XIX Tactical Air Command

The flak section at XIX TAG commenced The Command flak section compiled a card
operations in March 1944, when one officer and one file indexed to correspond to the map sheets of the
enlisted man undertook the staggering job of re­ 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 maps of Europe. Photo
constructing the flak picture in Belgium, Holland interpretation reports were extracted and filed to
and Northern France by poring over results of provide reference from the card system as to photo
all photo interpretation and sortie number, date
made during the past of photos, etc. Ground
two years. The informa­ source information and
tion was furnished bv the pilot experience were also
British War Office in the entered on the cards,
form of pinpoint loca­ which then became a flak
tions which were plot­ history for each map sheet.
ted on the standard
1150,000 scale overlaid Data Transmission
maps. With the acquisi­ Highlights to em­
tion of a flak officer at phasize the contributions
each Wing in April 1944 of XIX TAC to flak
the TAC flak picture during its organization
took on a more balanced can perhaps best be des­
aspect, since crews could cribed by listing some
then be lectured and of the methods used to
Groups more properly disseminate flak intel­
briefed on flak and flak ligence in coping with
analysis. the flak menace.
Toward the middle (a) Crew Reports of
of May, just as most of Flak Reaction (teletype)
the problems seemed re- - This message was dis­
solved, long range fight- Major General Otto P. Weyland patched each morning to
ers providing escort for Air Force and units of
heavy bombers deep inside Germany started to the Command. It contained flak experience of the
attack German airfields while enroute home from Groups for the preceding day, indicating new and
these escort missions. This necessitated consolida­ old defenses, flak trends, balloon defenses, flak traps,
tion and distribution of flak positions covering the etc.
defenses of about 100 German airfields. (b) Daily Briefing Information Bulletin — This

17
 Capt. W. C. Charlton
Capt. Thomas B. Kelly
Sgt. C. L. Shotwell
bulletin prepared at Command for the briefine Target Selection
of pilots on the missions of the following day con­
The flak officer at Command was always present
tained a flak briefing paragraph written by the
with advice and intelligence at the target conferences.
Command flak officer and was sent to Wings and
His daily indications of the appearance of new flak
Groups each evening. The strength of each defense
concentrations often resulted in re-examination of
and locations of guns were included, headings into
cover and discovery of new targets. Many times
and out of the target areas were recommended, and
the selection of targets depended on the flak officer's
other danger areas in the vicinity noted. When last
decision as to feasibility of attack from the flak
minute selection of targets became necessary, infor­ standpoint.
mation normally sent in this paragraph was tele­ Flak officers of this Command also contributed
phoned directly to the Groups and when aircraft greatly to the development of probability curves for
were airborne enroute to targets, this information low level flak analysis. Here too counter-battery
was transmitted to pilots over the radio telephone. flak fire was developed and employed through the
This briefing paragraph superseded the earlier Command flak section, as was the case throughout
"Flak Over Target" message sent down from Wings the Air Force.
on targets to be attacked. This latter teletype message With war's end so ended the flak section at
contained pertinent information on targets and was the XIX Tactical Air Command, but not without
used during the hectic invasion period. realization that it had played a vital part in the
An example of this message follows, the suc­ provision of intelligence which had unquestionably
cessive numbers constituting the circumferential saved lives and may well have enhanced the suc­
values of the " I N " and " O U T " flak clocks: cesses of many missions.
FLAK TARGET WM 8932, 4 heavy 15 Flakked up!
light. In Ht 13000 Begin 360. 3.1, 3.0, 2.7, 1.5, 1.3,
1.1, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 2.8, 3.2. Out Ht 3000 Begin 360.
1.7, 1.5, 1.1, 1.0, 1.2, 1.7, 2 . 0 , 2 . 3 , 2 . 7 , 3 . 0 , 2 . 5 , 2.0
Best out between 60-120. Past target 3 miles then
climb to minimum 6000 during next 7 miles. Keep
out of SW sector.
(c) Daily Intelligence Summary — A para­
graph was included in the published DIS which
gave information on flak trends in dispositions and
tactics of interest to other air or ground units with
which the Command cooperated.
(d) Loss and Damage Analysis Reports
These statistical reports prepared bi-monthly were
instrumental in presenting in a factual manner the
progress being made against the ever present flak
threat.

19
 XXETTAC

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UNDER FOO
AND ALWAYS

84* anJJOJ1? FIGHTER.

