G.R. No.

198240 July 3, 2013

LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA NAVARRO,
FRANCISCA NAVARRO MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN
NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III, MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP,
PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-
REJUSO, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Petitioner Luisa Navarro Marcos appeals the Decision1 dated February 28, 2011 and
Resolution2 dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460.

The antecedent facts follow:

Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in 1958 and 1993,
respectively. They left behind several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject
lot) located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.3

The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia
Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are
the respondents herein.4

Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of
the subject lot. Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated
May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.5

Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos,
requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary
Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard
signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person.6

Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215.7

After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that
the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that
presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since no
notice was given to them before the examination was conducted.8 Thus, PO2 Alvarezs report is
a worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.9

In its Order10 dated August 19, 2004, the RTC granted respondents motion and disqualified PO2
Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarezs supposed testimony would be hearsay as
she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need
for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness, because her
testimony is not yet needed.

The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their motion in an
Order11 dated October 11, 2005.

Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which however, dismissed their
petition in the assailed Decision dated February 28, 2011 on the ground that the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarezs disqualification as a witness.

1
Later, the CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated July 29,
2011. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of another CA Division which
reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of
decisions or matters pending before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is
not a member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for belatedly informing it that
Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated.

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to reconsider the assailed decision in light of the
reinstatement of Civil Case No. 5215. Petitioner adds that the CA erred in not ruling that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.12 They stress that
PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert witness to render an opinion on whether the disputed
handwriting was indeed made by Andres, Sr. or whether it is a forgery.13

In their comment,14 respondents counter that the CA properly disqualified PO2 Alvarez. They
also agreed with the CA that her disqualification was mooted by the dismissal of Civil Case No.
5215.

We find in favor of petitioner.

The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarezs
disqualification as a witness can no longer be justified. Hence, we reverse the CA ruling. While
we agree with the CA in considering the RTCs Orders15 which dismissed Civil Case No. 5215, we
are unable to agree with its refusal to take judicial notice of the Decision16 of another CA Division
which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Subsequent proceedings were even held in the reinstated
Civil Case No. 5215 per Orders17 issued by the RTC which were already submitted to the CA.
That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated is a fact that cannot be ignored.

We also agree with petitioner that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally
refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.18 Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the
Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence.19

In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic of the
Philippines,20we said that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a
witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by
reason of privileged communication.

2
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo,21 we have held that the specific enumeration of disqualified
witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules.
The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. We said:

The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest in the outcome
of a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not
grounds for disqualification.

Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those
who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them
incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged
communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it
states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called.

There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the
witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception. The
specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the
construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other
exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only
limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules
should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her
perception to others.1wphi1 We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the
Rules. Respondents motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not
based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of
the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.

Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence, to wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.

For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador,22 we were inclined to believe that Tamanis signature was
forged after considering the testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case involved
simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value
of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.

Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarezs testimony would be hearsay. Under Section
49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as
the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset that
PO2 Alvarezs testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is offered and she is called to the
witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari
and annulled the RTC ruling.

True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies that
the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
courts.23 Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the
testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries.24 However, we have also recognized that

3
handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the technical nature of the
procedure in examining forged documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned
signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.

In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness. She has the
qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules
allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the
opinion of an expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be determined if
P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she conducted.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1) Decision dated February 28, 2011
and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2)
Orders dated August 19, 2004 and October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
5215. We DENY respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a witness.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

4
 PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. GOLIMLIM (2004)

FACTS:

1. Salvador Golimlim (Accused) was charged for the rape of Evelyn Canchela (Victim), a mental
retardate, sometime in August 1996 while the Victim was placed in the Accuseds custody by her
mother who in turn left for abroad to work as a domestic helper. Accused was the husband of
the mothers sister;

2. Victim was able to file a complaint against the Accused only after several months. Accused
merely denied the allegations of the Victim and blamed her mental incapacity in casting doubt in
the accusation against him, stating that she mentioned many other names of men who had
intercourse with her. RTC ruled for conviction, hence the instant appeal.

ISSUES:

WON Evelyn Canchela, being a mental retardate, is disqualified from testifying as witness to the
case.

PROVISION: Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.

xxx

SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons
cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they
are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

RULING + RATIO:
No. Evelyn Canchela is still qualified as witness and may testify accordingly.
Mental retardation does not equate/translate to the incapacity contemplated in Sections 20 & 21
of Rule 130. Thus, the Court cited the definition of a mental retardate in People vs. Trelles, to
wit:

x x x A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a
witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally
accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid
objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly
intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. x x x

(emphasis supplied)

The Victim was fully capable of making her perceptions known to others since she was able to
respond to various questions framed in different forms so as to have her narrate the whole
incident and still give coherent facts. Further, mere denial of the Accused is a weak defense and
could not controvert the positive testimony of the Victim herself.

DISPOSITION: Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED/ UPHELD. Accused Salvador Golimlim is

CONVICTED and found

5
PEOPLE vs. CASTANEDA

FACTS:

1. Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent Benjamin Manaloto was charged before
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C.
Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public Document.

2. According to the Information filed against Manaloto, he forged the signature of his
spouse, Victoria in a deed of sale executed by Benjamin wherein he sold a house and lot
belonging to the conjugal partnership of said spouses in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana and was
notarized by Notary Public Abraham Gorospe, thereby making it appear that his spouse, Victoria
gave her marital consent to said sale when in fact and in trust she did not.

3. At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the witness stand but the
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court. (Now Rule 130, Sec.
22)

4. The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls
under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed but was denied by the respondent Judge.

ISSUE: W/N Victoria Manaloto should be disqualified as a witness because of her relationship
with the accused?

HELD:

No. We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification
rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.

WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL
RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the
other.

The exception applies to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who
stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And
it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in connection with the
instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her
husband.

The actuations of the witness-wife underacore the fact that the martial and domestic relations
between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony
to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. The security and
confidence of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no reason to
apply the martial disqualification rule.

6
 FACTS:

Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA for allowing the testimony of
petitioners wife in a criminal proceeding where petitioner was accused for ransom. Private
prosecutor in the said criminal case called the petitioners wife without objection from
petitioners counsel. Wife testified that it was her estranged husband who poured and set the
house of her sister on fire. A motion to disqualify the testimony of his wife was filed pursuant to
rules on martial disqualification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the wife can testify against her husband in a criminal case.

RULING:

The reason for the rule on martial disqualification are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidence of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.

The offense of arson attributed to the husband impairs the conjugal relation between him
and his wife. His act eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence,
respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes the
evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner
and his wife is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

7
Razon vs. IAC and Chuidian

FACTS:
Vicente Chuidian (administrator of the estate of his deceased father) filed a complaint for the
delivery of the certificates of stocks representing the 1,500 share holdings of his deceased
father, Juan Chuidian, in the E. Razon, Inc. (organized for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre
services in South Harbor, Manila). In the answer, Razon alleged that he owned the shares and
the same remained in his possession. It was alleged that the late Juan Chuidan did not pay any
amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares in question.

CHUIDIANs EVIDENCE: On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,5000 shares of stock
of defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan Chuidian (Juan). Razon had not
questioned (not until the demand was made) Juans ownership of the shares and had not
brought any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.

RAZONs EVIDENCE (In the answer and in his oral Testimony): After organizing E. Razon, Inc.,
Razondistributed shares, previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal
incorporators, to some friends including Juan. The shares of stock were registered in the name
of Juan only as nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares were owned
and held by the Razon (as he was the one who paid for all the subscription). Juan was given the
option to buy the same but did not do so.

CFI (RTC) declared that Enrique Razon is the owner of the said shares. IAC (CA) reversed and
ruled that Juan Chuidian is the owner. IAC excluded the testimony of Razon under the dead
mans statute rule (DMS) under Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, although such
testimony was not objected to during trial.

ISSUE: WON Razons testimony is within the prohibition under DMS Rule.

HELD: No. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claims against the estate.

The purpose of DMS Rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or
his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased
person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter
can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or
unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.

However, the rule is only applicable to a case against the administrator or its
representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.

In this stance, the case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan
Chuidian to recover shares Juan allegedly owned (IOW, it is the estate which instituted the
action or initiated the attack). Hence, the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition
of the rule.

Records also show that Razons testimony was not objected to. It was subjected to cross-
examination. Granting that it is within the prohibition under DMS, Chuidian is deemed to have
waived the rule. The court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent
under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto.

SCs DECISION: Juan was the owner of the shares. Razons testimony, though admitted, is not
sufficient to prove his ownership. Records show that during his lifetime Juan was elected
member of the Board of Directors which clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the
corporation. From the point of view of the corporation, Juan was the owner. For Razon to claim
ownership, he must show that the shares were transferred to him.

8
Corporation Code provides that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the
certificate must be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in the
transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. However, since the certificate
of stock covering the questioned 1,5000 shares of stock registered in the name of the late Juan
Chuidian was never indorsed to the Razon, the inevitable conclusion is that the questioned
shares of stock belong to Juan. Indorsement of the certificate of stock is a mandatory
requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock and Razons asseveration
that he did not require an indorsement in view of his intimate friendship with the late Juan
Chuidian cannot overcome the failure to follow the procedure required by law or the proper
conduct of business even among friends.

