BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)

CASE 1: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADRIANO CABRILLAS, BENNY
CABTALAN
G.R. No. 175980 February 15, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect
the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as
the perpetrators of the crime.
Factual Antecedents
The Information3 against Benny and his co-accused Adriano Cabrillas (Adriano)
contains the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about the 11th day of July 1999, at nighttime which was purposely
sought, in Barangay Laygayon, Municipality of Pinabacdao, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, and stab one Jesus
Cabujat with the use of long bolos (sundang), with which both accused have
provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victim multiple stab
wounds, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
5 immediately went outside the house and saw Benny releasing her father. As she got
Two years after the incident, Benny was arrested in Las Pias City while to date,
Adriano remains at large. During his arraignment, Benny entered a plea of "not
guilty".6 Trial thereafter ensued.
and Adriano had bolos, locally known as sundang, tucked on their waists. He also
heard the two talking about their plan to assault someone that same night. 7 Sensing
that something wrong would happen, Wilfredo left them and walked home. 8
Upon reaching his house, Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and Adriano circling the
house of Jesus Cabujats (Jesus) daughter, Elena Raypan (Elena), which is just
about two arms length away from his house. 9 Thereafter, the duo stood on a dark
portion of the road.10 Later on, he saw Jesus and his 9-year-old granddaughter
Jonalyn C. Raypan (Jonalyn) walking towards the house of Jonalyns mother, Elena.
Jesus stopped and turned towards a grassy area to urinate when suddenly, Benny
and Adriano emerged from their hiding place. They held Jesus by his shoulders and
alternately stabbed him. At that moment, Jesus shouted "I am wounded, please help
me because I was stabbed by Benny and Adriano."11 Jesus then fell to the ground
while Benny and Adriano immediately fled from the crime scene. 12
For her part, prosecution witness Jonalyn narrated that on the night of the incident,
she fetched her grandfather Jesus from her Ate Susans house. 13 She and her
grandfather walked side by side in going back to their house. 14However, upon
reaching the vicinity of their house, her grandfather went across the street to urinate.
It was then that she saw Benny and Adriano on the same street. 15 She knew the two
because Benny and her father are cousins while Adriano and her mother are also
cousins.16 She saw the two men take hold of her grandfathers arms, after which
Benny stabbed her grandfather with a long bolo. She heard her grandfather say
"Donie, help me, I am wounded."17 After that, Jonalyn saw Benny go home.18
Elena also testified that when she heard her father shouting for help, she
nearer to Jesus, Benny and Adriano ran away.19 When Elena asked her father as to
who stabbed him, the latter replied that it was Benny and Adriano. 20

Jesus was rushed to a hospital where he was pronounced dead due to multiple stab
Version of the Prosecution
wounds.21 His family spent P18,500.00 for his wake and burial. At the time of his
death, Jesus was earning P1,000.00 a week as a farmer.
Prosecution witness Wilfredo Pacayra (Wilfredo) narrated that on July 11, 1999 at
around 7:00 p.m., he went to the store of Susan Cabtalan (Susan) to buy salt. While
A case for murder was accordingly filed against Benny and Adriano and a warrant
thereat, Benny and Adriano asked him to join them in their drinking spree to which
was issued for their arrest which was, however, returned unserved since they could
Wilfredo obliged. In the course of their drinking spree, Wilfredo noticed that Benny
no longer be located. It appears that on July 13, 1999, at around noontime, Benny

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and Adriano escaped by ferryboat to Catbalogan, Samar. 22 Two years later, or on
July 31, 2001, Benny was arrested in Las Pias City by virtue of an alias warrant of
arrest.23
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 29, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision 27 convicting Benny of the
crime of murder. Discarding minor inconsistencies, relationship, and delay in
testifying in court, it gave more credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions two
eyewitnesses since their positive declarations that Benny and Adriano stabbed the
helpless Jesus were never refuted. Besides, the ad mortem statement of Jesus that
the two stabbed him "would serve to cleanse any doubt on their
responsibility."28 Also telling is the fact that Benny and Adriano immediately fled to
Catbalogan, Samar after the incident.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction through its August 29, 2006
Decision.32 However, it did not anymore consider the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength as the qualifying circumstance of treachery already
absorbed it.33 Thus, the CA modified the penalty imposed upon Benny by reducing it
from death to reclusion perpetua. Likewise modified were the amounts of damages
granted to the heirs of Jesus. It disposed of the case in the following manner:
ISSUE: Are minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters
affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrators of the crime?
RULING: NO. The trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses usually
remains undisturbed.
The trial and appellate courts reached the same conclusion that the testimonies of
eyewitnesses Wilfredo and Jonalyn deserve credence as both narrated in a
straightforward manner the details of Benny and Adrianos attack upon Jesus.
Benny, however, still disputes the credibility of these witnesses by pointing out that
Wilfredos testimony that he and Adriano took turns in stabbing Jesus differs from
that of Jonalyn who stated that while the two assailants attacked Jesus in unison, it
was only Benny who inflicted the mortal wounds. The Court, however, finds this
inconsistency to pertain merely to the manner the fatal stab wounds were inflicted
on Jesus. The materiality of the assailants exact position during their attack on the
victim is a trivial and insignificant detail which cannot defeat the witnesses positive
identification of Benny as one of the assailants. Besides, "[i]t is perfectly natural for
different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as
there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not
observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect
dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies
were [fabricated] and rehearsed."41
Bennys assertion that Wilfredo is not a credible witness since he surfaced three
years after the incident to testify for the prosecution also fails to impress. It is worthy
to mention that the proceedings in this case was suspended for two years because
Benny and Adriano left Pinabacdao, Samar and the warrant for their arrest could not
be served on them. Also, deference or reluctance in reporting a crime does not
destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. Delay in reporting a
crime or an unusual incident in a rural area is well-known. 42 It is common for a
witness to prefer momentary silence for fear of reprisal from the accused. 43 The fact
remains that Wilfredo fulfilled his duty as a good member of society by aiding the
family of Jesus when they were seeking justice. In the absence of other
circumstances that would show that the charge was a mere concoction and that
Wilfredo was impelled by some evil motives, delay in testifying is insufficient to
discredit his testimony.
The fact that Wilfredo and Jonalyn are related to the victim also does not diminish
their credibility. While admittedly, Wilfredo is a relative of the husband of Julita, who
is the daughter of Jesus, and Jonalyn is Jesuss granddaughter, relationship per se
does not evince ulterior motive nor does it ipso facto tarnish the credibility of
witnesses.44 "Mere relationship to a party cannot militate against the credibility of
witnesses or be taken as destructive of the witnesses credibility." 45 What matters is
that Wilfredo and Jonalyn positively identified Benny and Adriano as the assailants
of Jesus and that they testified in a straightforward manner. These indicate that the
two are telling the truth.
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As to the inconsistencies in Elenas testimony and in her affidavit as to who asked
her father the identity of the assailants, the same deserves scant consideration. It is
settled that "affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered
incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in
court, and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony
of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight." 46 The trial court
therefore did not err in affording more credence to Elenas testimony given in open
court despite her having previously executed an affidavit which was inconsistent
with her testimony. To stress, "appellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial
courts with regard to the assessment of credibility of witnesses. The reason for this
is that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand
and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination."
away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao
in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca
who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30
am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was
personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was
in the complex at the time.
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a
long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued but was finally arrested
and detained.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of murder.

CASE 2: On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, citing
the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, and
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 173476 Salafrancas positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present: ISSUE: Can the ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, Bolanon, in
this case, be admitted in evidence against the accused?
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
-versus- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, RULING: Yes. The Court further noted Estaos testimony on the utterance by
BERSAMIN, Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing
VILLARAMA, JR., and incident. The Court noted from Estaos testimony that Bolanon had gone to the
*
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca;
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General
y BELLO, Promulgated: Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who
Accused-Appellant. had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been
February 22, 2012 Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a
BERSAMIN, J.: hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that
about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital,
Doctrine: An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified
that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour
gestae, or both. before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a
dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the
FACTS: hearsay rule.

