One and Many

A Comparative Study
of Platos Philosophy
and Daoism Represented
by Ge Hong
Ji Zhang

Monograph no. 22 Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

One and Many
The Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy
Monograph Series was started in 1974. Works are
published in the series that deal with any area of Asian
philosophy, or any other field of philosophy examined
from a comparative perspective. The aim of the series
is to make available scholarly works that exceed article
length, but may be too specialized for the general read-
ing public, and to make these works available in inex-
pensive editions without sacrificing the orthography of
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 Monograph No. 22
society for asian
and comparative philosophy

One and Many

A Comparative Study of Platos Philosophy
and
Daoism Represented by Ge Hong

Ji Zhang

University of Hawaii Press

Honolulu
 2012 University of Hawaii Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America

171615141312 654321

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Zhang, Ji, 1966
One and many : a comparative study of Platos philosophy
and Daoism represented by Ge Hong / Ji Zhang.
p. cm. (Monograph / Society for Asian and
Comparative Philosophy ; no. 22)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8248-3554-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. One (The One in philosophy) 2. Many (Philosophy) 3. Plato.
4. Ge, Hong, 284-364. 5. Taoism. I. Title. II. Series: Monograph . . .
of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy ; no. 22.
BD395.Z43 2012
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2011022903

University of Hawaii Press books are printed on

acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence
and durability of the Council on Library Resources

Designed by Josie Herr

Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc.

 To my father
who taught me the real meaning of Confucian genealogy

and to my mother and my wife

who are still teaching me Daoist indeterminate action
 Contents

List of Figuresix
Abbreviationsxi
Introduction One and Many as an Ontological Problem xiii

Part One Textual studies

Chapter 1 Ge Hongs Doctrine of Xuan Dao 1
Chapter 2 Platos Answer to the Pre-Socratic Debate 32
Chapter 3 Ge Hongs Preservation of the One 53
Chapter 4 Platos Doctrine of Forms 79
Chapter 5 Two Forms of Enlightenment 91
Chapter 6 Ge Hongs Doctrine of Immortal Beings 104

Part Two Comparative Ontology

Chapter 7 Nothing145
Chapter 8 The One 183
Chapter 9 The Many 238

Conclusion Comparative Methodology 315

Notes327
Bibliography347
Index357

vii
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 The iconography of Xuan 10

Fig. 1.2 Names of hexagrams in the Book of Changes and headings
in the Tai Xuan11
Fig. 1.3 Tetragrams in the Tai Xuan1213
Fig. 1.4 A map of the Twenty-Eight Constellations 14
Fig. 1.5 Three influences on Ge Hongs thought 30
Fig. 3.1 A female adept practicing the Dao of Dividing Forms 61
Fig. 3.2 The Inner Environment of the Daoist body 71
Fig. 3.3 Xuan and dan 72
Fig. 3.4 Inner and Outer Alchemy and the wheel of change 77
Fig. 6.1 The Three Pure Ones in later Daoist iconography 120121
Fig. 6.2 The natural gods of the Twenty-Eight Constellations 122123
Fig. 6.3 The Sixty Primordial Asterisms 124
Fig. 6.4 Two groups of talismans 125
Fig. 6.5 Some of the immortals portrayed in Ming dynasty
woodcuts126127
Fig. 6.6 The just soul and the just state in Platos hierarchy
of One over many 136
Fig. 8.1 Two disputed models of the Huntian cosmology191
Fig. 8.2 The celestial and terrestrial spheres of the Twenty-Eight
Constellations193
Fig. 8.3 The Armillary Sphere and the water clock 195
Fig. 8.4 A pictorial reconstruction of the astronomical clock tower 196

ix
x figures

Fig. 8.5 Heaven inscriptions 198

Fig. 8.6 Reconstruction of the Gaitian theory 204
Fig. 8.7 Mathematical order of the World Soul 224
Fig. 8.8 Two distinctive schemes of the One and the many 234
Fig. 8.9 From One to many through the creative act 236
Fig. 9.1 Alchemic traditions between the Han and Jin periods 241
Fig. 9.2 Cycles of change and material time-space 263
Fig. 9.3 Embryogenesis of matter and the alchemic structure
of the universe 266
Fig. 9.4 The Standard Model and the Supersymmetry Model 268
Fig. 9.5 Interchangeable Five Phases and unchangeable elements 274
Fig. 9.6 Four elementssolids, cosmos-dodecahedron 278
Fig. 9.7 Mathematics of triangles 289
Fig. 9.8 Transformation from triangles to solids 294
 Abbreviations

AT Astronomical Treatise of the Jinshu

DZ Daozang
HNZ Huainanzi
IC Inner Chapters of the Baopuzi
LH Lun heng
OC Outer Chapters of the Baopuzi
OM one and many
OVM one over many
TPJ Taiping jing
ZHDZ Zhonghua Daozang

xi
 Introduction

One and Many

as an Ontological Problem

Why does this book compare Ge Hong (AD 284344?) with Plato (428
347 BC)? 1 Reasons of personal intellectual history are involved. When
I encountered Platonism in the field of Christian systematic theology, I
admired its persistent search for inner coherence of truths and was deeply
impressed by its transcendentalism and its unshakable influence on two
streams of Western thought, philosophy and theology. Although I reso-
nated with its idealism, over the years it became increasingly clear to me
that this intellectual tradition imposed on me a demand that restricts the
development of my own thought rooted in Chinese tradition. In contrast,
Daoism has provided me with the free space that I was looking for in the
formation of my intellectual identity. I first encountered Ge Hong when
I attended a seminar at Harvard University in 1998. Since then I have felt
that I was coming home to something that had unconsciously shaped my
thought yet had not been properly named. Eagerness to come to terms
with Daoism and Ge Hongs religious philosophy in particular has become
the inner drive for the current study.
In an intellectual journey, to reconcile past learning and present pas-
sion is just as important as creating a future life out of life experiences.
The book is not just an academic exercise to reconcile an existential gulf
between two cultures, but is also an effort to turn inner cultural experi-
ence into insight to bridge the two. Historically Plato and Ge Hong never
met. In the modern world of pluralism, to create a dialogue between the
two represents a way through which a Western philosophy and an Eastern
religion can meet face to face. The ancient debate on the one and the
many still proves relevant in todays challenge of globalization; a com-
parative study of the two traditions will explore the underlying issues of
unity and plurality.
Those who have read Platoone of the most influential thinkers in the

xiii
xiv introduction

Westand Ge Honga less known Daoist thinker in Chinamay question

whether there is anything that can be seriously compared between the two.
The short answer is yes. The longer answer is in this book. Admittedly, not
only do their systems of thought differ in content, but also their influence
on later schools gave rise to two independently evolved traditions: Greek
philosophy and Chinese Daoism. These traditions can be seen as two riv-
ers that derive from two separate sources, travel through different cultural
and historical landscapes, and discharge waters into different parts of the
earth. We cannot assume that they will never meet. As the interpreter, the
ocean is a free space to exchange answers, but the deriving questions are
akin. Plato and Ge Hong lived on the same earth under the same heaven
and shared concerns about the world. Where they really differ is in their
thoughts for framing and articulating what reality is at the most fundamen-
tal level, or in Chinese what is Dao.
This branch of metaphysics is called ontology. Although we have yet
to come to terms with how Daoist ontology differs remarkably from the
Parmenidean-Platonic being, one can name general schematic differences
on how the most fundamental reality is categorized. For Plato, realities
are plural ideasthe immaterial causes according to which physical things
are made. For Ge Hong, the ultimate reality is Dao, and the world is rela-
tional to Dao. From Dao the myriad things derive, and to Dao realities will
return. The former is causal, whereas the latter is relational. This onto-
logical difference underlines two contrary worldviews. To accept the dif-
ference, however, does not imply that two systems are incomparable. We
must reject the assumption that similarity is the basis for dialogue. Rather,
the contrary is the starting point of comparison.
I have selected the topic one and many as the starting point for com-
parison. The OM (as I abbreviate one and many from here onward)
debate first appeared among pre-Socratic philosophers when they disputed
irreducible reality as either one or many universals within the framework
of cosmogony. Similarly, early the Daoist philosophers Laozi and Zhuangzi
also posited Dao (one) and Nature (many) in cosmogonical terms. Philos-
ophies were born out of these contexts. On the one hand, humans began
to name what irreducible reality (or realities) is, and, on the other hand,
they developed tools to explain what reality (or realities) does. After Par-
menides Greek ontology adopted the language of being as the basic unit
of reality and formal logic as the method of inquiry. Later it was Plato who
systematically developed the language of being and argued that truth was
transcendental and immaterial, but the knowledge about realities ought to
be logically demonstrable with pure thoughts.
In Daoism, one and many has always been a philosophical question.
 introductionxv

However, it is never framed in the logical antitheses one not many and
many not one. Presented in the form of cosmogony, Laozi famously puts
the OM argument into only thirteen characters: Dao begets one, one
begets two, two begets three, and three begets the ten thousand things
(Laozi 42).2 Ge Hong followed the early tradition and said, That which
is Dark (Xuan ) is the primordial ancestor of Nature and the Great
Forebear of the myriad different [things] (Inner Chapters 1).3 Compared
with the Greek OM debate, which mainly takes the form of logic, the Dao-
ist OM represented by Ge Hong is presented in the form of poetry. But
beyond the difference of genres, there is philosophy. The OM argument
is analogically put as a genealogical unfolding of life from one ancestor to
many progeny.
My interest in the one and the many was not directly conceived through
philosophy, but through theology. Instead of through the one becoming
many, my interest was inspired by the reverse thinkinghow many may
become one.
I first encountered the OM problem was when I worked on my masters
thesis on apocalypticism. I argued that the end is the reversal of the begin-
ning. Instead of the generation of the many, apocalypticism is the con-
summation of the many and the hope associated with the many becoming
one. Under the supervision of Mark Heim at Andover Newton Theological
School, I began to identify the Daoist nature of this reversal and to locate
my intellectual voice within the scheme of religious pluralism. Looking
into the field of comparative studies, I was both inspired and unsatisfied.
Modern intellectual males have produced many theories about the one
above the many. Postmodern goddesses wish to have plural systems of
the many without the one. Why does it have to be either/or? Why can-
not we have both-and?
In another seminar with Frederic Lawrence at Boston College, I stud-
ied the OM problem in the doctrine of the Trinity. Although patristic theo-
logians had dealt with the logical antitheses one is not three and three
are not one, the OM problem had never been resolved in dialogues with
Greek philosophies, in particular with neo-Platonism. The problem was
nailed down by a succession of church councils on doctrinal bases and
accepted by faith. Unlike the mere pluralism celebrated by postmodern-
ism, the Trinity states that unity and plurality must be both affirmed. This
both-and thought is similar to the mutuality of Dao and Nature. Nature
spontaneously unfolds out of the self-generating Dao. The unity of Dao
neither has independent reality without the plurality of Nature, nor can
the many of Nature exist without the oneness of Dao. Unity and plurality
can either be both affirmed or simultaneously denied. With this intuition I
xvi introduction

attended another seminar on transcendence and immanence with Robert

Neville at Boston University. The paradox of transcendence and imma-
nence is fundamentally OM in kind. Reality at the ultimate level, such
as God or being-it-self, cannot enjoy absolute transcendence without its
immanence in plurality.
Looking back, the topic was conceived in the so-called Boston circle
with distinctive theological interest. Writing this book is my response to
the modern debate about unity and plurality. I am greatly indebted to my
former teacher Robert Neville at Boston University. However, the book is
a response to his theory that creation ex nihilo is the answer to the OM
problem.4 Contrary to Nevilles argument, which operates at an abstract
level of metaphysics, I take the existential position in Daoism and dialogue
with Plato with a narrative emphasis. The second formative idea comes
from Jrgen Moltmann. During my third visit to him in Tbingen in 2003,
I was impressed by his humility in his reading of Laozi and scholarly open-
ness toward Daoism in general. Moltmann argues that the creation was not
a single event in the beginning of time, resulting in the finished product
called the world, but rather an ongoing process still in the making.5 This
concept of evolutionary creation has had an influence on my interpreta-
tion of Ge Hongs cosmogony. However, unlike his linear evolution, which
bears the imprint of Hegelian teleology, I endorse the concept of cyclical
changes in Daoist alchemy. Therefore, the world and its becoming are
cyclical rather than linear. Unlike the traditional view of an unchanging
God, influenced by the Platonic unchanging being-it-self, I have come to
see a self-changing Dao from nothing into being as the inner core of Nature
and its becoming.
Why has the project taken the form of philosophy rather theology? As
the research progressed, quickly I realized the OM issue that I conceived
in theology was deeply philosophical. When philosophical language is
used to articulate the issue of unity and diversity, the issue is proven to be
far more resilient than what philosophical tools are designed to handle. In
Western metaphysics, the OM debate gravitates toward the ancient prob-
lem of logic exclusion between one and many, and involves various meta-
physical concepts that were invented in the attempt to solve the problem.
But coming from a Daoist perspective, the core issue can be named differ-
ently. The one and the many is not a logical problem, nor a metaphysical
problem. It is an ontological problem.
According to a modern definition in English, ontology, understood
as a branch of metaphysics, is the science of being in general, embrac-
ing such issues as the nature of existence and the categorical structure
of reality. 6 But the very term ontology translated into Chinese as benti
 introductionxvii

7 was absent in the period between Laozi and Ge Hong. In Daoism,

ontology is directly associated with Dao and its Nature (ziran ). In
more philosophical language, it inquires into the core of reality and its
manifestations, the oneness of the mother Dao and its manyness in the
world. To argue the one and the many as an ontological problem, there-
fore, requires an investigation of the historical contexts in which the OM
discussions were conducted in two separate traditions.
The one and the many has varied appearances. They include the pre-
Socratic debate on monism and pluralism, Daoist cosmogony from one
Dao to ten thousand things, the Jewish-Christian doctrine of creation, and
the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. These discussions can be viewed as
different approaches to and debated answers for the OM problem. But
the core of the problem is not the logical contrary between one and many
or the metaphysical schemas on monism and pluralism, materialism and
immaterialism. Rather it has to do with how reality is conceived in the first
place.
Plato rejects ontological monism as argued by pre-Socratic materialists
including Thales (water), Anaximander (earth), Anaximenes (air), and
Heraclitus (fire). Instead, he borrows Parmenides unchangeable One,
turns Parmenidean Being into a Pythagorean pluralism with mathemati-
cal essences, and proposes immaterial, unchangeable, and transcendental
ideas. The categorization of reality as Forms directly results in the prob-
lematic dualism with superior ideas over inferior objects and, just like
Parmenides, Plato creates the ontological difference between Being and
Becoming.
Unlike the Greek search for an unchangeable ontological something,
Daoist ontology takes a very different path by arguing that reality in the
most fundamental form is formless, in fact nothing. Ge Hong belonged to
this tradition and developed a religious philosophy that reverses cosmog-
ony into soteriology; to attain immortality means to return to the formless-
ness of Dao. The core reality is not the Parmenidean-Platonic unchang-
ing being, but the changing not-being together with its self-realization
into being. Contrary to Platos intellectualism, Ge Hongs instrumental
alchemy represents a natural philosophy with distinctive empiricism, the
aim of which is to understand the one in and through its works in the
many.
Can the propositional difference between being and not-being be used
to set up a meaningful dialogue between two thinkers? It can. But three
hermeneutical barriers must be overcome: language, history, and com-
parative method. They impose layers of misunderstanding upon Ge Hong
and his tradition.
xviii introduction

On Language

Platos works have been translated into English by many generations of

textual scholars, whereas among the surviving works of Ge Hong only two
are available in English, the Inner Chapters of the Master Embracing Simplic-
ity (Baopuzi neipian ) and the Biographies of Immortals (Shenxian
zhuan ).8 Hence reading Plato is relatively straightforward, whereas
reading Ge Hong is far more challenging. Because translation involves
interpretation and interpretations vary, I do not rely on the published Eng-
lish translations, but translate directly from the original texts. Throughout
this book, all English translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
I generally follow the principle that the Chinese text of key quotations
appears in the notes. This principle applies to all text from Ge Hongs
Inner Chapters (IC) and some text from other key sources, such as Laozi
and Zhuangzi.
Unlike modern Chinese and English, classical Chinese is highly allu-
sive. The rich meanings of classical texts tend to be concealed in poetic
and metaphorical language. In translation an interpreter is confronted
with the immediate difficulty of finding adequate English words to give
expression to ancient terminology. The connotation and denotation of
some concepts, such as Dao , Qi , and Xuan , are an immediate
difficulty, since these terms have no direct English equivalents. Thus
they are treated as technical terms, just as Platonic Forms and sensibles,
Reason and Necessity. Some terms are translated into English: wuwei
, indeterminate action; ziran , Nature; you , something (being);
and wu , nothingness (not-being). But each of these terms is discussed
explicitly in comparative contexts. On top of the conceptual difficulties,
there is another one related to various genres of Daoist texts. For instance,
alchemical texts are not meant to be easily intelligible, but written in code
to protect secret practices from people whose interests are fixed on mun-
dane goals. To translate alchemical texts involves decoding and textual
reconstruction.9
In the text to follow, large sections from Inner Chapters are translated
with philosophical overtones. Certainly this is not the usual practice in
Sinology, which prefers literal rather than interpretative translation. But
as Sinologists are aware, the translation of Laozi has resulted in numerous
English editions; scholarship still cannot reach a conclusive standard. This
is simply because translation involves interpretation. Since my project does
not claim to be a pure textual study, but a comparative one, two meth-
ods are applied: textual and contextual. Both methods are simultaneously
applied to Ge Hongs poetic language.
 introductionxix

On History

Ge Hong and Plato belonged to antiquity, and it would be wrong to assume

modern readers are familiar with classical writings. The historical distance
is often dealt with by a contextual method and historical criticism. The
contextual tends to bring the past into the present, whereas the histori-
cal reconstructs the past into which modern readers enter. Both methods
have weaknesses. On the one hand, contextualization can read the pres-
ent into the past. Modern Platonic scholarship often willingly or uncon-
sciously reads the dramatic dialogues of Plato through the lenses of ana-
lytic philosophy, as if Plato had woven together his thought out of a single
stream of rigorous logic. Likewise, the history of science interpretation
of alchemy by and large treats alchemy as proto-chemistry, as if chemistry
were the only legitimate child of alchemy. On the other hand, historical
criticism can never be certain whether historical distance is shortened or
stretched. Daoist scholarship traditionally uses historical criticism as the
chief method in commentary studies, which take the issue of textual fidel-
ity seriously. Platonic scholarship too has a commentarial tradition. If one
compares two thinkers on the base of commentarial traditions, the com-
parative goal can easily be lost in the forest of historicity.
This does not mean that comparative study needs to be divorced from
these methods. The book applies them complementarily. Part 1 involves
lengthy textual-historical studies that are devoted to each thinker. By sit-
uating Ge Hong in Daoist history and investigating Platos relation with
his predecessors, these textual-historical studies trace intellectual currents
from which their thoughts derived and evolved. The chief purpose is to
explicitly work the texts down to irreducible propositions within histori-
cal contexts in order to build a comparative platform from which later
dialogues may take their departure. Part 2 changes the direction from his-
torical settings to comparative context. By creating a dialogue on the one
and the many, the comparison overall argues that Platos system of mul-
tiple Forms is an ontological problem. And by comparing Platos one over
many Forms with Ge Hongs one under many Dao, the comparison also
offers a Daoist solution to the problem of the unity of plural Forms, which
Plato has unsuccessfully dealt with in his doctrine of creation.

Comparative Method

Mention of comparison naturally leads to the issue of methodology. There

is no single comparative method readily adoptable for this project, but
there are general trends. In the Chinese-speaking environment, there is
xx introduction

an increasing interest in intercultural comparison as a part of Chinese

modernization.10 In Western philosophy, some Platonic scholars still main-
tain the view that there is no true philosophy outside its defined norms
and happily leave comparative studies to Sinologists. The book implicitly
addresses an aspect of the OM problem in modern society, the unrelated-
ness of two traditions, by naming the issue of unity and plurality in the
world of globalization. In a more specific field, it fills a gap in comparative
philosophy, where a dialogue between the religious philosophy of Daoism
and Greek philosophy is rare.11
Generally all interpretative methods are designed to reinterpret the
classics by building an intellectual bridge over historical distances so that
past wisdom can illuminate modern minds. Such a bridge-building exer-
cise is easier in a single history than in a comparative study that hopes
to build a double arch bridge over two intellectual rivers. The major
hermeneutical difficulty is history. Unless it is through a hypothetical dia-
logue, two thinkers will not be brought into contact with each other, and
unless this happens, the issue of pluralism in history will be left unresolved.
This also becomes the role of the interpreter.
Apart from dialogical hermeneutics, there is an underlying question
of how to read Daoism as a whole. Currently two main approaches are
common in the scholarship that tend to read Daoism from the intellectual
other shore. Both have methodological problems.

Reading Daoism through Western Eyes

The division of philosophical Daoism (daojia ) and religious Daoism
(daojiao ) has separated the continuous history of Daoism (daoxue
) into two paradigms.12 However, the distinction between religion and
philosophy is a modern notion, not a historical one. Ge Hong and other
writers in the Daoist Canon (daozang ) regarded themselves as Daoists
(daojia ) who carried on the early tradition as creative interpreters. It
was only toward the middle of the twentieth century that such a distinc-
tion was made between religion and philosophy, and it basically echoes
the dichotomy of reason and revelation in the West. In Chinese circles,
this borrowed division separates Daoist studies into two camps. One the
one hand, scholars with philosophical interests concentrate on the Lao-
Zhuang philosophy (laozhuang zhexue ) of the pre-Qin period.
On the other hand, scholars with religious interests explore the Daoist
movements that began to take shape in the Han period as socioreligious
phenomena. Under this categorization, Ge Hong has been labeled as a
religious thinker who belonged to a camp opposite to the neo-Daoist phi-
losophies in the Wei-Jin period.13 But this assumption is wrong.
 introductionxxi

The book rejects the arbitrary division by showing that religion and phi-
losophy are interconnected in Ge Hong. The approach follows the recent
trend to read Daoism as an integrated whole.14 It also aims to demonstrate
that Ge Hong is not a religious thinker without philosophical insights, but
a religious philosopher. His Daoism is not a religion without philosophy,
but a philosophy within religion. 15 The key to rediscovering philosophi-
cal insights is to treat Ge Hong as a religious philosopher and to show
that he is capable of dialogue with Plato. Dialogical hermeneutics requires
historical comparisons to identify continuity and discontinuity between Ge
Hong and his predecessors as well as similarity and dissimilarity between
Ge Hong and Plato. The vertical historical study and the horizontal com-
parative study are two interpretative perspectives designed to shed light
not only on Ge Hong but also on Plato.
Comparative hermeneutics implicitly critiques another either philos-
ophy or religion approach in Sinology. Recent Sinological writings col-
lectively argue that reading Daoism should be freed from Western influ-
ences and Daoism treated as a unique religion among the worlds religious
traditions. Works of some leading scholars are revealing of the paradigm
change toward postmodern pluralism. Kristofer Schippers The Taoist Body
and Taoist Canon: A Companion to the Daozang, and Isabelle Robinets Tao-
ism: Growth of a Religion represent penetrating studies that approach Dao-
ism as a composite religion with considerable internal complexity.16 Livia
Kohn has moved away from the philosophical interests in her early work
Taoist Mystical Philosophy to the recently edited Daoist Handbook, which is
basically an encyclopedia on Daoism as a religious phenomenon.17 Ste-
phen Bokenkamps Early Daoist Scriptures demonstrates the capacity of
modern textual criticism to reconstruct and interpret the primary sources
for Daoist studies.18 John Lagerweys Taoist Ritual in Chinese Society and His-
tory exhibits the liturgical aspect of Daoist worship.19 Robert Campanys
commentary on Ge Hongs Shenxian zhuan is another attempt to recon-
struct social-religious context in its finest details.20 Companys translation
of shenxian also marks a break from the need to link Daoist immortals
with the Jewish-Christian God as exemplified in James Wares translation
of the Inner Chapters of Baopuzi published in the sixties.21
Overall the recent trend represents an exodus from the previous ten-
dency to read Daoism mainly through Western eyesfrom the intellec-
tual other shore. It seeks to read Daoism from within and to engage
its complex religious practices on their own terms. The theoretical move,
however, is basically a paradigm of negation, most noticeable in postmod-
ernism. Just as postmodernity rejects the modernist impulse to bring plu-
rality under a system of unity, the new religious-historical paradigm cel-
xxii introduction

ebrates the uniqueness of Daoism among the many religions in the world.
Whereas the problem is of the one and the many, the new paradigm rests
on another assumption that pluralism is opposed to universalismthat
no dialogue between Daoism and Western thought is necessary. This book
argues otherwise. There does not have to be a choice of either reading
Daoism through Western eyes or reading it solely from within Chinese
history. Current scholarship in the West basically posits an unnecessary
dilemma upon itselfthe many without the one. However, in the Daoist
view Dao is the motherly one humbly sustaining the many. Pluralism essen-
tially is not a rejection of unity, but an affirmation of Dao and its unfolding
becoming.
The emerging school of New Daoism (xin daoxue ) established
by Chinese scholars amounts to a call to modernize Daoism through active
engagement with the West in a movement that parallels the development
of a New Confucianism (xin rujia ) a century ago. The funda-
mental idea behind the movement is the belief that one can truly learn
about oneself through relationships with others. Compared with the dia-
logue between Confucianism and Western thought, and contrary to the
growing interest in Buddhism, comparative study with Daoism is rare and
unsystematic.

Reading Daoism through the Eyes

of Materialism and Science
The scientific paradigm entails reading Daoism through Western eyes but
with a specific interest, namely, the history of science. It has been persua-
sively argued that among the triple teachings in China (Daoism, Confu-
cianism, and Buddhism) only Daoism has provided the driving force for
the development of science and technology in China.22 Reading Daoism
through the eyes of modern science is therefore a justified approach.
Although the Marxist claim religion is the opium of the masses is
no longer unquestioned dogma, Marxist materialism, hand in hand with
rational sciences, still lingers over Daoism as an irremovable shadow. The
scientific paradigm has brought religion closer to science but further away
from philosophy. The failure to create dialogues with Western philosophy
goes much deeper than the methods of historical cordiality and scientific
objectivity. It has to do with the categorizations that Sinology has adopted
from modern sciences. Chemistry and astronomy, it might be supposed,
are two areas that have little to do with each other. Alchemy belongs to pre-
chemistrythe study of changing matter. Astronomy derives from ancient
cosmologythe study of heavenly forms. The alchemical search for lon-
gevity belongs to medicine. Needhams encyclopedic Science and Civilisa-
 introductionxxiii

tion in China, which has had a strong impact on later studies, generally
reflects this separation by keeping alchemy, astronomy, and life sciences
apart in three separate volumes.23 But in Ge Hong they are one.
If we adopt Needhams categories, then what was historically con-
nected is divided by modern sciences. However, in Ge Hongs writings the
alchemical Qi is a unity. Alchemy, astronomy, and medicine converge in
Qi because they are different categories of knowledge that study the self-
evolving One out of which changes arise, heaven rotates, and life emerges.
The ancient attempt to build a grand unifying theory for branches of
knowledge is essentially of the one and many kind. Monist conscious-
ness has reappeared in the dreams of modern scientific minds. Physics,
especially quantum mechanics and astrophysics, has returned to cos-
mogony. In searching for the primary unity of matter and form, or the
so-called God particle, out of which plurality emerged, modern scientists
have approached the ancient OM question from new angles. Not long ago
inorganic chemistry was far removed from concerns about the origin of
the universe. Now biochemistry suggests that the origin of species could
be a single life form. The many are the evolutionary progenies of the one.
Scientific theories are now much closer to the evolutionary theory of the
alchemical Qi.
Undoubtedly, to enter into dialogue with the sciences is an important
undertaking necessary to contextualize Daoism within a modern world-
view, and the conversation has produced many fruitful works.24 But the
fundamental problem is the underlying assumption that science is the
norm for empirical truth. Science can easily carry on the pursuit of truth
without religion. This assumed science without religion has already been
under examination in the West, precisely on the issue of whether reason is
the universal can opener to unlock the world.25 The immediate disadvan-
tage of the scientific approach is that it compels us to divorce religion from
science in Ge Hong, where they are interwoven.
The science without religion approach imposes upon Ge Hong some
serious blockages, which are philosophical rather than scientific. Some
key ideas and practices have been overlooked or mishandled because they
do not directly fit scientific categorizations. The Daoist arts (fangshu
) are labeled as necromancy without seeing any need to look into the
person-world synthesis beyond the liturgical appearances. Methods to pro-
long life (yangsheng ) are misinterpreted as spirituality in a way that
negates any interest in seeing the underlying difference between Western
spiritual liberation and Daoist bodily preservation of life. Bodily alchemy
(neidan ) is said to belong solely to Daoist mysticism but without any
active dialogue between two systems of human body: the Daoist body as
xxiv introduction

an alchemical vessel capable of self-transformation and the Western body

defined in terms of physiological and anatomical parts. Instrumental
alchemy (waidan ) is seen just as the field in which modern chemistry
discovers its ancient roots, without realizing that a different philosophy
of change is entailed. Most important of all, modern sciences assume an
atomist pluralism without any reflection on Daoist monism, in which all
things are inwardly related.
This review of the complex scholarship in Daoism comes back to the
methodological problem. Many interpretative exercises have consciously
and unconsciously imposed upon Daoism perceptions that simply do not
belong to the historical context. Why can we not read the West through
Daoist eyes? Whoever interprets Zhuangzi will also be interpreted by him.
This book takes such an approach by reading Plato through Ge Hong.
Apart from using the method of comparing and contrasting, one of the
most elementary methods in academic studies, it does not claim to evince
a well-established method. Instead of proposing a hypothesisa common
methodology used in scienceand then either proving or disproving the
validity of it, this project adopts a Daoist principle. It follows the principle
of spontaneity. As a general tactic, it treats methodology as a conclusion
not the preconditionof the research.
 pa r t o n e

Textual Studies

Ge Hongs religious philosophy is a converging point of three intellectual

streams. First, from the early philosophical stream derived from Laozi and
Zhuangzi, Ge Hong inherited cosmogony as the general worldview. He
then reinterpreted the cosmogony into the genealogical one and many.
Unlike a fixed being, the Dao is not an idea, but an act. From nothing
into being is an act of creativity; it therefore defines what Dao is by articu-
lating what Dao does. This core of reality was articulated as an ongoing
genealogical process in which the creative One and its unfolding expres-
sions in progenies constituted the relationship between the one and the
many.
The second stream was fed by many traditions related to the belief of
attainable physical immortality. Ge Hong systematized the belief by insert-
ing ethics into the collective hope for health, longevity, and immortality.
His writings on the hagiographic tradition marked a crucial move to trans-
form folk beliefs into a coherent system of soteriology. Unlike Christian
saints and imperishable gods in Greek mythology, Daoist immortals are
personified Dao, miniatures of the cosmos with distinctive personalities.
They are the visible images of the invisible One because they have attained
the highest form of health, the perpetual unity of the body and the spirit.
In a Confucian society that was formed on the principle of collective har-
mony, Ge Hongs religious anthropology celebrated individuality and held
high the value of bodily health, yet at the same time envisioned that all
lives were inwardly connected.
The third stream derived from a medical and alchemical tradition
passed down to Ge Hong through his family lineage. Unlike Laozi and
Zhuangzi, which discussed the Dao within implicit theoretical frameworks,

xxv
xxvi part one

Baopuzi bears testimony to an empirical search for practical ways to return

to the cosmogonical source. If the Lao-Zhuang tradition was famous for
pioneering the articulation of the Dao, then historically Ge Hong has been
remembered for formulating the arts of attaining the Dao. His medical,
alchemical, and astronomical texts belonged to an incipient school of
empiricism against Confucian intellectualism. It was this empiricism that
transformed religious soteriology into natural philosophy.
 chapter 1

Ge Hongs Doctrine of Xuan Dao

The Inner Chapters of the Baopuzi, which adopts Ge Hongs pseudonym the
Master Embracing Simplicity, opens with the chapter on the doctrine of
Xuan Dao.

[Genealogical One and Many]

(1) That which is Dark is the primordial ancestor [shizu ]
of Nature and the Great Forebear [dazong ] of the myriad
different [things].

[The Rhapsody of Xuan]

(2) Its impenetrable depth is called formless; its unbroken
continuity is named as excellence. Its height caps the nine heavens
[jiuxiao ]; its breadth covers eight directions [bayu ].
(3) Its brightness exceeds the sun and the moon, and its speed
surpasses lightning. Sometimes it appears as a drifting scene or
moves as shooting stars; sometimes it hovers over edgeless water
or glides as wandering clouds. (4) It is there is [you ] because
of its billion existences [zhaolei ] and is there is not [wu ]
because of its submerged stillness [qianji ]. In the Northern
Polar Region [dayou ], it sinks into great peace. At the edge
of the lodestars [chenji ] it floats above heavens motion.
(5) Diamonds cannot compare with its hardness; dew cannot be
softer than its softness. A square is no match for its straight shape;
a circle cannot eclipse its round form. It comes but is not seen and
goes but is not traced. It is because of its existence that heaven is
named high, earth is called low, clouds travel, and rain falls.

[The Universal Qi]

(6) Xuan is pregnant with the primordial One [baotai yuanyi
], universally casts the identities of Yin and Yang [fanzhu
liangyi ], and breathes out the breath of the great begin-
ning [tuna dashi ]. (7) From the One a hundred million
substances have been formed [guye yilei ], the Twenty-

1
2 textual studies

Eight Constellations are made to revolve [huixuan siqi

], change is created [jiangcheng caomei ], and orders
are activated [peice lingji ]. (8) With its life four seasons
are breathed into life in rotation [chuixu siqi ], stillness
embraced, and vitality expressed. Turbidity is restrained and purity
enhanced.

[Conclusion]
(9) Like adding and taking water from the Yellow River and the
Wei River, neither adding will cause Xuan to overflow nor will
taking exhaust it; external things can neither increase nor
languish its honor. (10) Therefore, where Xuan is happiness
is unceasing; where it withdraws, spirits depart and substances
become fragments.1

The translation is a philosophical one. It bears no reference to James

Wares English translation for the simple reason that his work is mislead-
ing and needs retranslation.2 Ware not only translates Dao as God, but
also replaces Daoist terminology with concepts bearing a strong sense of
(Greek) mysticism. Since mythology and philosophy are disassociated in
modern minds, it is necessary to remove the impression that Ge Hong is a
mystical thinker and place him in historical context as a religious thinker.
The method of translation I use is a hermeneutical circle. It contains three
overlapping areas: Translation is the result of interpretation, interpreta-
tion is based upon textual study, and textual studies correct and enhance
the translation.
Compared with Greek philosophy, which generally presents argument
in linear and logical expression, Daoist texts bear similarity to alchemical
cycles of transformation to refine essential meanings beneath the surface of
textual layers. Although some areas of textual study may appear repetitive,
nonetheless as in alchemy each transformation leads to a deeper under-
standing of an overflowing thought within the text. To help the process,
the above translation has been structured so as to reveal Ge Hongs argu-
ment. The text is purposely divided into four sections under the bracketed
subheadings in italics.
It begins with the claim that the one and the many is a genealogical
unfolding of life from an ancestor to many progeny and then follows the
rhapsody of Xuan, which is situated in an astronomical background.3 The
third section on universal Qi argues Daoist cosmogony by explaining that
the world containing the myriad things derives from the pregnancy of cos-
mic life in primordiality. Then the text finishes with the conclusion that
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao3

Xuan is the most fundamental reality of all existences. In addition to post-

ing signs for the OM argument, another feature of the translation is the
numbers I have supplied to indicate verses; these will be used later on for
ease of reference.
The translation is based on Baopuzi neipian jiaoshi , the
Annotated Inner Chapters of Baopuzi, by Wang Ming , who has pioneered
modern studies of Ge Hong.4 Like most ancient texts, the Baopuzi has
been copied from generation to generation, a process that has resulted
in alterations. Wang Mings annotated edition is widely recognized as the
standard text on the Inner Chapters. It represents a rigorous historical-
textual method used in classical Chinese studies, kaozheng , which is
not a detailed commentary but a canonical study similar to the method
used in biblical scholarship. It aims on the one hand to reconstruct the
text back to its original form and on the other hand to make annota-
tions identifying textual connections with earlier texts. Wang Mings tex-
tual reconstruction is based on the previous edition by Sun Xingyan
of the Qing dynasty. Suns Qing edition was based on manuscripts
of the Song-Ming period.5 Sun Xingyan corrected accumulated textual
problems and deleted some passages that were clearly later inserts and
evidently incompatible with Ge Hongs thought. Unlike the previous edi-
tions, Wang Mings punctuated edition has extensive notes that are not
just textual notes for correction (jiao ), but also commentary notes for
annotation (shi ).

The Structure and Philosophical Points of the Text

The opening passage of the Baopuzi summarizes the central tenets of Ge

Hongs thought. Written in the poetical genre of rhapsody, the argument
has two philosophical discourses: being and works, and the OM relation.
The being and works discourse is an ontological one. In the West, it can
be traced to pre-Socratic philosophies, and the discussion has been devel-
oped by Christian theology for the doctrine of God. Since Daoism has not
developed along Western intellectual paths, it is important to point out
that Ge Hongs discourse reflects his correlative thinking to give expres-
sion to inner being and outer manifestations of Dao. In modern Chinese,
the set of concepts connotation (neihan ) and denotation (waiyan
) have a similar correlation. But in Ge Hongs context, the correspon-
dence of the inner and the outer is linked to the birth of cosmic life. A
mother giving birth to a new child can be seen as what the mother does.
But childbirth also defines what the mother is. Likewise, to contemplate
what Xuan Dao is, Ge Hong describes what the Dao does.
4 textual studies

Human genealogy involves continuity and discontinuity; so too does

cosmic genealogy. This is the second discourse on the continuity and dis-
continuity between one and many. Ge Hong begins with the claim stated
in the opening phrase (1). Xuan is the first ancestor, whereas the myriad
things are her progenies. In a society that was influenced by the Confucian
(and pre-Confucian) value of family succession, the genealogical meta-
phor makes a chief claim about cosmogony. The OM relation is genealogi-
cal. The OM discourse in the universe is basically a genealogical unfold-
ing of lifes continuation and diversification from an ancestor to a large
extended family.
Why is Xuan identified as the primordial ancestor? Clearly the first sen-
tence on universal Qi (6) indicates that the primordial One (yuanyi )
is better identified as One rather than Xuan. This is a textual ambiguity
in the poetic genre. In Daoism yuanyi is a specific term for the uni
versal potency called Qi .6 If Qi is identified as the One along with
Xuan, strictly speaking the One of the ultimate form is not numerical one,
but two. It is not a monist entity, but a dualist couplet. Fortunately, Ge
Hong has provided an answer for the ambiguity with a biological model:
Xuan is pregnant with the primordial One (6). When a mother is preg-
nant with a baby, the baby cannot have a separate identity apart from the
mother, nor can the woman be called mother without the baby. The two
only have one identity.
The relational oneness marks a key contrast to Western understand-
ing. The mother, for example, might have an identity as a teacher, which
the baby does not possess. Here we encounter two thinking paths that
come face to face throughout this book: the relational and the logical. In
Western thinking, logic is both the philosophical tool and the criterion of
truth. In Daoism, the very issue of identity as in the metaphor is under-
stood as a relation rather than a possession. It speaks of the interchange of
life between the mother and the fetus, rather than a possession (as being
a teacher) that could have nothing to do with a fetus. The core identity of
the mother is its life-giving relation with the child. This biological model
holds the key to understand Ge Hongs relational ontology between Xuan
and Qi. The biological life brings together Xuan and Qi into a relational
whole. Life is the continuity underlying the discontinuity between the cos-
mogonical One and the myriad things.
Genealogy implies progress and evolution. This is also a distinctive
attribute of Ge Hongs OM argument. Presented in the narrative on the
universal Qi, it says that the cosmos comes to its own transformation from
a single origin to diversified existences. Ge Hong obviously aims to arrive
at the point that cosmogony and genealogy are akin. What is needed is
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao5

imagination. If genealogy can be understood in cosmic terms or cosmog-

ony can be viewed as genealogy, the linking of two forms of OM is not
unjustified. Biological reproduction is a process; likewise cosmogony is a
process. Many descendants do not come into existence in a single genera-
tion; rather, it takes many generations for life to evolve into a family tree.
Likewise, the world with plural phenomena did not come to existence
through a once-and-for-all act of creation, but diversifies by evolution.
Genealogy consists of both continuity and discontinuity of life. Likewise,
apart from the unfolding life of the Dao, cosmogony contains loss and
death, consequently change.
It is interesting that the underlying metaphor is birth, in fact femi-
nism, but Ge Hong links Xuan with zong and zu , rather than mu .
The idea of zongzu refers to ancestors in orthodox succession. They are
male in gender. In the beginning chapter of Laozi, this orthodoxy is chal-
lenged with the concept of the cosmogonical motherthe mother of ten
thousand things (wanwu zhimu ). It seems that Ge Hong wants
to do both things, to change the orthodoxy with the Confucian geneal-
ogy, on the one hand, and to remain faithful to the early tradition, on the
other. The narrative of universal Qi (68) explains Ge Hongs position.
The first moment of cosmic diversification is illustrated as the birth
of Yin-Yang (6), which gives rise to the making of a hundred million sub-
stances (7). Here Ge Hong adopts the cosmogonical argument in the
opening phrase of Laozi. Without name, it is the beginning of heaven
and earth; with the name it is the mother of ten thousand things (Laozi
1). Dao did not have a name, but by giving rise to ten thousand things,
it became the nameable mother of plurality. Laozis metaphor of one
mother and ten thousand things and Ge Hongs genealogy of one ances-
tor and all existences are evidently the same OM argument. The argument
indicates that what has been referred to as Ge Hongs religious Daoism is a
clear continuation of early philosophical Daoism.7 The one and the many
is primarily articulated within a genealogical-cosmogonical schema, but
Ge Hong developed and reinterpreted it.
In Chinese Xuan literally means the darkness of the night sky and car-
ries the connotation of mystery. Laozi originally says, Mystery [Xuan]
upon mystery [Xuan] is the gate to all wonders (Laozi 1).8 According to
the commentator Wang Pi (AD 226249) a century before Ge Hong,
all wonders come out of the same Xuan, thus it is called the gate of all
wonders. 9 For Ge Hong, the emphasis is not on the gate (men ); Xuan
itself is the totality of the mystery. More important, he uses the term xuan-
zhe instead (1) and suggests personhood. The term is topic maker. Its
external appearance is darkness; as if looking into a night sky, all that one
6 textual studies

can see is impenetrable depth. The image of the night sky also implies that
Xuan has no boundary.
But is it possible to describe the night sky? How is it possible to articulate
the attributes of something formless? The first sentence in the rhapsody of
Xuan explains the depth and the scope of Xuan. The impenetrable depth
[shen ] is called tenuous [wei ]; its distance [yuan ] is named as
marvelous [miao ] (2). Here the attributes of Xuan are captured by two
sets of words. Reading at the textual level, depth (shen ) corresponds
to the word distance (yuan ), tenuous (wei ) to marvelous (miao
). But distance does not only denote the meaning of far reaching, but
also the unbroken continuity involved in a distant journey. Tenuous does
not only mean physically small, but also formless or indeterminate in form
like wheat ground so fine that it is without shape. Here Ge Hong delib-
erately uses the ambiguity of classic Chinese in a positive way to illustrate
the mysterious nature of Xuan. Inwardly it has impenetrable depth yet
remains formless. Outwardly it reaches into the far distance with its unbro-
ken continuity, yet its humility is the most excellent of all.
To read the genealogical claim (1) in the light of this sentence brings
out additional meanings. The ancestor does not solely dwell within the
mysterious depth as a cosmogonical cause, but extends its influence
throughout the cosmos. The ancestor is the hidden and unbroken con-
tinuity of the world, just as an ancestors life is hidden and continued in
later generations. To put this in the language of OM, the One participates
in the many as the continuous unity of the discontinuity of the many. Ge
Hong further explains the universal presence of Xuan in the following
sentence: Its height towers over the nine heavens; its breadth covers eight
directions. The terms nine heavens (jiuxiao ) and eight directions
(bayu ) are meteorological and geographic respectively. The two terms
evidently come from the Shanhai jing .10 Ancient Chinese conven-
tion had it that heaven had nine layers, and earth spread out in eight
directions. According to the earlier text the Book of Changes (Zhou Yi ),
nine heavens (jiutian ) does not mean nine concentric spheres,
but overlapping layers.11 Their arrangement is rather like an umbrella
with eight directions and a center called the heavenly axis (juntian
).12 The word jun refers to the turning wheel used for pottery making.
Thus the nine heavens rotate like a spinning umbrella with its handle as
the polar axis. Overall the spatial dimension of capping nine heavens and
covering eight directions describes the breadth of Xuan as omnipresent.
Heaven and earththe totality of the nameable worldare embraced by
and dwell inside of Xuan. It is also implicitly suggested that alchemical and
cosmogonical transformation happen within Xuan.
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao7

Xuan: A Hermeneutical Problem

Why does Ge Hong use the term Xuan rather than simply adopt the
well-established concept of Dao in the Lao-Zhuang tradition? Historically
the religious Daoism of the Xianger commentary identified the his-
torical Laozi as the personification of Dao, or the incarnation of the cos-
mic principle.13 The answer I suggest is this. Prior to Ge Hong the concept
of Dao had already been used in an anthropomorphic sense. The equiva-
lent form of anthropomorphic Dao in Ge Hongs text is called those who
have possessed Xuan Dao (xuandaozhe ) (IC 2). This term desig-
nates those who have personified Xuan through their ordinary lives and
thus become immortal beingsDao personifiedby preserving the core
of cosmic creativity in them. To retain the impersonal nature of the Dao,
Ge Hong employs a concept less anthropomorphic but more universal.
But the question remains, if the concept of Dao had been used anthropo-
morphically, why did Ge Hong employ Xuan rather than something else,
such as Qi, a term widely used in Taiping jing , the Scripture of Eternal
Peace?
According to Wang Ming,

The term Xuan is derived from the Tai Xuan by Yang Xiong
of the Han period, rather from the School of Xuan of the Wei-
Jin period. Here the discussion on Xuan is centered on the ontology
of the cosmos, especially emphasizing [the attributes] of Xuan Dao.
Xuan Dao is equivalent to later Xuan Yi . The latter sentence [in
the next paragraph] explains it by saying, Attaining it enriches [the
adept] inwardly, preserving it he acts outwardly, using it he becomes
divine, and forgetting it he turns into a mere vessel. These are the key
instructions for contemplating Xuan. From this reference, it is clear
that the term Xuan in the Baopuzi really is about mystic ontology.14

Wang Mings commentary note is problematic. First, it has been a com-

mon view in Chinese scholarship since Wang Ming that Ge Hong sought
to establish an ontological system as the theoretical base for his religious
mysticism,15 which implies something beyond rational inquiry. The claim
that Xuan entails a mystic ontology reflects a Marxist critique. Quoting
Engels, Wang Ming says, All religions are nothing but external forces
manipulating peoples daily life, and the externals become internalized
in human minds in the form of illusions. 16 This is a sweeping criticism.
Historically Ge Hongs religiosity had driven him to compose the Baopuzi
as the apologetics to defend the quest for immortality in the face of Con-
8 textual studies

fucian criticisms, to justify Daoism as a valid path to attain truth, and to

systematize popular devotions by laying down key doctrines. The problem
with Wang Mings criticism is the division between Marxist materialism
and religious idealism. The antithesis of materialism and idealism is bor-
rowed from Western philosophy and is traceable to the pre-Socratic mate-
rialists and idealists. In Ge Hongs case, taking alchemy for example, the
soteriological quest for immortality was actually the driving force for him
to work with minerals in the form of instrumental alchemy, which in mod-
ern terms is laboratorial and material science. A Marxist would say that Ge
Hong was an idealist thinker with some materialist elements. But accord-
ing to Marxism, material sciences do better without religion. In Ge Hong,
religious idealism and material empiricism are two sides of the same quest
for knowing the world. The two are inseparable.
Recent scholars in China take a moderate position that recognizes
Ge Hongs overall contribution but treats the metaphysical values of his
thought as inaccessible.17 He Shuzhen writes in a recent commen-
tary: Xuan is both the origin of the world and the optimal state of Daoist
cultivation; The reality of Xuan is there is and there is not, and its
changeability cannot be measured within the scope defined by height and
depth. But it articulates the ontology of the cosmos. [Ge Hong] adopts the
metaphorical method of the early Daoists and transforms it into a theory
of immortals . 18 Hes words indicate a more positive recognition
of Ge Hongs metaphysical intention. However, the argument has not ven-
tured beyond the intellectual territory established by Wang Ming: The
concept derived from Yang Xiongs Tai Xuan in the Han period, rather
from the School of Xuan in the Jin period. 19
Did Ge Hongs Xuan actually derive from Yang Xiong (53 BCAD 18)
and have nothing to do with the School of Xuan? No. Wang Mings sug-
gestion must be rejected, because it has misled the study of Baopuzi for
almost thirty years. Instead I shall argue two key points. First, Ge Hong
has only taken the schema of Yang Xiongs Xuan, and has left the highly
speculative content behind. Ge Hong has replaced the speculation with
empirical data. Second, Ge Hongs relation with the contemporary School
of Xuan is not a horizontal direct exchange, but an indirect or vertical
lineage coming from the Lao-Zhuang tradition. If we place Ge Hong in
historical context, his religious philosophy and neo-Daoist intellectualism
were two parallel interpretations of the Lao-Zhuang tradition. This con-
nection means that the theological Xuan and the philosophical Xuan, the
distinction that underpins the disassociation of the two, are far closer than
previous scholarship has realized. This point can only be understood when
the imposed shadow of Marxist scientific materialism is removed from the
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao9

ahistorical label of religious idealism. The following three sections are

designed to develop these claims.