ALWAYS FRENCH

LAUNDR£JS£S AROUND- AlLUERS

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 XXIX Tactical Air Command

In September 1944 the 84th and 303rd Fighter made available at Group level via the Command
Wings formed the X X I X TAG, and the two flak daily flak teletype. As close cooperation between
sections joined in gathering and organizing the targets and flak was a necessity, these two sections
many overlaid maps, teletypes and SOP's necessary were always situated in the same room. A flak
for a command flak section in the new area of oper­ officer attended the "Combined Target Committee"
ations. meeting each evening
In maintaining its where material for the fol­
flak intelligence the lowing day's program was
XXIX TAG section de­ instigated. A flak officer
pended mainly on Ninth also spoke at the more
Air Force flak bulletins, formal briefing for the
but also made use of ori­ Commanding General,
ginal photo interpreta­ relating strength of de­
tion reports of Ninth Ar­ fenses, trends in flak de­
my, Second British Army, ployment, new technical
and a detachment of 20th data, and plane loss and
Photo Interpretation De­ damage to flak. Flak
tachment which was as­ maps were always kept
signed to the TAG. Photo up - to - date in the combat
pinpoints were compiled operations section in
on the standard 1:100,000 11500,000 and larger
scale overlaid maps used scales for reference at
throughout the Air Force, any time of day or night.
while the 11500,000 and
11250,000 flak maps were Controllers
used for general plan­ Flak information
ning. At Groups the same was available in another
procedure was followed, Brigadier General Richard E. Nugent form for fighter control-
the Group S-2 servicing lers. Range circles were
the Squadrons by transmitting for use at squadron drawn around heavy gun defended areas on the
briefings pin-pointed flak positions around the 1:500,000 scale vectoring board. Since the board
immediate target area assigned for that mission. displayed only a grid and not ground features or
Recent crew reports from neighboring fighter groups names of towns, the flak circle clearly showed safe
and units of other Tactical Air Commands were routes of approach and withdrawal from defended

21
 •

ft

Target Conference ist Lt. X. E. Langs taffand Gen. Xugent

areas for use by the vectoring officers. To aid in the
processing of information speedily to group level, a
special paragraph was reserved for flak in the daily
XXIX TAG A-2 periodic report. Contents of pub­
lications whose distribution stopped at command
level were reproduced and disseminated to
lower units. The flak officers made repeated visits
to squadrons where they carried on discussions of
the capabilities of flak and the guard against it.
Considerable interest was manifested at these con­
ferences, as X X I X TAC's operational area included
the Cologne plain and the "Happy Valley" of the
Ruhr — the hottest piece of sky in the world.

Flak Considered
Except in the Ruhr valley and in the center of
the larger industrial cities of the Rhine, a target was
not turned down on account of flak alone. Certain
areas in the Ruhr were recognized beforehand as
prohibitive to wise operation, and targets there
were not presented for consideration. When the
battlefield was to be isolated, the interdiction of
communications systems was accomplished at the
most advantageous places — flak being one of the
influencing factors in the selection of points of
attack.
After the breakthrough in December, an espec­
ially close watch was kept on movements of flak in
all areas, since changes in flak dispositions were
indicative of enemy movements and preparations
for attack. A special chart was prepared with the
entire Western front divided into Luftgau sub­
sections and German army zones. The relative
strength of zones was determined bi-weekly and the
results pooled with other information to give an
all-round intelligence picture.
By the Spring of 1945, many new agencies
were becoming interested in flak intelligence, as
flak guns were being used more and more in a ground
role. The XXIX TAC daily flak bulletin then includ­
ed on its distribution all Corps and Army artillery
sections as well as the pertinent air units.
Counter-Battery
Anti-flak fire was also coordinated with the
9th Army artillery, and became SOP on close
support operations. It met with considerable suc­
cess, much to the delight of our fighter-bomber
pilots.
During the last months of the war, the XXIX
TAC section was pressed to keep up with rapidly
advancing Allied Armies, and the end of hostilities
was received with both relief and satisfaction —
relief to know that the threat of German flak was
over and satisfaction with the realization that the
XXIX TAC flak section had played a very potent
part in disallowing this flak threat from ever devel­
oping into a menace to the fighter-bomber airmen
and aircraft they served.