Sometime in 1993, past midnight, Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence
Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following

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requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time
the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that
the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide,
in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-
mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed
him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death,
having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then
experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital
emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours
after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in
the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarants own statements or from
circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his
presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to
testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration
was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was
then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time
to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as
the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act. In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule
on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by
the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as
a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether
it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
CASE 3: PEOPLE vs. CERILLA
FACTS: The prosecutions evidence shows that at around 6:00 pm on 24 April 1998,
the victim, Alexander Parreo (Alexander), his 14-year old daughter, Michelle, and
neighbor, Phoebe Sendin (Sendin), went to the house of appellant. They were
cordially welcomed and entertained by appellant and his wife. [5] An hour later, a
blackout occurred. At this time, Alexander sought permission from the couple to
leave, which the latter acknowledged. [6] On their way home, Michelle was walking
ahead of Alexander with the latter closely following his daughter.
Suddenly, after walking for about 100 meters from appellants house, Michelle heard
an explosion. Michelle immediately turned her back and saw appellant pointing a
gun at Alexander who, at that moment, was staggering towards her. [7] Sendin, who
was also with Alexander and Michelle, did not look back but instead ran away and
proceeded to the house of Mrs. Parreo. [8] Meanwhile, Michelle was cuddling
Alexander beside the road when the latter repeatedly told her that it was appellant
who shot him.[9] Twenty minutes later, Alexanders other daughter, Novie Mae,
arrived; she was also told by Alexander at that moment that it was appellant who
shot him.[10]
SPO3 Frederick Dequito (SPO3 Dequito) and other police officers rushed to the
crime scene and helped carry Alexander to an ambulance. SPO3 Dequito was able
to ask Alexander who shot him to which he answered Pato. Pato is an alias by
which appellant is known.
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Alexanders wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was also told by Alexander that
it was appellant who shot him.[12] Alexander died the following day.[13]
Dr. Tito D. Doromal, Philippine National Police medico-legal officer, performed an
autopsy on the body of Alexander. The autopsy report stated the cause of death to
be hemorrhage secondary to pellet wounds. [14] Testifying on his report, Dr. Doromal
explained that Alexander died from a gunshot wound which penetrated the ribs and
lacerated the right lobe of the liver, colon, stomach, duodenum, and right
kidney. The entrance wound was located at the middle-back portion of the
body. Seven (7) pellets were recovered on the muscle of the upper and middle
abdominal wall.[15]
The defenses evidence consists of the testimonies of appellant himself and of his
wife, Madoline, his stepdaughter, Franlin, PO1 Manolito Javelora, PO3 Alberto
Sarmiento, and PO3 Wilson Allona. Appellant interposed alibi as his main
defense. He claimed that Alexander, together with his daughter and Sendin, had
gone to his house on 24 April 1998 at around 6:00 p.m. where they were welcomed
and offered snacks.[16] They were having a conversation when a blackout
occurred. Alexander then asked permission to leave.After the visitors had left,
appellant ordered his stepdaughter Franlin to buy candle at the store across their
house. Appellant and Madoline posted themselves at their doorway holding a
flashlight to light Franlins path. Upon Franlins return to the house, appellant heard
an explosion and he immediately closed the door. Later, the policemen went to his
house and told him that he was a suspect in the shooting of Alexander and was then
brought to the police station. [17] The following day, he was subjected to paraffin test
the result of which turned out to be negative.[18]
Appellants testimony was corroborated by Madoline and Franlin. PO1
Javelora declared that when he asked Alexander who shot him, the latter did not
answer.[19]Likewise, PO3 Sarmiento and Allona stated that when they went to the
hospital to interrogate Alexander, the latter could not give a definite answer as to
who shot him.[20]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the
prosecution's eyewitness, Michelle, as well as the dying declaration of Alexander
considering that the circumstances under which the crime was committed rendered
the identification of the gunman impossible.
RULING:
A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide,
referring to the material facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the
killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is certain
to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and
in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a
person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain,
stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.
[36]
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante
mortem statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost
credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and
false accusation.[37] It
is thus admissible to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased,
to show the cause of
death of the deceased,andthe circumstances under which the assault was made up
on him. The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity,
because the declarants death renders it impossible his taking the witness stand, and
it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime;
allowing it, therefore, prevents a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, because the
declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when
every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of death as a situation
so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an
oath administered in court.[38]
Of the doctrines that authorize the admission of special classes of
hearsay, the doctrine relating to dying declarations is the most mystical in its theory
and, traditionally, among the most arbitrary in its limitations. In the United States, the
notion of the special likelihood of truthfulness of deathbed statements was
widespread long before the recognition of a general rule against hearsay in the early
1700s. Not surprisingly, nearly as soon as we find a hearsay rule, we also find an
exception for dying declarations.[39]
Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be
admissible, thus: first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the
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assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct
causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the declarants injury or
the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack,
indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or
indicating the absence of cause for the act are admissible. [40] Second, at the time the
declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a
fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is
the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact
that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the
approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test
is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death
as certainly impending.[41] Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is
that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived,
the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Accordingly, declarations made by
a child too young to be a competent witness or by a person who was insane or
incapable of understanding his own statements by reason of partial
unconsciousness are not admissible in evidence. [42] Thus, in the absence of
evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a witness
had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have been
competent.[43] Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. [44] Anent this
requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had
caused its witnesses to take the stand and testify in open court on the substance of
Alexanders ante mortem statement in the present criminal case for murder.
CASE 4: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO
TAEZA
G.R. No. L-28482 January 30, 1971
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS: An information filed by the Provincial Fiscal charged the two accused, Juan
Brioso and Mariano Taeza, with the crime of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The records of the case show that on 23 December 1966, between 8 and 9 in the
evening, the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house at
barrio Tiker, Tayum, Abra. The husband was making rope in the annex of their
house, while the wife, four meters away, was applying candle wax to a flat iron.
Silvino Daria was using a lamp where he worked. Outside, the night was bright
because of the moon overhead.
Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of
dogs. She peeped through a crack in the wall of her house and saw appellants
herein pass southward in the direction of the house of Silvino Daria that was six
meters away. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened, she went
downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each appellant point a gun at the
bamboo wall of Daria's house. Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard
Daria moaning and his wife call for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal
went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable to speak.
The widow, however, testified that right after being shot, she rushed to her
husband's side and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza.
Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen
and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed
affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers.
The cause of the death of Silvino Daria was "Shock due to severe hemorrhage
secondary to gunshot wounds at the abdomen and leg," as found by Dr. Isabelo B.
Lucas, Municipal Health Officer of Tayum, Abra, contained in his Medico-Legal
Necropsy Report.
The motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval by the spouses
Silvino and Susana Daria of Mariano Taeza's courtship of their daughter, Angelita.
Angelita was even sent to Manila for her to avoid Mariano Taeza. The courtship is
admitted by Mariano Taeza.
ISSUE/s: Can the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony and statement of the
prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal on the physical identity of the accused be
admissible in evidence against the accused?
Can the ante-mortem statements of Silvino Daria be taken to corroborate Cecilias
testimony?
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RULING: Yes.
The Court found no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material
points. She stated that she did not see Mariano Taeza carry a gun when both the
accused passed by. But this brief observation does not necessarily mean that he
was not actually armed or carrying a gun on his person. The fact that he did was
proved when both the said accused were seen pointing their respective gun at the
victim and each subsequently fired once at him, Taeza using a short weapon that
could have been carried concealed in his person.
The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino Daria's.
The night was brightly illuminated by the moon. Cecilia Bernal had known both
accused for a long time and it is admitted that they also know her. There could have
been no difficulty in identifying the accused under the circumstances.
Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against
the above-said accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the
deceased by a first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew
of no reason why she should testify against him. Hence, her statement that she
came to court only to tell the truth should be believed. The witness also stated that
she was hard of hearing and could not understand some of the questions; thus, the
alleged inconsistencies in her testimony do not detract from the "positive and
straightforward" identification of the accused as the ones who were seen at the
scene of the crime and who actually shot Silvino Daria.
Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the
declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and
Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of
an ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino
Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely
inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of impending death,
considering that he died only one hour after being shot.
The alleged affidavit of Antonio Daria, was presented in court to corroborate
Mariano Taeza's testimony. But while the said affidavit was identified by the
Provincial Fiscal as having been subscribed and sworn to before him, he also stated
that he did not know Antonio Daria personally and that was the only time he
appeared before him. Said affidavit does not have the seal of the Fiscal's Office.