Two Historical Comparisons:

Yang Xiong and the School of Xuan

For or against Yang Xiong?

The works of Wang Ming and He Shuzhen represent two generations of

Ge Hong study. Both commentators have made a claim without textual
support. A brief historical comparison should demythologize the mystic
ontology of Xuan and grasp its philosophical significance.
According to Yang Xiong: The reality of Xuan radiates into three
dimensions: Heavenly Dao, Earthly Dao, and Human Dao. The oneness
of Xuan covers three dimensions [fang ]; each dimension contains nine
territories [zhou ]. Various branches have [twenty-seven] generational
installments [bu ] and are divided into [eighty-one] families [jia ] [of
the cosmic community] (ZHDZ 17, 745, DZ 27, 743).20 The introductory
sentences capture the core of Yang Xiongs metaphysical system including
four subordinate categories: 3 dimensions, 9 territories, 27 installments,
and 81 families. The numbers before the categories show a mathematical
order: 3 14 =3, 9, 27, 81. Ancient commentators have demonstrated this
order with the cosmic map shown below (Figure 1.1). The order actually
extended to the sixth power (316 ), thus producing 243 (35) headings (shou
) and 729 (36) branches (zan ).
From the diagram, it is not difficult to see that the complex content
bears some similarity with the system of the Yi .21 Recently Wang Qing
, a Yang Xiong scholar, has made a detailed comparison between the
branch names in the Book of Changes and the title names in the Tai Xuan
(Figure 1.2). It concludes that the system of Xuan is a complete imita-
tion of the system of Zhou Yi. 22 The comparison recalls and justifies Yang
Xiongs own statement in his autobiographic preface: Yi is the structure,
and Xuan is the content (ZHDZ 17, 665).23 The translation of the Tai
Xuan by Michael Nylan also provides a list of tetragrams used by Yang
Xiong (Figure 1.3).
As the cosmic map shows, the content is an OM system and the epis-
temological tools to explain it. It is an attempt to explain three forms of
reality (heaven, earth, and humans) with a single mathematical theory;
the theory formulates unpredictable changes in the universe into a pre-
dictable order of becoming. This is also the core philosophical idea of
the Book of Changes. The system of Xuan represents a major development
10 textual studies

Fig. 1.1. The iconography of Xuan: The concentric layers of Xuan as illustrated
in the Siku quanshu zi pu , 803810

of the ancient philosophy of the Han period. Another distinctive feature

of the theory is the mapping of concentric spheres as a representation of
cosmological structure. This attempt positions Yang Xiong in the intellec-
tual tradition that adopts the divination of Eight Trigrams (bagua ) to
articulate the basic principles of the cosmos.
Deriving from the Book of Changes, another intellectual construct paral-
leled the Yang Xiong school. This was the theoretical alchemy set forth
by Wei Poyang in his famous Cantongqi . It applied the dia-
lectic philosophy of Yin and Yang (yinyang ) and the changeability
of the Five Phases (wuxing ) to explain the universal phenomena of
Fig. 1.2. Names of hexagrams in the Book of Changes and
headings in the Tai Xuan. Reconstructed by Wang Qing .
(Reprinted by permission of Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe from
Wang Qing, Yang Xiong pingzhuan [Nanjing: Nanjing daxue
chubanshe], 130)
Fig. 1.3. Tetragrams in the Tai Xuan. Translated by Michael Nylan. (Reprinted by permission
from Yang Hsiung, The Canon of Supreme Mystery, translated by M. Nylan [Albany: State
University of New York Press], 8083)
14 textual studies

change.24 Compared to Yang Xiongs mathematical universe, Wei Poyang

established the ground theory of an alchemical universe. These theories
differ in kind, but they are akin in essence as two interpretative traditions
of the Book of Changes. Viewed against this historical background, the dis-
tinction is overt: Ge Hongs Xuan neither uses the divination of the Eight
Trigrams nor relies on the philosophy of the Five Phases.
Ge Hong had in mind another theoretical model. This was the emerg-
ing geocentrism and instrumental astronomy of his day (see Figure 1.4). In

Fig. 1.4. A map of the Twenty-Eight Constellations (south polar projection)

illustrated in the Xin yixiang fayao by Su Song (10201101).
(Reproduced with the permission of the Needham Research Institute from
Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1959], vol. 3, 277)
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao15

Ge Hongs astronomical writing, preserved in the Astronomical Treatise

(AT hereafter) of the Jin shu (History of the Jin Dynasty), he argues for
the emerging Huntian astronomy. The theory depicts the universe as
a cosmic egg: Heaven forms the shape of an egg. The earth dwells alone
inside the sphere like a yolk in an egg. Heaven is large, and the earth is
small. . . . The circumference of heaven is divided into three hundred sixty-
five and one-fourth degrees. The degrees can then be divided into halves.
The first half covers the earth, and the other half reaches under the earth.
Therefore the Twenty-Eight Constellations become half visible and half
invisible. Heaven rotates in a movement like a turning wheel (AT 281). 25
The chief feature of the text can be understood in this comparison.
Unlike Yang Xiongs speculative system, Ge Hongs Xuan is astronomical,
empirical, and visual. The introduction of the astronomical text brings in
an issue that needs clarification. Ge Hong scholarship has widely accepted
the view that Ge Hong is not a systematic writer.26 But is his thought
unsystematic? I argue throughout this book that the thought is internally
coherent and that he is not a mere collector, but a developer. Even
though his writings seem to collect from various schools of thought, we
can begin from the theory of Xuan to demonstrate that an ontological sys-
tem is developed by bringing together the strengths of two contemporary
schools: empiricism and idealism.
According to the geocentric Huntian theory, the earth occupies the
center of the universe like the yolk in an egg. This theory historically rep-
resented a new school of empirical astronomy that went hand in hand with
the Armillary Spheres invented by Zhang Heng (78139) in AD 124.
The Spheres functioned as the instrumental model to demonstrate celes-
tial movements. Contrary to this empirical-instrumental model, the previ-
ous Gaitian theory was an ethical model. It viewed the round heaven
as a lid covering the flat earth like a chessboard.27 This lid model affirmed
and justified the Confucian orthodoxy called round heaven and square
earth (tianyuan defang ). Without entering into the debate in
which Ge Hong was involved,28 here it is necessary to recognize that the
above passage belongs to Ge Hongs commentary on the operation of the
Spheres. Ge Hong argues for the Huntian theory and against the Gaitian
theory. In a later passage Ge Hong tells us that Yang Xiong actually was the
advocate for the Gaitian theory (AT 281). Thus historically Ge Hong took
a position contrary to that of Yang Xiong, the new versus the old.
Instead of seeing the world as a semispherical lid of heaven covering a
plain square earth, the new model views the cosmos as concentric spheres
and maps them in 365.25 degrees. The rotating cosmos is envisioned as a
turning wheel that moves like a yearly clock. Unlike Yang Xiongs cosmic
16 textual studies

wheel, Ge Hongs version of the rotating cosmos is closely tied to observ-

able phenomena. One of his key references is the movement of the Twenty-
Eight Constellations: The Twenty-Eight Constellations become half vis-
ible and half invisible. These empirical data are crucial and revealing.
The Twenty-Eight Constellations occupied a significant position in the
history of Chinese astronomy. Strictly speaking they are not circumpolar
stars in the sense that they are close to the pole, which they are not. But
they are polar in orientation. Each constellation (xiu ) commands a
section of sky rather like the outside of a section of orange. The Constel-
lations are traditionally divided into four main sections, and each sec-
tion has seven stars. The sections correspond to four cardinal directions
and are named after four quarters of the sky (sixiang ), and the col-
ors of the four symbolize the four seasons (Table 1.1).29 The sixiang are
macroasterisms.
The metaphor of a turning wheel summarizes their movements and
provides an explanation for their being half visible and half invisible.
Later I will come back to the problem of the Gaitian model, which failed
to explain the rotation of the heavens because the heavenly lid could not
turn like a clock, but could only move horizontally like a turning millstone.
This was the specific problem Ge Hong attacked (AT 282, 283). Here the
central issue is the connection between this text in the Astronomical Trea-
tise and the text in the Inner Chapters. There are two connecting points:
the Constellations and the axis of the cosmos.
In the Inner Chapters only a short but significant reference to the Con-
stellations is given. The term four sevens (siqi ) is a poetic expres-
sion for twenty-eight, and the term turning (huixuan ) is situated in
the narrative of cosmogony. From the One a hundred million substances
have been formed, the Twenty-Eight Constellations are made to revolve,
change is created, and orders are activated (7). Here the turning of the
Constellations is described in the context of cosmogony. So the turning
is neither self-generating like a celestial clock always in motion, nor is it
turned by an external cause force like a rolling wheel driven by an external

Table 1.1. Four directions and four seasons

East Green dragon Spring

North Black turtle Winter

West White tiger Autumn

South Red bird Summer

 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao17

force. The turning has an inner drive that is a part of the coming to be
of cosmic lifeQi.
As the birth of the cosmos begins, Xuan is pregnant with Qi. Then,
through a process of transformation, the Constellations are created and
made to revolve. The rotation gives the celestial reference to define time.
As Cullen has rightly argued, the most important role of the Constellations
in Chinese astronomy was not to satisfy intellectual curiosity to construct
a cosmology, but to make a functional and accurate calendar.30 Therefore,
the turning of the Constellations is closely associated with the definition
of time.
Moreover, Ge Hong uses two alchemical terms for the cosmic trans-
formation. The term fanzhu consists of two words: fandomain or
scopewhich denotes the idea of universality in the context of cosmogony,
and zhucastwhich refers to the casting of smelted metal into a mould
(like a crucible) with male and female parts. It suggests that the primor-
dial life symbolized by Qi is cast into Yin and Yang, which apparently are
opposites but actually are two sides forming the same reality. The second
term, guye , is made of two verbs: guto pump air into a furnace with
bellowsand yeto smelt base materials into an elixir or alloy in stages.
In alchemy, the turning (zhuan ) is a timekeeping activity carried out
by the regulation of fire. It must be noted that the Chinese concept of time
is not linear but cyclical, not abstract but concrete. Celestial time is associ-
ated with the rotation of the Constellations. Alchemical time is filled with
material substances that undergo cyclical transformations measured by the
number of turns.
Here we should note a highly original thought on the part of Ge Hong.
As an alchemist he envisions that cosmogonical change is somehow like
alchemical transformation. The coming to be of the myriad things happens
in stages, just as alchemists conduct reactions in stages. Compared with
philosophical Daoism, Ge Hongs originality is the alchemical perspective.
This is profoundly new. Neither Laozi nor Zhuangzi had an alchemical
view of the world, nor was alchemy involved in the philosophical debate on
how the world came to be. Just by reading the narrative of universal Qi at
the textual level, it is striking that the short passage has mentioned three
kinds transformation: the material in alchemy, the cosmic in cosmogony,
and the biological in genealogy. Beneath the poetic language, Ge Hong
seems to suggest that three schemasalchemy, cosmogony, and biology
somehow relate to each other. Apart from their encapsulation within the
concept of Qi, it remains unclear in the poetic text to what extent they
actually converge. If Ge Hong wants to argue that the one and the many is
fundamental to all three schemas, he must explain what kind of ultimate
18 textual studies

(or Xuan) can perform such drastic and universal works. This is an explicit
ontological question about the one and the many. We must wait and see
whether Ge Hongs thought can carry the philosophical distance in com-
parative studies.
The second connection is the axis of the cosmos. In instrumental
astronomy, one practical difficulty is to decide which two definable points
in heaven can be used to form the axis around which various rings of the
Spheres can be attached. But where do astronomers look for these two
points in the sky? Unlike Yang Xiongs Xuan that only occupies a theoreti-
cal center of the universe, Ge Hongs Xuan has a real astronomical loca-
tion. In the Northern Polar Region, it sinks into great peace. At the edge of
the lodestars it floats above heavens motion (4). The term the Northern
Polar Region (dayou ) comes from Shanhaijing , the Scripture of
Mountains and Seas. It literally means the most negative (jiyin ) region
in the north. The phrase the edge of the lodestars is translated from three
words: ling , denoting the far edge, and chenji , referring to one of
the lodestars.31 In the Astronomical Treatise, the northern chen (beichen
) is ranked as the most honorable of the lodestars (AT 289). In the
Inner Chapters (juan 8), Ge Hong indicates the star is immobile in the sky.32
The Northern Polar Region, especially the northern chen, represents the
primary reference point of the cardinal directions mapped on a compass.
Furthermore, the lodestars are not only the navigational stars that have
permanence in the night sky, but their being described as occupying the
most negative region signals their celestial center. Ge Hong later also says
that the OneQihas exactly the same location. The One dwells in the
Northern Polar Region and inside the great [negative] pool (IC 324).33
With the references to both Xuan and Qi, Ge Hong seems to suggest that
at the most negative region there is a cosmic womb. The mother Xuan is
in gestation with the fetus Qi at this most permanent place. Together they
define the cradle of the cosmos. In Ge Hongs own words, It is because of
its existence that heaven is named high, earth is called low (5).
Once the location of Xuan has been defined, the problem of defin-
ing the axis can be solved in instrumental astronomy. The northern chen
in the most negative region is the first point, and the earth is the second
point. This principle, which forms the axis, is still used in modern obser-
vational astronomy. So the line between two points becomes the axis upon
which various rings of the Spheres can be attached. And the model itself
becomes the representation of the cosmos. Obviously Yang Xiongs cos-
mology is merely a theoretical model, empirically unmatched to visible
celestial movements. Unlike Yang Xiongs system of Xuan, which appears
to have enclosed heavenly Dao, earthly Dao, and human Dao within the
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao19

single mathematical principle of multiplicity, the geocentric theory con-

centrates on the heavenly Dao through an empirical path by correlating
many principles irreducible to each other. Thus historically the geocentric
theory achieved the accuracy to demonstrate celestial movements through
instrumental means, which was undreamed of by previous generations.
The Huntian theory is essentially an OM structure that presents the OM
essence of the cosmos based not on speculation but on observation.
The hidden epistemological argument is that knowledge is not a matter
of how sophisticated the divinational content might be, but of whether the
theory can match observation. What is observable is not just the object to be
explained, but also the criterion of theory. Historically Ge Hong belonged
to a school of empirical thinkers who engaged in instrumental studies.
Similar to Zhang Hengs Spheres, which were basically an instrument of
change, Ge Hongs alchemical crucible was also an instrumental means
to study the changing universe through the transformation of matter.34
Instrumental astronomy and instrumental alchemy were two streams that
fed into empirical studies of Nature. It was Ge Hongs laboratory work and
subsequent investigations into the principles governing changes that set
him apart from Wei Poyangs theoretical alchemy.35 Compared with Yang
Xiongs Xuan, which is a reinterpretation of the Book of Changes, Ge Hongs
Xuan set the course for his laboratory commentary on the underpinning
idea in the Book of Changes that the changing world was governed by change
itself. In Ge Hongs words, Change is the principle of Nature (IC 284).36
To summarize the historical comparison, we can conclude one thing. If
Ge Hongs Xuan were derived from Yang Xiongs Tai Xuan, as Wang Ming
has suggested, then it is only plausible to argue that Ge Hong adopted
Yangs term but rejected the content, while he filled the theoretical vac-
uum with the geocentric theory supported by instrumental astronomy.
Although so far we have had only a glimpse of Ge Hongs astronomical
knowledge, this is enough to draw a distinction between the two systems
of Xuan. Yang Xiongs system was basically a reworked system of change
based on the Book of Changes. Ge Hongs system was developed out of his
involvement in the development of the geocentric worldview. Like Zhang
Heng, Ge Hong historically represented a current of intellectual exodus
in which Confucian scholars turned away from ethical idealism and turned
toward the Daoist virtue of being at one with Nature.

Indirect Connection with the School of Xuan

The School of Xuan emerged in the historical context of the later Han
dynasty and calls to reform New Text Confucianism. The intellectual land-
scape of the Han period was dominated by New Text Confucianism exem-
20 textual studies

plified by Chunqiu fanlu by Dong Zhongshu (179104

BC) and Tai Xuan by Yang Xiong two generations later. It was character-
ized by scholastic theories that had become increasingly sophisticated and
speculative. Against this scholastic tradition, there appeared another intel-
lectual movement.
The pioneering thinker He Yan (AD 193249) returned to Laozi
and Wang Bi (226249) to Laozi and Zhou Yi. Two later advocates,
Guo Xiang (253312) and Xiang Xiu (?), wrote extensive com-
mentaries on the Zhuangzi. Between these intellectual waves, Ruan Ji
(?) also reinterpreted Zhuangzi, and Ji Kang (223262) authored a
theory of preserving life.37 This intellectual exodus from Confucianism to
Daoism opened up a new channel of commentarial traditions. Ge Hongs
Xuan clearly reinterpreted Laozis cosmogony. But the question is whether
Ge Hongs Xuan has anything to do with the School of Xuan.
A general comparison indicates that Ge Hongs concise and elastic
genre is closer to the contemporary School of Xuan than to the euphuisti-
cal and prolix literature of Han scholasticism. In the whole of the Inner
Chapters there are only six prefacing sentences explicitly addressed to
Xuan, but the concept radiates throughout Ges writing. Ges corpus of
texts belonged to the School of Xuan in that it displayed the remarkable
feature of turning away from prolix expressions of Han scholasticism and
toward the concise language used by Laozi and Zhuangzi.38
The chief feature of early Daoist texts was simplicity. Philosophy oper-
ated in conceptual, poetic, and metaphorical contexts. The new commen-
tary genre reflected the old philosophy, allowing simple concepts to carry
sophisticated thoughts and using metaphors as symbols to point toward
deep meanings that words could not fully grasp and express. Ge Hongs
discourse on Xuan resembles the genre that emphasizes the method get-
ting and forgetting. Zhuangzi says: Fishing gear is used for catching fish.
Once a fish is caught, the gear is forgotten. . . . Language is used to express
meaning. Once the meaning has been grasped, the language is forgot-
ten (Zhuangzi 26). Having attained meaning, one forgets written words;
through language one enters the reality of meaning.39 This linguistic phi-
losophy hoped to eradicate the Han scholasticism that relied heavily on
theories of divination to explain everything. The reaction against the past
bypassed scholastic elaboration and went directly to the observation of
reality.
The modern scholar Tang Yijie has made a crucial correction
to Wang Mings disassociation of Ge Hong and the School of Xuan: At
the time of Ge Hong, the School of Xuan had already reached its intel-
lectual peak. As a Daoist scholar, Ge Hong inevitably was influenced by the
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao21

[intellectual] wind of Xuan. 40 On the ontological debate on nothing

and something, Tang further argues, Xuan has neither name nor form;
therefore it is the most formless nothing. It is the ultimate root out of
which the myriad things proceed. Therefore it is the most concrete form
of something. Ge Hong says: It is there is because of its billion exis-
tences and is there is not because of its submerged stillness. Here Xuan
is the synthesis of nothing and something. Although the view is different
from that of Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, it still has addressed the key question
of something and nothing.41
Tangs argument is inspirational. But how does Ge Hongs something
and nothing represent a view that is different from that of Wang Bi and
Guo Xiang? Tang has not explained.42 The suggestion Xuan is the syn-
thesis of nothing and something, however, points in the right direction.
First it is necessary to grasp how the School of Xuan addressed the chief
ontological debate of the time, namely, something and nothing. A sys-
tematic representation of the tenets of the school is not the main interest
here. The historical complicity of various commentaries on the three clas-
sical texts Zhou Yi, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, which are recognized as the Three
Xuan (sanxuan ),43 and of the different views of seven major thinkers
known as the Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Forest (zhulin qixian
)44 cannot be adequately dealt with here. The following discussion only
aims to investigate a philosophical link between Ge Hong and the pioneer-
ing thinker Wang Bi.
In his commentary on the Laozi, Wang Bi argues: Something is born
out of nothing. Thus the state that has neither form nor being is the begin-
ning of the myriad things. 45 Laozi originally articulates something and
nothing within the cosmogonyfrom nothing, something is born. In
Wang Bis interpretation, however, the point of focus is the issue of a priori
and a posteriori. In the School of Xuan, the issue is called ben and mo
, base reality and the many phenomena. Wang Bi says, The beginning
[or prior] without form or name can alone fulfill the myriad things. 46
Wang Bis argument can be understood in analogical terms. The
ground, which sustains a forest of trees (something), is a humble reality
(nothing) that neither has form nor seeks an honorable name. In pursu-
ing a priori to the ultimate end, one discovers that the ground of realities
is groundless. Tang Yongtong , the father of modern Xuan schol-
arship, has made the point explicit. All things change, yet they are depen-
dent upon the ground of Nothingness. . . . There is neither another reality
in opposition to this Nothingness nor one outside it. But it contains all. 47
The interpretation suggests that Wang Bis Nothingness is almost identical
to Zhuangzis Dao. The Nothingness is not just the cosmogonical alpha,
22 textual studies

but also the phenomenological omegathe groundless groundin and

through which all things inwardly relate.
The modern scholar Hu Fuchen a pupil of Wang Mingfur-
ther argues that Wang Bis commentary represents an intellectual break-
through: Daoism was no longer limited to the cosmogonical discussion
of how the myriad things evolved out of Dao and nothing, but emphasized
Nothingness as the foundation of all. The move has elevated the intellec-
tual focus [of the Wei-Jin period] to the higher level of ontology. 48
Hus argument represents an influential theory in current scholar-
ship.49 But it is problematic. First, the distinction between cosmogony and
ontology is arbitrary. Why cannot cosmogony be a form of ontology? The
ontology of Dao usually operates in a cosmogonical framework. The dis-
tinction between cosmogony and ontology has never been as distinctive
as the paradigms of the pre-Socratic cosmogonical one and many and the
Platonic ontology of Forms. Why is ontology higher than cosmogony? It
is possible that a cosmogony cannot be expressed except in terms that
imply an ontology. But a Daoist ontology centralized on the Dao was not
the invention of the School of Xuan. It was reinterpreted by the school
as Nothingness, and it was given the ontological status of a prioriwhich
the early cosmogony had already made explicit in terms that something
is born out of nothing. Laozi stated this proposition in the opening chap-
ter of the Daodejing; Wang Bi reinterpreted it into a causal a priori and a
posteriori.
Apart from assuming the separation of mystical cosmogony and ratio-
nal ontology, there is no particular reason to make such a value judg-
ment. Moreover, the distinction recalls, if it has not been directly bor-
rowed from, a frequently quoted sentence by Tang Yongtong: Therefore
[Wang Bi] had broken away from the cosmology or cosmogony of the
Han period but immersed himself in the true ground of ontology or the-
ory of being. 50 Noticeably Tang Yongtong has failed to make a distinc-
tion between cosmogony (yuzhou shengcheng lun ) and cosmol-
ogy (yuzhou jiegou lun ). We can briefly say that the former
deals with how the change from one to many happens, whereas the latter
investigates how the many are one. The separation between cosmogony
and ontology also resonates with a tendency in recent philosophical stud-
ies. Comparison between Heidegger and the School of Xuan has increas-
ingly made Chinese scholarship a willing companion of modern phe-
nomenology, which rejects theological cosmogony and embraces natural
cosmology.51
The real question is this. Who can show the connection between cos-
mogony and cosmology beyond Heidegger? Ge Hong has already pro-
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao23

vided us with an answer. The key to advancing beyond Heideggers Dasein

(being-there) is to argue that cosmogony is eternal. The act of from noth-
ing into being is creative, implies self-change of the Dao, and therefore
is what is always being-there in the changing world. Moreover the genea-
logical OM is not just a once-and-for-all change that happened at the very
beginning of time, but a process that unfolds in every moment of time.
Chinese scholarship should not give away this core argument in the face of
modern phenomenology; seeking acceptance by the West must not come
at the expense of identity loss.
Second, it is true that Wang Bi broke away from Han cosmology, but so
did Ge Hong. Wang Bi did not divorce his commentary from Laozis cos-
mogonical scheme, but operated within it. Commenting on Laozis saying
Xuan upon Xuan, he writes:

Two realities [something and nothing] derive from Nothingness.

Together they derive from [tongchu ] the same Xuan, but with dif-
ferent names [yiming ]. Once they have been given two names,
the two things cannot be the same. The one that comes first is called
the beginning [shouzhe wei zhi shi ]; the one that comes later
is called the mother [zhongzhe wei zhi mu ]. Xuan means
darkness in which nothing is distinguishable, the silence of there being
nothing [xuanzhe mingye moran wuyu ye ].52

Here Wang Bi argues that Xuan is Nothingness, and Nothingness is the

prior state. Out of it comes the twofold reality: nothing and something.
They are two names that are again understood as an earlier and a later.
The one that comes first is called the beginning. The one that comes
later is called the mother. The beginning interprets Laozis nothing (wu
) in the saying nothing is the beginning of heaven and earth, whereas
the mother refers to Laozis something (you ) in the saying some-
thing is the mother of ten thousand things. 53 The philosophical discus-
sion has pushed the boundary of language, but the logic is actually simple.
What Wang Bi has done is to set a newly invented Nothingness prior to
Laozis dialectic something and nothing. Thus Xuan has three layers
with a sequence of a priori and a posteriori:
Nothingness nothing + something

The epistemological issue here is how to know Nothingness. Since the cog-
nitive mind cannot operate in nothingness without dropping into bottom-
less emptiness, something must be the crucial step to reach Nothingness.
This issue holds the key to comparing Wang Bi with Ge Hong.
24 textual studies

Xuan, Dark, and Nothingness

The second step in comparing Ge Hong with the School of Xuan is to

come to terms with Ge Hongs reversible thinking or negative philoso-
phy. The opening sentence (1) contains two conceptual pairs, Xuan and
Nature, and Nature and the many:
Xuan Nature (ziran )the myriad things (wangshu )

The essence of Xuan is dark and indefinable, whereas its existence is shown
through the reality of Nature in which plurality exists. Ge Hong explains:
It is there is because of its billion existences and is there is not because
of its submerged stillness (4). Having said that, Ge Hong does not spread
more ink regarding what Xuan is. He immediately moves on to discuss
what it does. The inner reality of Xuan is not directly discussed because
of the limits of language, but it is indirectly expressed by the language of
negation, or negative philosophy.
This Daoist form of negative philosophy can be compared to the
apophatic theology argued by Christian Platonists during the Patristic
period. In modern theology, the Eastern Orthodox Church still stresses
that God cannot be known in terms of human categories, but is only
approachable through negation or denial of what can be said in the best
human language.54 To fully comprehend this negative philosophy, let us
look at three hidden claims that help us understand how Ge Hong and
Wang Bi share the ontology of nothingness and how Ge Hong takes the
School of Xuan farther than Wang Bi.

Xuan Is Formless
The attributes of Xuan are explained in the following discourse: Its bright-
ness exceeds the sun and the moon, and its speed surpasses lightning.
Sometimes it appears as a drifting scene or moves as shooting stars; some-
times it hovers over edgeless water or glides as wandering clouds (3).55
The first sentence is relatively straightforward. It illustrates Xuan with the
comparative (hu ): brighter than the brightest in day or night and faster
than lightning. The next sentence consists of four parallel phrases with
the same opening word huo , which can be glossed as sometimes and
or. The drifting scene refers to the dazzling light (shuo ) soon disap-
pearing like a fading scene of effulgence (jingshi ). The drifting also
connects to the term piaoze , which describes an object aimlessly float-
ing on a pond. But the slowness of drifting is paradoxically juxtaposed with
the metaphor of the shooting star (liuxing ) to promote the motif of
indefiniteness. The next two phrases repeat the motif by emphasizing the
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao25

spontaneous nature of change. Xuan hovers over deep water (yuancheng

) like wind or glides like floating clouds (yunfu ).
Both sentences describe the chief attribute of Xuan in terms of its appar-
ently unpatterned indefiniteness and changeability. But the attributes are
not directly expressed in terms of its inner being. Rather the being of
Xuan is indirectly explained through the description of its external activi-
ties. The poetic language captures this central paradox. Xuan is described
through its effects, which vary between regular and irregular (seemingly
random), between large and powerful, and weak and even imperceptible.
The being of Xuan cannot be pinned down to any of these characteristics
used to describe physical things. Its inward being is still beyond them.
The thought direction in these sentences moves from the outer works
of Xuan to its inner being, or from existence to essence. This is the impor-
tant reversible thinking in Ge Hongs thought. Compared with Wang Bis
logical sequence of a priori and a posteriori, Ge Hongs thought seems also
to move from the secondary to the primary, from the physical to that which
lies beneath. But the crucial distinction is whether the physical something
is the epistemological platform on which to understand the metaphysical
nothing.

Xuan Is No -Thing
Only a particular thing can be measured against the physical qualities of
hardness and softness, against the geometrical forms square and circle, and
against the motions of coming and going. Xuan is not a particular anything;
in fact it is no-thing. Hence it is neither hard nor soft, neither square nor
circular, neither coming nor going (5). The physical world does not rest
upon the seemingly chaotic Xuan. Rather astronomical orders are created
out of it. The Twenty-Eight Constellations are made to revolve, change is
created, and orders are activated (7). The myriad things depend upon
the very existence of Xuan. Where Xuan is, happiness is unceasing; where
it withdraws, spirits depart and substances become fragments (10). The
physical characteristics of hard/soft, square/circle, and coming/going are
not logical opposites, but two sides of the same reality, similar to day and
night, which complete the circle of changing time.
All physical qualities hinge upon the imperceptible unity, similar to
the four cardinal directions that connect to the center of a compass. The
change of four rotating seasons is breathed to life and born out of the
formless harmony. Heaven and the earth are called high and low respec-
tively (5) not just because they pull open the spatial tension in which physi-
cal things exist, but also because they derive from the same origin at which
heaven and the earth were not two existential categories. In the beginning
26 textual studies

of reality, there was no-thing, but things were born out of itincluding
time and space.
Compared with Wang Bis Nothingness, Ge Hongs Xuan contains the
meaning of ultimate nothing, because the schema from nothing into
being has already presupposed that primordiality is the state of indefinite
formlessness. But Ge Hong has made a point clear: Xuan changes ontolog-
ically. Creation by definition is change from a universal to many phenom-
ena. Although the idea of change is implied in Wang Bis Nothingness, it
is comparatively secondary because the logical sequence of a priori and a
posteriori is primary.
Like Wang Bi, Ge Hong also speaks of Xuan upon Xuan. Quoting
from the first chapter of the Laozi,56 Ge Hong does not treat the phrase as a
causal connection. A causal connection also implies an infinite regression
because there is no end to the trace of the ultimate. Ge Hongs discussion
appears in the context in which he interprets the Book of Changes, especially
on the subject that change is the basic truth of the world. Furthermore his
thought moves from something to nothing, from external works to inner
being. To reach the core of Xuan, philosophy cannot just simply say noth-
ing. It has to pursue the course of something in order to arrive at the form-
less unity in which all things share the same a priori. Wang Bi would not
deny language as a means to arrive at the end. Ge Hongs poetic writings
perform the function of passing from language to meaning. Therefore, an
ontological a priori worked out of logical deduction still requires a practi-
cal path to attain the end. It is simply because the ultimate is not a cogni-
tive concept, but a state of enlightenment. Enlightenment cannot be just
an idea about the ultimate cause, but must be the realization of the world
in which the plurality of things converge spontaneouslywithout cause.
If we read Wang Bis commentary closely, it suggests that Xuan upon
Xuan actually contains two kinds of Xuan. The one that comes first
is called the beginning; the one that comes later is called the mother.
Wang Bis notion of the mother causes confusion. It is not the original
idea of the cosmogonical mother in Laozi but is created out of Nothing-
ness as the mother of something. If the beginning and the mother
have different names, then their identities cannot be collapsed into each
other and called one single Xuan. If they are not collapsible, then the
mother has an important role to play in Wang Bis thought. Thus the
term the ontology of Nothingness widely used in Daoist scholarship is
misleading.57
For Wang Bi, the something-ness of the mother remains as the epis-
temological path leading into Nothingness. In this respect, both Ge Hong
and Wang Bi have interpreted the epistemology of Laozi, but differently.
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao27

Having known the son, one begins to preserve the mother (Laozi 52).
Through the knowledge of the son, the mother is indirectly known.
This is the direction from the many to the one and from something to
nothing. But Wang Bi tends to forget the son after having found the
mother, whereas Ge Hong praises the mother by loving the son.
In epistemology, when it comes to knowing Xuan, there is no differ-
ence between an ontological prior and a cosmogonical prior. Lets test the
theory in cosmogonical terms. The world is not a homogeneity in which
many are reducible to a same cause called Nothingness. It has many dif-
ferent parts (all something) and is heterogeneous. If Nothingness stands
at the deductive end of reality, this reality still has to be a derivative one.
It must act to transform itself from nothing into something so it can be
accountable for the many as the mother of all things. How does the change
from Nothingness to the myriad things happen? The School of Xuan (as
understood by Chinese scholarship) has not escaped the cosmogonical
OM question at all. The OM relation that it faced is the same dilemma that
cosmogony hopes to address.

Xuan Is Being-less
Following Laozis dialectical philosophy, Ge Hong argues that nothing and
something are defined neither in terms of logical opposites, as in Greek
thought, nor of causal connection as in Wang Bi. They are relational.
It is there is because of billion existences and is there is not because
of its submerged stillness (4). The notion of submerged stillness trans-
lates qianji . The word qian means to be submerged, whereas ji
refers to silence. By joining the two words together Ge Hong creates a
motif in which Xuan is submerged into primordiality, which is silent. And
he claims the primordiality as Nothingnesswu .
Ge Hongs wu is neither a Platonic immaterial idea beyond things nor
a phenomenological concept referring to the absence of existence. In the
context of the birth of cosmos, it is the generative first cause. Yet its essence
still sinks into its formlessness. Thus the best English translation for wu is
nothingness in the cosmogonical sense, prior to the coming to be of some-
thing. Although nothingness in English can mean nonexistence, here
it is necessary to use the translation nothingness in order to provoke
the distinction between Daoist ontological nothing and Parmenidean-
Platonic something, and leave the nonexistence ambiguity to be dealt
with separately.
Ge Hongs idea of the nothingness of Xuan is equivalent to Laozis
nameless Dao. Dao neither takes physical shape (wuxing ) nor bonds
to a metaphysical form (wuxiang ) (Laozi 14). It rests in the primordial
28 textual studies

state of formlessness (xuan ) with its potency (chong ) (Laozi 4).58 Ge

Hongs Xuan operates primarily s within this cosmogonical framework set
forth by Laozi. The key word in Laozis cosmogony is birthsheng . This
is exactly what the opening sentence in the narrative on Qi is about. Xuan
is pregnant with the primordial One, universally casts the identities of Yin
and Yang, and breathes out the breath of the great beginning (6).
It appears that Ge Hong borrowed the idea directly from Laozi. But
between Ge and Laozi there was a commentarial tradition that belonged
to Ges family lineage. The commentary on the Daodejing by Ge Hongs
granduncle Ge Xuan states:

Laozi has personified the spontaneous Nature. He was born out of the
Primordial Nothingness [taiwu ] and emerged into being without
cause. He experienced the beginning and the ending of the cosmos
without seeking an honorable title. He was the [personified] end of
Nothing without the end, the infinite Nothing without scope, and the
eternal Nothing without beginning. Therefore, he is the Endless [wuji
]. . . . The title Laozi (the Old Child) refers to his birth out of the
mysterious Xuan , which preexists the formation of the universe.59

The apotheosis of Laozi historically belonged to the commentary tradi-

tion that divinized the historical Laozi as the personification of Dao.60
The birth narrative of Laozi (which literally means the Old Child) was
deliberately aligned with the birth of the world, so the anthropomorphic
life of the created world was expressed in the form of the Daos incarna-
tion. Unlike his granduncle, Ge Hong does not attribute to Laozi a theis-
tic personality by claiming Laozi as the hypostasis of Dao. For Ge Hong,
Laozi is one of many immortals whose immortality is not inborn but rather
attained. Even with this major distinction, Ge Hong still directly inherited
Daoist cosmogony with a soteriological outlook. He writes, Those who
have personified Xuan Dao . . . emerge out of [that which] there is noth-
ing above and enter into [that which] there is nothing below (IC 2).61
Later he says, Without desire without temporality, fulfilling the true and
emptying the vessel . . . this formless Nature is the reality that the adept
seeks unity with (IC 3).62
The connections with Laozi and his granduncle cast further light on
Ge Hongs general claim. As in Laozi, the relation between nothing and
something is dialectical and inclusive. As in Ge Xuan, the primordial real-
ity prior to the existence of the myriad things is nothing. Similar to both,
the scheme of the OM argument is cosmogony. Within these contexts,
Ge Hong argues that, between there is not and there is, there is an
 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao29

unfolding birth narrative of the cosmos. The birth narrative of Qi (6) is

vividly illustrated in medical terms as gestation prior to birth. It is a major
development that an ontological theory is described and supported by the
empirical knowledge of medical practice, for which Ge Hong is renowned
to this day.
Just like a pregnant mother, Xuan embraces and encloses the primor-
dial life of the cosmos within its emptiness. Once Xuan has become preg-
nant with life, the following development of the fetus becomes entirely
a spontaneous and evolutionary process of diversification (7, 8). The pro-
cess leading from the formless one without plurality to the one organic life
with many parts becomes the model for the one and the many. This cos-
mogonical process can be conceptualized in human terms as a genealogi-
cal unfolding from one ancestral life into the many lives of the offspring,
which represent the discontinuity among the many yet carry the continuity
springing from the one. More important, each step of this genealogical
one and many is in itself a distinctive one and many as illustrated in the
image of gestation.
Thus the cosmogony is not a sudden explosion at the beginning of
time, but a genealogical unfolding in time with evolutionary openness.
Compared with the pre-Socratics monism, which originally was articu-
lated in a cosmogonical context, then defined by Parmenides as a logical
problem marked by the antithesis between the one and the many, the OM
problem for Ge Hong is not a logical problem, but a relational synthesis.
The relation rests upon the continuity between the one ancestor and the
many progenies. And the continuity is logically traceable to the cosmo-
gonical core at which there exists a dialectic change that has unleashed all
changesfrom nothing into being. Yet each single birth of a particular is
a marvelous creationfrom nothing into being.

