediately concerned with securing
organization. As the scholar Audrey regional dominance. The Islamic State
Kurth Cronin wrote in these pages this and most al Qaeda affiliates detest
past spring, the terrorist label is dan- everything American, yet they are more
gerously misleading, making it more focused on the day-to-day demands of
difficult to understand the group and civil war. Although these groups often
determine the best ways to defeat it. call for lone wolf attacks against the
The counterterrorism and counter- West, so far their leaders have devoted
insurgency strategies that greatly dimin- little effort and few resources to carrying
ished the threat from al Qaeda will not out more sustained or direct attacks.
work against ISIS, she writes, and yet Hamas and Hezbollah act much in
Washington has not adapted its response the same way. Neither has any love for
to reflect the true nature of the threat. the United States, and both should be
seen as U.S. enemies. But Hamas has
SAME BUT DIFFERENT never deliberately turned its guns on an
The United States has a range of inter- American, although it has killed Ameri-
ests in the Middle East. They include cans when conducting terrorist attacks
14 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
GLOBAL
CITIZEN
FIND YOUR
FUTURE SELF
New York University is an affirmative action/equal opportunity institution. 2015 NYU School of Professional Studies.
Jerusalem Center for Public Aairs
Israeli Security, Regional Diplomacy and International Law
Nadav Shragai
Dividing Jerusalem and subtracting its Arab neighborhoods is likely to cause much
worse security problems and hamstring the work of Israeli security forces in thwarting
Palestinian terrorist attacks. Moreover, over the course of 48 years numerous patterns
of Jewish-Arab cooperation have emerged in the city. Dissolving those patterns of
unity would clearly damage the existing urban fabric.
This study shows how Israel clearly acted out of self-defense and preempted a terrorist
massacre inside its heartland, principally through a Hamas network of sophisticated
attack tunnels. Had Hamas accepted the Egyptian ceasere proposal of July 15, as did
Israel, Palestinian wartime fatalities would have numbered less than 200 instead of more
than 2,100. Thus, Hamas was fully responsible for more than 1,800 Palestinian deaths.
Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror,
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Zeevi Farkash, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser,
Brig.-Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel, Amb. Dore Gold, Dan Diker
President Obama has declared that the borders of Israel and Palestine should be
based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized
borders are established for both states. But what are Israeli requirements for secure
borders? This updated study presents a comprehensive assessment of Israels critical
requirements for defensible borders.
A concerted campaign is being waged against Israel to question its very legitimacy
in virtually every aspect of its historical, political, and cultural life, with the aim of
undermining the very foundations of Israels existence. This book explains clearly
why the Jewish people deserve a state of their own and refutes all the major claims
against Israels rights.
Beyond Counterterrorism
in Israel. And Hezbollah has not tried to on Israel have sparked three wars since
conduct international terrorism against 2008. The Islamic State has brought the
the United States for many years. The smoldering civil war in Iraq back to a
primary threat Hezbollah poses is as a full blaze, and the violence in Syria has
guerrilla force should Iran and the worsened sectarian tension in countries
United States clash in places such as as far away as Pakistan and Yemen. The
Iraq or Syria. strongest terrorist groups threaten U.S.
A focus on counterterrorism thus allies such as Israel and Jordan. Their
inflates the terrorist threat, skewing U.S. attacks undermine governance, foster
public debate on matters of national instability, and incite civil war. At times,
security. Since 9/11, there have been their actions catalyze conflicts between
fewer terrorist attacks on U.S. soil than key regional players, as has happened
there were in the 1970s, a period now in Syria.
considered one of relative quiet. The In the long term, democracy might
2012 attack on the U.S. diplomatic reduce the appeal and capabilities of
facility in Benghazi, which resulted in terrorists. But in the short term, in its
the death of Christopher Stevens, the effort to fight terrorists, the United
U.S. ambassador to Libya, and three States may be strengthening the least
other Americans, also has many pre- democratic parts of undemocratic
9/11 precedents, several of which were regimes: their security services. The
far bloodier. But neither of these facts same services that disrupt terrorist plots
appears to have registered with the are often also involved in repressing
American public. The Benghazi attack legitimate political dissent. No surprise,
has received more attention than U.S. then, that after 9/11, nearly every state
policy in Syria, where the current conflict in the regionand others, including
has killed well over 200,000 people and China and Russiabegan referring
destabilized whole swaths of the Middle to their enemies as terrorists to gain
East. In the public eye, both events were U.S. support.
obscured by the 2013 Boston Marathon
bombing, which killed three people in WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE
the blast. And to look at polls of U.S. Too often, U.S. counterterrorist efforts
public opinion, one would think the are counterproductive, pitting the United
Islamic State had waged a massive and States against its allies in the Middle
successful terrorist campaign on U.S. East. Regional allies tend to interpret
soil. It has not even tried. U.S. actions through the lens of their
By fixating on the anti-American own regional rivalries and domestic
aspects of groups such as Hamas and politics rather than through the lens of
the Islamic State, policymakers miss anti-U.S. terrorism. Thus, U.S. support
that the biggest threat these organiza- for Kurdish forces in Syria, meant to
tions pose is not to the United States weaken the Islamic State, alarms Turkey,
itself but to broader U.S. interests in which fears that its Kurds might renew
the Middle East. Libyas oil production their separatist push.
has plunged as a result of its civil war. U.S. allies are particularly concerned
Hamas on-again, off-again rocket attacks about how Washington treats the Muslim
November/December 2015 15
Daniel Byman
16 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Beyond Counterterrorism
might create a vacuum that even more radicals in their own countriesa far
radical groups might fill. Today, for more effective approach than drone
example, Hezbollah is helping prevent strikes in the long term.
the Islamic State from expanding into It will be vital for the United States
Lebanon, and Hamas is fighting jihadist to identify countries that might be vulner-
groups in Gaza. And conflict resolution able to domestic conflict but that are
is not typically part of the counterter- relatively stable for now, a category that
rorist tool kit, even though such programs includes Jordan and Tunisia, for example.
might reduce the probability of civil wars After a civil war breaks out, supplying
in the first place. aid becomes tremendously expensive
and difficult; it is far easier and more
A BIGGER TOOL KIT cost effective to provide aid in advance
The Middle East is too complex for of crises. Preventive action could stop
any single paradigm. Fighting terrorism jihadist groups from feasting on civil
requires not just preventing the next wars between Muslims and non-Muslims
9/11 but also navigating civil wars, and on sectarian struggles within Islam.
stopping conflicts before they break Building the long-term security
out, containing the ones that do, and capacity of states in the Middle East
building state capacity. Widening the will be vital to preventing terrorism.
policy aperture will be difficult, but it Yet U.S. programs devoted to that task
will advance a broader set of U.S. are poorly resourced and unfocused,
objectives beyond counterterrorism. often designed more to reassure allies
Even if one rejects U.S. involvement than to encourage real reform. The U.S.
in the Middle East beyond preventing State Department and other civilian
attacks on the U.S. homeland, properly agencies have never embraced state
fighting terrorism requires methods that building as a core mission, and the
transcend the current U.S. counter- political will for state-building measures
terrorist strategy. Drone strikes and usually arrives too late. In places such
arresting key leaders can work for as Nigeria and Yemen, poor governance
smaller and more traditional groups, and state weakness were evident before
but for most of the jihadist groups the emergence of jihadist-linked conflict,
plaguing the Middle East, they are but the programs that might have stopped
insufficient. their descent into massive civil wars
Aggressive diplomacy will be were not well funded and never received
necessary to mitigate conflict in the high-level attention.
region. Pakistan supports jihadist State building goes beyond helping
groups in part because they aid its a country improve the technical profi-
objectives in Afghanistan and against ciency of its security forces. It requires
India. AQAP expanded its territorial helping it reform its political institu-
base in Yemen in part because Saudi tions. Functioning political institutions
Arabia has intervened in the country to help countries moderate predatory
fight AQAPs Houthi foes. Resolving elites, bolster legitimacy, and weather
conflicts between states makes it more shocks that might otherwise produce
likely that governments will turn on violence. In the absence of substantive
November/December 2015 17
Daniel Byman
political reform, state-building efforts training and advising. The United States
will likely fail. Consider Iraq, where should develop a set of general principles
years of massive U.S. technical assistance and procedures for vetting local allies
went to waste because a polarized political and maintaining relationships with
system quickly corrupted the senior regional allies, reducing the need for
military leadership and then the military ad hoc interventions.
as a whole. Sometimes, terrorism cannot be
The goal of state building should be stopped, only managed. In these cases,
not democracy promotion but conflict a containment policy is necessary. The
resolution. Before institutions are fully Middle East suffers from a bad neigh-
developed, efforts to hold elections borhood problem, with national dynam-
may backfire, polarizing the public. ics often spilling over borders. Syrias
Even successful elections may simply neighbors, for example, need help accom-
yield power to a government too weak modating refugees and should be provided
to contain violence. The United States with security assistance so that they can
and its allies should seek to cut deals manage any spillover from the Syrian
between moderates within warring civil war.
parties to isolate radicals and other- Although the United States record on
wise subdue the threat of terrorism. In solving broader problems in the Middle
Egypt today, for example, the United East leaves little room for optimism, its
States should encourage the govern- record elsewhere is encouraging: in places
ment to work with moderate Islamists as diverse as Colombia, Indonesia, and
rather than treat them as extremists, the Philippines, the United States has
driving them underground and into successfully built up the capacity of its
the arms of radicals. allies, enabling them to regain power,
State building should be seen as a negotiate from a position of strength,
long-term enterprise that may take years and, of course, fight terrorism. Taking
to work. The United States cannot hope these tactics to the Middle East offers
to completely change the local dynamics, the best chance for lasting progress.
and it will likely be blamed if its efforts
fail. But the costs are justified if the
United States is able to make states less
vulnerable to civil war and terrorism.
If the United States wants to stop
the Islamic State, it must realize that
the drone strikes and other tools that
have effectively repressed al Qaeda
will not work; instead, more traditional
military means will be necessary. In
most cases, intervening directly will be
too costly. At times, the United States
will want to work with local forces,
providing air strikes and other support.
Most of the effort, however, will involve
18 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
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T
he Joint Comprehensive Plan has repeatedly promised to destroy).
of Action (JCPOA), reached by The American political conflict came
Iran, six other countries, and to a head in September, when Congress
the European Union in Vienna in July, had the chance to register its disapproval
has sparked a heated political debate of the accordalthough the president
in the United States. Under the terms had enough support among Democrats
of the agreement, Iran has agreed to to prevent a vote on such a resolution.
accept some temporary limits on its Despite the conflict, however, both the
nuclear program in return for the lifting deals supporters and its critics agreed
of the economic sanctions the interna- that the United States should prevent
tional community imposed in response Iran from getting a bomb. This raises
to that program. The Obama adminis- the question of how to do sowhether
tration, a chief negotiator of the accord, without the deal, after the deal expires,
argues that the deal will freeze and in or if the Iranians decide to cheat. Stop-
some ways set back Irans march toward ping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all
nuclear weapons while opening up the three situations will require Washington
possibility of improving relations between to update and adapt its Cold War policy
the United States and the Islamic Repub- of deterrence, making Tehran understand
lic, which have been bitterly hostile ever clearly in advance that the United States
since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The is determined to prevent, by force if
administration further contends that the necessary, Iranian nuclearization.
agreement includes robust provisions
for the international inspection of Irans A CREDIBLE THREAT
nuclear facilities that will discourage and, The English political philosopher
if necessary, detect any Iranian cheating, Thomas Hobbes noted in Leviathan
triggering stiff penalties in response. that covenants, without the sword, are
Critics of the deal, by contrast, argue but words. Any agreement requires a
that it permits Iran to remain very close mechanism for enforcing it, and the
Iranian agreement does include such a
MICHAEL MANDELBAUM is Christian A. mechanism: in theory, if Iran violates
Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the agreements terms, the economic
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced sanctions that the accord removes will
International Studies and the author of the
forthcoming book Mission Failure: America and snap back into place. By itself, how-
the World in the PostCold War Era. ever, this provision is unlikely to prevent
November/December 2015 19
Michael Mandelbaum
Iranian cheating. The procedures for crossed the nuclear threshold before
reimposing the sanctions are compli- the U.S. military had the capacity for
cated and unreliable; even if imposed, precision air strikes that could destroy
the renewed sanctions would not cancel nuclear infrastructure with minimal
contracts already signed; and even as collateral damage. Israel and India, like
the sanctions have been in place, Irans the United Kingdom and France before
progress toward a bomb has continued. them, were friendly democracies whose
To keep nuclear weapons out of Tehrans possession of nuclear armaments did
hands will thus require something not threaten American interests. Pakistan
strongernamely, a credible threat by is occasionally friendly, is a putative
the United States to respond to signifi- democracy, and crossed the nuclear
cant cheating by using force to destroy threshold in direct response to Indias
Irans nuclear infrastructure. having done so. The United States is
The term for an effort to prevent hardly comfortable with the Pakistani
something by threatening forceful punish- nuclear arsenal, but the greatest danger
ment in response is deterrence. It is it poses is the possibility that after a
hardly a novel policy for Washington: domestic upheaval, it could fall into the
deterring a Soviet attack on the United hands of religious extremistsprecisely
States and its allies was central to the the kind of people who control Iran now.
American conduct of the Cold War. North Korea presents the closest
Deterring Irans acquisition of nuclear parallel. In the early 1990s, the Clinton
weapons now and in the future will administration was ready to go to war
have some similarities to that earlier to stop Pyongyangs nuclear weapons
task, but one difference is obvious: Cold program, before signing an agreement
War deterrence was aimed at prevent- that the administration said would guar-
ing the use of the adversarys arsenal, antee that the communist regime would
including nuclear weapons, while in the dismantle its nuclear program. North
case of Iran, deterrence would be de- Korea continued its nuclear efforts,
signed to prevent the acquisition of however, and eventually succeeded in
those weapons. With the arguable testing a nuclear weapon during the
exception of Saddam Husseins Iraq, presidency of George W. Bush. Since
the United States has not previously then, North Korea has continued to
threatened war for this purpose and work on miniaturizing its bombs and
has in fact allowed a number of other improving its missiles, presumably with
countries to go nuclear, including the the ultimate aim of being able to threaten
Soviet Union, China, Israel, India, attacks on North America. It is worth
Pakistan, and North Korea. Does the noting that in 2006, two experienced
Iranian case differ from previous ones national security officials wrote in The
in ways that justify threatening force Washington Post that if Pyongyang
to keep Iran out of the nuclear club? were ever to achieve such a capability,
It does. An Iranian bomb would be Washington should launch a military
more dangerous, and stopping it is more strike to destroy it. One of the authors
feasible. The Soviet Union and China was William Perry, who served as
were continent-sized countries that secretary of defense in the Clinton
20 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
R E U T E R S / M A S S C O M M U N I C A T I O N S P E C I A L I S T 3 R D C L A S S N A T H A N R . M C D O N A L D / U . S . N AV Y H A N D O U T How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb
Special delivery: aboard the USS Nimitz off the Arabian Peninsula, September 2013
administration; the other was Ashton East with multiple nuclear-armed states,
Carter, who holds that position today. all having small and relatively insecure
Bad as the North Korean bomb is, an arsenals, would be dangerously unstable.
Iranian one would be even worse. For in In a crisis, each country would have a
the case of North Korea, a long-standing powerful incentive to launch a nuclear
policy of deterrence was already in place attack in order to avoid losing its nuclear
before it acquired nuclear weapons, arsenal to a first strike by one of its
with the United States maintaining a neighbors. Accordingly, the chances of
strong peacetime military presence on a nuclear war in the region would sky-
the Korean Peninsula after the end of rocket. Such a war would likely kill
the Korean War in 1953. For this reason, millions of people and could deal a
in the years since Pyongyang got the devastating blow to the global economy
bomb, its neighbors have not felt an by interrupting the flow of crucial sup-
urgent need to acquire nuclear arma- plies of oil from the region.
ments of their ownsomething that But if an Iranian bomb would be
would be likely in the case of Iranian even worse than a North Korean bomb,
proliferation. preventing its emergence would be
Nor would the Iranian case benefit easier. A U.S. military strike against
from the conditions that helped stabilize North Korea would probably trigger a
the nuclear standoff between the United devastating war on the Korean Peninsula,
States and the Soviet Union. A Middle one in which the South would suffer
November/December 2015 21
Michael Mandelbaum
greatly. (South Koreas capital, Seoul, is In the case of Iran, the aim of deter-
located within reach of North Korean rence would be specific and limited:
artillery.) This is one of the reasons the preventing Irans acquisition of nuclear
South Korean government has strongly weapons. Still, a policy of deterrence
opposed any such strike, and the United would have to cope with two difficulties.
States has felt compelled, so far, to honor One is the likelihood of Iranian salami
South Koreas wishes. In the Middle tacticssmall violations of the JCPOA
East, by contrast, the countries that that gradually bring the Islamic Republic
would most likely bear the brunt of closer to a bomb without any single
Iranian retaliation for a U.S. counter- infraction seeming dangerous enough
proliferation strikeSaudi Arabia and to trigger a severe response. The other
Israel, in particularhave made it is the potential difficulty of detecting
clear that, although they are hardly such violations. The Soviet Union could
eager for war with Iran, they would hardly have concealed a cross-border
not stand in the way of such a strike. attack on Western Europe, but Iran is
all too likely to try to develop the tech-
A LIMITED AIM nology needed for nuclear weapons
Deterring Irans acquisition of nuclear clandestinely (the United States believes
weapons by promising to prevent it it has an extensive history of doing so),
with military action, if necessary, is and the loopholes in the agreements
justified, feasible, and indeed crucial inspection provisions suggest that keep-
to protect vital U.S. interests. To be ing track of all of Irans bomb-related
effective, a policy of deterrence will activities will be difficult.
require clarity and credibility, with the As for credibilitythat is, persuading
Iranian regime knowing just what acts the target that force really will be used
will trigger retaliation and having good in the event of a violationthis posed
reason to believe that Washington will a major challenge to the United States
follow through on its threats. during the Cold War. It was certainly
During the Cold War, the United credible that Washington would retali-
States was successful in deterring a ate for a direct Soviet attack on North
Soviet attack on its European allies America, but the United States also
but not in preventing a broader range sought to deter an attack on allies thou-
of communist initiatives. In 1954, for sands of miles away, even though in that
example, the Eisenhower administra- case, retaliation would have risked pro-
tion announced a policy of massive voking a Soviet strike on the American
retaliation designed to deter communist homeland. Even some American allies,
provocations, including costly conven- such as French President Charles de
tional wars like the recent one in Gaulle, expressed skepticism that the
Korea, by promising an overpowering United States would go to war to defend
response. But the doctrine lacked the Europe. The American government
credibility needed to be effective, and therefore went to considerable lengths
a decade later, the United States found to ensure that North America and
itself embroiled in another, similar Western Europe were coupled in
war in Vietnam. both Soviet and Western European
22 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
eyes, repeatedly expressing its commit-
ment to defend Europe and stationing
both troops and nuclear weapons there
to trigger U.S. involvement in any
European conflict.
In some ways, credibly threatening
to carry out a strike against Iran now
would be easier. Iran may have dupli-
cated, dispersed, and hidden the various
parts of its nuclear program, and Russia
may sell Tehran advanced air defense
systems, but the U.S. military has or
can develop the tactics and munitions
necessary to cause enough damage to
lengthen the time Iran would need to
build a bomb by years, even without the
use of any ground troops. The Iranians
might retaliate against Saudi Arabia or
Israel (whether directly or through their
Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah), or attack
American military forces, or sponsor acts
of anti-American terrorism. But such
responses could do only limited damage
and would risk further punishment.
The problems with deterring Irans
acquisition of nuclear weapons are not
practical but rather political and psy-
chological. Having watched American
leaders tolerate steady progress toward
an Iranian bomb over the years, and then
observed the Obama administrations
avid pursuit of a negotiated agreement
on their nuclear program, Irans ruling
clerics may well doubt that Washington
would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheating. U.S. President
Barack Obama initially embraced the
long-standing American position that
Iran should not be permitted to have
the capacity to enrich uranium on a large
scale, then abandoned it. He backed
away from his promise that the Syrian
regime would suffer serious consequences
if it used chemical weapons. He made it
23
Michael Mandelbaum
the core argument in favor of the JCPOA would help address some of the short-
that the alternative to it is war, implying comings of the JCPOA without sacrificing
that American military action against or undermining its useful elements.
Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be And since the deterrence policy could
avoided at all costs. Moreover, neither and should be open ended, it would
he nor his predecessor responded to help ease worries about the provisions
Irans meddling in Iraq over the past of the accord that expire after ten or
decade, even though Tehrans support 15 years. As during the Cold War, the
for Shiite militias there helped kill policy should end only when it becomes
hundreds of U.S. troops. The mullahs obsoletethat is, when Iran no longer
in Tehran may well consider the United poses a threat to the international
States, particularly during this presi- community. Should the Islamic Repub-
dency, to be a serial bluffer. lic evolve or fall, eliminating the need
for vigilant concern about its capabilities
DOUBT NOT and intentions, the United States could
All of this suggests that in order to revisit the policy. Until then, deterrence
keep Iran from going nuclear, the JCPOA is the policy to adopt.
needs to be supplemented by an ex-
plicit, credible threat of military action.
To be credible, such a threat must be
publicly articulated and resolutely
communicated. The Obama administra-
tion should declare such a policy itself,
as should future administrations, and
Congress should enshrine such a policy
in formal resolutions passed with robust
bipartisan support. The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its
promise by increasing the deployment
of U.S. naval and air forces in the Persian
Gulf region and stepping up the scope
and frequency of military exercises
there in conjunction with its allies. As
in Europe during the Cold War, the goal
of U.S. policy should be to eliminate
all doubts, on all sides, that the United
States will uphold its commitments.
The debate about the Iran nuclear
deal has become politically polarized,
but a policy of deterrence should not
be controversial, since all participants
in the debate have endorsed the goal
of preventing an Iranian bomb. In
addition, a robust policy of deterrence
24 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
the windfall from unfrozen assets will
A Windfall not be as significant as expected. Irans
O
ver the past few years, the levels required to rebuild Irans economy
nuclear issue has dominated are estimated to be close to $1 trillion
news about Iran. The landmark over the next decade.
deal recently agreed to between Iran Foreign investment will therefore be
and the United States and other world crucial for Iran, the last major economy
powers sets out arrangements for han- not to have integrated into the global
dling that issue, but it leaves open many economy. Indeed, Iran is ripe for eco-
other questions about Irans future nomic transformation. Unlike most
course. One of the most fundamental countries rich in natural resources, Iran
questions is what path Iran will follow has a host of additional advantages,
after the sanctions have been lifted: including a diversified economy, a trade
Will it open itself up to the world, fulfill- surplus, and a well-educated urban
ing the countrys economic potential, or population. Foreign investment will allow
will the countrys influential conservative Iran to capitalize on these strengths.
elite thwart global engagement? Irans But the end of the sanctions alone
choice will have profound geopolitical will not be enough to attract investors.
implications and will shape the countrys Although lifting the sanctions will
role in the world over the coming decades. remove a substantial impediment to
Conventional wisdom holds that Irans economic recovery, it will not
the Iranian government will get a huge automatically create the legal and
immediate economic windfall from the regulatory framework necessary for
deal, thanks to the release of about $100 sustained investment. Irans lackluster
billion in frozen assets, and then continue attempts at market liberalization and
to benefit as the end of the sanctions opens its undistinguished record on issues
the floodgates to foreign investment. But such as corruption and intellectual
property rights will continue to give
CYRUS AMIR-MOKRI is a Partner at Skad- pause to global investors. And even
den, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. From 2011 to when foreign companies are willing
2014, he served as U.S. Treasury Assistant
Secretary for Financial Institutions.
to invest, powerful conservative forces
within the Iranian governing elite are
HAMID BIGLARI is a Managing Partner at
TGG Group. He was previously Vice Chair and likely to cast doubts on their motives,
Head of Emerging Markets at Citigroup. hindering true engagement.
November/December 2015 25
Cyrus Amir-Mokri and Hamid Biglari
26 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
A Windfall for Iran?
ment in the world. Indeed, current will have to overcome a deep strain
foreign direct investment in Iran falls within Iranian political thought that
significantly short of Tehrans stated is hostile to the very idea of foreign
goal of attracting close to $1 trillion engagement.
over the next five to ten years. Although Iran has attempted to
The need for foreign investment is transition to a market-based economy,
hard to dispute. Irans young demographics its efforts have largely failed. Iran
and high unemployment levels, coupled nationalized much of its economy in
with inflation in consumer prices of the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
17 percent in 2014 (down from 39 percent But after an eight-year war with Iraq,
in 2013), indicate that its domestic savings leaders such as Irans fourth president,
rates will likely be too low to sustain Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, sought
November/December 2015 27
Cyrus Amir-Mokri and Hamid Biglari
to rebuild the economy through For one, Iran performs poorly in inter-
privatization. In 2004, Irans Expediency national ratings of the economic and
Council, which advises Irans supreme legal institutions necessary for develop-
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, began ment and growth. On the World Banks
advocating for greater private ownership 2015 Ease of Doing Business Index,
of enterprises, a proposal the Iranian for example, Iran ranked 130th out of
parliament ratified the following year. 189 countriesnot prohibitively low,
Under the new law, many state-owned considering that Brazil and India were
enterprises were permitted to privatize 120th and 142nd, respectively, but far
up to 80 percent of their shares. from optimal.
But this was privatization in name Iran is also a poor protector of
only. Of the shares that were priva- intellectual property rights. According
tized, roughly half were distributed by to a 2013 worldwide ranking of property
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadine- rights regimes by the U.S.-based advo-
jad to underprivileged segments of the cacy group Property Rights Alliance,
population through a program known Iran ranked 111th out of 131 countries.
as Justice Shares. Instead of making In comparison, Brazil, China, and India
the economy more efficient, this pro- were all in the top 60.
gram has had the opposite effect, as the Iran fares just as badly in corruption
new shareholders have no meaningful rankings. Iran ranked 136th out of 174
business experience to help them man- countries on Transparency Internationals
age or supervise the companies. 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, a
The remaining half of the shares standing comparable to Russias and
were transferred to three types of quasi- Nigerias.
governmental bodies: revolutionary Finally, the shortcomings in Irans
and religious foundations, military and institutions and business culture are
paramilitary organizations, and state- also evidenced by the World Economic
run pension funds. Although nominally Forums 201415 Global Competitiveness
private, these institutions are closely Index, where, overall, Iran ranked 83rd
connected to the Iranian state; former out of 144 countries. Iran fares particularly
government officials often serve in poorly in the areas of business sophisti-
supervisory or management positions. cation, financial-market development,
Thus, the net impact of privatization institutions, and labor-market efficiency.
has been to transfer ownership of state- All these weaknesses will give foreign
owned assets to entities directly or indi- investors pause, even once sanctions no
rectly associated with the state, but with longer prevent them from doing business
reduced transparency and accountability. in Iran. And even if investors decide to
Privatization has brought neither a cadre bet on Iran, a different obstacle might
of skilled management nor better corpo- stand in their way: Irans conservative
rate governance; unsurprisingly, most of elite, which harbors a deeply ingrained
Irans privatized companies are believed ideological opposition to the idea of
to be unprofitable. foreign involvement in and influence on
Investors may also balk at Irans Iran. Irans conservatives have fostered
many troubling economic indicators. a narrative of the countrys history
28 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
centered on the idea that foreign powers
have always triedand will always
tryto dismember Iran and to keep it
militarily and economically weak and
dependent. Although there are many
dimensions to this narrative, a large one Restless Empire
focuses on several historical episodes A Historical Atlas of Russia
of apparent economic exploitation or Ian Barnes
political meddling at the hands of Barnes has collected and
painstakingly reproduced maps
Western powers. and texts that trace Russian
Consider two concessions that the history from the origins of
Iranian government granted to European the Slavs to Russian President
Vladimir Putins annexation of
businesspeople in the late nineteenth Crimea. . . The impact is visually
and early twentieth centuries. In 1872, stunning and gives this massive
Irans monarch, Naser al-Din Shah, faced expanse of history a physical
quality.
with a dire need for funds to support the Robert Legvold,
central government, granted a concession Foreign Affairs
to Paul Julius von Reuter, the founder Belknap $35.00
29
Cyrus Amir-Mokri and Hamid Biglari
30 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
A Windfall for Iran?
will demand risk premiums to compensate countries all over the world have learned,
for the lack of transparency, effectively transferring state-owned enterprises to
taxing the Iranian economy. government insiders under the guise of
Corruption is also a significant privatization does not yield corporate
challenge for Iran. Of course, there is no dynamism or efficiency. To achieve such
emerging market in which corruption is gains, the Iranian government needs to
not a significant issue, and even advanced hire independent experts to evaluate
markets are susceptible to graft. On the performance of all companies that
balance, however, countries with stronger are majority-owned by the state and all
legal regimes have lower levels of corrup- quasi-state entities and then transfer
tion and better business environments. If majority ownership of underperforming
investors see that addressing corruption is entities to individuals or groups with no
a priority for the Iranian government, they connection to the state. And once those
will be more likely to invest, even if some entities have been truly privatized, Tehran
level of corruption remains inevitable. will need to avoid the temptation to
Investment capital also needs to be influence their corporate management
supported by a stable and credible bank- since governments that meddle in recently
ing system. The Ahmadinejad adminis- privatized companies do not attract
tration (200513) eroded the integrity investment or foster stable growth.
of Irans banks. It imposed savings and Iran will need to reassure investors
lending rates that compromised the ability that the return on their capital will not
of banks to generate adequate spreads, be negatively offset by currency deprecia-
and it directed state-owned banks to tions or price inflation, and those investors
lend to state-owned enterprises, which will look for a strong and independent
led to a glut of nonperforming loans. central bank to mitigate these risks.