Moreover, the said affidavit was never identified by the supposed affiant and there
was no opportunity for the prosecution to cross-examine him.
As stated in People vs. Mariquina, affidavits are generally not prepared by the
affiants themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiants' statements, which may thus be either committed or misunderstood by the
one writing them. For this reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party
is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally
rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
In view hereof, the Court found said affidavit having no probative value, and that the
lower court did not err when it rejected the same. In this connection, it is markworthy
that the prosecuting attorney stated in open court that Antonio Daria had also
executed another affidavit in the Fiscal's office "to the effect that he went to the
office of defense counsel, ...... and there affixed his thumbmark on a statement that
was never read to him." Be that as it may, not one of the other persons who,
Mariano Taeza claimed, were with him in the barrio clinic (Narciso Valera and Jose
Cabais) was produced in court to support his alibi. Mariano Taeza's testimony,
therefore, remains uncorroborated. It has been repeatedly held that in the face of
direct evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak defense and becomes more so if
uncorroborated. It is worse if the alibi could have been corroborated by other
persons mentioned by the accused but they are not presented.
CASE 5: PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ
FACTS: Herein appellant was charged of unlawfully and feloniously planting,
cultivating and culturing seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian
Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or
derived, to the damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the
Philippines. On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance
of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
TESTIMONY OF SPO3 Marcelo Tipay (a member of the police force of Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya) He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana
plantation, allegedly owned by appellant.
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied
by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being
grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police
operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found
appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where
appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana
plants. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according
to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven
marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of
the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy
Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic
examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a
positive indication for marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination, the
results of which confirmed her initial impressions.
APPELLANTS TESTIMONY. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M.,
September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he
was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with
the latter to "see something." This unknown person then brought appellant to the
place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from
his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front
of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana
growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist
at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and
afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants.
He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut,
where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted
marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the police station at
Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of
Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge
against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging
activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put
in a bad situation." At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew
nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around
the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away. The latter
house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer
who had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were found
was located between his house and Carlito Pascua's.
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was
offered to rebut appellant's claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in the
lot he was cultivating. Tipay presented a sketch he made, which showed the
location of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as
well as the closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40
meters away from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of
Carlito Pascua. Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied
him when he made the measurements. He further stated that his basis for claiming
that appellant was the owner or planter of the seized plants was the information
given him by the police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to the location
of said plants.
The trial court held the appellant liable. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE
APPELLANT'S GUILT.
APPELLANTS CONTENTIONS. Appellant now argues that his admission of
ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against him for being
violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for
the trial court to have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the
investigation conducted by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but was
meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant
theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and
independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought information
from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his
purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it
override his constitutional right to counsel during investigation.
OSGS CONTENTIONS. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under custodial
investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His
right to competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached.
Moreover, appellants failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to
falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
RULING: The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry
but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police
appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly
meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued
instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time
the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation
as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the
cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need to
inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking him..." In trying to
elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a
suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right
to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. From these circumstances, we may
infer that appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a
significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was
arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the
marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its
admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing. The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also
uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the
investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even
before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right
to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay. Even if the confession or
admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and
without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in
evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven
snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence
failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law
requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful
obeisance to the fundamental law."
CASE #6: JESUS GERALDO and AMADO ARIATE vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173608 November 20, 2008
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were, by Information filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao del Sur, charged with Homicide allegedly
committed as follows: [O]n the 1st day of July, 2002 at about 3:00 o'clock early
morning, more or less, at Sitio Tinago, Barangay Bunga, municipality of Lanuza,
province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another,
armed with xxx handguns and with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sho[o]t one ARTHUR U. RONQUILLO, thereby hitting and
inflicting upon the latter wounds described hereunder:
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other
persons, on being informed of the shooting of Arthur Ronquillo (the victim), repaired
to where he was, not far from his residence, and found him lying on his side and
wounded. Although gasping for breath, he was able to utter to Mirasol, within the
hearing distance of Arnel, that he was shot by Badjing and Amado.
Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" and "Amado" responsible for the
shooting of the victim were subjected to paraffin tests at the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Butuan City. In the PNP Chemistry Report No. C-
002-2002-SDS,4 the following data are reflected: Qualitative examination conducted
on specimens A and B gave NEGATIVE results for powder residue,
Nitrates.Specimens A and B do not reveal the presence of gunpowder residue,
Nitrates.
Both victim's son Arnel and Miraosl gave a statement in a question and answer style
that herein petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his
father. At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that "Badjing"
and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated Mirasol's statement.
Upon the other hand, petitioners gave their side of the case as follows:
Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod of Bunga, declared that Barangay Kagawad
Omboy Roz (Roz) woke him up at 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002 and informed him that
the victim was shot. He and Roz thus borrowed a tricycle, proceeded to the crime
scene and, along with others, brought the victim to the hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. Ariate submitted himself to a paraffin test and tested
negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates.8
Petitioner Geraldo declared that he slept in his house located also in Barangay
Bunga, Lanuza at 9:30 p.m. of June 30, 2002 and woke up at 4:00 a.m. the
following day. At 6:30 a.m., on seeing many people in the vicinity of the 45-meter
away house of one Josita Bongabong where the victim's body was found, he
inquired and learned that the victim was shot. Policemen subsequently went to his
house and advised him to take a paraffin test. He obliged and was tested at the
PNP Crime Laboratory and was found negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates. 9
The trial court, passing on the demeanor of prosecution witness-the victim's eight-
year old daughter Mirasol, observed:
. . . She talks straightforward, coherent and clear, very intelligent, with
child mannerism[s]. While testifying she was criss-crossing her hands,
touching anything within her reach, innocent and simple, pressing of[f] and
on her stomach but she talks with correct grammar. No doubt, this Court
was convinced of her testimony which was corroborated by her brother
Arnel Ronquillo.
On the nature and weight of the dying declaration of the victim, the trial court
observed:
Even assuming that the declaration is not admissible as a dying
declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae since it was
made shortly after the startling occurrence and under the influence
thereof, hence, under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no
opportunity to contrive.
RTC convicted petitioners. The CA affirmed with modification the trial court's
decision. It found that the trial court erred in appreciating nocturnity as an
aggravating circumstance. And it reduced the award of moral damages .
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AS
THE ALLEGED ASSAILANT HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED AS PER
EVIDENCE ON RECORD?
WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HAD
BEEN ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?
RULING: NO. The petition is impressed with merit. The trial court relied on the dying
declaration of the victim as recounted by his daughter Mirasol and corroborated by
his son Arnel.
A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are
present: (a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the
declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration
is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death. 23
There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his children related to the identities
of his assailants. As for the victim's consciousness of impending death, it is not
necessary to prove that he stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices that,
judging from the nature and extent of his injuries, the seriousness of his condition
was so apparent to him that it may safely be inferred that such ante mortem
declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death. 24 The location
of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his eventual death
before arriving at the hospital meet this requirement. 25
It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been competent to
testify had he survived the attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity
to see his assailant. Among other things, there is no indication whether he was shot
in front, the post-mortem examination report having merely stated that the points of
entry of the wounds were at the "right lumbar area" and the "right iliac area." 26
"Lumbar" may refer to "the loins" or "the group of vertebrae lying between the
thoracic vertebrae and the sacrum,"27 or to "the region of the abdomen lying on
either side of the umbilical region and above the corresponding iguinal." 28 "Iliac"
relates to the "ilium," which is "one of the three bones composing either lateral half
of the pelvis being in man broad and expanded above and narrower below where it
joins with the ischium and pubis to form part of the actabulum."
At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it
must identify the assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance. Contrary,
however, to the ruling of the appellate court, it is the prosecution, not petitioners,
which had the burden of proving that petitioners were, at the material time, the only
ones in the barangay who bore such nicknames or aliases. This, the prosecution
failed to discharge. When there is doubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is
essential for their conviction. 33 The Court notes that in their affidavits supporting the
criminal complaint, the victim's wife and children Mirasol and Arnel proffered not
knowing any possible motive for petitioners to shoot the victim. 34 At the trial, no
evidence of any motive was presented by the prosecution. Petitioners' defense of
denial and alibi thus assumes importance.
CASE 7: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDGARDO
LUPAC y FLORES, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 182230; September 19, 2012; BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: Lupac was charged with the crime of Statutory Rape of AAA, his niece.