There is also preponderance of evidence that would show that the shares were given to Juan for
value. Juan was the legal counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation and the shares
were payment for his legal services to the corporation.

9
[G.R. No. 143340. August 15, 2001.]

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA v. LAMBERTO T. CHUA

FACTS:

On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia
Sunga, daughter and wife, of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for "Winding Up
of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Attachment" with the Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga del Norte.

Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience,
respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership,
SHELLITE, under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered
his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced
P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally
divided between them. Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business its business
operation went quite well and was profitable. Respondent however suspected that the amount
indicated in these documents were understated and undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for
their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Upon Jacintos death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and
particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody,
disposition and management of Shellite without respondents consent.

Filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the SEC, not the RTC in Zamboanga del Norte had
jurisdiction over the action. the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in form and substance
denied the motion to dismiss.

Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, contending that they are not liable
for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorneys fees, that
respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation.

Trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the hearing of the case on January 17,
1996. Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were considered to have waived their
right to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence
despite notice. The trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. Petitioners filed a
Notice of Appeal with the trial court, the CA dismissed the appeal. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render respondent's
testimony and that of Josephine inadmissible.

10
HELD:

The "Dead Mans Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled
to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction. 9 But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased

person or a person of unsound mind;

3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against person of unsound mind;

4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind." 10

Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Mans Statute" to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the
trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed
this case from the ambit of the "Dead Mans Statute." Well entrenched is the rule that when it is
the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the
plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to
defeat the counterclaim. 13 Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said
action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Mans Statute" for the simple
reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that
Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term
"assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor
of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of
judicial precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between
respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review. This Court can no longer
be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to
ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this
or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. It must be also pointed out that petitioners
failed to attend the presentation of evidence of Respondent. Petitioners cannot now turn to this
Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence of respondent
when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence at the time that such
evidence was offered.

11
G.R. No. 112443.January 25, 2002] TERESITA P. BORDALBA,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME
DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY,
namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME
BACLAY,respondents.
FACTS: a land known as Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square meters and
located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City, is the subject of the controversy. This lot is part of a
parcel of land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and
originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme.In 1947,
an extra-judicial partition:
1)1/3 in favor of -(a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent
Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all
surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private
respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;

2)1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba;
and

3)1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jaymes house, which his
family occupied since 1945.

Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a
land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme;
and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition.She further stated
that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her
permission.
Nicanor opposed stating that the land sought to be registered also covers the land adjudicated to
him by way of extra judicial partition.

petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.

private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant
complaintagainst petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala,
Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through
purchase from her mother who was in possession since 1947.

the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent No. (VII-I)
11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation.
However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank
of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld
as valid the sale.

Appealed to CA. affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.It ruled that since
private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should
be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents.

12
RULING: Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal
heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay.Other than their bare allegations todispute
their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations.Besides,
in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.
Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private
respondents predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was
disregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her
name, to the exclusion of private respondents predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private respondents as co-
owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.

13
A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan

City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge Ubaldino A.
Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30,
against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba
("respondents"). Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,1 11.04,2 and
19.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion

("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos
("Barrientos").4 The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of
Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch
30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.

On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier
judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.5 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as
REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997.

Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from
ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot
covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters,
within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon standing covered by
Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and
Barrientos is ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration
No. 02006-01137.

SO ORDERED.6

Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) 7 dated 30
July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent portions of which read:

II. PREFATORY STATEMENT

This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual

and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x
x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x

xxxx

III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION

14
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing
the Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:1awph!l.net

x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT
period of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis,
the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the
plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

xxxx

[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not part
of the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the
RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need
we say more?

xxxx

4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled
to a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:

THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base
this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!

xxxx

6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that
The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction
over the Subject-Matter:

Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is
determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is
backed up by a Litany of Cases!

xxxx

7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the
Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiffs HOUSE:

THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS
committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.

xxxx

This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the
ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and
ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial
MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight!8

The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff
a fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside.9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.

On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain
why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10 In her Explanation, Comments and
Answer,11 Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the
subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively
participate in this case."12 Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to

15
degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the
respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice."13 She rationalized as follows:

x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-
striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random and bunch them
together, side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic picture of
total and utter disrespect. x x x

xxxx

We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and
hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They
were just articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal
of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing
judge. They must believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no
less. x x x The matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call
a spade a spade. x x x14

Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize "for whatever mistake [they]

may have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have stepped on
the line and gone out of bounds." She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases
stricken off the record.15

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized
her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.16

Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that
on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her
and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or
it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in
"trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and
future."17 This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could
not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law.18

Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without
conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta,"
ordering her imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija
Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over."19 At any rate, she
argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because
"[Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman."20

The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law
Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of
knowingly rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and ignorance21 and
violating

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019").22 The first charge became the subject of a
preliminary investigation23 by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge,
Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit24 filed on 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to
explain why he should not be held in contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with
Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001
motion. Against Velasco-Jacobas statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital
privilege rule in evidence.26 Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of
contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.

16
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP
Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient notice.28

IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002,

recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months.29 IBP
Commissioner Navarro found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory
remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority."30 Although
the remarks were not directed at Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at "his position as
a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole."31

The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP Commissioner Navarros Report and
Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three
months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its recommendation to this Court,
together with the documents pertaining to the case.

Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus:33

xxxx

3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge
Lacurom is sub judice; the same issues involved in this case are raised before the
Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari
and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;

4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court involving
the same issues we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the
Supreme Court for being premature, in view of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of
Appeals;

5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present complaint
should likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari case by the
Court of Appeals.34 (Emphasis supplied)

The Courts Ruling

On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacobas contention that the present complaint should
be considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with
preliminary injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before the Court of Appeals.

The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001,
seeks to nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the
Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying respondents respective
motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty
of contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge Lacurom acted "with grave abuse of discretion
[amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in violation of express provisions of the law and applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court."36

Plainly, the issue before us is respondents liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there
is neither identity of issues nor causes of action.

Neither should the Courts dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for
being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacuroms orders in Civil Case No.

17
2836 could not be the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a petition for
certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an appellate court. Administrative remedies
are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the
aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final
declaration that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis
to conclude whether the judge is administratively liable.37

The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The
corresponding implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first examine
the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.

There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001
motion. Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court:

SEC. 3.Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him x x x.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.

x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous

or indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
(Emphasis supplied)

By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she
knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature
supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that
of a court document.

Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her
husbands request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of
signing each others pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According
to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time.
Through the years, [she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is
signed by the other."38 By Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of
Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground

for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the
contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.39

We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001
motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the
author of the motion.

The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for
Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted
authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."40

Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her
reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was
raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2)
Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-
Jacobas assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.

18
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await
the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him.41 This
petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact,
Jacobas handiwork.42

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied
consent.43 This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001
motion.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 11.03.A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04.A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have
no materiality to the case.

No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor
required of Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his use of the following words and
phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an
insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba
acknowledged that the words created "a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect."44

Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July
2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.45 However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack
made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution. On its face, the Resolution
presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and
jurisprudence. Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.46 The use of unnecessary
language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration.47

In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified
language but also to pursue the clients cause through fair and honest means, thus:

Rule 19.01.A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his
client in instituting two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted,
Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before Judge Lacuroms sala. The Courts attention is
drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very well raise
the suspicion that the cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.

Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court. In
Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six
months because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession of property despite
the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him of P550 which his client gave him as filing
and sheriffs fees."48 In Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his
duties when he failed to file the appellants brief, resulting in the dismissal of his clients appeal.
We imposed the penalty of one year suspension.49

19
 As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay
conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in
Section 415 of the Local Government Code.50

In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would
merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of whether respondents
have conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the
bar and officers of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years
effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the
practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision.
We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a
more severe sanction.

Clarita J. Samala vs. Atty. Luciano D. Valencia

A.C. No. 5439; January 22, 2007
Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:

Clarita J. Samala (complainant) filed a complaint against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent)
for Disbarment on the following grounds:
(a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties;
(b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence;
(c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for non-payment of rental fees; and
(d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda and the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.

The Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Held:

This Court adopts the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality
and as to the recommended penalty.

(a) On serving as counsel for contending parties.

Respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants
Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the
RTC.

The Presiding Judge warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of
record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.

20
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. He may not also undertake to
discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern
rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the relation of
attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.

(b) On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment,
respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a
new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.

During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was
filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the
name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore.
Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him
only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial
court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as
shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is
decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No.
273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500,
was already issued in the name of Alba.

(c) On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.

Complainant alleged that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK
at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-
4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion,
respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases
were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for
estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.

As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As
payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as
his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.

The Court finds the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the
aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the
other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that
the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.

21
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client
and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend
and prosecute the right of his client.

(d) On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

The Court finds respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who
are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight
children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died
in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in
one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair
with Lagmay as a relationship and does not consider the latter as his second family. He
reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa
and another in Marikina.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of
moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer,
immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and
violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein
Resolution.

22
ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995

FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all
evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in
connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the
EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that
circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim
privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to
provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of
such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private
citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the
national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion,
dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be
made for privilege resting on other considerations.

23
G.R. No. 200148 June 4, 2014

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA D. RIVERA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in the
instant case. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF)
while Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. She was hired in September of 2002.