Summary

Within the general disputation of Dao throughout Chinese intellectual

history,63 Xuan was an important topic, and it became a distinctive stream
in the Wei-Jin period. Laozi first named Xuan upon Xuan the gate to all
wonders. Yang Xiong developed Xuan into a cosmological scheme with
the content of divination borrowed from the Zhou Yi. The School of Xuan
also joined the discussion with a commentary tradition. Various commen-
taries on the Laozi and Zhuangzi shaped the neo-Daoist tradition that trans-
formed itself into an intellectual protest against the New Text Confucian-
ism of the previous Han period.
With regard to the School of Xuan, modern scholarship has main-
30 textual studies

tained the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Dao-

ism. The categorization has overlooked the connection between the
School of Xuan and Ge Hong because the ontology of Nothingness as
argued by Wang Bi has been assumed to represent a higher philosophy
that has little to do with Ge Hongs quest for immortality. Again we run
into the familiar religion/philosophy division that has been considered
historical. As a response to this hermeneutical problem, this chapter has
gone the extra distance not only to investigate the similarity between Ge
Hong and his contemporary school, but also to analyze the dissimilarity
between Ge Hongs empiricism and Yang Xiongs idealism. The findings
can be summarized as shown in Figure 1.5.
In Figure 1.5 the backward arrows refer to the interpretation of the
past: Yang Xiong mainly interpreted the Zhou Yi, whereas the School of
Xuan reinterpreted the Lao-Zhuang philosophy. Three forward arrows
designate the influences of three past traditions in Ge Hongs thought.
Historically the doctrine of Xuan Dao represented the converging point
of three intellectual streams: universal change, cosmogony, and empiri-
cism. Between the Book of Changes composed in the pre-Qin period and
the Baopuzi published in the Jin, there was a succession of commentary
traditions. Laozi and Zhuangzi were major intellectual landmarks before
Han New Text Confucianism. Ge Hong reinterpreted universal change
Yi through his thesis of Change is the principle of Nature. The most
fundamental form of change is understood in the cosmogonical context:
the primordial change that activated all changes. This from nothing into
being schema is a direct interpretation of Lao-Zhuang intellectualism and
is indirectly connected with Wang Bis ontology of Nothingness. Contrary

Fig. 1.5. Three influences on Ge Hongs thought

 ge hongs doctrine of xuan dao31

to Yang Xiong, Ge Hong abandoned Confucian idealism but embraced

Daoist naturalism. And the naturalism went hand in hand with the instru-
mental astronomy developed in the Han and Jin periods. Overall, Ge
Hongs discourse on Xuan belonged to the tradition that took Xuan as
the ultimate topic for philosophical discernment.
 chapter 2

Platos Answer to the

Pre-Socratic Debate

The study of Plato has many starting points. I start from the book of Par-
menides because of its obvious discussion of the one and the many. Having
said this, one cannot ignore the current Plato scholarship on the subject.
Yet reading Plato and reading someone elses readings of Plato create two
different issues. The former is the historical issue that Greek antiquity is
far distant from the modern world. The latter is a methodological problem
in that the analytical tradition of the Plato scholarship is very remote from
the Daoists, who do not think cognitively through the mind but contem-
plate empirically through the body.
To begin with Parmenides, we must know the complicity involved in
reading and interpreting the book. The Parmenides in the book Par-
menides is not the historical Parmenides, but Platos spokesperson for his
own thought. Yet under Platos creative writing, the figure still resembles
the distinctive train of thought of the historical Parmenides. Among all
of Platos dialogues, the book is traditionally regarded as one of the most
difficult books for two main reasons: Platos employment of the Parmeni-
dean logic, which is mind stretching even for analytical philosophy, and
Platos hidden intention in writing the book, which has been interpreted
so diversely from being a masterpiece of metaphysics to a humbling self-
criticism. Against this complex background, therefore, the starting point is
to understand Parmenides in the pre-Socratic debate of the One and the
many, and his influence on Plato that led to the book Parmenides.

The Pre-Socratic Debate

Material Monism and Pluralism

The Milesian school began with Thales of Miletus (625545? BC),1 who
lived about half a century before Confucius (551479 BC). They were the
contemporaries of the early Daoism of the period when one of the earli-
est versions of Laozi was circulated.2 Thales was the first thinker to argue

32
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate33

for natural evolution based on material change. The world derived from
a single stuff called water, and the meteorological changes of the one pro-
duced the many (11B3).3
Almost all the Presocratic philosophies have been passed down as frag-
ments. They are preserved as quotations in subsequent ancient authors,
from Plato to Simplicius over a period of ten centuries. Scholars generally
agree that Plato is relatively less faithful to his sources and often mixes
paraphrase and exegesis when he recalls the works of previous thinkers.
Aristotle, on the contrary, did valuable surveys of his predecessors argu-
ments. Although his interpretations were often distorted by his view of the
past, many Presocratic ideas are preserved in his Physics, Metaphysics, and
De Caelo.
On Thales Aristotle called the change one of moist things and applied
his categorization to label meteorological change a natural principle
(Metaphysics 983b1727). When water evaporated, moist air emerged.
When it solidified, stone formed. Because of the material nature of water,
Aristotle interprets it as the material cause. However, Aristotles recollec-
tion of Thales involves his interpretation, which secretly transforms cos-
mogonical matter into one of immaterial principles of cause. The single
stuff was meant to be unlimited in a cosmogonical sense,4 rather than the
limited cause in a material sense. Aristotle explored the ambiguity and
placed it in his own philosophical categories, turning water from a general
One into a particular many, such as water as the cause of steam.
The idea of unlimited stuff was later made clear by Anaximander (610
540 BC?), a successor and pupil of Thales. On the one and many, he fol-
lowed naturalism and argued the indefinite and limitless as the primal
stuff, and fragments of the original thought were preserved in the early
Christian records The Refutation of All Heresies (12B2).5 The limitless stuff
was not Thales material monism, but contained plural elements, which
were not four traditional elemental stuffs (earth, water, fire, and air), but
rather more like principles (Physics 203b430). Anaximander was a pio-
neer in geometry, discovered the equinox and the solstice, and perfected
the sundial. He also argued the biological theory that from water and
earth animals arose under the heated condition.6 The combination of
the limitless stuff and the biological theory makes his OM view more com-
parable to Ge Hongs argument than Thales.7 However, Ge Hongs one
and many is far more complex and Anaximanders biology has little surviv-
ing evidences to pursue a meaningful comparison.
Anaximanders pupil Anaximenes further argued that the basic sub-
stance was air. Compared with Daoist Qi, air was evolutionary. But con-
trary to Qis biological change from one to many forms of life, air was
34 textual studies

mainly explained in terms of a change of density. Rarefaction generated

fire; condensation produced water, even stone.8 But Anaximenes added
that our souls were basically air, which hold us together, and breath and
air encompass the whole world. 9
Evidently Anaximenes air is a combination of Thales meteorology
and Anaximanders biology. Apart from the similarity that the air is as bio-
logically productive as Ge Hongs vital Qi, two theories of change diverge.
Ge Hong stood in the alchemical tradition. He did not only view change
as a transformation of kind like a chemical process in a crucible, but also
demonstrated the transformation between cinnabar and mercury. Anaxi-
menes returned to Thales and explained change as a variation of degree,
such as the interchange of water and moisture, but the change from air to
stone remained a belief rather than demonstrated fact.

Two Opposed Forms of Ontology

After the early material naturalism, two more materialists joined the OM
debate: Heraclitus, a native of Ephesus, north of Miletus (died c. 470478
BC), and Parmenides (c. 480 BC), the founder of the Eleatics.
Before Parmenides, Heraclitus argued the flux theory. We do not step
into the same river as we are and we are not (22B49a). Similar to the con-
cept of change in the Book of Changes, Heraclitus changing river is per-
petual. Similar to Ge Hongs changing Dao, change is not illusion, but per-
manent reality. The second element of flux theory is dialectical thought.
The sea is the most pure and most polluted water: for fish, drinkable
and life-preserving; for men, undrinkable and death-dealing (22B61).
Day and night are one. And so are good and bad (22B57). Dialectical
thought appears to be a mingling of opposites, against which Parmenides
unchangeable Being becomes acute.
Because of the equivocal nature of dialectical thinking, historically per-
haps driven by a need to seek permanent truth, the flux theory is viewed
as uncomprehensive by Aristotle and as heretical by Christian commenta-
tors.10 But what Heraclitus means could be the very opposite. Just as Yin
and Yang diversify Qi, the opposition of day and night together forms the
unity; one changing reality gives rise to the two. Either one cannot be
understood without the other. The common ground between the two is
the true nature of the two. The river generates the many; the many float
in the changing unity of the One. Out of the change, many emerge.
Heraclitus doctrine of flux is closely associated with the eternal Fire.
All things are constituted from fire and resolve into fire (22B3). Turn-
ing off fire: first, sea; of sea, half is earth, half lightning flash (22B31). The
fire functions as a cosmogonical potency that turns a wheel of change with-
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate35

out beginning and ending.11 Within the circle, fire vivifies the changing
logos. The changing fire becomes the substance exactly opposite to the
Parmenidean resting One. For Heraclitus the truth of change was creative,
as he said, from all things one, from one all things (22B10). This creative
change was actually the answer to the uncreative One of Parmenides.
If the fire and the flux can be mingled as the cosmogonical One, this
is the closest concept to Qi among pre-Socratic monism. But the difficul-
ties in establishing the comparison come down to one issue. On change,
Heraclitus says, cold things become hot, hot cold, wet dry, and parched
moist (22B126). Thus he relied on metrological change first proposed by
Thales to explain the creative change from all things one, from one all
things. But metrological change is physical change. On cosmogony, he
says, the world, the same for all, neither any god nor any man made; but
it was always and is and will be, fire ever-living, kindling in measures and
being extinguished in measures (22B30). This natural evolution of fire
seems to point toward an alchemical understanding of change similar to
Ge Hongs alchemical fire that kindles and regulates changes in a crucible.
However, no further evidence can be found to establish that the fire shares
the same material and alchemical nature as Qi. It is possible that alchemy
was foreign not only to Heraclitus, but also to the whole Greek tradition
from the pre-Socratics to Plato and Aristotle.
Parmenides stood for monist idealism but against Heraclitus ontologi-
cal change. Parmenides had a mystical vision that was revealed to him by
the goddess. The revelation recorded in his poem was a journey toward
enlightenment from the Way of Opinion to the Way of Truth. In the
poem, the One is defined as ungenerated and indestructible, whole, of
one kind and unwavering, and complete (28B8, 14). Under the condi-
tion that change was mainly understood as physical variation among the
early materialists, Parmenides unchangeable One had a radical element.
For instance, if water is the One, through evaporation it becomes steam, or
through condensation it turns into ice. Because steam and ice are varied
forms of water, they share the same being as water. Therefore there is no
change but variation of the same water.
This concept of change as homogonous variation is arguably the
most profound and most problematic for Plato. It comes down to the
question how to address the issue of change ontologically. Parmenides
unchangeable ontology had an unshakable impact on Plato. Platos Forms
are unchanging ideas. Each idea determined many homogonous varia-
tions of the idea, yet physical things associated with change are system-
atically treated as unreality. This type of unchanging ontology is a direct
result Parmenides seemly convincing argument. Parmenides One is the
36 textual studies

only Being, and the Being cannot change. Parmenides says, That it is and
that it cannot not be (28B2, 16). Put in the language of being, it means
Being without not-being.
This argument rests upon the logic of exclusion. That is, within the
most fundamental being, there cannot be two things in opposition; oth-
erwise it is not one but two. For instance, good and evil cannot form the
same idea, simply because they are logically exclusive. This is a powerful
weapon invented by Parmenides. It is also arguably one of most endur-
ing ideas in Western metaphysics. Plato later systematically developed and
turned it into the doctrine of Forms. We will come back to this point in
greater detail, but we leave Parmenides now as there are two more groups
to be introduced.

Pythagorean Immaterial Pluralism and the

Material Pluralism of Empedocles
Contrary to the natural cosmogony of the Milesian School, Pythagoras
professed the immaterial and otherworldly nature of the worlds origin.
With his combination of theology and mathematics, Pythagoras preached
transmigration of immortal souls, on the one hand,12 and on the other
hand argued that the illusory physical world was ordered by immaterial
and mathematical principlesinvisible but real.13 The doctrine that all
things are numbers belonged to the Pythagorean School in south Italy.
From Aristotle we read: The so-called Pythagoreans touched on the
mathematical sciences: they were the first . . . to think that their principles
were the principles of everything that exists. And since of mathematical
entities numbers are by nature primary, and among these they seemed
to observe many similarities with entities and thing coming to being,
rather than in fire and earth and water . . . (Metaphysics 985b2327).
Even though the Pythagoreans followed the doctrine of all things are
numbers, as Aristotle recorded in another passage, they only managed to
explain a limited range of things by means of numbers.14 It was Plato who
transformed the Pythagorean numerical entities into ontological ideas
with the same kind of otherworldliness.15 This inclination also sets Plato
apart from the material monists but moves him closer to the antimaterial-
ists. Like the Pythagoreans, Plato favored idealism.
Platos idealism over materialism is most evident in his doctrine of cre-
ation presented in the Timaeus. Pythagorean mathematics was formally
applied to Empedocles four elements and reduced the four into two pri-
mary triangles. The deductive approach did not apply only to the limited
pluralism of Empedocles, but also to unlimited atoms argued by Leucip-
pus and Democritus. Thus the Platonic Demiurge relied on elements as
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate37

the building blocks to create the material world, ordering them by assem-
bling geometric structures with mathematical principles. Is this Pythago-
rean treatment an advance over Empedocles elements and atomism, or
retrogression toward natural philosophy? We shall see below.

Platos Answer to the Pre-Socratic Debate

For and against Parmenides

Among Platos predecessors it was Parmenides who influenced Plato most

in his ontological vision that the world is essentially a unity rather than a
plurality. Epistemologically, Parmenides logic had direct impact on Pla-
tos theory of knowledge: the world is intelligible through logical reason-
ing, and logic is the tool to discover underlying rationality in the changing
world. Contrary to Heraclitus thesis change is ontological, Parmenides
unchanging Being is truly ontological, thus truly real. Therefore to under-
stand reality means to look beyond changing phenomena and arrive at the
unchanging core of Being.
Platos negative attitude toward the physical world is driven by the Par-
menidean instinct to seek something permanent, in this case the ontologi-
cal status of the physical world, which is not only immune to change, but
also persists through the temporality created by change. The doctrine of
Forms is Platos chief attempt to establish a system of universals, which exist
ontologically independent of changing phenomena but govern the physi-
cal world. With the plurality of Forms, Platos one and many evidently has
turned away from Parmenides denial of plurality. Similar to the atomists,
Plato accepts plurality as the fundamental feature of the world. Moreover,
under the influence of Pythagorean antimaterialism, Platos immaterial
Forms also mark a sharp contrast with the Parmenidean material Being.
Beyond these two aspects of difference, as we shall see below, the doctrine
of Forms is both for and against Parmenides doctrine of Being.
Platos double-world view of invisible Forms and physical world has built
directly on Parmenides ontological divide between Being and Becoming.
Parmenides divides the world into two categories of existenceBeing and
Becomingand corresponding to them two ways of inquirythe way of
truth and the way of opinion.16 Plato in the Republic (509d511e) pictures
the world in two subordinate ordersintelligible and visibleand in the
Timaeus (51) postulates the ideal/actual duality that the actual world of
Becoming is the created copy of the ideal world of Being.
The collective terms the intelligible and the ideal ontologically
refer to the objects of Forms and epistemologically correspond to the Par-
38 textual studies

menidean way of knowledge. The terms the visible and the actual
designate perceptible things that in totality cannot exist without ideal
Forms. Empirical knowledge of the visible only produces low-class belief,
which echoes the Parmenidean way of opinion. Just as Parmenides
insists, What can be thought is only Being, 17 Plato also develops the idea
that true knowledge is only possible through knowing primary beings.
For instance, to know chairs essentially is to know what the chair-ness
is about. Because the ontology of chair-ness determinates any concrete
knowledge of chairs, to know chairs can be reduced to the knowledge of
the Form. Just as Parmenides way of truth corresponds with the metaphys-
ical reality of Being, for Plato coming to knowledge is not about empirical
study, but a cognitive exercise that elevates the mind from perception of
physical things to engage in a dialogue with Forms.
The doctrine of Forms is Platos indirect criticism of Heraclitus flux
theory and his systematic answer in agreement with Parmenides separa-
tion of being and change. Parmenides critiqued the view that the universe
derived from a changing origin held by the pre-Socratic monists, who
asserted that the world of plurality derived from a primordial unity. This
criticism in itself sets forth the anthesis of being and change, or being
against change. Plato also critiqued Heraclitus flux theory with the same
argument. The flux theory implied that the one and the many could not
be understood apart. It should not be thought of as logical confusion that
many are one and one is also many; as Plato puts it reality is both many
and one (Sophist 242d). Rather the one is the underlying unity of oppo-
sites.18 The mingling of one and many results in nothing ever possessing a
certain being; rather everything is becoming.
Having become preoccupied with the Parmenidean instinct of seeking
fixed truth, Plato accused Heraclitus of promoting a philosophy in which
everything moves and nothing rests (Cratylus 402A). Platos view went
hand in hand with the contemporary Heraclitus school, which mistakenly
interpreted flux in the negative sense. But there is a logos in flux according
to Heraclituschange is that logos. Plato took flux as the greatest warning
against materialism, rather than as wisdom on the changing logos. Perhaps
even if Plato had seen the wisdom, he would still choose the Parmenidean
path for logical clarity and reject the moral confusion of good and bad
are one via Socratic ethics.
Platos rejection of Heraclitus ontological change sets his ontology
in agreement with Parmenides. More precisely, he rejected Heraclitus
because of his acceptance of Parmenides. The result is predictable. Plato
disassociates change from beingFormswhile at the same time ascrib-
ing change to physical thingssensibles (to use the technical term). The
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate39

dichotomy of Forms and sensibles is Platos Parmenidean solution to the

problem of being and change. Each Form constitutes what a class of things
unchangingly is, in contrast to what a class of physical things perpetually
becomes. Each Form is a permanent being, unalterable in changing cir-
cumstances and immaterial. A sensible is material, temporal, and con-
stantly becoming something else. No permanent truths can be positively
affirmed in changing things; only fallible opinions flow with the current
of changing appearance. Therefore the doctrine of Forms is overall a Par-
menidean denial of Heraclitus flux theory.
Parmenides treats one and many as logical antitheses: one is not many
and many not one. Plato only partially accepts this logic. Each Form as an
indivisible one is opposed to sensibles as many: a Form is not sensibles, nor
are sensibles Forms. For Parmenides one cannot become many without
ceasing to be one; therefore the one world cannot contain many parts.
However, the doctrine of Forms is a qualified rejection of this doctrine of
one without many. Each Form is a universal one [causing being] over
many [caused things]. The world contains multiple Forms irreducible to
a single Parmenidean Being. It is this system of Forms that is required
to critique Parmenides denial of plurality. Because the Forms are plural,
there are various determinative causes of one over many that determine
the myriad things in the world. The doctrine of Forms is Platos central
attempt to create a metaphysical synthesis from the logical anthesis of one
and many articulated by Parmenides. With Forms, the notion of one is no
longer limited to cosmogonical discussion. As long as Forms are discussed,
the OM issue is inevitably there.
This was a remarkable paradigm shift from cosmogonical ontology to
cosmological ontology, from a concern about what the world primarily
is to a concern about what the world is made up of. The shift also indi-
cated that Plato had moved away from material monism but toward ideal
pluralism. Another rejection of Parmenides is the uncreative nature of
monism. For Parmenides one cannot become many without ceasing to be
one; therefore plurality cannot arise from unity. However, Plato rejects the
argument bound to the logical antithesis of one and many in his doctrine
of creation. Creation by nature is understood as transformation from one
to many. We shall keep in mind these two rejections that set Plato and his
teacher apart.

The Nature of the Book Pa r m e n i d e s

What is the chief purpose of the Parmenides? The book traditionally is
divided into two parts. In the first and shorter part (126a135c), Plato
made the young Socrates expound his theory of Forms to the elderly Par-
40 textual studies

menides and his pupil Zeno. Then Plato placed Parmenides in charge of
the conversation and put the theory of Forms under various objections, to
which Platos usual spokesmanSocrateshad failed to reply. The elderly
Parmenides then pointed out a meaningful path for the young man, indi-
cating that he needed more rigorous training in logic.
The puzzling point is this: why does Plato make his doctrine of Forms
subject to serious criticism? In particular why does he make himself vulner-
able before two major attacksthe separation of Forms from sensibles and
the indefinite regress of the Third Man Argument?
The second part and longer dialogue (136a166c) consists of various
antinomies if purely examined by logic. When Plato applied the Parmeni-
dean unity theory that all things are one to various hypothetical situa-
tions, Plato showed there to be an underlying paradox that unity and plu-
rality could either both be affirmed or both be denied. Plato suggested
that any denial of Forms as universals would inevitably lead to the denial of
each forms determined pluralitythe predicator of its being; the affirma-
tion of unity was simultaneously the affirmation of plurality. Why did the
discussion of beings lead to the inclusive relation between one and many?
The inclusiveness in itself was the antithesis that the Parmenidean logic
neither permitted nor was able to solve. Plato ended the book with this
greatest puzzle overshadowing all subsidiary puzzles.
The precise nature of the book has been a philosophical obscurity, and
distinctive views have been held regarding its purpose. In the past century,
the second part of the book has been interpreted in various ways: from a
joke to a great metaphysical exercise. Burnet, followed by Taylor, presented
the theory that the second part was a philosophical joke. In the exhaustive
dialogue Plato played the game of abstract formal logic against Eleatic
philosophers who used their corrupt logic against certain aspects of Pla-
tos Forms. In return Plato aimed to show their reasoning actually yielded
various absurd consequences.19 In the commentary by Cornford, the joke
theory was rejected on the basis that the second part contained definite
philosophical content aimed at exploring and critiquing the ambiguous
nature of Parmenides One.20 Gilbert Ryle also rejected the joke theory and
argued that the arguments of the dialogue were either valid, or else plau-
sible enough for their author to have taken them to be so. 21 Furthermore,
he suggested a self-critical element in the dialogue. Contrary to Cornfords
Plato, who was in total control when criticizing Parmenides, Ryle thought
(in line with Aristotle) that Plato did not realize the inevitable antinomies
of Forms until he had constructed the logical apparatus. 22
This self-critical theory raised the central question of why Plato did not
modify the doctrine of Forms after he had exposed some fundamental
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate41

errors in his thought. Runciman argued the reflection theory, saying that
the dialogue reflected Platos own comments on his own theory.23 The
complexity of Forms was not precisely definable for the trained (Ele-
atic) philosophers.24 The dialogue appeared to be metaphysically serious
in the light of Parmenidean logic but actually was never serious enough
for Plato to abandon Forms. Hence Plato continued to hold to his belief
about Forms in various passages written after the Parmenides.25 Robinson
also argued that Plato regarded the objection to Formsthe Dilemma of
Participationto be serious but not fatal.26
What kind of problem could be serious but not fatal? With the apo-
retic theory Allen interpreted the dialogue as aporetic and akin to the
Beta of Aristotles Metaphysics.27 Contrary to a mere objection to a proposi-
tion, what Plato demonstrated in the dialogue were puzzles; each puzzle
involved a paradox of disproving both a proposition and its denial. Thus
the dialogue could be read as a great metaphysical exercise that explored
the aporetic nature of Forms.
As the above survey shows, the precise nature of the second part is
a matter of dispute. But many scholars have been convinced, even with
differing interpretations, that Plato demonstrated an underlying paradox.
Similar to the Daoist relational ontology of essence and existence, unity
and plurality can only be either both affirmed or both denied. A closer
look at the dialogue reveals the paradox. The investigation that follows
is inspired by the recent work by Samuel Scolnicov, which treats the Par-
menides primarily as a dramatic narrative.28 However, it differs from Scol-
nicovs work on the content of the drama because the dialogue partner
is a Daoist.

Is Platos Par m e n i d e s a Book on One and Many

or a Criticism of Eleatic Logic?
If One Is and If One Is Not Hypotheses

In the affirmation arguments Plato considers the logic of being in four

hypotheses of if one is. Bear in mind that the following inferences rely
on the logic of negation: one and many are exclusive entities because one
is not many and many not one.

(a)If the hypothesis unity is one without many [many denied]

(137c142a) is affirmed, then unity has no plurality.

It becomes the unity transcending all others. The transcending unity can-
not be a Parmenidean One either because for Parmenides the world is one
42 textual studies

containing a homogeneous many with the exact same ontological prop-

erty as the One. Thus one is neither the one (of Parmenides) nor the
many (of pluralists).
This particular aspect of transcending both by negating both greatly
inspired Neoplatonism. The absolute one beyond all was identified as God
with a creative capacity similar to the Form of Good in the Republic and the
Demiurge in the Timaeus. It is also beyond the reach of reason.

(b)If unity is one with many [many affirmed] (142b155e) is affirmed,

unity is a whole of parts and contains plurality.

Thus unity is an assembly of many, a form of togetherness. According to

the doctrine of Forms, the structure of one over many (OVM) categories
assembles various realities into the togetherness of various things of the
same kind.

(c)If unity is both one and many (157b159b), unity gets a share of
becoming and becomes many.

Since unity cannot come to be or cease to be, unity as one is denied. Since
many cannot be one (Zenos denial of plurality), unity as many is denied.
Thus unity is neither one nor many.

(d)If unity is one apart from many (159b160b), plurality has no unity,
as pluralists assert.

In order to affirm unity, it must transcend plurality. Yet one must be abso-
lutely apart from many; it has nothing to unify. Just as the first hypothesis,
unity is one without many, yields the result that unity is a self-subsistent
entity, neither a unity of many nor one of the many, a self-subsistent entity
can be neither one nor many.
These hypotheses (with the exception of the second) demonstrate an
underlying paradox. Deriving from the same affirmative statement if one
is, by Parmenidean logical deduction they actually produce the negation
of the propositionunity is not one. The denial of unity simultaneously is
the denial of plurality; unity is neither one nor many. Unity and plural-
ity can only both be rejected. The second hypothesis is an OVM situation
declared in the doctrine of Forms. It implies a simultaneous affirmation of
unity and plurality.
In the negative arguments Plato considers Parmenides not-being in
the following hypotheses on if one is not.
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate43

(a)If unity is not being (160b163b), what happens to one?

According to Parmenides false assumption that the negation of being

is not-being and equals nonexistence, then the being-less unity does not
exist. Unity as an empty concept affirms nothing, neither one nor many.

(b)If unity is not one (163b164b), what happens to one?

Without being anything in particular, it is without any character at all. It is

indefinite.

(c)If unity is not being (164b165e), what happens to many?

If unity does not exist, the absence of one makes many undetermined
(both becoming and not becoming) and chaotic, just as the primordial
chaos in the Timaeus. Thus to deny the existence of unity is also to deny
the existence of pluralitythe myriad things.

(d)If unity is no one (165e166c), what happens to many?

If unity is nonparticular, many will also be denied, since if many exist, unity
could be in them as one of many. Without many, unity can be nowhere.
The hypotheses rest on the negative form of the verbal noun to be,
namely, to be not. I will discuss the issue of verbal nouns in a separate
chapter in conjunction with Daoist concepts of nothing and something.
Here I concentrate on a core issue: with the negation arguments, Plato has
closed all roads for Eleatic logic to have any positive contribution toward
understanding the OM problem. What Plato has shown in eight hypoth-
eses is essentially one central argument. One and many are paradoxically
related; Eleatic logic cannot simply solve the problem by applying the logic
of exclusion to keep one and many apart.
The paradox is basically the fundamental weakness of Parmenidean
logic. Once the OM problem has been discussed in the context of Forms,
it cannot be simply explained as a set of logical antitheses, which would
yield a series of absurd results, as Plato has demonstrated. But Plato has not
taken an important step forward. If one and many can be both affirmed
or denied, it implies that they are coupled. Then, the question is this: is
it a relational problem? Ge Hongs relational ontology asserts that Dao is
paradoxically both one and many, both transcendent beyond the world
and immanent in Nature. Ge Hong understands that the ontological life
of Dao must be transcendent beyond apparent change in the world as the
44 textual studies

grand ancestor of all, yet it also must be immanent in the many in order
for the myriad things to be the diversification of ancestral life. Dao and the
myriad things (one and many) are relational.
Like Ge Hong, Plato also realizes that unity and plurality are inclusive
concepts. And he did conceive a relational ontology as Ge Hong did in the
biological model. However, he ended the dialogue without further com-
ment about his realization of the inclusiveness that had been produced
by formal logic that presupposes exclusiveness. This is because to a large
degree Plato has accepted Eleatic logic as a philosophical tool, and that
very acceptance impels him to be committed to the validity of the result.
The result is true because it confirms what the doctrine of Forms implies.
The world consists of Forms and sensibles, a combination of unity and
plurality. On the one hand, each Form has a structure of one over many
by predicating a class of sensibles sharing the same name. Even though
the many cannot contribute ontological value to the being of the one,
without the many one is a mere empty name, and has nothing to predi-
cate. On the other hand, each Form is also one among many in the sys-
tem of Forms. Without the plurality of Forms the world of many could be
reduced to Parmenidean homogeneity if the one and many were treated
solely in logical terms. Therefore the doctrine of Forms does imply that
one and many are relational. But as to what exactly the relation means for
the system of Forms, a unity containing multiple Forms, I would like to
postpone the discussion and to keep our thought trained on the critique
of Parmenides.
Plato believes the world is a system of harmony because the system of
unchanging Forms transcends the world of changing phenomena. Hav-
ing invented the doctrine of Forms, Plato cannot go back to the Parmeni-
dean homogeneous world without plurality, nor will he leave the atomists
Parmenidean miniaturesatomsfloating in being-less spaces without a
unity. However, the challenge is how to maintain that Forms are both onto-
logically separate (or transcendent) from sensibles and phenomenologi-
cally present (immanent) in them. The challenge is again Parmenidean
in kind. The ontological divide of Being/Becoming, which secures the
separation, also seriously limits the participation that is required for each
Form to be empirically traceable in sensibles as well as the intelligibility
of the universals to be conceived through physical objects. This problem
of separation/participation is exactly what Eleatic spokesman Parmenides
(and Aristotle also) rejects in the first part of Platos book.
Why did Plato choose to make the doctrine of Forms vulnerable to
attack? I would argue that it is simply because the central motif of the book
is against Parmenides, not for the Eleatic school. Plato chooses to put
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate45

forward the theory under objections precisely because the problem of sep-
aration is an inherited problem from the Parmenidean dualism of Being
and Becoming. Plato exhibits the criticisms before people influenced by
Eleaticism within the Academy. With his intellectual openness and creative
writing, he invites someone wisethe founder of the schoolto join the
discussion. In another dialogue on ontological matterthe SophistPlato
also invites an Eleatic stranger who turns out to be a well-trained logician
from the school. Here the hidden agenda of exposing problems concern-
ing Forms is actually to reassess the problem of separation against the
background of Being-Becoming.
For some well-trained philosophers, this premise that derived from the
historical Parmenides is accountable for the fundamental issue of Forms.
The fact that Plato did not make major modifications after having com-
pleted the book to a large degree is because Plato can turn against Par-
menides in the dialogue but cannot really run away from his tradition of
being. Among Platos predecessors, no one had produced a premise that
was nearly powerful as the Parmenidean One to lay the foundation upon
which Platos own rational philosophy could be constructed in the midst
of Heraclitean flux. Plato had no intention to leave the tradition of being.
Subsequently he neither abandoned his doctrine of Forms nor conducted
major modification in later dialogues such as the Timaeus. His arguments
against and for Parmenides were an intellectual device similar to what
Marx did with Hegel.

The Separation of Forms from Sensibles

If we read the two parts of the dialogue in reverse order, the second part
is Platos offensive move against criticisms by reducing the propositions
to perplexities even formal logic is unable to disentangle. The first part,
then, is a defensive move where Plato makes himself vulnerable before
objections. Nevertheless he has examined some of the twisted logic of his
time. To expose two major problems of his ownthe dilemma of participa-
tion and the unknowable Formsis to expose the premise of Parmenides.
Plato is a master of philosophical dialogues, and like his other dialogues
this ones narrative line twists and turns, ultimately apologetic.
The key to understanding the narrative is a philosophical premise set
out in the prologue. Various criticisms late in the book rely on this core
proposition. Historically Zeno of Elea (c. 470 BC) was the associate of Par-
menides (126c). Here Plato uses what is possibly a developed version of
Parmenides monism, but it is attributed to Zeno. Hence Plato uses one of
Zenos paradoxes to underline the issue of why the Parmenidean unity is
an explicit denial of plurality (127d128e).
46 textual studies

(a)If thing are many, they must be both like and unlike.
(b)Like things cannot be unlike nor unlike things, like.
(c)Therefore there cannot be many things. Plurality is impossible.

The underlying argument of Zenos paradox is the logical exclusion of

like/unlike. It is Zenos fallacy.
If all things are categorized by the logic of exclusion, then all relations
between things in the world are erased by the exclusion, because relations
are both like and unlike. For instance, the relationship between father and
son is like and unlike: like by inheritance, unlike by diversification. If the
logic of exclusion is applied, the both/and relation is forced to two logical
poles without any association in between, on which relationships depend.
The paradox of the relational like/unlike in Zenos argument mirrors
the sameness/difference issue in the OM problem. But what Zeno has done
is to use the logic of opposition either/or to set like/unlike in terms of
polarization rather than recognizing them as a pair of relations. The latter
is exactly the core of Ge Hongs genealogical unfolding from one to many.
The either/or entails that there will be either no likeness or no unlike-
ness between father and sons simply because any affirmation of the relation
is the very rejection of it by the exclusion. It is interesting that Plato precon-
ditions the whole dialogue in the prologue by crowning Zenos paradox as
an abiding treaty for himself and its critics. As the text demonstrates, once
the young Socrates enters into this treaty, he cannot get out.
Following the prologue, the book demonstrates some key objections
to Platos theory of Forms. Parmenides criticism focusing on the problem
of separation consists of two aspects: the problem of separation of Forms
from sensibles and the dilemma of participation.
In one passage (130be) Parmenides attacks an inherited problem of
Forms in the Phaedo and the Republic. According to the theory, justice is
the Form of many just deeds and virtues that share the same name, but the
Form of justice remains as a transcendental ideal above social conditions.
Parmenides names this separation problem for Socrates by asking a simple
question: is a human character separate from us (130c)? Following the
logic of Forms, Socrates answer should be yes, but he becomes unsure
because the theory of Forms implies the absurdity that human characters
are separate entities apart from the reality of being a human. Parmenides
recognizes Socrates perplexity and pushes the attack further by extending
the scope of the problem from the ethical to the empirical sphere.
Are there independent Forms for hair or mud or dirt or any other
trivial and undignified objects (130c)? Socrates could only dismiss the
question by saying that unphilosophical things have no place in the sys-
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate47

tem of moral and mathematical Forms. But the answer leaves the problem
of content wide open: how many Forms are there? More important, how
can it be decided what is a Form and what is not? When the doctrine of
Forms has been applied to the world containing nonethical and nonmath-
ematical objects, Platonic metaphysics seemingly cannot address the full
contents of the physical world. The doctrine of Forms is a selective system
through the filters of Socratic ethics and Pythagorean mathematics. But
the admission of those trivial objects will equally lead the young Socrates
into a bottomless pit of nonsense (130d).
Based on the problem of separation, Parmenides further raises the
dilemma of participation. He reasons that insofar as the problem of sepa-
ration exists, it also prevents Forms from full participation in sensibles. If
one Form is separated from many sensibles, then how can it participate
in them? The concept of participation requires the one to partake in the
many (131a). For participation to happen, the numerical one must sepa-
rate from itself in order to partake in many; for participation will violate
the principle of separation. Yet still, if the one partakes in the many, one
Form has to be partly or fully present in sensibles. The one needs to be
in many places at once. As a result, just as a large sail covers many people
(131b), because it is placed above people, it only covers each person with
a portion of the large sail but not the whole. In other words, for the one to
partake in the many, it has to be divided.
Then if the divided one consists of parts (131c), it is a unity containing
pluralityboth one and many. It will no longer be a numerical one. Fur-
thermore, according to the principle of divisibility (131cd), any part of
divided Largeness is smaller than Largeness, and any part of divided Small-
ness is smaller than Smallness; then Largeness will contain the character
of the small, and Smallness will be larger than its parts. If this reasoning
were correct (it is actually false), then Parmenides questions: How are
the other things going to partake of your Forms, if they can partake of
them neither in part nor as wholes? (131e). The question implies that the
smaller parts of Largeness, which are small, not large, cannot partake in
the Form of Largeness. Likewise the smaller parts of Smallness, which are
smaller than Smallness, cannot partake in the Form of Smallness because
Smallness is larger than divided parts.
Parmenides reasoning is wrong on various grounds. First of all, the
reasoning is based on the false assumption, as Cornford rightly points out,
that Largeness and Smallness are material things that are divisible.29 To
carry this insight further, in the analogy of a large sail covering many
people, the same assumption is used to treat Forms as materially divis-
ible. The young Socrates did not recognize this premise as contrary to
48 textual studies

his understanding of Forms. But Plato is absolutely clear that Forms are
immaterial and indivisible beings.
The young Socrates did not realize that the criticism can be easily
refuted by another analogy. If immaterial and indivisible sky instead of
the material sail covers many people in different parts of the world, then
each person does not have a divided sky above them, but the same and
whole sky. The one over many premise stays. The point at which Socrates
has become bogged down even to the point of having no reply is his own
ambiguous distinction of like/unlike. In the early passage, Socrates
declares like/unlike to be logical antithesis (129b), thus failing to recog-
nize that they are relational contrariesone cannot be meaningful with-
out the other. If a Form cannot contain the polarized like/unlike, the
Parmenidean logic of division impels him to accept that Largeness cannot
compose the Form of Large (or like), and the smaller parts of divided
large (or unlike) at the same time.
To be sure, the whole notion of unlike parts is based on the assump-
tion of material divisible being. This is a twist made by contemporary
thought, when the logic of division is applied to Forms. But the historical
Parmenides did not hold such a view. He regarded the One as an indivis-
ible material unity. The young Socrates somehow surrenders to the idea of
divisible being, which the doctrine of Forms rejects, without a fight. So
he accepts the dilemma of participation as not an easy matter to deter-
mine in the way that Parmenides has framed it for him.
Second, Parmenides permits only two kinds of participation: one in
many by presence and many in one by partaking. In the notions of pres-
ence and partaking there is a hidden problem. Parmenides employs
these concepts to explore the dilemma of participation. To keep Forms
separate from sensibles Plato wants to maintain the transcendence of
Forms. If Forms slip into a state of total immanence, for Plato the damage
is that rational Formsthe objects of knowledgebecome entangled with
irrational becoming in the physical world. In the Parmenides the separa-
tion has been stated as a symmetry that Forms are separate from sensibles
and sensibles from Forms. In Metaphysics (XIII) Aristotle also recognizes
that, according to Plato, Forms are separate from sensibles and capable
of existing apart, and points out that the separation is responsible for all
the problems with the Forms (1086a). Aristotle is correct to critique the
separation; Parmenides is not wrong to name the symmetry of separation.
However, what is wrong about Parmenides reasoning is that he attributes
a symmetrical relation to participation also.
Proclus rightly identified this asymmetrical relation long ago.30 For
instance, sons resemble their fathers characters. It is all right to say the
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate49

fathers character participates in the sons but not correct to imagine that
the characters of the sons participate in the father. Similarly, modeling
Forms (as in the Timaeus) participate in sensibles by creating physical
things as copies of the models, but the reverse is false. The causal relation
between Forms and sensibles or the models and their copies is irreversible.
The separation between the cause and the caused must be maintained,
just as the Demiurge must be self-differentiated from his creatures.
Ge Hongs relational ontology, the one and many, contains this asym-
metrical participation. One creates the myriad things, but the myriad
things do not create One. The creative order from one to many cannot
be reversed. However, what is reversible is the potency of ancestral life
the immanence within many, which has manifested in individual lives. That
is to say, the One can be understood in and through the many. Using the
same example, the resembled characters in the sons are traceable to the
father. By understanding inherited characters in the sons, some aspects
of the fathers life can be traced as the origin. Nonetheless, the father is
always ontologically independent of the sons; the sons are neither identi-
cal with the father nor with each other. There exist discontinuity and conti-
nuity between the father and the sons. This is how Ge Hong maintains that
the One is both transcendent and immanent in individuality.
For Plato the separation has secured the transcendental status of Forms:
being itself. A Form requires no external contribution and is indivisible.
But this is only the discontinuity between one and many. The discontinuity
between cause and caused, however, must be sustained by a causal continu-
ity. In reality an OVM Form has already stated this causal continuity. The
problem is that the continuity is greatly overshadowed by the discontinu-
ity because Plato has committed to the Parmenidean suggestion to divide
being from becoming. Consequently, what is lacking is the immanence of
Forms. This absent immanence is the other side of the problem of separa-
tion generated out of the same premise of being separated from becom-
ing. It is what the Platonic Parmenides attacks.
Third, the separation of Forms from sensibles is the by-product of the
double-world view of Being/Becoming. This worldview is originally Par-
menides vision that Plato inherits and never abandons. Is Platos two
worlds theory identical to Parmenides? The answer is a double standard.
In Platos theory of ethical Forms the division is not as great as in his
theory of mathematical Forms. But he never sorted out the ambiguity of
why he affirms two versions of Forms: transcendent mathematical Forms
and relatively immanent ethical Forms. The doctrine of souls affirms that
humans exist in the realm of Becoming, but the rational part of soul has
independent existence in the realm of Being. In the doctrine of creation,
50 textual studies

the World Soul intermediates two realms; the Soul is created as a copy of
the eternal model (the system of Forms) and is the rational identity of the
physical world. But here in the Parmenides, the point of dispute is shifted
from ethical Forms (130c), which Plato argues in the Phaedo and Meno, to
the transcendental Forms (132b133a), which is mathematically in kind as
in the Republic and Timaeus. The whole idea of intermediation is evidently
absent in the Parmenides.
For Parmenides, Being and Becoming derive from his famous argu-
ment that within Being there is nothing of not-Being. 31 To support this
argument, Parmenides reasons that the human mind can only think about
something, about Being, and no one can possibly think about nothing,
about not-Being.32 Sensible objects in the realm of Becoming contain both
coming to be and passing away; they are mere names without substan-
tial and definable essence that reason could positively affirm.33 Being and
Becoming are logical opposites conditioned by the ontological anthe-
sis that within Being there is nothing of not-Being. There is nothing
between two worlds. Plato employs this polarized theory in the Parmenides.
In the passages where the young Socrates tries to salvage his theory
by presenting Forms as thoughts (132bc) and paradigms (132c133a),
Plato makes Socrates further postulate the two worlds theory. Parmenides
subsequently rejects both arguments and further charges the greatest dif-
ficulty, namely, that Forms are unknowable (133a134e). Traditionally this
part of the dialogue is read as the elder Parmenides training of the young
Socrates. But an alternative reading can be interpreted through the train
of thought against Parmenides.
The dialogue could be Platos way of training students in the Acad-
emy to recognize some of the problems associated with the Parmenidean
antithesis of Being/not-being and the reduction of plurality to homogene-
ity. By making the young Socrates open-mouthed at the end of the dia-
logue, Plato actually takes the criticisms upon himself. He neither rejects
the problem of separation (because it is the problem) nor affirms the
Eleatic criticism to be true (because it is false). But the passive ending of
the first part opens the door for Platos offensive move in the second part.
If a good student could distinguish the difference between two kinds of
double-world theory, he should recognize that Parmenides one without
many argument, which reduces the heterogeneous world to the homoge-
neous One, is exactly what the doctrine of Forms rejects.

The Epistemological Problem of the Separation

In the Parmenides, the epistemological problem is even greater in the Par-
menidean sense. If there is nothing between Being and Becoming, then
 platos answer to the pre-socratic debate51

inevitably there will be no epistemological access between them. Par-

menides argues (133a134e):

(a)If A is not related to B, B is also not related to A.

(b)If Forms belong to A and human minds to B, then B has no access
to A.
(c)A is either self-revealing to B or unknowable to B.