AAA, her mother (BBB), and Lupac (allegedly BBBs brother) had originally been
living together in the same house, but he eventually transferred to another place in
the neighborhood. Nonetheless, he continued going to BBBs house, where he
occasionally took afternoon naps in the bedroom of the house. BBB left AAA in the
house alone with Lupac to sell peanuts. In the afternoon of the same day, AAA told
Lupac that she was going to take a nap in the bedroom. She did not lock the
bedroom door as was her usual practice. When she woke up, AAA was aghast to
find herself naked from the waist down. She felt soreness in her body and pain in
her genitalia. Momentarily, she noticed Lupac standing inside the bedroom near her,
clad only in his underwear. He was apologetic towards her, saying that "he really did
not intend to do that to her." He quietly handed her a towel. As soon as she
absorbed what had happened, she started to cry. He opened the windows and
unlocked the door of the house. Seeing the chance, she rushed out of the house,
and ran to the place of Tita Terry, a neighbor, who was a friend of her mothers. AAA
revealed to Tita Terry what he had done to her, saying: Inano ako ni Kuya Ega. She
uttered the word hindot vernacular for sexual intercourse. AAA and Tita Terry left
together to find BBB and informed the latter about what had happened to AAA. The
three of them reported the rape to the barangay. A barangay kagawad accompanied
them to the Taytay Police Station to lodge a complaint for rape against Lupac.
Lupacs defense consisted of denial and alibi. Lupac denied being related
to AAA, either by consanguinity or otherwise, but admitted being her neighbor for a
long time. He also denied the accusation, insisting that he had been asleep in his
own house during the time of the rape. The RTC convicted Lupac of statutory rape
and concluded that although the qualifying circumstance of relationship had not
been proven, AAAs testimony showing her age of only 11 years at the time of the
rape, being born on December 23, 1988, sufficed to prove her age as an essential
element in statutory rape. On intermediate appeal, the CA affirmed the
conviction, but modified it by holding that Lupac was guilty of simple rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b), RPC. It noted that the Prosecution was not able to
effectively establish the victims minority under 12 years because of the non-
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
submission of AAAs birth certificate, such fact being essential in qualifying the
offense to statutory rape. It observed, however, that the lack of consent as an
element of rape was properly alleged in the information and duly established by the
evidence showing that AAA had been asleep and unconscious at the time of the
commission of the rape. It held that the variance in the mode of the commission of
the rape was really a non-issue because he did not challenge the information at the
arraignment, during the trial and even on appeal. Hence, the appeal. Among others,
Lupac assailed the absence of credible direct evidence about his having carnal
knowledge of AAA because she herself, being then asleep and unconscious, could
not reliably attest to his supposed deed. Consequently, he argued that there must
be proof beyond reasonable doubt of at least the introduction of the male organ into
the labia of the pudendum of the female genital organ, which required some degree
of penetration beyond the vulva in order to touch the labia majora or the labia
minora.
ISSUE: WON the conviction of Lupac was proper, applying the doctrine of Res
Gestae.
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The Court holds that AAAs denunciation of Lupac as her rapist to Tita
Terry and her own mother with the use of the words hindot and inano ako ni Kuya
Ega without any appreciable length of time having intervened following her
discovery of the rape was part of the res gestae (that is, rape). Section 42, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 42. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while
a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may
be received as part of the res gestae.
For the application of this rule, three requisites must be shown to concur,
namely: (a) that the principal act, the res gestae, must be a startling occurrence; (b)
the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances. The requisites were met herein. AAA went to
Tita Terrys house immediately after fleeing from Lupac and spontaneously,
unhesitatingly and immediately declared to Tita Terry that Lupac had sexually
abused her. Such manner of denunciation of him as her rapist was confirmed by Tita
Terrys testimony about AAAs panic-stricken demeanor that rendered it difficult to
quickly comprehend what the victim was then saying. Of course, AAAs use of the
words hindot and inano ako ni Kuya Ega said enough about her being raped. The
nature of res gestae has been fittingly explained by the Court in People v.
Salafranca, viz:
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are
the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are
admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow
out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res
gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during,
or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances
are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
The petition was dismissed.
CASE 8: JUANITO TALIDANO vs. FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES,
INC., SPECIAL EIGHTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND LABOR
ARBITER ERMITA C. CUYUGA
G.R. No. 172031 July 14, 2008
TINGA, J.:
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
Note: This is an illegal dismissal case.
Topic: 2 kinds of res gestae. Requisites of res gestae.
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime
and Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent) and was assigned to M/V Phoenix
Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based
in Korea.
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated against and
maltreated the vessels Filipino crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint
to the officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a
measure that allegedly was resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner
was dismissed on 21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27
October 1999.7
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily disembarked the vessel
after having been warned several times of dismissal from service for his
incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his
superiors. It cited an incident involving petitioners incompetence wherein the vessel
invaded a different route at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner
who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a copy of a fax
message, sent to it on the date of incident, reporting the vessels deviation from its
course due to petitioners neglect of duty at the bridge, as well as a copy of the
report of crew discharge issued by the master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after
the incident.9
The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the alleged misbehavior and
neglect of duty by petitioner have no probative value and are self-serving. It added
that the ships logbook should have been submitted in evidence as it is the
repository of all the activities on board the vessel, especially those affecting the
performance or attitude of the officers and crew members, and, more importantly,
the procedures preparatory to the discharge of a crew member.
The NLRC also noted that private respondent failed to comply with due process in
terminating petitioners employment. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration,14 claiming that the complaint was filed beyond the one-year
prescriptive period. The NLRC, however, denied reconsideration in a Resolution
dated 30 August 2002.15Rejecting the argument that the complaint had already
prescribed.
Despite ruling that prescription had not set in, the appellate court nonetheless
declared petitioners dismissal from employment as valid and reinstated the Labor
Arbiters decision.
The appellate court relied on the fax messages issued by the ship master shortly
after petitioner had committed a serious neglect of his duties. It noted that the said
fax messages constitute the res gestae. In defending the non-presentation of the
logbook, it stated that three years had already passed since the incident and Hansu
was no longer the principal of private respondent.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying merely on fax messages
to support the validity of his dismissal from employment. He maintains that the first
fax message containing the information that the vessel encroached on a different
route was a mere personal observation of the ship master and should have thus
been corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages cannot be considered
as res gestae because the statement of the ship master embodied therein is just a
report. He also contends that he has not caused any immediate danger to the
vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the incident would have been
recorded in the logbook. Thus, he posits that the failure to produce the logbook
reinforces the theory that the fax messages have been concocted to justify his
unceremonious dismissal from employment. Hence, he believes that his dismissal
from employment stemmed from his filing of the complaint with the ITF which his
superiors resented.
Private respondent insists that the appellate court is correct in considering the fax
messages as res gestae statements. It likewise emphasizes that non-presentment
of the logbook is justified as the same could no longer be retrieved because Hansu
has already ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it refutes the allegation of
petitioner that he was dismissed because he filed a complaint with the ITF in behalf
of his fellow crew members. It claims that petitioners allegation is a hoax because
there is no showing that the alleged complaint has been received by the ITF and
that no action thereon was ever taken by the ITF.
Private respondent also asserts that petitioner was not dismissed but that he
voluntarily asked for his repatriation. This assertion, however, deserves scant
consideration. It is highly illogical for an employee to voluntarily request for
repatriation and then file a suit for illegal dismissal. As voluntary repatriation is
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
synonymous to resignation, it is proper to conclude that repatriation is inconsistent
with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.36
Main Issue:
1. Was the CA correct in ruling that the fax messages can be considered as part of
res gestae?
2. What are the 2 kinds of res gestae?
3. What are the requisites of the 2 kinds of res gestae?
Law Applicable: Section 42 of Rule 13040 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts
which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts.
In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in
verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act.
Ruling:
1. Was the CA correct in ruling that the fax messages can be considered as
part of res gestae?
No. The paramount issue therefore boils down to the validity of petitioners
dismissal, the determination of which generally involves a question of fact.