About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her
resignation to be effective on February 3, 2006 and continued working for BANFF until March of
the same year to complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas
(Lumapas) Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her
remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be
paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on
hold by Syhunliong.

On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of
BANFFs official cellular phones held by Lumapas:

I am expecting that. grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last

pay ko. I dont deserve this because I did my job when I was still there. God bless.
Sana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.

Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:

Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including incentive up to

the last datena nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.

Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and
incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund.

On April 16, 2007 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong
instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, and the public prosecutor finds probable cause to
indict Rivera the crime of libel.

Rivera filed a Motion to Quash the aforequoted information. She argued that the text
message, which was the subject of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she
had suffered due to the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries, benefits and incentives.
Further, the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel as the elements
of malice and the making of defamatory imputation for public consumption were wanting. Her
text message was not prompted by ill will or spite, but was merely sent as part of her duty to
defend her own interests.

During the arraignment on October 11, 2007, Rivera entered a plea of not guilty

The lower court concurred with the Public Prosecutors finding that there was probable
cause to indict Rivera for having ascribed to Syhunliong the possession of a vice or defect, or for
having committed an act, tending to cause dishonor or discredit to the latters name. As a
defense, Rivera said her text message falls squarely within the parameters of "Privileged
Communication" or the elements of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code are not fully
established by the Prosecutions evidence. Thereafter, the lower court issued an Order on June
18, 2009 denying Riveras motion for reconsideration of the foregoing.

24
 On July 11, 2011, the Appellate Court rendered their decision directing the dismissal of
the information for libel filed against Rivera. The CA likewise explained that:

The focal issue to the parties in the present case is whether the facts charged in the
information as well as the undeniable facts appearing on the record show that an offense of libel
has been committed. Our criminal law convincingly provide us with a definition of libel It is a
public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect ... or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of ... a person. x x x.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute the offense of libel?

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of the
complaint of Syhunliong on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were
privileged communication?

Ruling:

There is no merit in the instant petition.

Prescription had set in. Well settled rule in statutory construction that the liberal
construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes emanates from the liberality of the State,
any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused. As
prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish the same.

In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his complaint against
Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas. Whether
the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007, it would not alter the
fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90 of the
RPC.

In relation thereto, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the prescription of
crime has the effect of totally extinguishing the criminal liability.

Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order the dismissal
of the libel information, but the Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to
Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication.

The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on
any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a
duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur:

(1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make
the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own
or of the one to whom it is made;

(2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some

interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and

(3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice

25
 Presiding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that
Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she
was speaking in response to duty, to protect her own interest, and not out of an intent to injure
the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the message
beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned.

26
 G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006

o Requisites of Judicial Review

o Legislative Inquiry vs. Executive Privilege
o Executive Privilege, defined
o Kinds of Executive Privilege
o Executive Privilege as applied to an official
o Constitutionality of EO 464

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its
declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military
in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by
E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?

ISSUES:

o Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

o Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern
o Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented EO 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation
o
RULING:

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:

1. there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
2. the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised as the earliest opportunity; and
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

LEGAL STANDING

Standing of the Senate

27
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public
decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not
disputed. EO 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access
information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members,
has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party
to assail the constitutionality of EO 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed
to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives
as legislators.

Standing of an ordinary citizen

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders and other regulations must be direct and
personal. In Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.

Requisites for transcendental importance: Establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is
public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.

ACTUAL CASE/CONTROVERSY

The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or
prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of
an actual case or controversy insofar as EO 464 is concerned. For EO 464 does not require either
a deliberative withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in
order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.

As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials
invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for
any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be
sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality
of EO 464.

The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21, Art. VI. But as early as 1950
(the 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision) in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Court
already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. xxx

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be
deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry...is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper
subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

xxx the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of the
information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the
operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning,
Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

The power of inquiry is subject to judicial review

xxx the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less

28
susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review
pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Sec. 1, Art. VIII.

For one...the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the
constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically,
one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result...is to indicate in its invitations to the public
officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its investigations, along with the
usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof,
there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry
is in aid of legislation.

Sec. 21, Art. VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of
inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or
Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an
inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Sec. 21 also mandates that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

Exemption to power of inquiry

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power
of inquiry, which exemptions falls under the rubric of executive privilege.

Executive privilege, defined

Schwartz defines executive privilege as the power of the Government to withhold information
from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the
courts, and ultimately the public.

Kinds of executive privilege

One variety of the privilege...is the state secrets privilege...on the ground that the information is
of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another
variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity
of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement
of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that
it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of
privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls
within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a
given procedural setting.

The principle of executive privilege

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized
only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege
is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked
to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

xxx

29
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned
by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof
is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary.

Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference
to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Sec. 22, Art. VI xxx

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance
of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of

legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by
the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Validity of Sec. 2 and 3, EO 464

En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of EO 464 virtually states that executive privilege
actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege...is properly
invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.

The claim of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific allegation of basis thereof

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of
office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that
determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information
could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression,
do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make
Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the
information that it has requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must,
therefore, be clearly asserted xxx

Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of
determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected xxx

Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the
privilege against self-incrimination xxx

The claim of privilege under Sec. 3, EO 464 in relation to Sec. 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is

30
not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim,
it merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of
inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated.

EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority to the heads of offices in Sec. 2(b) to determine certain
information as privileged

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines
that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject
only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exception nature of the privilege.
Executive privilege...is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is
crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in
those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly
important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the
fact that certain informations (sic) must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit
of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to
the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive
Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state
that the authority is By order of the President, which means that he personally consulted with
her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in
the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to
exercise such power.

How executive privilege should be applied in the case of an official

xxx when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment,
might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is
necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, afer the lapse of
that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege,
Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and
may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Right to Information

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right
to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual
citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are

31
exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive assistance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation,
is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other governmental
officials through various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression xxx

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of EO 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power
of inquiry.

Implementation of EO 464 prior to its publication

While EO 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do
not directly apply to people in genera, Tanada v. Tuvera states: The term laws should refer to
all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of the law is a
matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political
forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.

Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the
challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, EO 464
has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is,
therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this
Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance
before it was implemented.

32
NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Posted by kaye lee on 8:54 PM
G.R.No. 180643, March 25 2008 [Executive Privilege]

FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the
bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It
pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-
making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.
Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in
the constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates
to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military
and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power. - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains
important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. - there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

33
G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013

OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and CASIMIRA

MATURINGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR., represented by ASUNCION
LAQUINDANUM, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the 31 May 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329, which
reversed the 27 October 2003 Decision2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Malolos
City, Bulacan, in a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman,"
Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022-02653 & 1002655, With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction & Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 630-M-99.

The facts

This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which needed to
be proportionally subdivided among heirs.

Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned several
parcels of land, one of which is an unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration 208143consisting of 240 square meters situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy,
Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was survived by his six (6) children, namely: 1) PEDRO
CONSTANTINO, JR. (Pedro Jr.), the grandfather of the respondents; 2) ANTONIA CONSTANTINO,
who later died without issue; 3) CLARA CONSTANTINO, who also later died without issue; 4)
BRUNOCONSTANTINO, who was survived by his 6 children including petitioner Casimira
Constantino-Maturingan; 5) EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, who is survived by his daughter Maura;
and 6) SANTIAGO CONSTANTINO, who was survived by his five (5) children which includes
petitioner Oscar Constantino.4

On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum (Asuncion)and Josefina Cailipan

(Josefina), great grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint5

against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira Maturingan,

grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a document denominated as "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman" dated 10 August 1992,6Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022 (02653)7 and 96-
10022 (02655)8 and reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 208149 in the name of Pedro Sr.

In the said complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in October 1998, petitioners asserted
their claim of ownership over the whole parcel of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr.,
to the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. Upon verification,
respondents learned that a Tax Declaration No. 02010-2170-33235 in the name of petitioner
Oscar Constantino and his cousin Maxima Constantino was unlawfully issued, which in effect
canceled Tax Declaration No. 20814 in the name of their ancestor Pedro Sr. The issuance of the
new tax declaration was allegedly due to the execution of a simulated, fabricated and fictitious
document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," wherein the petitioners
misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr. It was further alleged that
subsequently, the subject land was divided equally between petitioners Oscar and Maxima
resulting in the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-0265310 in the name of Oscar, with an

34
area of 120sq m and the other half in the name of Maxima covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-
10022-02652.11 The share of Maxima was eventually conveyed to her sister, petitioner Casimira
in whose name a new Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-0265512 was issued.

Thus, respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas ngHukuman" as well as the Tax
Declarations that were issued on the basis of such document.

The petitioners, on the other hand, averred in their Answer With Counterclaim13 that Pedro Sr.,
upon his death, left several parcels of land, namely: 1) a lot with an area of 240 sq m covered
by Tax Declaration No.20814; 2) a lot with an area of 192 sq m also situated at Sta.
Monica,Hagonoy, Bulacan, previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534; and 3)an
agricultural land with an area of Four (4) hectares, more or less. The petitioners claimed that the
document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" pertaining to the 240 sq m lot was perfectly
valid and legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement between and among the
descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr.

Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them
considering that the respondents lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr., had already been
transferred to them as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver14 dated 5
December 1968,executed by Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent
Asuncion), Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes Constantino, all heirs of Pedro Jr. In the said deed,
respondents adjudicated unto themselves to the exclusion of other heirs, the parcel of land with
an area of 192 sq m by misrepresenting that they were "the only legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr.
Thus, petitioners claimed that in the manner similar to the assailed "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman," they asserted their rights and ownership over the subject 240 sq m lot without
damage to the respondents.

In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which
led to the issuance of Tax Declaration No.9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of Pedro Sr.,
including the petitioners, on the understanding that the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. would no
longer share and participate in the settlement and partition of the remaining lot covered by the "

Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."

On 15 August 2000, pre-trial conference15 was conducted wherein the parties entered into
stipulations and admissions as well as identification of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon, trial
on the merits ensued.

On 27 October 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of the respondents finding that:

As a result of execution of "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated December 5, 1968 (Exh.
"2") executed by the heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., a son of Pedro Constantino, Sr. and the
subsequent execution of another deed denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"
dated August 10, 1992 (Exh. "E") executed by the heirs of Santiago and Bruno Constantino, also
other sons of Pedro Constantino, Sr., to the exclusion of the other heirs, namely, those of
ANTONIA, CLARA, and EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, both plaintiffs and defendants acted equally at
fault. They are in pari delicto, whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by
either one of them. (See:Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 367 SCRA 559). Parties who are equally guilty
cannot complain against each other. (Sarmiento v. Salud, 45 SCRA 213.)

Supplementing the law on the matter, that is, the provision of Article 19 of the New Civil Code
whereby every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, is the legal maxim
that "he who comes to court to demand equity must come with clean hands." (LBC Express, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 602).

Although, plaintiffs-heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., including Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina
Cailipan, are not parties or signatories to the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated

35
December 5, 1968, they are successors-in-interest of Pedro Constantino, Jr. They areconsidered
"privies" to said deed, and are bound by said extrajudicial settlement. (See: Cabresos v. Tiro,
166 SCRA 400). In other words, they are "PRIVIES IN ESTATE". (Correa v. Pascual, 99 Phil. 696,
703).

Consequently, plaintiffs are now estopped from claiming otherwise. (See: PNB v. CA, 94 SCRA
357). They are estopped to share in the real property subject matter of this case. In fine, they
are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.1wphi1 (Communication Materials & Design, Inc. v. CA,
260 SCRA 673).

With respect to alleged damages claimed by plaintiffs against defendants in their Complaint and
counterclaim for damages by defendants against plaintiffs in their Answer, both claims are
hereby dismissed for lack of valid factual and legal foundations.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and disquisition, the deed denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" of August10, 1992 and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-
02653 in the name of Oscar Constantino and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02655 in the name
of Casimira C. Maturingan (from Maxima Constantino to Casimira C. Maturingan) stand.
Plaintiffs Complaint for nullification thereof with damages is hereby DISMISSED.17

Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted decision to the Court of Appeals (CA)
raising, among others, the erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of "in pari
delicto" in declaring the validity of the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."

In its 31 May 2007 Decision,18 the CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr.,
declaring that the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated 5 December 1968 they executed
covering the 192 sq mlot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr.
The CA rationated in this wise:

The 192 square meters lot which was adjudicated in the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver"
dated 5 December 1968 among the heirs of Pedro Jr. namely Angelo, Maria, Arcadio and
Mercedes is a property belonging to Pedro Jr. although there is a typographical error in that the
name of Pedro Jr. was inadvertently typed only as Pedro Constantino. It is clear from the
reading of the document that a typographical error was committed because the four (4) children
of PedroJr. by Felipa dela Cruz were specifically identified. Further, during the presentation of
evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was rebutted that Pedro Sr. had six (6) legitimate
children namely: Pedro Jr., Antonia, Clara, Santiago, Bruno and Eduardo19 and Pedro Jr. had four
(4).20

Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the
192 sq m lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the
adjudication in the document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December
1968 pertains to a different property and is valid absent any evidence to the contrary. Hence, it
is erroneous for the trial court to declare the parties in pari delicto.

The Issue

The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the
CA to appreciate the existence of misrepresentation in both documents, thereby ignoring the
propriety of the application of the in pari delicto doctrine. Likewise assailed is the erroneous
disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference on which the
application of the doctrine of in pari delicto was based.

Our Ruling

36
Latin for "in equal fault," in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are
guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties,
when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto.21 Under the
pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have
no action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds them. This doctrine
finds expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis."22

When circumstances are presented for the application of such doctrine, courts will take a hands
off stance in interpreting the contract for or against any of the parties. This is illustrated in the
case of Packaging Products Corporation v. NLRC,23 where this Court pronounced that:

This Court cannot give positive relief to either petitioner or respondent because we are asked to
interpret and enforce an illegal and immoral arrangement. (See Articles 1409, 1411, and 1412 of
the Civil Code). Kickback arrangements in the purchase of raw materials, equipment, supplies
and other needs of offices, manufacturers, and industrialists are so widespread and pervasive
that nobody seems to know how to eliminate them. x x x.

Both the petitioners and the private respondent are in pari delicto. Neither one may expect
positive relief from courts of justice in the interpretation of their contract. The courts will leave
them as they were at the time the case was filed.24

As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and
1412 of the Civil Code, which state that:

Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract,
and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.

xxx xxx

Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx

1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the others undertaking;

xxx xxx.

The petition at bench does not speak of an illegal cause of contract constituting a criminal
offense under Article 1411. Neither can it be said that Article 1412 finds application although
such provision which is part of Title II, Book IV of the Civil Code speaks of contracts in general,
as well as contracts which are null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code
such as the subject contracts, which as claimed, are violative of the mandatory provision of the
law on legitimes.

We do not dispute that herein parties, through the Deeds they separately executed deprived
each other of rightful shares in the two lots subject of the separate contracts that is, if the two
(2) parcels of land subject matter thereof, form part of the estate of the late Pedro Sr.

It is asserted by the petitioners that their execution in 1992 of the contract denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" which excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with an
underlying agreement with the other heirs including Maria Constantino, daughter of Pedro Jr.
and grandmother of respondents.25 The agreement was for the other heirs to recognize the 192
square meters lot subject matter of the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" executed in 1968
as the share of the heirs of Pedro Sr. in the estate of Pedro Sr., Petitioners respected such

37
agreement, as in fact, Maria Laquindanum and that of her heirs, herein respondents, were not
disturbed in their possession or ownership over the said parcel of land; thus, the heirs of Pedro
Jr. were said to have acquiesced26 to the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" and the
underlying agreement and therefore they have no recourse or reason to question it taking cue
from the doctrine of in paridelicto. This was the basis of the trial courts findings that
respondents are now estopped from claiming otherwise.27

We find that the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine.

This is not to say, however, that the CA was correct in upholding the validity of the contract
denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman." The CA decision being, likewise, based on
pari delicto, is also incorrect.

Finding the inapplicability of the in pari delicto doctrine, We find occasion to stress that Article
1412 of the Civil Code that breathes life to the doctrine speaks of the rights and obligations of
the parties to the contract with an illegal cause or object which does not constitute a criminal
offense. It applies to contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts
rendered void for being simulated,28 or those in which the parties do not really intend to be
bound thereby. Specifically, in pari delicto situations involve the parties in one contract who are
both at fault, such that neither can recover nor have any action against each other.

In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the signatories of the
portions of the estate of an ancestor common to them and another set of signatories likewise
assigning unto themselves portions of the same estate. The separate Deeds came into being out
of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share
in the entire estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in reality, an assignment of specific portions of the
estate of Pedro Sr., without resorting to a lawful partition of estate as both sets of heirs intended
to exclude the other heirs.

Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The inapplicability is dictated not only
by the fact that two deeds, not one contract, are involved, but because of the more important
reason that such an application would result in the validation of both deeds instead of their
nullification as necessitated by their illegality. It must be emphasized that the underlying
agreement resulting in the execution of the deeds is nothing but a void agreement. Article 1409
of the Civil Code provides that:

ART. 1409. The following contracts are in existent and void from the beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law; morals, good customs, public order
or public policy;

xxx xxx xxx

Corollarily, given the character and nature of the deeds as being void and in existent, it has, as a
consequence, of no force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and
which cannot be validated either by time or ratification.29

That said, we cannot give credence to the contention of respondents that no fault can be
attributed to them or that they are free from the effects of violation of any laws arising from the
supposed unlawful agreement entered into between Maria Laquindanum, their predecessor-in-
interest, and the other heirs, including petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not
signatories to said agreement, thus, the lack of any binding effect to them. Respondents argued
and set forth as an issue during the trial that they were not signatories to any of the contract or
privies to such an arrangement. It is not disputed, however, that respondents are successors-in-
interest of Maria Laquindanum, one of the signatories in the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver
who was also allegedly in agreement with the petitioners.

38
On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents are "privies" to Maria Laquindanum.
By the term "privies" is meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although they
are not literally parties to the said action.30 This Court, in Correa v. Pascual,31 had occasion to
explain that "privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and
donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their
respective assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in
estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in question by purchase; one
who takes by conveyance." In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right
from and are in the same position as their predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such
successors, respondents situation is analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in
Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,32reiterating Fetalino v.
Sanz33 where this Court held:

As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant,
and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to him. He
is a proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the
judgment against his predecessor.34

Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is
applicable to respondents who merely succeeded Maria.