The reasoning follows that Forms in the world of Being are inacces-
sible to humans living in the world of Becoming. Parmenides concludes:
Forms are unknowable to us (134c).
This conclusion is only valid when Being/Becoming is defined by the
Parmenidean ontology. But the conclusion is false, because (a) and (b) do
not produce (c). For instance, a chair is not related to a man, but a chair
can still be known by the person. The unrelated identities (of a chair and a
man) do not entail no relation at all between them. Parmenides argument
rests on the nonrelational division of Being/Becoming. But there must be
something fundamental between Being and Becoming. This something
could be an experience, for example, a person feels the support of a chair
on which he is sitting. Unfortunately, Plato rejects experience as a reliable
source of knowledge but is committed to the epistemology of knowing
Forms through Forms alone. Consequently the OVM causation has made
experiencea connection between many and oneontologically inferior
and epistemologically unreliable.
To reject Parmenidean reasoning, Plato has a separate discourse. Inso-
far as he is concerned, epistemology is also Pythagorean. Following the
Pythagorean theology of the immortal soul, Plato in the Phaedrus (245c
d) argues that rational part of the soul has inborn intelligence to access
the world of Being. In the Phaedo (72e77d), Plato presents the theory of
knowledge as recollection. Between the intelligible world of Forms and
human souls, there exists a divine logos running in both directions. Thus
true knowledge of Forms seems to be inborn rather acquired. These argu-
ments would require extra space to discuss. Here the point is this: they
all support the ultimate aim of knowing transcendental Forms, which is
developed from the Parmenidean epistemology of knowing being in and
through being.
The puzzling question emerges: if true knowledge is of nothing but
Forms, again why is it is necessary to give intermediate status to sensibles/
belief and human souls. For Plato the intermediate status does not just
represent a sandwiched category between intelligible beings and unintel-
ligible and shadowing images, but speaks for a real condition of the soul
52 textual studies

and physical objects. They are the existential ground of human reality and
the epistemological point of departure to which Plato must hold on. With-
out these anchoring points, there will neither be the starting point of the
souls search for rational beings nor the ascending journey to intellectual
enlightenment. But with these anchoring points, human life will always be
a struggle to control irrational passions and desires within human nature,
and the making of the philosophical mind will always involve a painful
process to remove perceptions in order to gaze at beings beyond sensibles.
In the Parmenides Plato has shown nothing about how accessible this
path from many to one is. Having turned the problem of unknowable
Forms back to the Parmenidean tradition, the first part of the dialogue
ends with a perplexing situation. Without Forms, one will not even have
anything to which to turn his mind. . . . And so he will utterly destroy the
power and significance of thought and discourse (135c). Having followed
Parmenides tradition of being in his intellectual formation thus far, he
clearly knows his predecessor and the problems. The doctrine of Forms
overall is an important step in the Parmenidean tradition of being and
aims to solve problems by redefining ontology through Forms.

Summary

Modern Platonic scholarship has a tendency to read the Parmenides as

Platos centralized discussion on the OM problem. This tendency has been
rethought. The book is not for but against the Eleaticism founded by Par-
menides. Under the influence of analytical philosophy, Platonic scholarship
tends to treat the one and the many as a logical problem and pays great
attention to the logical aspect of the ontological problem. Because Eleati-
cism had a strong influence on Plato, the book evidently shows that Plato
had gone an extraordinary distance to address the logic of exclusion.
However, this investigation has identified a Marx and Hegel relation
between Plato and Parmenides. Having inherited the tradition of logic
from Parmenides, in the second half of the book, Plato has demonstrated
his capacity to deal with the OM problem just as well as Eleatic logicians. In
the first half, many arguments did not entirely represent Platos view. They
are reactions against the contemporary school within which he was entan-
gled and from which he tries to break free. As the dialogues show toward
the end, Plato realizes that the one and the many is unsolvable by Parmeni-
dean logic. Similar to Ge Hongs one and many between the ancestral Dao
and the myriad things, the whole book demonstrates an ontological para-
dox: between one and many there is a mutual dependency. Any rejection
of either unity or plurality leads to the denial of the other.
 chapter 3

Ge Hongs Preservation of the One

Having traced the development of the OM debate from the pre-Socratics

to Plato, we must now come to terms with Daoist epistemology. Strictly
speaking, epistemology is not the right term for Daoism because it suggests
the cognitive knowing of things that are rationally worthy of belief. Unlike
Platos abstract reasoning, Ge Hongs notion of knowledge is empirical.
It neither regards reason as having the monopoly on knowing Dao nor
believes objective knowledge is superior to subjective opinion. For Ge
Hong, cultivation plays the central role in the activity of preserving truth.
Ge Hong uses a specific term meaning to cultivate spirit and preserve the
One, sishen shouyi (IC 112).

Cultivating Life

We begin the investigation by returning to the narrative on the universal

Qi (68), which contains an evolutionary theory of one and many. Xuan
is pregnant with the primordial One, universally casts the identities of Yin
and Yang, and breathes out the breath of the great beginning (6). Here
the key image is baotai yuanyi , which literally means pregnant
with the original one.
The Scripture of Eternal Peace says, Concrete things proceed from pri-
mordial Qi (wu shiyu yuanqi ) (TPJ 67, 254).1 Ge Hong also
says in an alchemical context, From heaven to earth and ten thousand
things between them, there is nothing that is not born out of Qi (IC 5,
114).2 Thus the original one refers to the primordiality of the undistin-
guished matter out of which concrete things are created. With this refer-
ence, it is clear that Ge Hongs One refers to a material form of life in a
state of gestation within Xuan. He later explains the cosmic pregnancy in
the context of internal cultivation. What the Master Lao said about Form
in the midst of formlessness, Matter inside the nothingness really referred
to the One (IC 323).3
Compared with the Nothingness of Xuan, Qi is a Form (xiang ) and
Matter (wu ). Just as a fetus is a new life that evolves through the pro-
cess of synthesizing form and matter, Qi is the material life of the invisible

53
54 textual studies

Xuan. Just as a mother extends her life force to the fetus through the
umbilical cord, Xuan extends the immanent life to the primordial Qi. The
underlying issue between nothing and something is the continuation of
life. In cosmic terms, the gestation of Qi bespeaks the formation of the
universe within the empty space of Xuan. Contrary to the modern idea of
space, which can be traced to the characterless space of pre-Socratic atom-
ismwithout any ontological significancehere the empty space is full of
potency. The cosmic womb is a biological vessel similar to the alchemical
vessel that creates an environment to enable and contain change.
One problem, common in classical Chinese, is that the chosen phrase
does not indicate a particular tense. Is the gestation a prehistoric moment
or a constant process of making? Unlike modern linear thinking in the
West, ancient Daoism does not hold the premise that the creation was a
once-and-for-all event at the very beginning of time. The act of creation is
completed so that nothing more can be added. On the contrary, Daoist
creation is internally a biological transformation of life like a fetus and
externally a natural process like a growing genealogical tree. The core of
this change is called Indeterminate Action (wuwei ); the manifestation
of the change is called Nature (ziran ).
Here there is also a translation problem. Laozi originally said, Dao
does not act (wuwei ), but nothing is left undone (Laozi 48).4 Ge
Hong also specifically used the term wuwei eleven times in the Inner Chap-
ters.5 In two instances, Ge Hong says, The method of immortality requires
quiet, solitude, and wuwei (IC 17) and Heavens wuwei, therefore, is
clear (IC 138).6 Often misleadingly, wuwei is translated as nonaction, to
act without acting, and doing nothing.7 These translations have failed to
demonstrate the meaning of being indeterminate.
Indeterminate refers to action that is open-ended and exploratory, not
confined to goal-directed action. The translation also makes an important
philosophical contrast. To be indeterminate is the chief virtue of the Dao.
The activity of the indeterminate Dao is Indeterminate Action. Regarding
the translation of wuwei two interconnected issues need to be clarified:
spontaneity and humility. Laozi asks, why is the ocean the greatest? He
then answers, It is because it has the virtue of humility. By taking the
lowliest position it draws all streams of living water into it (Laozi 66). The
greatest virtue of Dao rests in its indeterminateness in the likeness of soft
water (Laozi 78). The ocean does not act, but the indeterminate space
creates the environment from which diverse forms of life spontaneously
emerge from water. Like Laozis ocean and water, Ge Hongs cosmic womb
is also an indeterminate environment for the gestation of life.
Another key connection with Laozi is the concept of sheng. Like Laozi,
 ge hongs preservation of the one55

Ge Hong uses sheng as the verb to give birth, not the noun life. Citing
the classic texts Zhou Yi and Zuozhuan, he says, The greatest virtue in the
universe is to give birth. And to give birth is to cherish things (IC 252).8
Interestingly the original context of the verb sheng in Zhou Yi is discussed in
the context of universal change (bian ). Because Yang and Yin are push-
ing each other, change emerges from their midst. . . . To give birth means
to be active. 9 The reference indicates something crucial in Ge Hongs
reference to cosmic pregnancy that has not been mentioned. To give birth
is closely associated with the concept of change, and change in Zhou Yi is
not just a universal phenomenon, but also a permanent reality. Therefore
the permanent realityDao, which consists of the relational ontology of
Xuan and Qiis expressed in the cosmogonical context with the motif of
the cosmic pregnancy.
Unlike Parmenides unchanged One, Ge Hongs cosmogonical one is
ontologically a changing one. Unlike Zenos logic exclusion of like and
unlike, Xuan and Qi are relational, and their relationship is defined as
life. From here onwards, we should use Ge Hongs own concept Xuan Dao
to express this relational ontology and give the abbreviation of Dao to this
self-generating first cause.
Since change is the perpetual principle of Nature, this self-generating
Dao transcends time rather remaining a prehistoric moment at the begin-
ning of time. Since change is expressed through the central theme to
give birth to life, the change that manifests through the act of giving birth
must happen in every moment of time.10 Therefore, the underlying reality
of the world of changing phenomena is not a fixed logos, but a changing
Dao. The interactive Xuan-Qi together form the concept Dao, or the most
fundamental reality of all things. Out of the water in the womb, out of the
environment of letting life freely develop, the first material life (Qi) took
potency from the mother and began to evolve into more and more com-
plex life with plural parts. Creation was not the result of one single deter-
minative act, like building a chair according to a design, but a sequence
of biological diversification. Out of this cosmic womb, Yin and Yang came
to being. The world was breathed into life. And billions of substances took
form within the organic life of the cosmos. The process is called ziran,
being itself and following ones own accord.
Is Daoist creation comparable with the Judeo-Christian seven days
creation? The simple answer is no, if it is presented as a dialogue with Pla-
tonism. For Daoism, the diversification process is an internal gestation
process within the creator. In Genesis, the seven days of divine creation
are expressed as an external work of God. More complex answers relate
to the coinciding issues of what the creator is and what the creator does.
56 textual studies

These issues in Christian theology are called the being and works of God.
To borrow the concepts, the works of Dao center on Indeterminate Action.
Out of the indeterminate Dao, the creation unfolds in sequence: first, the
primordial Qi; second, the two energies of Yin and Yang; third, the embodi-
ment of life as Qi breathed into Nature; fourth, the actuality of substances
taking concrete physical forms. For Ge Hong, this sequential evolution
of life does not only take place inside the cosmic wombXuanbut the
creator like a mother also converts nothing into something. The change
from nothing into being is intrinsically an internal conversion. The creator
internally changes timelessly, more like Heraclitus perpetual change than
the Platonic unchangeable Demiurge, which has an unshakable impact
on the interpretation of the Creator in Genesis. Contrary to the determi-
nate God, Dao is indeterminate. Laozis mother Dao is the self-humbling
ocean that withdraws its power by harboring life inside its infinite space.
Ge Hongs pre-cosmos is spontaneous change inside of the infinite dark-
ness of Xuan.
After this brief comparison, it is necessary to deny any sweeping claim
that Dao and God are interchangeable. Religious pluralism cannot give
way to the idealism of one supreme deity over all religions. James R. Ware
in his translation of the Inner Chapters has persistently translated Xuan Dao
as God. 11 Ware failed to recognize the complex nature of intercultural
dialogue. Just to mention a few important distinctions, God is personal,
whereas Dao is impersonal. God is identified and worshiped by the cho-
sen people. Dao is nameless. Even Laozi humbly acknowledges that who
and what Dao is, he does not really know. To make this distinction does
not mean the God-Dao comparison is inconceivable. For example, what
Christian negative theology says about God is similar to Ge Hongs reverse
thinking from something to nothing. Yet unless this comparative ground is
thoroughly discussed, Wares sweeping claim is troubling.
It is true that the creation ex nihilo is what Judeo-Christian theogony
and Daoist cosmogony share. The modern commentator Chen Feilong
has interpreted Ge Hongs opening chapter as creationism.12 But
creationism as expressed in Genesis operates in a linear teleological frame-
work, whereas Daoist creation is a cyclical and ongoing process.
Unlike medieval theology, represented by Aquinas, the Hegelian Chris-
tian theology of the modern age tends to view creationism teleologically.
Creation, Incarnation, and Consummation are three paradigms of history.
History is a determinative course or salvation history to the climax when
God becomes the All and in all. The teleological end was already built in
at the beginning of time, namely, the will of God. The divine will becomes
the very purpose for the creation in history. And the purpose is yet to be
 ge hongs preservation of the one57

fulfilled at the end of history. Contrary to this concept of God, Dao neither
performed a once-and-for-all single creation nor possesses a built in telos
for eschatological fulfillment. The making of the world is understood as
a never-ceasing process because the creativity of Dao is always in the mak-
ing. The distinction between intelligent design and evolutionary change
cannot be collapsed.

Qi and Empiricism

Based on the relational ontology of Xuan and Qi, Ge Hong argues that
knowledge is empirical. To engage the knowledge path also means to
understand what life is for the individual or universally what Qi is. Humans
exist within the [universal] Qi, Qi dwells within the human body. From the
heavens and earth to the myriad things, there is nothing that does not
require Qi to be born (IC 114).13 Unlike Platos distinction of transcen-
dental Forms and material objects, Ge Hongs creative Qi is immanent
within the world. Heaven attaining the One becomes clear, the earth
attaining the One remains peaceful, humans attaining the One gain life,
and gods attaining the One become efficacious (IC 323).14 The concept
of the One is not only concealed in the cosmogonical beginning, but also
runs the continual course that sustains it in each of the creatures.
Xuan Dao the One (Qi) the immanent Qi in the myriad things

Is the One material or immaterial? Ge Hong says in the alchemic chap-

ter: Clouds, rain, frost, and snow are forms of heavenly Qi. . . . As to
the [changes] of high mountains becoming low pools and of deep vales
becoming hills, they are also the changing [phenomena] of the great mat-
ter (IC 284). Contrary to the Pythagorean concept of the soul, Qi is a cos-
mogonical component rather than a pneumatic force apart from matter.
Compared with pre-Socratic material monism (water or air), Qi is more
than the primal matter. It is a combination of both matter and life. It is a
unique materialism.
Prior to Ge Hong, Wang Chong (AD 2797) in the Han period
put forward a materialist account of Qi in his book Arguments Weighing
in the Balance (Lun heng ). The birth of ten thousand things comes
from the original Qi (LH 23, 949). When heaven and the earth embrace
Qi, ten thousand things are born spontaneously. This is like when hus-
band and wife unite [their] Qi, a child is born spontaneously (LH 18,
775).15 Wang Chong argued that the world had a universal and material
foundation. Primal matter was innately changeable, and by self-changing
it became many and transformed into diverse substances. The same mate-
58 textual studies

rialism was argued by two earlier texts. In the Scripture on Eternal Peace, as
mentioned earlier, Qi was defined as the irreducible substance of the mate-
rial world. In the Master of Huainan (Huainanzi ), written by various
sages under the aegis of Liu An (180123 BC), the cause of all material
things dwells within ten thousand things (HNZ 14, 734).16 Although Qi
was prior to material existences, it was still immanent within the world by
transforming itself from one to the many.
The remarkable aspect of Wang Chongs materialism, which evidently
influenced Ge Hong, was the corresponding empiricism. Many [specula-
tive] thinkers have turned away from reality without seeking effective tests
[for their theories]. Though they have fine and elaborate theories, peo-
ple still do not believe them. . . . Thoughts must be verified against what
things demonstrably do (LH 26, 1086).17 Wang Chongs empiricism gave
priority to reality over theory and argued reality as the criterion of truth.
In the Outer Chapters, Ge Hong spoke highly of Wang Chong and praised
him as the pioneering thinker at the time when Han scholasticism was
immersed in bottomless speculation. From the end of Han, none can
match Wang Chongs brilliance (OC 43, 423).18 In Ge Hongs cultivation
and instrumental alchemy, he also maintained the principle that from
small experiments, one is able to know great truth (IC 140).19
Ge Hongs theory of knowledge is both for and against Wang Chong.
He accepts Qi is material and empirical but rejects the antireligious senti-
ment of Wang Chongs materialism. Ge Hongs religious philosophy rests
upon the doctrine of soteriology. For those who hope to attain longevity,
the preservation of the One is to be taken as a clear [priority] (IC 323).20
Human life is not inevitably a degenerative process of aging, but ought to
be able to attain the longevity in the likeness of eternal Qi.
The general method is called the Preservation of the One (shouyi
). Against the background of from the one to the many, Ge Hong
argues reverse thinking once more. Comparable with the continuation
of life between ancestor and progeny, this continuity of life beyond the
discontinuity between the creator and the created allows humans to seek
paths back to the point of cosmic origin and to participate in the creative
core of the cosmos. Obtain it on the inside, and preserve it on the out-
side. Whoever uses it becomes an immortal; whoever forgets it becomes a
vessel (IC 2).21 Xuan Dao can be inwardly discerned to enrich life from
within. And the preserved creativity can be manifested externally. Who-
ever participates in the One becomes divine, and whoever neglects it will
become a mere vessel. As Ge Hong scholar Hu Fuchen rightly points out,
Ge Hong reinvented Qi as an empirical philosophy based on the cultiva-
tion of the Dao. 22
 ge hongs preservation of the one59

Soteriology

Ge Hong has two empirical methods: internal cultivation and instrumental

alchemy, or inner and outer alchemy.23 For the current purpose, it is neces-
sary only to focus on the former; the latter can be left for the discussion of
Ge Hongs natural philosophy. In the eighteenth chapter, titled Earthly
Truth (dizhen ), two distinctive methods are mentioned: Preserving
the Xuan-One (shou xuanyi ) and Preserving the Real-One (shou
zhenyi ).

The method of Xuan-One is also an important practice. The method

has no unavoidable improbity that is impossible to overcome, [thus
it] achieves the same effects as [the practice of] the Real-One. The
first chapter of my Inner Chapters named Rhapsody of Xuan [changx-
uan ] is aimed exactly at this point. To preserve the Xuan-One is
easier than [preserving] the Real-One. The Real-One possesses names
[xingzi ], [with characters of] tall or short [changduan ] and
[is dressed in] colorful raiments [fuse ]. But the Xuan-One is about
Self-Seeing [zijian ]. An adept practices it in the middle of the day,
therefore [the practice] is called knowing the white but preserving
the black [zhibai shouhei ]. Even if the adept wants to die, he
will not able to. The adept must first follow the purification ritual for
a hundred days, and then he may engage in the practice. It should not
take more than three or four days to encounter the One. Once it is
encountered, take it and keep it [dezhi shouzhi ]. In this way it
should not depart from the person. Preserving the Real-One, [sponta-
neously] discerning his body [siqishen ], he should be split into
three persons [fenwei sanren ]. Once the three persons have
been realized, [the realization] further enhances the One. Eventually
over ten physical beings of the adept will appear, all in the likeness of
the original one. To make [the multiple appearances] disappear and
appear, one has separate oral instructions [koujue ]. Overall this is
the Dao of Dividing Forms [fenxing zhidao ]. (IC 325)

In interpreting such a text one faces three hermeneutical problems.

First, oral instructions (koujue ) are never written down. They are the
sacred orally transmitted teachings to be used together with the text. As
Ge Hong indicates, oral instructions can only be transmitted from a mas-
ter to a chosen pupil under the strict oath to protect the lineage (IC 324).
Second, texts on cultivation and instrumental alchemy are written in meta-
phors and fables. They are not to be taken at face value; thus interpreta-
60 textual studies

tion requires careful reconstruction. Until the language has been demy-
thologized, it is very difficult to grasp what the instructions are. Third,
Daoist cultivation methods are not descriptive, but rather invitational.
Unless a reader is willing to be drawn into the text, it is impossible to gain
an understanding of the process they refer to.

The F ANGSHU Tradition

In the above passage, the Preservation of the Xuan-One is called the Dao
of Dividing Forms (fenxing zhidao ). The images below illustrate
a female adept practicing the method in stages (Figure 3.1) and describe
how inner cultivation will lead to external manifestations of the same per-
son at different places. Historically the method belonged to the tradition
called fangshu . Before Ge Hong, fangshu was regarded as arts that
produced mystic abilities to communicate with cosmic powers, to control
demons, and to heal the sick. Some Daoist adepts, including Ge Hongs
granduncle Ge Xuan (164244), who was a member of the alchemi-
cal school of Zuo Ci (155220), saw themselves as fangshi .
The term fangshi literally means scholars of methods, but it is often
translated as magicians 24 and fangshu as esoterica. 25 Historically fangshi
were not wandering magicians but were more like the prophets of Juda-
ism, who often appeared in the imperial court. Zuo Ci was a leading figure
in the group around Cao Cao in the Three Kingdoms period. The
early commentator on the Laozi Heshang Gong was among the
Han dynasty fangshi who introduced a medical theory of the human body
to the philosophical text.26 The famous medical doctor Hua Tuo was
also a fangshi.27
Many fangshi were both alchemists and medical practitioners. Apart
from his alchemical activities, Ge Hong practiced herbal medicine and
wrote two influential texts. Yuhan fang (100 fascicles) recorded
and categorized by name the diseases that had been identified up to his
time, and provided corresponding prescriptions for each illness (IC 272).
The handbook was one of the most important diagnostic tools for follow-
ing generations of doctors.28 In modern medical study, the book still pro-
vides valuable information on rare diseases. A more concise medical text,
Zhouhou jiuzu fang (3 fascicles), was written for ordinary family
use (IC 272). Recently three out of five prescriptions recommended by the
Chinese Health Organization to combat the disease SARS came from this
text.29 Overall medicine, called the art of healing (yishu ) by Ge Hong
(IC 271), had an inseparable relation with the empirical studies done by
fangshi. They developed the Chinese medical tradition, including herbal
medicine for treating diseases, methods for the prolongation of life, and
 ge hongs preservation of the one61

Fig. 3.1. A female adept practicing the Dao of Dividing Forms. Illustrations
from The Journey of the Goddess of Mount Tai on Her Way to Immortality in
Portraits of Immortals. (Reproduced by permission of the Chinese Daoist Asso-
ciation from Zhongguo Daojiao Xiehui, ed., Daojiao shenxian huaji, Collectors
edition [Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1995], 115)

also arts for exorcism. Modern Daoists still recite the principle without
shu Dao is not agile (dao wu shu bu ling ).
Daoist shu does not refer narrowly to magical prescriptions, but des-
ignates empirical methods to put the Dao into praxis. Contrary to the
main tendency of Confucian intellectualism and moral philosophy, it rep-
62 textual studies

resents the convergence of esoteric empiricism and medical philosophy.

Ge Hongs attitude toward this fangshu tradition was ambivalent. His Inner
Chapters collected many passages on the mystical arts of longevity, but he
was also critical of some cult practices, deriding them as necromancy, and
he tried to eliminate the more drastic practices (IC 172). Yet he preserved
a folk belief in the existence of immortals filtered through soteriology.
Daoist praxis, as Ge Hong puts it, has two aims: it aims primarily to pro-
long life and secondarily to provide relief from disasters and heal the
sick (IC 173). Fangshu for preserving life and necromancy for harming life
thus had to be distinguished from soteriology.

The Soteriological Principle of Return

The central belief of Daoist soteriology is the return to the base of the
cosmic beginning (taichu zhiben ) (IC 170), so that the adept can
become a manifestation of the Dao by personifying its creative potency.
The principle of return is summarized in the phrase knowing the white
but preserving the black in the passage quoted above. The symbolic lan-
guage of white and black is traditionally understood in astronomical con-
text. Black and Xuan share the meaning of infinite space, whereas white is
like a lodestar in the night sky. In another passage it is said, The One [Qi]
can be found in the lodestar (IC 324). As we have seen earlier, Xuan and
Qi are a relational reality of Dao. Here, by employing the words for con-
trasting coloration, Ge Hong vividly but also secretly reveals the principle
of knowing Qi (white) and preserving Xuan (black). Instead of following
the cosmic awakening from Xuan to the One, bodily cultivation goes in
the opposite direction, from white to black. Then the black may be trans-
formed into the white again with renewed access to primordial creative
power.
Ge Hongs instructions in the text explain the principle of return fur-
ther: The first of my Inner Chapters named Rhapsody on Xuan (Chang
xuan ) has this precise purpose. He continues: The immortal adept
travels through the zenith and enters into the nadir. . . . He moves freely in
the realm of the undistinguishable and above the sphere of similarity. He
gulps down beauty at the edge of the clouds and breathes the breaths of
the cosmos in the rosy clouds. He walks through the land of no form and
no trace, and flies across the boundary of the perceivable and the unsee-
able. . . . This is the sage who has preserved the Xuan-One (IC 2).30
This passage claims that the method of returning to the universal ori-
gin produces the effect of cosmic wandering. The motif of wandering
in this passage and the Dao of Dividing Forms in the previous passage
have the similarity of leaving the limited self and entering into the cosmic
 ge hongs preservation of the one63

breadth. What does this wandering really signify? Compare this passage
with another passage from the Zhuangzi.

When three days passed, he was able to put the world outside himself
[wai tianxia ]. After leaving the world, he went on with the pres-
ervation. When seven days passed, he could move beyond forms [waiwu
]. After leaving forms, he again went on with the preservation.
When nine days passed, he could move beyond his life [waisheng
]. After leaving life behind, his mind became pure and fresh as dawn
[zhaoche ]. With this mind he could see what stands alone [jiandu
]. After he had seen the singularity face to face, he was able to
obscure the distinction of the past and the present [wu gujin ].
After he had done so, he could go beyond the distinction between life
and death. Dao begets life and receives life, but it was never born and
it will never die. Something exists as the matter in everything. There is
nothing it does not send off and nothing it does not welcome; there
is nothing it does not destroy and nothing it does not complete. The
name of something is called tumultuous tranquillity [yingning ].
Whoever attains [this paradoxical state of] tumultuous tranquillity is
disturbed [by the Dao] then accomplishes [it]. (Zhuangzi 6)

This passage represents Zhuangzis epistemology: true knowledge is

really about undoing the perversions of learning. To acquire formlessness,
the adept must let go of the habit of seeking endless distinctions, choosing
instead the path with the five steps of wei (to go or move beyond) as the
means to be drawn into the Dao. The adept first lets go of the concept of
the myriad things by standing outside the world. He then lets go of any
forms by standing outside of matter. Having moved beyond the distinction
of life and death, his sleeping mind awakens to the clarity, as if sight is able
to see things in the dawn. At that point, he begins to see the oneness of the
world. Enlightened by the One, he is freed from the matrix of time and
space, which divides the ancient from the present. Having been freed from
the plurality marked by form and matter, life and death, and time and
space, the adept realizes for the first time the truth of the Dao.
The formless Dao does not rule, but nothing is unaccomplished. It
empties itself, but nothing has not been drawn into it. It is not diminished,
but no diminished thing is not returned to it. It does not seek success, but
nothing does not succeed through it. What stands alone in the formless
Dao is primordial matter. It rests inside the formlessness in the state of
tumultuous tranquillity. Whoever attains this paradoxical state of being
will share the same state of Qi with the Dao. Being disturbed but in the
64 textual studies

deepest tranquillity, the adept will always be ready to change but will rest
forever in peace. By succeeding in this paradoxical state, enlightenment
is attained. Zhuangzi calls the enlightened man a realized man (zhenren
).
In Ge Hongs passage, the end of preservation is called True Knowl-
edge of Sufficiency (zhenzhizu ). Through the wandering of drift-
ing into the cosmos, the adept has achieved the state of potency in the
likeness of Qi and rests his being inside Xuan like a fetus. Yet he becomes
a free being without desire, without change, who tastes the purest
and preserves the simplest and drifts spontaneously and mingles with
[Xuan] and seeks equality to its Nature (IC 3).31 Preserving the Xuan-
One, although it appears as a spiritual exercise call Self-Seeing (zijian
), essentially is not about the self, but about the other. The adept views
the totality of his personhood within the context of the cosmos by dissolv-
ing his body into the body of the universe. Once his being is a part of the
world, he will see himself for the first time as a free being. He wanders
through the zenith and enters into nadir, moves freely in the realm of
formlessness, and travels above the sphere of singularity. He gulps down
beauty and breathes the breaths of the cosmos, just as the fetus of Qi
evolves from the womb of the cosmos.
Finally he wonders about his capacity to walk through the land of no
form and no trace, and to fly across the boundary of the perceivable and
the unseeable. Dao manifests life in three primary categories of existence.
Dao gives rise to Qi, and Qi is transformed into the Forms of heaven,
earth, and humanity, so the three are one (IC 323).32 In the likeness of
cosmic creativity, the adept also becomes creative and expresses his cre-
ativity by showing his personhood in three different places at the same
time. This anthropomorphic feature is repeatedly seen in Ge Hongs writ-
ing. Here the enlightened adept is the personified Dao, whose multiple
appearances are anthropomorphic expressions of Daos creativity. Three
different appearances collectively give expression to his inner being. Look-
ing inwardly, the art of revealing the self is no longer a magic play, but
an enlightened state of personhood, through which the invisible creativ-
ity of the One becomes visibly apprehensible to humans. And the One is
the self-generating continuity between its oneness and the plurality of the
myriad things.

The Alchemical Body and the Changing Universe

Is the Xuan-One a mental state of enlightenment or an empirical reality

of life? Without knowing the second method, Preserving the Real-One
 ge hongs preservation of the one65

(shou zhenyi ), the question cannot be answered. Ge Hongs writing

on Preserving the Real-One illustrates the physiological environment of
the body with terminology traditionally used for astronomy.

I have heard from my master: the One can be found in the North-
ern Pole [beiji ] and the great pool [taiyuan ] [the upper and
lower cinnabar fields]. Before it there is the bright hall [mingtang ]
[between eyebrows one cun deep], behind it is the crimson palace
[jianggong : heart]. Nearby there stands the flowery canopy [huagai
: lungs], and the golden tower [jinlou ] with a chamber inside
[the throat]. On the left and the right are the hanging lodestars [gang-
kui : left and right kidneys]. Around it there are also rushing waves
[jibo : urinary system] reaching the sky.
Dark fungus [xuanzhi : blood vessels in the thorax] cover the
cliff, exuberant red grass [zhucao ] surrounds the area [blood ves-
sels in the thorax], white jade [baiyu ] [the teeth] towers up, and
the sun and the moon [riyue : eyes] shine from above. Having expe-
rienced the fire [huo : primordial Qi] and crossed the waters [shui
: Qi in the kidneys], experienced the mysterious Xuan [alchemi-
cal body], and traveled through the yellow earth [huang : physical
body], you shall arrive at the interleaving walls and palaces [chengque
: abdominal cavity and thorax] of the city. You shall see beauti-
ful tents and curtains [weizhang : forms of internal organs] all in
close sight. Dragons and tigers [longhu : Yin-Yang energies] are the
guards; divine persons [shenren : internal gods] stand on two sides.
Neither action nor effort is required, the One is always in harmony
with the surroundings; neither too fast nor too slow, the One gently
occupies the room. Be peaceful and cheerful, the One will not leave.
Preserving the One [yi ] and discerning the Real [zhen ], you
should communicate with the divine. Control your desires and moder-
ate your diet, then the One will stay. Even with a sword at your neck,
discerning the One you should live.
To know the One is not difficult, the difficulty is being persistent.
Preserving but not losing it, you will experience the unlimited abun-
dance of the One. It keeps you safe from wild beasts on the ground and
dragons in the water, and keeps you away from poisonous insects or
snakes. Ghosts will not come near you, and weapons will not harm you.
This is the brief description of the Real-One (IC 324325).

From the perspective of Daoist internal alchemy (neidan ), the text

is clearly an instruction for the inward journey to encounter the inborn Qi.
 66 textual studies

Qi is identified as a flow of energy that spontaneously moves between three

cinnabar fields (dantian ) within the bodily environment.
The text further explains that in the likeness of an immortal being, the
One dwells in harmony with the guarding dragons and tigers, which cor-
respond with the Yin-Yang energies to sustain bodily vigor and strength.
Following the breath pattern, the internal organs can be manipulated to
become channels to allow Qi to travel. Finally the One will occupy its place
near the lower elixir field close to the navel. As soon as the One flows into
the place created by cultivation, the adept preserves the inborn Qi. Thus
he discovers the flow of energy from the external world to the internal
body. The text says, Preserving but not losing it, you will experience the
unlimited abundance of the One.
Having sensed the general purpose of the text, it is necessary to identify
the terminology used in the passage. Table 3.1 collects the terminology
from the text and provides many designations of the body in the language
of bodily alchemy as well as their equivalents in modern biology. Based on
my review of Gu Jius text notes,33 it further provides references to indi-
cate their textual origins. The table indicates that Ge Hongs terminology
has a remarkable resemblance to that in the Scripture of the Yellow Cham-
ber (Huangting jing ).34 Ge Hong mentions that this text circulated

Table 3.1. Terminology of Inner Alchemy

Inner
Alchemy Chinese Physical Documen- Daozang
Term Term Location Translation tation Reference

Northern () Upper Vol. 5, 914

Pole Cinnabar
Field
Great pool Lower Cin- Vol. 5, 914
nabar Field
Bright hall Between eye- , Vol. 5, 910
brows up one Vol. 5, 910
cun then one ,
cun deep
Crimson Heart , Vol. 5, 909
palace
Flowery Lungs , Vol. 5, 909
canopy
 Table 3.1. Terminology of Inner Alchemy (continued)

Inner
Alchemy Chinese Physical Documen- Daozang
Term Term Location Translation tation Reference

Golden () Throat , Vol. 5, 910

tower
Lodestars Left and
right kidneys
Rushing Urinary system
waves
Dark () Blood vessels Vol. 5, 914
fungus in the thorax
Red grass () Abdominal Vol. 5, 914
vessels
White jade () Teeth , Vol. 5, 910

The sun and Eyes , Vol. 5, 908
the moon
Fire Primordial , Vol. 5, 911
spirit

Water Qi of the , Vol. 5, 909
kidneys
The Dark : The middle , Vol. 5, 910
Cinnabar
Field
Yellow () : The lower , Vol. 5, 908
earth Cinnabar
Field
Walls () Abdominal Vol. 5, 913
cavity
Palaces Thorax Vol. 5, 913
Tents and () Internal , Vol. 5, 910
curtains organs

Dragons Qi of vigor , Vol. 5, 910
and tigers
Divine Preserving , Vol. 5, 910
persons vigor
68 textual studies

uring the Western Jin period in his bibliographical chapter (IC 334); this
d
may not be identical to the text that has come down to us. In this pas-
sage Ge Hong directly adopts the idea of the correspondence between
the inner and outer environments (neiwai jing tongyi ) in the
Huangting jing. More particularly, he illustrates the benefits of cultivation
in the form of an outward journey from the body into the celestial world.
With reference to this text, two ontological arguments that evolved around
the inner and outer correspondence require detailed investigation.

The Inner and Outer Correspondence

An effort to close the gap between the microcosm and the macrocosm is
the central idea of the cultivation practice Preserving the Xuan-One. The
correspondence of the two environments is expressed directly by labeling
the physiological body with astronomical terms. As Table 3.1 shows, almost
every term carries a double denotation, referring to both environments.
For example, the navigational lodestar, which defines the astronomical
axis of the sky, corresponds to the upper cinnabar field in the center of
the head that runs a vertical line through the body. Adopting terms from
the Scripture of the Yellow Chamber, Ge Hong not only develops the cultiva-
tion from terminology used in the early tradition, but also places the body
in the astronomical context. Thus he posits the same synthesis of inner
and outer environments. What connects the two is the reality of Qi that
runs the bidirectional course from the many to the One (from the micro
to the macro) and then from the One back to the many (from the macro
to the micro).
The passage reveals some attributes about the Real-One. Portrayed
in anthropomorphic fashion, it is a lord surrounded by a community of
natural gods. Yet the celestial One is capable of wandering through the
environment of the body. By applying the terminologies used for celestial
phenomena, Ge Hong depicts the body as a heavenly city.35 As the table
shows, each term uses a celestial name to designate a particular part of the
body, such as an organ, a system, or an internal god. The city also implies
the body is intrinsically similar to the celestial community with indwelling
gods.
This is one of the most productive ideas in Daoism, which is contrary
to the Buddhist view of the body as prison. Compared with the Platonic
soul, which is capable of transmigration to the world beyond, Ge Hong
argues exactly the opposite. Instead of having the essence of life leave the
body behind in searching for transcendence, Ge Hong brings the cosmos
into the body. Hence the body is neither defined in physiological terms
nor viewed as an irrational corpse ruled by a rational mind. It is defined as
 ge hongs preservation of the one69

the microcosm in the likeness of the cosmos and as a community of living

organisms in the likeness of natural gods in the harmonious world.
The hidden argument that human nature and the Nature of the world
are akin rests on the philosophical view of the body-spirit relation. As
opposed to the Platonic soul/body duality, Ge Hong argues the mutuality
of the two. Just like the relational ontology of Xuan and Qi, the enlight-
ened state is described by the exactly the same words Xuan-One. In another
passage, Ge Hong puts this relation vividly using the metaphor of a candle
and a flame: The body and the vigor can be seen clearly in the example
of a candle. Once the candle is burnt out, the flame will be exhausted
too. When the body is fatigued, the spirit will be dispersed; when Qi is
exhausted, life will come to an end (IC 110).36 There is no subordination
between the candle and the flame, but mutuality. The body is the vessel of
the spirit, and the spirit shines through the body.
This mutuality is ontologically rooted in the cosmogony. Because
the something is born out of nothing, material form needs the spirit to
construct its appearance. That which exists is the palace of Nothingness,
whereas that which has form is the dwelling place of the spirit (IC 110).37
Just as the motherly womb of Xuan and the fetus Qi have no separate iden-
tities, relational ontology defines that nothing and something, and body
and spirit are two sides of the same reality. The unity of body and spirit
produces lifethe inner life that shares the same substance of Qi.
In Chinese the same word Qi is used for both environments, the bodily
and the celestial. As Hu Fuchen rightly points out, this understanding of
life is unique to Daoism.38 Ge Hong does not only argue for a body-spirit
synthesis (contrary to the Platonic and Buddhist dualism), but also defines
human existence in a triple structure. The body (xing ), Qi (), and
spirit (shen ) form the relational whole. Here Ge Hong argues for the
triple structure that is explicitly mentioned in the Master of Huainan. The
body is what houses life, Qi is what fills life, and spirit is what rules life
(HNZ 1, 39).39 Ge Hongs class of immortal beings have all three elements,
whereas ordinary humans fail to bring the physical and celestial environ-
ment into a unity through Qi.
The text does not give a precise location for the Real-One, but only sug-
gests somewhere between the upper and the lower cinnabar fields. Why
does the One have no spatial location? The cosmic Qi offers a hint. It is
because Qi is what connects celestial bodies into a harmonious whole, just
as blood flows into various parts of the human body. In the text, Qi is self-
manifesting through its relation with its surroundings. So the Real-One in
the bodily environment is not an enthroned deity, but rather a flowing
energy with mobility. Its chief attribute is to harmonize and be in harmony
70 textual studies

with its surroundings. The One works as a web of organic life that makes
various parts intact. Just like astronomical harmony, which comes into exis-
tence spontaneously, bodily harmony is also a natural quality evolved out
of the conception brought by the energies of motherly Yin and fatherly
Yang. Just as the essence of celestial phenomena sinks deep into the end-
less dark sky, bodily phenomena also drift around the scene of the heav-
enly city. But the continuity between the two is the same harmonious One
that wanders freely between heaven and human bodies.

The Alchemical Body

The text takes the form of an outward journey, but cultivation is an inward
journey. As Ge Hong wanders through the city, we are virtually led on a
tour on which we are invited to unconsciously but happily wonder at the
enormous spaces of the inner body. But the journey led by spontaneity is
not totally unstructured. The text shows a clear structure with three steps.
The text indicates that the movement begins at the upper cinnabar
field in the ventricle chamber. It is one cun (an ancient measurement,
approximating one inch) deep from the middle of the eyebrows. From this
upper court, the journey then proceeds downwards through the throat to
the heart. It further wanders between the lungs and encounters the cham-
ber of fire (huo ) and then the breath of air (qi ) that exchanges life
with the external environment. The middle cinnabar field is located in this
middle court of the thorax. Bodily elixirs are in the making in this court of
fire, constantly energized by air.
Further downwards, the journey arrives at the ventral court where the
lower cinnabar field is located. The left and right kidneys are the cen-
tral organs for the circulation of water (shui ). The urinary system turns
external water internally and discharges bodily water to the external envi-
ronment. Between the kidneys and behind the navel is the lower cinnabar
field. The field provides a womb for the One to rest in and evolve inside of
water. These three courts can be seen clearly in an illustration belonging
to a later age (Figure 3.2).
Having described the three courts, the text turns to a discourse on
exchange. It mentions teeth and eyes. Teeth symbolize the door to the
external world for food intake. Eyes are the windows to communicate with
the world and natural gods (shen ). And then suddenly the text changes
direction, again mentioning fire and water.
The text also mentions the words Xuan and yellow (huang )
to symbolize the image of the cosmic egg with darkness outside and a yel-
low yolk inside. Xuan and huang originally refer to dark heaven and yel-
low earth respectively. In cultivation, here Xuan can be seen as the self-
Fig. 3.2. The Inner Environment of the Daoist body as illustrated
in the Huangdi bashiyi nanjing cuantu jujie
(possibly of the Song period). (Reprinted from Daozang 21,
595)
72 textual studies

emptied body, comparable to the spatial heaven. The yellow yolk has
the same shape as a bean-size elixir. The bodily elixir does not refer to the
three elixir fields mentioned in the text but to the fetus as new life. This is
because the enlightened body becomes a hypostasis of the Daodan. This
bodily dan is contained within the bodily vessel, just as heaven contains the
earth in the cosmic egg. Thus the shift from the word huang to the idea of
the bodily dan is unnoticeable. However, the transformation underlying
the free exchange between the micro body and the macrocosm constitutes
bodily enlightenment. These two symbolic words are even better pictured
(see Figure 3.3) in internal alchemy texts belonging to later periods. The
word Xuan is directly pictured as an emptied body. The word dan is in
the likeness of the alchemical fetus.

Fig. 3.3. Xuan and dan : two imitative characters, Xuan in the shape of a
crucible (left), dan in the form of a person (right) as illustrated in the Huanzhen
ji (Reprinted from Daozang 24, 98)
 ge hongs preservation of the one73

Here the text describes the internal environment in the likeness of an

alchemical chamber energized by bodily fire. The fire is constantly kindled
by blood vessels in the abdominal cavity upward to the thorax. But the
language still remains in the celestial context. Hence the transition from
inward to outward journey is completed in a way that is hardly noticeable
in the text. For the adept who practices cultivation, the smooth transition
plays the crucial role. It requires immense concentration to move natu-
rally, even without noticing any transition, from the rhythm of breath to
the exchange of vigor between two environments. The key to the smooth
transition is concealed in the perspective of the body. The body is neither
physiological nor celestial but alchemical. Ge Hong indicates earlier that
to attain the absolute real by emptying ones body . . . is the way to be
mingled with Nature (IC 3). Unless the body is turned into an emptied
alchemical vessel, unless the vessel creates an environment for the gesta-
tion of life, the fetus of Qi will not come to life.
The last part of the text turns the readers attention to the community
of natural gods. The dragon (long ) and the tiger (hu ), which sym-
bolize Yin-Yang energies, are the guards. Natural gods (shenren ) in
the celestial world (including the gods of the sun, the moon, and the five
planets) stand in a circle. At the center of the divine community is the
One, which is depicted also as a superior god. Ge Hong says in another
passage, The Real-One possesses names [xingzi ], [with characters
of] tall or short [changduan ] and [is dressed in] colorful raiments
[fuse ] (IC 325). Although Ge Hong uses anthropomorphic lan-
guage to describe the One, the lordship of the One over the natural gods
is consistent with his cosmogonical scheme. From the One comes Yin-
Yang energies, and natural gods come to exist together with the celestial
bodies. But for the adept to join the divine community, Ge Hong says,
Neither action nor effort is required, the One is always in harmony with
the surroundings; neither too fast nor too slow, the One gently occupies
the room.