The validity of an employee's dismissal hinges on the satisfaction of two substantive
requirements, to wit: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided for in
Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee was accorded due process,
basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.38
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioners absence during his watch duty when an
emergency call was received from the Japanese port authority that M/V Phoenix
Seven was "invading other route" constituted neglect of duty, a just cause for
terminating an employee. Records reveal that this information was related to private
respondent via two fax messages sent by the captain of M/V Phoenix Seven. The
Court of Appeals treated these fax messages as part of the res gestae proving
neglect of duty on the part of petitioner.
We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae. Classes of
res gestae: To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that:
(1) the principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
Assuming that petitioners negligencewhich allegedly caused the ship to deviate
from its courseis the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements
contained in the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In
addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical element of
spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the
first kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its admissibility
are: (1) the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act
must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act;
and (4) the statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.43
Petitioners alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least
proved to be one.
Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not
accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts
of the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax
messages were made simultaneously with the purported equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of
route encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author
of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only
from the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as
double hearsay. In any event, under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employer
may terminate an employee for gross and habitual neglect of duties. Neglect of duty,
to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence
connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies
repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.
A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the
dismissal of the employee. Petitioners supposed absence from watch duty in a
single isolated instance is neither gross nor habitual negligence. Without question,
the alleged lapse did not result in any untoward incident. If there was any serious
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
aftermath, the incident should have been recorded in the ships logbook and
presented by private respondent to substantiate its claim. Instead, private
respondent belittled the probative value of the logbook and dismissed it as self-
serving. Quite the contrary, the ships logbook is the repository of all activities and
transactions on board a vessel. Had the route invasion been so serious as to merit
petitioners dismissal, then it would have been recorded in the logbook. Private
respondent would have then had all the more reason to preserve it considering that
vital pieces of information are contained therein.
In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an
employee rests on the employer.52 Private respondent miserably failed to discharge
this burden. Consequently, the petitioners dismissal is illegal.
We also note that private respondent failed to comply with the procedural due
process requirement for terminating an employee. Such requirement is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious
concern since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man's
innate sense of justice.
Won by the petitioner.
CASE 9: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL PEA
G.R. No. 133964 February 13, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS: Accused-appellant Ramil Pea was charged with murder in an Information
which reads, thus: That on or about the 8th day of December, 1995, in the
municipality of Obando, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a firearm with intent
to kill one Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and shoot the
said Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer, hitting the latter on the head thereby inflicting wound
which directly caused the death of the said Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer.
In the early morning of December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a
tricycle driver working the night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando, Bulacan. When
they reached their destination, he ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle. Then,
accused-appellant robbed Pelagio of his money and repeatedly struck him on the
head with a gun. Pelagio fell on the ground unconscious. Accused-appellant shot
him on the head and fled on board his tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela
Emergency Hospital stating that a man had been shot on the head and was in their
hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana rushed to the hospital and found
the still conscious Pelagio lying on a stretcher.
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a question and answer method,
which he took down on two sheets of yellow paper. After his statement was taken,
Pelagio affixed his thumbmark on both sheets. In his statement, Pelagio related how
accused-appellant inflicted his injuries on him. The owner of the tricycle, Wilfredo
Lampa, after being informed that Pelagio had been shot, proceeded to the hospital.
There, Pelagio told him that it was accused-appellant who shot him and took away
his tricycle.
Francisca Pelagio, Jimbo Pelagios mother, also rushed to the hospital. Upon advice
of the doctors, Francisca brought her son to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. On
February 6, 1996, Jimbo Pelagio expired. For his part, accused-appellant claimed
that he was in San Isidro, San Luis, Pampanga together with his wife on the date of
the incident. He went into hiding in the house of his uncle, Maximiano Guevarra, for
nine (9) months because he allegedly killed a certain Roger Wininsala. He came to
know that he was being accused of the murder of Pelagio, whom he did not know,
only while he was in detention on a drug charge. Accused-appellants testimony was
corroborated by his uncle Maximiano Guevarra. The RTC found RAMIL PEA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code
ISSUE: Whether the statement of the victim Jimbo Pelagio as well as the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the victims declaration can be
considered as part of the res gestae, hence, an exception to the hearsay rule.
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
RULING: YES. The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have
already been established in a long line of cases. An ante-mortem statement or dying
declaration is entitled to probative weight if: (1) at the time the declaration was
made, death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the
declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3)
the declaration relates to facts which the victim was competent to testify to; (4) the
declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case
wherein the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not established with certainty
whether Pelagio uttered his statement with consciousness of his impending death.
While he was in pain when he made his statement, he expressly stated that
accused-appellant only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him. 6
The significance of a victims realization or consciousness that he was on the brink
of death cannot be gainsaid. Such ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest
order because at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled.
The utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be
considered the incident speaking through the victim. It is entitled to the highest
credence.7
Granting that Pelagio, after giving his statement, later on realized that he was dying,
his statement still can not be considered a dying declaration. The crucial factor to
consider is the contemporaneity of the moment when the statement was made and
the moment of the realization of death. The time the statement was being made
must also be the time the victim was aware that he was dying.
While it may not qualify as a dying declaration, Pelagios statement may
nonetheless be admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae. In People v.
Marollano,8 this Court held: The requisites for the admissibility of the victims ante
mortem statement as part of the res gestae and also as a dying declaration are
present in this case, hence the same should be admitted under both exceptions to
the hearsay rule. (Citation omitted) While the admissibility thereof would naturally
not be affected whether viewed under either or both considerations, the advantage
of resting the issue on the aforesaid dual bases is that its admission would be
invulnerable to a theorized absence of an element of one of said exceptions. This is
particularly important in this case, considering that the very identification of the
assailant and the accuracy thereof are essentially based on the declaration of the
victim. (Emphasis supplied)
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of
the res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.9
In People v. Naerta,10 this Court held that: The term "res gestae" comprehends a
situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a
spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are
made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design
in the formulation of their content.
Pelagios declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made
shortly after a startling occurrence and under the influence thereof. Under the
circumstances, the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive his statement
beforehand.11
In this case, it is clear that the pistol-whipping and the gunshot on the head of
Pelagio qualified as a startling occurrence. Notably, Pelagio constantly complained
of pain in his head while his statement was being taken by SPO1 Bautista, so much
so that there was no opportunity for him to be able to devise or contrive anything
other than what really happened.
In People v. Putian,13 the Court held that although a declaration does not appear to
have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending
death, and, for that reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such
declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the
crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still
continued in the declarants mind, it is admissible as part of the res gestae.
Thus, even if there were intervening periods between the time the victim gave his
account of the incident to the prosecution witnesses and the time the latter first
disclosed what the victim told them, the same will not affect the admissibility of the
victims declaration or statement as part of res gestae since it is sufficient that such
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
declaration or statement was made by the victim before he had time to contrive or
devise a falsehood.15
In any case, there is no reason why SPO1 Bautista would contrive or devise a
falsehood especially on the matter that Pelagio was shot on the head and that it was
accused-appellant who shot him. As a police officer, he was duty-bound to
investigate and unearth the facts of the case. There is a presumption that as an
officer of the law, he sought only the truth. Besides, no motive was shown as to why
he would contrive or devise a falsehood against accused-appellant.
Given the probability that he was already unconscious or his head had become
numb due to severe head injuries when accused-appellant shot him, it is not unlikely
for the victim not to have known or felt being shot and hit by accused-appellant on
the head. This was probably the reason why in his initial declaration, the victim
merely stated that he was nearly shot by accused-appellant. 18 Regardless, Pelagio
categorically declared that it was accused-appellant who caused his head injuries
which eventually led to his death.1wphi1 SPO1 Bautistas testimony as well as
Wilfredo Lampas and Francisca Pelagios merely corroborated Pelagios statement Was the Labor Arbiter correct that payroll sheet was altered?
that it was accused-appellant who caused his head injuries.
CASE 10: SAPIO vs. UNDALOC CONSTRUCTION
FACTS: The controversy started with a complaint filed by petitioner against Undaloc
Construction and/or Engineer Cirilo Undaloc for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
wages and nonpayment of statutory benefits. Respondent Undaloc Construction, a
single proprietorship owned by Cirilo Undaloc, is engaged in road construction
business in Cebu City.