23
 Development of mathematical solutions to the
flak problems of a tactical air force was the continual
and ingenuity-testing goal of flak analysis officers
in this theater. "Approved solutions" were pro­
duced, but as the campaigns rolled on it became
more evident that the best flak analyses in the
rapidly shifting tactical areas were very seldom the
mathematical solutions.
The eternal question in the tactical opera­
tional area was, "'Where are those German flak
positions?", and because flak analysis is founded
on an exact knowledge of the weapon locations and
characteristics, the problem became extremely neb­
ulous. There always appeared to be more unknowns
than equations. In addition, in a tactical air unit
24
targets were selected and attacked with such dis­
patch that formal analysis systems, especially with
fighter-bomber organizations, were applied only
when time allowed. It was with these limitations
that flak personnel approached the subject and
evolved the procedures briefly described in the
following paragraphs.
Medium Bombardment
Essentially the analysis method in use through­
out the Bomber Command was that system origin­
ally devised for the strategic high level bombers in
this theater, slightly revised to accomodate the
lower bombing altitudes (10,000 to 14,000 feet)
employed on the B-26, A-20, and A-26 missions in
 "Sir, the flak was light, but accurate over Malmedy"
the tactical area. Oftentimes because of the typical
unbalanced defenses of the tactical area it was pos­
sible to choose the proper bombing axis and route
without resorting to the flak clock. However, if any
doubt existed, due to gun density, wind, possibility
of shifts in the mobile defenses, etc., the flak defenses
were thoroughly analyzed in conjunction with other
operational factors of sun, drift, etc.
In order to better evaluate and record flak
experience for future use, overlays (see insert) of
each mission route with flak experience as to loca­
tion, intensity, planes damaged, quality and type
of fire, etc. were composed at group level and for­
warded to Command for analysis. This method of
presenting flak fire experiences proved very suc­
cessful in providing intelligence of enemy disposi­
tions in areas for which there was no photographic
cover.
Fighler-bombers
With due regard to the enormity of the vagaries,
the possible errors, the unknown quantities, the
flexible conditions, etc. which haunt the fighter
flak problem, efforts were made to produce a work­
able "gadget" that would indicate best routes into
and out of light flak areas for the particular benefit
of fighter-bomber aircraft. In May, 1944, flak
analysis officers of the IX and XIX Tactical Air
Commands produced the first dive-bombing and
low level bombing flak computers for light flak
analysis.
25

(See fig. i, Pg. 27) This simple expedient for
computation of gun effectiveness factors was based
on the probability of hitting at midpoint slant ranges
for light flak weapons. The effectiveness numbers
were placed on the computer between the slant
range limits (2,500 yards considered maximum effec­
tive range of light flak), and the altitudes of bomb
release and scale of the map determined the size
of the computer. Values for each of the guns in a
defense were computed at various headings, the
smallest effectiveness number determining the best
axis of approach.
(See fig. 2, Pg. 27) This second computer was
based on the assumption that the effectiveness of
light antiaircraft artillery at various ranges is inver­
sely proportional to the square of the slant range.
The curves shown were constructed for typical
dive-bombing methods in use at the time; i. e..
seventy degree dive, release of bombs at 4,000 feet
26
Ninth
fighter-bombers
score on an
enemy ammo
column
and pullout at 1,500 feet, with full recovery 2,500
yards beyond the aiming point. Again, in order to
determine axis of attack, data derived from reading
values of gun positions at thirty degree intervals of
the compass was compiled and the best heading
readily chosen.
Although these systems were merely basic and
did not consider the fact that the aspect of a moving
plane constantly changes, thus presenting varying
size targets to the ground gunner, this factor is in
all probability eliminated since aiming errors in­
crease with deflection, which itself is greatest when
the aspect of the target makes it appear largest.
From these beginnings mathematical analysis
of light flak has progressed, but it can still be said
that flak analysis in a fluid battle situation is essen­
tially one based on intelligence of the enemy's flak
dispositions, capabilities and tactics.
 323 BOMBGP(M)AAF
22 FEBRUARY 1945

TARGETS 8 KEY

INEUBECKUM­
3 Runs-10 A/C.
All crews reported Meg­ LEAD # 2 a # 6 Cat. A
ger Inaccurate HFFin area 3TS.W. of NEUBECKUM­
of HULMEN in and out, 3 Runs-II A/C.
and at COESFELD on the IEAHLEN —
route out. Meager inaccu­ 3 Runs-12 A/C.
rate LFF was observed by LEAD # 1 Cat. A
some crews of the ALTEN­ 12LAGE­
BEKEN mission at the 1 Run-6 A/C.
target, on the strafing run LEAD # 4 Cat. A
which was made at 3 , 5 0 0 ISZALTENBEKEN­
ft. and an airspeed of ap­ 2 Runs-II A/C
proximately 2 9 0 miles an MEAG. INACC.
hour indicated. No HFF or MEAG. 1NACC LIGHT.
LFF was reported at the
BRIEFED ROUTE
five primaries when the
a/c were at bombing alti­ No Flak in target areas
tude. except for meag. inacc.
Visibility was I % miles LFF on strafing run.
up sun, 6 miles down sun. ONE FLIGHT DROPPED HERE.
*HAMM
No clouds. DORSTEN
TIME 1419 to 1430
HEIGHT 8,000'to 12,000'
SOEST NO CLOUDS —
VIS. ifeMI. UP SUN
WEATHER 6 Ml. DOWN SUN
HAZE.