At the same time, many banks started But the Central Bank of Iran is not truly
to engage in speculative activities, independent. A central bank cannot
such as real estate and private equity pursue price stability while financing its
investment, for which they were poorly governments budget deficits, as Irans is
equipped. And a shadow banking system made to do. It was not until Turkey gave
emerged outside of regulatory oversight, full operational independence to its
often a harbinger of financial instability. central bank in 2001, for example, that it
Investors will be hesitant to invest in an was able to restore financial stability and
economy with a closed financial system attract foreign capital. In part due to that
that misallocates and misprices capital. decision, Turkeys inflation level fell from
Irans banks will need to be able to 30 percent in 2002 to eight percent in
operate without government direction 2005, and its GDP growth increased from
but with suitable regulatory oversight six percent to eight percent. If Iran
to promote sound risk management. follows Turkeys example, it will give
Aside from Irans oil and gas reserves, investors significantly more confidence.
which will surely stay firmly under state Finally, Iran would benefit from
control, most state-owned assets will encouraging its diaspora community to
need to be genuinely transferred to invest back home. Iranians living abroad
the private sector. As postcommunist share a cultural connection to Iran,
November/December 2015 31
Cyrus Amir-Mokri and Hamid Biglari
making them more willing to take on risk; Economic reform is never easy.
other investors will then be more likely to Opposition can coalesce quickly and
follow their lead. Moreover, diaspora add resistance to the already formidable
communities can introduce invaluable obstacles to growth and efficiency. It is
global networks of business, research, and difficult to know exactly what the broader
technology to their countries of origin, implications of reform will be for Iranian
thus accelerating their development. politics and society. If Iran wants to reap
Indias experience and success in this the economic benefits of sanctions relief,
regard is noteworthy, and one way Iran however, reformers must persuade those
could follow Indias lead would be to issue skeptical of free markets and foreign
identification cards to people of Iranian investment that reform can be a win-win
origin that would allow them to travel to opportunity, allowing for national wealth
and invest in Iran without a visa or dual creation. If the Iranian leadership wants
citizenshipand without fear that Iran to reap the benefits of membership in the
would refuse to acknowledge their global economy, it will have to encourage
non-Iranian citizenship and the rights its peopleelites and ordinary Iranians
and protections that entails. Such an act, aliketo accept that the world has
by itself, would be a powerful signal and changed and that outdated narratives of
could attract large amounts of capital. foreign meddling and exploitation should
not hinder pragmatic decisions about
BEFORE ITS TOO LATE the countrys economic future.
Iran missed the golden era of globaliza- Iranian elites must also overcome
tion, from 1998 to 2007, during which their fear that market liberalization
foreign investment poured into the entails a decrease in state authority. In
emerging economies. Today, all emerging fact, successful transitions to free markets
economies must compete aggressively require not a weak government but a
for their share of the available pool of strong one able to preserve the rule of
capital. Within the next few decades, law and the market stability necessary for
as the advanced economies age, the reform. The states power is not dimin-
amount of investment capital may be ished; rather, the state simply reorients
substantially lower and the cost of its role in the economy from dominant
investing substantially higher. Having actor to guarantor of free markets.
missed one era, Iran must race against Walter Wriston, the legendary former
the clock before another runs out. CEO and chair of Citicorp, famously said,
As Iran opens up, investment capital Capital goes where its welcome and
will initially trickle in slowly. Investors stays where its well treated. If welcomed,
will dip their toes into the water on the the first wave of foreign direct investment
basis of hard facts, an analysis of long- in Iran will originate from those with a
term comparative advantage, and evidence considerable appetite for risk and deep
of policy shifts toward free markets. They pockets. If they choose to deploy their
will look for pragmatism over dogma, capital, they will demand a high return
openness over isolation, and long-term for taking that risk. If their capital is well
foundation building over short-term treated, more will follow. If not, there
cosmetic fixes. are plenty of other places it can go.
32 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
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Sh a p in g Pe rsp e c ti ve s o n Gl o b a l A f fa i rs
political process, rather than guns, to
Iraq in Pieces settle their differences. And in 2012, even
A
merican leaders contemplat- predictions proved wrong.
ing Iraq have made a habit of Today, of course, the Iraqi army has
substituting unpleasant realities all but collapsed, despite some $25 billion
with rosy assessments based on question- in U.S. assistance. Shiite militants who
able assumptions. In 1991, after the Gulf have sworn allegiance to Irans supreme
War, the George H. W. Bush adminis- leader operate with impunity. And the
tration hoped that Iraqis would rise up Islamic State (or ISIS) dominates more
against Saddam Hussein and encouraged than a third of Iraq and half of Syria.
them to do so, only to abandon them Obamas successor will thus certainly
to the Republican Guard. In 1998, earn the distinction of becoming the
President Bill Clinton signed the Iraq fifth consecutive president to bomb Iraq.
Liberation Act, officially embracing Still, the next resident of the White
regime change and transferring millions House can choose to avoid the mistakes
of dollars to an Iranian-backed convicted of his or her predecessors by refusing
embezzler, Ahmed Chalabi. In 2003, to unconditionally empower corrupt
the George W. Bush administration and divisive Iraqi leaders in the hope
assumed that toppling Saddam would that they will somehow create a stable,
lead to stability rather than chaos when prosperous country. If Iraq continues on
the U.S. military shocked and awed its current downward spiral, as is virtu-
its way to Baghdad. In 2005, as the ally certain, Washington should accept the
country descended into violence, Vice fractious reality on the ground, abandon
President Dick Cheney insisted that its fixation with artificial borders, and
the insurgency was in its last throes. start allowing the various parts of Iraq
In 2010, still flushed with the success and Syria to embark on the journey to
of Bushs surge, Vice President Joe self-determination. That process would
Biden forecast that President Barack no doubt be rocky and even bloody, but
Obamas Iraq policy was going to be one at this point, it represents the best chance
of the great achievements of this admin- of containing the sectarian violence and
istration, lauding Iraqis for using the protecting the remainder of the Middle
East from still further chaos.
ALI KHEDERY is Chair and CEO of Dragoman
Partners. From 2003 to 2010, he was a special DECLINE AND FALL
assistant to five U.S. ambassadors in Iraq and a
senior adviser to three chiefs of U.S. Central Since the founding of modern Iraq in
Command. Follow him on Twitter @akhedery. 1920, the country has rarely witnessed
November/December 2015 33
Ali Khedery
34 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Iraq in Pieces
November/December 2015 35
Ali Khedery
from remnants of the Baath Party to Baghdads relations with Iraqi Kurdi-
al Qaeda in Iraq to the Iranian-backed stan and the Sunni provinces collapsed,
Shiite militias. With each religiously and the central government lost control
charged atrocity, the Iraqi national over more than half its territory. The
identity grew weaker, and the millennia- Iranian-backed Shiite militias that Maliki
old senses of selftribal, ethnic, and had once crushed rebounded so fero-
religiousgrew stronger. ciously in the face of the Islamic States
Of all the main forces, perhaps the assaults that they now likely outnumber
single most corrosive was Maliki, a the official Iraqi security forces. Most
duplicitous and divisive politician who damning, both the Islamic State and
served as prime minister beginning in the Shiite militias now wield advanced
2006. After he lost the 2010 elections, U.S. military hardware as they commit
he managed to stay in office through a atrocities throughout Iraq.
power-sharing deal backed by Washing- Across much of the Middle East
ton and Tehran, only to consolidate his today, a sad truth prevails: decades of
authority further by retaining personal bad governance have caused richly diverse
control of the interior, defense, and societies to fracture along ethno-sectarian
intelligence ministries, among other lines. In Iraq, it is now evident that Shiite
important bodies. With Obama dis- Islamists will not accept secular-nationalist
tracted by the global economic melt- rule by Sunnis or Shiites and that neither
down and advised by top aides that camp will accept rule by Sunni Islamists,
Maliki was a nationalist rather than a especially the radical version espoused
sectarian, the prime minister secured by the Islamic State. The relatively
nearly unconditional Iranian and U.S. secular Kurds, meanwhile, are unwilling
backing and purged professional officers to live under Arab rule of any sort. In
in favor of incompetent loyalists. He short, these powerful groups visions of
intentionally pitted organs of the state life, religion, and politics are fundamen-
and his hard-line Shiite Islamist constitu- tally incompatible. As for the minority
ency against all manner of opponents: Christian, Shabak, Yazidi, Sabean Man-
Shiite secularists, Sunni Islamists, daean, and Jewish communities that once
Sunni secularists, Kurds, and even numbered in the millions and occupied
rival Shiite Islamists. Mesopotamia for millennia, they have
Although Maliki achieved many faced the Hobbesian fate of violent death
successes during his first term, which or permanent displacement.
coincided with Bushs surge, his second,
from 2010 to 2014, was catastrophic. FROM BAD TO WORSE
Violence rose from the post-2003 lows Despite some tactical gains, such as the
to new heights. Entire divisions of the liberation of Tikrit, the strategic situa-
Iraqi army melted away in the face of tion has only gotten worse since Prime
vastly smaller forces, leaving billions Minister Haider al-Abadi succeeded
of dollars worth of vehicles, weapons, Maliki in September 2014. Over the
and ammunition behind for use by past year, the Islamic State has enhanced
terrorists. The entirety of Iraqs Sunni its position, even in the face of coalition
heartland fell to the Islamic State. bombing campaigns chronicled on Twitter
36 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Iraq in Pieces
by top U.S. officials, who, echoing Gen- deficit in the tens of billions of dollars, a
eral William Westmoreland during the limited ability to borrow on the interna-
Vietnam War, cite body counts and tional capital markets, and the prospect
the number of air strikes as metrics for of looming stagflation. Youth unemploy-
success. Mosul was taken by the Islamic ment has stayed chronically high. This
State in June 2014; today, few are talking past summer, with temperatures rising
about liberating it anytime soon, and the well above 120 degrees Fahrenheit and
terrorists have thrust forward to capture households having no more than a few
Ramadi, the capital of Iraqs Anbar hours of water and electricity per day,
Province. The barbarians that Obama the seething population was primed
dismissed as the JV team are now a few to explode.
dozen miles from the gates of Baghdad, And that is precisely what happened.
as they expand their reach in Syria and In July, tens of thousands of largely
establish franchises across Africa and peaceful and secular protesters filled
Asia. Earlier this year, when I asked public squares across Baghdad and the
one of Iraqs deputy premiers how provincial capitals of southern Iraq,
Baghdad looked, he shrugged and said, decrying sectarianism, corruption, the
How should I know? I cant leave the lack of jobs, and nonexistent government
Green Zone. services. Angrier protesters burned in
The collapse of the Iraqi security effigy leading national politicians, namely
forces and the rise of the Shiite militias Maliki, who was now one of Iraqs three
have weakened Baghdads already feeble vice presidents yet still wielding power
grip on the country and empowered behind the scenes in a bid to undermine
Tehran, since the militias have sworn Abadi. Government offices in Malikis
allegiance to Irans supreme leader and hometown were sacked, and crowds
are directed by Irans Islamic Revolu- threatened violent action against the
tionary Guard Corps. U.S. military Basra-based international oil compa-
commanders have rightly voiced alarm nies, Iraqs only economic lifelines.
over the growing strength and popular- After Abadi announced limited
ity of these terrorist groups, which are reforms, Sistani, sensing mass unrest
responsible for bombing U.S. and allied and a budding threat from rival clerics
embassies and killing and maiming in Iran, instructed Abadi through his
thousands of Iraqi, U.S., and coalition representatives weekly sermons to
troops. Every time the militias thrust be more daring and courageous. In
into Sunni enclaves, they carry out new response, Abadi announced a series of
atrocities and displace more people, major reforms, including the abolish-
inevitably enhancing the Islamic States ment of the offices of the three deputy
appeal. Every time the Islamic State premiers and the three vice presidents,
bombs innocent Shiite civilians, the along with 11 of 33 cabinet posts. To
Shiite militias grow stronger, and the overcome paralysis and hold officials
Iraqi government grows weaker. accountable, Abadi promised to elimi-
Compounding Baghdads nightmare nate the ethno-sectarian quota system
has been the plunge in oil prices, which in the government and prosecute dozens
has left Abadis government with a budget of top civilian and uniformed leaders for
November/December 2015 37
Ali Khedery
38 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Iraq in Pieces
November/December 2015 39
Ali Khedery
40 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Iraq in Pieces
for instance, has been threatening remember that al Qaeda in Iraq was
self-rule for a decade in the face of defeated not by the U.S. military and
Baghdads failure to deliver security intelligence services, the Kurdish Pesh
and services. The Sunni provinces Merga, or Iranian proxies but by Sunni
would form between one and three Arab Iraqis, who led the fight with
regions and cleanse their territories of international support. Likewise, al Qaeda
the Islamic State through a reinvigor- in Iraqs supercharged successor, the
ated and internationally supported Islamic State, can never be defeated by
tribal awakening. And Iraqi Kurdistan air strikes or foreign boots on the ground
would no doubt continue down the alone. The Islamic States root cause
path toward economic self-sufficiency, poor governanceis indigenous. Thus its
leveraging the opportunity to export root solutiongood governancemust
oil and gas to Turkey and the European also be indigenous. Only local actors can
Union. Special independent status break the vicious cycle of poverty,
could be granted to the diverse and disenchantment, radicalization, and
geopolitically sensitive provinces of extremism and spark a virtuous cycle that
Baghdad, Diyala, and Kirkuk ( la the offers security, jobs, education, modera-
District of Columbia), in a last ditch tion, dignity, and, most critically, hope
effort at maintaining their pluralism. that tomorrow will be better than today.
Unlike in Syria, in Iraq, many of these Barring a miracle, managed decen-
processes are already permitted by tralization across Iraq and Syria may
the constitution. soon be the only viable path ahead. The
As Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrated next U.S. president could choose to
during the 1990s, transitions to self- respond to the inevitable crises there by
determination are often attended by following an ideological course, as his
regional interference, warlordism, or her predecessors did, or attempt to
corruption, cronyism, and internecine manage them actively yet rationally.
conflict. Nonetheless, as that case With or without Washington, a new
has also shown, with timeand with reality is dawning on Mesopotamia.
constant international rewards for
good behavior and sanctions for bad
behaviorself-determination always
produces better results than authoritari-
anism. Were Saddam still terrorizing
the Kurds today, a Kurdish insurgency
would be raging stronger than ever.
Instead, autonomous rule in Kurdistan,
albeit far from perfect, has contributed
to relative security and the development
of basic infrastructure and economic
opportunity. This should serve as a
model for the rest of Iraq and Syria.
Indeed, those eager to destroy
the Islamic State at any cost should
November/December 2015 41
Yet the Islamic State is hardly the first
ISIS as extremist movement to combine violent
THE POST-AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST
T
o many who have witnessed ruthless violence to eliminate or intimi-
its brutal tactics and religious date rivals and demonstrate their power
extremism, the Islamic State, to a wider world.
or ISIS, seems uniquely baffling and The earlier episodes are reassuring
unusually dangerous. According to its when contemplating the Islamic State
leaders own statements, the group today. They show that revolutions pose
wants to eliminate infidels, impose serious dangers only when they involve
sharia worldwide, and hasten the return great powers, since only great powers
of the Prophet. The Islamic States foot have proved capable of spreading their
soldiers have pursued these goals with revolutionary principles. The Islamic
astonishing cruelty. Yet unlike the original State will never come close to being a
al Qaeda, which showed little interest in great power, and although it has attracted
controlling territory, the Islamic State some sympathizers abroad, just as earlier
has also sought to build the rudiments revolutions did, its ideology is too paro-
of a genuine state in the territory it chial and its power too limited to spark
controls. It has established clear lines of similar takeovers outside Iraq and Syria.
authority, tax and educational systems, History also teaches that outside efforts
and a sophisticated propaganda opera- to topple a revolutionary state often
tion. It may call itself a caliphate and backfire, by strengthening hard-liners
reject the current state-based interna- and providing additional opportunities
tional system, but a territorial state is for expansion. Today, U.S. efforts to
what its leaders are running. As Jrgen degrade and ultimately destroy the
Todenhfer, a German journalist who Islamic State, as the Obama administra-
visited territory in Iraq and Syria con- tion has characterized U.S. policy, could
trolled by the Islamic State, said in enhance its prestige, reinforce its narra-
2014, We have to understand that tive of Western hostility to Islam, and
ISIS is a country now. bolster its claim to be Islams staunchest
defender. A better response would rely
STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Rene on local actors to patiently contain the
Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the
Harvard Kennedy School. Follow him on Twitter group, with the United States staying
@stephenWalt. far in the background. This approach
42 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
ISIS as Revolutionary State
requires seeing the Islamic State for what First, revolutionary organizations
it is: a small and underresourced revolu- portray their opponents as evil, hostile,
tionary movement too weak to pose a and incapable of reform. Compromise is
significant security threat, except to the therefore impossible, which means the
unfortunate people under its control. old order must be uprooted and replaced.
The revolutionaries in eighteenth-
WHEN EXTREMISTS TAKE POWER century France saw Europes monarchies
Revolutions replace an existing state with as irredeemably corrupt and unjust, a
a new one based on different political view that justified radical measures at
principles. These upheavals are usually home and made war with the rest of
led by a vanguard party or rebel group, Europe nearly inevitable. Vladimir Lenin
such as the Bolsheviks in Russia, the and the Bolsheviks insisted that only a
Communist Party in China, the Khmer thoroughgoing revolution could elimi-
Rouge in Cambodia, or Ayatollah nate capitalisms inherent evils, and
Ruhollah Khomeini and his followers in Mao Zedong told his followers, The
Iran. Sometimes, a revolutionary move- imperialists will never lay down their
ment overthrows the regime on its own; butcher knives. Khomeini thought
other times, it exploits a power vacuum likewise about the shah, instructing his
after the old order has collapsed for followers to squeeze his neck until he
other reasons. is strangled.
Because revolutions are violent The Islamic State is no different.
struggles conducted in the face of Its leaders and ideologues portray the
enormous obstacles, their leaders need West as innately hostile and existing
abundant luck to topple a regime and Arab and Muslim governments as
consolidate control afterward. They heretical entities contrary to Islams
must also convince their supporters to true nature. Compromise with such
run grave risks and overcome the natural infidels and apostates makes no sense;
inclination to let others fight and die they must be eliminated and replaced
for the cause. Revolutionary movements by leaders following what the Islamic
typically use a combination of induce- State regards as true Islamic principles.
ment, intimidation, and indoctrination Second, revolutionary organizations
to enforce obedience and encourage preach that victory is inevitable, pro-
sacrifices, just as the Islamic State is vided supporters remain obedient and
doing now. In particular, they purvey steadfast. Lenin argued that capitalism
ideologies designed to justify extreme was doomed by its own contradictions,
methods and convince their followers and Mao described imperialists as
that their sacrifices will bear fruit. The paper tigers, both thereby reassuring
specific content of these beliefs varies, their followers that the revolution would
but their purpose is always to persuade eventually triumph. The Islamic States
supporters that replacing the existing current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
order is essential and that their efforts offered a similarly upbeat assessment
are destined to succeed. Typically, in November 2014, telling his audience,
revolutionary ideologies do this in Your state is well and in the best of
three main ways. conditions. Its advance will not cease.
November/December 2015 43
Stephen M. Walt
44 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
ISIS as Revolutionary State
France the strongest power in Europe. Moscow worried that the revolution in
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein mistakenly France might topple thrones across
believed that the fall of the shah had Europe, just as Europeans and Americans
left Iran open to attack, but when his obsessed about the spread of Bolshevism
forces invaded the country in 1980, the after 1917 and otherwise sensible people
clerical regime mobilized new sources succumbed to McCarthyism in the 1950s.
of military power, such as the Revolu- To make matters even more confus-
tionary Guard, and turned the tide of ing, revolutions also generate a flood of
battle in Irans favor. refugees fleeing the new regime. Eager
It is also impossible to know for to persuade foreign powers to help them
AL-FU RQAN M E D IA / ANADO LU AG ENCY / G ET TY IMAG ES
certain whether a revolution will be return home, exiles typically offer lurid
contagious, but there is usually some accounts of the new states crimes (which
reason to fear it might be. Revolution- may well be true) while suggesting the
ary states ambitions inevitably strike new regime can be easily defeated. French,
sympathetic chords abroad and convince Russian, Chinese, Cuban, Iranian, and
some number of foreign sympathizers Nicaraguan exiles made such claims to
to flock to their banner. Antimonarchical convince foreign powers to intervene in
elements from all over Europe swarmed their home countries, but governments
to Paris in the 1790s, and Westerners who took their advice usually came to
such as the Harvard-educated social regret it.
activist John Reed journeyed to Russia Ironically, the uncertainties that
following the Bolshevik Revolution. accompany most revolutions can some-
Such reverberations reinforce fears of times help the new state survive. Because
contagion: Europeans from London to foreign powers cannot know for sure
November/December 2015 45
Stephen M. Walt
how powerful or appealing the revolution ground against weak opponents. Its
will be, they cannot easily determine ability to attract thousands of foreign
which is the greater threat: the revolu- fighters, meanwhile, has raised concerns
tion itself or the possibility that other about the groups broader appeal and its
rivals will take advantage of the resulting potential to inspire violent attacks in
chaos to improve their own positions. other countries. Testimony from refugees
The revolution in France survived in fleeing the Islamic States territory has
part because its monarchical foes were amplified these fears and reinforced
suspicious of one another and initially opponents urge to destroy the new state
more interested in making territorial before it grows stronger.
gains than in restoring Louis XVI to At the same time, just as with past
the throne. Similarly, divisions among revolutionary movements, efforts to
the major powers and uncertainty defeat the Islamic State have been
about the Bolsheviks long-term inten- undermined by opponents conflicting
tions impeded a coordinated response priorities. Both the United States and
to the revolution in Russia and helped Iran want to see the end of the Islamic
Lenin and his followers retain power State, but neither country wants to help
after 1917. the other gain influence in Iraq. Turkey
Yet contrary to revolutionaries also views the group as a threat, but it
hopes and their adversaries fears, the loathes the Assad regime in Syria and
aftermath of most revolutions is neither opposes any actions that might strengthen
a rapidly spreading revolutionary cascade Kurdish nationalism. Saudi Arabia, for
nor a swift counterrevolutionary coup. its part, sees the Islamic States funda-
The more typical result is a protracted mentalist ideology as a challenge to its
struggle between the new regime and own legitimacy, but it fears Iranian and
its various antagonists, which ends when Shiite influence as much, if not more.
the revolutionary government is removed As a result, none of these countries has
from power, as the Sandinistas were in made defeating the Islamic State its
Nicaragua, or when the state moderates top priority.
its revolutionary aims, as the Soviet Its penchant for violence and use of
Union, communist China, and revolu- sexual slavery notwithstanding, there
tionary Iran eventually chose to do. is little that is novel about the Islamic
These complex dynamics are all State. Its basic character and impact
evident with the Islamic State today. are strikingly similar to those of earlier
Its leaders regard the outside world as revolutionary states. We have seen this
hostile and heretical, believe their movie many times before. But how does
opponents are doomed to collapse, and it end?
see their successes as the beginning of
an irresistible transnational uprising THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT SPREAD
that will sweep away existing states. Revolutions can spread through one of
The group has proved surprisingly two ways. Powerful revolutionary states
capable at providing security and basic rely on conquest: in the 1790s, France
services in its territory, spreading its waged war against monarchies across
message online, and fighting on the Europe, and after World War II, the
46 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
CO LU M B I A U N I V E R S I T Y P R E SS
www.du.edu/korbel
ISIS as Revolutionary State
Soviet Union took over eastern Europe. from its more powerful neighbors. The
Weaker revolutionary states, however, Islamic State has already triggered
can hope only to provide an inspirational stepped-up efforts to contain it, most
example. North Korea under the Kim notably Turkeys recent decision to seal
family, Cuba under Fidel Castro, Ethio- its southern border, create a buffer
pia under the so-called Derg, Cambodia zone in northern Syria, and allow U.S.
under the Khmer Rouge, Nicaragua aircraft to use the Incirlik Air Base for
under the Sandinistasall lacked the bombing missions in Iraq and Syria.
raw power necessary to spread their One can say with confidence that the
model by force. group will never conquer a substantial
So does the Islamic State. The Soviet portion of the Middle East, let alone
Union could impose communism on any areas beyond it.
eastern Europe thanks to the mighty Nor will the Islamic State spread
Red Army, whereas the Islamic State via contagion. Overturning even a weak
has perhaps 30,000 reliable troops, government is difficult, and revolution-
according to U.S. military intelligence, ary movements succeed only on rare
and no power-projection capabilities. occasions. It took two world wars to
Although alarmists warn that the bring the Marxists to power in Russia
Islamic State now controls a swath of and China, and the Islamic State suc-
land larger than the United Kingdom, ceeded only because the stars aligned:
most of it is empty desert. Its territory the United States foolishly invaded Iraq,
produces between $4 billion and $8 Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
billion worth of goods and services governed in a particularly divisive man-
annually, putting the Islamic States ner, and Syria fell into civil war. Absent
GDP on a par with that of Barbados. equally fortuitous events, the Islamic
Its annual revenues amount to a mere State will have a tough time replicating
$500 million or soabout one-tenth the its rise elsewhere.
annual budget of Harvard University Spreading a revolution via contagion
and they are shrinking. The Islamic also requires a level of resources that
State is nowhere close to being a great only great powers possess. The Soviet
power, and given its small population Union was powerful enough to subsi-
and underdeveloped economy, it will dize the Communist International and
never become one. support client states around the world,
Still, might the Islamic State over- but medium-sized revolutionary powers
whelm weaker neighbors, such as Jordan, are not so fortunate. Iran has backed a
Iraqi Kurdistan, the rest of Syria, or number of proxies over the past 30-plus
even parts of Saudi Arabia? This is years, but it has yet to create a single
highly unlikely, for the Islamic State successful clone. The Islamic State is
has faced growing resistance whenever far weaker than Iran, and any foreign
it has tried to move outside the ungov- subsidiaries it inspires will have to rely
erned Sunni areas in which it arose. on their own resources to succeed.
And were the Islamic State to expand Moreover, a successful revolution
significantly, the result would be more serves as a wake-up call for nearby states,
vigorous and coordinated resistance prompting them to take steps to prevent
November/December 2015 47
Stephen M. Walt
a repeat performance on home soil. outside Iraq and Syriaa total dwarfed
European powers contained the threat by the 14,000-plus people murdered in
of Bolshevism domestically after 1917 the United States in that same period.
by suppressing suspected revolutionar- All these deaths are regrettable, but
ies and addressing the concerns of the violence on a comparatively modest
working class, and the United States scale will not expand the Islamic
helped do the same thing in Europe and States sway.