Petitioner had been employed as watchman from 1 May 1995 to 30 May 1998 when
he was terminated on the ground that the project he was assigned to was already
finished, he being allegedly a project employee. Petitioner asserted he was a
regular employee having been engaged to perform works which are "usually
necessary or desirable" in respondents business. He claimed that from 1 May to 31
August 1995 and from 1 September to 31 December 1995, his daily wage rate was
only P80.00 and P90.00, respectively, instead of P121.87 as mandated by Wage
Order No. ROVII-03. From 1 March 1996 to 30 May 1998, his daily rate
was P105.00. He further alleged that he was made to sign two payroll sheets, the
first bearing the actual amount he received wherein his signature was affixed to the
last column opposite his name, and the second containing only his name and
signature. To buttress this allegation, petitioner presented the payroll sheet covering
the period from 4 to 10 December 1995 in which the entries were written in pencil.
He also averred that his salary from 18 to 30 May 1998 was withheld by
respondents.5
For its part, respondent Cirilo Undaloc maintained that petitioner was hired as a
project employee on 1 May 1995 and was assigned as watchman from one project
to another until the termination of the project on 30 May 1998. 6 Refuting the claim of
underpayment, respondent presented the payroll sheets from 2 September to 8
December 1996, 26 May to 15 June 1997, and 12 January to 31 May 1998. 7
On 12 July 1999, the Labor Arbiter 8 rendered a decision favorable to the
complainant. Respondents appealed the award of salary differential to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a Decision 10 dated 28 August 2000, the
NLRC sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Respondents elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals which deleted the award of salary differential and attorneys
fees.
ISSUE:
RULING: NO.
The conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that entries in the December 1995 payroll sheet
could have been altered is utterly baseless. The claim that the December 1995
payroll sheet was written in pencil and was thus rendered it prone to alterations or
erasures is clearly non sequitur. The same is true with respect to the typewritten
payroll sheets. In fact, neither the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC found any alteration
or erasure or traces thereat, whether on the pencil-written or typewritten payroll
sheets. Indeed, the most minute examination will not reveal any tampering.
Furthermore, if there is any adverse conclusion as regards the December 1995
payroll sheet, it must be confined only to it and cannot be applied to the typewritten
payroll sheets.
Moreover, absent any evidence to the contrary, good faith must be presumed in this
case. Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the
presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court. Hence,
while as a general rule, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on
the employer,20 when fraud is alleged in the preparation of the payroll, the burden of
evidence shifts to the employee and it is incumbent upon him to adduce clear and
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
convincing evidence in support of his claim. 21 Unfortunately, petitioners bare
assertions of fraud do not suffice to overcome the disputable presumption of
regularity.
CASE 11: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. EUGENIO TOLEDO
and SISENANDO HOLGADO, defendants.
EUGENIO TOLEDO, appellant.
FACTS: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the
occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of
Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The
argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel
with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando
Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring
house. From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where
he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared
that only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando
Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The
disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel
and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution, there was
presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who
testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was
partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the
theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight between
Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting
Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this
effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of
Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando
Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellant
Eugenio Toledo did not take part in the fight between accused Sisenando Holgado
and deceased Filomeno Morales, resulting in the death of the latter.
RULING: Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said
on high authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the
principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns the
admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under
certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own
pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the
declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he
committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay
doctrine.
Professor Wigmore, one of the greatest living authorities on the law of evidence, has
attempted to demonstrate the false premises on which the arbitrary limitation to the
hearsay rule rests. He shows that the limitation is inconsistent with the language
originally employed in stating the principle and is unjustified on grounds of policy.
Professor Wigmore in turn has been answered by no less a body than the Supreme
Court of Mississippi in the case of Brown vs. State of Mississippi ([1910], 37 L. R. A.,
New Series, 345). The editor of the Mississippi case in L. R. A., however, comes to
the support of Professor Wigmore saying the unanimity of the decisions "is as
complete as the shock which they give the general sense of justice." The question
has likewise in recent years gained attention by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Donnelly vs. United States ([1913], 228 U. S., 243). There it
was held that the court below properly excluded hearsay evidence relating to the
confession of a third party, then deceased, of guilt of the crime with which defendant
was charged. Mr. Justice Pitney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "In this
country there is a great and practically unanimous weight of authority in the estate
courts against admitting evidence of confessions of third parties, made out of court,
and tending to exonerate the accused." Mr. Justice Van Devanter concurred in the
result while Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Lurton and Mr.
Justice Hughes, dissented. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
. . . The rues of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and
common sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the
substantive law. There is no decision by this court against the admissibility
of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of the two
countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of
declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much
against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to
convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man
(Mattox vs. United States, 146 U. S., 140; 36 Law. ed., 917; 13 Sup. Ct.
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
Rep., 50); and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards,
some of which seem to me excessive; I think we ought to give him the
benefit of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight. The
history of the law and the arguments against the English doctrine are so
well and fully stated by Mr. Wigmore that there is no need to set them forth
at greater length. (2 Wigmore, Evidence, pars. 1476, 1477.)
In the Philippine jurisdiction, we have never felt bound to follow blindly the principles
of the common law. A reexamination of some of those principles discloses
anomalies.
A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court of
Mississippi states, "to reach those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes when
there are no other eyewitnesses." But the person accused of a crime, under the
same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by offering in evidence
the admission of another under oath that this other committed the crime. Again
admissions are receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but
not against a penal interest. We fail to see why it can be believed that a man will be
presumed to tell the truth in the one instance but will not be presumed to tell the
truth in the other instance. Again the exhibit would have been admitted against its
maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible to
exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that in
the second.
CASE 12: ALVARES vs. PICOP RESOURCES
FACTS
- PICOP Resources, Inc (PICOP) filed with the DENR an application to
have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) converted into an Integrated
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA). In the middle of the processing of
the said application, PICOP filed with the RTC-Quezon City a Petition for
Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Alvarez. They seek the
issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary
to, among others,
o Sign, execute, and deliver an IFMA to PICOP,
o Issue a permit to allow them to harvest timber in the said area in
accordance with the warranty and agreement between the Govt
and PICOPs predecessor in interest, the Bislig Bay Lumber
Company, Inc. (BBLCI); and
o Honor and respect the Presidential Warranties and contractual
obligations to PICOP in accordance with the warranty
agreement between the Govt, through then President Marcos,
and PICOPs predecessor in interest
- RTC granted PICOPs petition and also ordered Alvarez to pay the PICOP
damages. DENR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was
denied by the RTC. It granted PICOPs motion for the issuance of Writ of
Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction, although it did not
mention of the damages imposed against DENR Secretary Alvarez. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
- Both DENR Secretary and PICOP filed a petition for review of CAs
decision; the two were consolidated. SC reversed the decision by CA and
RTC granting the Petition for Mandamus by PICOP; and dismissed the
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
- PICOP filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) and motioned the case be
referred to the SC en banc for the resolution.
o PICOP claims that the SC, in reversing the findings of facts of
the RTC and CA, misappreciated the evidence when it ruled
that, among others, PICOP failed to comply with the payment of
the forest charges.
o DENRs report of the non-payment is heavily reliant to the
testimony of the Forest Management Bureau (FMB) Senior
Forest Management Specialist (SFMS) Evangelista whom is
part of the Natural Forest Management Division of the Forest
Management Bureau (FMB), DENR.
PICOP claims that the testimony of Evangelista is
merely hearsay as they are merely based on the
Memos of Forest Management Specialist II Orlanes
and DENR Bislig City Bill Collector Arayan whom were
not presented as witness. They also claim that
Evangelista has nothing to do with the collection of
forest charges.
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
ISSUE
- WON the 1969 Document signed by former President Marcos to enter into
an IFMA with PICOP is covered by the Non-Impairment Clause.
RULING
RULING
- NO. SC en banc ruled that the said Presidential Warranty issued is not
distinct from the TLA and FMA. The contested Presidential Warranty
simply reassures PICOP of the Governments commitment to uphold the
terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOPs
peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are
the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. Such
warranty only covers the right to cut, collect, and remove the timber in its
concession area. It does not extend to the utilization of other resources
occurring within the concession.
o The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract
distinct from the TLA and FMA held and being asked by the
PICOP. They are similar. The said warranty is merely a collateral
undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under its
timber license. Further, under Oposa v. Factoran, a Timber
License is not a contract within the purview of the Non-
Impairment Clause as it is merely a privilege given by the State
to regulate the utilization and disposition of its forest resources.