This notwithstanding, it must however be shown that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver, referred to a property owned by Pedro Sr. There is such basis from the facts of this
case.

The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion Laquindanumss statement that the
parcel of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of
the estate of Pedro Sr., their common ancestor, no other evidence was offered to support it. The
CA in giving credence to the respondents claim, merely relied on the alleged typographical error
in the Deed. The basis for the CAs conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and that
of their children, which the CA considered as proof that the property was owned by Pedro Jr. and
not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. As pointed out by the petitioners, the mention of the names of
the children of Pedro Jr. in the Extrajudicial Settlement is not proof that the subject of the deed
is the property of Pedro Jr. Meant to exclude all the other heirs of Pedro Sr., only the children of
Pedro Jr. appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement as heirs.

Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the
respondents during the pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 9534 consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro Sr.35

A portion of the admission and stipulations made by both parties during the pre-trial is
hereunder quoted, thus:

Respondents admissions:

"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro Constantino,
Sr. was transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting ours)

1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per Doc. No.319, Page No. 44, Book No.
11, Series of 1968 by Notary Public Romerico Flores, Jr."

Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against respondents interest of the fact of
ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534, which was
transferred to respondents mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr. Such that, in one of the issues
submitted to be resolved by the trial court, this was included: "Whether or not the "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" is enforceable against the plaintiffs, thus curing the legal
infirmities, if any, of the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"36 an issue earlier mentioned.

39
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in
civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall
control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.
In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al.,37 this Court emphasized that:

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they
become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or
facts stipulated.38 Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to
rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.39 (Highlighting
ours)

Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,40 this Court declared that:

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a
waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party,
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.41 (Citations omitted)

We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court serves as a
caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial admissions for, in the interest of justice, issues
that may arise in the course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in the
pre-trial can still be taken up.

Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 7. Record of pre-trial. The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be

recorded.1awp++i1 Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall
recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties
as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall, explicitly
define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent injustice.

In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule
regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of
proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission.42

However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the
trial. While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion
Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of
land was acquired by Pedro Jr. A portion of her testimony43is hereto reproduced as follows:

"ATTY. DOMINGO:

40
Q: Do you know if as part of the estate of the late Pedro Constantino, Sr. is another parcel of
land also situated at Sta. Maria, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of 192 square meters?

A: It is not owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr., sir. It is our property owned by Pedro Constantino,
Jr. that was inherited by my mother Maria Constantino.

Q: And do you know how Pedro Constantino, Jr. acquired that parcel of land, the one that you
mentioned a while ago?

A: Kinagisnan ko na po yong lupang yon pagkabata pa na yon e amin." (Highlighting ours)

The above assertion of denial is simply a self-serving declarationunsupported by evidence. This

renders conclusive the stipulations made during the pre-trial conference. Consequently,
respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on which they based their right over the
property subject matter thereof. Considering that the infirmities in the two deeds relate to
exclusion of heirs, a circumvention of an heirs right to his or her legitime, it is apt to reiterate
our ruling in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy,44 disposing that:

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
in favour of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Annunciation should have participated. Considering that
Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity. (Highlighting ours)

Further highlighting the effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate, the case of
Segura v. Segura,45elucidated thus:

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only partition. The partition in the
present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was
a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold
that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution x x x.

In light of the foregoing, while both parties acted in violation of the law on legitimes, the pari
delicto rule, expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "in pari delicto potior
est condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and
leaves them where they are, does not apply in this case. (Underline supplied)46 As held in De
Leon v. CA:47

In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both acted in violation of laws. However, the pari delicto rule
expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "In pari delicto potior est
condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves
them where they are does not apply in this case.

xxx xxx xxx

Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to
adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws,
positive relief should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed
in the position in which she was before the transaction was entered into.

Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws as contemplated by
the parties in the instant case, we must declare both contracts as void. Indeed, any
circumvention of the law cannot be48countenanced.

41
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is
hereby REVERSED. The Pagmamana sa Lahas ng Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver are hereby declared void without prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro
Constantino Sr. with the full participation of all the latter's heirs.

SO ORDERED.

42
G.R. No. 146111 February 23, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee

vs.
ROLENDO GAUDIA @ "LENDOY" or "DODO", appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

There can be no greater violation of a persons right to feel safe and secure than the crime of
rape. When one commits such a horrible act on another, he degrades not only that persons
body; more importantly, he defiles that persons mind. When the victim is a little child, the act
and the perpetrator himself assume a bestiality beyond the comprehension of normal human
beings. Yet, the law must apply equally upon saints and sinners alike, even to the most salacious
ruffian.

Before us is the Decision1 dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos,
Davao del Sur, finding appellant Rolendo Gaudia2 guilty of the crime of rape, meting upon him
the penalty of death, and ordering him to pay to private complainant Remelyn Loyola the
amounts of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and costs of suit.

The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:

That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30
Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines,
Court, the above-named accused, by means of
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
against her will to her damage and prejudice.
oclock in the evening, in the Municipality of
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
force and intimidation, did, then and there
knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor,

The prosecution presented Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia
testified that on 24 March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)3and
Kimberly (1 year old)4 at their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs food at
Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in
the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and
proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her
any information. On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyns name. At about 6:00
p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, "Ma, I am here," from a grove of ipil-
ipil trees.5 Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some
thirty (30) meters from their house.6 She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking
with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to
her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and
washed her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from
Remelyns private organ.7

The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring,
a quack doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and
parents of the appellant.8 The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in
Remelyns vagina, and told Amalia, "Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being (sic) raped."9 At
about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the
appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn.10 At this point, the parents of appellant told
Amalia, "Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the
amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed."11 Police officers came and brought
Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for
investigation. Amalias statement was taken.12

43
On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del Sur. Dr.
Patricio Hernane, the municipal health officer,13 conducted a genital examination of Remelyn,
and made the following findings:

GENITAL EXAMINATION:

Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted on the external genitalia. Dried
blood are (sic) noted on the labia minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10
oclock (sic) are noted with fresh vaginal laceration noted at the posterior commissure but not
extending to the perineum. No lacerations were noted at the anal opening.

Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia minora make the child
cry. (sic)

CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.14

The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign
object, such as the penis of a man.15

On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint.16 Amalia stated therein that
Remelyn had told her "Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos."17 (Meaning "crazy lendoy he forced me" in
the Visayan dialect.) Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the incident,
Remelyn told her, "Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees."18

The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their
area. Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way
home after registering at the COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a
fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms.19 He identified the little girl as Remelyn
Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-
ipil trees.20

The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn
had been raped. He proceeded to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn
for examination. Amalia confirmed to Mik that Remelyn had been raped. Mik told Amalia that
appellant committed the crime. Mik then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo Malud21 and the
other tanods of the incident. They were instructed to locate the appellant. They passed to the
police the information that appellant was in Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and took
appellant for investigation. 22

The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March
1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the
National Elections. With him was Totong Loyola, the brother-in-law of Amalia Loyola. They
finished at 5:00 p.m., left and repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano, appellants aunt, to ask
for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish composed of raw fish steeped in vinegar). They found Daylen
Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina, alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence, they
brought her with them as they proceeded to the place where Catalina was
collecting tuba (fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried Daylen.23 They reached
Catalinas place after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon and
appellants parents were in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Malon left, after
partaking of the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning (25 March 1997),
appellant and Dodo Malon went to the river to fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to
the house of his aunt, Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by the police
and investigated.24He claimed that it was Daylen and not the victim Remelyn whom he was
carrying.

As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex "Totong" Loyola. Totong testified that on 24
March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering,
they went home to appellants house, but again left to get vinegar from his aunt Catalina

44
Cabano, for their kinilaw. In Catalinas house, they found her drunk husband, her 10-year old
daughter, and her 3-year old grandchild Daylen.25 Catalinas daughter directed them to the place
where she was gathering tuba. As Daylen was crying, appellant carried her on their way to
Catalina. It was then about 4:00 p.m. After Catalina finished gathering tuba, the four of them
appellant, Totong, Catalina and Daylen, left together and repaired to Catalinas house for the
vinegar. Appellant and Totong returned to appellants house where they spent the
night.26 Totong woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day, and left appellants house. Totong came
to know of appellants arrest the following day.27

Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellants story. She relates that on 24 March 1997, she was
gathering tuba, at a place around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her youngest
child and Daylen, her grandchild, at her house.28 At about 5:30 p.m., appellant and Totong
arrived. Appellant was carrying Daylen. They waited for Catalina to finish gathering tuba until
6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong went to the formers house, had a drinking spree, and then
parted ways at about 6:30 p.m. That night, according to Catalina, she talked to Tulon Mik at the
premises near the house. Mik was looking for Remelyn. At that time, appellant was already at
the house of Catalinas younger sister, which is located across the river, about 4 kilometers
away.29

After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
appellant for the crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven
years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

In his Brief30 to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in the judgment of the trial
court:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic) GAUDIA
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME

CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE WITH CERTAINTY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION.

We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.

Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.31

The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness
Tulon Mik that at 4:00 p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the
direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters from her house.32 As a neighbor and relative of
Remelyns stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity with the child Remelyn. The possibility that
he could have been mistaken in identifying the victim is nil.