Asia after World War II by establishing The Islamic States ideology will also
the Marshall Plan and providing secu- limit its ability to grow. Although the
rity through NATO and its alliances in groups leaders believe that their vision
Asia. Iran, the Gulf monarchies, and of a new caliphate is irresistible, it is
other Muslim governments are already unlikely to capture enough hearts and
working to contain the Islamic States minds. The ideals of liberty and equality
influence by restricting its intake of embodied in the American and French
foreign fighters, interrupting its financ- Revolutions resonated around the world,
ing, and encouraging local religious and communisms vision of a classless
authorities to challenge its religious utopia appealed to millions of impover-
claims. Muslim communities in Europe ished workers and peasants. By contrast,
and elsewhere are busy countering its the Islamic States puritanical message
poisonous message, as well. and violent methods do not travel well,
Despite these efforts, some individu- and its blueprint for an ever-expanding
als will still succumb to the Islamic caliphate clashes with powerful national,
States allure, but even 100,000 foreign sectarian, and tribal identities through-
recruits would not be enough to shift out the Middle East. Using Twitter,
the balance of power in its favor. Only a YouTube, or Instagram wont make its
tiny fraction of the worlds billion-plus core message more palatable to most
Muslims are interested in submitting to Muslims, especially after the novelty
the groups brutal discipline, and many wears off and potential recruits learn
who rush to join it today will become what life in the Islamic State is really
disillusioned and eager to leave or end like. In any case, a version of Islam
up isolated in a landlocked country and that is anathema to the vast majority
unable to cause trouble elsewhere. of Muslims will certainly not gain a
To be sure, some foreign fighters following among non-Muslims. If one
have already returned home and carried were trying to invent a revolutionary
out terrorist acts, and foreigners inspired credo devoid of universal appeal, it
by the Islamic States propaganda have would be hard to beat the Islamic
staged lone wolf attacks in several States harsh and narrow worldview.
countries. Such incidents will not disap- Finally, should an Islamic Statelike
pear, but they will be too few and too movement manage to gain power outside
small in scope to topple a government. Iraq and Syriaas could conceivably
According to The New York Times, since occur in the chaos of Libyathat groups
September 2014, groups or individuals leaders would follow their own interests
claiming some connection to the Islamic rather than slavishly obey Baghdadis
State have killed roughly 600 people commands. Outsiders often see radical
48 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
ISIS as Revolutionary State
November/December 2015 49
Stephen M. Walt
states do not tame their behavior unless The Islamic State is not an existential
other states teach them that relentless threat to the United States, to Middle
extremism is costly and counterproduc- Eastern energy supplies, to Israel, or to
tive. This means the Islamic State must any other vital U.S. interest, so U.S.
be contained for the foreseeable future, military forces have no business being
until it moderates its revolutionary aims sent into harms way to fight it.
or even abandons them entirely. Contain- Successfully containing the Islamic
ment worked against the Soviet Union, State also requires Middle Eastern
and a similar approach has limited Irans countries to do more to insulate them-
influence for more than three decades. selves against its revolutionary message.
To succeed, a policy of containment Governments can reduce the risk of
must prevent the Islamic State from contagion by undertaking energetic
conquering other countries and impos- counterterrorist effortstracking and
ing its radical vision on them. Because arresting potential sympathizers, drying
the Islamic State is weak and its core up financial support, and so onand
message is so corrosive, preventing further by tackling the corruption that makes
expansion should not be beyond the the Islamic State look like an attractive
capacity of the frontline countries with alternative. Respected Muslim authori-
the most at stake, with only modest ties in neighboring countries should
help from the United States. The Kurds, remind their coreligionists that Islamic
Iraqs Shiites, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, the civilization was at its height not when
Gulf monarchies, and Israel are not it was most dogmatic or intolerant but
going to stand by and watch the Islamic when it was most inclusive. To under-
State grow, and any minor victories it cut the Islamic States local support,
does obtain will encourage its neighbors Washington should continue to press
to balance against it more vigorously. the Shiite-dominated government in
Washington should provide intelli- Baghdad to adopt more inclusive
gence, weapons, and military training policies toward Sunnis.
to aid such efforts, but it should keep The United States should encourage
its role as small as possible and make it these efforts in private and support
crystal clear that stopping the Islamic them in public, while resisting its normal
State is largely up to local forces. It tendency to tell local governments
follows that U.S. airpower should be how to run their own countries. Recent
used solely to prevent the Islamic State U.S. efforts to steer local politics in
from expanding; trying to bomb it the Middle East have been a series of
into submission will inevitably kill embarrassing failures, and U.S. leaders
innocent civilians, strengthen anti- should be modest in offering advice
American sentiment, and bolster the today. Washington can also encourage
Islamic States popularity. its European allies to better integrate
Regional actors will no doubt try to their own Muslim minorities, but that
pass the buck and get Americans to do task is ultimately up to them, too.
their fighting for them. U.S. leaders Indeed, U.S. policymakers should
should reject such ploys politely but keep in mind that the more involved
firmly and pass the buck right back. the United States gets in containing the
50 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
ISIS as Revolutionary State
Islamic State, the more it will reinforce 24-hour cable news, and it runs counter
the Islamic States propaganda about to the interventionist instincts of much
Western crusaders and their supposedly of the U.S. foreign policy establishment.
heretical Muslim allies. At the sectarian But not every foreign tragedy is a
level, were the United States to undertake threat to U.S. interests, and not every
another costly effort to rebuild Iraqs problem needs to be solved by Ameri-
security forces, it would appear complicit can power. The United States blun-
in the anti-Sunni policies that helped dered badly when it responded to 9/11
make the Islamic State popular, thus by invading Iraqprecisely the sort
encouraging Sunnis in Iraq and eastern of error Osama bin Laden had hoped
Syria to remain loyal to the group. it would makeand the Islamic State
A U.S.-led campaign against the would no doubt welcome another mis-
Islamic State also risks heightening its guided U.S. intervention in the Middle
appeal: if the worlds mightiest country East. It would be worse than a crime to
keeps insisting that the group is a grave make the same mistake again.
threat, then its claim to be the most
faithful defender of Islam will gain
credence. Instead of hyping the threat
and reinforcing the Islamic States own
propaganda, it would be far better for
U.S. policymakers to treat the group
as a minor problem that deserves only
modest attention.
Taking the lead against the Islamic
State would also encourage free-riding
by local powers with far more at stake.
The best defense against Islamic extrem-
ism is improved governance throughout
the Middle East, but that difficult process
will not even begin if local governments
believe Washington will protect them
no matter what. The more the United
States does, the less incentive local
actors will have to get their own houses
in order.
In short, containing the Islamic State
is more likely to succeed if the United
States declines to do the heavy lifting.
This hands-off approach requires Ameri-
can leaders to remain cool in the face of
beheadings, terrorist attacks, the destruc-
tion of antiquities, and other provocations.
Such discipline is not easy to maintain
in the era of partisan politics and
November/December 2015 51
fighters since Afghanistan in the 1980s,
Digital with recent estimates putting the total
THE POST-AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST
T
he Islamic State, or ISIS, is the digital sphere to wage psychological
first terrorist group to hold both warfare, which directly contributes to
physical and digital territory: its physical success. For example, before
in addition to the swaths of land it the group captured the Iraqi city of
controls in Iraq and Syria, it dominates Mosul in June 2014, it rolled out an
pockets of the Internet with relative extensive online campaign with text,
impunity. But it will hardly be the last. images, and videos that threatened the
Although there are still some fringe citys residents with unparalleled death
terrorist groups in the western Sahel and destruction. Such intimidation makes
or other rural areas that do not supple- it easier to bring populations under the
ment their violence digitally, it is only Islamic States control and reduces the
a matter of time before they also go likelihood of a local revolt.
online. In fact, the next prominent Foiling the Islamic States efforts on
terrorist organization will be more the Internet will thus make the group
likely to have extensive digital opera- less successful on the battlefield. To date,
tions than control physical ground. however, most digital efforts against the
Although the military battle against Islamic State have been too limited,
the Islamic State is undeniably a top focusing on specific tactics, such as
priority, the importance of the digital creating counternarratives to extremism,
front should not be underestimated. in lieu of generating a comprehensive
The group has relied extensively on strategy. Instead of resorting to a single
the Internet to market its poisonous tool, opponents should treat this fight as
ideology and recruit would-be terrorists. they would a military confrontation: by
According to the International Centre waging a broad-scale counterinsurgency.
for the Study of Radicalisation and
Political Violence, the territory controlled KNOW YOUR ENEMY
by the Islamic State now ranks as the The first step of this digital war is to
place with the highest number of foreign understand the enemy. Most analyses
of the Islamic States online footprint
JARED COHEN is Director of Google Ideas and focus on social media. In a Brookings
Adviser to the Executive Chair of Alphabet Inc.
He is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Institution report, J. M. Berger and
Foreign Relations. Jonathon Morgan estimated that in late
52 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Digital Counterinsurgency
2014, 46,000 Twitter accounts openly which gives orders and provides
supported the group. Back then, resources for disseminating content.
strategies for fighting the Islamic State Although its numbers are small, its
online centered on simply removing operations are highly organized.
such accounts. According to Berger, for example, the
Social media platforms are just the origins of most of the Islamic States
tip of the iceberg, however. The Islamic marketing material on Twitter can be
States marketing tools run the gamut traced to a small set of accounts with
from popular public platforms to private strict privacy settings and few follow-
chat rooms to encrypted messaging ers. By distributing their messages to a
systems such as WhatsApp, Kik, Wickr, limited network outside the public eye,
Zello, and Telegram. At the other end of these accounts can avoid being flagged
the spectrum, digital media production for terms-of-service violations. But the
houses such as the Al-Furqaan Founda- content they issue eventually trickles
tion and the Al-Hayat Media Center down to the second tier of the pyramid:
presumably funded by and answering to the Islamic States digital rank and file.
the Islamic States central leadership This type of fighter may or may not
churn out professional-grade videos operate offline as well. He and his ilk run
and advertisements. digital accounts that are connected to the
Yet understanding the full extent central command and disseminate mate-
of the Islamic States marketing efforts rial through guerrilla-marketing tactics.
without knowing who is behind them In June 2014, for example, Islamic State
is not an actionable insight; it is like supporters hijacked trending hashtags
understanding how much land the group related to the World Cup to flood soccer
controls without knowing what kinds of fans with propaganda. Because they
fighters occupy it and how they hold it. operate on the frontline of the digital
An effective counterinsurgency requires battlefield, these fighters often find
comprehending the Islamic States hierar- their accounts suspended for terms-of-
chy. Unlike al Qaeda, which comprises a service violations, and they may there-
loose cluster of isolated cells, the Islamic fore keep backup accounts. And to make
State resembles something akin to a each new account appear more influen-
corporation. On the ground in Iraq tial than it really is, they purchase fake
and Syria, a highly educated leadership followers from social media marketing
sets its ideological agenda, a managerial firms; just $10 can boost ones follower
layer implements this ideology, and a count by tens of thousands.
large rank and file contributes fighters, Then there are the vast numbers of
recruiters, videographers, jihadist wives, radical sympathizers across the globe,
and people with every other necessary who constitute the Islamic States third
skill. This hierarchy is replicated online, type of digital fighter. Unlike the rank
where the Islamic State operates as a and file, they do not belong to the
pyramid consisting of four types of Islamic States official army, take direct
digital fighters. orders from its leadership, or reside in
At the top sits the Islamic States Iraq or Syria. But once drawn into the
central command for digital operations, Islamic States echo chamber by the
November/December 2015 53
Jared Cohen
rank and file, they spend their time RECAPTURING DIGITAL TERRITORY
helping the group disseminate its Much of the debate over how to combat
radical message and convert people to the Islamic State on the ground has
its cause. These are often the people been binary, split between those pro-
who identify and engage potential posing containment and those insisting
recruits on an individual level, devel- on its defeat. The best strategy for fight-
oping online relationships strong ing it online, however, is something else:
enough to result in physical travel. In marginalization. The result would be
June, for example, The New York Times something similar to what has happened
documented how a radical Islamist in to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
the United Kingdom met a young Colombia, or FARC, the narcoterrorist
woman from Washington State online group that grabbed headlines through-
and convinced her to consider heading out the 1990s for its high-profile kid-
to Syria. nappings and savage guerrilla warfare.
Although joining the Islamic States Today, the group has been neither dis-
operations in Iraq and Syria may be banded nor entirely defeated, but its ranks
illegal, spreading extremism online is have largely been driven into the jungle.
not. These fighters are masters at taking Along the same lines, the Islamic
advantage of their right to free speech, State will be neutered as a digital threat
and their strength lies both in their when its online presence becomes barely
numbers and in their willingness to noticeable. The group would find it
mimic the Islamic States official line either too risky or tactically impossible
without having to receive direct orders to commandeer control of social media
from its leadership. platforms and public chat rooms, and its
The Islamic States fourth type of digital content would be hard to discover.
digital fighter is nonhuman: the tens of Incapable of growing its online ranks, it
thousands of fake accounts that auto- would see its ratio of digital fighters to
mate the dissemination of its content human fighters fall to one to one. It
and multiply its message. On Twitter, would be forced to operate primarily on
for example, so-called Twitter bots the so-called dark Web, the part of the
automatically flood the digital space Internet not indexed by mainstream
with retweets of terrorist messages; search engines and accessible to only
countless online tutorials explain how the most knowledgeable users.
to write these relatively simple pro- Compelling terrorist organizations to
grams. In comment sections on Face- operate in secret does make plots more
book, YouTube, and other sites, such difficult to intercept, but in the case of
automated accounts can monopolize the Islamic State, that is a tradeoff worth
the conversation with extremist propa- making. Every day, the groups message
ganda and marginalize moderate voices. reaches millions of people, some of whom
This programmable army ensures that become proponents of the Islamic State
whatever content the Islamic States or even fighters for its cause. Prevent-
digital central command issues will ing it from dominating digital territory
make its way across as many screens would help stanch the replenishment of
as possible. its physical ranks, reduce its impact on
54 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Digital Counterinsurgency
Fangirls: two women charged with plotting ISIS-inspired attacks in New York, April 2015
the public psyche, and destroy its most raids than strategic bombing cam-
fundamental means of communication. paigns. Blanket suspensions covering
It will take a broad coalition to any accounts that violate terms of
marginalize the Islamic State online: service could not guarantee that the
from governments and companies to leadership will be affected. In fact, as
nonprofits and international organiza- Berger and Morgans research high-
tions. First, they should separate the lighted, the Islamic State has learned
human-run accounts on social networks to protect its digital leadership from
from the automated ones. Next, they suspension by keeping its activities
should zero in on the Islamic States hidden behind strict privacy settings.
digital central command, identifying This is not to downplay the impor-
and suspending the specific accounts tance of banning users who break the
responsible for setting strategy and rules and distribute terrorist content.
AP PHOTO / JAN E ROS EN BE RG
giving orders to the rest of its online Technology companies have become
army. When that is done, digital society skilled at doing just that. In 2014, the
at large should push the remaining rank British Counter Terrorism Internet
and file into the digital equivalent of a Referral Unit, a service run by Londons
remote cave. Metropolitan Police, worked closely with
The suspension of accounts needs to such companies as Google, Facebook,
be targetedmore like kill-or-capture and Twitter to flag more than 46,000
November/December 2015 55
Jared Cohen
pieces of violent or hateful content for information (such as the address and
removal. That same year, YouTube took social security number) of a target is
down approximately 14 million videos. revealed, or distributed denial-of-
In April 2015, Twitter announced that service attacks, which can take down
it had suspended 10,000 accounts linked an entire website.
to the Islamic State on a single day. To mitigate this threat, the digital
Such efforts are valuable in that they fighters activities need to be diverted
provide a cleaner digital environment away from extremism altogether. This is
for millions of users. But they would be where counternarratives against violent
doubly so if the leadership that orders extremism can come in. Over the last
terrorist content to be distributed were two years, several notable efforts have
also eliminated. been launched, including video series
That, in turn, will require mapping produced by the Arab Center for Scien-
the Islamic States network of accounts. tific Research and Humane Studies and
One way law enforcement could make the Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
inroads into this digital network is by To be effective, these campaigns need
covertly infiltrating the Islamic States to reflect the diversity of the groups
real-world network. This technique has ranks: professional jihadist fighters, former
already achieved some success. In April, Iraqi soldiers, deeply religious Islamic
the FBI arrested two young women scholars, young men in search of adven-
accused of plotting attacks in New York ture, local residents joining out of fear
City after a two-year investigation that or ambition. Moderate religious messages
had relied extensively on their social may work for the pious recruit, but not
media activity for evidence. Law enforce- for the lonely British teenager who was
ment should scale such efforts to focus promised multiple wives and a sense
on the digital domain and target the of belonging in Syria. He might be
Islamic States digital leadership, sus- better served by something more similar
pending the accounts of its members to suicide-prevention and anti-bullying
and arresting them in certain cases. campaigns.
Once the Islamic States online For maximum effect, these cam-
leadership has been separated from paigns should be carefully targeted.
the rank and file, the rank and file will An antiextremist video viewed by
become significantly less coordinated 50,000 of the right kinds of people will
and therefore less effective. The next have a greater impact than one seen by
step would be to reduce the groups 50 million random viewers. Consider
level of online activity overall, so that Abdullah-X, a cartoon series marketed
it is forced into the margins of digital through a YouTube campaign funded by
society. During this phase, the danger the European Union. Its pilot episode
is that online, the Islamic State might was promoted using targeted advertis-
splinter into less coordinated but more ing oriented toward those interested in
aggressive rogue groups. With a higher extremist Islam. Eighty percent of the
tolerance for risk, these groups might YouTube users who watched it found it
undertake doxing of opponents of through targeted ads rather than through
the Islamic State, whereby the private unrelated searches.
56 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
2015-Nov-Dec-FA-vonEinsiedel-Vtl_Foreign Affairs 9/23/15 11:00 AM Page
57
Jared Cohen
learning, such campaigns could battle the groups opponents can apply and
the Islamic State online with newfound discard new ways of fighting terrorism
precision and reach a scale that would quickly to hone their strategy.
not be possible with a manual approach. The benefits of digitally marginalizing
It is worth noting that just like a the Islamic State, meanwhile, are mani-
physical counterinsurgency, a digital fold. Not only would neutering the group
counterinsurgency is more likely to online improve the lives of millions of
succeed when bolstered by the participa- users who would no longer be as likely
tion of local communities. All the online to encounter the groups propaganda; it
platforms the Islamic State uses have would also make the groups real-world
forum moderators, the equivalent of defeat more imminent. As the Islamic
tribal leaders and sheiks. The technology States digital platforms, communica-
companies that own these platforms have tion methods, and soldiers became less
no interest in seeing their environments accessible, the group would find it harder
flooded with fake accounts and violent to coordinate its physical attacks and
messages. They should therefore give replenish its ranks. And those fighting
these moderators the tools and training it online would gain valuable experience
to keep their communities safe from for when the time came to fight the
extremist messaging. Here again, machine next global terrorist group trying to
learning could someday help, by auto- win the Internet.
matically identifying terrorist messages
and either highlighting them for modera-
tors or blocking them on their behalf.
ACCESS DENIED
At first glance, the Islamic State can look
hopelessly dominant online, with its
persistent army of propaganda peddlers
and automated trolls. In fact, however,
the group is at a distinct disadvantage
when it comes to resources and num-
bers. The vast majority of Internet
users disagree with its message, and the
platforms that its fighters use belong to
companies that oppose its ideology.
There is no doubt that undertaking
a digital counterinsurgency campaign
represents uncharted territory. But the
costs of failure are low, for unlike in a
real-world counterinsurgency, those
who fight digitally face no risk of injury
or death. That is yet another factor
making the Islamic State particularly
vulnerable online, since it means that
58 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
deeply suspicious of Iran and worry
Bridging the Gulf that by ending the sanctions regime
T
he events of the past five years Washingtons inclination will be to
have put an intense strain on signal its commitment by lavishing on
the relationship between the the GCC countries increased military
United States and its traditional part- aid in the form of weapons, technol-
ners in the Arab world, particularly ogy, and training. Such largess will be
the countries that belong to the Gulf necessary but not sufficient to close the
Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, gap that has opened up between the
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United States and the GCC states. The
United Arab Emirates. As popular violence and disorder wracking Iraq,
revolts have flared up across the Middle Syria, and Yemen; the genuine threat of
East, civil wars have broken out, and Iranian meddling; and unrest in Egypt
the regional order has become increas- and elsewhere in the region will continue
ingly vulnerable, leaders in Washington to test U.S.-GCC ties and will require a
and in Arab capitals have often had more sophisticated form of diplomacy
starkly different reactions. Meanwhile, from both sides.
most of the GCC countries have watched Going forward, Washington and
nervouslyand sometimes angrilyas the Arab governments will continue to
the United States has negotiated with have significantly different priorities
their bitter rival, Iran, over an agreement when it comes to regional strategy, but
to limit the Iranian nuclear program. there is enough overlap to maintain
In August, a few weeks after the their partnership, so long as each side
nuclear deal was sealed, the Gulf coun- is prepared to respect the others core
tries publicly indicated their support for concerns, especially when it comes to
the agreement. But GCC leaders remain dealing with Iran. Both sides will have
to be flexible. A coordinated approach
ILAN GOLDENBERG is a Senior Fellow and
can lead to a more stable Middle East
Director of the Middle East Security Program at in which Iranian influence will be
the Center for a New American Security. Follow held in check. But if the United States
him on Twitter @ilangoldenberg.
and its GCC partners diverge further,
MELISSA G. DALTON is a Fellow at the the end result will be an even messier
Center for Strategic and International Studies
and Chief of Staff of its International Security region where Irans position will
Program. Follow her on Twitter @natsecdalton. be strengthened.
November/December 2015 59
Ilan Goldenberg and Melissa G. Dalton
60 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Bridging the Gulf
Washington sees the Gulf countries impossible without Iranian support. The
as reckless, and the Gulf countries see United States doesnt share that assess-
Washington as feckless. ment, seeing Iranian involvement as less
The disagreement over how to significant and hardly determinative.
intervene in Syriaand also in Iraq and Finally, in Iraq, the United States
Yemen, two other Arab republics riven has spent years trying to persuade the
by civil strifehas been sharpened by GCC countries to accept the legitimacy
Irans role in all three conflicts. In each (or at least the reality) of a Shiite-
place, the Iranians have supplied money, dominated central government and to
weapons, and fighters to forces opposed further integrate Iraq into the Arab
by the United States and the Gulf coun- world. Washington has even used the
tries: the Assad regime in Syria, the Iraqi government as a go-between with
Houthi rebels in Yemen, and extremist Iran in the fight against ISIS, an enemy
Shiite militias in Iraq. But Washington that the GCC states and Iran share. But
and Arab governments dont agree about for years, the Gulf states have watched
the nature or importance of Irans with dismay as the central government in
involvement. Many of the Gulf states, Baghdad has marginalized Iraqs Sunni
especially Saudi Arabia, believe that minority despite U.S. pressure to
Iranian intervention has itself driven integrate the Sunnis into the countrys
these conflicts: they see Irans support social and political fabric. Moreover,
for its proxies as the primary cause of the Gulf states see Iraqs Shiite leader-
the violence, not as an effect of the ship as beholden to its Iranian patrons.
political instability in all three places. Such views have led the Gulf states to
The United States, on the other hand, keep their distance from Baghdad and
views Iran as an unhelpful actor but to refrain from fully supporting U.S.
thinks its involvement, especially in strategy in Iraq.
Yemen, is opportunistic rather than
the root of the problems. UNEASY PARTNERS
These divergent views have led to Differing threat perceptions are hardly
starkly different policies. In Syria, Irans the only source of tension between the
support for Assad is a major reason why United States and its Arab partners.
the GCC states have prioritized toppling A number of other issues, many with
the regime over combating the Islamic deep historical roots, pose obstacles to
State (also known as ISIS), the Sunni U.S.-GCC cooperation. First, although
jihadist group that has seized territory the United States has encouraged the GCC
and sown terror in Syria and across the countries to strengthen their collective-
border in Iraq. The United States has security capabilities for the past 20
precisely the opposite view: ISIS poses years, those efforts have been mostly in
a threat to the U.S. homeland and thus vain: each GCC country still prefers
takes priority over ousting Assad, even dealing directly and individually with
though Assads survival benefits Iran. the United States instead of cooperating
In Yemen, the GCC countries view with the rest of the groups members.
the Houthi rebels as Iranian agents and Part of the problem is that the smaller
believe their advances would have been GCC countries are perennially uneasy
November/December 2015 61
Ilan Goldenberg and Melissa G. Dalton
with Saudi Arabias powerand in return, the governments response to the upris-
the Saudis resent Qatars and the United ing found that internal security forces
Arab Emirates increasing independence used systematic and deliberate
and assertiveness. excessive force, including torture and
A second challenge involves the U.S. forced confessions, against protesters.
commitment to Israel, a country with This violence unfolded not far from
which the Arab states of the GCC maintain the port in Bahrain that hosts the Fifth
no official relations. When considering Fleet of the U.S. Navy, perhaps the
the sale or export of military hardware most visible symbol of U.S.-GCC secu-
or services to any country in the Middle rity cooperation. Such optics were not
East, the United States is committed exactly helpful for the United States,
by law to make sure that the sale will which sees itself as the worlds most
not adversely affect Israels qualitative enthusiastic promoter of liberal democ-
military edge in the region. To assuage racy. What happened in Bahrain also
the GCC countries concerns about the highlights the risk that U.S. partners
Iran nuclear deal, Washington is willing in the Gulf might use weapons and
to increase its direct security assistance ammunition manufactured in the
to the Gulf states. But Israel often adopts United States against unarmed civilians
the narrowest, most conservative view in attempts to suppress legitimate
possible of what could reduce its advan- political opposition.
tage and might object to the kinds of Of course, the increased economic
military assistance that the GCC countries and political participation that many
will request, even if Israel and the GCC Arab populations demand would not
share a common interest in countering necessarily lead to stability or security,
Iran. All new major U.S. arms sales at least in the short term; nor would
require congressional approval, and it such changes necessarily serve U.S.
is unlikely that Congress would support interests. But if Washington appeared
such measures over Israeli objections. complicit in the repression of popular
Finally, even when U.S. relations movements, it would tarnish the United
with the GCC states are relatively smooth, States image globallyand if those
they present some level of long-term movements ultimately succeeded in
risk for Washington. The GCC states upending and replacing established
are led by authoritarian regimes that regimes, then the United States would
suppress dissent and sometimes commit have little credibility and leverage with
human rights abuses; they do not always the new governments.
make for the most savory partners. In
2011, the GCC responded to popular TEHRAN TILT?
protests in Bahrain by deploying its Hovering over the new threats in the
Peninsula Shield Force, with troops region and the old constraints on U.S.-
from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab GCC relations is a widely held fear in the
Emirates, to help the Bahraini authorities Arab states of the Gulf that Washington
quash the demonstrations. Later that is slowly withdrawing from the region
year, an independent commission as part of a broader retrenchment, leaving
established by Bahrain to investigate the GCC states to fend for themselves.
62 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Bridging the Gulf
The king and I: Saudi King Salman and Obama in Washington, D.C., September 2015
For decades, the United States has sold Such feelings are heightened by a
billions of dollars worth of weapons belief among many Gulf elites that the
systems to its Gulf partners. Neverthe- nuclear deal with Iran is merely the first
less, the armies of the Gulf states have step in a broader plan to reach a dtente
not developed into capable fighting with the Islamic Republic and create a
forces, as GCC regimes have geared their new balance of power in the region at
security forces more toward protecting the expense of Arab interests. Washing-
themselves and maintaining domestic tons decision to prioritize the nuclear
stability and have relied on the United file over Irans regional meddling feeds
States to deter or deal with any threat to this concern. U.S. policymakers have
the regional order. But after more than a responded to such complaints by insisting
decade of war, the American public has that they have no intention of pursuing
R E U T E R S / G A RY CA M E R O N
little appetite for more adventures in any broader accommodation with Iran
the Middle East, and U.S. policymakers and by talking tough when discussing
and defense officials would like to see the Islamic Republic. Gulf states view
the GCC states take more responsibility this rhetoric as hollow if not backed up
for their own defense. The GCC bitterly by action.
views this as a fundamental change in Arab fears of a future U.S. tilt toward
the relationship, akin to a betrayal. Tehran are unfounded, but, combined
November/December 2015 63
Ilan Goldenberg and Melissa G. Dalton
with the new uncertainties in the Mid- crisis. The UN estimates that the
dle East, they have influenced the Gulf violence has taken the lives of almost
states strategic calculations and increased 2,000 Yemeni civilians and injured
their willingness to take independent more than 4,100 others.
action. In 2014, for example, the United The violence has had the effect of
Arab Emirates projected its power more strengthening radical forces: al Qaeda
than 3,000 miles beyond its borders, in the Arabian Peninsula, the terrorist
launching air strikes against Islamist groups affiliate in Yemen, has expanded
militias in Libya in support of more its reach and now controls a number of
moderate tribal forces who are vying places that tribal or government forces
for influence in post-Qaddafi Libya. had previously held. Meanwhile, the
The Gulf countries are not only more GCCs insistence on casting the conflict
willing to use force on their own; they in Yemen in sectarian termsportraying
are also reshaping their alliances with the Houthis as little more than Shiite
Arab states elsewhere, such as Egypt, stooges of Iranwill make it far more
Jordan, and Morocco: at its March difficult for Washington to help resolve
2015 summit, the Arab League an- the tribal and factional disputes that
nounced that it would create a unified U.S. officials believe are actually behind
command for a joint military force. the fighting.
(To date, little progress has been made
on that project.) WE CAN WORK IT OUT
Washington might welcome this In spite of all the complications and
shift toward more autonomy on the part obstacles that recent years have pre-
of its Gulf partners, which will reduce sented, the U.S.-GCC relationship can
the burden that being the regions police- still be salvaged and even strength-
man places on the United States. But ened. Closer defense ties must be part
more Arab autonomy also means less of the solution, but merely pouring
U.S. influence and an increased possi- U.S. military resources into the Gulf
bility of negative outcomes from Wash- states will not suffice. Instead, both
ingtons point of view. Consider the sides must increase their cooperation
air war and blockade that the Saudis on areas where they agree and also be
launched in March to combat the willing to make some concessions on
Houthi rebels across the border in issues that are important to the other
Yemen. The Saudis continue to receive side. Both sides will have to work closely
U.S. intelligence and logistical support. on training credible, reliable Sunni forces
But as the campaign has dragged on, in Iraq and Syria that can take on both
Washington has grown alarmed at the ISIS and the Assad regime. The United
results. The Saudi-led coalition, which States will have to demonstrate its will-
also includes the majority of the other ingness to counter Iranian surrogates
GCC states, has been accused of using and proxies throughout the region, even
cluster munitions in civilian areas, and as it begins implementing the nuclear
the widespread destruction of Yemens deal with Iran. And in exchange, the
already limited infrastructure is deep- GCC states will have to prove that they
ening the countrys humanitarian are willing to lower the temperature of
64 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Bridging the Gulf
their rivalry with Iran and to even con- cities, coordinating their moves to take
template diplomatic engagement with advantage of air strikes carried out by
the Islamic Republic. the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition.