The Principle of Spontaneity

To attain the One requires no artificial effort; it only requires the principal
indeterminate action (wuwei ). Note that spontaneity is the central
quality of the Real-One. To join the divine community is not to elevate
ones social and moral status. Rather, the adept needs to free himself from
desires, self-imprisonment, and bodily environment. So the body becomes
an uncontaminated vessel and assumes a lowly position. It is ready to
receive the influx of life from the external environment. Having preserved
74 textual studies

the One, the adept is also infused into the world and among the natural
gods through the fusion between the One and the many. The only way
to preserve the One beyond the initial point of realization, as Ge Hong
points out, is to be peaceful and cheerful so the vigor of the One can
shine through bodily happiness.
The above three discourses can be summarized with three characters
used by Ge Hong: Real (zhen ), One (yi ), and spirit (shen ). The
Real means the stage of cultivating the true self. The reality of the human
body is neither physiological nor psychological but the unity of both attri-
butes. During the inward journey to encounter the One, the distinction
between the body and the spirit gradually fades away. It is realized that the
whole alchemical body is in the likeness of the changing cosmos, in which
Qi fills the emptied body and is spontaneously in the making. This is the
stage of One, or Qi. In order to transform the body into an alchemical
vessel to smelt inborn Qi, the adept learns to regulate the breath pattern
the method to regulate bodily fire. This inborn Qi refers to the vitality of
the body, not the primordial Qi.
The preservation of the primordial Qi occurs in the stage of commu-
nicating with the divine. Having realized what connects the body and the
cosmos, the adept flows with Qi and moves beyond his body into the celes-
tial environment. Neither are there natural gods that could exist without
their dwelling placescelestial bodiesnor is there true bodily vigor that
could exist without the bodily vessel. This is the principle of mutuality
between the body and the spirit (xingshen xiangwei ) (IC 244).
Compared with the stage of Qi in which the adept is happily lost in Qi,
the stage of immortals requires the adept to commune with the commu-
nity of immortals. When the cultivating body has diffused into the cosmos,
the mind completely loses its grip on any cognitive control, as in Zhuang-
zis method of letting go of all things. This is the stage of communicating
with immortals. At this stage, the One emerges out of inexhaustible peace.
It dwells in harmony with the surrounding parts of the body and turns the
body inside out. The communication with the natural gods then becomes
a natural process because the adept is already a member of the community
like others who have personified Dao with their celestial bodies. He travels
freely between two environments and across the distance between the One
and the many.
The cultivation method is undoubtedly described in a mystical genre.
But the mysticism is by no means philosophically unintentional. The tex-
tual study essentially tries to recover the idea that the cosmos, the body,
and the crucible are intrinsically alike. They are vessels different in scale,
yet the core reality resting in these vessels is alchemically the same. What is
 ge hongs preservation of the one75

the underlying reality of this core? Ge Hong says, Change is the principle
of Nature.
Change is the basic sign of life; life evolves in the context of change.
Celestial movements, inner bodily activities, and alchemical transforma-
tion share the same principles of change. Change is not subordinated
to another even higher and unchangeable reality. Contrary to the Par-
menidean division of Being and Becoming and the Platonic separation
of unchanging Forms and changing objects, change is the reality of life at
its most primal form. This change is internally self-caused and externally
self-causing. It is not governed by random chance, but by the accord of
following its own course. Laozi describes the principle of spontaneity as
Dao follows its own accord (daofa ziran ) (Laozi 25). Zhuangzi
argues that the spontaneous accord of the Dao is knowable through the
method of forgetting the self (zuowang ). By leaving his desiring
body behind, by leaving his controlling mind behind, by leaving forms and
assumed knowledge of them behind, the sage becomes a part of the reality
in which all things are inwardly connected. This is what forgetting the self
while sitting means (Zhuangzi 6).40 Ge Hong defines spontaneity as the
principle of Nature. It springs out of the relational ontology of Xuan-Qi.
In cultivation, the change is presented in the image in which Qi forms all
changing things into a living harmony.
The synthesis of inner and outer environments stands in contrast to the
Parmenidean antithesis of being and becoming. Parmenides ontological
gap between metaphysical and physical is, in Ge Hongs method, merely
an illusion created in the human mind rather than a permanent reality in
the natural world. In cultivation, the first step to be taken is to remove this
intellectual illusion. The adept then can be free his assumption about the
world. To understand this core reality is not to engage in a mental exercise
involving step-by-step reasoning bound to the criterion of logic, but rather
to have an existential experience. The bodily engagement with the Dao
the universal ordertakes the form of a wandering journey to enter into
the life of Dao in Qi. Until the adept has fully infused himself in this core
reality, he can only speculate on something or being (you ) but cannot
see nothing or not-being (wu ). Until the adept has wandered in the
city of Qi, he cannot shift his gazing eyes from bright stars to the infinite
dark space that holds them together. Until the adept has experienced the
spontaneous One, he cannot realize that the changing of the four seasons
actually is one single rhythm that is constantly turning and in the making.
Until the adept has preserved the One, occupying its space effortlessly, he
cannot realize that to live with Nature requires no control but only fol-
lowing. Until the adept has wandered into the core of Nature, he cannot
76 textual studies

wonder why sophisticated plurality abides in harmonious unity. Neither

can the One exist without the many, nor can the many without the One.
Behind the mystical genre, there is also a kind of Daoist empiricism
that can be brought into clearer focus through a historical lens. Ge Hongs
cultivation belonged to the school of empiricism. It began in the Han
period as a heterodox current practiced by various fangshi and then found
its place in organized religious Daoism in the Jin period. The school of
empiricism did not break away from the early Lao-Zhuang intellectualism,
but the early tradition developed and continued through the empirical
school, which was misunderstood by Confucians intellectually as esoteric
fangshu. From the early philosophical contemplation of the One (zhiyi
) to the later religious preservation of the One (shouyi ), the quest
for unity with the cosmos never faded away.
One of the chief advances beyond intellectualism was the perspective
on the body and the unique idea of a thinking body. Since the body was
viewed as a miniature of the cosmos, the cognitive activity of the mind sub-
sequently belonged to and was a part of the alchemical body. This advance
evolved out of the synthesis of the micro and the macro represented by
the Scripture of the Yellow Chamber, and drew nourishment from the practice
of fangshu in which medicine played the key role to understand the body
clinically. It then reached a climax in the empirical school that argued that
the ultimate form of knowledge was not consciousness but existential. Ge
Hongs soteriology belonged to this school but added a new criterion that
echoed his medical practice. Not all ecstatic feelings were beneficial to
health, and not all arts were methods of longevity. If bodily knowledge was
true, then truth had to be life giving.

Summary

Joseph Needham once famously argued that Daoism propelled the devel-
opment of Chinese sciences.41 Ge Hong is an important figure in that tra-
dition. His writings have provided us with enough information to puzzle
together his grand vision. Both forms of cultivation that he describes
seek a path exactly opposite to the ontological flow of Dao. Cosmogony
unfolds from the one to the many in the mode of separation. Soteriology
returns from the many to the one in the mode of unification. The former
articulates the self-awakening Dao in the process of creation. The latter
practices those methods that yield hidden paths to the core of all reali-
ties. The unfolding separation and the refolding unification form a wheel
of change. They are an empirical interpretation of the two central con-
cepts in the Daodejing: the Dao and its Virtue. The cosmic wheel is not an
 ge hongs preservation of the one77

enclosed and self-repeating circle, but a turning wheel (Figure 3.4). As the
wheel turns, spontaneous continuity rolls out a course over the discontinu-
ity of ten thousand things.
Compared with Plato, who believes reason is innate in the rational part
of the soul, Ge Hong believes Qi is the inborn reality of human life. Con-
trary to Platonic intellectual wisdom, Ge Hongs preserved Qi is more than
a cognitive state of mind; it is an existential life. The One can be preserved
in human life, so the body becomes a vessel to harbor cosmic potency.
Thus, the body is a micro recipient of the macrocosmic essence because Qi
is a reality to be experienced both inside and outside of the human body,
rather than an idea to be grasped. Influenced by Wang Chongs reality as
the criterion of truth, Ge Hongs view holds that the knowledge of Dao
must be evaluated against the soteriological criterion of whether knowl-
edge is life giving.
Compared with Platos rational philosophy, which is psychological,
immaterial, and ideal, the Preservation of the One is biological, empirical,
and existential. Both philosophies are soteriological, but their contents
are different. Ge Hong aims to preserve the bond between the human

Fig. 3.4. Inner and Outer Alchemy and the wheel of change
78 textual studies

microcosm and the macrocosm. Based on empirical knowledge about

what the One does to the body, the adept is posed to take the intellec-
tual step across the distance between the one and the many. Yet the unity
between the person and the cosmos is not liberation of the soul from the
body, but the liberation of the body through which the spirit is harbored.
This soteriological aim holds the key to understanding many Daoist mysti-
cal texts written in highly coded language.
 chapter 4

Platos Doctrine of Forms

In Chapter 2 I investigated historical connections between Plato and the

pre-Socratics through the study of the Parmenides. Parmenides ontologi-
cal tradition of Being, answered the question of the one and the many
with the theory of Forms and exposed before the Eleatic school one of
the key problems of the theory, namely, the separation of Forms from sen-
sibles. But the investigation also indicated that Platos Forms had radically
changed the one and many debate from a cosmogonical schema, in which
universals were understood as primordial stuff out of which the world was
made, to an ontological schema, in which universals were viewed as eternal
ideas that exist permanently within the Parmenidean realm of Being and
independent of Becoming.
Behind this paradigm change, there is a complex system of Forms that
categorizes reality in a linear hierarchy and defines ontology in degrees,
which subsequently becomes one of the most influential categorizations
in Western metaphysics. This chapter asks to what extent this system has
reshaped the landscape of the OM debate and whether we can compare
the two ontological systems of Ge Hong and Plato, which increasingly
diverge in content. The main passages for the discussion of Platos ontol-
ogy come from the Republic: the Divided Line, the Simile of the Sun, and
the Simile of the Cave. The Timaeus provides the background of Platos
cosmology and gives breadth to his Forms.

Forms: Immanent or Transcendent?

The doctrine of Forms is not a consistent thought throughout Platos dia-

logues. In the Symposium (211ab), the Republic, and the Timaeus (51e52d),
which are grouped in the middle and the later dialogues respectively,1 the
Forms are clearly transcendent above and ontologically independent from
sensible objects. The Forms in the Meno and Phaedo (102b) are compara-
tively immanent within sensible objects. These two types of Forms create
the disjunction within the doctrine of Forms. Which type of Forms rep-
resents Platos thought on the relationship between Forms and physical
objects? Traditionally it has been accepted that Plato postulates transcen-

79
80 textual studies

dental Forms and keeps perfect Forms and imperfect physical objects
ontologically apart.2 Recent scholarship tends to read the disjunction to
be not as great as typically thought and attempts to reconcile the inconsis-
tency.3 Among the emerging new views, Gail Fines arguments appear to
be the most provocative. In two essays Separation 4 and Immanence, 5
the central argument not only has turned against the traditional inter-
pretation, but has gone to the other extreme to argue immanence as the
central feature of Forms.
However, the Fine view also meets serious criticisms. Vlastos states that
the same claim on separation may be expressed by either (P) or (Q):

(P) The forms exist themselves by themselves.

(Q) The forms exist separately.

Vlastos argues that Plato holds both expressions to be true. He then

explains, So there is a good reason to accept the equivalence of (P) and
(Q) as authentic Platonic doctrine. 6 Daniel Devereux also defines the
traditional view as an accurate account of Platos doctrine of Forms: I
believe that Platos views on immanence and separation are consistent and
clear-cut: from the Phaedo on, he denies that Forms are immanent in their
participants, and he is committed throughout to the claim that all Forms
are ontologically independent of sensible particulars. 7
Having noted the dispute, let us consider a Daoist view. If the texts
demonstrate that inconsistency does exist within the centerpiece of Platos
thought, then why shouldnt we simply accept the ambiguity? Apart from
the logical contrary of transcendence and immanence, is there anything
more to the ambiguity? To affirm Forms as both transcendent and imma-
nent may not be a logical contradiction to be rejected but could well rep-
resent an intellectual challenge to discover connections between transcen-
dence of truths and their immanence within physical realities. By asking
how one can participate in many without ceasing to be one, the topic of
transcendence and immanence or essence and existence will lead us into
the study of Platos theory of the one and the many. But first we should
come to terms with Platos ontological degrees.

Ontological Degrees: A Hierarchy of One over Many

Platos ontology classifies what is (or ontos) by defining reality in degrees.

It categorizes reality by quantifying rationality on a scale consisting of the
Form of Good, Forms, sensibles, and images each possess. For Plato the
scaling of reality in degrees and the ascending order of mental statuses are
 platos doctrine of forms81

two parallel rails that take philosophers to encounter the truth defined
by Forms. Ontology and epistemology are inseparable. The dynamics of
Platos ontological-epistemological parallelism can be presented in the fol-
lowing diagram, which is a summary of the Divided Line passage in the
Republic (509d511e).8 The diagram will be referred to frequently later to
give a visual perspective of Platos abstract and sophisticated arguments.

(A) Dialectic intelligence First principles The ideal realm

of
(B) Mathematical reason Assumptions of Forms Being

(C) Belief Physical objects The actual realm

of
(D)Illusion Images Becoming

Images/Illusion and Physical Objects/Belief

The lowest category is images/illusion. Platos categorization relies on
the geometric principle of reflection, such as a mirror image on the water
or a polished surface (510a). Therefore, images are regarded as the reflec-
tions of objects. They are not real objects themselves, but only illusions
of something else. A mirror image of a person cannot have real existence
without the person that it reflects. Images and physical objects are two
different degrees of reality; the latter is the cause of the former. Since
illusions bear little relation to truth, Plato ranks the perception of images
as the lowest level of understanding. It is the wholly unenlightened state
of mind 9 that ordinary people gain from primitive perception, yet it falls
short of seeing the originals of the images.
In book 10, Plato explicitly, also controversially, ranks poetry in this
lowest section of knowing, and categorizes art in general as an illusive rep-
resentation of physical objects.10 In his words, so the tragic poet, if his art
is representation, is by nature at third remove from the throne of truth;
the same is true of all other representative artists (597e). If Platos view
of poetry were true, then Ge Hongs poetic genre would be ranked as the
lowest form of knowledge. If visual artists understand the lowest degree of
truth, would musicians not also fit into this category? Arent Beethovens
Fifth Symphony, Homers Iliad, and Michelangelos Last Judgment equally
representations of passion, wonder, beauty, and harmony? They have
incarnated something eternal and transfigured art into vehicles of truth
by weaving divine truth and human passion. Platos preference for music
over visual arts and poetry is Pythagorean in kind. Astronomy and music
82 textual studies

are two movements of harmony (530d) sharing mathematical concords in

common. As in the Timaeus they together form a transcendental harmony
of the World Soul that can even be demonstrated mathematically.11
Platos negative attitude toward poetry and the visual arts fits his schema
of Forms-sensibles-images. Physical objects (or sensibles, using the techni-
cal term), according to Plato, stand for the objects that are the originals of
the imagesthe animals around us, and every kind of plant and manufac-
tured object (510a). Compared with images, sensibles are the substantial
originals of the images. They are inferior to Forms (Phaedo 75b) and less
real. Although sensibles possess real existence, they are still ontologically
dependent upon invisible Forms as their causes. In other words, without
the causal Forms sensibles would not even exist. Within the divide between
visible becoming and intelligible being, sensibles are copies of Forms and
exist in the realm of becoming. Forms, however, are self-subsistent beings
and exist independently in the realm of being.
In short, sensibles are imperfect copies of Forms. Tangible things do
not fully possess rationality, but they approximate Forms. Two equal sticks
can only be approximately equal but not perfectly equal.12 Any drawn cir-
cle is fully real not because it does not look like a circle, but because its
imperfection is viewed against the inability to fully exemplify a principle:
the locus of points equidistant to a fixed center.

The Epistemological Problem of the Sensibles

The ontological distinction between Form and sensible has direct impli-
cations for epistemology. Ontology is defined by quantifying degrees of
being possessed by Forms and sensibles. Hence epistemology is valued by
the degree of real and less real between two degrees of reality. The subor-
dinate order of image, sensibles, and Forms corresponds to the ladder of
knowledge of the least real, the less real, and the most real Forms. Forms
possess and exemplify the complete truth; sensibles only contain partial
truth; but images are the illusion of incomplete truth. If a tree is a physi-
cal copy of the Form of tree-ness, then a picture of a tree is only a repre-
sentation of the tree. The Form is the reality that philosophers seek. The
physical tree is the inferior reality that craftsmen may lay their hands on. A
picture of tree is an image of the second-degree reality of a tree that artists
express.
Why are sensibles epistemologically unreliable? Plato says they hover
between being and not-being (479b). A beautiful rose is beautiful one
day and becomes ugly some days later. The fading away of beauty shows
the changing status of the physical rose. Unlike the Form of beauty that
can only be beautiful and not ugly, a physical rose is a composition of
 platos doctrine of forms83

the contrary properties of beauty and ugliness, or being-beautiful and not-

being beautiful. If the Form represents precise knowledge of the noncon-
tradictory being-beautiful, then the rose is the mixture of two contrary
properties of being and not-being. Epistemologically the rose is imprecise
because it is not what the Beauty really is.
All physical objects have the same ambiguity. They are not definitely
either being or not being or both (479c) but drift between what fully is
and what absolutely is not (479d). The ontological ambiguity of being and
not-being defines sensibles as the category of becoming. In the Divided
Line Plato couples sensibles with belief and Forms with intelligence (511d).
With these general schematics, Plato distinguishes two kinds of humans.
Ordinary people take sensibles at face value; they are sight lovers (476b).
Like Parmenides way of opinion, Plato believes that the faculty of sight
can produce only opinion (511a, de). Philosophers, however, are wisdom
lovers. They rely on the faculty of thought, look beyond appearance, but
gaze at true realities of what things are. Hence belief without knowledge
is always a poor thing (506c); perception without reasoning is not rational
knowledge.
In the Timaeus (28) the knowledge/belief and Forms/sensibles argu-
ments shape the core of Platos doctrine of creation. The created world
is the visible image of the invisible model (28). Thus any study of images
is epistemologically unproductive and never fully real (27d). Empirical
studies of the changing world are bound to be imprecise. The never fully
real again reflects the inferior ontological status of the physical world,
which is always becoming but never is. The phrase never fully real
unveils Platos rejection of Heraclitus flux in favor of Parmenidean Being.
Thus he protects Forms from the turbulent tide of change, just as Par-
menides did for Being. Consequently being can affect becoming but can-
not be affected by it.

Infallible Knowledge

As briefly mentioned in the second chapter, the doctrine of Forms is Pla-

tos answer to the Parmenidean ontology of one without many. Each
Form is an ontological structure of one over many that predicates many
phenomena sharing the same being. Contrary to the Parmenidean denial
of plurality, for Plato plurality is implied through the predication of unity.
It is through unity that sensibles are understood as plural instances of the
same reality. But apart from this acceptance of plurality through unity,
the uniqueness of Forms evidently is a Parmenidean characteristic. The
distinction between what absolutely is and what altogether is not evi-
84 textual studies

dently also inherits the division of Parmenidean Being and Becoming.

This divide rises out of the central argument that within Being there is
nothing of not-Being (book 2, 16).
Having accepted the definition of Being, Plato commits to two prin-
ciples that the ontology of Being without not-Being implies.

(A) Each Form is a being without not-being.

This bears a Parmenidean homogeneity by excluding not-being and

represents a pure being. Contrary to sensibles, which are the composition
of being and not-being, Forms are noncontradictory unities in which the
copresence of contrary identities is prohibited. This is the noncontradic-
tion principle.

(B) Each Form is unchangeable.

Change is both being and not-being. Since not-being is denied through

the premise of Being without not-Being, change cannot happen in
Forms. This is because the Parmenidean idea of change implies self-
change. Change requires Being to undergo modification from one iden-
tity to something different from the original. This is a fallacy. If the original
is the not-being of Dao, it can give birth to being without ceasing to be
what it is. I will explore this problem in comparative ontology. In Platos
context, change is a universal character of sensibles but not of Forms. This
is the nonchangeability principle.
How do these principles answer the question of the one and the many?
We can pose three questions. First, how does Plato implement the Par-
menidean antithesis of Being/not-being? Second, what is the problem
of not-being for the Forms? Third, what will arise from the disassociation
of being from not-being?
In Republic, book 5, Plato explains the noncontradiction principle with
the Form of Beauty. Plato first states that beauty and ugliness are oppo-
sites; they are two contrary qualities (475e). According to the noncon-
tradiction principle, the Form of Beauty is impelled to exclude ugliness.
Therefore, the Form Beauty is an infallible identity that can never be nor
become ugly. A particular beautiful thing, a rose, for example, may be not
beautiful some days later or may be seen as ugly if it is wrongly placed in
improper situations. For Plato, the same is true of justice and injustice,
good and evil (476a). The absolute Justice cannot be injustice under any
circumstances, nor can the ethical idea of good mutate into evil.
For Plato the knowledge of what beauty is cannot derive from a beau-
 platos doctrine of forms85

tiful rose primarily because of its mixture of being beautiful and not-being
beautiful. Anything that is both being and not-being is not genuinely a
Form; it is a self-contradictory entity.13 To conceptualize what beauty is,
one must look beyond the fluctuating state of being/not-being and inquire
into the essential nature of beauty itself (476b). This beauty itself is a
noncontradictory identity of what beauty is. Therefore, the ontology of
being-itself (nothing but beauty itself) produces true knowledge of beauty,
which is also freed from the dual presence of the opposites of what beauty
is and what beauty is not.
The core of the argument is the Parmenidean Being without not-
being. By the ontological exclusion of not-being, Plato argues that phi-
losophers are able to seek beyond self-contradictory entities in temporal
instances and reach noncontradictory Forms. Forms are single realities
that exemplify the ontological uniqueness of beauty-in-itself, goodness-
in-itself, and justice-in-itself (507b). They are self-generating and casual
beings that neither require external contribution to be what really is, nor
are they affected by change and decay (485b). They are eternal realities
according to which physical realities have been organized. Plato believes
the knowledge of noncontradictory Forms cannot be acquired from the
composite sensibles.
Why cannot we acquire the one from the many? What prevents the
composition of being and not-being from being the empirical point of
departure for true intelligence? It is the problem of not-being. Plato con-
tends in the Parmenidean fashion that, on the one hand, we can only think
of something in some sense of being and, on the other hand, not-being is
unknowable (476e477a).

(a)Does a man who knows, know something or nothing?

(b)A person can only know something.
(c)Something is what is; nothing is what is not.
(d)A person can only know something but cannot know what is not
(nothing).
(e)What fully is (being) is fully knowable; what no way is (not-being)
is entirely unknowable.

The argument has two problems one of which leads to the other. First,
nothing is what is not in (c) is wrong; not-being does not equate to noth-
ing.14 To equate not-being with nothing is a Parmenidean fallacy. If
the Form of beauty is something, then its logical negation is not-beauty.
Not-beauty does not necessary entail ugliness but can mean anything other
than beauty. For instance, a not-beautiful person can appear to be a nor-
86 textual studies

mal looking person. Normal appearance is not nothing at all but some-
thing. Thus nothing is what is not in (c) is false. It is a problem of subject
negation when the not directly negates the subject beauty.
Second, not-being is not unknowable. A person cannot know what is
not in (d) relies on the assumption that what is not equals nothing.
Parmenides in his epistemology argues that we can only think about some-
thing, but we cannot possibly think about nothing. Here Plato follows the
same unthinkable nothingness.
However, if not-beautiful can refer either to what is ugly or to what-
ever is neither ugly nor beautiful, then there is a problem of collapsing
the distinction between opposition and negation. Ugly is the opposite of
beautiful. Neither beautiful nor uglynormal lookingis what the logi-
cal negation of beauty entails. If not-beauty can mean normal looking (or
ugly), then it is only something other than being beautiful. Why is nor-
mal totally unknowable? In fact, normal is not nothing but something.
According to the second statement (b), which accepts a person can only
know something, normala possibility of something other than beauti-
fulmust be knowable. So the conclusion (e) is false.
The analysis reveals that the argument is crippled. The argument relies
on two double equations.

The positive equation: being=something=knowable

The negative equation: not-being=nothing=unknowable

The first is a positive argument on the theory of Forms that Plato argues
elsewhere. But here Plato supports the argument that we cannot acquire
the one from the many with the second double equation. Sensibles are
unreliable for true knowledge not only because they are composite enti-
ties, but also because the element of not-being is unknowable. As the
above analysis shows, it turns out that not-being= nothing is false, and the
conclusion not-being= unknowable is also wrong. Therefore, the whole
argument has lost the support of the negative equation.
Is this a cardinal mistake? Yes, because the argument originally relies
on the negative equation to support the position equation. Once one leg
of the argument is false, it brings down the other. What is dragged down
is the proposition that the knowledge of Forms is only possible in and
through Forms. The analysis has shown that the knowledge of Beauty can
be possible through not-beauty as in the case of normal looking. This
is the epistemological path from the many to the one, which Parmenides
denied and Plato rejects. In a Daoist sense, this path can mean experience
by cultivating the immanent presence of Dao in a person and empiri-
 platos doctrine of forms87

cal study by engaging alchemical practice to know the works of Dao in

Nature.
Furthermore, the fact that the argument on the unintelligibility of
not-being is false causes one to rethink why the distinction between being
and not-being is at the heart of Parmenidean-Platonic ontology at all.
Why should subject negation be the only alternative to define the rela-
tion between being and not-being? Can the Daoist alternative of nothing-
something correlation be considered?
Plato had something else in mind. According to Cornford, Plato main-
tains that whatever is thought of must in some sense be. 15 Again, this is
the Parmenidean tradition that being, and only unalterable being, is the
starting point of ontology. Yet if Plato wants only to argue his theory of
beings, it is enough to say that we can only think of beings called Forms.
Why does he follow the Parmenidean path and persistently argue against
not-being? Cornford has not addressed this question; in fact the question
has been explained away.
As the equation being= something= knowable shows, Plato argues
that knowing noncontradictory Forms can produce infallible knowledge
of unchanging realities (something) defined by beings without not-being.
Furthermore, changing realitiesthe compositions of being/not-being
are denied full ontological status because of their association with not-
being; belief is thought to be imprecise because changing sensibles belong
to realm of becoming. Becoming involves the contradiction of being and
not-being. Plato defines the epistemological degrees of knowledge, belief,
and ignorance not only according to their degrees of being possessed in
Forms (fully present), sensibles (partially present), and images (totally
absent), but also according to the degrees of not-being with which the
three categories of reality are associated. He says, Knowledge is related
to what is and ignorance necessarily to what is not (477a); belief falls
between ignorance and knowledge (477b).
As long as the noncontradictory principle stands, Plato affirms being
and simultaneously rejects not-being. If we consider that the world of
change as a whole is made of compositions of being and not-being, since
being is unchangeable, then not-being must be directly responsible for
change. Just as the Parmenidean denial of not-being leads to the denial
of change in homogeneous Being, Platos rejection of not-being also pre-
vents Forms from undergoing ontological change. To be sure, ontology
of change was the position that the Milesian School and Heraclitus held
in the pre-Socratic OM debate. Plato rejects the position and presents his
ontology of unchangeable Forms. The rejection takes three steps. First,
the noncontradiction principle of being without not-being disqualifies
88 textual studies

not-being from having any ontological property. Second, the false equa-
tion of not-being= nothing reduces not-being to non-existence. Third,
the charge of unthinkable nothingness reduces knowing not-being to epis-
temological nonsense and mental ignorance.
Even though the negative argument turns out to be unprovennot-
beingnothingunknowablePlato still uses the noncontradiction prin-
ciple as a filtration device to separate not-being from the pure realm of
being. What has been excluded, as not-being nothing unknowable
shows, does not stand for the opposite of truth, namely, falsehood. Platos
positive argument on Forms has neither proven nor disproved the episte-
mological status of not-being. It has simply excluded it all together.
If philosophy has its chief interest in beings, then knowledge of Forms
has a limited scope. Rational philosophy aims to understand beings; not-
being(s) falls outside of its scope entirely. What Plato has done in the
schema of Forms/knowledge is simply to disassociate being from not-
being and to prioritize knowledge with respect to other understandings
that are not entangled with not-being, which is defined by the problematic
subject negation.

Independent Beings

Why are Forms ontologically independent? This can be explained using

the classic example of craftsman and bed for introductory purposes.
Plato makes a threefold distinction of reality in the Republic (597ad):
the Form of bed, physical beds, and pictures of beds. Plato believes that
there exists a single Form of bed created by the divine craftsman that is
predicated of every actual bed in the world. The Form is eternal, immate-
rial, indestructible, and independent of sensibles. Without the Form no
concept of bed would be conceived, nor could any bed-making activity be
possible.
Within this example, ontological independence has three related
dimensions. First, Forms have separate existence. An ideal bed exists inde-
pendent of and separate from actual beds. Even if all beds in the world
were destroyed, the ideal bed would still exist. The indestructibility of the
ideal rests on its separate existence from the actual (Parmenides 130b).
Thus the Form is capable of existing independently. The same status of
independence has been composed in immortal souls. After death souls are
capable of existence in a disembodied state. Platos ethical Forms ( justice,
beauty, love, good, and so forth) in general possess separate existence.
Second, Forms are non-immanent beings. This feature of Platonism
was a matter of controversy even among people in the Academy. Aristotle
 platos doctrine of forms89

criticized it in the Metaphysics, saying that Forms do not inhere in the

things that participate in them (991). For Plato, the ideal bed conceals
the first principle in itself (511b) and exemplifies the determination of
one ideal bed among all physical beds. Non-immanence refers to the prin-
ciple that is not in actual beds but in the universal reality of bed-in-itself
(597d). The causal identity is concealed within being-itself, and the iden-
tity is self-affirmative and self-sufficient as being in itself by itself and with
itself (Symposium 211ab; Republic 507b). All beds gain identity from the
Form bed-itself by participation. The relation of the non-immanent one
and the participatory many reassembles the cause/caused dualism. The
distinction between being-itself and things of being-itself cannot be col-
lapsed (Timaeus 51e52a).
Third, Forms are transcendental. The attribute of transcendence has
already been implied in the separation from and the non-immanence
within sensibles. The attribute becomes more evident and problematic
when it is viewed against the double-world view. As in the case of Pythag-
orean antimaterialism, Plato also postulates the mathematical nature of
Forms. For example, the principle of circle is the transcendental reality of
many circular shapes. In the Timaeus, Plato makes an even stronger claim
that at the time when the physical world had not been created the Forms
were already there. Transcendence in the doctrine of creation is meant to
be the primordiality of Forms. It refers to the entire ideal world of Forms
that were self-subsistent before the creation and existed as a parallel uni-
verse beyond primordial chaos.
The problem of independence has been discussed in the Parmenides.
Here it is to be argued that transcendence and immanence are not logical
antitheses to be kept apart, but two sides of the paradox to be joined. To
start with, I excavate the problem of immanence embedded in transcen-
dental Forms and then discuss why Plato asserts transcendence despite the
dilemma of immanence.
In the craftsman analogy, Plato uses the verb resemble to indicate
actual beds as resemblances of the ideal. If we think about it, for a human
craftsman to make a bed means to bring the idea into a pile of timber.
The ideal Form ought to be immanent in the actual bed in order that the
actual can resemble the ideal. The same dilemma must be true for ethical
Forms of good-itself, beauty-itself, and justice-itself. To be a good, beauti-
ful, and just person, the Forms ought to manage a sort of presence in the
person in order that the immanent characters of the virtues may be identi-
fied. Regarding these examples, all Forms must be immanent within, not
just transcendental over, sensibles. This is the paradox of immanence that
transcendence Forms must address.
90 textual studies

If Forms are non-immanent, how could the human mind know them?
This question, which the old Parmenides asks the young Socrates in the
Parmenides, does not go away despite the fact that Parmenides arguments
remain unwarranted. Knowledge requires a pathan immanent path
from many to onefor humans to reach beyond sensibles to Forms. If
the path is not there, it is probable that the objects are not knowable but
rather remain as presupposed ideas subsistent on their own.

Summary

In leaving this chapter, it is necessary to point out where the above discus-
sion leads. It leads to the study of the paradoxical dilemma of continu-
ity and discontinuity within ontological unity and the relationship among
multiple unities. This dilemma can be named differently, such as the para-
dox of transcendence and immanence, heterogeneity and homogeneity,
difference and sameness. But the central issue of what these pairs repre-
sent is the noncollapsible tension between one and many. The core of the
one and the many is not the apparent antithesis of transcendence and
immanence, even though philosophies of Greek origin have treated one
and many as a logical problem. Rather it is the issue of how elementary
reality (or realities) has been presupposed in the first place.
The OM problem is the problem of being. Plato rejects pre-Socratic
theories on the basis that many of them promote ontological change.
His doctrine of Forms eliminates the element of not-being in ontology
by making unchanging Forms independent of change. As a result Plato
also creates the independence of being-itself, and each Form is a unity
of commonality within the one over many structure. But the creation of
Forms also creates a problem, the problem of unity over the plural Forms.
Is there another Super Form over all Forms? Here we turn to Platos idea
of the Good.
 chapter 5

Two Forms of Enlightenment

At the end of the Simile of the Sun, Plato says: What gives the objects of
knowledge their truth and the knowers mind the power of knowing is the
form of the good (508e). . . . The good therefore may be said to be the
source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also
of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but beyond it, and
superior to it in dignity and power (509b).

The Good: The Cause of Reality and knowledge

The Form of Good has occupied the supreme position within the doctrine
of Forms. For Plato Forms are related to the supreme Good, on the one
hand, and the Good provides an umbrella over the multiple Forms, on
the other. Discussion on Forms and the Good can be found in various
dialogues: Symposium (205e206a), Phaedo (99c), Republic (509b), Phaedrus
(245e), Philebus (133, 15a), and Timaeus (29e). The scope of the Good is
comprehensive. If Platonic Forms are the objects of knowledge that enable
human minds to be connected with ethical universals and arithmetic theo-
rems and geometric pattens, then Platos Good is the visionary unity of
ethics, mathematics, epistemology, and ontology. If reason follows the
road of knowledge and arrives at transcendental Forms, then Plato envi-
sions at the intellectual summit there stands the Good as the grand unity
of all ends of philosophical wisdom.
Although the idea of the Good occupies a significant position in Platos
thought, Plato has not presented a systematic theory about it. In fact it is
mystical. One could think along lines that attribute new meanings to the
Good: it is a creatorlike god comparable with the Jewish-Christian God or
a grand unifying theory for all cosmological principles. The concept opens
itself to interpretation not simply because of its ambiguity, but because of
its visionary unity rooted in Western consciousness. Historically the Pla-
tonic Good-itself has been a puzzling and thought-provoking concept for
both Neoplatonists and early Christian theologians.1 In recent Platonic
studies, many scholars have reinvestigated the concept, which represents
one of the main puzzles in Platonism.2 It occupies the central position in

91
92 textual studies

Platos Eleatic dialogues, 3 and it is closely associated with the One in the
Parmenides.4 With diverse interpretations, scholars frequently return to
the key set of texts in the Republic where Platos discussion of the Good
is spread through the Simile of the Sun and the Divided Line, the Cur-
riculum for educating philosophers, and the Cave. 5 From these passages,
the collective understanding of the Good can be brought into focus. The
Good is both a vision of wholeness and its harmony.
The following study, however, is not designed to summarize recent
scholarship. It aims to identity key aspects of the Good to prepare for the
comparison of two different forms of the ultimate good in Plato and Ge
Hong.

The Claims
In the passage quoted above, Plato makes three remarkable claims. The
Good is (a) the source of Forms, (b) the power of knowing truth, and
(c) not reality but beyond it on the other side of reality. If the Good
is the beginning of ontological realities and the end of ethical and math-
ematical knowledge, then this ultimate reality itself becomes the alpha of
realities and the omega of intellectual enlightenment. Such a supreme
oneness, which links reality and knowledge, is comparable with Ge Hongs
concept of One, within which ontology and epistemology come to face to
face with each other. For Plato a dialogue with the Good is the intellectual
enlightenment transforming a thinker into a true philosopher. The ques-
tion is how to attain the enlightenment.
In the Simile of the Sun, Plato begins by linking the Good to the sun.
The sun is the source of light that gives visibility to sensible objects (507c);
without light the faculty of sight is unable to see objects. The sun is not
itself sight but the cause of vision (508b). Similarly the Good is the
source of intelligibility to thought that gives the enlightening power to the
faculty of knowledge (509b); without the Good the mind cannot be fixed
on Forms illuminated by truth (508d). The sun causes the processes of
generation, growth, and nourishment without itself being such a process
(509b). Likewise, the Good is not only the source of the intelligibility of
Forms, but their being and existence also come from it (509b).
To understand the simile, we must pay attention to Platos comparison
between the sun/sensibles and the Good/Forms. Both the sun and the
Good transcend sensibles and Forms. Without the sun the sensible world
is imperceptible; without the Good Forms would be unilluminated and
unintelligible. Just as the sun is neither sight nor sensibles, the Good is
neither knowledge nor objects of knowledge (Forms). But they are tran-
scendental causes with the one over many determination that penetrate
 two forms of enlightenment93

what has been caused. Without the sun, generation, growth, and nourish-
ment of sensibles will not be possible. Without the Good, the existence of
Forms will not be possible.
If we examine Platos three claims in conjunction with the one over
many structure, the Good is (a) the ontological cause of Forms, (b) the
epistemological cause for Forms to be intelligible, and (c) the connection
between reality and mind. Putting these claims in the language of one over
many, (a) the One Good predicates many Formsunity over plurality,
(b) the one enlightens the mind to see many Forms, and (c) the Good
is the one over many connection between Forms and minds.
These three points can be visualized as follows.

The Good

Forms The mind

In this diagram, the first claim (a) seems self-explanatory. It claims that
the Good predicates Forms, just as the sun shines on sensibles. The predi-
cation is a determinative cause over many Forms. The second claim (b)
indicates that the mind must be enlightened by the Good; otherwise even
if Forms are illuminated and self-evident the mind cannot see them. If
these two one over many relations are relatively straightforward, the third
one (c)the Good as the connection between Forms and mindsis not.
But the third is crucial because if the connection is not there, then Forms
will not be accessible to the mind.

The Epistemological Problem of the Good

The first and second claims condition the third. The first claims that the
Good is the ontological condition that causes Forms to exist. The second
claims that the Good is the epistemological condition that causes the mind
to recognize Forms. These two sides of the triangle suggest that the mind
could not know Forms if the Good were absent. In this sense, there is
94 textual studies

no direct connection between the mind and Forms. To put it in positive

terms, the Good is the bridge between Forms and the mind. By claiming
the Good as the ontological and epistemological cause, Plato suggests that
the knowledge of Forms is only an indirect path. Until we apprehend the
Good, we will not know what Forms truly are with absolute clarity. This
indirect path further entails that to attain knowledge of Forms we must
first ascend to the level of the Good and then descend with an enlightened
state of mind to comprehend the first principles that Forms exemplify.
In the comparative view, the third claim is similar to Ge Hongs: If a
person can know the One, [the knowledge of] ten thousand issues will
come to an end. For those who know the One, nothing is beyond know-
ing. For those who do not know the One, nothing is [truly] knowable (IC
323). If the third claim is what Plato proposed, he must also mean that the
mind does not have direct access to know Forms. Rather it is through the
Good that the mind can truly know Forms. But how does the reasoning
mind engage the intellectual ascent?
In the Divided Line, Plato has made for us an epistemological ladder
with four steps to reach four ontological degrees: illusion/image, opinion/
sensibles, reason/Forms, and dialectic/principles. Unlike the immanent
Qi in Daoist cultivation, the ladder reaches from the existential ground to
the transcendental realm defined by the one over many hierarchy. If one
climbs this ladder, it appears as if one moves upward to seek the source of
light, while the source of illumination shines on the ascending path. There
are still questions about this elevation of the cognitive state of mind. Is
this ladder tall enough for the mind to reach the Good, whose position
must be ranked still higher (509a)? Is the last step between reason and
dialectic too far apart, so that the mind would find it difficult to cross the
gap? Does there exist a platform of Gooda foundation to all Forms and
reasonon which the mind is able to stand above cloudy assumptions and
see first principles face to face? While all these questions are indispens-
able yet point in different directions, a single question will help us to stay
focused on the issue of enlightenment. How does the Good connect the
mind and Forms?