45
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalias testimony that Remelyn
emerged naked from the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead.
Remelyn was crying and walking with her legs spread far apart. Remelyns private organ was
bleeding and excreting a white mucus-like substance.33

The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyns statement to her mother that it
was appellant who had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove34 and forced her to do something against
her will.35

There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane,
the Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh
vaginal lacerations.

From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the
aforementioned circumstances have been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the inability of the appellant to
discredit their veracity.

The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence against him is futile. Appellant
contends, first, that Tulon Miks testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the
husband of Amalia.36 He also questions the credibility of Mik because of his failure to confront
appellant when he saw him carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform Amalia about what he saw
when Amalia was looking for Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom he carried and
not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement
that he sexually molested her. Third, he maintains that the accusation of flight against him is
false. Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by his parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola
should not be taken against him,37 while the offer of compromise he allegedly made to Amalias
husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be excluded as evidence for being
hearsay.38 Finally, he submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and Cabano
should not be counted against him on the ground that any finding of guilt must rest on the
strength of the prosecutions evidence.

We reject appellants arguments.

First, appellants attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a
relative by affinity of Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship
to one of the parties, without a showing of any other improper motive, is not sufficient basis to
impair the credibility of the witness.39 In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill motive
for Mik to testify adversely against him.

Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he was carrying Remelyn. Also, he
assails Mik for failing to inform Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the
inadvertence. He said his own child was down with a fever, and he and his wife were hurrying
home.40 For this same reason, he revealed the fact that he saw appellant carrying Remelyn
toward the ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of Remelyns fate. But thereafter, he lost no time
in reporting the matter to the barangay chairman.41 As a barangay kagawad, he also assisted in
the pursuit and arrest of appellant at Barangay Mahayahay.42 These subsequent actions
strengthen Miks credibility.

The trial court accorded more credence to Miks narration of the events over the testimonies of
Cabano and Loyola. It is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge's evaluation of
the testimony of a witness and its factual findings are accorded not only the highest respect, but
also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood which could
alter the result of the judgment rendered. In the case at bar, there is no irregularity in the
assessment of evidence by the lower court. It granted utmost credibility to Miks testimony.
Given the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a
vantage position to assess his demeanor and determine if he was telling the truth or not.43 The

46
trial court found Miks testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and Loyola. We
have no reason to reverse its findings.

Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made any statement that he
sexually molested her. This is a specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, "Crazy
Lendoy forced me."44 Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At such an infantile age, she
could not be expected to have a comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies show that
children, particularly very young children, make the "perfect victims". They naturally follow the
authority of adults as the socialization process teaches children that adults are to be respected.
The childs age and developmental level will govern how much she comprehends about the
abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand what has
happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the
consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events because
they do not understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences
from which to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel.
Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary.45 The fact that Remelyn called appellant "Buang" or
crazy shows that he did something which she knew was not right or proper. By saying "iya kong
lugos," Remelyn clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something bad. With her limited
comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of relating that she had been sexually
abused. Finally, it must also be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word
"rape" in Visayan parlance.

Appellants charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he fled arrest, even if correct, is
not pivotal to his guilt. There are enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him.
Neither will it affect the penalty or the award of damages rendered against him.

Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the
appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been
taken against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the
offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay
evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged
offer,46 and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy
Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or
perception.47The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia may
have been the subject of testimony48 of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet,49 the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he
was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of
compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence
against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of
the appellant.

Appellants defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses
claim that it was at around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her
grandmother Catalina at the place where she was gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was
around 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove. Given the
130-meter distance between the ipil-ipil grove and the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola,
appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house, raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and
left her there, all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m., he could then have
returned to his house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC office to
register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have done.

The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Catalina and Loyola. The
discrepancies in the witnesses narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where
Catalina was gathering tuba, his time of arrival at his own house, and the time when Loyola and
appellant actually parted ways, are not mere trivial details which could be forgotten by witnesses
because of the passage of time. To make matters worse, the appellants testimony was, at
times, contradicted by his own witnesses. Particularly telling was the conflict between appellants
statement that Totong had already left his house on the night of 24 March 1997 and Totong and

47
Catalinas own averments that Totong had stayed the night at appellants house. These
contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous appellants tale.

We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information
states that appellant, "by means of force and intimidationwillfully, unlawfully and feloniously
(had) carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and
prejudice."50 (emphasis ours) The Information did not allege that Remelyn was below seven
years old when she was violated. Appellant was therefore charged with simple rape, under
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death
Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659 introduced seven new attendant circumstances,
which when present, will transform the crime to qualified rape, punishable by death. We again
stress that these new attendant circumstances must be properly pleaded in the information to
justify the imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime for which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried.51 The
main purpose of requiring all the elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if
he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death,
although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment
was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.52

We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and again, we have ruled that
when there is a finding that rape had been committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is
mandatory.53 If the death penalty has been imposed, the indemnity should be P75,000.00;
otherwise the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for each count of rape.54 Thus, the appellant is
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to Remelyn Loyola.55

We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically awarded in rape cases without
need of further proof other than the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.56

We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower court in favor of complainant
as proper because complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the offense
against her was committed with the aggravating circumstance57 of age. However, the amount
awarded must be reduced to P25,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.58

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos,
Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No. 213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the
crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered
to pay to complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against
the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

48
[G.R. NO. 164481. September 20, 2005]

CONRADO C. DOLDOL, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Conformably to the Memorandum1 dated April 6, 1995 of the Provincial Auditor, a team of State
Auditors led by State Auditor Emilie S. Ritua, with State Auditors Lydia Naoe and Beverly T. Cruz
as members, conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the
Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The audit covered the General Fund, Special
Education Fund and Trust Fund in his custody for the period of November 30, 1994 to June 8,
1995. Doldol and the Municipal
Accountant were present during the audit. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a
shortage of P801,933.26. They also noted that on June 5, 1995, he made cash withdrawals from
the municipality's deposit account with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) amounting
to P360,000.59. The withdrawal, purportedly for salaries, wages, allowances and mid-year
bonuses of municipal officers and employees, had not been recorded in the General Fund
Cashbook as of June 8, 1995. The State Auditors also noted that Doldol made adjustments in the
said cashbook on June 8, 1995, increasing his P801,933.26 shortage to P1,134,421.54. In a
Letter2 dated July 5, 1995, the State Auditors demanded the immediate refund of the said
amount, and for Doldol to submit within 72 hours a written explanation on the said shortage.
Doldol failed to respond and was, thereafter, relieved of his duties. On July 20, 1995, he was
directed to transfer the account to Assistant Municipal Treasurer Loida Cancino.

The State Auditors then conducted another audit of the said account, this time covering the
period of June 8, 1995 to July 19, 1995. They discovered that Doldol incurred an added cash
shortage of P149,905.92. In a Letter to Doldol dated July 27, 1995, the State Auditors
demanded the immediate restitution of the missing fund, and directed him to submit within 72
hours a written explanation why he incurred such shortage. Again, Doldol failed to respond. The
State Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on their examinations showing his
shortages. On August 3, 1995, the State Auditors submitted their Memorandum on the result of
the audits to the Provincial Auditor.

On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be conducted
on his cash and cash account, taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors.

Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On
September 15, 1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he
was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage, as
follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995.
However, he reneged on his promise.

On February 6, 1996, the Provincial Auditor transmitted the Memorandum and Consolidated
Report of the State Auditors to the Ombudsman, and requested that Doldol be charged for
malversation of public funds. Despite the extensions given to him, Doldol failed to file his
counter-affidavit.

Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City. The first Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SCC-
2760, reads:

49
That on or about June 8, 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, CONRADO C.
DOLDOL, a public officer, being then the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, and as such accountable for public funds received and/or entrusted to him by
reason of his office, acting in relation of his office and taking
advantage of the same, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, use and benefit
the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
TWENTY-ONE PESOS and 54/100 (P1,134,421.54) from such public funds received by him by
reason of his office, to the damage of the government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SCC-2763, reads:

That sometime between June 8, 1995 and July 19, 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, CONRADO C. DOLDOL, a public officer, being then the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, and as such accountable for public funds received and/or entrusted to
him by reason of his office, acting in relation of his office and taking advantage of the same, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, misappropriate and convert to his
personal use and benefit the amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FIVE PESOS and 92/100 (P149,905.92) from such public funds received by him by reason of his
office, to the damage of the government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Doldol testified that the funds which the State Auditors found missing were, in fact, cash
advances availed of by the municipal employees. He insisted that not a single centavo was used
for his personal benefit. He averred that the charges lodged against him were premature
because the same were based on an incomplete audit.

In a Joint Decision, the trial court convicted the accused of the crimes charged. The fallo of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Conrado Doldol is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds in Criminal Case No. SCC-2760
and in Criminal Case No. SCC-2763, as defined and penalized by Art. 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. In both cases, the amount involved is more than P22,000.00, as such the penalty to be
imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Considering that the
accused surrendered to the police in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan (See Exh. 4) and being entitled to
the provision of [the] Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 10 years, 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years, 8 months
of reclusion temporal as maximum in each of the two cases. Further, he is ordered to pay the
amount of P1,134,421.54 in Criminal Case No. SCC-2760 and another amount of P149,905.92 in
Criminal Case No. SCC-2763 minus, of course, his advance payment of P200,187.80. In
addition, he should be made to suffer the accessory penalties corresponding to the principal
penalty imposed upon him which includes perpetual absolute disqualification (Art. 41, Rev. Penal
Code) and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.5

On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), Doldol alleged:

1. That the trial court erred in rejecting the defenses put up by the accused as follows:

A. The evidence shows that the audits were not yet completed when the letters of demand were
served upon him to produce the alleged missing funds.