Closer cooperation and mutual The GCC countries should also help
flexibility will not preclude the United Washington press Baghdad to adopt an
States from monitoring human rights inclusive but decentralized approach to
violations in the GCC states and remind- governing Iraq, one that would assure
ing its Gulf Arab partners that the surest the countrys Sunnis that they have a
path to long-term stability is gradual stake and a say in Iraqs future. In the
reform. The United States and the GCC years since the fall of Saddam Hussein,
can work together even as they continue the GCC states have declined to expand
to disagree on fundamental questions their diplomatic, economic, and military
about the stability and soundness of ties to Iraq. The GCC should make clear
democratic and authoritarian models. to Baghdad that if it pursues a more
In Syria, the United States should inclusive agenda, Iraq will no longer be
shift its objectives, focusing more on frozen out of the Arab regional order.
trying to create the military and politi- These efforts in Iraq and Syria
cal conditions that could lead to a negoti- would benefit from broader U.S.-GCC
ated end to the civil war rather than strategic engagement and military
exclusively combating ISIS. That would cooperation. This would include new
mean ramping up the lackluster U.S. U.S. arms sales to the Gulf, but heavy
efforts to train vetted Syrian opposition weaponry is not what the GCC states
forces by supporting qualified fighters need, since the majority of the threats
regardless of whether they prefer to fight facing them are unconventional. Whats
ISIS, Assad, or both. Meanwhile, the GCC needed instead is more intelligence
needs to stop aiding extremist groups sharing and more joint counterterrorist
and instead shift its support to U.S.- training exercises aimed at improving
trained fighters and other moderate U.S.-GCC cooperation in combating
anti-Assad factions, such as Kurdish both Sunni extremists and Irans mili-
fighters in northeastern Syria and the tant proxies. The United States and the
Southern Front, an opposition collective GCC countries should also consider
affiliated with the Free Syrian Army. creating a joint headquarters for their
In Iraq, the United States and the respective special operations forces.
GCC states should step up their support Finally, the two sides need to improve
for Sunni tribal forces, coordinating their communication with each other:
with Baghdad but also working directly regular multilateral meetings to address
with the forces to fund and expedite the regions conflicts would help Wash-
their training. Washington should also ington and its Gulf Arab partners arrive
send additional military advisers to at a consensus about when and how to
Iraq to assist with the training. Initially, use force in the region and would reduce
Sunni tribal forces should be trained to the likelihood of unilateral military
protect civilians and deter further ISIS action by either side.
incursions into Iraqi territory. Over For the United States and the GCC
time, they could push ISIS out of Iraqs to improve their cooperation, they will
November/December 2015 65
Ilan Goldenberg and Melissa G. Dalton
have to reestablish the trust that has need Iran (and Assads other main ally,
deteriorated in recent years. Both Russia) to pressure Assad to step down
sides will need to be flexible and must as part of a deal to end the civil war.
recognize the others core concerns, Handling Yemen may be easier because
especially when it comes to Iran. For the conflict there is a lower priority for
its part, the United States should join the Iranians, and so they would likely
its GCC partners in a more aggressive be willing to make greater concessions
and coordinated effort to push back to the Saudis.
against Iranian influence in the region. This diplomatic approach is unlikely
Washington should launch a high-level to yield immediate solutions, but over
strategic dialogue with the Gulf states time, the only way to end the multiple
about how to combat Irans proxies civil wars that are afflicting the Middle
with more interdictions of Iranian arms East is through a negotiated agreement
shipments, additional joint covert that includes all the main actors. To get
actions targeting Iranian proxies, and what they want out of such a process,
greater intelligence sharing aimed the United States and the GCC coun-
at Iran. tries will need to maintain a unified
For their part, the Gulf states will front; to do so, they need to start
need to ratchet down their open feud- mending fences.
ing with Iran by reducing the amount of
inflammatory anti-Shiite rhetoric that
flows from their state-sponsored media
outlets and by drawing to a close their
ill-considered military campaign in
Yemen, which has caused a humanitar-
ian crisis there but has had little effect
on Iran. Moreover, because Iran is able
to exploit the political grievances of
repressed Shiites in the Gulf countries,
the GCC states must undertake gradual
reforms to increase political inclusivity
which would also have the effect of
enhancing their internal security.
Finally, even as the United States
and the GCC push back against Irans
proxies, they should seek to engage with
Iran on areas of mutual interest. The
United States and the GCC should
support a multilateral diplomatic push
for a political settlement that would
address the many sources of instability
in the region. Any regionwide talks
would have to address Syria, where
Washington and the Gulf states will
66 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
SOLUTION D R I V E N
PA C I F I C F O C U S E D
GLOBAL R E S U L T S
F
or decades, the partnership condition, the U.S.-Egyptian relation-
between Egypt and the United ship has become an anachronism that
States was a linchpin of the distorts American policy in the region.
American role in the Middle East. This is not to say that the United States
Today, it is a mere vestige of a bygone gets nothing out of the relationship. U.S.
era. There are no longer any compelling naval ships enjoy fast-track access to the
reasons for Washington to sustain espe- Suez Canal (albeit with the payment of a
cially close ties with Cairo. What was hefty premium), and Egypt allows Ameri-
once a powerfully symbolic alliance with can military aircraft to fly over Egyptian
clear advantages for both sides has become airspace, both of which help Washington
a nakedly transactional relationship project power in the Middle East and
and one that benefits the Egyptians manage its military deployments. Egypt
more than the Americans. The time also provides some diplomatic support for
has come for both sides to recognize American regional policies and remains a
that reality and for the United States potentially valuable partner in the fight
to fundamentally alter its approach to against the self-proclaimed Islamic State
Egypt: downgrading the priority it places (also known as ISIS), to which militants
on the relationship, reducing the level in neighboring Libya and in Egypts Sinai
of economic and military support it Peninsula have pledged allegiance. But
offers Cairo, and more closely tying the such benefits do not justify the attention
aid it does deliver to political, military, and resources that Washington lavishes
and economic reforms that would make on Egypt, which is scheduled to receive
Egypt a more credible partner. $1.3 billion in military aid and up to $150
The contemporary U.S.-Egyptian million in economic assistance from the
relationship began in the aftermath of United States this year, making Egypt
the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and was shaped the second-largest recipient of American
by the logic of the Cold War, with Egypt largess. And even if Washington cut back
switching from the Soviet to the Ameri- its aid, Cairo would have plenty of reasons
can camp in return for various kinds of to continue its cooperation.
To be sure, the United States would
MICHAEL WAHID HANNA is a Senior Fellow profit greatly from close ties with a strong,
at the Century Foundation and an Adjunct prosperous Egypt that had a representa-
Senior Fellow at the Center on Law and
Security at New York University School of Law. tive government and a capable military
Follow him on Twitter @mwhanna1. a country that could act as an anchor for
November/December 2015 67
Michael Wahid Hanna
68 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Getting Over Egypt
There will be blood: a Morsi supporter injured by Egyptian riot police in Cairo, July 2013
in 1978 and a peace treaty between peace efforts in the early 1990s, the
Egypt and Israel the following year. U.S.-Egyptian relationship became even
U.S. President Jimmy Carters pledges more valuable to Washington, as Egypt
of sustained American economic and emerged as the Arab state most fully
military aid to Egypt were a key factor in engaged in the process.
persuading Egyptian President Anwar al- Meanwhile, at home, the authoritarian
Sadat to make peace with Israel. The regime led by Sadat and then, after Sadats
deal was a diplomatic masterstroke. It 1981 assassination, his successor, Hosni
pulled Egypt into the U.S. orbit, Mubarak, entrenched itself. Over time,
eliminated the possibility of another human rights advocates and Egyptian
large-scale conventional Arab-Israeli dissidents called for Washington to use
war (and thus the risk of great-power its leverage to press Mubarak for reforms.
conflict in the region), and created a But as the threat of jihadist terrorism grew,
more stable and sustainable backdrop especially in the aftermath of the 9/11
for international oil marketsand, by attacks, U.S. officials decided not to push
REUTE RS / MOHAM E D ABD EL GHANY
extension, the global economy. too hard, which could risk diminishing
For the duration of the Cold War Egypts cooperation on counterterrorism.
and during its immediate aftermath, Then came the Arab uprisings, during
U.S.-Egyptian security cooperation which Mubarak was ousted in the wake
and coordination flourished, reaching of a broad-based popular mobilization.
a peak when Egypt participated in the In 2012, a government dominated by
multinational effort to liberate Kuwait the Muslim Brotherhood came to power
after Iraq invaded in 1990. And with through democratic elections, only to cata-
the advent of renewed Arab-Israeli strophically overreach. That government,
November/December 2015 69
Michael Wahid Hanna
70 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Getting Over Egypt
uprising that toppled Mubarak, the its historical use of violence decades ago,
Egyptian military thwarted a potential could reverse course or splinter, with
U.S. military intervention. Two U.S. breakaway factions turning to terrorism
frigates were besieged by the navy and and antistate violence. But the Sisi regime
were forced to withdraw from [Egypts] has demonstrated a dangerous inability
territorial waters, Mamish claimed. It or unwillingness to differentiate between
was important to show the Americans Islamist actors, lumping together the hith-
that the Egyptian military was highly erto generally nonviolent members of
diligent and prepared to deter any the Muslim Brotherhood with the brutal
intervention, he explained. extremists of ISIS. The mainstreaming of
Incendiary rhetoric such as this is regressive and sectarian ideologies such
particularly rankling given that many as the Brotherhoods would hardly serve
Egyptian military leaders, including U.S. interests. But the United States
Sisi himself, have received training at rightly sees Sisis forceful repression of
U.S. military institutions as participants all opposition as a destabilizing factor for
in a program designed to increase the the region and a boost to the radicalizing
professionalism of the armed forces of efforts of militants.
American allies and partners. Yet this
extensive, decades-long effort has not MANAGEABLE RISKS
produced the hoped-for doctrinal or Although the acrimony and strains in the
structural shifts within the Egyptian U.S.-Egyptian relationship are on full
armed forces nor increased the compe- display, U.S. officials are understand-
tence of Egypts military leadership. As ably wary of making dramatic changes
a result, there is not much close coopera- to long-standing U.S. policies in the
tion, confidence, or trust between the two Arab world, particularly at a moment
militaries. This gap is so large now that of regional disorder and instability. Many
the United States has made no effort to in Washington share well-founded
include Egypt in an operational role in concerns about the potential destabiliz-
the U.S.-led anti-ISIS military campaign, ing effect of political violence in Egypt;
despite the obvious need for Arab mili- some even worry about the more remote
tary partners. possibility of state failure. But such fears
Indeed, when it comes to fighting are built on overestimations of Washing-
Islamist extremists, even some members tons impact on Egyptian politics. Egyp-
of the U.S. defense establishment have tian leaders have consistently rejected
come to see Egypts repressive tactics as U.S. advice throughout the post-Mubarak
counterproductive, since they tend to period, and a restructuring of bilateral
further radicalize militants and under- ties is unlikely to have a significant effect
mine international efforts to curb mili- on Egypts internal stability.
tancy in the region. The United States Some proponents of maintaining the
remains concerned about the real and status quo argue that a U.S. shift away
serious terrorist threats Egypt faces, from Egypt would further alienate
including the risk that formerly non- influential American allies in the Arab
violent Islamist groups, such as the world, many of which are dispirited by
Muslim Brotherhood, which renounced Washingtons limited engagement in the
November/December 2015 71
Michael Wahid Hanna
Syrian civil war and troubled by the when Cairo has sought to express its
Obama administrations push for the displeasure with Washington, it has
Iranian nuclear deal. This is a legitimate delayed granting permission for U.S.
concern, but the fallout could be con- aircraft to fly over Egyptian airspace,
tained in much the same way that the temporarily complicating American
United States assuaged Arab allies military planning and logistics. In light
uneasy about the nuclear deal with of the ongoing and open-ended U.S.
Iran: by increasing direct U.S. security campaign against ISIS, such delays have
cooperation with Arab states. panicked Pentagon planners, who are
Other advocates for continuing on the accustomed to preferential treatment.
present path claim that Sisi is a different But although Sisis regime might be
kind of Egyptian leader, more willing to willing to occasionally push back against
confront the problem of Islamist extrem- U.S. demands for access, Egypt cant
ism and more focused on the need for afford to be too aggressive, since doing
real economic reform. They point to his so angers not just the Americans but also
calls for a religious revolution to combat the Gulf states that have become Egypts
extremism within Islam and were encour- main patronsand that are counting on
aged when Sisi remarked that it is incon- U.S. military power to not only protect
ceivable that the thought that [Egyptians] the region from ISIS but also serve as
hold most sacred should cause the entire their overall security guarantor. The
nation to be a source of anxiety, danger, governments of Saudi Arabia and the
killing, and destruction for the rest of the United Arab Emirates will not sit idly by
world. Those words were notable, but if Egypt drags its feet on U.S. requests
they served mostly to highlight Egypts for logistical support and endangers the
tragedy: the country and the region as a mechanisms that ensure Gulf security,
whole are in desperate need of alterna- and Sisi cannot afford to unduly antago-
tives to the regressive and sectarian vision nize them; as Sisi himself has stated, the
of most of the Arab worlds Islamists. security of the Gulf states is an integral
But by yoking the call for reform to part of Egyptian national security.
repression, authoritarianism, and hyper-
nationalism, Sisi is merely repeating the TIME FOR A CHANGE
mistakes of his predecessors, stoking the For the United States, military aid to
very radicalism he seeks to eliminate. Egypt has long been understood as
As for the economy, the highest priority the central pillar of a broad and close
for the regime, Sisi lacks credible plans relationship with the Arab worlds most
for development that would create populous nationa means of leverage
equitable growth. and a source of influence over not only
The most powerful arguments against the Egyptian military but also the
restructuring the relationship are based broader contours of Egyptian political
on the fear that a spurned Egypt would life. But in reality, U.S. aid has not
stop cooperating with the U.S. military been successful in producing a profession-
and thus stymie Washingtons ability to alized and effective Egyptian military.
project power in the region. According Nor has it encouraged Egyptian leaders
to multiple U.S. officials, in recent years, to share Washingtons worldview or
72 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Getting Over Egypt
strategic priorities. And it certainly has Such a reduction would not threaten
not had a particularly positive effect on the training and technology transfers the
the countrys political trajectory: foreign Egyptian military values, nor would it
military funding has proved wholly harm intelligence and counterterrorism
ineffective in pushing Egypt toward cooperation between the two countries,
democratic reform. which would continue on the basis of
In the future, therefore, American mutual necessity. To cushion the blow
aid should be tightly focused on assisting to U.S. arms manufacturers that such a
the modernization and professionalization change would entail, the United States
of the Egyptian military and should be should consider diverting future military
made wholly contingent on evidence assistance to more reliable allies, such as
that Egypt takes those matters seriously. Jordan; or to partners that need help far
In March, the Obama administration more urgently than Egypt, such as Iraq;
announced that Egypts future purchases or to states in the region that are transi-
of U.S. military hardware must be specifi- tioning to democracy more successfully,
cally tied to counterterrorism, protecting such as Tunisia.
Egypts borders, combating militants in But the United States should leave
the Sinai, or maritime security. But it open the possibility that aid to Egypt
remains unclear how the United States could be restored to previous levels if
will determine whether any prospective Egypt undertakes serious political liberal-
purchase meets the new criteria. ization, begins credible efforts at inclusive
Washington should make it perfectly and sustainable economic change, and
clear that its military aid is not connected initiates a program of genuine military
to a push for Egypt to embrace political modernization. Such reforms would
reforms, much less democratize. Targeting justify a strategic U.S.-Egyptian relation-
the aid more narrowly and focusing it ship and enhance regional security and
on clear and relatively modest goals will could serve as the foundation for a stable,
allow Washington to significantly reduce democratic, pluralistic, and prosperous
the overall amount of military financing Egypt that would provide the Arab world
it provides to Cairo. The level of aid with a much-needed alternative to its
should accurately reflect the current failed political models.
importance of the bilateral relationship, It is hard to imagine Egypt taking
which now ranks far below U.S. rela- any of those steps in the foreseeable
tions with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and future. In the meantime, if Washington
the United Arab Emirates. Lowering decides to proceed with an outdated
the total annual amount from $1.3 billion approach to Cairo, the result will be
to around $500 million would express constant tension, friction, and frustra-
U.S. displeasure with the status quo while tion, as both sides expectations go
adequately serving the near-term security unfulfilled. Business as usual will
needs of the United States, continuing do nothing to alter Egypts negative
to signal an American commitment to trajectory and will further bind the
Egypt, and conferring a certain level of United States to an unreliable partner.
political status on the Egyptian govern-
ment and military.
November/December 2015 73
state solution in theory, indicating that
Why Israel Waits he does not believe one can emerge in
THE POST-AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST
I
sraeli national security strategy no solutions to the challenges the country
can seem baffling. Many observers faces and that seeking quick fixes to
in the United States and Europe, intractable problems is dangerously
for example, wonder how Israeli Prime naive. Kicking problems down the road
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could until some indefinite future point at
have warned for years that Irans nuclear which they can be tackled more success-
program posed an existential threat to fully therefore does not reflect a lack of
Israel yet has balked at the international Israeli strategy; rather, it defines Israeli
communitys attempts to defang it. strategy. This strategy is at times wrong,
By raising concerns about the nuclear but it is not absurd.
deal between Iran and five great powers Israels strategic conservatismthe
without offering a convincing alterna- notion that it can be better to bide ones
tive, Netanyahu has appeared to oppose time and manage conflicts rather than
any solution at all. Instead, as Philip rush to try to solve them before the
Hammond, the British foreign secre- conditions are ripeis not inherently
tary, said in July, Netanyahu is acting bad and has in fact served Israel well in
as though he would prefer a permanent some cases. In others, as in the conflict
state of standoff with Tehran. with the Palestinians, it has damaged the
Nor do Israeli leaders seem to have a countrys prospects. Whether or not this
clear answer in mind for how to solve strategy is effective, U.S. policymakers
the countrys conflict with the Palestin- need to grapple with it as they make their
ians. The country faces nearly universal own decisions about how to address
opprobrium for its occupation of the the problems in the Middle East.
West Bank and the looming possibility
that it will have to sacrifice either its PLAYING IT SAFE
democracy or its Jewish demographic At his core, Netanyahu is not so much
majority should it not pursue territorial hawkish as conservative: determined to
partition with the Palestinians. Yet few avoid revolutions, wary of the unintended
in the Israeli government offer realistic consequences of grand policy designs,
strategies for ending the conflict. and resolved to stand firm in the face
Netanyahu himself has gone back and of adversity. He is deeply pessimistic
forth, declaring his support for a two- about change and believes that Israel, a
small country in a volatile region, has
NATAN SACHS is a Fellow at the Brookings a minuscule margin for error. Despite
Institutions Center for Middle East Policy and
the author of the forthcoming book Does Israel what many progressive Europeans
Have a Plan? Follow him on Twitter @natansachs. think, such a worldview does not
74 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Why Israel Waits
November/December 2015 75
Natan Sachs
but for Netanyahu, such a solution was minister, had made more concessions in
never the point. the negotiations than most Israelis had
Under the Netanyahu-Yaalon approach, expected, only to be rebuffed by Arafat
Israels relations with both the Palestinians and answered with a violent uprising.
and Iran are likely to remain unresolved The picture that is emerging, is that
until the distant future; they will remain there is apparently no partner for peace,
managed stalemates that persist until there Barak said in October 2000, and many
is some sort of fundamental shift in the of his compatriots agreed.
landscape, such as a generational change During this period, Israel started to try
in attitudes or a regional upheaval. to solve its regional problems unilaterally.
Israel withdrew its forces from southern
THE EVOLUTION OF Lebanon in 2000 and then evacuated all
ISRAELI SKEPTICISM settlements and troops from the Gaza
This worldview is far from unusual in Strip in 2005. But when attacks against
Israel. On the Palestinian issue, in fact, Israel continued to emerge from both
Yaalon is an exemplar of middle-of-the- areas, the Israeli public grew disenchanted
road Israelis, who genuinely hoped that with unilateralism as well.
the peace process of the 1990s would The years since have not been kind
succeed and were deeply disillusioned to Israeli optimism about any of the
by its failure. Middle Easts problems. Multiple rounds
Yaalon grew up in a left-leaning home of negotiations between Israeli leaders
and initially supported the Oslo Accords, and Arafats successor, Mahmoud Abbas,
the agreements between Israel and the have failed to bring peace. Countries
Palestine Liberation Organization, starting bordering Israel have erupted in politi-
in 1993, that aimed to pave the way to a cal turmoil and horrific violence in the
final-status deal between the two sides. wake of the Arab Spring. And behind the
As the chief of Israeli military intelli- rocket fire, kidnappings, and perennial
gence in the years that followed, however, flare-ups that have defined their more
he came to reassess Palestinian intentions. immediate anxieties, many Israelis have
He observed frequent calls for violent seen Irans hand: both in Hezbollah, which
resistance by Palestinian leaders, denials straddles the line between a Lebanese
that Jews could self-identify as a nation political party and an Iranian proxy
or that they have a historic connection militia, and in Hamas, a Sunni Islamist
to the Holy Land, and the failure of the militia that has at times received
Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat to crack Iranian support.
down on terrorism in the run-up to the With Israel having failed to achieve
Hamas-led bombings of early 1996. normalcy through negotiations, unilateral
Over time, the Israeli public echoed withdrawals, or brute force, most Israelis
Yaalons loss of confidence in the peace have concluded that normalcy is not theirs
process. Many Israelis grew disillusioned to be had. They need to brace themselves
with Arafat after watching his actions for a long fight and avoid the temptations
during the negotiations at Camp David of grand plans. They will not be fooled
in 2000 and especially during the second again. Indeed, in a poll conducted by the
intifada that followed. Barak, then prime Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv
76 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Why Israel Waits
The long view: Netanyahu near the Egyptian-Israeli border, January 2010
November/December 2015 77
Natan Sachs
far, he has generally done a good job achievable peacewhich tends to be ugly,
managing Israels borders with Egypt practical, and unsatisfying. In this sense,
and Syria, for example, mostly staying Netanyahus anti-solutionism reflects just
out of the turmoil in both those coun- as much naivet as the solutionism he
tries while protecting core Israeli and Yaalon have decried.
interests. But on balance, Netanyahus Properly applied, moreover, strategic
strategic conservatism has damaged conservatism should keep a countrys
Israels international standing and long-term options open. In the case of
restricted its room for maneuver. Israel, that would entail maintaining the
Whether or not the Iran nuclear possibility of a future Israeli-Palestinian
deal succeeds, there is little doubt that partition, an objective that Netanyahu
Netanyahus stance has isolated Israel has claimed to support.
internationally, strained its alliance with Yet Israels current approach is gradu-
the United States, and strengthened ally ruling out this long-term objective.
critics view of Israel as rejectionist. Yaalon and Bennett vigorously support
Indeed, Netanyahus conditions for an settlement construction in the West
acceptable deal with Iran were so strin- Bank. Netanyahu has also advanced
gent that they seemed to preclude any settlement construction, although often
agreement at all, despite his claims to on a more limited scale. If the conflict
the contrary. lasts for decades, as Yaalon has suggested
On the Palestinian issue, too, it must, such settlement construction will
Netanyahu and Yaalon have set their render Netanyahus stated goal of parti-
policy standards so high as to block tion increasingly impossible. This logic
realistic progress. Their demand that is not lost on right-wing Israelis, many
the Palestinians accept the idea of of whom support settlement construction
Israel as a nation-state makes sense in precisely to eliminate the future possibil-
the context of reconciliation between ity of a two-state solution.
the two parties, especially in light of Netanyahus muddled settlement
the Palestinians demand for the right policy reflects an attempt to accommo-
of return for refugees and their descen- date both international pressure and the
dants. Yet if a practical peace is ever demands of his right flank. Yet his dance
to be achieved, Israeli and Palestinian between progressives abroad and the
leaders will need to accept that their right wing at home has convinced neither
demands will be only partially met. A of his commitment. As in the immediate
full right of return for Palestinians, for aftermath of the Iran deal, Netanyahu has
example, will simply not be possible failed both to persuade his critics of his
under any realistic settlement, and even sincerity and to effect change. Instead,
those Palestinians who accept the exis- he has cast himself as a rejectionist.
tence of Israel are not likely to forget A cautious strategic approach, finally,
their dismay at its creation. Condition- makes sense only when the passage of
ing peace with the Palestinians on their time works in ones favor. Time is indeed
acceptance of Zionisms basic principle on Israels side with respect to many of
is therefore not only a stretch; it also its traditional Arab adversaries, which are
confuses perfect conflict resolution for so mired in internal conflict that they
78 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
I N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D
Cutting-Edge
Forecasts and Analysis
What factors are shaping the global outlook?
How do commodity price changes influence potential growth?
Will there be global repercussions from Chinas growth slowdown?
How do we balance financial booms and busts?
What is the impact of falling oil prices?
elibrary.imf.org/page/fa105
ADVANCING A
MODERN VISION
OF SECURITY.
November/December 2015 79
Natan Sachs
costs of calling Iran out on even small Palestinian policies that will prejudice a
infractions, because failing to do so future deal and those that will not. As it
would cause the deal to lose force over does so, it should pressure both sides to
time. Next, Israel and the United States make choices that will keep options open
should better coordinate their monitor- in the long run.
ing of Irans compliance, which could With this in mind, the United States
help prevent an unintended blowup of should change two major tenets of its
the deal, for which either country could current policy. First, Washington should
be blamed. promote interim steps between Israel and
Finally, in its public messaging about the Palestinians well short of a final-status
the costs of violating the deal, Israel agreement. The Obama administration
should stop undermining the United has been loath to push for such steps,
States. At present, the credibility of including Israeli withdrawals of settlers
the American claim that Iran will face or troops from parts of Area C, the
punishment for violations of the deal large portion of the West Bank that is
is the single most important asset under full Israeli administration. This
that Israel and the United States have; reluctance stems in part from the under-
Netanyahu and Obama should both standable fear among the Palestinians,
cultivate it deliberately. Netanyahu has which Washington is sensitive to, that
repeatedly said that Iran will be able to temporary agreements could become
break the deal and get away with it; he permanent, lessening the pressure on
should change his tune, making clear that Israel without bringing fundamental
he believes such violations will come change. And although the Netanyahu
at a serious cost, levied by the United government has been open to some
States. Obama and the next U.S. presi- provisional steps, such as the easing of
dent should likewise make sure U.S. restrictions on Palestinian economic
threats are taken seriously. development in the West Bank, it has
On the Palestinian issue, meanwhile, resisted settler and troop withdrawals,
the United States should resist the citing the perceived failure of Israels
temptationstill present in some circles unilateral retreats from southern Lebanon
in the Obama administrationto try to and Gaza.
push the parties toward a comprehensive Many Israelis indeed believe that
solution in the near term, because such a unilateral withdrawal was tried in Gaza
settlement is currently unobtainable. This and failed. But Israels 2005 withdrawal
is not because a realistic two-state solution was made up of two components, each
aimed at conflict resolution rather than of which should be considered separately:
reconciliation is fundamentally impos- the withdrawal of Jewish settlements
sible, as Yaalon has argued, but because from the heart of a highly populated
the current set of Israeli and Palestinian Palestinian territory and the withdrawal
leaders, and the current environment in of all Israeli security forces from the
the Middle East, is ill suited for the area. The uprooting of the settlements
negotiation of one. Instead, the United was no easy matterwhole communities
States should focus on distinguishing were forcibly removed and their homes
between those short-term Israeli and and buildings razed, causing a deep rift
80 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Why Israel Waits
November/December 2015 81
Natan Sachs
82 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
STEPHEN BREYER
ON
THE COURT AND THE WORLD
J
udicial isolationiasm,
[Breyer] rightly insists,
will make it difficult for
judges to address the kinds
of problems we need them
to solve in the ever smaller
world of the 21st century
No accounting of the
costs and benefits of global
integration can by itself
resolve the tensions
between self-governance
and interconnectedness.
But democracy has never
been a nativist straitjacket.
Breyers book offers a
powerful description of the
price we would pay for
allowing it to become one.
JOHN FABIAN WITT,
The New York Times Book Review
A A K N O P F. C O M
START HERE.