Intellectual Mountaintop

In the seventh book of the Republic, Plato has designed a curriculum of two
stages to train philosophers. The first stage includes five mathematical dis-
ciplines: arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonics.
The second stage involves the procedures of dialectic. The mathematical
studies ultimately pave the path to the pure philosophy of dialectic. To
 two forms of enlightenment95

Plato, the capacity for knowledge is innate in each persons mind (518c).
Although this faculty of knowing is an inborn capacity of humanity, Plato
makes it clear that it is not a natural habit for humans to look beyond
transitory phenomena. The mind must be turned away from the world of
change until its eye can bear to look straight at reality. And ultimately it
has to gaze at the brightest of all realitiesthe Good (518d). Although
reasons location in the human soul is identical to the logos within the
World Soul, humans must connect and conduct a dialogue with the for-
mal cause of knowledge. Education for philosophers, therefore, should
achieve two objectives: turning away from the actual world of change to
the ideal world of Form and turning toward the Good. The first objective
aims to bridge the distance between the mind and the rational models of
the world through reason. The second objective should create a fusion
between the soul and the Good through dialectic.
To achieve the first objective of reasoning, Plato presents the first of
the five disciplines, arithmetic, to train abstract thinking beyond the pre-
liminary stage of character building, which involves physical and musical
training. Plato argues that arithmetic represents a situation of one and
many. Each number is a unity; the whole of numbers forms an unlimited
plurality (525a). Like the Pythagoreans, Plato believes the study of num-
bers is extraordinarily effective for envisioning the world, which consists
of abstract unities similar to numbers. Arithmetic trains the mind for cal-
culative reasoning and right value judgment, and converts thinking from
the world of becoming to that of [mathematical] reality and truth (525c).
Plane and solid geometries are the disciplines that train the mind to
engage with the basic structure of the world. Unlike physical shapes, geo-
metric Forms are not liable to change and decay (527b). They demon-
strate the interconnectedness of lines, angles, circles, and surfaces. Within
geometric structures basic principles, such as the Pythagorean theorem,
can be rationally formulated. For Plato all principles are intrinsically good;
hence the reasoning mind must further apprehend the common good-
ness in mathematical studies. Plato later explains in the Timaeus that the
goodness in the Republic actually is the divine purpose. Collectively those
patterns express the harmony of the Good. With this cosmic vision, Plato
argues that the study of geometry has the practical end of making it easier
to see the form of the good (526e).
Based on the hypothesis that astronomy is mathematical (530b), Plato
insists that celestial movements have a mathematical nature. Astronomy is
a form of celestial geometry. It explains the visible heavens by the reduc-
tion of phenomena to invisible geometric patterns. To be sure, this is the
astronomical amplification of the doctrine of Forms. Finally it is the disci-
96 textual studies

pline of harmony. Following the Pythagoreans, Plato regards musical har-

mony as the sister science of astronomy (530d). Just as a composer writes
concords in musical notes (numbers for Plato), which are played out in
movements, Plato further links musical harmony with cosmic harmony
with his influential hypothesis that heavenly motions and musical move-
ments share a mathematical nature. This harmony, which later is identified
as the central attribute of the World Soul, moves celestial bodies to form
a celestial clock. The clock manifests time quantifiable by mathematics.
Beyond the study of the five disciplines comes the method of dialectic.
Where does dialectic take up from mathematics? Plato says it is the point
where we acquire knowledge but cannot argue logically about what it is
(531e). From this ambiguity, dialectic progressively moves up to the sum-
mit of the intellectual realm where the Good is (532b). This progress
is what Plato calls dialectic; it moves from logical ambiguity beneath the
cloud of assumptions to the summit of the Good where principles are self-
evident. Dialectic takes up assumptions from mathematics and discusses
them in critical and logical terms. The procedure involving criticism of
assumptions (also proposing higher-level hypotheses) can go on indefi-
nitely until the power of dialectic destroys assumptions, reveals the truth
itself, and claims truth with certainty (533a). At this level dialectic
deals directly with what each thing essentially is in itself the ontological
identity of being-itselfinstead of treating basic unities as numbers, geo-
metric shapes, musical concords, and celestial pattens. Instead of being
compelled to use reason to understand these unities (511c), dialectic
pulls the mind out of assumption and leads it to a conversion (533d).
For Plato, reason, which was sufficient in mathematics, becomes insuffi-
cient at this higher level. He feels the need to distinguish reason from
dialectic. Consequently he calls it pure knowledge in the Curriculum,
echoing the concept of intelligence in the Divided Line.
Why can dialectic alonenot reasonreach the end of the intellectual
journey? Plato must mean that dialectic alone can connect the mind and
the Good. Perhaps enlightenment is all about the connection, just like
the connection between a person and the Dao, based on which a founda-
tion of all knowing can be comprehended. The connection allows a free
exchange of thought with the Good. If so, Plato leaves us with an impres-
sion that dialectic will elevate the mind along the ascending path to focus
on the brightest reality above all things. But how is it exactly that the
dialectic establishes this fusion and transforms the mind at the last stage of
ascent? Plato tells us virtually nothing about how.
While we speculate on the crucial ambiguity in the Curriculum, Plato
somehow switches the discourse on dialectic to another show on the four
 two forms of enlightenment97

levels of knowledge in the Line. This aborts the whole drama at the most
exciting stage. Instead, Plato treats the Good as one of Forms and repeats
what has been said earlier. Through his rhetoric he restates the original
proposal that dialectic is the only way to know what the good in itself is
(534c). Such a detour leaves readers with little to go on in order to answer
the question of how the mind makes the final step to dialogue with the
Good. It makes them question what Plato said earlier: So when one tries
to get at what each thing is in itself by the exercise of dialectic, relying on
reason without any aid from the senses, and refuses to give up until one
has grasped by pure thought what the good is in itself, one is at the summit
of the intellectual realm (532a, b).
If we do not interpret the saying too literally, it should make the same
claim made earlier that the Good is the epistemological cause. But this is a
proposition, not a conclusion. How is the mind grasped by the Good? Or
does Plato suggest that the causation of knowledge produced by the Good
is entirely unexplainable? What can be said about the causation refers
to the minds intuitive pursuit to capture the Good by which it has been
captured.
Returning to the earlier question, has Plato shown us the path of
enlightenment? The answer is simply no. When we read Platos Curricu-
lum as a whole, it is evident that Platos intellectual ascent involves two dis-
courses, one on the training of mathematical reasoning through five dis-
ciplines, the other on the critical procedure that moves the mind beyond
assumptions. Dialectic does not only ensure the coherence of knowledge,
but also attains communication with the Good. Although Plato has not
demonstrated how mathematics, astronomy, and harmonics converge into
a synthesis, it is his conviction that the world is a created harmony princi-
pally animating the Good. So mathematical principles are related through
the one over many determination and become structures of the cosmos.
Platos hypothesis of a mathematical universe is undoubtedly one of
the most brilliant and enduring ideas in intellectual history. However,
within Platos grand unity, there is an unbridged gap between the Good
and those disciplines. The second discourse is supposed to close the gap,
but the dialectic ends with another gap between dialectic and the Good.
This later gap further confirms that the earlier gap in the first discourse is
actually situated at the higher end of the Divided Linebetween knowl-
edge and its cause.
If we return to the diagram, what remains to be explained is how the
Good and dialectic form a fusion between the cause of knowledge and wis-
dom. This fusion is essential. Without this fusion the mind cannot reach
the Forms that the Good has produced. But it is evident that the road from
98 textual studies

the mindthrough the Goodto Forms has an unconnected section at

the top end. Plato does not stop there. He repeats the four orders in the
Divided Line. In the schema image/illusion, sensibles/belief, Forms/rea-
son, first principles/dialectic, it seems to be self-evident that dialectic and
first principles do correspond. However, this correspondence is actually
a short circuit. It is an assumption to be proven, not a conclusion to be
reached. The damage of creating such a short circuit is that if the dis-
tance between the mind and first principles is short-circuited, there is no
need to take the long road through the Good at all. Posting the sign of
the Good as the cause of knowledge, which invites the mind to travel the
distance through the Good rather than taking the already established
short way, becomes redundant, even unnecessary. As a result, the short
circuit rejects the proposition all together.

The Enlightened Mind and the Personified Dao

From the Daoist perspective, instead of taking the intellectual ladder

upwards, one can look inwardly into bodily life. To argue that the Good
is the common cause to principles and dialectic, however, requires some-
thing like what Ge Hong had in mind. The connectedness between inborn
Qi and the adepts spontaneous search is depicted in imagery in which the
adept takes an inward tour led by the movement of Qi. In such a tour
no shortcut can be taken, one can only follow the tour guideQiwho
invites the adepts mind to let go of all thoughts and to venture into the
reality of Dao. Just as the final moment of preserving the One is an effort-
less reception of Qi taking its position in bodily elixir fields, the final leg of
intellectual enlightenment has nothing to do with human initiativethe
kind of rigorous pursuit that Plato speaks of in the procedure of dialec-
tic. Rather it is the result of self-emptying cultivation. Inner peace trans-
forms the body into an empty vessel to receive truth, which is comparable
with a lowly positioned pond always ready to receive waters flowing into its
emptiness.
If we revisit the Sun, Plato has already made a similar point implicit.
Human senses can never reach the sun but only receive enlightenment
from it. Nor can the mind ever reach the Good, but it can receive wisdom
by becoming an emptied vessel free from any assumptions. If this is how
the Good as epistemological cause is interpreted, then the one and many
relation between the Good and dialectically trained minds has a radically
different meaning.
The final step of intellectual ascent is not a cognitive move but the move
of the Good. Just as Qi generates overflowing peace within the adept, the
 two forms of enlightenment99

ray of the Good warms the hearts of those who gaze at it. To communi-
cate with the Good is actually a passive act of receiving rather than a pur-
poseful act of apprehending. The Good would create a top-down flow
from the Good to human minds on the condition that the mind had been
instructed by the dialectic to be cognitively lowly positioned to receive
whatever the Good would flow into it. The final stage of dialectic is not
a two-way dialogue between the mind and the Good at all. Rather it is a
single-directional flow, which Christian theology calls revelation.
If the Good is the self-revealing and self-active cause for the mind to
recognize truth, then another disturbing question emerges. Is there really
the need to insist, Dialectic in fact is the only procedure . . . to the very
first principle of everything (533b)? No. The dialectic is not the only way,
but one of many methods.
What really happens to a dialectician at the summit of the intellectual
realm remains a mystery. Plato is confident that the procedure of dialectic
leads the mind to encounter the vision of the best among realities (532c)
and that intellectual vision later assists the procedure to determine first
principles (533b). Why does Plato here change the prefix of the Good
from Form (which speaks in various passages) to vision? As a Form,
the Good must have absolute clarity like any other Form, whereas vision is
equivocal. We can only gather hints from the Simile of the Sun. The anal-
ogy of the sun/Good depicts the Good to be more of an intuitive impres-
sion than a rational definition, more of what the Good analogically is than
of what the Good absolutely is. The sun is the brightest reality of the visible
realm; the Good is comparatively the brightest reality in the invisible
realm. But in the Simile we get no explanation of why it is the vision, not
the Form, of the Good that inspires a dialectician to attain the highest
point of his wisdom.
For Ge Hong it makes sense to treat the Good as an intuitive vision
rather than conforming to a particular Form. The moment of enlight-
enment is nothing other than the process of breaking down the barrier
between the mind and the world. Ge Hong would agree with Plato on
the point that the vision of Good over Forms is essentially about the relat-
edness of Forms in and through the Good. That is Platos cosmological
point. But for Ge Hong the unity cannot be a numerical oneness that the
Form of the Good denotes. It has to be a unity of relatedness in which
there is room for plural Forms to relate to each other. They are related
not because the determination of the Good penetrates through every one
of them, but because within the unity there exists the infinite land of
no form and no trace. All perceivable boundaries between plural things
become unseeable.
100 textual studies

From a Daoist one within many perspective, what really happens to

a dialectician at the mountaintop must not be a perception of the mind,
something like seeing billion rays deriving from a single point above, but
a transformation of the mind to realize that everything is interconnected.
The enlightened mind does not fail to recognize differences among
things, but moves freely among them, as if the boundaries among things
had broken down, and the barrier between the mind and the objects had
vanished. Philosophical wisdom is no longer a cumulative wisdom depend-
ing on the understanding of each Form, but the realized wisdom of find-
ing a path to infuse the mind into the unity and to emerge out of it.
The world has not changed, but the mind has seen realities differently.
All discontinuities among things together vivify the ontological continu-
ity connecting them. The continuity of the world in itself is the unity, just
like what Parmenides saw in his vision. Paradoxically the unity is shown
through all discontinuities with multiple things, just as Heraclitus saw the
ever-flowing river. Knowledge of the unity, therefore, ought to follow the
ontological flow and to investigate what the unity has continued in and
through discontinuity.
The Good, if it is a unity of Forms, must not be a commonality demand-
ing Forms to confirm with a singular sameness. If the Good is the cause of
Forms, then Forms cannot be coeternal with the Good. They must be cre-
ated realities but superior to sensibles in that they have determination over
sensibles. If Forms were coeternal with the Good, then the Good would
not be beyond and superior to them in dignity and power. As long
as the one over many structure remains, the Good must be in the creator
position demanding a commonality of goodness in all Forms. The good-
ness then becomes the central identity of Forms. It is further required that
Forms be subordinate to this being of the Good. Consequently, the com-
monality will destroy the differences of Forms.
Nor can the Good be a unity of togetherness piling up the differences
of Forms without a continuity to bring them into relation. It has to be
a unity of ontological continuity sustaining discontinuity. To do so, the
Good is impelled to move out of its absolute transcendence and to move
into Forms to be truly their ontological cause. The One must be in the
many, just as the primordial Qi. If the sun shines on sensibles by the virtue
of what the sun does, the Good ought to be immanent in Forms. Can the
Good be a unity of numerical oneness in the likeness of Forms? No, it can-
not. The indivisibility of the numerical one forbids any divisions within
the unity. Therefore, the Good cannot be present in the many, in order
to obey the principle of indivisibility. However, to be the continuity of dis-
continued Forms, the Good needs to extend its cause into what has been
 two forms of enlightenment101

caused. How is it possible for the unity to be both absolutely transcendent

and paradoxically immanent in the many? This is the ontological dilemma.

Philosopher-King: The Synthesis of Wisdom and Power

Plato is absolutely clear on what will happen after intellectual enlighten-

ment. A dialectician cannot stay at the mountaintop forever. In the Sim-
ile of the Cave, Plato argues the enlightened must descend to the actual
worldthe cavewhere people are still in the prison of darkness.
Ge Hong gives a similar instruction to Daoist adepts. Enlightenment is
not the end of wisdom, but a new beginning. The best of those who know
to preserve the One must translate the knowledge of unity as ontological
continuity into a countrys longevitythe succession of a dynasty (IC 326).
For Plato, to implement the unity of the Good over many Forms socially
is meant to create an ideal society modeled from the determinative OVM
structure. The philosopher-king represents the synthesis of wisdom and
power, and he rules the state as the one over many. Plato has assigned two
tasks to the enlightened who has returned to the mundane world. The first
is to relearn knowledge by freeing previous learning from unexamined
assumptions. The second is to become a statesman.
I have already discussed the first assignment in the Curriculum. To
relearn previous learning, the enlightened must follow the instruction
having grasped the first principle, it can again descend, by keeping to
the consequences that follow from it, to a conclusion (511b). Philosophy,
then, is a critical and corrective enterprise to free knowledge from unex-
amined assumptions. Even mathematical hypothesessuch as the Form of
square for all square objectsmust be critically reexamined to see whether
any fundamental premises lay beyond them. As the first intellectual assign-
ment, Plato asks a dialectician to become a ruler for his fellow men still
imprisoned in the cave.
Certainly intellectualism and politics are two different careers; so how
is it possible to manage the two in a single life?6 The same tension exists for
Ge Hong, who wants to seek immortality and to be involved in politics. Is a
person really torn apart by two divergent currents? For Ge Hong, politics
is really the public life of one who has attained inner transformation. In
his words, having known the way to govern the body, then one can gov-
ern the state (IC 326). For Plato the same relation of inner wisdom and
outer power is also identifiable. If politics is understood as the public life
of a philosopher, then his penetrating intellect and supreme vision shall
greatly assist him in ruling. Inner wisdom and outer power are two sides
of the same identity of Platos philosopher-king. A philosopher who takes
102 textual studies

no practical action is only an intellectual, not a philosopher. To be a phi-

losopher, the wisest must approach politics as an unavoidable necessity
(520e). He has the ethical responsibility of transforming personal wisdom
into national endowment.
To do so, he shall first personify the Good by living with it and then
practice it by drawing all who see it into its service. 7 The government
that he assembles is the community of guardians who share the vision of
the good. The mission in which he engages is to define moral principles to
sustain a good society. Legislation that the government wishes to establish
aims to unite all citizens under laws and to make each person a link in
the unity of the whole (520a). The key to incarnating the ideal Good into
the common good of the citizens is something that is fundamental in each
individual. It is not Spartan power, nor oligarchic wealth, nor Athenian
equality, but Socratic virtue. Hence politics is not based on the principle of
securing power or distributing power, but on morality. Plato believes that
the ideal state will be achievable when each citizen personifies the Good at
his or her level of the social hierarchy and lives morally and justly.
Politics is morality. This is perhaps Platos most influential idea other
than the doctrine of Forms. Throughout history many generations have
asked a similar question: would this vision of a good societya utopian
state called a Republicever be actualized on earth? Nonetheless many
lessons of politics come back to the same passage in the Republic. The book
has not just created an ideal society or viewed the earth as merely a shad-
owy reality of the eternal world, but also promotes the principle of good-
ness as the base of sustainable social orders. The discourse throughout the
Republic explains lesser forms of social organization in terms of a failure of
the better. Plato holds this beacon of morality to the end, when he comes
to his conclusion. He says, But it doesnt matter whether it exists or ever
will exist (592b).
Perhaps, even though the republic of the Good is unachievable on
earth, for Plato nothing could destroy the power of the Good in the mind
of the philosopher-king. If he could not actualize it on earth, he would
turn his eyes toward the heavens, where the Good really belongs. As Augus-
tine later depicted, the vision of the Good and the perfect society could
not truly converge and become an earthly reality, but would be established
as an eschatological synthesis in the City of God.

Summary

The investigation of Platos one over many begins with his answer to the
pre-Socratic OM debate. The textual study in this chapter has looked at
 two forms of enlightenment103

various passages mainly in the Republic to understand the theory of Forms

that defined ontology in degrees. The study has had only one aim: to iden-
tify the antithesis of transcendence and immanence. This is an ontological
problem that Plato hoped to resolve through the doctrine of Forms but
also intensifies the tension through the one over many structure of Forms.
The second part of the chapter has followed Platos intellectual ladder,
reached the summit, and identified the idea of the Good. It represents
the ontological cause of Forms and the epistemological state of enlighten-
ment. But the Good in itself is the one and the many problem. The prob-
lem appears to be an epistemological difficulty in having a knowledge path
between the mind and Forms. The difficulty is really ontological. Accord-
ing to the one over many structure, the Form of Good will be the deter-
minate cause of multiple Forms. The epistemological question is whether
the one Form above all Forms is still in the reach of reason. If the Good
is the cause of all Forms, then this wholly other strictly speaking cannot
be called one of many Forms in the way that it has been frequently named
(even by Plato). Something about this wholly other must be fundamen-
tally different from the rest of Forms because of the distinction between
the creator and the created. Glaucon concludes after Socrates speech on
the Good, It really must be miraculously transcendent (509c). If so, what
is the inner being of the Good?
Even though the Good is ambiguous, it remains Platos grand philo-
sophical vision. It has profound ethical implications. The Good does not
only represent the personal enlightenment of a philosopher, but also an
ethical good for politics and social organization. Because of the position-
ing of the supreme One Good over many Forms, the one over many geo-
metrical hierarchy sets itself up as contrary to the Daoist biological model
of one within many. The content of Platonic Good is the timeless order
of republican society ruled by philosopher-kings, whereas for Ge Hong the
longevity of a person and the longevity of a dynasty are akin, namely, to be
in accordance with the Dao.
 chapter 6

Ge Hongs Doctrine of Immortal Beings

During the Western Han (202 BCAD 9), a dynasty before Ge Hong, there
was a widespread belief in the existence of immortals. Archaeological evi-
dence discovered over the last few decades has revealed a belief in immor-
tality expressed in art and iconography with strong cosmological symbol-
ism in pre-Buddhist China.1 The hope for immortality was mainly focused
on the subjects of death, burial ceremonies, and the theology of postmor-
tal existence. Contrary to the belief in life after death, one of Ge Hongs
obscure arguments is his life without death doctrine. His Shenxian zhuan
represents a different way to express the belief in the existence of
immortals and resembles the biographical genre of the Liexian zhuan
by Liu Xiang (77 BCAD 6?).
The Inner Chapters contains Ge Hongs attempt to systematize these
beliefs in immortality, to defend them against their detractors, and to insist
on their core value for his tradition. In the second chapter, On Immortal-
ity (lunxian ), he argues that physical immortality is possible. In two
alchemical chapters, Golden Elixirs (jindan ) and Yellow White
(huangbai ), he reveals his unshaken faith that physical immortal-
ity can be attained through the practice of instrumental alchemy. In the
eighteenth chapter, Earthly Truth (dizhen ), he builds his ethics and
political philosophy on the basis of these beliefs. These writings formulate
Ge Hongs doctrine of immortal beings. On the one hand, it insists that
suffering and death can be avoided. On the other hand, it forms an ethical
platform upon which he presents his religious ethics by defining what life
is and how it ought to be lived.

Immortality: A Hermeneutical Problem

Why does Ge Hong place ethics within the framework of seeking immortal
life and value life from the perspective of immortality? The whole doc-
trine could be subject to attack since physical immortality might be a weak
basis on which to build ethics and politics. To gain a more comprehensive
understanding of what he means by immortal beings (shenxian )
requires a close reading of the texts.

104
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings105

Comparisons with Western Concepts

The class of immortal beings is closely associated with the term immor-
tal life (changsheng ). The term is widely used throughout the Inner
Chapters (see Table 6.1). By looking at the three main chapters on the
methods of attaining immortal existence, a broad range of meanings can
be glimpsed.
From Table 6.1 it is evident that the term changsheng does not just denote
longevity, but also suggests the sort of existence that surpasses death. The
term does not indicate any distinction between longevity and immortality.
But the word long (chang ) expresses the meaning of continuous.
Against a cosmogonical background, to be continuous does not just refer
to the continuation of a natural life, but also to the continuity of the genea-
logical process of Nature. For example, the term long life and forever
seeing is used in a context that refers to an everlasting existence, which
carries the same meaning as the term long life without death. The Dao
of xian-hood and long life and the Dao of long life both indicate an
active life that attains permanent unity with the Dao and becomes a part
of the unfolding creativity of Dao. Thus long life means continuous life
or an unlimited extension of life. The best English translation is immortal
life or immortality.
In the Inner Chapters, Ge Hong uses long life 109 times but only uses
longevity (changshou ) once for describing animals with a long nat-
ural life, such as the turtle (IC 47).2 Contrary to long life, which evi-
dently refers to unlimited life, the word advanced age (shou ) is quan-
tifiable and finite. In the majority of instances where the word is used,
it is a ssociated with the annual cycle of time, namely, the year.3 There-

Table 6.1. Various uses of the term immortal life (changsheng )

English Chinese Pinyin Reference

Long life and forever seeing changsheng jiushi IC 3, 47

Long life in the world changsheng shijian IC 4, 76
The Dao of xian-hood and xiandao changsheng IC 3, 47
long life
Long life without death changsheng busi IC 4, 78
The Dao of long life changsheng zhidao IC 3, 73
Communicating with spirits/gods tongshen changsheng IC 11, 205
and long life
106 textual studies

fore, there is a distinction in Ge Hongs writings between immortality and

longevity. The former is unlimited existence, whereas the latter is a natural
process. Long-lived people can still die, just as a long-lived turtle or a thou-
sand-year-old pine tree can still perish. Even though longevity could turn
into immortality, it is a lower form of existence. Longevity can be managed
by cultivating natural life (yangsheng ) (IC 73), whereas immortality
can only be attained through alchemy (IC 70). But longevity is a necessary
step toward immortality that no one can bypass.
To compare these ideas with the Platonic immortal soul and Christian
eternal life, three comparative points could be made. Daoist immortal
life

is neither a life after death in which the disembodied soul continues

to exist beyond death, as Plato has portrayed in the myth of Er
(Republic, book 10),
nor is it a life over death, as in the resurrection of Christ, that
proclaims the eternal life comes as Gods victory over death,
rather it is a life without death in that the existing life attains an
unlimited extension.

The doctrinal importance of Daoist immortal life can also be expressed

through comparisons. If, without the doctrine of the soul, the Platonic
intelligible world of Forms would not be accessible to human minds, and
if, without the resurrection of Christ, there would be no personal salvation
or eschatological salvation of the general resurrection of the dead, then
for Ge Hong Daoism stands or falls on the central belief in the existence
and attainability of immortal life.

Hermeneutical Difficulties
To say that the doctrine of immortals is central to Daoism does not entail
that it is problem-free. Given the perception of finite life as defined by
modern biology, people reject the belief of immortality. In a world influ-
enced by postenlightenment rationalism, Ge Hongs physical immortal-
ity, Platos psychological immortality, and Christs resurrection belong
to ancient dreams mythologized by religions. Immortality is a biological,
medical, and ethical problem.
The problem is not new. If life has a beginning, it should also have an
end (IC 12). Ge Hong understood and addressed this criticism. Although
he did not solve the problem of finite existence, the basis of modern biol-
ogy, his arguments remain inspirational. Compared with Daoist physical
immortality, it is easier for modern people to take the Platonic position
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings107

with its double-standard view of life, namely, the dichotomy of a perish-

able body and an imperishable soul. Because psychological immortality is
situated outside the scope of biology in an otherworldly realm, it cannot
be proven nor disproved. At the same time, biology mainly defines the
body in terms of physiology and anatomy, that is, sciences were developed
out of the knowledge of the dead corpse, in which the body-soul dichot-
omy is nonexistent. Compared with Daoist beliefs, people in the West are
more accustomed to accept the resurrection as a matter of faith because of
Christian influence in the world. This does not mean that the resurrection
is not a biological problem.
If we turn our attention away from the biological problem and consider
medical practices such as genetic cloning, freezing of the body prior to
biological death, and even the widespread practice of organ transplanta-
tion, isnt the ancient dream of physical immortality still alive in the medi-
cal sciences? Is Darwinian evolution not also in a sense a form of physi-
cal immortalitylife without beginning or ending? The development of
the medical sciences has, in fact, pushed the boundary of life beyond the
previous norm of individual biological existence. The so-called biological
problem of physical immortality essentially works on the premise that the
ending defines the process of life. Can life be defined by death? If so, it
becomes an ethical problem. Can life be defined by physiology? If so, there
is no need for meta-ethics to exist in philosophy and religious anthropol-
ogy in religion.
In Daoist studies physical immortality has been treated as a hermeneu-
tical problem mainly because Daoist religious anthropology presents itself
in contrast to the modern biological view of life. The problem basically
comes down to two questions: What does it mean? and What is it for?
There exists a hermeneutical barrier between the ancient and the modern
understandings of life. On the one hand, the preoccupation with biologi-
cal life has overcome the inertia of thought powered by postenlighten-
ment rationalism to explore anthropology presented largely in irrational
terms. On the other hand, a historical, cultural, and religious distance has
limited the capacity of ancient beliefs to communicate with modern eth-
ics. To rediscover ancient thought requires a particular approach. Here
we must first acknowledge an influential thesis, then use a comparative
approach to compare two arguments on immortality.
In recent years, Li Gang in his Daoist Philosophy in the Han Dynasty
has put forward an influential thesis.4 Daoist immortality is not a religious
answer to the phenomenon of death nor a life after death, but a phi-
losophy of life (shengming zhexue ).5 The ethical thesis does not
only move away from a Marxist material interpretation of life, but also
108 textual studies

takes scholarship out of its preoccupation with Buddhist otherworldly

transcendence and with the distinction between the Buddhist concept of
the other shore (bian shijie ) and the Daoist idea of the sphere
of immortal beings (shenxian jingjie ). The otherworldly nirvana
and this-worldly transformation set Buddhism and Daoism apart.6 More-
over, Lis thesis creates a powerful synthesis between Confucian ethics and
Daoist soteriology, which is particularly meaningful in the Chinese con-
text. Subsequently his study has been closely followed and elaborated in
Chinese scholarship.7
In his study on the Scripture on Eternal Peace, Li argues that immortal
life is the highest form of ethical good, namely, the heavens and the per-
son becoming the One (tianren heyi ). Thus, in his view, Daoist
soteriology can be placed in a direct dialogue with Confucian ethics. As Li
puts it, In reality this philosophy of life is fundamentally a convergence
of Confucian ethics and the Daoist Way of longevity. 8 The public life of
the immortals can be seen as being in agreement, rather than in conflict,
with Confucian politics, namely, inner virtue enabling outer ruling (nei
sheng weiwang ). This principle of Zhuangzi, which Confucians
historically also adopted, is the shared ground upon which the Confucian
interest in public ruling and the Daoist emphasis on inner virtue can be
mingled.
Are Confucianism and Daoism closely associated in harmony, as Li
has suggested? Ge Hong certainly tried to bring Confucian ethics into
his religious Daoism. But he also saw deep confrontations between the
two. On the one hand, like the Scripture on Eternal Peace, Ge Hongs doc-
trine of immortals also has ethical implications. In the light of the prin-
ciple of heaven and the person becoming one, Ge Hong also says to
mingle virtues with the Way of heaven and the earth (yu tiandi hede
) (IC 16). Ge Hongs life, recorded in his autobiographiesas a
trained Confucian scholar immersed in politics in his early life, author of
a book called Arts of War, and later a Daoist master who practiced medi-
cine and alchemyexemplifies a clear conversion from Confucianism
to Daoism.9 Yet he argued against contemporary Confucians. His Outer
Chapters present more criticism than praise for the society built upon
Confucianism.
In the Inner Chapters he clearly prioritizes Daoism over Confucianism.
Confucians, according to Ge, attacked the belief in immortality as an illu-
sion that tried to grasp winds, catch shadows, seek unattainable things,
and walk a nondestined path (IC 13). Ge Hongs arguments on immor-
tality were written to counter those who rejected Daoist bodily enlight-
enment but preferred Confucian intellectual enlightenment (IC 136).
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings109

Daoism is the origin of ten thousand streams, whereas Confucianism is

the main stream feeding into the great current (IC 138).10 Above all,
he defines the relation of two traditions saying, Daoism is fundamental,
and Confucianism is derivative (daoben rumo ). On the basis of
textual evidence, we can say that Lis thesis has made Daoist immortality
more meaningful to the modern mind, but it is not completely applicable
to Ge Hong.
To gain a full picture of Ge Hongs central doctrine, we can continue
to use the comparative method. On the one hand, by examining two sets
of texts the distinction between Platos belief in the immortal soul and
Ge Hongs doctrine of the immortal body can be comprehended. On
the other hand, the implication of Daoist religious anthropology can be
viewed against Platos political philosophy.

Two Arguments on Immortality

Platos Proof of the Immortal Soul

Plato offered a series of arguments that carry a conviction of the immor-

tality of the soul in the context of the highly charged Phaedo. The text is
Platos recollection of Socrates last speech in prison before his pupils that
led to the final moment when Socrates took charge of his life and drank
the cup of hemlock. This great tragedy of Western history evokes a pow-
erful sense of human dignity. But the dignity is closely associated with an
ancient belief in the immortality of the soul.
Taking his cue from the Orphic doctrine of rebirth, Plato says, If that
is true, that the living come back from the dead, then surely our souls
must exist there (70c). The doctrine is basically a circular argument. In
the wheel of rebirth, the soul cannot perish, but only moves between the
embodied and the disembodied states. Platos argument on immortality
relies on this doctrine.

(a)Death is the opposite of life, and sleeping is the opposite of

awakening (71d).
(b)Hot is the opposite of cold (71c).
(c)[Since] things move from opposite to opposite (71a).
(d)Therefore, death comes from life, and life comes from death (71e).

The argument has been carefully examined by Platonic scholars and

has not survived critical attention.11 However, a Daoist perspective can
shed further light on the body-soul issue.
110 textual studies

The first premise (a) is false. Sleeping and awakening are two opposites
based on the continuation of being alive. But it is false to say death and
life are opposites. In a Daoist view, living and being dead are not opposites
because there is no continuity between them. Death is the discontinuation
of life, and there is no continuity from death to life. In Ge Hongs writing,
there is no mention of rebirth and reincarnation. Plato relies on the doc-
trine of rebirth to assume that there is a continuation between death and
life. But it is an assumption. Then Plato uses the continuity in (b) to justify
the assumption. The second premise (b) is conditional. A cup of hot water
can get cold. But hot and cold are varied temperatures of water. Cold does
not generate hot, nor does death generate life. The conclusion (d) has
only repeated the proposition on circular rebirth, which is an assumption
to be proven, not a conclusion to be reached. Therefore, the argument is
circular, and the conclusion is unjustified.
Plato has not proven the immortality of the soul in the argument. Even
in the Phaedo he is unsure as to whether he has produced proof or not.
The idea of immortality, however, remains as a central motif in Platos psy-
chology of ethics. Plato often signals that approximations and myths are
the best we can hope for in these matters. Nevertheless, the souls home-
coming to Reason is the overtone played out in various dialogues, such
as the Crito, Gorgias, Meno, Phaedo, Republic, and Timaeus. It is Platos con-
viction that life is more than physical existence. The conviction is ampli-
fied in the story of Socrates death. Although Socrates accepted death,
he refused to let his life be defined by the approach of death. Instead he
envisioned that within human life there is something intrinsically divine
and imperishable.
This something is the soul, and it plays the same role as Daoist Qi.
It carries the continuity between now and then, between the essence of
human life and eternal Reason. Death can interrupt bodily life, but the
continuity of Qi cannot be broken by it. The argument of the imperish-
able soul also implies that philosophers do not have a monopoly on this
continuity; rather, the rational part of the soul is inborn in everyone. As
an enlightened philosopher, Socrates fully activated reason in his mind
and discovered its continuity with the cosmic logos. In comparison, ordi-
nary people are not yet aware of this natural endowment and still seek
happiness in appetitive desire, sexual passion, and ambition for power. As
Socrates departed from his life, he was convinced that his earthly depar-
ture was also a homecoming to the realm of reason, the place of his souls
true yearning and happiness. True happiness, like the Form of the Good,
is not physical but immaterial, not worldly but otherworldly (79d).
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings111

Ge Hongs Apologetics on Immortality

Compared with Plato, Ge Hong has a similar conviction regarding immor-
tality. In the second chapter, On Immortals, Ge Hong addresses a popu-
lar question stated in the first sentence: Can one attain the belief [in
the proposition] that gods and immortals do not die? (IC 12).12 He then
places the question in the context of creation and turns the question back
on his opponents. If there exist ten thousand kinds creation, and there
exist things of all sorts, then why could not immortals exist? (IC 12).13 This
set of questioning and counter questioning captures the conflict between
faith and doubt. Popular doubt was powered by Confucian skepticism
about the supernatural, which denies the meaningfulness of the Daoist
search for immortality.
Among critical voices the most forceful criticism comes from Wang
Chong, who also influenced Ge Hong on material empiricism. If a thing
has a beginning, then it must come to an end, and if life is real, death is
also inevitable (IC 12).14 Wang Chongs materialism is both an inspiration
for Ge Hongs material view of life and a problem for his soteriology. Wang
Chong argues that life is material because Qi is material. Ge Hong turns
against materialism and argues that the genealogical continuity between
inborn Qi and primordial Qi is not bound to material changes. Ge Hong
does not directly reply to Wang Chongs criticism, but names two assump-
tions upon which (he thinks) the criticisms are based.

(A)Immortal life should be perceptible (jian ) in the same way as

the body.
(B)Confucian ethics is the only acceptable norm of life.

To address the first assumption, Ge Hong argues that people mistak-

enly make an either/or judgment according to common sense. If immor-
tals cannot be seen, they do not exist. If they exist, where are they (IC 13)?
The counterarguments are not straightforwardly recognizable in Ge
Hongs text. Ge is not a progressive logician in the Greek sense. Unlike the
Greeks, who employ logic as their chief tool, Ge Hongs style of argument
in the chapter On Immortals is typically nonprogressive and can even
be called farfetched.15 The central question is whether Ge Hong wants to
prove immortality or to defend his faith. If we look for proof, we will be
disappointed. But if we read the text as an apologia, we may come closer
to an understanding of Ge Hongs religious anthropology.
Many points can be reconstructed out of the text and presented in the
112 textual studies

style of syllogism that are not Aristotelian deductive arguments. To recon-

struct Ges apologetics in the three-sentence style is mainly to highlight his
arguments that apparently hide behind religious language.
First, the criticism says:

(A)If I can perceive something, it exists; if I cannot perceive it, it does

not exist.
(B)Immortals cannot be perceived.
(C)Therefore, they do not exist.16

Is immortality dependent on perception? Attacking proposition A, Ge

Hong argues,

(A2) Certain things and events are imperceptible.

(B2) But they either exist or did exist.

For instance, the Confucian Master is dead but did exist.17

(C3)Therefore, present perception is not the only criterion for

existence.

With this argument, Ge Hong exposes the problematic proposition A

and contradicts it with the conclusion of C3. If A is false, then C does not
stand.
Ge Hongs argument from this point onwards becomes quite simple.
He further explores the problem of common sense and argues that the
believability of immortal beings cannot be judged under the criterion of
regularity. By listing various things that are irregular in the midst of regu-
lar things, such as irregular seasonal changes, he further argues:

(A3)Common sense cannot explain those irregular things, nor immor-

tality for that matter.18
(B3)But irregular things do exist.
(C3)So not all things can be judged by common sense.19

At this point, if his opponent accepts C3, the original criticism has no
basis. This is the point that Ge Hong aims to establish. As he puts it, It is
not possible from short-sighted mundane perceptions to deduce the far-
reaching purpose of immortals (IC 49).20
Are the above arguments sufficient to answer Wang Chongs criticism?
No, at least not directly. But the arguments service the apologetic purpose.
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings113

Wang Chong argues that death is unavoidable. Ge Hongs soteriology

seeks overall to defend his faith that death is avoidable.
What Ge Hongs arguments have done so far is to address the crite-
rion of life. Immortal life is not ordinary life that is under the judgment
of death. It requires an entirely different criterion, a criterion of life, to
come to terms with the ethical implication of the belief. Death cannot
define immortal life. Rather the belief in immortal life can become an
inner flame to energize life at every step of lifes journey. If common sense
cannot be the criterion, then soteriology should not be judged by it. Even
if death is unavoidable is true for ordinary humans, it does not yield the
conclusion that immortal life is impossible. All that Ge Hong has tried to
do is to remove the logical connection between the inevitability of death
and the impossibility of immortal life.
The second assumption presupposes Confucian ethics as the authori-
tative way to view life. This is the issue of criterion of knowledge. In Ge
Hongs teasing words, Since the book [of immortals] did not come out
of the house of Zhougong and the Confucian master has not written any-
thing about immortals, mundane people will always refuse to believe in
them (IC 16).21 Is Confucian orthodoxy the norm for Daoist religious eth-
ics? Ge Hong moves from a defensive mode to an offensive one. And he
argues, Daoism is fundamental, Confucianism is derivative (IC 184). The
relationship between Daoism and Confucianism is redefined in terms of
the causal relation of a priori and a posteriori. This is exactly how Wang Bi
explained the relationship between Nothingness and Something, wu and
you. Thus Ge Hongs argument turns the issue of criterion upside down.
Confucianism is well known for its emphasis on morality, politics, and
social hierarchy. Within a Confucian society, individual life is primarily
defined in terms of communal responsibility to maintain a functional
social order; even the value of individual life can be sacrificed for a greater
good, such as social stability or ritualized arrangements (keji fuli
). Within the social hierarchy sustained by the kingly qualities of rulers,
the filial piety of offspring, and the obedience of servants, each individ-
ual life has a social status, which is believed to be predestined. The value
of life is measured and ranked according to the individuals status. For
the rich, their official ranks, material wealth, and family succession are
the yardsticks for a successful life. For the poor, accepting their social sta-
tus, enduring hardship, laboring productively, and being intrepid before
death are the appropriate virtues. As Hu Fuchen points out, the combina-
tion of kingship and the patriarchal system produces the most oppressive
social structure. But Daoism is the worlds most life endorsing religion. 22
If we place Ge Hongs argument within this social context, it is not difficult
114 textual studies

to understand why he attacks the Confucian criticism. It is a part of his

apologetics. Instead of subordination to the common good, he argues for
the liberty of individuals.
Ge Hongs counterattack is aimed at Wang Chongs rationalism if life
is real, death is also unavoidable. But the argument must not be under-
stood as a rejection of Wang Chongs materialism. In fact, instrumental
alchemy largely agrees with Wang Chongs materialism and empiricism.
The point of dispute is the ethics of life. Ge Hong sees the criticism as an
endorsement of a negative aspect of common belief, namely, fate. Wang
Chong says: A persons fortune and adversity is predetermined by fate
(LH 1, 20). The idea of predestination, which morally justifies the social
hierarchy, goes hand in hand with the degree of material prosperity (or
poverty) among people. If death is inevitable, then it should be rationally
accepted. Is life nothing but material? As a religion Daoism rejects the
notion of material life but professes that material possessions and social
statutes must not be seen as the measures of life and its value.
Ge Hong insists that kingship cannot be traded for immortal life, but
poor people can pursue it with diligence (IC 19). To attain immortal life
and cultivate its Dao, the secret is persistence, not personal possessions
(IC 17).23 Persistence in doing what? Ge replies, My longevity and fate
are matters in my own hands (IC 15).24 And above all, can life be defined
by death? If life is predestined for a particular social status, then there is
no motivation for change. When people wholeheartedly accept the say-
ing If life is real, death is also unavoidable, they are also compelled to
accept that human life overall is a process of aging. If life is purely a bodily
existence, then the degeneration process becomes an irreversible journey
toward death. As Ge Hong alarmingly puts it: Life on earth is shortened
day by day. People are like a herd of oxen and sheep hurried to a slaugh-
terhouse. Each step forward is a step closer to death (IC 253).25 Whoever
accepts this fate also accepts that death is not just simply a moment at the
end, but the shadow that accompanies every moment of living.
With the above argument, the existence of immortals is again not
proven. What Ge Hong has done, however, is to use the tactic of disquali-
fication. To write his apologetics, he did not use the tactic of direct proof,
in which Plato engages. Rather, the arguments defend the proposition by
disarming two assumptions upon which the criticism is based: believing is
the result of seeing and Confucian ethics is the norm for life. It must be
accepted that at the textual level the apologetics are not clearly presented
as a convincing logical argument either. The above textual reconstruction
has demonstrated two points. (1) If common sense cannot comprehend
Daoist immortality, it is a matter of not knowing rather than so-called non-
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings115

existence. (2) If the Confucian consensus cannot grasp immortal life, then
a new ethics needs to be introduced. Therefore, the main argument is quite
straightforward. These two points have pushed the boundary of ethics.

Daoist S hen and X ian

X i a n -hood

The Biographies of Immortals (Shenxian zhuan ) is the second most

important source for understanding Ge Hongs doctrine of immortals. The
most thorough study in recent years is the book To Live as Long as Heaven
and Earth: Ge Hongs Traditions of Divine Transcendents by Robert Campany.26
Campanys central motive is to read the genre of Daoist hagiography
within its original anthropological and historical context. To interpret the
text and understand the context of the stories requires modern readers
to place the book against its social-historical background. Through this
method, the book opens rare windows onto the religious and social
world of Ge Hongs audience, where the stories of the immortals were
both descriptive models of and prescriptive models for religious life.27
Behind sophisticated social-historical studies, there is an insightful thesis,
which I call immortal life as religious life.
Within the overall framework of anthropology that keeps the interpre-
tation of immortals within a defined historical window Campanys textual
criticism has demonstrated its strength to unearth aspects of Daoism rep-
resented by the hagiography. Campanys method is basically Ge Hongs.
Instead of bringing the past to the present, Campany transports modern
minds to the ancient past in order to hear the legendary stories that Ge
Hong once told his audiences. Compared with the original text of less
than forty pages, the reconstructed stories require over six hundred pages
to cover the sociohistorical bases.
Campanys argument is especially significant in that it corrects some
misconceptions in Sinology.28 Campany identifies the following misconcep-
tions: (1) There is a problem of projection that reads Ge Hongs socially
immanent transcendents through more divinely characterized immortals
belonging to later periods. (2) Approaching hagiography as protofiction
ignores the original values and assumptions that reveal actual social and
historical meanings. (3) The strange phenomena in need of explanation
tend to secularize and rationalize Chinese religious thought in a way that
is friendly to post-Enlightenment thinking. (4) Widespread ignorance of
Daoist religious tradition treats hagiography as merely metaphorical.
On the central concept of xian , Campany argues, on the one hand,
116 textual studies

that this unparalleled term in English should be freed from Western

dichotomist ideas of time/eternity, death/immortality, human/divine,
natural/supernatural, and this world/the next world. On the other hand,
he indicates that his English translation transcendent, which is used as a
noun, denotes neither a once-and-for-all immortality nor an escape from
time and change into an eternal stasis, but reflects the hierarchy of beings
that historical adepts have ascended to links in the chain higher than
those occupied by even the best human beings. 29 The translation of xian
as transcendent follows a trend in recent scholarship that prefers tran-
scendent over the common translation of immortal. 30 Even though
Campany recognizes that many shenxian are socially immanent transcen-
dents, 31 the translation transcendent is nonetheless misleading. I argue
that the term transcendents is too Platonic to be Daoist.
The term transcendent carries the misleading meanings of going
beyond and ascendance over. And it promotes the motif of departure to
a transcendental realm where a person has been transfigured into a divine
being. It is true that in the xian literature the idea of ascending can be
found in many biographies, especially the motif of going up to heaven in
broad daylight. But the question is what kind of transformation Daoism
envisions. Is it a spatial ascending from the physical to the metaphysical
world? Or is it a chronological return, as we will see shortly? In Campanys
transcendent the motif of ascending is similar to the biblical imagery of
the transfiguration of Christ. Indeed the genre of hagiography appears to be
akin to Christian hagiographical tradition. Although Campany accepts that
there is no transcendence without the body in Daoism, this term still implies
the departure of the dead to an otherworldly eternity, just like Christian
saints in the eternal presence of God. The unspoken Western consciousness
in the translation provokes a further problem. How is it possible to solve the
apparent contradiction between transcendence and immanence?
If Daoist saints are both models of and models for religious life,
the key question is whether the ascending over normal humanity points
only to a transcendental departure to a higher order of beings or indi-
cates simultaneously a motif of immanent connection to ordinary life, in
particular the involvement of those adepts in social affairs. The question
is ethical, not theological. Without immanence, how could the transcen-
dents be the personified Ways of Dao? Christian saints dwell in the eternal
life of God, but the immortals are humans who have formed a permanent
bond with Nature. Nature is not a transitory phenomenon compared with
Gods eternity, but rather a bodily vessel into which Dao awakens itself.
The simplest example is the Chinese character xian: = + . 32 The
word joins a person on the left and a mountain on the right. A xian, there-
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings117

fore, is natural not transnatural or supernatural. Alchemical evolution of

the body is not a sanctified departure of the spirit. The class of xian are the
direct beneficiaries of Daos endowment in Nature.
My disagreement with Campany further points to a philosophical
problem embedded in his religious life thesis. Campany has persistently
divorced his study from philosophy and treats Ge Hong merely as a religious
thinker of no philosophical interest.33 This separation of religion from
philosophy should be rejected. Ge Hongs Inner Chapters clearly reflect that
his thought belonged to the Wei-Jin period, when religion and philosophy
were intermingled. Although his project has assisted in the understand-
ing of religious life at this period, with his sole interest in religious life
Campany has unconsciously, or perhaps consciously, kept religion and phi-
losophy apart. Hence Ge Hongs philosophy coded in religious language
has been overlooked. Campanys concentration on just one of Ge Hongs
works naturally leads him to this conclusion. The Inner Chapters should be
understood in light of Ge Hongs other writings, such as the Outer Chapters
and the Astronomical Treatises in the Jinshu , as I have done. More-
over, the comparison with Plato and the OM problem enables me to place
the philosophical side of the Inner Chapters in clear relief.