Such can be withdrawn whenever dictated by Public Interest or
Public Welfare.
o The Presidential Warranty cannot be construed as a contractual
undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and
enjoyment of its concession areas as such will result in the
complete surrender by the state of the control and supervision of
the development and utilization of its natural resources in the
area in favour of PICOP. It merely assured PICOP that the
boundaries of its concession area will not be altered despite the
provision in the TLA that the DENR Secretary can amend the
said boundaries.
NOTE
ISSUE
- Has DENR sufficiently proved that PICOP has not sufficiently complied
with the payment of the unpaid forestry charges for the purpose of
determining compliance with the IFMA requirements through the testimony
of Evangelista?
- NO. DENR has not sufficiently proved that PICOP had unpaid forestry
charges, at least for determining compliance with the IFMA requirements.
o The testimony of Evangelista relied on the Memos by Orlanes
and Arayan, whom were both not presented as witnesses, and
on his personal observation for the purpose of verifying the
contents of the said Memos.
o Under S. 44, Rule 130 of the ROC, Entries in Official Records
made in the performance of duty by a public officer of the PH, or
by a private individual in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. In short, entries in official records are an exception to the
hearsay rule.
In this case, his findings based on the Memos he
claimed, despite not being actually involved in the
collection of forest charges, is considered an
exception to the hearsay rule.
As to the testimony relating to the Memos, as these
records or their authors were not presented in court,
the testimony by Evangelista as to the contents of the
said Memos shall be considered as hearsay evidence.
o Evangelistas testimony of non-payment of forest charges was
furthermore based on his failure to find ORs corresponding to
billings sent to PICOP. This was countered by PICOPs attached
official receipts in its Addendum to Motion for Reconsideration
with SC. Though such act by PICOP is irregular in judicial
proceedings, this disposition by PICOP sufficiently complies with
the foregoing requirements.
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
- The Motion for Reconsideration of PICOP is Denied.
CASE 13: MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.,
vs. MODESTO CALAUNAN
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
Facts: The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353
owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2)
owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza.
In the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo
Mendoza, was on their way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type
jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion,
Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay
Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to
the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point
of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. By reason of such
collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint
for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan
City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the
civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as
well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and
the existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being
ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight,
although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the
civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan,
the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramosin said
case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the
Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who
appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named
witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.Counsel for
respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case
to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial
court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be
offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The
TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal
Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the
ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the
TSNsof the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
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 BATCH 14 DIGESTED CASES (EVIDENCE JUDGE TENORIO)
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Calunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the
criminal case be admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule in the present civil
case.
Ruling: Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos should not be admitted in
evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or
those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same
subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the
issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the
present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth
by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible
as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal
Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in
said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic,
petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the
criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal
case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground
that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the
statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti
that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure
to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove
the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a
fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to
be considered and given the importance it deserves.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both
petitioners. Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing
the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues
that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should
not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of
Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It cannot argue that the TSNs of the
testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be
admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for
the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs
of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been
admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
"testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said
section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents
from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be
admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted.
Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may
be entitled.
CASE 14: ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 124491. June 1, 1999]
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ was charged with libel by the Provincial Prosecutor
of Catarman, Northern Samar, with Judge Proceso Sidro of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Mondragon-San Roque, Northern Samar, as complaining
witness. According to the Information, the crime was committed when Vicario
allegedly distributed and circulated in the vicinity of the Northern Samar Provincial
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Hospital in Catarman photocopies of page 7 of the 20 March 1992 issue of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of libel filed in connection with the
distribution and circulation of photocopies of a news article about the filing by the
Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan of graft charges against Judge Sidro after its
investigation of a complaint that the judge refused to return the cash bond of an
accused after the latter's acquittal in a criminal case.
The news article did not contain the contents of the affidavit complaint of petitioner
but was a fair and true report, without any comments or remark. Judge Sidro
alleged that petitioner's action greatly prejudged his reputation and caused him
great distress. Although there was no evidence that petitioner was the source of the
statements contained in the news item nor was he the one who photocopied the
article, the trial court handed down a judgment of conviction. It based its judgment
on the testimony of Montes, an acknowledged subaltern of Judge Sidro, who
testified that petitioner gave him a copy of the xeroxed news item. However, no
other witness corroborated his testimony. The trial court observed that petitioner
manifested anger towards complainant during his testimony in court. The Court of
Appeals, on appeal, affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
a Whether the act of merely distributing a photocopy of an article in a
newspaper reporting that graft charges had been filed against a judge
named therein constitutes libel, and
b Whether Vicario's act was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
As found by the trial court, there was no evidence at all to show that petitioner was
the source of the statements contained in the news item published by the Philippine
Daily Inquirer. Indeed, for not only was the news item by itself bereft of this
information, the records also confirmed its absence. This is why it was incorrect for
the appellate court to find that "the news item was patently culled from the Affidavit-
Complaint of the appellant imputing a criminal act on Judge Sidro filed with the
Ombudsman (emphasis ours)" when no basis, factual or legal, exists for so
ruling. To be sure, the Affidavit-Complaint was merely a narration of the facts
constituting the cause of action of petitioner. Its contents never appeared in the
news article which spoke only of the filing by the Ombudsman with the
Sandiganbayan of graft charges against Judge Sidro after its investigation of a
complaint that the judge refused to return the cash bond of an accused after the
latter's acquittal in a criminal case. There is no specific reference therein to
petitioner nor to his Affidavit-Complaint. Since it has not been established that he
caused the publication of the subject article nor was the source thereof, it would be
inappropriate to conclude that through the disputed news item he ascribed a
criminal act to Judge Proceso Sidro.
In his appeal, petitioner disputes the existence of the elements of publication
and malice, arguing that inasmuch as he was not the author or originator of the
subject article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer he could not be liable for its
publication. The Court of Appeals brushed aside this proposition, declaring in the
main that by having the news item machine copied and furnishing prosectution
witness Montes a copy thereof, accused-appellant thereby endorsed and adopted
the news item and hence was answerable therefor. We note the American citations
relied upon by the appellate court to support its conclusions. However, we deem
these as not authoritative, much less persuasive upon the Court, considering further
that there are dissimilarities in the facts between the cited cases and this case
before us.
Contrary to the perception of the appellate court, there was no evidence at all
offered to show that petitioner himself photocopied the article. Nor was evidence
sufficiently adduced to prove that he himself distributed photocopies of the news
item to so many people, prompting the trial court to rule as hearsay the testimony on
the matter by Judge Sidro and his protege Amador Montes. This puts to doubt
whether petitioner himself gave a copy of the publication to Montes. Notably, Montes
was not even named by the judge as one of the original witnesses listed in the
complaint he filed for preliminary investigation. The witness named therein was a
certain Hermito Pahimnayan who was never presented in court despite his having
executed an affidavit which was attached to Sidro's criminal complaint in the
Municipal Trial Court. This affidavit described not the incident of 22 May 1992 on
which the charge for libel was based but one which occurred sometime in 1991 or a
year earlier during which Vicario was said to have shown Pahimnayan a copy of his
administrative complaint against Judge Sidro. Moreover, in the affidavit executed by
Judge Sidro which he also attached to his complaint, he declared that it was Romeo
Pinangay, his court messenger, who gave him a copy of Philippine Daily
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Inquirer and informed him that Roque Vicario distributed clippings of the news item
to everyone in the premises of the hospital. Amador Montes was never mentioned in
this affidavit; much less was he made to execute any affidavit to support the criminal
complaint of Judge Sidro. This much he admitted on the witness stand. [9] Other than
the testimony of Montes himself, an acknowledged subaltern of the judge, no one
else was presented to establish the fact of distribution by petitioner of copies of the
alleged offensive news article. The prosecution could have offered other witnesses
with more objective dispositions than Montes, but it did not do so. With these doubts
subsisting, it was therefore reversible error of the courts below to conclude that
petitioner was liable for the republication of the news article alleged to be libelous.
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Catarman, Northern Samar, dated 11 March 1993 finding petitioner guilty of
libel, and that of the Court of Appeals dated 28 February 1996 affirming his
conviction are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner ROQUE VICARIO Y
MENDEZ is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
CASE 15: TAMANI vs. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 171497, April 4, 2011
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
A complaint for quieting of title was filed by the respondents against
petitioners over a 431 sq. m. parcel of land located at Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya. Petitioners are the surviving children and legal heirs of the
spouses Demetrio Tamani and Josefa Caddauan (Spouses Tamani).