GW ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
elliott.gwu.edu
ESSAYS
Refugees need autonomy and
opportunity, which only
integration into the global
economy can provide.
Alexander Betts
and Paul Collier
Alexander Betts and Paul Collier 84 David M. Edelstein and Ronald R. Krebs 109
T
here are now some 60 million displaced people around the
world, more than at any time since World War II. The Syrian
crisis alone, which has created the largest refugee shock of
the era, has displaced some ten million people, around four million of
them across international borders. In recent months, Western attention
has focused almost exclusively on the flood of these refugees to Europe.
Yet most of the Syrian refugees have been taken in not by Western
countries but by Syrias neighboring states: Jordan, Lebanon, and
Turkey, whose capacity has been overwhelmed. Lebanon, with a pop-
ulation of around four million and a territory smaller than Maryland,
is hosting over a million Syrian refugees. Young people are over-
represented in the refugee population, so that more than half of the
school-aged children in Lebanon are now Syrian.
International policy toward the Syrian refugee crisis is both anti-
quated and fueled by panic. It is premised on the same logic that has
characterized refugee policy since the 1950s: donors write checks to
support humanitarian relief, and countries that receive refugees are
expected to house and care for them, often in camps. The panic comes
from Europe, where debate has focused on how to fairly distribute
hundreds of thousands of new arrivals, from both Syria and elsewhere,
across the European Union and how to prevent asylum seekers from
ALEXANDER BETTS is Leopold Muller Professor of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies
and Director of the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. He is the author
of Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement. Follow him on
Twitter @alexander_betts.
PAUL COLLIER is Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of
Government at the University of Oxford. He is the author of Exodus: How Migration Is
Changing Our World.
84 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Help Refugees Help Themselves
November/December 2015 85
Alexander Betts and Paul Collier
86 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Help Refugees Help Themselves
November/December 2015 87
Alexander Betts and Paul Collier
88 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Help Refugees Help Themselves
AN ECONOMY IN EXILE
The brutality of the Syrian civil war has fueled a sense that the conflict
will drag on indefinitely. But all wars end, and it is actually not diffi-
cult to imagine a scenario in which parts of Syria revert to peace in the
next few years. Syrian President Bashar al-Assads forces have suf-
fered massive casualties relative to his regimes base of support. Syrias
ability to pay for the war has deteriorated as its tax base has shrunk,
and the country has heavily depleted its foreign exchange reserves.
At some point, the leaders of the Syrian ruling establishment will
recognize that Assad has become a liability. They will have to choose
between jettisoning him and facing total defeat; in all likelihood, they
will rid themselves of Assad and push for a negotiated end to the war.
But even once peace arrives, it will likely be insecure. If disempowered
Syrians can access employment and educational opportunities in exile,
they will be more likely to return to their country equipped to con-
tribute to its postconflict recovery. And they will be less likely to fall
victim to the lure of militant organizations that recruit from among
the disempowered. By building legitimate sources of opportunity,
then, a development-based approach to the refugees in Jordan could
help pave the way for a more stable postwar Syria.
November/December 2015 89
Alexander Betts and Paul Collier
STRESS TESTED
Setting up SEZs to employ refugees would be a dramatically different
approach from the dominant model of housing them in camps, but it
would not be without precedent. A number of states have success-
fully employed refugees in the service of economic development,
to the benefit of both the displaced and the societies hosting them.
In Greece during the 1920s, for instance, the League of Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees worked with the International
Labor Organization to integrate nearly 1.5 million Greek refugees
who had fled Turkey for their ethnic homeland. With loans and
assistance from the League of Nations, the Greek government em-
ployed the refugee population in the economic transformation of
underdeveloped areas of the country. The effects on the Greek
economy were dramatic: with international support, primitive
farming practices were replaced with modern ones, and agricultural
output quickly rose.
Similar schemes were employed in sub-Saharan Africa in the
1960s, when many states faced an influx of refugees displaced by
anticolonial struggles and Cold War proxy conflicts. In western Uganda,
for example, Oxfam supported the development of the Kyangwali
settlement, drawing on Rwandan refugees to support agricultural growth
in a previously underdeveloped region. Neighboring countries, such
as Burundi and Congo, followed Ugandas lead. The benefits of these
90 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Help Refugees Help Themselves
projects were twofold: refugees improved the lot of their host countries
and integrated themselves into local economies.
Such approaches were also pursued in Central America around
the end of the Cold War. In Mexicos then underdeveloped Yucatn
Peninsula, for instance, the International Conference on Central
American Refugees employed displaced Guatemalan refugees in
agricultural projects, contributing to the regions development and
improving the refugees capacities for self-reliance in anticipation
of an eventual return to their country of origin.
These examples all involved agricultural, rather than industrial,
development. Nevertheless, they illustrate the potential of refugees,
given international support, to contribute to the economic develop-
ment of their host states, to improve the prospects for long-term
regional stability, and to augment their own livelihoods. Zonal
development is a flexible approach that can be adapted to a variety
of situations. Jordan is not Mexico, but there is no reason why refugees
could not work to improve a manufacturing sector rather than an
agricultural one.
November/December 2015 91
Alexander Betts and Paul Collier
92 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
The Worlds Leading MA Program in
Security Studies
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I
n the last year, some 39,000 migrants, mostly from North Africa,
tried to make their way to the United Kingdom from the French
port of Calais by boarding trucks and trains crossing the English
Channel. In response, the British government attempted to secure
the entrance to the tunnel in Calais, dispatching two and a half miles
of security fencing that had been used for the 2012 Olympics and the
2014 NATO summit.
The United Kingdoms improvised response to the migrant crisis,
with recycled fences substituting for a coherent immigration policy, is
emblematic of its increasingly parochial approach to the world beyond
its shores. The Conservative government of Prime Minister David
Cameron appears to lack a clear vision of the countrys place on the
global stage. The United Kingdom, a nuclear power and permanent
member of the UN Security Council, now seems intent not on engaging
with the outside world but on insulating itself from it. The United
Kingdom does not merely lack a grand strategy. It lacks any kind of
clearly defined foreign policy at all, beyond a narrow trade agenda.
Historically, the United Kingdom has been an active player in world
politics. After the loss of its empire, the country was a founding and
engaged member of the institutions of the postwar Western order.
British governments have led the way in pressing for, and undertaking,
humanitarian interventions from Sierra Leone to Kosovo. And the
United Kingdoms relationship with the United States has been a great
asset to both sides since World War II.
Recently, however, factors including fatigue following the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, a recession, and a prime minister with little
ANAND MENON is Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs at Kings College
London. Follow him on Twitter @anandmenon1.
November/December 2015 93
Anand Menon
94 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Littler England
November/December 2015 95
Anand Menon
IN OR OUT?
Yet precisely when international cooperation is needed most, a new
political argument threatens to weaken the United Kingdoms ability to
collaborate: the debate over whether the country should leave the EU.
Cameron has promised a referendum on EU membership by the end of
2017, and it appears likely that one will take place in 2016. The United
Kingdomlike all EU memberscontinues to pursue its own foreign
policy alongside those formulated for the EU as a whole in Brussels. If,
however, it votes to leave the union, it will weaken its global influence
and further jeopardize the stability of the international order.
For some proponents of a British exit from the EU, or Brexit, with-
drawal forms part of a broader strategy of retrenchment. Twenty-four of
the 30 Conservative members of Parliament who voted against interven-
tion in Syria also defied their own party to vote in favor of a referendum
on EU membership in October 2011.
96 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Littler England
FORTRESS BRITAIN?
Buried within some of the Euroskeptics criticisms of EU member-
ship lies a paradox about British power. On the one hand, advocates
November/December 2015 97
Anand Menon
98 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Littler England
November/December 2015 99
Anand Menon
100 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
The Future of Land Warfare
Michael E. OHanlon
Imperial Gamble
Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War
Marvin Kalb
brookings.edu/press
CORNELL New Books in Global Affairs
UNIVERSITY PRESS
from Cornell
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Rank Has Its Privileges
How International Ratings Dumb Down
Global Governance
Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder
W
hen the Berlin-based group Transparency International
released its annual ranking of international corruption levels
in December 2014, Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs
responded with a blistering statement. Chinese authorities were upset
that their country had sunk from 80th to 100th place on the watchdogs
influential Corruption Perceptions Index, even though Beijing was
pursuing a high-profile anticorruption campaign. As a fairly influential
international organization, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson
said, Transparency International should seriously examine the objec-
tiveness and impartiality of its Corruption Perceptions Index.
This wasnt the first time Beijing had dismissed the results of an
international ranking. A year earlier, it had called for the elimination
of the World Banks annual Ease of Doing Business Index, in which
China had similarly underperformed, citing what Chinese officials
described as flawed methodologies and assumptions.
Chinas anger reveals just how powerful such ratings have become.
Todays ratings, produced by nongovernmental organizations and
international agencies alike, score governments on nearly every aspect
of a state: democracy, corruption, environmental degradation, friend-
liness to business, the likelihood of state collapse, the security of nuclear
materials, and much more. The ratings customers are equally diverse.
Government officials and activists refer to these indexes as measures of
102 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
even small groups can generate indexes without conducting original
research, such as labor-intensive surveys.
Ratings can indeed work as designed, pressuring states to improve
governance. By comparing states with their rivals and peers, the
measures exert social pressure for improved policy. The International
Budget Partnerships Open Budget Index, for instance, convenes
regional conferences marking the publication of its biennial review of
104 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Peterson Institute for International Economics
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106 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Rank Has Its Privileges
and interactive effects, they often take a shortcut: they assume that
the outcomes of interest to them represent syndromes in which all
good things (or all bad things) go together. Of course, that is not the
case, as the many components of a single score can easily undercut
one another and because external variables often play hidden roles.
The various criteria that produce a countrys media freedom rating,
for instance, can move in opposite directions without affecting that
states final scoresay, when increases in the availability of information
motivate leaders to crack down on free expression in response.
Such simplifications cannot be solved by carefully weighting the
components that produce ratings, since factors such as repression of
speech and the availability of political information are interactive,
rather than additive, variables, meaning that they can dampen or
multiply the overall effect. So whats needed is not a single metric of
state behavior but a better understanding of the interactions that
produce the outcomes being studied.
108 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
SPONSORED SECTION | MOROCCO - 1
www.foreignaffairs.com/morocco2015
Pulling free from successive shocks of the global sustainable for the years ahead and could be higher
financial crisis, the Arab Spring protests, and sluggish still, if further reform is implemented. Moroccos trade
growth in the Moroccos main export markets in deficit decreased in the first half of 2015 to $7.8 billion,
Europe, Morocco today looks not only revived, but from $10.2 billion in 2014. Lower oil prices had a role
stronger and better positioned to exploit its strategic to play, but so too did a strong 6.4 percent increase in
advantages in the global economy. As King Mohammed exports, totaling $11.22 billion.
VI remarked last year on the fifteenth anniversary of Moroccos government, first elected in 2011 after
his accession to the throne, known as Throne Day, the introduction of constitutional changes strengthening
growth rates have increased significantly thanks to the role of the parliament, is determined to continue
the adoption of ambitious sectoral plans. development on this upward trend. I think we are
Morocco has managed to steer clear of the issues opening ourselves today to a future in which Morocco
affecting its Arab neighbors and has maintained growth will be among the developed countries, says Benkirane.
through even the most difficult years. When the World The government plans to capitalize on the countrys
Economic Forum released the Global Competitiveness strategic location and the access it enjoys to both
Report earlier this year, it confirmed Morocco as the European and African markets. It has put in place
most competitive economy in North Africa and the development strategies for each of Moroccos key sectors,
fourth most competitive in the entire African continent. including industry, energy, infrastructure, health, and
I think everyone now recognizes that Morocco is a education. Morocco now has a set of programs and
stable country. It is also a secure and a democratic national strategies aimed at growth. Many things are
country, says Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane. being done today, so that tomorrow Morocco will be
Last year, Moroccos economy grew by an estimated competitive in attracting investment and facilitating the
2.6 percent, despite poor harvests and persistently work of companies, explains Benkirane.
low demand from its main export markets in Europe. According to the Prime Minister, in 2014 the
Prospects for 2015 are better still. Driven by record automotive sector surpassed phosphate for the first
harvests and significant growth in non-agricultural time as Moroccos top foreign-exchange earner,
sectors, including automotive, aeronautics, and a clear sign of things to come. Investments in
textiles, growth is gaining speed and is expected to manufacturing and assembly from companies such
rise to a healthy 5 percent. This rate of growth looks as Renault, Bombardier and Sumitomi Electric Wiring
SPONSORED SECTION | MOROCCO - 2
Systems mark a significant change in Moroccos since there were segments of society below decent
economic orientation. living standards.
Morocco is becoming increasingly attractive for A wide agenda of reforms is now set to change
international companies seeking to relocate, be it almost every part of civic life in Morocco. There
in manufacturing, offshoring, or high-tech sectors. are reforms on many levels, for example the justice
Taking this a step further, the government aims to turn reform, civil society reform, public finance reform,
Morocco into a regional industrial hub. A seven-year decentralization reform, media reform, and gender
Industrial Acceleration Plan, launched in 2014, presents reform after the successful reform of the family code,
a comprehensive strategy to accelerate development says Mustapha Khalfi, Minister of Communication
of the industrial sector and grow the contribution of and Spokesperson for the Government. These
manufacturing to Moroccan gross domestic product reforms represent the reform agenda and explain
from a current 14 percent to 23 percent by 2020. why Morocco has succeeded in becoming the most
stable country in North Africa.
International institutions look at these efforts
favorably. Last year the International Monetary Fund
approved a $5 billion credit line, under an arrangement
known as the Precautionary and Liquidity Line. Valid
over a two-year period, the arrangement allows
Moroccos government to pursue its reform agenda,
while protecting it from external shocks. Equally, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Abdelilah Benkirane, Prime Minister of Morocco increased lending to Morocco from $600 million a year
to $1 billion a year over a four-year period. As part
A model built on reforms of the World Banks Country Partnership Strategy,
Moroccos recent success and economic growth the lending program supports Moroccan efforts at
can be credited to shrewd business planning, but improving economic competitiveness, quality of public
also to a distinctly Moroccan model of development services, governance, and social protection.
that insists on making growth more inclusive. King One of the most anxiously anticipated and eventually
Mohammed VI underlined the importance of tying successful reforms is the subsidy reform. Starting in
growth to human development during his speech at 2014, the government has begun removing subsidies
Throne Day earlier this year. Setting up institutions, on fuel products that were draining public budgets,
no matter how important they may be, is not an but were not aiding the most vulnerable members
end in itself. By the same token, economic growth of society. Most such consumer subsidies will now
can only be significant if it contributes to improving be eliminated by the end of 2017, freeing the budget
peoples quality of life. for other purposes. An evaluation by the World Bank
Since ascending to the throne in 1999, King characterized the subsidy reforms as perhaps the
Mohammed VI has pushed for and sanctioned wide- most rational reforms undertaken in the Middle East
ranging economic and political reforms aimed at and North Africa region in recent years.
fighting poverty and inequality and promoting Khalfi underlines that, Subsidy reforms have had
economic development, including through the a huge impact in reducing the budget deficit from 7
dedicated Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social percent in 2012 to 4.3 percent in 2014. This allows the
Development. Moroccos government under Prime government to spend more in fighting poverty, in making
Minister Abdelilah Benkirane follows a similar the necessary investments to provide electricity, public
agenda. Faced with unemployment, in particular youth health services, housing, and education for the poor,
unemployment, low productivity, and corruption, the and to support the private sector [in] creating jobs.
government has committed to a program of structural Similar positive effects are now expected from
reforms to improve the business environment, living pension system and justice system reforms, as well as
conditions, and social and spatial cohesion. from regional devolution. Corruption is being tackled
For the past four years our actions have been decisively. In the past two years more than 18,000
based on three axes, explains Benkirane. We first cases of corruption have been presented to the courts.
had to restore the macroeconomic balances since we A reform of the educational system is also under way.
felt those balances were strangling our budget, we had A new education project, launched by the government
to simplify the administrative procedures in order to last year under the name of Vision 2030 aims to raise
facilitate the work of every enterprise, and we had to the general level of education and to better prepare
restore the economic balance in the Moroccan society, students for the future job market.
SPONSORED SECTION | MOROCCO - 3
The World at Moroccos Doorstep
Since gaining independence in 1956, Morocco has are losing between 1 and 2 percent of regional GDP
pursued an open market policy. It has been a member because of the lack of this regional integration. It is
of the World Trade Organization since 1987 and has important to look at North Africa as a future market
concluded a series of free trade agreements over the that we have to prepare, says Abouaida.
past two decades. The largest of these agreements,
concluded with the United States, has been in force Investment opportunities abound
since 2005. Moroccos expanding international engagement is
Any free trade agreement can be critical at the reflected by a rise in foreign direct investment (FDI).
beginning, but we now see a lot of benefits from our Whereas in the 1990s Morocco attracted an average
agreement with the U.S., says MBarka Abouaida, of $500 million of FDI annually, in recent years it has
Minister Delegate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. attracted an average of $3 billion.
More and more Moroccan companies are exporting The 2015 Africa Attractiveness Index, produced
to the U.S. and this is very important because it by consulting firm Ernst & Young, ranked Morocco
helps us become more competitive by developing our the third largest recipient of FDI in Africa. Foreign
production capacity and the quality of our products. investments in Morocco rose to $1.32 billion in the
Europe, visible just across the narrow strait of first half of 2015, compared to $1.1 billion during the
Gibraltar, remains Moroccos most important trading same period last year, representing a 19.6 percent
partner by far. Trade with the countries of the increase.
European Union (EU) amounted to a total of more Investors are attracted by the countrys stability,
than $32 billion in 2014. Historic links tie Morocco to the availability of skilled labor at comparatively
the developed markets of Europe, especially France lower wages, the proximity to European and African
and Spain, while proximity to the European mainland markets, and the access to other markets via the
offers obvious economic opportunities. Morocco is countrys free trade agreements. Moroccos improving
aligned with the EU via an advanced association business environment, a direct result of its reform
agreement, while deeper integration with the EUs efforts, has also made it easier for investors to enter
internal market is currently in the making as part of the market. In the World Banks 2015 Doing Business
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement report, Morocco jumped to 71st out of 189 economies,
that will eventually lead to an opening of markets for a significant improvement over the 2012 report that
services, investment, and public procurement. put Morocco in 94th.
At the same time, relations with other regions are Investments are made across sectors, from
gaining importance. This includes the Gulf region, industry, tourism, energy, and infrastructure,
which is making significant investments in Morocco, to financial services, technology, and
and Asia, particularly China and Japan. There is a telecommunications, including investments from
special focus on Asia for the next two to three years international heavyweights such as Renault, Dell,
to increase relationships at the political and economic Bombardier, Delphi, GDF Suez, and Acciona. The
level. There is lot of potential to be present in Asia and government-led Moroccan Investment Development
for Asia to be present in Morocco, confirms Abouaida. Agency (AMDI) is instrumental in attracting and
To attract more Asian companies, the government directing investments. We know exactly what we
is prepared to make specific arrangements. We are want in each and every activity sector, remarks
discussing the possibility of having an Asian logistical Hamid Benelafdil, General Director of AMDI. The best
zone in Morocco, in order to re-export Asian products example is the industrial sector where ecosystems
from Asia to Morocco and through Morocco to the rest have developed and we know in each ecosystem what
of Africa, says Abouaida. we must look for in a foreign investor.
These prospects point to Moroccos emerging role Traditionally, Morocco attracts the most investment
in Africa. The country maintains close relations with from France and Spain, but the government is now
nations across the continent, building on what Prime pushing to diversify its sources of FDI. We want to
Minister Benkirane terms a very old and special diversify FDI to come from other continents, such
relationship with Africa. Moroccos trade with sub- as Asia and America, to reduce volatility in foreign
Saharan Africa is developing rapidly and jumped 13 direct investment and to benefit from the know-how
percent in 2014 alone. Regional integration in North and expertise that exist in those regions, states
Africa could pay similar dividends, if successful. We Benelafdil. Interest these days exists from around the
believe that there is a huge potential to work with globe, Benelafdil emphasizes. There is interest from
other countries in the north of Africa. Every year we countries that were not interested in Morocco before:
SPONSORED SECTION | MOROCCO - 4
China, Russia and Brazil. This means that today regionalization. Since we recovered the Sahara, for
Morocco is on the world map of investors. every single dirham of revenue from the Sahara, the
state invests seven dirhams in the region, he stated
Gateway to Africa during last years anniversary of the Green March.
What adds to Moroccos attractiveness as an investment This is echoed by Prime Minister Benkirane, who
destination is that the country is a gateway to the fast- says that we want to progressively allocate $1 billion
growing African continent. Africa today is as China was to disadvantaged regions. The region represents 59
twenty years ago. The potential for economic growth percent of Moroccan territory, but includes some of
is extraordinary, notes Benelafdil. Morocco has an the worlds driest deserts.
entrepreneurial advantage. It has already experimented Between 2004 and 2010, a total of $1 billion
with Africa and knows Africa very well. has been invested in economic and social projects,
Moroccan companies are already present in more bringing the regions indicators for education, health,
than twenty-five African countries through major and poverty reduction above the national average.
investments, subsidiaries, and businesses in a large When Spain relinquished colonial rule of the
variety of sectors, including banking and insurance, southern provinces in 1975, the region was virtually
the pharmaceutical industry, telecommunications, without infrastructure. Today, the three regions of
real estate, and the cement and mining industry. Guelmim, Layoune and Dakhla count a total of
Furthermore, Casablanca Airport serves as a hub for eight large hospitals and more than 150 local health
Royal Air Maroc flights to any destination in Africa. We centers and dispensaries, reaching also into rural
are a country that gives international companies the areas. There are more than five hundred schools
opportunity to discover Africa, to invest in Africa while catering to nearly 200,000 students and literacy rates
enjoying the legal and the physical infrastructure of have risen above the national average. The rate of
Morocco, says Benelafdil. completed secondary school education stands at 81
Moroccos legitimacy in the eyes of African nations percent, compared to 64 percent nationally. Living
rests on the countrys commitment to genuine conditions have also improved dramatically. More
cooperation between partners. Our priority for the than 95 percent of the population now has access
last ten years has been to develop this South-South to drinking water and poverty rates have dropped
Cooperation and give it real substance, remarks significantly. Layoune and Dakhla, the regions
Minister Delegate Abouaida. We are trying to help largest cities, have some of the lowest poverty rates
as much as we can by transferring our know-how in the whole of Morocco.
in different sectors, such as finance, agriculture, A New Development Model for the Kingdoms
telecommunications, electrification, social housing, Southern Provinces, backed by the King
education and others. and presented by the Economic, Social and
Diplomatic relations with countries in Africa build Environmental Council (ESEC) in 2013, points to
on links that have existed for centuries and are the regions great potential for growth. The plan
supported by modern connections. As Benelafdil distinguishes between two phases of development;
points out, an asset that is often overlooked is that a first phase devoted to optimizing existing
many African students come to Morocco for higher potentials and promoting growth opportunities, and
education. It is the African elite that come to study in a second phase to establishing a high added-value
Morocco. This is where relationships are created but processing sector, a knowledge-based economy,
also a natural link with Morocco. and the inclusive use of natural resources.
It is this privileged relationship with the African This is supported by strong transport connections.
continent that gives Morocco additional value in the The Moroccan state has invested nearly $500 million
eyes of international investors, opening the door to in the construction and improvement of six fully
three-way cooperation projects. We are trying to operational ports, in Layounee, Dakhla, Sidi Ifni,
develop and to promote what we call the Triangular Tan Tan, Tarfaya, and Boujdour. And it has invested
Cooperation, explains Abouaida. The idea is to work another $300 million in growing the road network
at the triangular level, which means for Morocco, from 70 to almost 4,000 kilometers in the regions of
African countries, and other countries from Europe, the Layoune and Dakhla.
Gulf region, the Middle East, the U.S., and Asia to come The declared aim of the new development model
together and see what we can do together in Africa. is to double the regions GDP over the next 10-year
period and to create more than 120,000 new jobs.
South provinces: A regional hub Implementation of the new model holds the promise
In support of development and domestic cohesion, of turning the southern provinces into a dynamic hub
the King has long favored decentralization and between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa.
SPONSORED SECTION | MOROCCO - 5
Tanger-Med Port
Renault Tanger
I
n February 2015, when U.S. President Barack Obama released his
second and final National Security Strategya formal outline of
the administrations foreign policyit was met with the usual
fanfare. Critics and defenders debated its principles and priorities.
Prospective presidential candidates piggybacked off the release to
highlight their own security agendas, hoping to score political points
and broadcast their resolve. Others were simply relieved that the
president, who often seemed allergic to explaining his grand strategy,
had given voice to one.
The periodic production of a national security strategy has been
an American ritual since 1986, when the Goldwater-Nichols Act
required the president to submit an annual report to Congress. In
theory, strategizing is supposed to make the country safer. As officials
debate competing strategies, the poorest policy options should fall
by the wayside. The public debate following the final documents
release should bring democratic transparency to a discussion of
the countrys strategic priorities and how they are to be pursued.
The production of an explicit strategy is meant to hold leaders
accountable to the citizenry at large and to signal Washingtons
RONALD R. KREBS is Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associ-
ate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. He is
the author of Narrative and the Making of US National Security.
110 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Delusions of Grand Strategy
Strategery: President George W. Bush with his foreign policy advisers, September 2001
to address todays conflicts and tomorrows threats. The panel con-
cluded, Instead of unconstrained, long term analysis by planners
who were encouraged to challenge preexisting thinking, the QDRs
became explanations and justifications, often with marginal changes,
of established decisions and plans.
Finally, even if a strategy could be consistently implemented, there
are no clear metrics to assess the costs and benefits of a particular
course of action, even in retrospect. Strategic outcomes that appear
poorly calculated to one analyst may seem sensible to another with
different goals and ambitions. In addition, strategies that offer short-
term rewards may sometimes prove unwise over a longer period.
This is not to say that U.S. foreign policy simply shifts with the
E RIC D RAPE R / WHITE HOUS E / G ET TY IMAG ES
winds. Indeed, the United States has acted as a liberal hegemon, more
or less coherently, ever since World War II. But this is less the product
of a formal grand strategy than the result of enduring structural
features of the international and domestic landscape: the United
States material preponderance, the powerful corporate interests that
profit from global integration, the dominance of core liberal tenets in
American political culture. To detect actual strategy in the U.S. gov-
ernments diverse initiatives over the decades is to confuse cause with
after-the-fact rationalization and requires sweeping aside countless
deviations from that supposedly carefully charted course.
112 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Where the World Connects
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The fellow will receive a $45,000 stipend, employee benefits, office space, and access to Cornell facilities.
Outstanding junior scholars from any part of the world whose work demonstrates excellence in the
social sciences or humanities and addresses questions of lasting importance are encouraged to apply.
behind the policy was sound, and rewarded when something works,
even if it was a reckless gamble that should never have been tried.
Strategizing is supposed to provide a way beyond all of this,
forcing an administration to show the thought processes behind
its choices and helping the public apportion credit and blame
appropriately. But formal strategy documents are typically vague
on their metrics for failure and success. This is partly for good
reason: international politics is turbulent and unpredictable, and
so strategy must be flexible. But presidents also shy away from
making firm commitments, which run the risk of alienating inter-
ests inside and outside government and would give ordinary citizens
too much ammunition to hold them accountable. Consequently,
the National Security Strategy typically lays out a laundry list of
threats and challenges so long and varied that leaders can always
point to some success or deflect some blame after the fact. Obamas
latest National Security Strategy, for example, highlights threats
from weapons of mass destruction, violent extremism, terrorism,
fragile states, civil wars, corruption, economic recession, and many
others. Obama cannot fail because neither he nor anyone else
could truly succeed.
A final argument in favor of strategizing is that it makes U.S. interests
clear to allies and adversaries, reducing uncertainty in global affairs
and boosting international stability. But credibility cannot be gained
merely by issuing a public document, let alone one that carries few
concrete proposals or repercussions. And when foreign officials do take
published strategy seriously, they read in their own biases, refracting
and distorting the intended message.
Consider the Obama administrations pivot to Asia. As Kurt
Campbell, then the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and
Pacific affairs, explained in 2012, the pivot was founded on two
premises: that in the twenty-first century, the lions share of the
history of the world will be written in the Asia-Pacific region and that
every country in Asia wants a better relationship with China. But in
China, the pivot was seen as the beginnings of containment. Beijings
latest official military strategy makes thinly veiled references to new
threats from hegemonism, power politics, and neo-interventionism
and places U.S. rebalancing in a broader narrative of encirclement
by hostile regional competitors. A strategy intended to make the
region safer has thus had the opposite result.
114 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Delusions of Grand Strategy
116 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
High Hopes for Hydrogen
Fuel Cells and the Future of Energy
Matthew M. Mench
T
he appeal of hydrogen fuel cells has long been obvious.