Four Modes of Immortal Existence

Ge Hong has not explicitly developed a hierarchical structure of immor-
tal beings similar to Platos four ontological degrees and four statuses of
the mind. The only classification is a three-degree distinction: The upper
ranked immortals dwell in celestial palaces; the middle ranked gather in
Kunlun Mountain; the low ranked forever live among ordinary people (IC
76). These ranks correspond to three classic categories of Nature: heav-
enly, earthly, and human. Immortals are not divided into three degrees of
transcendence. But more like three ranks of officials in a state, their exis-
tence spreads across the world by forming a bond with Nature.
From various parts of Ge Hongs writings, we can extrapolate four mod-
els of immortal existence. Although Ge Hong has not given them specific
terms, we can name them as primordial gods (tianran shen ), natu-
ral gods (ziran shen ), immortal beings (xianren ), and humans
with longevity (shouren ).

Primordial Gods
Only three primordial gods are mentioned in Ge Hongs writings. The
Book inside the Pillow (Zhenzhong shu ) says, The Heavenly Lord of
the Primordial Beginning already existed as the vigor of the
precosmos. 34 The text indicates that Ge Hong had the highest deity in
118 textual studies

mind when he wrote a version of theogony echoing Xuanthe grand

ancestorin his cosmogony in the Inner Chapters. The primordial god is
ungenerated but is a self-generating god who predates the world coming
into existence.
In the Inner Chapters, he also mentions another superior deity. The
Primordial Master (Yuanjun ) is the master of Laozi. . . . He is the man
with the greatest immortal nature. . . . All natural gods in the world are sub-
jected to his superiority (IC 76).35 The primordial god is ranked above the
created natural gods. Even the best of all humansLaozihad learned
from him. The third deity comes from the first chapter of the Biographies.
The ancient Master of Formlessness (Xuao Ruoshi ) . . . dwelled
in the realm beyond the light generated by the sun and the moon, yet the
stars floated upon it. . . . Above it there is no sky, under it no land. Like
the previous two, the Master of Formlessness transcends light and stars,
and there is nothing beyond its formless and limitless breadth. All three
primordial gods have no form, but the whole world is their body.
Compared with later traditions, Ge Hong never conceptualized the
highest deity in terms of the trinity the Three Pure Ones (sanqing ).
The relationship among primordial gods remains ambiguous. The figure
of Laozi in Ge Hongs writing was divinized and in later times transfig-
ured into the Heavenly Worthy of Dao and Virtues , the third
primordial god in the three-one community that also included the Lord
of Primordial Beginning and the Lord of Numinous Treasure
(see Figure 6.1). But for Ge Hong, Laozi was one of the immortal
beings who were born in human form and later attained immortality. The
ancestor Peng and Laozi were humans, not different beings [from
us]. The reason for their extraordinary longevity is attaining Dao; it was
not inborn (IC 46).36
Another remarkable feature is that Ge Hong places the primordial gods
on a scale of genealogical time instead of the hierarchy of transcendental
space. In later traditions, the Buddhist Three Realms (sanjie ) had
a strong influence on the hierarchy of the celestial, the human, and the
demonic beings. But the subordination was absent in the early Daoism rep-
resented by Ge Hong. He frequently speaks about the gods as genealogical
ancestors in the time of high antiquity (shanggu ). Even though they
possess primordial status in his doctrine of immortals, cosmogony is far
stronger than theogony. They are visible forms of the invisible Dao and
play out cosmogony in human fashion. Thus, their primordiality does not
suggest absolute transcendence but genealogical priority. And Daoist biog-
raphies are not arranged according to the rank of spatial transcendence,
but on a scale of time. This is the exactly the order of one and many.
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings119

Natural Gods
Daoists believe that gods dwell in the midst of the myriad things. Contrary
to the primordial gods who existed prior to creation, natural gods came
to existence together with the created world. Natural gods often refer to
celestial gods who are generated to maintain the celestial order. The sun,
the moon, the Twenty-Eight Constellations, and the five planets are the
bodies of those natural gods. For instance, among fifteen polar stars in the
Purple Palace (zigong ), the first one, where the son of heaven per-
manently dwells, is called ziwei (AT 290). Even time is turned by sixty
natural gods. Each god represents a defining point in a sixty-year cycle (see
Figures 6.2, 6.3).
Similar to the gods of Greek mythology, Daoist natural gods all have
anthropomorphic representations. But unlike Greek gods, who do not
necessarily possess physical form, each Daoist natural god takes a unique
celestial body and occupies a permanent time-space location. And the
body (astral, planetary, and human) is closely associated with this time-
space location. Here is another issue with great philosophical significance.
Time is not an independent concept, but relates to space as well. Without
spatial characteristics, the gods of the Twenty-Eight Constellations cannot
define four sections of celestial time. I will come back to this point in the
study of Ge Hongs alchemical universe.
In Ge Hongs doctrine of immortals, natural gods are less frequently
mentioned in celestial context, but they do appear in internal cultivation.
The Preservation of the One involves an inward journey to meet inter-
nal gods. The aim of the cultivation is to realize that the internal gods in
the physiological environment are beings consubstantial with those of the
celestial world. As we have seen already, this distinctive feature of inner-
outer correspondence derived from the medical tradition represented
by the Huangting jing . The free movements of the gods between
two environments create a river to channel the flow of Qi, hence closing
the distance between the body, on the one hand, and the cosmos and its
energies, on the other. Having attained this level of realization, the adept
empties his body and adopts the cosmos as his body, so his bodily transfor-
mation actually ensures that the body and the spirit can form an unbreak-
able bond.
This permanent unity is celestial, since the natural gods never leave
their celestial bodies behind. Likewise, the adept will always flow with the
course of Nature, just as natural gods will always rely on Qi to empower
their activities and to ensure that the myriad things can have the natural
environment to exist. Natural gods all have their created beginning but no
120 textual studies

teleological ending. If the adept can join this community, there is immor-
tality. To attain non-ageing status means to abide in the natural flow that
always changes.
Another group of natural gods is the earthly ones. Mountains regard-
less of whether they are large or small have indwelling gods (IC 299).37
Mountain gods can cause both good and evil, just as water can either float
a ship or sink it. To conduct alchemical practice in a selected mountain
site, alchemists usually bring various talismans to protect themselves from
demonic influences and to seek guidance from mountain gods.
Ge Hong has recorded various talismans derived from two inherited
texts: the Scripture of Numinous Treasure (Lingbao jing ) and the True
Forms of the Five Marchmounts (Wuyue zhenxing tu ) (IC 302314).
Some talismans perform a function similar to a modern map with contour
lines to give directions and guidance to hikers. In the Ge Hong context,
these talismans represent the pulses of living mountains to indicate the flow
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings121

Fig. 6.1 (left and facing

page). The Three Pure Ones
in later Daoist iconography:
The Lord of the Primordial
Beginning (left); The
Lord of Numinous Treasure
(middle); The Lord
of Dao-Way (right).
(Reproduced by permission of
the Chinese Daoist Association
from Zhongguo Daojiao Xiehui,
ed., Daojiao shenxian huaji
[Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe,
1995], 2, 4, 6)

of natural forces, similar to pulses in the human body that Chinese doctors
use to diagnose internal conditions. They are the means to communicate
with mountain gods and to seek secure paths in a dangerous environment
(see Figure 6.4). Similar to celestial gods, mountain gods on earth repre-
sent fundamental forces of Nature. Alchemists always sought ways to go
with Nature rather against it. Before conducting instrumental alchemy, the
preparation also involves a ritual to invoke mountain gods and local earth
gods to bless and participate in the alchemical practice (IC 74).

Immortal Humans
Most of the immortals in Ge Hongs Biographies belong to the category
of immortal humans. Unlike natural gods who take celestial and earthly
entities as their bodily forms, immortals are born in human form. Almost
all immortals in the Biographies were historical figures. They include Laozi
and the Master of the Upper Stream , the early commentator on the
122 textual studies

Fig. 6.2 (above and facing page). The natural gods of the Twenty-Eight
Constellations. (Reproduced by permission of the Chinese Daoist Association
from Zhongguo Daojiao Xiehui, ed., Daojiao shenxian huaji [Beijing: Huaxia
chubanshe, 1995], 60)

Laozi. Some immortals lived several centuries earlier than Ge Hong: the
founder of the Daoist movement (Zhang Daoling ), the prince of
Liu An , the Mohist Master (Mozi ). Some belonged to the tradi-
tion of alchemy, such as the pioneer of theoretical alchemy Wei Boyang
, and three alchemists of Ge Hongs family tradition.
These adepts were born in ordinary human form but lived extraordi-
nary lives. They did not only contribute their wisdom to the great knowl-
edge of Dao, but also practiced the Dao and lived out the Way through
their lives. The living stories of historical persons in the genre of hagiog-
raphy represents a strong sense of the incarnation of Dao in human lives.
Later artists also carried the persistent humanism and portrayed them in
primarily human form (see Figure 6.5). Their immortal attributes were
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings123

humbly concealed in their humanity yet radiated inside out through

virtues.
Common characteristics of these figures are prolonged bodily life and
longevity extending beyond death into immortality. Immortals live a life
unbound by death. As Ge Hong points out in the hagiography of Laozi, his
prolongation is achieved through the act of emptying his identity into the
plurality of the cosmos so that he can change spontaneously with Qi, just
as most of the adepts do in this age (Biographies, chapter 3). The changing
physical universe absorbs Qi to attain existence upon which death has no
effect. Viewed against the cosmic background, Daoist immortality is really
about the permanent bond of the body and the spirit, and the lift that is
empowered by Qi and changes with it. This is the consistent soteriology
that underlies all immortal humans (xianren ).
In the likeness of natural gods, their bodies have no definite ending,
only an open-ended process of evolution. Their immortal existence does
not leave their finite body behind, but carries the original body by trans-
124 textual studies

Fig. 6.3. The Sixty Primordial Asterisms. Before adopting the Western calendar,
the ancient Chinese used a sixty-year calendar cycle. These male and female
immortals are believed to be responsible for the turning of cyclical time. (Repro-
duced by permission of the Chinese Daoist Association from Zhongguo Daojiao
Xiehui, ed., Daojiao shenxian huaji [Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1995], 70)

forming it into the vessel to carry Qi with an indefinite continuation. The

many stories of immortal existences reflect the large and collective story
of cosmic creativity. Contrary to the abstract doctrine of Xuan Dao, the
hagiographies exhibit more humanistic and conceptually more accessible
portraits. The stories of the immortals are the collective story of the Dao
and fundamentally one and many in kind. Instead of arguing Daos uni-
versal creativity, the Biographies call people to follow the footsteps of the
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings125

Fig. 6.4. Two groups of talismans. In the chapter Climbing and Wading
Ge Hong unveils the sacred inscriptions that are used to enter into unfamiliar
mountain routes. (Rewritten in calligraphy by the author from the original in
the Inner Chapters 309, 11)

historical adepts and to preserve the creative Qi in their bodily lives so that
they too may become living examples of Dao. The liberation of the spirit
and the prolongation of the body together form the collective story of the
reality of the One, in which no distinction of the body and the spirit can be
drawn at the primordial level.
Another remarkable feature of immortal humans is that of socially
immanent beings. Ge Hong makes the point vividly in the hagiography of
the Master of Whitestone (Biographies, chapter 2, 1). The immor-
tal appeared to be in no hurry to make his ascension. Others asked him
why. He replied, How can one assume that heaven is a happier place than
the realm of humans? Social immanency is expressed through parables
of miracles with which the immortals are associated. Ge Hong recalled
the story of Zhang Daoling of the Eastern Han period. Zhang was
the founder of organized Daoist movement known as the Religion of Five
Measures of Rice (wudoumi dao ). Zhang had over ten thousand
followers who all contributed personal possessions, including five mea-
sures of rice, to be used to build bridges and roads. But what really made
people flock to him was his knowledge of how to heal the sick, and the
arts of longevity (Biographies, chapter 4, 3).
With respect to the five female immortals mentioned in chapter 7, Ge
 A B C

D E F

Fig. 6.5. Some of the immortals portrayed in Ming dynasty woodcuts by Wang
Shizhen (15261593), selected to illustrate the persistent humanism in
Ge Hongs hagiographical tradition. The names of the adepts are a, Laozi
; b, the Ancestor Peng ; c, the Master of Accomplishments ; d, the
Lady Xuan ; e, the Master of Whitestone ; f, the prince of Liu An
; g, Wei Boyang and Yu Sheng ; h, Zhang Daoling ; i, Fei
Changsheng and the Pot Master ; j, Ma Gu , Wang Yuan
and Cai Jing ; and k, Ge Xuan . The images are modern reproductions
of the Ming versions in Youxiang liexian quanzhuan (1783).
(Courtesy of Hebei Meishu Chubanshe; reprinted from Wang Shizhen, Liexian
quanzhuan [Shijiazhuang: Hebei meishu chubanshe, 1996], 1, 20, 9, 44, 54, 61,
83, 84, 100, 99, 104)
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings127

G H I

J K

Hong mainly portrays them as miracle workers. The Lady of Taixuan

was born with birth defects and was predicted to have a short life. But
she was determined to learn from a wandering adept and attain the Way
of longevity (changsheng zhi dao ). In return, she performed many
healing works for others. An eighteen-year-old girl called Fairy Ma (magu
) taught a moral lesson to the adepts Wang Yuan and Cai Jing
in the golden age. Miracles are not shows but must have a functional
purpose to help others. She demonstrated it by transforming spilled rice
into pearls and turning a pacifying stick (for Cai to scratch his itchy back)
into a whip to teach his male counterpart a hard lesson. Madam Fan
128 textual studies

, who knew arts of change, brought many years of prosperity to the

county under her husbands rule.

Long-Lived Humans
Those who have attained long life are only beginners on the soteriological
journey. But they can still die. Ge Hong calls them those who have entered
the path of Dao (rudaozhe ). In the hagiography of Master Peng,
a distinction between immortal humans and long-lived humans is drawn.
Immortal humans are those who ingest primordial Qi for nourishment
and have transformed their original identity by the means of preserving
the changing Qi. On the contrary, longevity refers to those humans who
eat pure food, dress in simple clothes, communicate with Yin-Yang, and
are involved in social governance. Every one has the inborn Qi, but this
group, although they do not know Daoist arts, have lived appropriately.
So it is not unusual to see people of one hundred twenty years of age.
Having said this, Ge Hong points out that they cannot attain immortality
(chapter 1, 4).
The distinction between the two is basically the difference between
immortality and longevity. They are not equal, but overlapping. Longev-
ity still has a limited end conditioned by death. Immortality is the exten-
sion of longevity with no definite ending. The central difference between
the two rests in the transformation of the original body. Immortals have
turned the body inside out by preserving life permanently within, whereas
long-lived humans have not changed the natural process of aging during
which the bond of the body and inborn Qi is increasingly loosened. The
two kinds of body also require different food. Immortals can practice the
way of living without grain foods. The practice of abstaining from grains
is traditionally called bigu .38 As natural gods draw energy from the
universal Qi, immortals draw nourishment directly from Nature literally by
eating Qi. On the contrary, humans do not know the arts of preservation
and still rely on ordinary food to sustain the body.
For Ge Hong, longevity is the best that humans can achieve within a
normal course of life. It can be managed by medicine. Ge Hongs medi-
cal approach includes physical exercise, dietary regulation, emotional self-
care, sexual arts, controlled release of reproductive energy, and prevention
of illness. Immortality, however, can only be obtained through alchemical
means. Among the four degrees of soteriology, it is clear that the state
of longevity ranked as the lowest. Within mainstream Daoist traditions,
however, the adepts never seek any shortcut to bypass longevity in order
to arrive at immortality. Immortality is a religious life that begins with
daily living, and longevity is a style that builds upon those habits. Manag-
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings129

ing the body and nourishing life requires extreme attention to the finest
details. One cannot neglect small exercises because they bring out small
benefits, nor can one forget illness prevention because small sicknesses
do not bring great harm immediately (IC 240).39 Because the body-spirit
bond requires both the house and its occupant, daily nourishment to
the body is a necessary way of life to produce the health that becomes the
physical foundation upon which the inside-out transformation might pos-
sibly be constructed.

Many Becoming One

Behind the four soteriological modes, there is a hidden OM argument.

The modes are directly in proportion to the closeness of the many to the
One. The primordial gods are genealogically the closest to the precosmos,
in which the only nameable identity is formlessness. Natural gods come
together with the universe during the materialization process of Qi. Their
immortal life represents the timeless existence of navigational stars, mov-
ing planets, and the sixty-year cycle of time. They are materialized Dao on
an astronomical scale, possessing the same Qi as heterogeneous bodies,
which are irreducible to each other.
Immortal humans are the personified Dao. They are ordinary humans
with extraordinary lives. Unlike in the degenerative process of ageing,
these humans have reversed the order of creation and turned the cosmo-
gonical process from the One to the many into a soteriological path from
the many to the One. Although they all have preserved the same Qi, as
the hagiographies of individual immortals have shown, they still maintain
individualities exemplified by their different bodies. Thus the return to
primordiality does not cause their heterogeneous personalities to collapse
into the homogeneity of the One. In fact, the One is diversified by the
many. What the One has incarnated into the inborn Qi cannot be undone.
This is the natural order of creation. But human bodies can harbor this
inborn vitality.
Closeness to primordiality can be schematized as shown below. The
diagram demonstrates that genealogy and soteriology are related. They
appear to be two aspects of the one and many running in opposite direc-
tions. If we join the two ends indicated as One and many together, the
upper half and the lower half actually form a cycle of change. They are
two forms of alchemical change, genealogical in the natural world and
soteriological in human life, as the diagram at the end of Chapter 3 has
shown (Figure 3.4). The most important feature of the diagram below is
the correspondence of cosmogony and soteriology. Cosmogony is shown
130 textual studies

in the direction of the forward arrow. It indicates the evolving nature of

the world and thus is labeled Genealogical OM of Nature. Soteriology is
indicated by the arrow pointing in the opposite direction. It refers to the
path of Daoist search for immortal life and is called Soteriological OM
of humanity. In the language of the one and the many, these two arrows
designate two movements from one to many and from many to one.

One may ask what these movements really are in less metaphysical
language. The answer is time. The arrows are the material form of time.
Unlike modern linear time, time is cyclical in Daoism. Unlike modern
abstract time, the Daoist concept of time is concrete. And time is filled
with material things, not transcendent and abstract ideas. Both material
time and cyclic time become central in Ge Hongs instrumental alchemy.
Here we encounter the genealogical feature of time. Time is measured
by recorded generations with real names and historical circumstances,
including Ge Hongs hagiographical tradition. Chinese genealogy is not
just a record of ancestry, but also a process of generation and transforma-
tion of that ancestry, an unfolding time with nameable individuals.
This time is also bidirectional. Life comes out of formlessness, and this
is also the point of eternal return. Ordinary life and immortal life are not
two different kinds of life, yet there is only one bodily life. Within human-
ity, there is the natural endowment of Qi that makes the continuation pos-
sible. Qi is capable of being evoked. Within the cosmos, there is also the
same cosmic potency that unites natural gods into one life beyond their
plural and irreducible existences. The more thought-provoking question
is this: what is the continuity that penetrates the discontinuity of humans
and Nature? For Ge Hong, it is the ontological life that springs out of the
inner being of Xuan-One and actualizes itself into the genealogical tree
the plurality of the worldwith the single evolutionary life. This life is
ontologically immortal.
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings131

Ge Hongs Ontoethics: A Comparative View

Plato and Ge Hong have a shared idea of intellectual homecoming to the

origin of the world. But the object of return is comparatively different. In
Platos metaethics the soul seeks its ultimate conformity with the logos of
the world. Ge Hongs ontoethics involves a return to the most original life.
Further comparison requires a better understanding of Platos doctrine
of the soul.
As seen earlier, Platos intellectual homecoming is the elevation of
the mind to the summit of all knowledge where the Form of the Good
becomes self-evident. What are the chief rewards that intellectual and
moral goodness can win? Toward the end of the Republic Plato presents two
attributes of the soul: the animation of the Good in this life (608c613e),
and the transmigration of the soul after death (614a621d). By recalling
the Orphic myth of Er, Plato hopes to conclude his ethics with two argu-
ments. First, the philosophers life seeks ultimately to attain unity between
the cause of life in the soul and the cause of the world in the Good. The
same connection is made in the Timaeus: the Good has been passed from
the divine maker to the World Soul (30a), and the human soul is the min-
iature of the World Soul (41d). Second, philosophical life is intellectually
enlightening, politically necessary, and soteriologically rewarding.
In the Republic, book 4, Plato identifies the exact part of the soul that
is capable of immortal existence. This argument is presented against
the previous discussion of the three parts of the souldesire, spirit, and
reason (439a441c). According to Irwin, Platos principle of division is
good-dependent.

The appetitive is not good-dependent.

The emotional is partly good-dependent.
The rational is entirely good-dependent and for the over-all good. 40

Among the three parts of the soul, only the rational part is fully depen-
dent on the Good. The mingling of the soul and the Good, therefore,
speaks for the homecoming of the soul to the cause of Forms and the
world. It is an ethical model of the many becoming the one. The hierarchy
of the three can also be schematized in terms of degrees of closeness to
the one.

the rational the most good the one immaterial World Soul
the emotional the less good
the appetitive the least good the many material World Body
132 textual studies

The connection between the essence of life and the essence of the
world is comparable with Ge Hongs doctrine of immortals. However, two
questions set the two apart. What is the ultimate good? For Plato, it is the
rational soul in unity with the immaterial logos. For Ge Hong, it is the
body-spirit bond that surpasses human finitude and is absorbed into the
ongoing process of change in Nature. Change is good because the primor-
dial state of change is creative and enduring. For Plato, change is bad. The
reward of the most good-dependent is a disembodied existence, similar to
Buddhist enlightenment. The enlightened are not reincarnated (as in the
Phaedo)they live as disembodied souls. Only those who are contaminated
by matter are reincarnated. In the Republic, as the scene of reincarnation
of souls appears before Er, what catches his attention is the central struggle
for the souls to choose a better fate for the next life. The soul struggles not
because it has few options, but because there are too many attractive ones
(618d619a). The moral lesson beyond the myth is that one should know
earlier (before death) the knowledge and ability to tell a good life from a
bad one (618c). Like Buddhist reincarnation, the current ethical life has
direct consequences in next life. The freedom of choice of what is most
appropriate in the next life depends upon the ethical knowledge to distin-
guish good from bad that has been learned in the previous life.
For Plato, the essence of life is the soul. Only the rational part of the
soul has continued existence beyond death in a disembodied state. For Ge
Hong, it is Qi preserved by the body. The doctrine of immortals persistently
argues the body-spirit bond as the true identity of human existence. Platos
doctrine of the soul, on the contrary, separates the soul from the body with
the antithesis of rational/irrational, immaterial/material in the hierarchy
of the Good. Plato even says that death is the liberation of the soul from
the body. The historical Socrates was brought to trial for corrupting youth.
He was found guilty and was ordered to drink poison. We have already
encountered the story in Platos Phaedo, but here is another comparative
perspective. It would be a shocking idea for Ge Hong that Socratesthe
spokesman of Platoturns the death penalty into a voluntary suicide
with his conviction that death is not the end. In the last hours of his life,
Socrates told his friends, as if he had always been waiting for this moment,
that whoever practices philosophy in the proper manner is practicing for
dying and death and that, as if his departure was for the greater good
after death, a true philosopher is to be of good cheer in the face of death
and to be very hopeful that after death he will attain the greatest blessings
yonder (63e64a). Then he went on to prove the immortality of the soul
as the true happiness waiting for all philosophers.
Second, if death is the end of the body, why is it not the end of the soul?
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings133

For Ge Hong, the body without the soul is a corpse, and the soul with-
out the body is a mere ghost. Neither a corpse nor a ghost has ontology
because to be an ontological entity requires the living relation of a body
and a soul. H
owever, Platos doctrine of the soul rests upon the assumption
that the soul has ontological independence from the body. The immortal-
ity of the soul goes hand in hand with the eternity of Forms. Even if all
chairs in the world had been destroyed, the ideal Chair would still exist.
Even if the body was gone, the soul would still exist. The premise death
is the separation of the body and the soul reaffirms the assumption and
leads to the belief that death is the liberation of the soul from the body.
From the Daoist point of view, Platos intellectual enlightenment, which
involves body-spirit separation, entails misery. Ghosts and demonic spirits
are never happy. They always try to abduct someone elses body to become
a functional reality (IC 299). It is troubling to accept the immortality of the
soul on both grounds that the soul has independent ontology, on the one
hand, and death is the liberation for the essence of life, on the other. Why
should one place all hope on postmortal existence?

Cultivating the Self and Governing the State:

Ge Hongs Political Philosophy

In the eighteenth chapter, Ge Hong presents his political philosophy:

Hence a persons body can be pictured as a state. The allocation of

chest and stomach can been seen as the arrangement of courts in the
palace, the stretching of the four limbs as the extension of a countrys
territory, the interconnection of bones and joints as the order of many
bureaucracies. The immortal One is like the emperor, the blood the
ministers, and the flowing Qi the people. So by knowing how to man-
age bodily life, knowledge of governing the state will then follow [guzhi
zhishen , zeneng zhiguo ]. Love the people, the country
shall be made secure; nurture the Qi, the body shall be kept whole.
When people are scattered, the state will fall; when Qi is exhausted, life
comes to an end. For the deceased cannot be born again, the lost have
no continued existence. Therefore the most venerable adept [zhiren
] eliminates hidden disasters before they arise and treats illnesses
before they occur. He applies the philosophy of preventative medicine
instead of chasing life after it has gone. People are difficult to adminis-
ter but easy to endanger; Qi is difficult to make lucid, but easy to make
turbid. Therefore, [for an emperor] to examine his manner and virtue
will protect the country, to reduce extravagant desires will preserve the
134 textual studies

vigor of his blood [xueqi ]. After all this, the Real-One shall be pre-
served, three spirits and seven gods will be internally kept, hundreds of
diseases can be kept away, and life is extended. (IC 326327)

Interestingly, this passage on politics is sandwiched between passages

on the Preservation of the One. The context provides readers with a hint
as to why the method of internal cultivation is applicable to ethics and
politics. The Dao can internally nurture the body and externally govern
the state (IC 185).41

The Longevity of the Body and the State

Comparable with Platos general principle that politics is discussed within
the context of ethics and vice versa, the text above also highlights Ge
Hongs political philosophy. Ethics is the core of politics but not other way
around. Echoing Zhuangzis principle inner virtue enables outer ruling,
Ge Hong also insists that by knowing how to manage bodily life, knowl-
edge of governing the state will then follow. But unlike Zhuangzis reluc-
tance to be involved in politics, Ge Hong argues that political involvement
is an essential part of the public life of the enlightened. Compared with
Laozis naturalism and the principle of indeterminate action,42 Ge Hong
also argues that political activities should be in conformity with Nature.
But as a medical doctor, he uses the philosophy of preventative medicine
to argue that the prevention of social illness is a prescription for morality,
hence politics.
The medical philosophy appears to be shifting away from Daoist inde-
terminate action and toward a more Confucian commitment to social
management. But the core value of indeterminate action is not lost. In
medicine it is generally understood that a healthy body and its immunity
are the strongest defense against any cause of illness. In politics, social har-
mony is the best medicine for the longevity of a dynasty. Laozi says, Gov-
erning a large country is like cooking a small fish (Laozi 60); too much
action will demolish natural wholeness. For Ge Hong, the indeterminate
action rests on the principle of Qi. As the passage indicates, Nurture the
Qi, and the body shall be kept whole. When the social Qithe people
are loved and preserved, life-giving gods will be internally maintained and
social diseases kept away. A political ruler should be like a medical doctor
taking the initiative to restore social harmony in order that the well-being
of individual people will be the true security for a country.
Another unique feature of the text is the biological model of One
within many. Ge Hong says to preserve the Xuan-One is easier than the
Real-One (IC 325).43 But he does not explain why. The answer is simple.
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings135

Personal enlightenment is easier than social transformation. The former is

the prerequisite for the latter. The best adept, who knows how to preserve
life, should turn his personal synthesis of wisdom and life into a social
endowment. Ge Hong also says that the emperor should translate his per-
sonal virtue into the harmony of the social body, like Platos philosopher-
king, who represents a synthesis of wisdom and power. Although ethics
and politics are two different fields, one personal and the other public, the
method is the same. It is to discover the One within the many and then to
let the One shine through the many. Achieving the longevity of the indi-
vidual and the longevity of the state are two different operations, but they
are methodologically the same. This political philosophy was a revolution-
ary thought in a Confucian society.

Platos Just Society: A Model of One over Many

Confucian social hierarchy is comparable with Platos ideal state, as indeed
has been pointed out by Western thinkers since the days of Voltaire. In the
Republic, book 4, Plato draws the analogy between what the rational soul
does for a just person and what wisdom does for a just state. The main
arguments can be summarized in three points.

Rationality rules the embodied soul as a whole (431e).

Knowledge is only possessed by a small class of wise rulers. They are the
legislators of laws, and the laws reflect the metaphysical order of the world
(428c, 429e430b). Also in the Laws 12, philosophers use these meta-
physical and transcendental principles to frame consistent rules of moral
action (967de). The Platonic law has a function similar to Confucian
moral codes. Ethics provide moral guidance to individuals, whereas peo-
ple should exercise self-control and follow social rituals defined according
to the principle of heaven. Confucius states, To limit the self and to obey
the ritual is called benevolence. 44 This virtue of benevolence is first of all
an inner quality belonging to the sage. Similarly Platos idea of the just
person is fundamentally a psychological condition. Each part of the soul
does its job in the one over many hierarchy. Rationality rules emotion and
controls appetite (442ab).

Courage is the chief characteristic of auxiliaries.

Auxiliaries are subordinate to the philosopher-king and act as guard-

ians for a just state (439d). Their social status is lower than rulers but
higher than ordinary citizens, in the same way that courage psychologically
136 textual studies

is located between rationality and desire. By exercising courage ruled by

reason and in obedience to the king, they perform their duties to defend
justice and challenge injustice,45 so the state can be administered accord-
ing to the ideal model defined by laws.

Desire is subject to courage.

Courage exercises rational judgment as to whether desire is good for a

person (438a). Water generally eases thirst, but seawater does not. There-
fore, a person should resist the impulse to drink seawater (439d). In a
state, desire is what ordinary people tend to live by. Individuals must follow
the one over many order in which emotions and desires are ruled by the
rational mind.
As Figure 6.6 shows, Platos correspondence between the just person
and the just state can be seen as two arms of Platos ethics. A just society
is built on the model of one law over many citizens. And the republican
state depends on the idea that each individual can potentially become a
just person. In the psychological hierarchy, the proper subordination of
the three parts of the soul is the inner identity that can become exter-
nally manifest as acts of justice under the principle of self-control for the
greatest good of a personinward harmony of fully one instead of many
and outward self-mastery and order (443e). In the social hierarchy, the
philosopher-king has the class of courageous auxiliaries through which

Fig. 6.6. The just soul and the just state in Platos
hierarchy of One over many
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings137

to exercise his kinship, and the chief duty of citizens is to be responsible

for their occupations. So the just state is built on an internal social order
between rulers and subjects and external laws reflecting what constitutes
the harmony of the world. Plato then says, Justice is keeping what is prop-
erly ones own and doing ones own job (434a). Similar to a Confucian
society, the shoemaker, carpenter, goldsmith, or other craftsman should
stick to his own trade that has turned out to be a kind of adumbration of
justicehence its usefulness (443c).
Self-control is the principle that brings the three parts of the soul into
harmony. And justice is the manifestation of the harmony with each parts
performance of its proper function in the whole soul. 46 Self-control in a
state means accepting those principles and making moral actions in sub-
ordination to the law. The function of the law stretches across the whole
social hierarchy and produces a harmony among three classes. The ratio-
nal ruler, courageous auxiliaries, and ordinary citizens accept their social
status and perform their social responsibilities for the common goal of
justice (432a, 442cd). Therefore, a just state and a just person are dif-
ferent in appearance but not in essence. In the Laws, the idea of justice
is further identified as the harmonious condition of the cosmos, which
is determined by laws to ensure the triumph of virtue and the defeat of
vice throughout the universe (904b). In the Timaeus, the condition of the
universe is finally revealed not as a permanent status, but as a divine gift
brought by the work of Reason over primordial chaos (30b).

Three Similarities?
The parallelism of the just soul and state shows some similarities with Ge
Hongs correlation of the body-state. The two thinkers agree on the cen-
tral idea that morality is the foundation of politics. But they stand by two
distinct doctrines: the immortal soul and immortal life. Apart from the
central idea, they agree on three principles.

The best should rule.

For Plato philosophers have personified the rationality of the world

by forming harmony among the three parts of the soul. For Ge Hong the
immortal beings have personified Dao.

Public ruling is the expression of inner virtue.

The political philosophy of the preservation of social Qi clearly states

that the wisdom to preserve life is the prerequisite for the art of ruling.
138 textual studies

Only those who have preserved the vigor of life can possibly preserve the
vigor of the country. Looking after Qi and looking after the people are
one and same method. For Plato the model of the just state is the just
soul and vice versa. In fact the investigation of justice in the individual is
placed in the context of seeking true justice in the state. Ge Hongs medi-
cal approach emphasizes movement from the inner to the outer. Appar-
ently the medical approach and psychological modeling set these political
philosophies apart. But the idea of inner virtue enabling outer ruling
underlies the shared principle that morality is the core of politics.

Human essence and social essence are intrinsically the same,

namely, life.

Platos threefold argument on cosmos-state-soul is comparable with Ge

Hongs cosmos-empire-immortal correspondence. To be a ruler, a philoso-
pher ought to incarnate the logos in his soul and to translate his wisdom of
the world into the organization of the society. To be an enlightened adept
is to remove the distinction between the macro and the micro.
All these similarities cannot draw our attention away from the obvi-
ous difference in Platos psychological model of One over many and Ge
Hongs medical model One under many. In fact the very notion of life is
understood differently.
Both Plato and Ge Hong had similar careers and were involved in poli-
tics in their early lives. Later they both abandoned politics and traveled
extensively. When they returned, they founded new schools. Ge Hong
established the religious order now called the Temple of Cleansing Vacuity
on Mount Luofu in southern China. Platos Academy in the
city of Athens was a school for statesmen. By training philosophers, Plato
attempted to fullfil his political vision through a new class of statesmen
whose chief virtue was wisdom.
But the ideal state of a republic did not break away from the one over
many social structure. Nor is the notion of lifes true happiness. In the
discussion of imperfect societies (543a92b), Plato argues that happiness
is to be measured in degrees. Among four types of statesmanship, only the
happiness of the philosopher-king is real, whereas the Spartans in timar-
chy, the wealthy in oligarchy, the anarchists in democracy, and the popular
champion in tyranny all are to some extent mixed with pain and therefore
illusory. The political model directly corresponds to Platos ontological
hierarchy. Certainly the ideal state of a republic ruled by a philosopher-
king was a revolutionary thought in its historical context. Nevertheless, the
state relied too much on one mans intellect and knowledge of the world.
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings139

If the king errs, will the top-down structure cause immeasurable suffer-
ing to the ordinary people below?

The Biological Model of One under Many

Viewed from the point of view of modern democracy, the model has little
sympathy with democracy. Viewed from the eyes of Ge Hong, the ordinary
people are wrongly labeled. They are neither unwise, easily deceived, nor
powerless. But they are the livelihood of the social bodyQi. The best
politics to work with the social Qi is not suppression but preservation.
Prior to Ge Hong, although the Han New-Text Confucians justified
the claim that the emperor was the earthly incarnation of heavens order,
historical kings kept failing to translate moral codes into social realities.
Although the Confucian principle of heaven and man becoming one
and the Platonic wisdom-power synthesis in the ruler envisioned two ideal
states in different historical settings, these one over many models con-
tained a central weakness in praxis.

the One the king and wisdom

the body the state
living organisms laws and governing structures
blood ministers
Qi people

Daoist One under many Platonic One over many

Ge Hongs politics is a bottom-up approach to the problem of the top-

down social hierarchy. Within the body, the One and Qi are the same thing,
but the former is the cultivated identity, the latter the inborn capacity of
life. Qi supports the body by keeping it alive and bringing together many
parts into an organic whole. This is the biological OM model. The One
cannot be cultivated without the many unless the many form the body to
contain it. Although the One represents the master identity of the adept,
the cosmic One takes a humbling and supportive role to keep bodily parts
intact. This is the paradox of Qi, both superior and inferior. The key is to
recognize and accept that the social Qi is the people.
The emperor has no existence independent of the people. Unless the
emperor empties himself into the people, he cannot rediscover his true
identity, namely, as the One. What bonds the many parts of the body is
not power but life. In the likeness of paradoxical Qi, the true life of the
emperor is not his superiority, but his participation in the life of the peo-
ple. To attain this virtue, Ge Hong only prescribes one medicinelove. By
140 textual studies

loving the people, just as the emperor loves his own life, his oneness will
be preserved by the many. This principle of cultivating Qi and loving the
people (yangqi aimin ) turns the social hierarchy upside down.
In the hierarchy, ordinary people are inferior and therefore suppressed.
Like the historical Confucius, who lobbied feudal lords to take ordinary
citizens seriously during the war-torn Spring and Autumn period (722481
BC), Ge Hong says, When people are scattered, the state will fall; when
Qi is exhausted, life comes to an end. Having been a government official
for almost ten years, Ge Hong clearly sees what can cause a dynasty to
fall. Water can carry a ship but can also sink it. When the peoples well-
being is sacrificed for the unity of the state, various forms of social unrest
emerge. As the passage clearly explains, People are difficult to administer
but easy to endanger; Qi is difficult to make lucid but easy to make turbid.
Whoever turns against Nature will be punished by it. Whoever governs a
state by running against the people will be overrun. Therefore, to love the
people is not a gratuitous act of charity, but a moral obligation.
For Ge Hong, loving the people signifies much more than a personal
virtue since the virtue has a cosmogonical origin. Just as love is a natural
expression of parents toward their children, the genealogical unfolding
of the Dao is an act of love to empty oneself into the many; in so doing,
life truly finds its continuation. If the emperor can empty himself into the
many, he will ride on the harmonious flow of social Qi in the likeness of
immortals who glide on the cosmic potency. Thus he becomes a free man.
One becomes many so that many may become one.
This one under many model has a radical implication. It is not just for
the emperor, but also for every citizen. In a society where people passively
accepted predestination, Ge Hong urged the people to look inwardly and
listen to the inner flow of life and to contemplate nothingness as if the
emptied body has no heart rate (IC 17).47 Instead of seeking endless pos-
sessions and building luxurious tombs, people should break to free from
self-imprisonment and realize that deep inside the body something is con-
stantly flowing. Just as with the Preservation of the One, Ge Hong argues
that knowing immortal existence is a matter of openness. When a person
opens the body to be a receptacle of Qi, the experience of the embodied
Dao will set the people free from individual self-centredness to cosmic per-
sonhood. Human destiny can be changed if one returns to the core of life.
For Ge Hong openness toward the Dao holds the key to a renewed life.
This is a common virtue of all immortals, and everyone can possess this
virtue. To learn the way of immortals, one must empty himself, let go of
voracious desires, take an inward journey, and cultivate nothingness and
peace (IC 17).
 ge hongs doctrine of immortal beings141

For the body to attain longevity, each single organism must be a healthy
part with complete wholeness. A forest cannot have continued existence
without individual trees flourishing. For the state to turn into a dynasty,
each single citizen must be able to live a life with full potential. That means
that each single one of the many should be one, ideally a cosmic being
who lives to the full potential of the created nature. An ocean cannot be
timeless unless each species can be sustained. For the state to be a web of
social Qi, each citizen ought to be a being free to personify the Dao in his
or her social location. To achieve this natural status, the emperor must act
like Nature. That is to be indeterminate. By humbling himself to the lowest
position, by emptying his identity into the many, he is no longer a ruler. He
is an open ocean into which streams of living water flow. Within this open
and confident being, individuals evolve in accordance with whatever kind
of body-spirit Nature has given to them. What he can do despite his humil-
ity, however, is to create a healthy condition of the body in which each part
of the body forms a relational unity. People can then form a harmonious
unity inwardly connected by Qi. He can achieve this most complex aspect
of politics with the simplest virtue. Love is that one empties oneself into
the many.
When the ruler can translate virtue into praxis, he becomes the living
example for the people to follow. Each one becomes life-giving to others,
just as different organisms in a healthy body share a single life by support-
ing each other. Having in mind the ancient Yellow Emperor who ruled the
country out of the synthesis of wisdom and immortality, Ge Hong argues
that the perfect model of a statesman ought to resemble the virtue of
mingling wisdom and health (IC 148). By cultivating the body, the body
can be prolonged, and by governing the state, the state will attain eternal
peace (IC 148).48 Politics, then, becomes the extension of the soteriologi-
cal pursuit to enhance and sustain the life of humanity. Ruling is like heal-
ing. Once health is restored, then visionary policies for the prolongation
of the state can be effective. When each citizen becomes a cosmic being,
a personified Dao, society becomes a harmonious community in the like-
ness of the four modes of immortals portrayed in the Biographies. What
interweaves individuals together is not power but life. The genealogical
unfolding Dao carries the many, supports individuals health, and unifies
them into a relational whole. This is the model of humanity. Not only are
the body and the state isomeric, but the state and Nature are too.
If many illnesses exist, it is impossible to attain longevity. If hundreds
of social illnesses exist, no longevity is foreseeable for a dynasty. To attain
bodily longevity requires daily care of the body and the right methods to
preserve the One. To achieve social longevity, one needs compassion for
142 textual studies

the people and the right policies to restore their well-being. And impor-
tantly, the emperor cannot do it alone. The wisest people are required
to assist the emperor to implement this medical-political program, espe-
cially Daoists. But a Daoist emperor should not exclude Confucianism alto-
gether. What the principle of cultivating Qi and loving people hopes to
achieve is a goal shared by Daoists and New-Text Confucian ethics. But
where New-Text Confucianism sees the emperor as the cosmic being, Dao-
ist ethics wishes to transform every person into a miniature of the Dao.
In Daoist soteriology, the door to immortal life is closed to the wealthy
who are burdened by their possessions. But it is open to the poor whose
simplicity is the primary asset in transforming themselves into empty yet
open vessels.