Respondents and the Spouses Tamani are co-owners of an undivided
parcel of land with an area of 776 sq. m. Respondents own 345 sq. m.
whereas the Spouses Tamani own the remaining 431 sq. m. (disputed
property).
On August 17, 195, Sps Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to
Milagros Cruz for P2,500.00 with a Deed of Absolute Sale. On December
11, 1980, Cruz sold the said property to respondents for a consideration
of P2,500.00.
In 1973, Benigno Magpale (Magpale) and Leoncia Velasco (Velasco) filed
a complaint for specific performance against the Sps Tamani in CFI to
compel the Spouses to execute a deed of sale over a residential lot with
an area of 496 sq. m., which was allegedly sold to them by the Spouses
in 1936 without documentation. The CFI and CA dismissed the complaint
but they remained in possession of the property.
Petitioners alleged in their answer that they are the lawful owners of the
disputed property and contended that the signatures of their parents
appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged.
During trial, petitioners submitted for examination and comparison the
Deed and his standard signatures to the NBI (Albacea) who found that
the signatures were written by one and the same person. Dissatisfied with
the result, petitioners asked again for another examination, this time
before the document examiner of the PNP. The result indicated that the
signatures were written by two different persons.
RTC gave more weight to the PNP (Sorra) report and testimony because
of her educational, professional and work background. CA reversed and
set aside the decision after examining the questioned and standard
signatures and opined that the similarities of strokes are more prominent
and pronounced than the dissimilarities and the apparent dissimilarities
are overshadowed by the striking similarities in the questioned and the
standard signatures.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision.
Held:
Yes.
The manner by which the RTC disposed of the issue leaves much to be desired.
While credentials of an expert witness play a factor in the evidentiary and
persuasive weight of his testimony, the same cannot be the sole factor in
determining its value. The CA was thus correct when it declared that the judge
must conduct his own independent examination of the signatures under scrutiny.
During cross-examination, Sorra explained that the differences she accounted for
were not variations, which are normal and usual deviations. She clarified that the
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differences were different based on the hesitation in writing in the questioned
signature. Sorra was steadfast that the similarities between the questioned
signature and the standard signatures is attributable to the fact that the case
involved a simulated forgery or a copied forgery, such that there will be similarities,
but the similarities will be superficial.
Withal, although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery, preponderance of
evidence inarguably favors petitioners. In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.

The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere
statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance
he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed CASE 16: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL LEE
observer. While admittedly this Court was unable to fully comprehend all the
differences noted by Sorra given that her testimony was fairly technical in nature
G.R. No. 139070 May 29, 2002
and description, it would, however, not be amiss to state that this Court has
observed a good number of the differences noted by her. Moreover, while We are
not unmindful of the testimony of Albacea, the document examiner from the NBI, this PUNO, J.:
Court is more inclined to believe the findings of Sorra, because unlike Albacea,
Sorra limited her examination to Exhibits S-1 to S-11 and S-19. Albacea, on the FACTS:
other hand, considered all 19 specimen signatures. Noticeably, Exhibits S-12 to S-
At 9:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, Herminia Marquez, 46 years of age
18 were executed several years apart from the questioned signature which was
and her son, Joseph, 26 years of age, were in the living room of their house located
supposedly written in 1959. However, the dates of execution of Exhibits S-12 to S-
at No. 173 General Evangelista St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The living room
18 covered years ranging from 1933 to 1952 and 1974. Thus, this Court finds that
was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent lamp in the ceiling. Outside their house was
Sorra was correct when she opted to disregard the said Exhibits in her examination.
an alley leading to General Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling
Lastly, while it was improper for the RTC to rely solely on Sorras credentials, her
with people and activity. There were women sewing garments on one side and on
superior credentials, compared to that of Albacea, give added value to her
the other was a store catering to customers. In their living room, mother and son
testimony.
were watching a basketball game on television. Herminia was seated on an
Furthermore, as observed by the RTC, the circumstances surrounding the sale of armchair and the television set was to her left. Across her, Joseph sat on a sofa
the property militate its veracity and truthfulness, to wit: against the wall and window of their house and the television was to his right.
Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at her son. To her
a) When the property was mortgaged to secure a loan, the mortgaged value complete surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window
of the land was P12,000.00 in 1958, it would be contrary to human nature behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering
for him to sell his portion of the land for only P2,500.00 a year after for through the window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn
less than the loan value of the land; him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant
b) Demetrio Tamani declared the land for taxation purposes and paid taxes fired his gun hitting Josephs head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up
thereon from 1955 to 1973, which are considered as acts of dominion; but could not move as accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and three
c) A contract of lease executed by Teresita Tamani is likewise an act of (3) shots more two hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots
dominion over the land. were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a blue sando,

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flee towards the direction of his house. Herminia turned to her son, dragged his
body to the door and shouted for help. With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare,
Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital where he later died.
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against accused-appellant and alleged that he
is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending
against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and
attempted murder in 1989. The accused-appellant, in reply, explained that the
information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victims
desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and
admitted his crime.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to the penalty of
death.
On appeal, accused-appellant makes capital of Josephs bad reputation in their
community. He relayed that he had known the victim since childhood and their
houses are only two blocks apart. Further, Joseph had a bad reputation in their
neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days before his death, on September
23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car
stereo. Joseph scampered away. He also alleged that the victims drug habit led him
to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the persons from
whom he had stolen. As proof of Josephs bad character, appellant presented
Herminias letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Josephs
rehabilitation from drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter
to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything about her sons thievery.
ISSUE: Whether Accused Lee cab be acquitted of the crime of murder based on
evidence showing the victims bad reputation.
HELD:
1.
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of
mind and morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally
entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are
acquainted with him; his reputation.
2. "Good moral character" includes all the elements essential to make up such
a character; among these are common honesty and veracity, especially in all
professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good among people
of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the
average citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and
upright conduct.
3.
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as
legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating
thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to
be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial
would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual
inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try
the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous cause.
4. There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives
the exceptions in both criminal and civil cases:
In criminal cases:
o Sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused
may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents
proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption
of innocence, and where good character and reputation are
established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit the
crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of
good character and high reputation is not likely to have committed
the act charged against him.35
o Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the
bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when
such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused
who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he is a person of bad character.36 The offering of character
evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the
prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to
produce such evidence.37 Once the defendant raises the issue of his
good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the
defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from
refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a false
character upon the tribunal.
o Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to
character evidence of the accused.39 And this evidence must be
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"pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged,"
meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and
germane to the kind of the act charged,40 e.g., on a charge of
rape, character for chastity; on a charge of assault, character for
peacefulness or violence; on a charge for embezzlement, character
for honesty and integrity.41
o Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the
character of the offended party.42 Character evidence, whether
good or bad, of the offended party may be proved "if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of
the offense charged." Such evidence is most commonly offered to
support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a
claim of consent in a rape case.
5. In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended
party is applied with frequency in sex offenses and homicide. 44
In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution involving an
unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the
willingness of a woman is material, the womans character as to her
chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented to the mans
act.45 The exception to this is when the womans consent is immaterial
such as in statutory rape46 or rape with violence or intimidation.47
In the crimes of qualified seduction48 or consented abduction,49 the
offended party must be a "virgin," which is "presumed if she is unmarried
and of good reputation,"50 or a "virtuous woman of good reputation."51
The crime of simple seduction involves "the seduction of a woman who
is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen
years of age x x x." 52 The burden of proof that the complainant is a
woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and the accused may
introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of bad reputation. 53
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is
admissible in two situations:
o (1) as evidence of the deceaseds aggression; and
o (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused. 54
o The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of
the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature,
as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the
deceased or the accused was the aggressor. 55 When the
evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known violent
character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of
the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive
action was necessary.56
In cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation, the
Supreme Court held in People v. Soliman:
"x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid
to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an
offense (Section 15, Rule 123), 58 such is not necessary in the crime
of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or
premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in
homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction
that a prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases
of murder."59
RULING:
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant
to determine the probability or improbability of his killing.
Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or
that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between
the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the
hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony,
the claim that because of the victims bad character he could have been
killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple
speculation.
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The evidence shows that the murder was committed through treachery. victim was attended by treachery, proof of the victims bad character
Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the is not necessary.

28