Because these devices use electrochemical reactions to generate
electricity from hydrogen, emitting only heat and water in
the process, they offer a particularly green source of power, especially
for vehicles. What has not been so obvious, however, is how to make
hydrogen fuel cells practical. In 2009, Steven Chu, then the U.S.
secretary of energy, told an interviewer that in order for hydrogen
fuel-cell transportation to work, four miracles needed to happen.
First, scientists had to find an efficient and low-cost way to produce
hydrogen. Second, they had to develop a safe, high-density method
of storing hydrogen in automobiles. Third, an infrastructure for dis-
tributing hydrogen had to be built so that fuel-cell vehicles would
have ample refueling options. Fourth, researchers had to improve the
capacity of the fuel-cell systems themselves, which were not as durable,
powerful, and low cost as the internal combustion engine. Chu concluded
that achieving all four big breakthroughs would be unlikely. Saints
only need three miracles, he added.
Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Energy dramatically cut
funding for fuel cells, reducing its support for various programs to
nearly a third of previous levels. For the rest of Chus tenure, the
department awarded nearly no new grants to develop the technol-
ogy at universities, national labs, or private companies. Although
the departments total expenditures on fuel cells and hydrogen
had always amounted to a small fraction of overall global invest-
ment in the sector, the change in posture sent a deeply pessimistic
signal worldwide.
MATTHEW M. MENCH is Robert M. Condra Chair of Excellence Professor and head of the
Department of Mechanical, Aerospace, and Biomedical Engineering at the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville.
118 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
High Hopes for Hydrogen
Chus about-face had little practical effect, however, given that he left
office in 2013. Even though the Department of Energy has recently
reinstated some of its support for hydrogen fuel-cell research, it is fund-
ing that research at significantly lower levels than it once did. And so at
the same time as the sector has lost one of its biggest sources of support,
it has seen a major leap forward in terms of practical application.
can allow fueling stations to start operating in the short run, without
having to wait decades for a massive network of hydrogen pipelines to
be built. Already, stations using one or the other distribution method
are being installed around the world, primarily in Europe, Japan, and
South Korea.
Finally, over the past decade, fuel cells themselves have become more
efficient, durable, and inexpensive. The advancements owe in part to a
Department of Energy program that, before funding was slashed, set
clear milestones and proved extremely successful in moving the tech-
nology forward. As a result, estimates of what it would cost to mass-
produce fuel-cell systems have decreased tremendously, from $124 per
kilowatt of capacity in 2006 to $55 per kilowatt in 2014. The durability
of these systems has improved dramatically as well, and they now meet
the expectations of customers used to conventional automobiles.
120 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
High Hopes for Hydrogen
Its a gas: a hydrogen fuel-cell vehicle at a fueling station in California, June 2014
Although transportation is perhaps the most glamorous application
for fuel cells, they are making inroads into a variety of other markets
as well. In large part, thats because the fuel-cell advancements in the
automotive sector translate well into other markets. Of all the possible
uses for fuel cells, putting them in cars entails the most challenging
design requirements. Automotive fuel cells need to be small, high-
powered, inexpensive, functional in all environments, and able to
handle varying load demands. In addition, fuel-cell cars have to beat
out some very tough competition: not just the gasoline vehicles that
have dominated transportation for more than a century but also the
hybrid and electric ones that are gaining market share.
One of the biggest growth areas for hydrogen has been stationary
electricity generation. Fuel cells are rapidly establishing a foothold in
this market, acting as a source of backup power or allowing consumers
to unplug from the grid entirely. The early adopters are in Asia, where
turnkey systems generating anywhere from fractions of a kilowatt to
REUTERS / ALEX GALLARDO
utilities need to build their facilities for peak demand rather than
average demand. So, for example, they construct costly power
plants that get turned on only during the hottest days of the sum-
mer. The growth of renewable energy has only made things worse,
because the hours when these intermittent sources generate power
often do not match the hours when consumers use it most. Storage
alleviates the problem.
Hydrogen may offer one of the cleanest, most efficient, and most
versatile ways of storing energy. Once it is created through electrolysis,
hydrogen can be stored and then used to generate electricity on demand
later via a fuel cell, used to fill up fuel-cell cars, or sent elsewhere through
pipelines. Recent advances in electrolysis have made this energy-storage
option more attractive, but there are dozens of competing methods of
storing electricityfrom giant batteries to compressed air to water
pumped uphilland no clear winner has emerged.
GETTING THERE
Although commercially available hydrogen fuel cells are no longer a
thing of the future, they do have a long way to go before gaining wide-
spread adoption. Safety ranks as one of the most important challenges.
Hydrogen is highly flammable and can even spontaneously ignite
when exposed to just a small amount of air. A variety of industries,
including food processing, steel production, and aerospace, have long
used hydrogen safely. But the existing industrial safety regulations
that cover its transportation, storage, and use are not yet adequate to
deal with all the anticipated applications related to fuel cells. Revising
those regulations is a time-consuming process that will have to involve a
number of different stakeholdersgovernment agencies, manufacturers,
trade groups, and so on.
Another major barrier standing in the way of fuel cells is continually
improving competition. It is almost certain that transportation will
someday rely on electricity in lieu of fossil fuels and that large-scale
energy-storage systems will feature in the electrical grid. But there
are many promising technologies that could fill those needs. For now,
hybrid and electric vehicles are simply further ahead than fuel-cell
vehicles when it comes to commercial viability, and so fuel cells may
have to wait their turn. The U.S. natural gas boom has also made fuel
cells less attractive than other sources of energy. Although the boom
has reduced the cost of hydrogen production, it has also cut the cost
122 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
High Hopes for Hydrogen
A
frican agriculture has long been a symbol of the continents
poverty. Officials considered the hundreds of millions of
African smallholder farmers too backward to thrive; the future
would arrive not by investing in them but rather by bypassing them.
But all that is changing.
In recent years, African agricultural policies have been haphazard
and inconsistent. Some countries have neglected smallholders in favor
of commercial farmers. Others have given them attention but focused
narrowly on increasing their productivity. African farms harvests are
indeed much smaller than harvests elsewhere, so increasing productiv-
ity is important. But agriculture is about more than yields. A vast food
system spreads beyond farm and table to touch almost every aspect of
life in every society. Making that system in Africa as robust as possible
will not merely prevent starvation. It will also fight poverty, disease,
and malnutrition; create businesses and jobs; and boost the continents
economies and improve its trade balances.
Food systems cannot be created quickly out of whole cloth. They
tend to evolve incrementally over time. But in digital technology, to-
days African leaders have a powerful tool they can deploy to help clear
away the primary obstacle to progress: the profound isolation of the
vast majority of smallholder farmers. Until now, it has been very hard
to get information to or from smallholders, preventing their efficient
integration into the broader economy. But mobile communications
can shatter this isolation and enable the creation of a new food sys-
KOFI ANNAN was UN Secretary-General from 1997 to 2006.
SAM DRYDEN is a Senior Fellow at Imperial College London and was Director of Agricultural
Development in the Global Development Program at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
124 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Food and the Transformation of Africa
FIVE PRINCIPLES
The new African food system should be built around the idea that agri-
culture is about more than producing calories; it is about changing
society. Its five components should be valuing the smallholder farmer,
empowering women, focusing on the quality as well as the quantity of
food, creating a thriving rural economy, and protecting the environment.
Neither of us is sentimental about small farms, but we recognize
the need to be practical. More than 80 percent of African agricultural
production comes from smallholders. Any rational food system for
Africa must put its smallholders first. Over the years, many African
governments have tried to bypass the existing agricultural sector by
investing in large-scale commercial farms, on the theory that they
would be more efficient. But allocating large blocks of land to foreign
investors, reserving water for industrial-sized operations, and concen-
trating research and development on a few cash crops doesnt help
most farmers. It also hasnt generated enough produce to feed the
continents rapidly growing urban areas, which is why food imports
are going through the roofand why city dwellers are spending more
than they should on food.
In fact, Africas smallholders are more than capable of feeding the
continentso long as they boost their yields by using the latest agro-
nomic practices in combination with appropriately adapted seeds and
fertilizer. Most have not adopted these improvements, however, be-
cause they dont know about them, or cant get to a place where they
can buy them, or cant afford them. The infrastructure to link most
smallholders to markets simply doesnt exist, which means that many
farmers have little incentive to increase their productivity in order to
generate surpluses to sell. Enabling smallholder farmers to grow more
food and sell it in formal markets for a fair price would change life for
almost every poor person in Africa.
The keys to fixing this problem are supplying smallholders with
appropriate seeds and fertilizer, providing education and training, and
ensuring easy access to markets and larger economic networks. Mobile
technology can help on all these fronts. Cell phones and digital vid-
126 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Food and the Transformation of Africa
Field of dreams: on a maize farm near Bangui, Central African Republic, March 2014
whatever nutrients might still remain. This means that Americans get
lots of cheap, tasty breakfast cereal that isnt good for them.
The current African food system shares some of these features. The
seeds available in Africa are bred for yield almost to the exclusion of
other traits; the breeders who develop these seeds focus mostly on corn
and wheat, so crops such as cassava and sorghum remain unimproved;
and roller mills remove nutritional value in Africa just as they do in
North America. But there are some reasons to be optimistic. For
example, the fortification of food that has long been standard in devel-
oped countries has begun coming to Africa as well. Rice in Ghana,
maize in Zambia, and sweet potato in several countries are now being
fortified with vitamin A. And biofortification promises even bigger
T HOMAS KO EHLE R / PHOT OT H EK VIA G ET TY IMAG ES
ment bought seeds and fertilizer and then had them delivered to farm-
ers. Not only did the system not worklittle of the seeds and fertilizer
ever reached smallholdersbut it also crowded out entrepreneurs who
could have served rural communities directly. To address these issues,
Nigeria recently dismantled the public procurement system and imple-
mented policies to spur new businesses. By giving farmers a 50 percent
subsidy (via vouchers sent to their cell phones), the government has
helped generate demand for seeds and fertilizer. In the meantime, to
make sure there is enough supply to meet that demand, the Ministry of
Agriculture and the Central Bank of Nigeria launched a risk-sharing
program to encourage local banks to make agricultural loans. And with
the partial guarantee, banks have quadrupled their lending to the agri-
culture sector. The number of seed companies operating in Nigeria has
gone from just 11 to more than 100, and there are now thousands of local
mom-and-pop shops selling these companies seeds directly to farmers.
The green revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, finally, introduced new
and highly productive agricultural technologies and methods and fed a
billion people in Asia and Latin America. But it also ended up doing
significant damage to the environment of those regions, depleting the
soil and reducing biodiversity. We now know that ensuring the long-term
sustainability of the African agricultural environment is more critical
than ever, given the problems already being caused by climate change.
The good news is that with digital education in basic conservation
techniques, such as crop rotation with legumes, so-called green ma-
nure, and good water management, smallholder farmers can not only
increase yields in the short term but also restore soil health over time.
This is crucial, since African soils are the most depleted in the world.
128 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Food and the Transformation of Africa
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Now, as in Lon
Blums day, economic
and political crises
fuel anti-Semitism.
Lisa Moses Leff
H U LT O N A R C H I V E / G E T T Y I M A G E S
J
ust two days after the terrorist in their teens and, as young men, found
attack at the offices of the French their way to Islamist terrorist movements,
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo carrying out their anti-Semitic acts in
last January, Amedy Coulibaly, a French- the name of global jihad. As more and
born militant who had pledged allegiance more people from such neighborhoods
to the self-proclaimed Islamic State have followed this path, policing has
(also known as ISIS), murdered four increased, but the underlying economic
Jewish shoppers in a kosher supermar- and social problems persist.
ket in eastern Paris. Coulibalys heinous The Sunday after the attacks on Charlie
act was not without precedent. In 2014, Hebdo and the kosher supermarket,
Mehdi Nemmouche, a French citizen 3.5 million people marched in the streets
who had spent a year training with the of France carrying signs expressing
Islamic State in Syria, opened fire in solidarity with the victims; most read,
the Jewish Museum of Belgium, killing I am Charlie, but some also declared,
four. In 2012, Mohamed Merah, a French I am Jewish. That evening, Israels
follower of al Qaeda, killed three children prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu
and a rabbi at a Jewish school in Toulouse. (often called Bibi), visited Paris
Such attacks are the most visible signs Grande Synagogue, making his entrance
of a wider trend: for the past 15 years, alongside Frances leaders: President
anti-Semitism has seemed to be on the Franois Hollande, Prime Minister
Manuel Valls, former President Nicolas
LISA MOSES LEFF is Associate Professor of Sarkozy, and the mayor of Paris, Anne
History at American University and the author Hidalgo. Although all these leaders
of The Archive Thief: The Man Who Salvaged
French Jewish History in the Wake of the have been remarkably supportive of
Holocaust. Frances Jewish population in their
132 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
How to Be a Jew in France
public comments, with Valls going so far here, and not just petty personal
as to say that France without Jews is not reasons. Read the answers young
France, it was Netanyahu whose entrance European Jews . . . have written
garnered the loudest applause, accom- in response to the never-ending
question of whether they might be
panied by chants of Bibi! Bibi! and
leaving. Unlike in the 30s, our
Isral vivra, Isral vaincra! (Israel will governments protect us rather than
live, Israel will win!). The enthusiastic excluding us and we are determined
reception reflected French Jews deep to improve our respective countries
commitment to Zionism, which has only in terms of social justice and
been strengthened in recent years. minority integration.
The audience responded warmly to
much of Netanyahus speech, at one point
giving him a standing ovation. But when THE FIRST JEWISH PRIME MINISTER
the Israeli leader addressed French Jews One way to understand French Jews
directly, telling them that Israel would simultaneous attachment to Zionism
welcome them with open arms, the and the French Republic is to turn to
reaction was rather different: members Pierre Birnbaums illuminating new
of the audience broke into an impas- biography of Lon Blum. In both his
sioned rendition of La Marseillaise, life story and his politics, Blum embod-
Frances national anthem. The message ied the apparent contradictions at the
was clear: Frances Jews would stand heart of French Jewish identity. Born
with Netanyahu against the scourge of in 1872 to a bourgeois Jewish family in
anti-Semitism but would not accept the Alsace, Blum is today best remembered
suggestionimplicit in his invitation as the leader of the French socialist party
that Jews did not fully belong in France. (known by its French acronym, SFIO)
The unscripted, heartfelt response speaks and prime minister of France in 193637,
to something deep within French Jewish during the Popular Front (and again,
culture that foreigners have some trouble briefly, in 1938). Blum was a true devo-
seeing, much less understanding. For tee of what Birnbaum calls republican
all their ardent Zionism, French Jews still socialism. This is a socialism inflected
have a deep faith in the values of the with an abiding respect for the institutions
French Republic. Although Jewish emigra- of the democratic state, an admiration
tion from France to Israel has increased for the universalistic ideals of the French
sharply in recent years, 99 percent of Enlightenment, and a commitment to
Frances Jews are choosing to stay put redressing the ills caused by economic
rather than heed Netanyahus call. As inequality.
the French Jewish writer Diana Pinto But even as Blums politics were
put it astutely: decidedly universalistic, recognizing no
distinction between Jewish problems
The Europe we live in, despite its and general problems, Blum came to
blatant faults, remains a place we
are a part of not just politically as
his convictions as a Jew and proudly
citizens, but also linguistically and brandished his Jewish identity in public,
culturally. . . . We have major stakes even when it made him a target for
some of the most vicious anti-Semites
France has ever seen. He was a committed politicsfor example, by helping found
Zionist and served as president of the the Human Rights League, which opposes
French Zionist Union. Blum saw no all forms of discrimination.
contradiction in this. As he said in a For Blum, it was Jean Jaurs, one of
1929 speech, I am Zionist because I am the first leaders of the SFIO, who offered
French, Jewish, and Socialist, because the most meaningful response to the
modern Jewish Palestine represents a Dreyfus Affair, by seeking to defend
unique and unprecedented encounter the individual by promoting social
between humanitys oldest traditions justice for all. Not Jewish himself,
and its boldest and most recent search Jaurs was a moderate Socialist who
for liberty and social justice. As have was committed to the rule of law and
many French Jews today, in the 1930s, the democratic process, with a modest
Blum responded to the rising tide of and honest demeanor that garnered
anti-Semitism by doubling down on him broad support within and beyond
both his Zionism and his belief in the the SFIO. Jaurs choice to join the
values associated with the French Dreyfusards represented an important
Revolution, because he saw a funda- turning point in his partys history.
mental connection between Jewish Rather than simply focus on the class
security and the universal promise strugglewhich made other Socialists
of republican democracy. indifferent to the fate of the bourgeois
As Birnbaum deftly reveals, the young Dreyfus and largely hostile to Jews as a
Blum came to politics as a second career group, since Jews were not generally
(he first was a writer and literary critic) members of the French working class
in response to the Dreyfus Affair, a Jaurs saw the affair as a case of violated
national scandal that broke out in the rights. For him, the French state should
late 1890s after Alfred Dreyfus, a French have been expected to guarantee individ-
Jewish army captain, was accused, tried, ual rights, and thus in this case, it should
and wrongly convicted of treason. Blum be pushed to exculpate the wrongly
was fiercely critical of other French accused captain. Unlike socialist parties
Jews whose response, he claimed, was in other countries, the SFIO that Blum
to bury their heads in the sand rather joined saw the republican state as, in
than stand and fight on Dreyfus behalf. Jaurs words, the political form of
But Blum ignored the larger picture: socialism and sought to complete the
he was, in fact, far from alone in his French Revolutions promise of social
outrage. As Birnbaum shows, drawing equality through the ballot box.
from his fascinating and original study After Jaurs was assassinated in 1914,
of the Dreyfus Affair, The Anti-Semitic Blum carried on in his political footsteps,
Moment, published in 2003, many French and when the SFIO split in December
Jewsfrom military officers to religious 1920with the majority breaking off
leaders to low-level civil servantsbecame to form the Moscow-aligned French
Dreyfusards, advocating for Dreyfus Communist PartyBlum took over the
and even fighting armed duels with leadership of the partys remnants and
anti-Semites. Most important, the affair stayed faithful to the republic. When
led many French Jews to get involved in Blum became prime minister with the
134 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
victory of the Popular Front coalition
in 1936, he proved his willingness to
compromise rather than conquer, out
of respect for the democratic process.
As his detractors never fail to point out,
this hampered his ability to achieve
much in the areas in which the left-
wing parties disagreed. His refusal to
intervene in the Spanish Civil War, the Franklin Williams
failure to resolve the future of Frances Internship
colonial empire, and Frances inadequate The Council on Foreign Relations is seeking
responses to the Nazi threat and the talented individuals for the Franklin Williams
Jewish refugee crisis have all been criti- Internship.
cized by historians in the decades since. The Franklin Williams Internship, named after
Even so, his tenure saw the passage of the late Ambassador Franklin H. Williams,
was established for undergraduate and graduate
historic legislation: a French New Deal students who have a serious interest in
that greatly expanded workers rights international relations.
by securing unemployment insurance, Ambassador Williams had a long career of
greater collective-bargaining rights, paid public service, including serving as the
vacations, and the 40-hour workweek. American Ambassador to Ghana, as well as the
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Lincoln
University, one of the countrys historically
WILL FRANCE BE ISRAELS black colleges. He was also a Director of the
SOLDIER? Council on Foreign Relations, where he made
The fact that a Jew such as Blum could special efforts to encourage the nomination of
rise to such political heights in the black Americans to membership.
1930s is astonishing and could have hap- The Council will select one individual each
term (fall, spring, and summer) to work in
pened only in France, where Jews have
the Councils New York City headquarters.
arguably been more successful in The intern will work closely with a Program
politics than anywhere else outside Director or Fellow in either the Studies or
Israel. Even in the United States, where the Meetings Program and will be involved
Jews have long represented a larger with program coordination, substantive
and business writing, research, and budget
proportion of the population than they management. The selected intern will be
do in France, no Jew has reached Blums required to make a commitment of at least 12
level. Indeed, as far back as the 1840s, hours per week, and will be paid $10 an hour.
French Jews have served in important To apply for this internship, please send a
state positions, as deputies, prefects, rsum and cover letter including the se-
mester, days, and times available to work to
ministers, judges, and army officers, in
the Internship Coordinator in the Human
numbers entirely disproportionate to Resources Office at the address listed below.
their population. The Council is an equal opportunity employer.
Birnbaum insightfully situates Blum Council on Foreign Relations
within this tradition of state Jews, Human Resources Office
who benefited from French republican- 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065
tel: 212.434 . 9400 fax: 212.434 . 9893
isms revolutionary mission to shake up humanresources@cfr.org http://www.cfr.org
traditional Catholic society with secu-
135
Lisa Moses Leff
136 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
How to Be a Jew in France
J
ustice Stephen Breyer of the U.S. ing constitutional cases, especially those
Supreme Court has long been known involving the application of the free-
as the most cosmopolitan justice speech clause of the First Amendment.
the justice most familiar with the laws Such rules are not derived or derivable
of other nations and most concerned from the text of the U.S. Constitution,
with how U.S. courts can cope with those but what is more objectionable about
laws when they impinge on American them is that they are nonsensealthough,
national interests or are invoked in U.S. of course, Breyer does not characterize
courts. In his new book, The Court and them in that way. The rules go by such
the World, he sets forth his views on the names as strict scrutiny, heightened
interaction between the U.S. legal system scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and
and the legal systems of other countries. rational-basis review, in order of dimin-
The book is insightful, clearly written, ishing rigor of judicial review. The rules
well informed, free of legal jargon, and also frequently invoke such terms as
accessible to a lay audience as well as overinclusive and underinclusive,
informative to lawyers, judges, and law narrow tailoring, least restrictive means,
professors. Its principal weakness is its compelling interest, viewpoint-based
almost exclusive focus on decisions by regulation versus content-based
the Supreme Court. The Court is an regulation, and fundamental rights.
atypical judicial body in that it tends All of this is window-dressing: the
to decide relatively few cases in most of outcomes of constitutional cases are
driven not by legal jargon but by the
RICHARD A. POSNER is a judge of the U.S. justices ideological views and a rough
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a
Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago balancing of the costs and benefits of
Law School. alternative outcomes.
138 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
The Law of the Lands
The courts of the European Union, French dominance of the European Court
by contrast, follow a much simpler of Justice, whose judges are appointed
approach, known as proportionality. by the EU member countries. The French
They ask, Breyer explains, does the government supplies almost all the
[regulatory] limitation on private rfrendaires, or law clerks, of the court,
conduct impose a restriction that is and the vast majority of them are French
disproportionate to the legitimate lawyers. Many of the judges, however,
interests the government seeks to being from non-French-speaking coun-
achieve? As Breyer points out, an- tries, have limited knowledge of the
swering that question requires the French language, leaving them largely
judge explicitly to balance the harm at the mercy of their law clerks.
to the protected interests (e.g., speech) The bulk of Breyers book, however,
against the need for the limitation to is solidly argued and will be useful to
protect a critically important objective. American lawyers and judges. In one
So far, so good; but Breyer doesnt section, for example, he discusses the
seem to have the full courage of his application of American law to acts that
convictionsor, more likely, a desire to occur in foreign countries. Suppose two
reject jargon that has become orthodox foreign companies manufacture similar
in U.S. constitutional decision-making. products, export them to the United
He makes plain that he does not intend States, and agree to sell them at the
to abandon that jargon; rather, he plans same price, thus eliminating competi-
to add proportionality to the termi- tion between the two products, to the
nological stew. But the last thing the detriment of American consumers. They
Supreme Court needs is more legalese. are deliberately injuring Americans,
Proportionality, or, what seems equiva- and such injurious conduct is usually
lent, the balancing of costs and benefits, deemed sufficient to trigger the applica-
could well replace the current system (I bility of U.S. antitrust law, even though
would like to see it do so, and I imagine enforcement may be difficult or even
that Justice Breyer would as well) but impossible (it may be impossible to obtain
cannot supplement it coherently, because jurisdiction over the companies in an
the two frameworks are inconsistent. American court, for example). But to
enforce U.S. antitrust law against such
THE LAW OF NATIONS suppliers would, as Breyer emphasizes,
In addition to comparing the Supreme violate comitythe respect that nations
Courts rules with the European approach are expected to accord other nations in
of proportionality, Breyer catalogs differ- order to minimize international friction
ences between the U.S. legal system and and conflict.
the systems of foreign countries, such No formula has been devised to draw
as India, Switzerland, and the United the line between permissible and imper-
Kingdom. But he makes no attempt to missible extraterritorial applications of
arbitrate the differences among them. U.S. antitrust or other regulatory laws.
For example, although fluent in French, The Supreme Courts approach, as
he fails to discuss one of the most ques- described by Breyer, is distinctly ad hoc:
tionable features of European law: it seeks harmony between overlapping
140
The Law of the Lands
L
awyers may reign in Washing- their preferences and the information
ton, D.C., but it is economists available to them. And yet it is safe to
who drive the policymaking say that every economics professor has
process. In July 2009, for example, paused at some point after setting out a
Douglas Elmendorf, the economist theoretical model and said something
who headed the Congressional Budget like, In reality, people dont act exactly
Office, nearly derailed the Affordable this way. As Richard Thaler, a professor
Care Act (also known as Obamacare) at the University of Chicago Booth
when he announced that, as drafted, School of Business, explains in Misbe-
the legislation would not reduce the having, the standard economic approach
trajectory of federal health spending by suffers from the fact that humans are
a significant amountcontradicting not what he terms Econs: they dont,
assurances made by the laws supporters, or cant, optimize all the time. Some-
who had to scramble to make changes times the decision at hand is simply too
to the bill. Economists also dominate in complex to be dealt with rationally;
academia, so much so that scholars in other times, people allow what Thaler
the other social sciences call economics calls supposedly irrelevant factors to
the imperial discipline, decrying its affect their behavior. For example, in
tendency to intrude beyond its proper theory, a person should be no more
boundaries. likely to drink a bottle of wine from
The accusation is on the mark: his or her own cellar than to go out and
many economists do believe that they buy a new one. After all, the bottle in
can explain political and sociological the cellar can be sold, which means that
its consumption involves an implicit
PHILLIP SWAGEL is Professor of International cost equal to buying a new bottle. But
Economic Policy at the University of Maryland
School of Public Policy. Follow him on Twitter few people think this way. In fact, the
@pswagel. so-called endowment effect, in which
142 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
A Nudge Too Far
From my cold, dead hands: protesting the proposed soda ban in New York City, July 2012
people overvalue what they have in hand, sciences team to devise behavioral-
influences decisions in a variety of based approaches to policy. When it
circumstances, even when it should not comes to policymaking, however,
factor into optimal decision-making. behavioral economics can be easily
In his absorbing and accessible book, abused. In the wrong hands, it can
Thaler explains that such irrationalities justify a pernicious form of paternal-
not failings but facts of lifemean that ism under which policymakers shove,
the mainstream economic understanding rather than nudge, to achieve their
of the world and the policies it suggests desired outcome. Thaler denounces
can be off the mark. He explores alter- this approach, and it is not his fault
native methods of optimization, notably that his brainchild can be misused.
including ways to craft policies that But it can be, and too often is.
nudge peopleto use the phrase popu-
larized by Thaler and the legal scholar A NATURAL PROGRESSION
R EU T E R S / A N D R EW BU RT ON
most economists were wary of embrac- incentive to work hard. After all, an
ing behavioral economics, whether in employee caught slacking off would
explaining how people behave or in risk returning to a lower-paying job.
formulating policy. In part, their hesi- With such clever adaptations in its tool
tancy reflected a belief that seemingly kit, mainstream economics goes far in
irrational behavior could be understood explaining the world.
as a form of optimization. Consider, But not far enough. Beginning in the
for example, a firm that discriminates early 1970s, Thaler emerged as part of
in hiring. At first glance, such behavior a small group including the psychologists
appears to be irrational, as discrimina- Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
tion on the grounds of race, sex, and that began to focus on anomalies in
other such characteristics would de- human decision-making not easily
crease profits. But in 1957, Gary Becker, explained by mainstream approaches.
an economist from the University of In his book, Thaler describes how the
Chicago who went on to win a Nobel behavioralists have identified a variety
Prize, explained such discrimination of systemic biases in decision-making
by positing that employers might suffer that prevent people from optimizing
some personal cost from hiring people correctly. When making decisions, he
they dislike. Discrimination could thus writes, people are often influenced by
reflect an instinct to maximize personal psychological factorshow a question
satisfaction instead of profits. To dis- is phrased, for example, or whether a
suade discrimination, governments choice seems fair or unfairthat can
could impose a tax on it high enough to lead them to act in ways that appear
change an employers decision calculus. to be irrational. He finds that psycho-
(The lay reader might be forgiven for logical factors matter even in financial
seeing a gray area between rational markets, where one would expect mon-
and yet subjective and personal forms of etary incentives and the presence of
maximization and the kinds of irra- experts to discourage irrational behavior.
tional factors that are the purview of In fascinating detail, Thaler describes
the behavioral economist, but to neoclas- the academic journey that began with
sical economists and behavioralists, the these discoveries, generously crediting
dividing line is clear.) collaborators and others who have made
Other apparent market imperfections key contributions to the field.
can also be explained as optimizations. Thalers is no longer a lonely journey.