FO. 424

REPRODUCED BY Co B, 942ND ENGR AVN TOPO BN

 SLANT
750O'
SLANT
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COURSE. Or A/C S\-ANT RANGE
OF

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SLIkNT
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SLAVAT
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F l G . i

OF
Of
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AT AN ATAGV.t OF
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OF
PUV IN \ 5
SEC. XT \5OO FT.

SCM.E *.-»-. 50,000

F I G .

28

 Early in 1944 flak replaced enemy aircraft as the principle cause of loss and dam­
age to Allied aircraft. Flak production moved into high gear and the Hun built up
powerful defenses throughout the Reich for the protection of his cities, industries,
and military installations.
During the hey-day of the German Air Force
flak was considered a minor and annoying evil, like
a mosquito that buzzed around and sometimes bit.
The greatest proportion of loss and damage to
Allied aircraft during this early period was caused
by enemy fighter planes. Formations, tactics, and
other defensive measures aimed at reducing the
destructive power of enemy aircraft — and flak
was hardly considered worthy of special treatment.
That was before the back of the GAF was
finally broken in the early months of 1944, forcing
the Hun to rely almost completely on his flak defen­
ses for protection against the air supremacy enjoyed
by the Allies.
Production of flak equipment, which had the
same priority as did production of aircraft, increas­
ed in tempo, and by the end of 1944 the already
formidable defenses had increased to 16,000 heavy
guns, 50,000 light guns, 7,500 searchlights, and
1,500 balloons, manned by a total of more than
1,000,000 personnel. Moreover in December 1944
production of flak equipment was given higher
priority than all aircraft except jet propelled planes.
Around his most important industries the
Hun amassed the greatest concentration of flak
guns the world has ever known. The Ruhr defenses,
greatest of the great, were capable of hurling 200
tons of metal and explosive into the air every minute;
the Cologne defenses, 80 tons; the Berlin defenses,
70 tons.
The total defenses of Germany, firing for one
minute, could have put 5,000 tons of shells into the sky.
Defense of the Reich, as well as of GAF installa­
tions, was mostly the responsibility of the German
Air Force, which controlled approximately 80%
of all flak defenses. The Army and SS units con­
trolled 15%, and the Navy, 5%. Everywhere, on
everything, flak guns were found: on the ground,
on buildings, towers, trucks, tanks, submarines,
barges, small boats, warships, and railway cars.
Fire control equipment, both optical and radio,
directed accurate fire to heights seven miles above
the earth's surface.
These, plus deceptive tactics, tricks, and traps
engendered of German ingenuity, all joined in
desperate battle against the crushing blows of the
bombers and the deadly sting of the fighter-bombers.
This was the enemy against which flak sections
were established. This was the enemy that was, after
the demise of the GAF, the primary cause of loss
and damage to our aircraft. This was the enemy
which is described pictorially in the following pages.
Port engine smoking from flak
hit, B-26 streaks for home
 Capable of shooting 20 rounds per minute,
this gun made up 80% of Germany's heavy
flak defenses, protecting all important industries,
communication centers, supply points, bridges,
etc. More than 1000 heavy flak guns were used
in the defense of the Ruhr. Not visible in the
picture are two sets of bogies which are the
mobile mounting.

"Bogie" of airmen and tank­

ers alike, this dual purpose gun
was the mainstay of Germany's
heavy flak defenses, capable of
firing effectively to a height of
35,000 feet or of piercing five
inches of armor at 2,000 yards.
Note foliage camouflage on barrel.
The gun was fired electrically.
 Considerable use was
made by the enemy of
such railway mounted
heavy flak as shown here
for rapid reinforcement of
threatened areas — a mobile
strategic reserve. Generally
there were four heavy guns
per battery, complete with
director (Kommandogerat
40) and radar equipment.
The guns could not be fired
on the move.

In traveling position this

gun weighed 12 tons, and it
was generally towed by a
12-ton half-tracked vehicle.
In an emergency it could be
fired from the wheels. At
0" elevation the barrel recoiled
four feet. This picture, taken
msmmmm

in Africa, shows the gunners

waiting in foxholes till time
to move out to new locations.
The gun was loaded manually.
 128mm

A bigger gun patterned after

the 105mm, this weapon streng­
thened already large defenses of
important targets. Intended for
static operation, there was also a
mobile model which weighed more
than 26 tons. *

In addition to the static mount­

ing shown here, there was also a mobile
version of the 105mm flak gun. In range
and rate of fire it was inferior to the
"88" (41 model), though its projectile
weighed 65% more. Since the 88mm
was a better all-round weapon, pro­
duction priorities favored the 88mm as
the standard heavy flak gun and the
128mm in the heavier class. Both the 105
mm and 128mm had automatic loaders.

34