50
b. He was not given the chance to further verify the records despite his request to that effect.

c. There is no evidence that he took the money from the vault or brought it home.

d. The missing funds, if any, were cash advances of certain municipal employees.

e. His having borrowed money from the bank negates the charge of misappropriation of public
funds.

2. That the trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the testimonies of the auditors
and the documentary evidence adduced by them.

3. That the trial court erred in sentencing the accused to suffer the penalties imposed by the
assailed joint decision.6

On February 11, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision, and, likewise,
denied Doldol's motion for reconsideration thereof.

Doldol, now the petitioner, forthwith filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, faulting
the CA as follows:

1. In affirming the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan in Crim. Case Nos. SCC-2760 and SCC-2763;

2. In convicting the accused-petitioner on the basis of an erroneous and incomplete audit;

3. In not dismissing the cases against the accused-petitioner.7

The petitioner reiterates his arguments that the audit of his accountabilities had not been
completed because the State Auditors had yet to conduct a verification of their initial findings
based on the cashbook and a reconciliation of the bank deposits of the municipality. The
petitioner insists that the State Auditors did not submit any bank reconciliation statement. The
petitioner argues that he was never given a chance to explain and point out that he did not incur
any shortage of public funds, and that the charges against him should be dismissed. To bolster
his claim, he cites the ruling of this Court in Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan8 and Section 560 of the
Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors and other Guidelines to bolster his claim.

The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that the public funds were for his
personal use. In fact, the petitioner insists, the evidence shows that the alleged missing funds
were unliquidated cash advances of employees. Hence, the petitioner concludes, the prima
facie presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code does not
apply.

In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the issues
raised by the petitioner are factual and, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of
law may be raised. The OSG posits that the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, are conclusive on this Court, absent a showing that the trial court ignored, misconstrued or
misunderstood cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome
of the case. The OSG maintains that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt
that the petitioner malversed the public funds subject of the two Informations. Moreover, the
petitioner's contention that the charges against him were premature, because the audit of his
accountabilities had not yet been completed and he was not given a chance to explain the
whereabouts of the subject funds before the said charges were filed, is belied by the fact that he
even made a partial restitution of the public funds. The OSG notes that as found by the trial
court, the petitioner even failed to specify the names of the employees who were granted cash
advances and the accounts of the said advances. It further avers that the ruling of this Court
in Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan9 does not apply because:

51
In his vain attempt to exculpate himself from criminal liability, petitioner invokes the doctrine
established in Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan, et al., [211 SCRA 171, 177 (1992)]], wherein this
Honorable Court acquitted the accused of the crime of malversation of public funds, holding that
"[s]ince the audit examination left much to be desired in terms of thoroughness and
completeness as there were accounts which were not considered, the same cannot be made the
basis for holding petitioner liable for malversation."

It is submitted that the ruling in Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan (supra) is not applicable to the
instant case as the two cases are based on different factual circumstances.

In the first place, in Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan (supra, at p. 178), there was a finding that the
"haphazard examination of the cash accountability of petitioner" was made by the auditor "in
violation of the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors" and that "the 'missing' funds
would have been 'discovered' if only the auditor took into consideration the contents of the two
vaults in Sindangan and Tampisilan and the fact that her collection in Dipolog City were
deposited with the NFA cashier." In the instant case, there was sufficient compliance with the
Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors as the two (2) auditing teams had completed
their examination and, thereafter, required herein petitioner to produce or explain the shortages
of funds in his custody. Notwithstanding the demand for him to explain the shortages, petitioner
totally disregarded the same and further failed to produce upon demand the missing funds
amounting to P1,134,421.54 and P149,905.92. There was, thus, nothing left for the team of
auditors to do in the instant case. If at all, State Auditor Ritua requested for the return of
petitioner's cashbook and passbooks merely to reconcile and confirm the correctness of their
findings.10

The petition has no merit.

The evidence on record shows that the team of State Auditors conducted its first audit of cash
and cash accounts of the General Fund, Special Education Fund and Trust Fund in the custody of
the petitioner, and discovered that he had a shortage of P1,134,421.54.11

In a Letter12 dated July 5, 1995, the State Auditors demanded that the petitioner immediately
produce the missing funds. He was also required to submit within 72 hours a written explanation
why the shortage occurred. In the meantime, the State Auditors conducted another audit of the
cash and cash accounts of the petitioner during the period of June 8, 1995 to July 19, 1995, and
he was found to have a shortage of P149,905.92. The petitioner was informed of the results of
the audit in a Letter dated July 27, 1995, where he was directed to refund his shortage
of P149,905.92 and to submit a written explanation thereon within 72 hours.13 However, the
petitioner failed to respond to such demand, and failed to object to the findings and conclusions
of the State Auditors. It bears stressing that the petitioner was present during the said audit.

While it is true that the petitioner requested for a re-audit on August 3, 1995 and objected to
some of the findings of the audit team, he addressed the letter-request to the Provincial
Treasurer, and not to the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan. We note that while the Provincial
Auditor had already signed the Transmittal Letter dated August 3, 1995 on the State Auditor's
Report and request for the petitioner's prosecution for malversation of public funds, it was filed
only on February 6, 1996. In the meantime, the Provincial Auditor never received any letter from
the petitioner requesting for a re-audit of his account.

Admittedly, State Auditor Ritua conducted an audit of the General Fund, the Special Education
Fund and Trust Fund Passbook, and the LBP and DBP Passbooks on July 11, 1995 for verification
and reconciliation purposes. However, the petitioner was not barred from examining and
receiving the same, preparatory to the submission of his explanation to the State Auditors'
demand-letters. Indeed, the petitioner was even able to write the Provincial Treasurer on August
3, 1995, and requested his objection to such findings. The following findings and ratiocination of
the CA, as supported by the evidence on record, negate the submission of the petitioner:

52
'[T]he records at the depository banks confirmed the correctness of the COA's findings that there
were, indeed, shortages in the funds under appellant's control, thus, rendering appellant's
request for a re-audit as a mere superfluous and redundant procedure (TSN, Amando T. Sison;
Emelie Ritua, supra).

Appellant's contention that he was not given the chance to verify the records under audit despite
a request to that effect deserves scant consideration. The records show that appellant was twice
afforded ample opportunity to replenish the funds or explain the reason for its disappearance.
Verily, this could have been the perfect opportunity for the appellant to verify the records and
provide an acceptable reason behind the shortages in the municipal funds under his custody.
Appellant, however, on both instances failed to reply to the demands given by the COA. For
having refused "to face the music," so to speak, and disregarded the demands sent by the COA,
appellant has only himself to blame if he has lost any opportunity to further verify the financial
records of the municipality.14

The record of the Ombudsman shows that the petitioner was required to submit his counter-
affidavit, but requested for time to do so, on his representation that his request to the
Commission on Audit for a re-audit was still pending. It turned out that the petitioner made no
such request.

Moreover, the petitioner failed to submit his counter-affidavit to the Ombudsman. Thus, the
petitioner's submission that the audit of his account had not been completed before the report of
the State Auditors was referred to the Ombudsman is not correct.

Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to
prove that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The
petitioner could have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients
and amounts of the cash advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the
Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on September
15, 1995, P200,000.00 on or before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995.
He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the balance of
his shortage. Such partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied
admission of misappropriation of the missing funds. The ruling of the CA on this matter is
correct:

As We have already stated hereinabove, on September 15, 1995, not too long after the
shortages in the municipal funds were discovered, appellant made a partial payment/settlement
in the amount of 200,187.80 pesos as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 436756 (Exhibit "8,"
Record, Volume III, p. 6). With respect to the balance of the missing funds, appellant promised
to pay the same in installment basis. Appellant, though, failed to comply with his undertaking
(Record, Volume I, p. 457; TSN, Amando T. Sison, July 27, 1998, pp. 32-33). Said payment is of
no moment and could not have legally brought acquittal for the appellant. On the contrary, as
guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, We hold that said payment,
particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant's commitment to gradually pay the
remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an
implied admission of appellant's guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his
personal use.15

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25845 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

53
Ladiana vs. People, 393 SCRA 419
FACTS: The accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police
(INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his
duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his
official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which
were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto
Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing
along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter has no
business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, attacked and shot
Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting
upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking him. Kaya itong si
Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako
ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag
hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na
siya ay tinamaan
ISSUE: whether he acted in self-defense is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to
the latters death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did
it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is
admissible in evidence against him.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were
made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was
made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the
true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had
been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim,
petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no
criminal liability therefor. Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. Petitioner argues that it was the
prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense. Hence, he could not be bound by it.
This argument deserves scant consideration. Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime charged. As far as he is concerned,
homicide has already been established. The fact of death and its cause were established by his
admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the Certificate of Death, the
Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination and the Medico-Legal Findings. The intent to kill is
likewise presumed from the fact of death.
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are
statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people
that he had already gone to the police station. There is no showing that he was not actually
arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in
authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in
the killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to
report the shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus,
he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. In the absence of sufficient and
convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate
voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioners penalty.
Petition is DENIED