For example, the Nobel Prizewinning Behavioral economics is hot, yielding
economist George Akerlof and U.S. hundreds of articles in top academic
Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen have journals and even a new textbook that
explained why some employers choose weaves the subject through the usual
to pay employees a salary higher than introductory coursework for college
the going rate: under their model of students. Thaler himself has reached
efficiency wages, an employer could the peak of his profession; he is finish-
rationally choose to pay a higher wage ing a one-year term as president of the
to employees whose effort is difficult American Economic Association. And
to monitor in order to give them an behavioral economics is having its day
144 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
A Nudge Too Far
in Washington; the White House but not coercing, them to make the
team has a mission to harness behav- optimal decision for themselves. Done
ioral science insights to help Federal right, such a nudge would impose little
government programs better serve the to no cost on those people who are
nation while saving taxpayer dollars. already truly optimizing by rationally
(In setting up this group, Washington choosing to go their own way.
was following the lead of British So far, nudges have been most
Prime Minister David Cameron, who successful in encouraging people to
put together a similar team a few years save for retirement. Many companies
earlier, with advice from Thaler.) So now automatically enroll their employ-
far, the White House team has had a ees in tax-preferred programs rather
modest impact, such as finding ways than requiring them to sign up for a
to help people take advantage of tax- plan, a tactic that helps employees
preferred savings vehicles and loan overcome the natural tendency toward
repayment programs. inertia. Among Thalers contributions
There is ample room for policy that to this field is a scheme, developed in
takes behavioral factors into account. collaboration with Shlomo Benartzi, a
Consider, for example, the Obama behavioral economist at the University
administrations mortgage assistance of California, Los Angeles, known as
programs, set up in the aftermath of Save More Tomorrow, through which
the 2008 financial crisis to help home- employees agree in advance to increase
owners and stabilize the housing their savings account contributions after
market. Through early 2015, nearly future pay raises. By having employees
4.8 million homeowners had their set aside the extra cash only after a pay
monthly payments reduced through raise, ensuring that their take-home
the U.S. governments refinancing pay never declines, the policy increases
and loan modification programs. The savings while sidestepping employees
government calculates, however, that psychological aversion to loss. Of course,
there are hundreds of thousands of participants retain the ability to opt
additional borrowers who could benefit out at any timeand so the policy is a
from the programs but have not yet nudge rather than a handcuff.
participated. Some of these people
have good reasons for their reluctance. NOT JUST A NUDGE
They may be planning to move, for For all the benefits of policies that
example, and thus do not expect to incorporate behavioral economics, there
receive enough savings to compensate is a serious concern: that policymakers
for the time and effort it would take can too easily move beyond nudges to
to sign up for one of the programs. something more forceful, something that
But others have not signed up because reflects their preferences more than those
they have succumbed to inertia, dont of the people affected. When misapplied,
understand the programs, or are acting behavioral economics provides an easy
irrationally. The behavioralist approach cover for policies that mistakenly assume
to policy would look for ways to nudge that government officials understand
those potential beneficiaries, leading, peoples true desires and motivations
better than they do. Thalers nudges government requires new passenger
are gentle; when misapplied, however, vehicles to come with labels detailing
the logic of nudging can undergird annual fuel costs and other statistics
more coercive practices, with signifi- related to fuel economy.
cant downsides. In neoclassical economics, the usual
In their analysis of several recent justification for a regulation is the exis-
energy regulations, for example, the tence of an externality, a side effect of an
economists Ted Gayer and W. Kip action that affects others but that is not
Viscusi found that paternalism, rather reflected in the official cost or benefit of
than sound reasoning, lay behind U.S. the activity in question. A factory dis-
government decisions to regulate charging pollution, for example, imposes
incandescent light bulbs and raise fuel- a negative externality on people in the
economy standards for cars and light area. Negative externalities can be offset
trucks. Regulators claimed that these by a tax: if the proper amount could be
regulations were good for consumers calculated, charging the polluting factory
because with them, people and busi- for the costs it imposes on others would
nesses would have lower electricity lead to the socially optimal outcome with
bills and save money on gasoline. In reduced emissions. Positive externalities,
both instances, however, the consumers in contrast, call for subsidies. Subsidizing
and firms were likely to understand the vaccines, for example, limits the spread of
tradeoffs involved and would, barring disease, benefiting whole communities.
the regulations, have chosen to purchase It turns out, however, that the negative
incandescent bulbs and fuel-inefficient externalities associated with incandescent
cars and trucks. As Gayer and Viscusi light bulbs and fuel-inefficient cars and
argue, the regulations reflect a behavior- trucks are modest. In these cases, the
alist assumption that consumers are impact of increased energy usage on
irrational and that their true preferences pollution and carbon emissions is rela-
will be better reflected by choices made tively small, which means that society
by government officials. The mainstream does not gain much, environmentally,
economic approach, by contrast, assumes from the regulations. Instead, most of
that consumers have valid reasons for the supposed benefits come from savings
acting as they do and that someone for the very consumers who would gladly
willing to purchase a less energy-efficient pay more for the light bulbs and cars or
light bulb or a gas-guzzling vehicle must trucks they actually prefer. In justifying
value other aspects of what they are such regulations, policymakers make
buyingthe warmth of the light, per- vague references to consumers supposed
haps, or the power of the engine. This inability to weigh long-term benefits
approach is more likely to be correct, against near-term costs. But that reason-
particularly when it comes to the deci- ing does little to rescue the misguided
sion to buy a fuel-inefficient car or policies, which appear to rest on the
truck. Presumably, consumers and U.S. governments belief that people
businesses are acutely aware of the should use more energy-efficient products
implications of their choices for gas regardless of their actual preferences.
costs, especially given that the U.S. This is paternalism disguised as science.
146 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
A Nudge Too Far
I
n June 2014, a small force of Islamic political causes and have deployed
extremists routed the Iraqi army indiscriminate violence in struggles for
and seized control of Mosul, Iraqs independence, in national resistance
second-largest city. The militants then movements, or in pursuit of utopian
swept south, capturing Tikrit, until they secular ambitions. Others have been
occupied an area the size of the United driven by religious fervor, inspired by
Kingdom stretching across eastern Syria apocalyptic visions, and led by charis-
and northwestern Iraq. The militants, matic prophets. The Islamic States
who had previously called themselves rhetoric, filled with references to the end
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, times and the fulfillment of messianic
or ISIS, declared themselves the Islamic prophecies, may baffle most observers,
State and pledged allegiance to a but it is merely the latest expression of
a long tradition of absolutist extremism.
HISHAM MELHEM is a columnist for Al Within Islam, this tradition reaches back
Arabiya and Washington Correspondent for the
Lebanese newspaper Annahar. Follow him on past al Qaeda and the twentieth-century
Twitter @hisham_melhem. theoreticians of jihad, through the rise
148 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
of the ultraconservative movement of
Wahhabism in the eighteenth century,
and has its roots in ancient strains of
Sunni theological thought.
For all the continuities between the
Islamic State and past extremist move-
ments, however, there are also stark
differences in tactics and strategy.
Whereas al Qaeda focused on spec-
tacular attacks on the United States
and showed some qualms about exces-
sive violence toward fellow Muslims,
for example, the militants who lead the
Islamic State have focused on establish-
ing a state in the Middle East and have
shown no hesitation in massacring their
coreligionists. And the Islamic State has
distinguished itself from all past extrem-
ist organizations in the sophistication
and scale of its use of social media
and other forms of technologically
advanced propaganda. the Muslim world. It will threaten the
If the group is to be contained and West with the possibility of mass-casualty
ultimately destroyed, it is crucial for terrorism, but lone wolf attacks of
policymakers to understand precisely limited scope are more likely. Its goals
what differentiates it from past extremist are impossible for the organization to
movements. Not surprisingly, the past achieve, and a broad coalition of coun-
several months have witnessed a flood tries is now opposed to its expansion.
of new books addressing that subject. Military efforts should be focused on
Three in particular merit attention; taken containing the Islamic State rather than
together, they represent the most author- pursuing a decisive military victory.
itative portrait available of a movement And the West should exploit its control
that continues to mutate. The books show of social media platforms to counter the
how the Islamic State represents a new groups propaganda and to blunt its ability
and more dangerous evolution in the to spread its apocalyptic narrative online.
development of violent extremism and
demonstrate its deep roots in Islamic BORN IN CHAOS
history. They stress its control of social All three books tell a similar story
media and its apocalyptic vision, which about the rise of the Islamic State. As
are unique among current terrorist groups. the terrorism experts Jessica Stern and
Yet the authors also agree that the J. M. Berger put it in ISIS: The State of
Islamic State does not represent an Terror, The rise of ISIS is, to some extent,
existential danger to the West; its malig- the unintended consequence of Western
nant impact will be felt most of all in intervention in Iraq. In 2004, Osama
bin Laden reluctantly gave his blessing move, nor is its exploitation of apoca-
for the Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al- lyptic prophecies. Throughout Islamic
Zarqawi to establish a local branch of history, many figures have claimed the
al Qaeda in Iraq. In the words of Stern title of caliph, or ruler of all Muslims,
and Berger, Zarqawi was a thug- with varying degrees of success. Some
turned-terrorist who brought a particu- of them have waged violent campaigns
larly brutal and sectarian approach to his to establish their legitimacy. Islamic
understanding of Jihad. It was Zarqawi history is also replete with false prophets,
who popularized the genre of filmed some of whom have declared themselves
beheadings. Zarqawi, unlike bin Laden, to be the Mahdi, the savior that some
believed that all Shiite Muslims should schools of Muslim theology predict
be killed and had no compunction about will appear before the apocalypse.
murdering Muslim civilians, to bin In The ISIS Apocalypse, William
Ladens consternation. Zarqawis bloody McCants, a specialist in radical Islamist
rampages and his fixation on instigating movements in the Middle East, provides
a sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiites the most comprehensive analysis so far
horrified bin Laden and his deputy, of the central role that Sunni traditions
Ayman al-Zawahiri, who repeatedly but of apocalyptic fervor play in the Islamic
unsuccessfully urged Zarqawi to change States tactics and strategy. The groups
course. After Zarqawis death in a 2006 constant invocations of the Day of Judg-
U.S. air strike, his organization rebranded ment and the end of time have deep roots
itself as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). in Muslim history. McCants describes
The U.S. troop surge in Iraq in 2007 the striking parallels between the
and Iraqs so-called Sunni Awakening, rhetoric and iconography of the Islamic
when the countrys Sunni Arab commu- State and those of the Abbasid Revolu-
nities turned against al Qaeda and other tion of 750, when rebels flying black
extremist militants, succeeded in greatly flags overthrew the second caliphate
weakening ISI. Yet with the increas- and established a third. During that
ingly violent sectarianism of Iraqi Prime period of upheaval, he writes, apoca-
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, and lypse, caliphate, and revolution were
the withdrawal of U.S. troops, Sunni inseparable, just as they are for the
communities found themselves disen- Islamic State.
franchised, and ISI successfully exploited The Islamic State also has more
these fears to recover its strength. The recent antecedents. As McCants writes,
outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011 the groups theology and method of
allowed the group to expand across the engaging with scripture is nearly identi-
border, and it changed its name again, cal to Wahhabism, the ultraconservative
this time, in 2013, to the Islamic State form of Islam found in Saudi Arabia.
of Iraq and al-Sham. Then, in June 2014, McCants notes that when the Islamic
the group returned to northwestern Iraq, State needed to distribute educational
seized Mosul, and declared the caliphate. materials to schoolchildren in its strong-
Although undeniably dramatic, the hold in Raqqa, Syria, it printed out
groups declaration of a new caliphate copies of Saudi state textbooks found
under Baghdadi was not an unprecedented online. Unsurprisingly then, most of
150 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
the Islamic States hudud penalties [the
fixed punishments specified in Islamic
Scripture for the most egregious crimes]
are identical to penalties for the same
crimes in Saudi Arabia.
The similarities between the Islamic
States theology and Wahhabism are
perhaps unsurprising, given the Islamic Assistant Editor
States roots in Wahhabi-influenced
al Qaeda. In his compelling and meticu-
Foreign Affairs is looking for
lously researched book The New Threat,
an Assistant Editor to join our
Jason Burke analyzes the origins of global
editorial team.
jihad and the unique role of al Qaeda in
shaping its development. Burke, a veteran
The Assistant Editor position
foreign correspondent for The Guardian,
is a full-time paid job offering
traces the intellectual progenitors of the
exceptional training in serious
modern ideas of jihad that inspired bin
journalism. Previous Assistant
Laden and his followers. The key figures
Editors have included recent
include Sayyid Qutb, the theoretician of
graduates from undergraduate and
the Muslim Brotherhood and an iconic
masters programs. Candidates
figure in Islamist militancy, and Abdullah
should have a serious interest in
Azzam, a charismatic Palestinian ideo-
international relations, a flair for
logue and polemicist whose call for
writing, and a facility with the
Muslims to engage in defensive jihad
English language.
was instrumental in mobilizing support
and fighters for the war against the
The Assistant Editor works for one
Soviets in Afghanistan. Qutb was hanged
year, starting in July or August.
by Egyptian authorities in 1966, and
Azzam was killed by a car bomb in 1989,
For more information about how
but their ideas outlived them.
to apply for the 201617 Assistant
Bin Laden used the teachings of
Editor position, please visit:
Wahhabism and the legacies of Qutb and
Azzam to construct a global narrative:
of the cosmic struggle between good and www.foreignaffairs.com/Apply
evil, belief and unbelief, the mujahideen
and the Crusader-Zionist Alliance, Applications will be due
Burke writes. This Manichaean view of February 1, 2016.
the world, divided sharply between the
forces of good and the forces of evil,
between Muslims and infidels, would
be even more strongly emphasized by
the Islamic State in the years following
its split with al Qaeda. As McCants
argues, The U.S. invasion of Iraq and
151
Hisham Melhem
the stupendous violence that followed that it remains available even if Internet
dramatically increased the Sunni publics providers pull the content down. If
appetite for apocalyptic explanations al Qaeda was publicity-shy . . . ISIS, in
of a world turned upside down. The contrast, is a publicity whore.
masked armies of the Islamic Stateits This mass online campaign has
soldiers brandishing swords, storming attracted supporters from all over the
cities, and daring the West to fight a world; some estimates place the number
final cataclysmic battlehave hardly of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria at
appeared from nowhere. They are just around 20,000. Their reasons for joining
another extremist group, made up of the jihad vary, from the promise of
violent men driven by the same absolutist living in and defending the worlds
and apocalyptic impulses that have moti- only ostensibly true Islamic state, to
vated similar organizations in the past. the opportunity for camaraderie and a
sense of purpose, to the simple thrill
THE CALIPHATE ONLINE of murder and the officially sanctioned
And yet despite the similarities between practice of sex slaverywhich The New
the Islamic State and previous theocratic York Times dubbed a theology of rape.
revolutionaries, from the Abbasids to the Not much is known about the volun-
Wahhabis, the rise of the Islamic State teers who have since returned to their
represents something new and modern. native countries, perhaps disillusioned
The technologies of globalization offer and repentant, or possibly plotting
contemporary radical extremists oppor- terrorist attacks. The phenomenon of
tunities to reach mass audiences their fighters volunteering abroad is not in
predecessors could never have imagined, itself a new onein the Spanish Civil
and the Islamic State has exploited these War, thousands of Americans and
technologies more successfully than Europeans volunteered to fight for the
any of its contemporaries in the Islamist Republicans against the Nationalists.
world. Stern and Bergers book provides And jihadist organizations have always
the most compelling analysis yet of the attracted foreign militants. Yet the scale
groups creative and sophisticated propa- of the Islamic States online presence
ganda efforts and its unprecedented use and the ease with which a European
of social media. The Islamic State has extremist can travel to Syria have con-
several thousand active online supporters tributed to far greater numbers of
who operate in disciplined regiments. Western volunteers serving with the
After the group posts something to the group than ever fought for al Qaeda.
Internetsay, a beheading videoand The Islamic State is also different
it is authenticated, a second-tier regiment from recent jihadist movements in the
takes to Twitter to retweet the link with size of the territory it controls. Unlike
a hashtag, then retweet each others tweets al Qaeda, which was never particularly
and write new tweets. At coordinated interested in governing or in seizing
times, online hashtag campaigns gener- and controlling land, and which pre-
ate hundreds of similar tweets to create ferred to launch attacks on the U.S.
a Twitter storm. Other members upload homeland, the Islamic State has always
the material to multiple platforms so wanted a state in the Middle East. As
152 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Keeping Up With the Caliphate
Burke writes, Zarqawis strategy was the Renaissance and of today. The
simple: to seize and hold real ground Islamic State is as much a part of
to endure and expand, as the Islamic Islam as Baghdad, Cairo, Crdoba,
States motto later put it. And this and Damascus were during their
territory now generates a level of wealth golden ages as centers of learning
for the Islamic State that al Qaeda and high culture.
never possessed. Many experts believe It is crucial, for the Islamic world
that the group is more than capable of above all, to recognize that the Islamic
financing itself through taxes and extor- State has deep roots in Islamic tradi-
tion, through which it takes in more than tions. Containing it will require the
$1 million per day, as well as oil revenues. support of Arab and Muslim allies, and
The Islamic State may well be the richest it is only by placing the group in the
terrorist group ever. proper historical and cultural context
that it can be demystified in the Muslim
A WAR ON MANY FRONTS world. Once Muslims in the Middle
The Islamic State is not as terrifyingly East free themselves from the delusion
new as so much of the media coverage that the Islamic State is a wholly alien
has claimed, but as these books illus- phenomenon and recognize that the
trate, it represents a more dangerous groups false Mahdis and caliphs are but
evolution in the jihadist movement the latest in a long and bloody genealogy,
one that must be understood accurately they might come to see the fight against
if it is to be defeated. In the current the Islamic State for what it is: a struggle
debate among historians, journalists, to determine which tradition within Islam
policymakers, and scholars about the will define the religion going forward.
nature of the group, there are those who The authors of these three books do
seek to deny that it is rooted in Islamic not foresee the groups demise in the
traditions and who claim that the self- near future. They counsel Western
declared caliphate has hijacked a religion powers against overreacting to the
of peace and distorted its humane mes- threat, which would undermine civil
sage. Such views ignore the fact that liberties at home and deepen the rift
none of the three major monotheistic between Western countries and Muslim-
religions can be considered wholly majority states. But the Islamic State
peaceful: in their sacred texts, Christi- will not simply collapse on its own.
anity, Islam, and Judaism all contain The fight against the group is as much a
elements of brutality and violence. war against an idea as it is a battle
But religions cannot and should not against armed militants. It must be
be understood by their texts alone. The fought not only on the frontlines of Iraq
lived history of a community of believers and Syria but also on every platform,
defines a religion; a great deal depends electronic or otherwise, that the extrem-
on how the custodians of a faith choose ists use to spread their vision.
to interpret, defend, exploit, or abuse its
sacred texts. The crusaders who slaugh-
tered their way to Jerusalem in 1099
were as Christian as the Christians of
S
ince the 1990s, in the wake of social change and at other times looking
humanitarian emergencies, violent for insights in small places, such as a
civil wars, and terrorist attacks, the school for girls in India. Sen rejects the
tension between the norm of state sover- view of antiglobalizers, who claim that
eignty and the need to prevent atrocities international trade inherently stacks the
has become more intense, forcing the UN deck against weak and poor countries. Sen
and great powers to repeatedly ponder argues that the poor would be even worse
what circumstances, if any, justify inter- off in closed societies, without access
national intervention. In this magisterial to technology, trade, and the political
study, Doyle provides the most thoughtful benefits of living in an open world. The
and searching exploration yet of this challenge, Sen argues, is to organize the
dilemma. The book builds on John Stuart global political economy so that it will
Mills classic 1859 essay on the norm more widely distribute the benefits of
of nonintervention and the prudential globalization. Indeed, this is Sens most
terms for its violation. Doyle finds Mills compelling message: markets are here
analysis flawed but sufficiently compelling to stay, but they can and should be
to use as a starting point for the construc- embedded in wider systems of social
tion of a moral logic for liberal interven- support and protections that can bring
tionism. He sifts through a rich array of the world closer to a more justor at
cases from the nineteenth century to the least more tolerableglobal order.
present day to ascertain the costs and
consequences of intervention, identifying
circumstances that justify exceptions to Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a
and overrides of the nonintervention prin- Political and Legal Concept
ciple. Affirming the progress represented BY DIETER GRIMM. TRANSLATED
by the UNs responsibility to protect BY BELINDA COOPER. Columbia
doctrine, which was formally articulated University Press, 2015, 192 pp.
in 2005, Doyle makes the case for limited,
cautious, and multilateral interventions Grimm provides a learned but accessible
that require both a license and a leash. history of the concept of sovereignty,
154 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Recent Books
Other Peoples Money: The Real Business Piketty first published this book in
of Finance French in 1997, long before he became
BY JOHN KAY. PublicAffairs, 2015, famous. Translated into English for
352 pp. the first time, it offers an exception-
ally clear, cogent, and coherent dis-
T
his important book is simulta- cussion of economic inequality. The
neously a clear primer on analysis is necessarily technical in
modern financial systems and places, but Piketty carefully explains
a scathing indictment of them. It the technicalities. He draws heavily
acknowledges the essential role of on data from France and the United
finance in modern economies but States but also offers broader interna-
levels three critical charges at modern tional comparisons. The book also
financial systems: they are larger than takes some instructive excursions into
necessary, they perform inefficiently or topics such as savings and investment,
worse, and they transfer unjustifiably education, affirmative action, unions,
large sums of money to the financial and the minimum wage. Mainly, how-
sector from the rest of the economy. ever, Piketty is concerned with the
Financial sectors have become self- debate between those who argue that
156 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
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T
sions) to shake firms out of their his admirable book covers the
traditional ways. The public sector last ten days of World War II
relies on innovative officials, some- in Europe, starting with April
times prodded by parliamentary or 30, 1945, the day of Hitlers suicide,
congressional oversightan imperfect and concluding on May 9, by which
process, especially when it comes to point all German soldiers had surren-
international organizations. Hanrieders dered. The books strength lies in
perceptive book details several failed Jones well-crafted account of the
attempts to reform the World Health complex negotiations over the pace,
Organization by aiming to reverse the manner, and location of the surrender.
organizations fragmentation and to Admiral Karl Dnitz, Hitlers anointed
introduce greater coherence into its successor, believed that there were
policies and practices. A functional sufficient German fighters, still im-
WHO should be a wholly uncontroversial, bued with Nazi faith, to mount a
consensus goal; after all, everyone rear-guard action to split the Allies.
favors good health and the contain- But most Germans, aware that the
ment of contagious diseases. Yet the cause was hopelessly lost, sought to
WHO has become factionalized by hand themselves over to the Ameri-
region and in some places has lapsed cans, the British, or the Canadians
into patronage and inefficiency, which staying as far away as possible from
have proved difficult to overcome. the Russians. All the parties had an
Hanrieder also looks at mostly unsuc- eye on how the conclusion of the war
cessful reform efforts at UNESCO and might shape the coming political
the International Labor Organization. struggles. Although Jones passes too
Despite the books excessive use of lightly over the backstories of certain
political science jargon, its discourag- events, he skillfully uses diaries and
ing analysis is valuable and applicable other memoirs to vividly re-create
to many organizations. dramatic moments: German civilians
suddenly at the mercy of Soviet forces,
British troops recoiling at the horror
and degradation they found at Nazi
concentration camps, and the camaraderie-
158 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Recent Books
Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War wars are essentially unwinnable for the
BY P. W. SING ER AND AUGUST United States. This is because they are
COLE. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, civil conflicts rather than interstate wars.
2015, 416 pp. The United States tends to find itself in
uncomfortable positions when interven-
Singer and Cole use this fast-paced tale ing in such conflicts, quickly looking for
of a hypothetical future war between a way out; indigenous forces, by contrast,
the United States and a somewhat ten- often know how to play the long game
tative Sino-Russian alliance to explore required by such situations. The simplest
the vulnerabilities of advanced weapons way to avoid unwinnable wars is not to
systems and the advantages of more engage in them in the first place, but
basic weaponry. After effectively blind- Tierney is not sure it will always be
ing U.S. surveillance with cyberweap- possible for Washington to stay out. If
ons, China attacks Pearl Harbor and intervention becomes necessary, Tierney
occupies Hawaii. The ghost fleet of urges U.S. officials to think carefully
the title is a collection of mothballed about the difficult security challenges
U.S. ships whose outdated technology that arise even after relatively easy initial
allows them to survive in an environ- combat successes and to remember the
ment in which new systems are unable importance of a credible exit strategy.
to operate. The ghost fleetalong with Tierneys argument is imaginatively
other old-fashioned weapons, such as organized around a sequence he dubs
patriotism, grit, and self-sacrifice surge, talk, and leave: strengthening
allows the United States to fight back. ones position before engaging in
The authors have fun (and so does the negotiations that might allow for a
reader) imagining a world shaped by dignified departure.
the widespread use of stimulant drugs
and Google Glasslike devices and in
which women play vital combat roles. The United States
One problem is that its never quite
clear why the war started, nor why the Walter Russell Mead
Russians joined the fight. As always,
when drawing up scenarios for future
wars, the hardest thing to do is make
the politics credible. Kissinger, 19231968: The Idealist
BY NIALL F ERGUSON. Penguin Press,
2015, 1,008 pp.
The Right Way to Lose a War: America in
H
an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts enry Kissinger is the most
BY DOMINIC TIERNEY. Little, Brown, brilliant U.S. diplomat since
2015, 400 pp. World War II; he is also the
most controversial. This first volume
It is a sign of the times that Tierneys of Fergusons authorized biography of
brave and interesting book begins with Kissinger ends in January 1969, when
the assumption that most contemporary Richard Nixon had been elected as U.S.
160 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Recent Books
president but not inaugurated and about two decades laterin which she
Kissinger had been selected as Nixons wrestles with some of the ambiguities
national security adviser but not yet and shadows she tiptoes around in To
appointed. Ferguson argues that the Kill a Mockingbird. In Go Set a Watchman,
young Kissinger was no Machiavellian Scout is forced to face harsh realities
realist, and he persuasively makes the about race relations and about her
case that Kissinger saw neither Metter- familys complicity in an ugly system
nich nor Bismarck as a model to emulate. when she finds her father at a White
In Fergusons account, Kissinger appears Citizens Council meeting planning
as a Kantian, rather than a Wilsonian, resistance to racial integration. William
idealist who believes that the duty of Faulkner and Ralph Ellison wrote more
a statesman is to choose among evils. profoundly than Lee about race in
Ferguson follows Kissinger as he streaked America, and Flannery OConnor had
across the American intellectual sky like a sharper eye for the South. Still, the
a meteor. He was already famous in the grace and sincerity of Lees fiction have
1950s; during the Kennedy and Johnson helped sharpen the consciences of
years, he was already engaged in nego- millions of readers; many writers have
tiations with North Vietnam. Every published far more to far less effect.
serious student of U.S. policy and history
will want to read this compelling book
about a towering figure. The Obama Doctrine: American Grand
Strategy Today
BY COLIN DUECK. Oxford University
Go Set a Watchman Press, 2015, 336 pp.
BY HARPER LEE. HarperCollins,
2015, 288 pp. Duecks book, which should be required
reading for 2016 presidential candidates
Harper Lees novel To Kill a Mocking- and their staffs, offers a critique of
bird tells the story of Atticus Finch, a U.S. President Barack Obamas foreign
small-town Alabama lawyer who risks policy, an overview of the state of the
ostracism and violence to defend an foreign policy debate among Republican
obviously innocent African American voters, and some foreign policy prescrip-
man against a false charge of rape; tions that Dueck believes would help
the tale is narrated by Finchs tomboy the eventual GOP candidate unite the
daughter, Scout. More than half a Republicans and reach out to indepen-
century after its publication, it remains dents and some Democrats. Dueck
one of the most popular works in the argues that Obama has sought to be a
American canon. Yet some readers have transformational presidentbut in
objected over the years to what they domestic rather than foreign policy.
deemed to be an excessively saintly Obamas overriding goal has been to
portrayal of Finch. It turns out that prevent foreign policy entanglements
prior to writing To Kill a Mockingbird, from splitting his electoral coalition
Lee wrote a different novelfeaturing and diverting economic resources
most of the same characters but set away from the nation building that
he believes the United States needs to and people of the United States; on the
do at home. As for the GOP, Dueck sees other, they belong to a racial minority
a party divided into three factions: that has suffered greatly from both
libertarian neo-isolationists, conserva- informal and legally sanctioned discrimi-
tive internationalists, and conservative nationand worse. Another common
nationalists. The three groups command theme is the continuing hold of Africa
roughly equal support in the party, on the imaginations of black Americans:
Dueck maintains, but conservative one should expect the continuing rise of
nationalists may prove decisive in the African Americans in the nations foreign
2016 primaries. Dueck advises the next policy establishment to result in closer
administration to embrace conserva- ties between the United States and the
tive American realism, an approach countries of Africa.
that focuses more on conserving the
foundations of U.S. primacy than on
transforming the world in the United Reinhold Niebuhr: Major Works on
States image. Religion and Politics
BY REINHOLD NIEBUHR. Library of
America, 2015, 850 pp.
African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy:
From the Era of Frederick Douglass to the The indispensable Library of America,
Age of Obama the most useful publishing venture in
EDITED BY LINDA HEYWOOD, American letters, has produced an edition
ALLISON BLAKELY, CHARLES of Niebuhrs major works, annotated by
STITH, AND JOSHUA C. Niebuhrs daughter, Elisabeth Sifton, a
YESNOWITZ. University of Illinois highly regarded editor and publisher. It
Press, 2015, 264 pp. belongs in the library of every student
of U.S. foreign policy. Niebuhr, a
Young Americans might take for granted Protestant pastor and theologian whose
the presence of African Americans in career stretched from World War I to
high-level U.S. foreign policy circles; the Vietnam era, was one of the United
after all, the U.S. president and his States keenest social thinkers. His
national security adviser are black, and approach to foreign policy, often known
in the past decade, two African Ameri- as Christian realism, was at bottom an
cans have served as U.S. secretary of attempt to bridge the gulf between the
state. But it has been a long road, as idealism promoted by American reli-
this useful collection of essays by noted gious culture and the difficult choices
scholars reveals with its in-depth look that confronted a global superpower in
at the history of African American an era of struggle against totalitarian
international engagement going back to regimes. For American thinkers such as
Frederick Douglass service as the U.S. George Kennan and Arthur Schlesinger,
minister to Haiti. One theme that links Jr.to say nothing of President Barack
these essays is the difficult line African Obama, whose 2009 Nobel Peace Prize
Americans have had to walk: on the one acceptance speech was steeped in
hand, they represent the government Niebuhrian thoughtNiebuhrs synthesis
162 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
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H
azareesingh explains French of physical objectsa technique taken
intellectual life more clearly from his recent bestseller, A History of
than his subjects themselves the World in 100 Objects. These items
possibly could, caught up as they are range from the obvious, such as Martin
in the discourses, habits of mind, and Luthers Bible, to the obscure, such as
pathologies he describes. The book begins a crude handcart that refugees used to
with a set of familiar stereotypes and flee East Prussia during World War II.
bons mots about French thinkers: their In each case, they help lend visceral
tendency to privilege deduction over texture and immediacy to the evolution
empiricism, abstraction over concrete- of the German spirit. To be sure, this
ness, and style over substance. Yet it approach has its flaws: politicians remain
soon delves deeper, focusing with great distant, thinkers and poets are short-
intelligence and subtlety on distinctively changed, and composers are almost
French conceptions of history, nation- absent. But the book makes for a satisfy-
hood, democratic participation, existen- ing read nonetheless.
tialism, and the creative tension between
order and imagination. Hazareesingh
closes by discussing how a current French The Trouble With Empire: Challenges to
crisis of doubt has diluted what was once Modern British Imperialism
a confident intellectual universalism. He BY ANTOINET TE BURTON. Oxford
sometimes falters when linking ideas University Press, 2015, 336 pp.
to political trends and at times fails to
distinguish clearly what is essentially This book begins with an overenthusias-
French and what is only coincidentally tic and unconvincing effort to distinguish
so. Yet anyone who loves, loathes, or is itself from previous works of imperial
just perplexed by self-styled French history. Yet readers should persevere,
intellectualsthat is, most educated because Burtons basic interpretation of
French peopleshould read this book. imperial rule is provocative and relevant.
She maintains that the British Empire a single currency, while maintaining
was never as solidly grounded as many local restrictions on service provision
believe: in many respects, it did not and the practice of professions. What
work very well, even at its height. From differences remain reflect inherited
the American Revolution, through the institutional residue. Egan makes a good
Opium Wars, the Anglo-Afghan Wars, case, yet substantial differences between
and the Anglo-Zulu War, to nationalist the EU and the United States suggest that
uprisings on the Indian subcontinent, the underlying commitments to social,
imperial rule faced constant armed political, and ideological integration
opposition. Informal labor and mar- remain very different in the two regions:
ketplace rebellions were commonplace. one cannot help wondering if Europeans
Imperial authorities often responded just dont want a United States of
with cultural incomprehension and Europe. This is nonetheless an insight-
military incompetence. To be sure, ful work, particularly for those who
this interpretation requires a rather follow transatlantic regulatory matters.
one-sided focus on British failures, yet
it does make a plausible case that even
at its apex, the empire on which the Europes Path to Crisis: Disintegration via
sun never set contained the seeds of Monetary Union
its own destruction. BY TOM GALLAGHER. Manchester
University Press, 2014, 272 pp.
Single Markets: Economic Integration in Nearly everyone now agrees that the
Europe and the United States euro is dysfunctional, at least in its
BY MICHELLE EGAN. Oxford current form. Among the currencys
University Press, 2015, 240 pp. greatest liabilities is that it fuels blanket
criticism of all other EU policies, most
This sophisticated book compares the of which have actually been politically
most ambitious and successful single and economically successful. So in the
market created in the late nineteenth years to come, Europe watchers should
century, the United States, with its expect more books like this one, in which
late-twentieth-century counterpart, Gallagher tosses the baby out with the
the EU. The comparison is instructive bath water. He recycles a litany of British
because, whatever economists may Euroskeptical criticisms of the EU: it is,
counsel, societies do not simply make in his view, an undemocratic, left-wing
choices to maximize economic welfare superstate foisted on unsuspecting
as a matter of course. Instead, they European peoples by an alliance of
respond to complex pressures from government bureaucrats and ideologically
business interests and legal advocates. driven politicians. Such claims have been
Egan maintains that such pressures convincingly refuted many times, and
have ultimately led to similar out- this book provides almost no original
comes on both sides of the Atlantic, evidence for themeven Gallaghers
generating rules to protect the free potted history of how the monetary
movement of goods and, eventually, union came about is unsupported by
164 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Recent Books
I
security threats. He argues that ecological n the 1960s, economic theorists
stress and disasters will trigger violent divided the world into a hegemonic
conflict, border tensions, resource scarcity, industrialized North and an ex-
economic disputes, democratic instability, ploited and impoverished South. In
increased migration, and global power this dense, data-rich milestone of a study,
shifts. Curiously, however, this book does a group of World Bank experts argue
as much to undermine its case as to make that the rise of the Southern economies
it. It demonstrates that EU officials and including those of Brazil, Mexico, and
politicians talk a great deal about the other countries in Latin Americahas
relationship between the environment disrupted this simple dichotomy and
and security but have done little to created a more differentiated and inter-
address it, in large part because the link twined international economy. (In the
remains abstract and the concrete policy financial sphere, however, the Northern
solutions unclear. Youngs theoretical capital centersNew York, London,
arguments for a coordinated Brussels- Frankfurt, and Tokyoretain their
based approach rest on a simplistic and traditional dominance.) As an increasingly
misapplied dichotomy whereby realists globalized region, Latin America depends
predict rivalry and independent pursuit for its future on the extent and quality of
of material interest and liberals foresee its external connections. In reaffirming the
multilateral cooperation and environ- value of openness, the authors argue
mental priorities. His practical proposals that trade and investment boost growth
for fighting climate change are logisti- not only through efficiency gains but
cally and politically daunting, requiring also by serving as conduits for learning
heavy lifting by national militaries, and technology diffusion, which in turn
UN agencies, crisis-prevention groups, depend on where countries fit into global
development institutions, and a wide supply chains. In a finding certain to raise
range of interest groups. Its worth hackles in some parts of the developing
wondering whether the attention paid world, the study argues that trade linkages
to this trendy issue might be better with the North could indeed yield higher
applied elsewhere. growth payoffs than trade with the South.
166 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Recent Books
I
ts unusual for two masterpieces to the awful event with layer upon layer of
appear within less than a year of meaning. Gessens own Russian back-
each other on a subject that has ground helps her unravel the immensely
already been pored over by countless complicated vagabond existence of the
writers from nearly every angle. That Tsarnaev family. Like many of their
has now happened with two books about fellow Chechensa people Stalin
Joseph Stalin. The first was Stephen uprooted in the last stages of World
Kotkins Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, the War II and shipped in cattle cars to
initial volume in a projected trilogy. Central Asiathe Tsarnaevs struggled
And now appears Khlevniuks superb to find a place, first in Russia and
book, a deeply informed and utterly ultimately in the United States, where
compelling biography, written by a they and their children could enjoy
careful Russia historian who knows upward mobility. Gessen is personally
the relevant archival material better familiar with the Russian immigrant
than any other scholar. Khlevniuks experience and sketches with special
fine filter lets through only the essen- insight how it went so awry in this case.
tials; what he highlights is so frequently She skillfully reconstructs and narrates
new and revealing that the portrait the bombing and its aftermath, but it is
in the end seems more accurate and her dogged determination to talk to
complete than anything before. Stalin everyone overseas and in the United
and the country that produced him States who knew the family that makes
and that he then harshly refashioned the book so startling and eye opening.
emerge with stunning clarity. The
integrity of Khlevniuks account
comes from his refusal to speculate The End of the Cold War: 19851991
beyond where hard evidence carries BY ROBERT SERVICE. PublicAffairs,
him. Favorovs masterful translation 2015, 688 pp.
from the Russian preserves the books
spare, penetrating prose. Service takes the vast literature on the
Cold Wars end, adds newly available
168 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Recent Books
archival sources, and pulls it all together gradual reforms in crisis situations have
into a single massive history of how failed. The EU must step forward with an
Washington and Moscow achieved aid package as ambitious as the Marshall
their improbable peace. Instead of Plan. But political reform must come
taking a side in the simplistic debate first, and Aslund details the progress
over whether Soviet Premier Mikhail Ukraine has achieved on that front in the
Gorbachevs revolution in Soviet foreign past two years. Still, much remains to be
policy or U.S. President Ronald Reagans done, and he urges campaign finance
initial hard line deserves more credit reform, the elimination of parliamentary
for the outcome, Service chooses a immunity, and the decentralization of
subtler middle ground, crediting both economic and political power. Those steps
sides. He commends the skill and will pave the way for deeper changes: new
flexibility of Gorbachev, Reagan, and anticorruption policies and practices,
two other men: U.S. Secretary of State measures to achieve financial stability and
George Shultz and Soviet Foreign sustainability, the transformation of the
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, both energy sector, and new social policy. In all
of whom Service places at the center of these areas, Aslund proposes concrete
his story. The narrative weaves between steps based on his deep experience.
the diplomatic action on multiple fronts
and the political maneuvering in the
United States and the Soviet Union. To Broad Is My Native Land: Repertoires
cover as many elements as Service does and Regimes of Migration in Russias
requires very tight writing, even in a Twentieth Century
big book such as this one: as a result, he BY LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM AND
settles for sentences rather than para- LESLIE PAGE MOCH. Cornell
graphs to cover the necessary ground. University Press, 2014, 440 pp.
S
ky, a British expert on develop-
Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post- ment and conflict resolution in
Soviet States the Middle East, opposed the
BY JESSE DRISCOLL. Cambridge U.S.-led 2003 invasion of Iraq. To atone
University Press, 2015, 264 pp. for her countrys involvement, she
volunteered to work for the Coalition
Taking a deep look at the fighting that Provisional Authority, which was set up
took place in Georgia and Tajikistan in by the Americans to govern Iraq. She
the early 1990s after the Soviet Union ended up spending six years in Iraq,
disbanded, Driscoll questions many of first as the senior CPA civilian official in
the core assumptions scholars make in Kirkuk and then as a political adviser to
the literature on international peace- the U.S. generals running the war; she
keeping. He knows this academic field worked especially closely with General
well and is fluent in its key arguments, Raymond Odierno. Like many soldiers
but he also spent two years in the places and journalists who hang out in combat
where these wars occurred and among zones, she became addicted to the
those who fought them. This kind of tension and loyal to her colleagues. The
firsthand research gives his analysis real book is a fast-paced diary based entirely
heft. In both cases, it was not the even- on her recollections and enlivened by
tual triumph of state authority, the clear her skillful character sketches. But it
defeat of one side, the disarming of the doesnt shed much new light: in line
warring parties, or the arbitration of with other, more analytic accounts of
international mediators that allowed the the war, Skys narrative suggests that
conflict to end, as many theorists would Iraqs unraveling was not inevitable
assume. Rather, he argues, it was the but rather the result of poor decisions
deals that opposing warlords worked out on the part of clumsy leaders. She faults
among themselves, based on the bounty Washingtonand in particular U.S.
they could share, in a system that toler- Vice President Joe Bidenfor trusting
ated or even exploited their avarice too much in Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-
not least because they frequently came Maliki. Biden was a nice man, Sky
to constitute the state. In both cases, writes, but he simply had the wrong
Russia acted not as an honest broker instincts on Iraq.
but as a source of the spoils of war.
170 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Recent Books
One Islam, Many Muslim Worlds: Islam and Democracy After the
Spirituality, Identity, and Resistance Across Arab Spring
Islamic Lands BY JOHN L. ESPOSITO, TAMARA
BY RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER. SONN, AND JOHN O. VOLL. Oxford
Oxford University Press, 2015, 392 pp. University Press, 2015, 320 pp.
Baker is an old Middle East hand, and The authors are at pains to refute the
this intriguing but exasperating book idea that Islam is incompatible with
is built on decades of residence in and democracy, citing survey data showing
reflection on the Islamic world. He that Muslims everywhere aspire to it.
argues that the vast majority of the They examine six Muslim-majority
globes 1.6 billion Muslims are inspired countriesIndonesia, Iran, Pakistan,
by midstream Islam, which is humanis- Senegal, Tunisia, and Turkeythat
tic and democratic, eschewing violence enjoy some degree of democratic
except in self-defense. Baker asserts practice or tradition and also look at
the existence of this midstream without one autocracy, Egypt. They explain
providing much empirical evidence. why some of these countries are more
He appears untroubled that its leading democratic than others by pointing to
clerical figuressuch as Alija Izetbegovic contingent factors involving military
in Bosnia, Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah influence, economic conditions, and
in Lebanon, Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar, external actors. But their survey is
and Rachid al-Ghannouchi in Tunisia incomplete: the vast differences in
are either dead or very old. Moreover, socioeconomic conditions among the
the only book Baker points to that seven is not systematically examined.
might qualify as a middle-of-the-road Moreover, the authors make scant
manifestoA Contemporary Islamic reference to the relative absence of
Vision: Declaration of Principles, by the democracy in the Arab world. Nor do
moderate Egyptian Islamist attorney they take into account quantitative
Ahmed Kamal Abul Magdwas pub- analyses correlating the absence of
lished in 1991. In Bakers portrait, most democracy with the presence of Islam.
of the worlds Muslims are constantly Of the countries they study, the most
searching for justice and resisting injus- stable appear to be Indonesia, where
tice, whose main source is the United most Muslims practice a syncretic
States and its quest for empire. But version of Islam, and Senegal, where
Bakers depiction of U.S. policy is a relatively moderate Sufi orders prevail.
caricature. For Baker, Washingtons
thirst for oil, desire for more military
bases, and devotion to Israel mean that Islam in Saudi Arabia
the United States cannot tolerate an Islam BY DAVID COMMINS. Cornell
which embodies the cosmic human University Press, 2015, 224 pp.
struggle for justice in the face of evil.
Commins breaks no new ground, but
he has produced a succinct and insight-
ful survey of puritanical Wahhabi Islam
P
ils, a legal scholar, interviewed
Its always interesting to imagine dia- nearly half of the 200 or so lawyers
logues with ones adversaries. Farrall, a in China who try to use Chinese
former Australian intelligence analyst, courts to protect citizens from abuse
and Hamid, an Egyptian who traveled by local officials and police. They were
to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in typically drawn into this type of work
1979 and remained involved in jihadist by encounters with clients who had
circles there for the next two decades, been tortured into false confessions or
actually had a chance to communicate who had lost their houses to corrupt
over a four-year period, over the Inter- developers. As they were radicalized
net and in person. In the conversations by the Kafkaesque obstacles they
172 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
confronted in court, these rights
protection lawyers (as they are known
in China) developed a strategy of
taking the play for the real: arguing
their cases as if the legal system were
independent and using the inevitable DIRECTORY
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Economics, Politics, and Foreign Policy
BY DANIEL C. LYNCH. Stanford Employment and
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Most of what outside observers know
about policy controversies in China INTERNATIONAL EDITIONS
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runs counter to the regimes happy
talk, pointing to problems such as an
aging work force, the politicized alloca-
tion of credit, and government control
173
Recent Books
of the land market. On international the vast amount of data their hackers
relations, by contrast, many specialists steal. Looking only at the Chinese side
express what Lynch calls a belle-poque of the relationship, the book does not
hubris, urging the government to be detail the digital threats that the United
even more assertive than it already is. States poses to China. But Chinese
Commentators on domestic politics thinkers believe they are significant,
do not challenge one-party rule, but and given Chinas strategic doctrine of
some call for more inner-party democ- striking first and massively, this creates
racy, while others view authoritarianism the risk that in a crisis, Beijing might
as a developmental stage that will lead launch a preemptive cyberattack. The
to democracy, and a third group is even fact that Chinese and Western experts
more rigid than the Chinese Commu- cooperated in this pathbreaking book
nist Party itself, portraying the current shows that there is a potential for
system as perfectly suited to Chinese working together. But there are many
culture. No one knows the extent to obstacles, including the inherent secrecy
which these debates influence policy, of the field.
but this skillful inquiry shows how
informed insiders see Chinas possible
future trajectories. The China-Pakistan Axis: Asias New
Geopolitics
BY ANDREW SMALL. Oxford
China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, University Press, 2015, 288 pp.
Strategy, and Politics in the Digital
Domain China has been Pakistans most consis-
EDITED BY JON R. LINDSAY, TAI tent supporter for over half a century,
MING CHEUNG, AND DEREK S. but always with the instrumental purpose
REVERON. Oxford University Press, of maintaining a counterweight to India
2015, 398 pp. rather than out of ideological or cultural
affinity. No wonder the relationship has
This books contributors argue that frequently disappointed Pakistani hopes.
China is not the electronic supervillain China stood by when Indian troops
it is often thought to be. Despite the helped dismember Pakistan during the
regimes hefty investment in digital 1971 rebellion in East Pakistan (now
espionage and cyberwar capabilities, its Bangladesh). China helped Pakistan get
networks are less secure than those in nuclear weapons in order to weaken the
the United States, the Chinese agencies Indian nuclear threat to China, but then
that make cybersecurity policy are more lobbied against Pakistani adventurism
fragmented than their U.S. counter- that risked triggering a war with India.
parts, and the country suffers losses It encouraged Pakistan to sponsor
worth close to $1 billion a year because jihadist militants to attack the Soviets
of weak policing of online theft and in Afghanistan, but then pressured
fraud. China conducts a great deal of Pakistan to rein in the jihadists who
industrial espionage, but its enterprises were targeting Chinese rule in Xinjiang.
have a hard time filtering and applying Today, China needs Pakistan to anchor
174 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Recent Books
Chinese plans to develop infrastructure which all three sides would acknowl-
in South Asia and Central Asia, but edge historical wrongs and agree to
China will not get deeply involved look toward the future. Although few
enough in Pakistan to fix the instability of its facts are new, the book offers a
that renders that country a risky venue useful overview of an important
for investment. Given the frustrations trilateral relationship.
of both sides, the relationship described
in this exceptionally well-informed and
insightful account does not yet qualify Dreams of the Hmong Kingdom: The Quest
as an axis. for Legitimation in French Indochina,
18501960
BY MAI NA M. LEE. University of
The JapanSouth Korea Identity Clash: Wisconsin Press, 2015, 430 pp.
East Asian Security and the United States
BY BRAD GLOSSERMAN AND This innovative contribution to the
SCOT T A. SNYDER. Columbia historiography of Southeast Asia tells
University Press, 2015, 240 pp. the tragic story of the Hmong ethnic
group, not only from the usual outside
Glosserman and Snyder use poll data perspective but from within the Hmong
and interviews with elites to argue that cultural tradition as well. Lee draws
an increasingly confident South Korea on French colonial archives and inter-
has become more and more impatient views to show how the Hmongsa hill
with Japans hesitancy to acknowledge people scattered across Laos, Thailand,
the crimes it committed during its Vietnam, and parts of southern China
imperial era and during World War II. have oscillated between submission to
The authors think this explains the and rebellion against superior forces:
two countries difficulty in getting French colonizers, the Laotian royal
along despite shared democratic values government, the Japanese occupiers
and similar threat perceptions. Realists during World War II, and later the
might counter that divergences in the local communist movements and the
two countries strategies for handling Americans. The messianism of the
the threats posed by China and North Hmong rebellions, the fractiousness
Korea are a better explanation for the of the Hmong clans, and the oppor-
lack of cooperation. But both explana- tunism of Hmong relations with other
tions recognize that part of the prob- forces mystified colonial powers and
lem lies in the hub-and-spoke alliance have puzzled historians ever since. But
system that the United States built in Lee, herself a member of the Hmong
Asia after World War II, which links diaspora, makes sense of these behaviors
each ally separately to Washington as she deciphers the communitys myths,
without fostering ties among them. To symbols, lineage ties, sexual politics,
overcome this deficiency, the authors and rituals, with the combined skills of
recommend building on existing low- a historian and an anthropologist.
level forms of cooperation. In the
longer term, they hope for a reset in
T
Thondup was the go-to Tibetan inter- he wave of democratization that
locutor for foreign governments and washed over Africa in the early
China. The book is full of tales of inter- 1990s resulted in the spread of
national intrigue, recounting Thondups multiparty electoral competition and
meetings in the 1950s with Indian the emergence of a number of imperfect
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and democracies in which citizens enjoyed
the Taiwanese leader Chiang Kai-shek, greater political liberties than they had
who Thondup says personally paid for before. But it produced few countries
him to attend college. Thondup also in which presidents did not continue
claims that he was the CIAs contact to enjoy extraconstitutional advantages
person in Tibet and that he even man- come election time. In this short but
aged the agencys clandestine base in thorough book, Cheeseman recounts
Nepal. Later, when Deng Xiaoping came the breakdown of authoritarian gover-
to power in China, Thondup writes that nance in the 1980s, the emergence of
he was summoned to Beijing to discuss opposition movements and parties, the
renewed negotiations between China and process of reforms, and the obstacles to
the Dalai Lama. Still, Thondup offers very democratic consolidation. One particu-
few substantial revelations about Tibets larly thoughtful chapter focuses on
recent history. And the book is marred institutional arrangements that different
by speculation that verges on conspiracy countries have used to address ethnic
theorizing; indeed, in a postscript, tensions. Cheeseman uses lively case
Thondups co-author, Thurston, actu- studies to support his main arguments
ally questions the veracity of Thondups and delves into the recent academic
story. In Thondups telling, the 198789 literature on this topic to assess current
protests in Tibet were engineered by trends and make predictions about the
foreign governments and Beijings future. He eschews much of the pessi-
negotiations with the Dalai Lama mism about African democracy that is
were sabotaged by the Indian govern- fashionable today, instead offering a
ment. These are fascinating allegations, lucid and balanced account of both
but Thondup offers little evidence to achievements and failures.
support them.
TSERING SHAKYA
176 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Recent Books
Africas New Oil: Power, Pipelines, and generally been considered one of
Future Fortunes Africas more stable democracies, with
BY CELESTE HICKS. Zed Books, regular multiparty elections, a progres-
2015, 256 pp. sive constitution, and seemingly robust
personal freedoms. Melber, a veteran
Hicks considers whether African countries member of the countrys entrenched
that have recently become oil producers governing party, the South West Africa
will fall victim to the resource curse: Peoples Organization (SWAPO), casts
the combination of corruption, poor a much more critical look at Namibias
economic growth, and environmental record. He argues that SWAPO has become
disaster that oil wealth has led to else- too dominant, too willing to use state
where. Her focus is Chad. Around resources to maintain its grip on power,
15 years ago, in exchange for financial and too thin-skinned. His criticism of
support from the World Bank, Chad the countrys economic policies is even
agreed to a number of restrictions on harsher. He complains that the state
the use of its oil revenues, promising has done little to reduce the high
to use its newfound wealth to improve levels of inequality bequeathed by the
the welfare of its population. But Chad pre-independence white minority-rule
broke its pledges and ultimately turned government. SWAPOs management of
to China, which offered help in devel- the countrys significant land, mining,
oping Chads oil sector with far fewer and marine resources has mostly served
strings attached. Hicks detailed to create a new, black oligarchy. Melber
account, which also looks at the role of ends his compelling account by pondering
oil in Ghana, Kenya, Niger, and Uganda, the future. In a country where a major-
provides reasons for both optimism ity of the population is under 30 years
and pessimism. On the one hand, old, the SWAPO leadership increasingly
increasingly well-informed media and looks like a gerontocracy. But Melber
civil society organizations in those believes its hold on power is secure
countries have ensured that oil contracts, for now.
revenues, and environmental problems
are discussed much more frankly and
knowledgeably than in the past. On the Dictators and Democracy in African
other hand, decision-making in these Development: The Political Economy of
new oil sectors remains top-down and Good Governance in Nigeria
thus vulnerable to corruption. BY A. CARL L E VAN. Cambridge
University Press, 2014, 308 pp.
Nigerian politics and public policy, observation that Senghor was largely
LeVan rejects those conventional ignorant of the Senegalese countryside
explanations, arguing instead that the and did little to improve the welfare
country has been undermined by the of his rural countrymen. Particularly
prevalence of veto players, which he interesting portraits emerge of Muammar
defines as political and institutional al-Qaddafi of Libya, Robert Mugabe
actorssuch as the legislature, power- of Zimbabwe, and Mobutu Sese Seko of
ful networks within the military, and Zaire. Diplomatic historians will value the
regional pressure groupsthat can books substantive details. Other read-
block policy reform in order to gain ers will be tickled by some of Cohens
private concessions for themselves. revelations: he reports, among other
The more power veto players have things, that Mobutus favorite ride at
enjoyed, the less Nigeria has been able Disneyland, which the dictator visited
to achieve desirable economic outcomes. in 1970, was one that featured an
LeVans thesis raises some questions, imitation Congo River, replete with
such as why the number of veto players electronic crocodiles.
varies across Nigerias postcolonial
history. But he has written a provocative
and insightful analysis of the Nigerian
political economy that rings true.
178 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
countries of the Organization for
Letters to the Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, at almost 50 percent of GDP. And
Editor its public-sector employment accounts
for a third of its labor force, compared
with the OECD average of under 20
percent. None of this should come as
INEQUALITY AND THE SAFETY NET a surprise: governments must provide
To the Editor: social services directly or pay for them
In The Next Safety Net (July/ indirectly if they are guaranteed to all
August 2015), Nicolas Colin and Bruno citizens, and that is expensive.
Palier correctly identify the increasing The real challenge of building a welfare
incompatibility between twentieth- state for the twenty-first century will be
century social welfare systems and developing a collective commitment to
twenty-first-century employment the provision of economic security. The
patterns. They predict a future in mid-twentieth century, for example,
which the majority of workers will have featured a commitment to the redistribu-
precarious, short-term, low-paying jobs tion of market gains through progressive
and in which social benefits tied to an tax regimes, the social welfare state, and
outdated occupational model will fail strong labor-market protections. Yet that
to meet their needs. commitment began to falter in the 1970s.
As a solution, they favor Danish-style If it were once again possible to
flexicuritycomprehensive social commit to a redistributive tax regime,
provisions decoupled from employment, however, different states would likely
together with labor-market deregulation. experiment with a range of social safety
Flexicurity allows firms to make business- nets tailored to their cultures and econo-
driven hiring and firing decisions against mies. If some states, such as Denmark,
a background of government-financed are willing to redistribute 50 percent of
benefits and worker retraining programs. their GDP for flexicurity, others might well
In the new economy, flexicurity would choose to devote the same level of funding
have obvious advantages. But Colin and to establishing a basic income. Economic
Palier fail to subject flexicurity to the same security can take the form of subsidies for
criteria by which they dismiss other types basic services, or in cash, or as a mixture
of safety nets, such as a guaranteed basic of both. Whatever the approach, however,
income, an option that they should take it would require increasing taxes on the
more seriously. wealthy to be sustainable.
They write, for example, that a The idea of a basic income thus lays
basic income is extremely expensive bare the redistribution that will have to
and insufficient and that governments be at the heart of any reckoning with
are ill equipped to compete with the rising economic inequality and insecurity.
private sector in job creation. That ALMAZ ZELLEKE
may be the case, but flexicurity is not Visiting Assistant Professor, NYU Shanghai
cheap or entirely reliant on private-
sector job creation, either. The tax burden
in Denmark is the highest among the
180 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Letters to the Editor
Foreign Affairs (ISSN 00157120), November/December 2015, Volume 94, Number 6. Published six times annually (January, March,
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182 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
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