54
People v Ulit

Victim Lucelle Serrano filed 2 complaints for rape and 2 complaints for acts of
lasciviousness against her uncle alleging that he took advantage of her when she was still 11.
Pleaded not guilty. Lucelle was undergoing psychiatric treatment at the Philippine General
Hospital. The prosecution presented her as the first witness. The trial was reset 4 times as she
refused to answer certain questions and ended up crying. Upon examination, it was discovered
that she is suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the witness stand. The trial was
reset to July 21, 1997. Finally on October 20, 1997, she declared that the appellant raped her in
November 1996 and many other times thereafter in her residence at No. 7104 San Maximo
Street, Makati City. Instead of asking questions to elicit the facts and circumstances before and
during the commission of the crimes, the prosecutor asked Lucelle to identify her signature in
her sworn statement and to affirm the truth of its contents. She did so. He then declared the he
had no more questions to ask for direct examination. The sworn statement contained the
manner as to how the accused violated the victim (with balisong, happened several times etc)
On clarificatory question by the Court, appellant testified as to the manner of commission
of the crime. On re-direct examination, when asked why she did not respond to the questions
propounded to her during the previous hearings and why she had been crying in open court,
Lucelle replied that she was afraid of her uncle, the appellant.
Father testified that she saw blood on the underwear of the victim. When asked, she
merely said that it was menstruation so he gave her money to buy napkin. Mother testified that
one night, she was surprised that her daughter is not sleeping beside her. When she went to her
other daughters room, she was surprised to see her daughter sleeping beside the accused. She
wanted to talk with accused but failed when she saw him playing with his balisong. Lastly, she
was surprised to see accused leaving the bathroom sweaty before her daughter left the same
bathroom, pale and afraid. This prompted her to go to the Barangay where victim told the sexual
abuse.
The barangay chairman asked the appellant if he raped Lucelle and the latter replied that
he did. A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the Office of the Barangay Chairman in which
the appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in February 1997, and on March 2, 1997. Such was
signed by the accused. In the Makati Police Head Quarters, a police conducted a custodial
investigation of the appellant who was without counsel during which the latter admitted having
raped the victim.
However, when prosecution offered in evidence the appellants Sinumpaang
Salaysay before the barangay chairman the appellant objected to its admission on the ground
that the appellant was not assisted by counsel and that, he was forced and coerced into signing
the same. The appellants counsel, likewise, objected to the admissibility of Lucelles sworn
statement on the ground that she was incompetent to give the same because of her mental
illness. However, both were admitted by Trial Court.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing to November 5,
1997 for the appellant to adduce his evidence. When the case was called for trial on that date,
his counsel manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his plea from not guilty to
guilty in the rape cases. As to the acts of lasciviousness cases, he manifested that he would no
longer adduce any evidence in his defense because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein.
The trial court suspended the proceedings and gave the appellant forty-five minutes to
confer with his counsel. When trial resumed, the appellant reiterated his earlier manifestation.
When told by the court that he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant
stood pat on his decision. Hence, convicted of death for rape and 8-15 years of prison for acts of
lasciviousness.
The trial court declared that even prescinding from the appellants plea of guilty, the
prosecutor adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for qualified
rape. Appellant does not contest his conviction for rape but merely wishes that he be not
sanctioned death penalty due to his remorse as shown in his plea of guilt.

Held:

55
 Appellants plea of guilty was not properly made. He was charged with a criminal offense.
When the appellant informed the trial court of his decision to change his plea of not guilty to
guilty, it behooved the trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea. Courts must proceed with extreme care where
the imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable.
There is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may conduct a searching inquiry. It has
been held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on the voluntariness of the plea and
the full or complete comprehension by the accused of his plea of guilty.
However, In People vs. Aranzado, we formulated the following guidelines as to how the
trial court may conduct its searching inquiry:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent or avenging quarters.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty
of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or
make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing
details or significance
In People v Ostia, it was also held that also required to probe thoroughly into the reasons
or motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances for a change of plea of the accused and
his comprehension of his plea; explain to him the elements of the crime for which he is charged
as well as the nature and effect of any modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of
the offense, inclusive of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as well as the qualifying and
special qualifying circumstances, and inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities
for the crime for which he would plead guilty to.
In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the appellants
voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilty
First. The trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for changing his plea, from not
guilty to that of guilty, and the cogent circumstances that led him to decide to do so. Second. It
appears in the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that the appellant opted not to avail
himself of his right to a regular preliminary investigation and refused to execute a waiver.
However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when he
was brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for inquest investigation. Third. The trial court
also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when he executed
his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the barangay hall. Fourth. The trial court failed to
ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a rape committed in November 1996, when in
his Sinumpaang Salaysay, he confessed to having raped the victim only in February 1997 and
March 2, 1997. Fifth., the Court did not discuss the elements of the crime and aggravating
circumstances in clear terms. Sixth, it was not explained to him that his conviction carries with it
civil liability. Seventh. Neither did the trial court inquire from the appellants counsel whether the
meaning and the consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a language or
dialect known to and understood by him. Eight. The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain
from the appellant his age, educational attainment and socio-economic status. Ninth. The trial
court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident
of qualified rape Tenth. The appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence.
As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses
because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment. However, where the trial court receives, independently of his plea of guilty, evidence

56
to determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged he may still be convicted if
there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate
conviction
However, upon review of the evidence on record, Court is convinced that the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in November 1996.
The victim declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination and her testimony on
clarificatory questions that accused raped her.
By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely
from the credence to be attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on the veracity
and competence of some persons from whom the witness has received the information. The
basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not subject to the test
which can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is
not present and available for cross-examination. In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay
evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision while the accused shall enjoy the
right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against him. In this case, Lucelle
testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn statement which she herself had
given.
Also, although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his
statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in
evidence against him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he
gave his statement.

57
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, et. al.

FACTS:

Before the Court is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death; and (2) finding appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel
Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide.

On December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and
the accused attacked, and assaulted Joseph Galam y Antonio, inflicting upon him mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs.
The appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in
evidence against him because the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial
investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was
ineffective because he remained silent during the entire proceedings. He was not independent,
as he was formerly a judge in the National Police Commission, which was holding court inside
the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.

ISSUE: Did the accused validly waive his right to counsel? Did the police afford the accused the
right to be informed?

RULING:
No. Beginning with the admissibility of Sayabocs extrajudicial confession, the Court held that
such cannot be used in evidence in this case. Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial
confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is that
the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds
rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the
extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any
fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or
intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the
confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges
against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his
rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.
In Sayabocs case, apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession
contains the passing of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed
under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The stereotyped "advice" appearing in
practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a
"legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with the curt
"Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or
even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow
the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these
rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of
Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police
officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.

G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013

CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

58
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.

Facts:
1. Five separate Information for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed
against petitioner.
2. The said Information portray the same mode of commission of the crime as in Criminal Case
No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory notes
involved and the dates and amounts.
3. In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the
Commercio Branch for more than a week.
4. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice
president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day.
5. When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven other
people present: two senior branch officers, two bank lawyers, two policemen (one in uniform
and the other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank,
Valentino Elevado.
a. Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper in connection with the audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation;
that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be brought to the
precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of
the purpose of the meeting; and that just to get it over with he signed the paper which turned
out to be a confession.
b. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable to find the
latter.
c. He also tried to phone him but to no avail.
d. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right
to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in
evidence against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the written statement executed by the appellant is admissible in evidence.

Held:

We find the Petition wanting in merit.

Petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence.

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt

obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the
CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.

Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach
upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights
above.19 In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written
statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear:
(1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal
affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty
in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the
taking of his written statement.

Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to counsel
"applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an

59
administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the
recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:21

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.22

Here, petitioners written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence
and in giving due consideration to petitioners written statement as there is no constitutional
impediment to its admissibility.

Petitioners written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition
is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress
and intimidation.

Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is
proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary."23 Petitioner failed to
overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been
executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such
nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained
therein attest to its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:

As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details
which could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence
which cannot be associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellants
answers to questions 14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the
corrections made therein. The response to every question was fully informative, even beyond
the required answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints.24

In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
petitioners extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge
and information given by him."

Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or
administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated
him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a
settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no
physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as
having been voluntarily executed.26

Neither will petitioners assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before
affixing his signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition. To recall,
petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a bank
manager for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend
the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due
diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.

No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the
matter. His non-presentation created the presumption that his testimony if given would be

60
adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution suppressed
its own evidence.

Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the
evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present
its case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply
where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution.30 In the present
case, if petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability
by establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the most
prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have
compulsory process to secure Tans attendance during the trial pursuant to Article III, Section
14(2)31 of the Constitution. The records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right.
In view of these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.

Petitioners denial is unavailing.

The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the
loans covered by the promissory notes and the cashiers checks were personally transacted by
Tan against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his
signature thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by
established evidence. "It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified
on affirmative matters."32 The chain of events in this case, from the preparation of the
promissory notes to the encashment of the cashiers checks, as narrated by the prosecution
witnesses and based on petitioners own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that
he committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be
imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.

61