Summary

The One becomes the many so that the many may be one. These two pro-
cesses can be summarized with two Chinese words: diversification (fen )
and unification (he ). The doctrine of immortal beings professes that by
preserving the One, the continuity of ontological life, humans are capable
of embarking on the journey of return from the many to the One. In the
overall scheme of Ge Hongs one and many, the doctrine contains a bio-
logical model of the one and many discussion. If the doctrine of Xuan Dao
presents the one and many discussion in a cosmological framework and
the many are dealt with in terms of genealogical oneness, then immortals
are incarnations of the One, and the One is dealt with in the framework
the many.
The ethical implication of the one and many shares a common interest
with Platos doctrine of the soul, that is, to seek conformity with the worlds
origin. Although both Ge Hongs soteriological ethics and Platos psycho-
logical ethics aim to establish an ontological base for human life, the very
idea of the One sets the two apart. For Ge Hong, the One within many
is the continuity of Qi into which humans ought to abide. For Plato, Rea-
son is the one over many logos toward which souls ought to transcend.
Qi spontaneously changes, whereas Reason never changes. Thus Daoist
immortal beings are presented in the genre of a religious anthropology
in which transformation of the body becomes a central theme. Platonic
immortal souls are presented in the context of intellectual ascent toward
the realm of eternal Forms where change is absent. Daoist immortals cher-
ish spontaneous and bodily life, whereas philosophical souls celebrate
rationality and disembodied enlightenment. The political philosophies of
both thinkers also diverge according to these core ontological differences.
 Pa r t T w o

Comparative Ontology

Why is not-being denied ontological properties? And why is being the start-
ing point of ontology? The following three chapters on comparative ontol-
ogy proceed from such basic questions.
Key issues in comparative ontology shall be investigated by looking at
how the concepts of being and not-being are categorized in Platos dia-
logues and how Daoist not-being (wu ) and being (you ) are used in Ge
Hongs writings. Chapter 7, titled Nothing, is intended to address these
questions in three parts. First, it identifies subject negation: not-being is
treated as the absence of beingthe wholly unreal are thus excluded
from ontology. Second, it investigates the OM problem embedded in the
rejection of not-being from ontology. Finally, it offers Daoist cosmogony,
moving from nothing into being, as an evolutionary solution to Platos
problem of change from being to becoming. This final idea is systemati-
cally developed in the next two chapters by creating a dialogue between
Daoist cosmogony and Platos theogony, between creation by evolution
and creation by intelligent design. Chapter 8, under the name The One,
investigates the unity of the world in astronomical contexts: the continuity
and discontinuity between cosmogony and cosmology, and comparison of
the biological model of Qi and the mathematical model of the World Soul.
Chapter 9, The Many, investigates the plurality of the world in the con-
text of Ge Hongs alchemical Nature and Platos mathematical universe.
Comparative study by nature takes both Plato and Ge Hong beyond
their written works. Platonic and Daoist scholarship usually would not
transgress the norm of textual fidelity. Textual fidelity and intercultural
comparison do not only conflict, but they also create a methodological
problem. How far can we take propositions beyond their original inten-
tions? How far can we interpret core concepts without distortion? These
questions will be directly and indirectly addressed individually within the
comparative contexts.
A set of methods has already emerged in the textual studies to this

143
144 part two

point. Ge Hongs tradition is the product of his creative interpretation of

earlier traditions. The study so far has followed this creative hermeneutics and
interpreted Ge Hongs Daoism in the context of historical lineages and
on this historical basis; his religious philosophy is reinterpreted through
a creative lens to bring out implications for the comparative project. Pla-
tos philosophy, for its part, was developed in a historical context in which
Plato engaged in a critical evaluation and rejection of his predecessors in
order to establish his system of metaphysics. The study of Plato, therefore,
takes the form of critical hermeneutics. To clarify, the critical reading of Plato
is by no means a rejection of Platos philosophy and its influence. Rather,
criticism is a means of engagement with Plato through a Daoist perspec-
tive. The following comparative dialogues will continue to employ these
methods. The interplay of the hermeneutics becomes a form of philoso-
phy in the making.
 chapter 7

Nothing

The OM problem is ontological. The problem is located at the heart of

knowledge and has to do with the philosophy of what primary reality is
(or what primary realities are). Any presupposed ontological reality (or
realities) must answer one central question: how does the changing world,
both whole and parts, either rise out of or hinge upon the irreducible?
The previous chapters on Ge Hong and Plato have worked the texts down
to an irreconcilable propositional difference: Platos being without not-
being defined by logical exclusion of the two and Ge Hongs not-being
with being articulated in terms of the relational inclusion of both. To cre-
ate a dialogue between the propositions, we first discuss the rejection of
not-being and the problems that arise from it.

Not-Being: The Ontological Problem

of the One and the Many

Platos Rejection of Not-Being and Its Problems

In our study of Platos idea of the Good thus far, we have encountered a
basic problem: it is difficult for the Form of the Good to attain a unity for
multiple Forms. It is not because the Good is not superior to them, nor
is its logos noncontinuous in the many, but it is because the discontinuity
represented by Forms is irreducible to the single Form of the Good. The
root problem is the premise of being without not-being, which derives
from Platos inheritance of Parmenides denial of not-being. Within the
determinate being there is no room for indeterminateness to harbor plu-
rality. Let us see how this is so.
In the situation of the Good over Forms, the Good is said to be the caus-
ing unity over multiple caused Forms. According to the doctrine of Forms,
each Form is a determinate being predicated on a group of items sharing
the same name. The first difficulty is to create a unity of commonality over
independent Forms. If the Form of Good is determinate, then its deter-
mination requires Forms to share the Good as the common cause. Conse-
quently the Good demands a commonality among plural Forms. Let us say

145
146 comparative ontology

they are all good. However, also according to the doctrine, each Form must
be unique. The principle of uniqueness entails that Forms must be differ-
ent from each other. Let us say tree, water, and volcano must not share the
same character of good; otherwise they are not unique. Therefore, com-
monality and uniqueness are exclusive in terms of sameness and difference.
Platos answer is implied in his discussion of the ethical Forms, where
the Good is the one over many Forms of Beauty, Justice, Love, and so on.
It seems to be all right to think all ethical Forms must be good. But the
world surely is not created by the ethical Forms alone. Once Plato takes
other realities into consideration, such as drought, insects, and floods, it
is difficult to explain that they are caused by the Good. The problem goes
deeper than that. Suppose Forms all share one quality. Standing at the
level of Forms, to single out a sameness in them would suggest that there is
at least one sameness that they all share. How is this possible?
There are three ways to think about the idea of sameness in the schema
of one over many (OVM). The first way is to think of a Form of geometry
over a triangle and a sphere. This is fine in geometry but problematic in
practice. Shipbuilding, for example, is not an exercise to cause material
objects by a single Form of shipness, but a realization of a design that
consists of many disciples or ideas. If the Form is limited to be numerically
one, this presents a fundamental difficulty for Plato: how is it possible for
a single cause to bring the many under the umbrella of the one? A design
must be internally plural, not numerically one. I shall come back to the
problem in detail.
The second way is to think in terms of one cause and many effects. An
oven at 220 degrees affects steel, paper, and a roast differently. It seems
the heat is an OVM cause affecting three objects. But the argument is
false. The cause and effects are not just physical, that is, to generate heat,
but fundamentally chemical. These items have different responses to the
heat: steel withstands the heat, paper is burnt, and a roast is cooked. Burnt
paper is a chemical change of substance, as is turning a roast from raw to
cooked. But Plato did not understand chemical change, nor did he have
access to Ge Hongs alchemy on the interchangeability of things. There-
fore, Forms stand for unchangeable truth in any circumstances.
When we apply this OVM example to the Form of the Good, a problem
emerges. If the Good is the OVM temperature, and any three Forms are
like steel, paper, and a roast, then Forms must also respond to the temper-
ature differently, to be the same, burnt, or cooked. It implies Forms must
be capable of change and must be changed like the items in the oven. Can
Forms change? No. The doctrine of Forms forbids this. Therefore, the
Good cannot be the cause of different effects.
 nothing147

Since physical things cannot contribute any ontological value to the

Form, the backflowing effects on the cause are ruled out, which are
essential in the oven example. To be a multiple cause, the effects must
be accountable as the immanent parts of the cause 220 degrees. This is
because the 220 degrees cause is indeterminate over whatever things are
inside the oven. The effects (the hot plate, the burnt paper, the cooked
roast) are self-generative, just like Ge Hongs cinnabar that can respond
to heat and change into mercury. In a phrase, what the example demon-
strates is that becoming can contribute to being. If Plato can accept the
interplay between becoming and being, no further comparison is needed
from this point. The comparative ontology can simply end here. However,
the ontological backflow is impossible.
The third way is to think about one over many is as an irreducible uni-
versal. We can take two of Platos geometrical Forms, triangle and sphere,
as examples. To argue for an irreducible universal, one could explain that
triangles and spheres are made of lines (regardless of whether straight or
circular lines). Then the sameness of lines would destroy what the geo-
metrical shapes stand for. This is because the principles embedded in the
shapes (such as the area of a triangle=bh/2 and the area of a circle=r 2 )
are reduced to lines that do not necessarily resemble those principles. If
the sameness is treated as a deductive commonality and singled out to be
the one over the many, then it will destroy the uniqueness of these shapes.
All three ways of thinking confront a common dilemma. In the Good
over many Forms situation, on the one hand, the determination of the
Good requires some sort of sameness in order to be their master unity. On
the other hand, the principle of uniqueness of Forms rejects the demand
of commonality.
The root cause of this problem is the premise of being without not
being. It fundamentally conditions what sort of qualities Forms must pos-
sess. Each Form is single, noncomposite, and numerically one. We can
use the emperor and feudal lords analogy to explain this problem. An
emperor has many feudal lords, and they are powerful and independent.
We can call the emperor the master unity and the lords Forms. If the mas-
ter unity is willing to compromise and allows Forms to be independent,
then the unity will change its kind. It becomes a unity of togetherness,
just as in Spring and Autumn period China there was no real harmony
but empty togetherness. To be sure, togetherness is not a noncomposite
unity at all, but an assembly of many. Since the independence of Forms
will force multiplicity into the numerical oneness of the Good emperor,
togetherness of feudal lords will reject the ideal oneness demanded by
the superior. The introduction of plurality into the unity subsequently
148 comparative ontology

makes the master unity multideterminate. As long as multiple Forms exist

as unique causes, the Good must have an equal number of determinations
to match them. To be multideterminate is essentially to be indeterminate.
Therefore, allowing Forms to be self-subsistent feudal lords will eventu-
ally overthrow the emperor all together. The Good is not a real emperor
with real power of one over many. It is only an ideal character of perfec-
tion. This is the difficulty of having a unity of togetherness.
Among the Pre-Socratics, this unity of togetherness is exactly the same
problem as atomism. Since infinitely many atoms reject unity all together,
what has been left between them is indeterminate space, which has nei-
ther character nor unifying capacity. In Platos Parmenides, when the old
Parmenides asks how many Forms there are, the young Socrates can only
reject the suggestion of infinitely many Forms that include mud and other
trivial things by the criterion of aesthetics. This argument denotes Platos
rejection of the suggestion that the infinite one creates infinitely many
universals. But the multidetermination of the Good is not explained, even
though it is demonstrated.
Now we meet two impossibilities:

(a) A unity of commonality is not possible among Forms.

(b) A unity of togetherness is not possible within the Good.

If the first one stands, then the Good cannot truly be the cause of them.
This is because causality must meet two requirements.1 First, between the
Good and Forms there must be a discontinuity to maintain the causing/
caused difference. Second, among Forms there must be a continuity that
runs across them horizontally as their sameness and executes the causal
connection vertically. Since Forms are self-subsistent universals, then the
continuity of them is not possible. If the second requirement stands, then
the noncomposite and numerical oneness of the Good rejects the very pos-
sibility of togetherness. In order to be the cause, the Good must swallow
the plurality that multiple Forms strongly protect. The very acceptance of
plurality alters the unity from being singly determinate to being multi-
determinate. Hence the Good becomes an indeterminate cause. It is no
longer a causal Form.
Using the same analogy of emperor and feudal lords, the problem is
acute. These feudal lords are too powerful and self-subsistent. The prob-
lem is concealed beneath the claim that Forms are irreducible universals.
It is the issue of being. Platonic Forms have been bred out of the Par-
menidean noncomposite being without not-being. The idea was origi-
nally designed to eliminate change from ontology. Plato adopts the idea to
 nothing149

secure the chief attributes of Forms such as being determinate, noncom-

posite, independent, unchangeable, and preexistent. Consequently the
elimination of not-being has not only driven the dissident not-being out
of the ontological community, but also ruled out the relational possibility
for any other partisan beings to associate. Relationship is both being and
not-being. But the relationship among Forms is impossible simply because
the aspect of not-being is absent in being.
Is being the only reality of ontology? In the analysis of two impossibili-
ties, we start from the proposition of being without not-being and pre-
suppose the Form of Good as the most determinate cause of all Forms. But
we arrive at the opposite end.
The unity of togetherness somehow requires pluralitynot-being the
Good-itselfto be a central identity of ontology. If the emperor takes
the identity of not-being itself, then he must be less in control over the
feudal lords and internally be indeterminate. This is exactly what Ge
Hong argues in his political philosophy. To be the master unity, the chief
virtue of the emperor ought to be to see himself as Qi: on the one hand,
to be as indeterminate as the circulating Qi and, on the other, to empty
himself into the people. Every single one of the feudal lords could learn
from the virtue of the emperor and would be imitative of the master cause
in order to form a unity. A unity of this sort is no longer centered on the
power of being self-subsistent, but rests upon communion with each other.
The analysis also shows the remarkable comeback of not-being. The
very rejection of not-being by the doctrine of Forms eventually invites the
exiled ontological dissidentindeterminate not-beingto return to the
center stage of ontology. But why?
Apart from the emperors need to manage political harmony, from
the Daoist perspective, it is simply because indeterminateness is nonreject-
able. Laozi says, The myriad things are born of beings; beings are born
of not-being (Laozi 40). To reject not-being, one commits the ontological
crime of rejecting the mother of beings. Plato has envisioned the world
as a harmony under the principle of common good. But the very nature
of harmony depends on the acceptance of others, who are different from
each other in virtue of having different personalities that are irreducible
to the commonly defined being-itself. In other words, the individualities
of Forms cannot be collapsed into the single Good of being-itself, just as
Ge Hongs immortals have never cast away their personalities exemplified
in their bodies, yet the creativity of Dao shines through them. The har-
mony in itself is an indeterminate and identity-affirming space in which to
coexist freely. Cosmic harmony intrinsically consists of the discontinuity of
individuals, and the myriad things open themselves to allow the continuity
150 comparative ontology

of life to penetrate their manyness through and through. This is the onto-
logical paradox of continuity and discontinuity. The one and the many are
intrinsically relational.
In the second part of the Parmenides, Plato has already arrived at this
paradox. All hypotheses lead to the principle that unity and plurality can
be either both affirmed or simultaneously denied. But Plato did not real-
ize that this paradoxical principle is actually the most powerful weapon
against the twisted logic among his contemporaries. What it does is to
reject Parmenides logic of mutual exclusion between the One and the
many. Plato ought to accept the validity of the paradox produced by logic,
yet he neither affirms the logical antinomy nor rejects it. The book con-
cludes with an inconclusive ending. Plato arrived at the door of enlighten-
ment, but he did not push it open.
Could the harmony of the Good be ultimately indeterminate yet its
determinateness be manifested in and through the determinate Forms
created by it? In the Republic, the narratives on the Form of Good may
be suggesting that this is a possible understanding of the OM relation.
But Plato remains equivocal about the central paradox. For Ge Hong,
however, political harmony among the Forms is possible if the ethical
indeterminateness has been appropriated as the chief virtue of the One.
If the emperor opens himself to embrace heaven and earth, so his self-
emptied being, indeed self-confidence, will harbor truths between heaven
and earth within the breadth of his indeterminateness. To translate the
ethical idea to ontology, it requires the Good to hold humility as its chief
identity and the Forms to disarm their insecure uniqueness.
This ethical move alters Platonic ontology radically. This is simply
because the move is the very acceptance of not-being into ontology. In
the Parmenides, Plato did not make the young Socrates wrestle with the
old Parmenides when the separation of Forms was exposed, nor did he
respond to the Third Man Argument, which Aristotle later used to attack
the advocates of Forms in the Academy. Perhaps for Plato these problems
were not fatal. Would the admission of not-being into ontology be fatal to
his ontology?

The Paradox of Not-Being and Being

What would a Daoist approach make the OM problem look like? I have
already employed the concept of harmony that both Platonism and Dao-
ism share. Now we continue to investigate what the unity of harmony will
do to the OM problem. We start from the Daoist proposition of not-being
under beings. Although the language of being and not-being would make
Ge Hong (who mainly writes in poetic style) feel uncomfortable, the pur-
 nothing151

pose is to grasp some fundamental issues of harmony. The following dia-

gram gives a bottom-up description of the relationship of the one under
many.

(a) (b)
(The myriad things or Forms) Determinate beings

(Dao or the Good) Indeterminate not-being

One

In the diagram (a) describes the general schema whereby the Dao
begets the myriad things or the Good creates multiple Forms. It expresses
the OM relation. Column (b) explains that the basic attribute of the One
is indeterminate not-being and that the many are determinate beings. This
diagram represents the aspects of the doctrine of creation from nothing
into being. The world derives from the same not-being; derivative realities
are different beings of not-being.
In the previous section, two ontological principles were mentioned.
For current purposes we can turn them into OM language.

(a)If the One generates the many, there must be an ontological

continuity between them.
(b)If the One generates the many, there must be a discontinuity
between them.

In the case of the Dao and the myriad things, the unity of harmony con-
tains both principles. On the one hand, the Dao manifests itself as the
ontological continuity of the world. Dao moves out of itself and extends
its presence into something other than itself. The one must be determi-
nate in this sense. The determination is carried out by the continuity (or
homogeneity) between Dao and the myriad things. Plato has also clearly
expressed the continuity between a Form and its physical instances in
the cause/caused relationship. On the other hand, the myriad things are
never the same as the creating Dao but always different from it. The dif-
ference is maintained by discontinuity (or heterogeneity). In other words,
the myriad things can be the vessels into which the Dao actualizes itself,
but they are not the Dao itself. Plato also distinguishes ideal from actual to
emphasize the discontinuity.
However, the doctrine of Forms ignores any horizontal difference
152 comparative ontology

between sensibles. The discontinuity not only represents the difference

between a causing Form and its caused instances, whereby for instance
the ideal bed is different from any actual bed. A Form also cannot be a
common character over all differences like a place for sleeping. The idea
sleeping cannot create beds, but a design with functional structure can.
If the ideal bed is understood as a design, it must alter its internal structure
in order to be accounted for as the single cause for all beds in the world.
Any fixed being can only function as a character (sleeping) but not a pro-
ductive design in which plurality is implied. It is simply not possible for an
unchangeable being to have multiple determinations.
In Platos Parmenides, the older Parmenides correctly criticizes the
young Socrates for having committed the fallacy of division. In the analogy
of a sail covering many people, each person will only have a section of the
sail covering them, rather than a whole unity over each one of the many.
If the OVM structure stands to be true, then the unity must be divided
into parts and no longer constitutes an indivisible unity. The discontinuity,
therefore, represents the unitys inner capacity to hold multiple determi-
nationspluralitywithin its identity of being-itself. The young Socrates
explains the problem of multiple determinations away by arguing that the
many participate in the one, but the one does not directly partake in the
many.
This argument of one not in the many is problematic. If the design
were nonparticipatory in any crafted bed, then a bed would not yet have
been made; even it had been made, the whole would fall apart and become
unstructured parts. So this argument is off target to address the issue of
multiple determinations. To admit Forms having multiple determinations
impels Socrates to admit that Forms are indeterminate. Yet Socrates did
not realize that this is actually the answer to the second ontological prin-
ciplethe discontinuity between the One and the many. It also meets
the Parmenidean challenge to manage the continuity among the many.
Instead of having a sail covering many people, one could have the sky
performing the function of covering many people at once without being
divided into parts. Each person would then have a complete sky over them,
not a piece of sky that each one possesses. This is because sky is indivisible,
whereas a sail is materially divisible. Parmenides can divide a sail but not
the sky.
The sky is essentially indeterminate. The indeterminate unity of the sky
sets itself in radical contradiction to any determinate Forms. The young
Socrates did not realize the indivisibility of the continuity of the One and
so allowed Parmenides to frame the problem of participation in terms of
the divided and material sail. Nor did he realize the continuity of unity
 nothing153

over many people must meet the dilemma of self-differentiation. The dif-
ferentiation is not maintained by the external separation of Forms from
sensibles with the Parmenidean division of Being and Becoming. Rather,
it is an internal reality.
Ge Hongs vision of the best emperor is of one who empties himself
into the many and by this virtue draws people into his act of ruling. In
ontology, the role of being is not just to act as a cause outwardly, but also
to move inwardly. Its inward movement creates space to accommodate the
plurality that the many represent. To be indeterminate is to change. It is
a way to cope with the backflow of the discontinuity of the many upon the
one.
However, Socrates has predefined unity in a different fashion, so he
is unable to stand outside the defined norm that commits unity to be an
unchangeable being without self-differentiation. The admission of inde-
terminateness on the top of determinate beings makes a Form a paradox-
ical union of both determinateness and indeterminateness at the same
time. And the Parmenidean mutual exclusion being without not-being
fundamentally prohibits such a union. Plato never ventured beyond this
marked-out ontological territory. Hence the very possibility that unity must
be both being and not-beinga position of pre-Socratic monismnever
occurred to Plato as an ontological synthesis.
The same paradox also exists in the Good. As in the OVM cause, the
Good would have to be both determinate and indeterminate, both being-
itself and not-being-itself. How is possible to solve the logical antinomy?
By positing being without not-being, Plato hopes to exclude not-being
from ontology altogether. In reality, the method of exclusion does not
expel it. We have viewed the problem of separation of Forms and sensibles
from various angles. A simpler example should capture the essence of the
problem.

(a)If the ideal bed (F) is the design of ordinary beds (A) and sofa beds
(not-A), then F causes both A and not-A.
(b)Since F is A and F is not-A are both true, then the identity of F
must include the opposites of being A and being not-A.
(c)Then not-being does not only exist, but exists as the partner of being
within the Form.

The conclusion about not-being may seem to be a way of saying that

beds do not have all their qualities in common. Parmenides would not
resist that conclusion. But it actually reinserts not-being into the causal
being, which Parmenides will surely resist.
154 comparative ontology

The separation of Form/sensibles actually is the separation of being

and not-being. It is what the paradoxical dilemma defines as inseparable.
This partnership of being and not-being is at the heart of the OM prob-
lem. Daoism affirms the partnership, whereas Plato denies any correlation
between them. The being without not-being position excludes the part-
nership by the principle of noncontradiction. Daoism regards the para-
dox of not-being and being as the gate of ontological mystery. Plato also
arrived at this gate in the Parmenides, but turned away from it, because
Parmenidean consciousness told him to. Daoism not only enters the gate,
but also goes even a step further. Laozi names not-being as the mother of
beings. Ge Hong calls Xuan (the darkness of the Dao) the grand ancestor
of all beings. Platos rational philosophy from the very beginning treats
not-being as an epistemological vice rather than an ontological virtue.
To this stage we have only arrived at the partnership issue in the OM
problem. We are still far from coming to terms with what constitutes the
partnership. In particular, the original questionCould Daoist from
nothing into being offer an alternative answer to the OM problem?is
still untouched. To advance the Daoist approach will take major steps and
many pages. In the meantime we need to take a step back to investigate the
key concept of not-being.

Not-Being and Being:

Subject Negation or Subject Correlation?
In Daoism, there is no such concept as not-Dao. The relationship
between something and nothing is not a subject negation, but a subject
correlation. Ge Hong uses two words to express the correlation: the word
Xuan (the darkness) and the word Yi (the oneness). They designate
the not-being of Dao and the being of Dao respectively, or more Platoni-
cally Xuan is transcendent in the darkness of the night sky; the oneness
of Qi is immanent in creation. Compared with Plato, who dichotomizes
being and not-being, Ge Hong mainly treats them as partners. How-
ever, the correlation of the opposites does not collapse the apparent logi-
cal contraries into a single concept without internal differentiation. Ge
Hong describes this inner relation and differentiation as generation. Not-
being is not a product of subject negation, but the mother of being. Qi is
the child of Dao; being is the offspring of not-being. The not-being of Dao
is not only responsible for becoming, but creates the being of Qi, which is
the life of Daos own becoming.
Ge Hong has a whole different outlook on not-being: positive, gen-
erative, and life-giving. In fact Daoist not-being is entirely foreign to the
Parmenides-Plato school. Before we can create a dialogue between subject
 nothing155

negation and subject correlation, it is necessary to ask a basic question. Is

Plato ignorant about not-being? No. Nevertheless, contrary to the level of
clarity on Forms, not-being is far more ambiguous. Four types of not-being
can be outlined.

(a)Not-being designates the negation of unity.

In the Parmenides Plato considers two hypotheses consequent on what

would follow if unity is not-being were true. If unity is not-being (not-
being negates a Form), then beingless unity does not exist (160b163b).
Unity is denied. If beingless unity could exist, then non-unity would have
no predicates. To participate in non-unity, the many would become head-
less and causeless entities, too. So plurality is denied. If unity is not-being
(Form is other than being), the absence of universals causes the world
to have no differences at all (164b165e). An undifferentiated world is a
world of primordial formlessness in which plurality has not yet been born.
So plurality is denied.
Both hypotheses conclude that to deny unity is also to deny plurality.
Therefore, the hypothetical affirmation of not-being leads to the annihila-
tion of both unity and plurality. It is the problem of not-being.

(b)Not-being and being are coupled.

Apart from the Parmenides, the Sophist presents the most concentrated
discussion of the subject. In both dialogues the keynote speakers come
from the same school: the founder Parmenides in the Parmenides and the
Eleatic stranger in the Sophist. As a distinguished logician visiting Athens,
the stranger in the Sophist points out: Then weve now given a complete
statement of our confusion. Because both that which is and that which is not
are involved in equal confusion. That is, insofar as one of them is clarified,
either brightly or dimly, the other will be too (250e251a).
Owen argues in his essay Plato on Not-Being that this passage holds
the key to understanding that, while Plato is mainly interested in being, he
never denies not-being. Plato regards not-being as a puzzle and moots that
not-being and being could be twin brothers of ontologyor, at least, the
Sophist points toward that direction.2
Owens argument is mainly a critique of Cornfords theory that Platos
intention in the Sophist is about Forms rather than not-being. Cornfords
theory is not limited to the Sophist. In his commentary on Parmenides, he
illustrates that Plato actually is not the criticized, but the criticizer, in total
control of the dialogue to explore problems of contemporary Eleatic
156 comparative ontology

logic. The hypothesis of if one is not-being mainly serves the purpose

of defending the doctrine of Forms rather than self-criticism. Against this
background, Owen argues that not-being has an important position in
Platonism, or otherwise Plato would not have written about the puzzles
of not-being in the Sophist. In a sophisticated linguistic-analytic fashion,
he explores multiple connotations of the verb to be through English
concepts such as nothing, negation, contrariety, and nonexistence. But
toward the end he concludes that Plato is mainly interested in to be is to
be something and holds to be in no way at all as a paradoxical notion.
Owens conclusion provokes a further puzzle not about not-being, but
about his attempt to create a parallelism of being and not-being. Owen
would hope that insofar as one of them is clarified, the other will be too.
Yet in reality, the understanding of being does not clarify not-being in
Cornfords study, nor does Owens study clarify the partnership between
being and not-being. Does Plato actually think that not-being is the twin
of being? The answer is clearly no. Among Western philosophers, it was
Heidegger and the postmodernists who revisited the ontological stranger.
The Sophist may present a specific case and is still debatable, but it has
not created a general motif. If being and not-being are the twin broth-
ers of ontology, why did Plato not take not-being to be a standard feature
of his thought? Certainly Plato has an acute interest in Eleatic logic; the
Parmenides and the Sophist have demonstrated his extensive engagement
with the school. But Plato has not changed his mind about being without
not-being. In the Republic Plato argues that a true reality is being without
not-being, and a changing reality is to compose both, since change is both
being and not-being. The degrees of ontology (Forms/sensibles/images)
are measured by the degrees of definite being, not by the percentage of
indefinite not-being. Platos doctrine of creation in the Timaeus further
intensifies the distinction by arguing that the forming of formlessness is
the victory of Reason over Necessity, and orderly beings overwrite chaotic
not-being. These are the evidences against Owen. It would be a powerful
argument, however, if Owen could show that knowing the puzzling not-
being could yield knowledge of beings.

(c)Not-being is an equivocal notion for the impoverishment of ethical

Forms.

Plato in the Republic declares that beauty and ugliness are two things,
and the same logical negation exists between good and evil, and justice
and injustice (476a, b). Clearly beauty, good, and justice are ethical Forms;
on the contrary evil, injustice, and ugliness refer to the impoverished state
 nothing157

of Forms. Then he further categorizes ignorance as the absence of knowl-

edge. Knowledge is related to what is, and ignorance necessarily is related
to what is not (477b).
We have already explored the epistemological problem of subject nega-
tion. Now let us have a closer look (Table 7.1). The problem of subject
negation is concealed in the equivocation between two sorts of not-being,
as if the two can be freely exchanged. The exchange happens in the prem-
ise that knowledge is related to being and ignorance to not-being. This
epistemological claim rests upon the ontological division that not-being is
the subject negation of being.
When the negation is applied to the first premise, the negation of the
being Beauty produces the not-being of ugliness. Thus beauty and ugli-
ness become two separate subjects logically opposed. Plato says beauty and
ugliness (being and not-being) are two things and each of them is single
(476a). The second premise then reinforces the dichotomized status of
being and not-being by the argument that the ambiguous state of belief
primarily reflects the self-contradictory state composed of being and not-
being. Therefore, the subject negation is outlined with two contrary moral
qualities. Beings designate the total presence of ethical Forms, on the one
hand, and ugliness, evil, and injustice refer to the total absence of beings
on the other. The exchange takes place between two denotations of the
subject negations: from the impoverishment of ethical Forms to the abso-
lute negation of beings.
Does the negation of Beauty entail ugliness? The negation of Beauty is
not-Beauty. The not-being of Beauty is an impoverished state of Beauty but
not the total absence of Beauty. Socrates is not-being beautiful. This could
mean he is normal looking. The impoverishment of beauty does not mean
beauty is completely absent in his average appearance. A child does not
know the goodness of eating vegetables. This means that the child is igno-
rant about what Good is but does not entail that not-being Good makes the
child evil. A farmer might kill a sick chicken without knowing the Form of

Table 7.1. Ontological order, moral order, and social order

Knowledge/Forms=Beings Beauty, Good, Justice Philosophers

Belief/becoming=being+not-being Moral ambiguity Sight-lovers,
art-lovers
Ignorance=not-beings Ugliness, Evil, Unenlightened
Injustice minds
158 comparative ontology

Justice. His ignorance does not mean his act of killing has no justice at all for
the chicken and others in the hennery. In these instances, the not-beings
of beautiful, goodness, justice are not equal to ugliness, evil, and injustice.
What happens in the examples is that the negation of the subjects yields
objects. The objects, such as average appearance, dislike of vegetables, and
killing a sick chicken, are not independent subjects. The impoverished
subjects become objects that are still under the domain of the subjects.
Not-being is not the unconditional negation of subject-being without any
objects. Rather, not-being is a conditional object of subject-being. The pov-
erty of being still exists as the realities of Socrates, the child, and the farmer.
The negation does not produce a single concept of not-being, such as ugli-
ness, evil, and injustice. Rather, it gives rise to the whole realm of becom-
ing that consists of being and not-being. It is the realm of moral ambiguity.
Plato is partially right when he labels being and not-being as two single
entities. But not-being cannot be reduced from being by the method of
negation. To accept the irreducibility and to affirm the existence of not-
being require the move to presuppose not-being as an irreducible cause,
similar to Necessity in opposition to Reason in the Timaeus.

(d) Not-being is evil.

Properly speaking, that which is not must be called not one thing but
nothing (478b). The sentence repeats a Parmenidean fallacy that Plato
has inherited. However, ugliness, evil, and injustice certainly do exist as
vices in individuals and unethical social conditions. They are existentially
real but ontologically unreal. These vices do not have separate being, nor
are they capable of forming another ontology of not-being. They are always
viewed against the background of being. Whenever the ethical Forms are
discussed, they are equally mentioned and criticized.
On physical objects Plato says, Most things are subject to their own
specific form of evil or disease (609a). For example:

eyes : ophthalmia
the body : disease
grain : mildew
timber : rot
bronze and iron : rust

These objects and their specific evil are given to support the definition
that anything that harms and destroys a thing is evil, and anything that
preserves and benefits it is good (608e).
 nothing159

Plato is preoccupied with the category of becomingthe composition

of being and not-beingand maintains the dualism by saying each indi-
vidual thing has its own particular good and evil. Instead of viewing the
phenomena of change grain-mildew, timber-rot, and metal-rust as gener-
ally caused by external things, such as moisture, insects, and oxygen, he
attributes them to the internal antithesis between good and evil. Then, he
concludes that physical things somehow have immunity against external
harm, but a things specific evil or flaw is therefore what destroys it; noth-
ing else will do so. The conclusion is wrong because of Platos false claim
that rust (treated as internal evil) can destroy bronze. Rust is in fact the
product of the changing bronze. In Ge Hongs eyes, change is not a spe-
cific evil, but an alchemic virtue. Without change no metallurgical refinery
is possible.
It should be noted that this argument is part of Platos proof of the
immortality of the soul (611a). Here attention is not paid to the validity of
the proof, but to the substantial dualism.

Good+evil=physical objects
Being+not-being=becoming

Plato has attributed moral good and evil to physical objects. But the real
problem is that evil and not-being have interchanging meanings. Since all
Forms are created by the Good, they must be good beings. Being is good,
not-being is (or becomes) evil. If we continue to follow the logic of nega-
tion, the problem of evil is amplified in the doctrine of creation.
If the world contains evil and the creator-Good has created the world,
then the Good must have created evil also. If evil is the privation of the
Good, then in the created world there is a timeless antithesis of good and
evil. If the self-negation of the Good produces evil, then evil must be a part
of Good prior to the creation. In the Timaeus Plato polarizes the prob-
lem by naming Reasonthe cause of orderand Necessitythe cause of
disorder. In so doing, the conflict of good and evil is made not only an
existential reality, but also a primordial one. Evil was, is, and will be, and is
coeternal with the Good. It is not a realityless shadow, but an apocalyptic
beast. It grows a collective army in physical objects to thwart the purpose
of Good in the world. It has no being yet uses physical things to exercise
the power of very real evils, such as disease, mildew, rot, and rust. It is sup-
posed to be ontologically nothing, as Parmenides declares, but is capable
of disintegrating life by turning life against itselfin fact inside outas
Plato suggests a things specific evil or flaw is therefore what destroys it;
nothing else will do so.
160 comparative ontology

With these difficulties, therefore, the categorization of physical realities

as both being and not-being, both good and evil, is deeply problematic. It
is only plausible to argue that evil has no ontology or that not-being has
no definite being. But not-being and evil have no direct correspondence.
Among these types of not-being, there is a common feature. It is subject
negation. The norm being pertains to the subject-predicate what is. In the
negative form, the norm becomes what is not. Platos use of the verb to
be is inherently Parmenidean. Since the Parmenidean tradition, three
different senses of is have been developed: the is of predication, the
is of existence, and the is of identity.

Predication: snow is white.

Existence: there is snow.
Identity: snow is the frozen moisture of the atmosphere, composed of
minute hexagonal ice crystals and usually aggregated in feathery
white flakes (Shorter Oxford Dictionary).

Later in Aristotles logic, the predicative function becomes evident.

On not-being, the negative use of the verb to be in English usually
requires a predicate of not to be what.3 For example, Plato usually talks
about Beauty is but not Beauty is her appearance. In the negative
form of to be, Plato directly applies the logic of negation and allows the
negation that supposedly happens to the what object to backflow onto
the subject of being. Because the predicative her appearance is absent,
Beauty is Not her appearance becomes Beauty is not. What Plato has
done is to apply the same subject-predicate principle and to add a nega-
tive prefix to the subject of being. The negation of Beauty is should be
Beauty is not. But because the predicative is not assigned, the negative
form of not to be becomes the subject negation of not-Beauty is.
Contrary to being as to be something, not-being mainly refers to to
Not be something. If Beauty represents the fullest form of something,
then not-Beauty actually negates the subject. The negation of to be beau-
tiful becomes to not-be beautiful and to be not-beautiful. 4 Both infer-
ences mean the same thing and are often further inferred as being noth-
ing at all. This existential problem is the direct consequence of subject
negation. Therefore, the existential predicative becomes important to
carry positive meaning for the impoverishment of being that subject nega-
tion supposedly infers. Thus Socrates not-beauty is average appearance.
Otherwise the absence of being makes the subject beingless, and Socrates
not-beauty becomes nothing at all.
 nothing161

Logical Aspects of the Partnership between

Not-Being and Being

A remarkable feature of Ge Hongs ontology is the double subject Xuan-

Qi. Would two subjects make Dao not numerically one but two causes? We
can approach the Platonic question in two steps. The first is to identify the
inner unity of the subjects. The second is to understand the outer unity
that arises out of the subjects. These unities are basically two forms of the
same life of the Dao. The inner rests in the creative core, whereas the
outer acts by sustaining the many with evolving Nature.

Indeterminate and Determinate in Daoist Generation

At first glance, the inner reality of the Dao is an antithesis in logical terms.
Xuan basically is nothing, or not-being, whereas Qi is the primordial life,
an undistinguished matter-energy, or the first being. Ge Hong would not
dispute the logical antithesis between not-being and being. Certainly the
partnership is a logical problem that inheres even within the Dao. To
establish a unity of two opposites requires a continuity to establish the
complementary nature for the discontinuity of the opposites. If the antith-
esis is unreconciled, then the disharmony will be passed on to the world
of plurality through creation. The world becomes the manifestation of the
antithesis.
From Parmenides to Plato, the ontology of being without not-being is
the filtering device to single out unchanging universal(s) from Becoming.
But the ontology of being does not really aim to solve the problem of the
antithesis, but only to isolate beings from not-being. The system of Being,
therefore it could be said, deliberately bypasses the antithesis of not-being
and being. For Daoism, the antithesis is not an apparent reality of the
manyof Becomingbut the essential reality within Being. Behind the
antithesis there exists a hidden synthesis, and being and not-being are not
primarily a logical contrary but a creative tension held by two complemen-
tary parties.
Ge Hongs imagery of cosmic pregnancy provides a metaphorical
answer, which needs some analytical explanation. The mother Dao and
the fetus Qi, not-being and being, are a relational whole. The partnership
of not-being and being can be explained simply as the mothers womb
and the fetus. To fully articulate the logical aspect of this cosmic womb is
difficult at this stage. It is basically the inner core of the cosmogonical one
and many, or how the world came to be. But we can simplify the discus-
162 comparative ontology

sion by following Laozis suggestion: To know the mother is to know her

children (Laozi 52). So we move from the external to the internal, from
children to the mother.
The mother-child relation is basically an OM argument. If the mother
is the one and her children represent the many, then between them there
exists both continuity and discontinuity. By giving birth to children, the
mothers life has continued in her childrens lives. This is the continu-
ity of life. Is the continuity determinate or indeterminate? According to
Laozi, the life of the mother Dao is the most spontaneous (ziran ). For
Ge Hong genealogy is also spontaneous. Hence, contrary to the determi-
nate continuity of the Platonic one over many, Daoist continuity is inde-
terminate. Even though the mothers life is continued in her childrens
lives, her childrens lives are no longer her own. This is the discontinuity
between the one and the many. Just as a mothers womb creates room for
life to be conceived, nourished, and developed, a mother lives a support-
ive life that provides living space for her children to develop their indi-
vidualities and eventually becomes indeterminate by setting her children
free. Laozi refers to this chief virtue of the motherly Dao as indeterminate
action (wuwei ).
The continuation of the mothers life evolves out of the indeterminate
womb. During birth, the living space of life engages in the inward act of
self-emptying. However, in Laozis dialectic philosophy, indeterminate
action is the most potent determination. The Dao acts indeterminately,
but nothing is not accomplished by it (Laozi 48). Childbirth is the most
determinate act of the mothers life. But the outward letting-be of the
child is produced by the inward act of self-emptying. Hence a mothers
determination is the expression of an indeterminate self-withdrawal. The
determination is the consequential reality of indeterminacy manifested by
the act but not the permanent reality of the one. After the birth of new life,
the determination during the contraction is discontinued, and the womb
returns to the empty state. Therefore the self-emptying act is transformed
into the reality of infant life. Each one of the many children embodies the
spontaneous life of the motherly one. And each one of the many becomes
a living vessel to diversify the indeterminate continuity of the one.
To put the mother-children parable in the bloodless language of
being/not-being, it can be said that the one holds the identity of not-
being, whereas the many diversify the one as beings of not-being. But this
sort language has explained nothing about the innate connection between
being and not-being apart from the confusion that arises from the fact
that the two concepts stand logically against each other. Surely children
are not born as the opponents of their mother. If we adopt the parabolic
 nothing163

OM argument, we must explain the logical sequence from not-being into

being, which neither Laozi nor Ge Hong has directly explained for us. But
the parable can be reconstructed with four segments.

(a)Indeterminate not-being: The motherly Dao is the indeterminate

not-being.
(b)Indeterminate action: By the virtue of self-emptying, something is
born of nothing. The indeterminate self-emptying and the deter-
minate begetting are two simultaneous movements of the same act,
namely, generation.
(c)Continuity argument: Each one of the many embodies the life of the
motherly one. The life of the mother in each child is the indetermi-
nate continuity that forms the blood relation among the children.
(d)Discontinuity argument: By begetting children out of her womb,
and later by setting them free from her care, the mother remains
indeterminate over her childrens evolving lives. Each of them is a
unique discontinuity from the mother but diversifies the mother by
becoming beings of the not-being.

These four segments can be arranged in a bottom-up flow chart as

follows:

(iv) Many: beings of not-being

(ii) Indeterminate emptying (iii) Determinate begetting

(i) One: not-being

The chart demonstrates the flow from nothing into being. The continu-
ity over the course of generation is intrinsically indeterminate. We can
advance this argument one step further. Can this indeterminate genera-
tion take the Platonic place of determinate causation and answer Platos
difficulty of forming a harmonious unity?
Let us presuppose that the chief identity of each Form is not-being.
Surely Form as not-being will have radically altered Platos premise of
Form as being. We should investigate whether such a radical shift would
upset the world of ideas.
In the instance of the ideal/actual bed, if the identity of the ideal bed
is not-being, then the universal design of all beds must be indeterminate.
164 comparative ontology

Plato might immediately become uneasy at an attempt to treat his defi-

nite being as indefinite not-being. Without the Form bed-ness, what else
could it be? It could be anything, if not nothing, except bed-ness. But these
difficulties derive from the premise of being without not-being, What
does not-being refer to here? In Chinese it is wu . It is not the negation
of being produced by the hypothesis that presupposes being as bed-ness
and then negates it. It is the reality prior to something or being (you ).
The Daoist proposition alters the principle of being without not-being
into the relational principle of not-being with being. The not-being of
bed-ness refers to the indeterminate otherness of bed-ness. This state of
not-being is the unawakened idea yet to give birth to the design that Plato
calls the model of being. Therefore, there exists an internal distinction
between the unawakened idea and the design. The former is indetermi-
nate, whereas the latter is the expression of the indeterminate. Now let us
test this Daoist proposal against Platos model/copy schema.
According to Plato, the Demiurge has made the perfect design of bed-
ness according to which all beds are made. If the model is a single unity,
this unity is ultimately indeterminate. Why? A determinate design cannot
be simply floating in the metaphysical sky, but rather requires the vessel to
receive what it will eventually produce. If the design is placed in the ideal
realm, it remains indeterminate in itself. In craftsmanship, there is no
essential difference between a dream and an unrealized blueprint. Plato
puts the determination in the ideal/actual causation and believes the ideal
bed exists independently. But causation requires both the cause and the
caused. Without the caused, the causation cannot be established. Without
physical beds, the ideal would have nothing through which to realize its
universality; its determination would have nothing to rest upon because
the removal of the actual would make the determination nonfunctional.5
What is left is pure indeterminateness; the being in itself cannot even be
itself. It is the otherness. In Chinese it is wu prior to you. Plato also has a
similar ideal that absolute transcendence negates all external assertions
about the one (Parmenides 137d). If Plato had taken this otherness as seri-
ously as the neo-Platonists were later to do, he would agree more with Dao-
ism. Any unity must be primarily indeterminate unless it moves out of the
transcendence by the act of causing actuality.
Contrary to the neo-Platonists wholly-otherness, Ge Hong speaks of
the otherness as the living space innate within the reality of Dao. Xuan is
viewed against astronomy as the night sky. The dark and infinite universe is
the cosmic womb in which celestial bodies are contained. Ge Hongs culti-
vation methods aim to create a living space within the body. Having mas-
tered his desires, purified his passions, the adept looks inward and traces
 nothing165

the sound [of flowing Qi] [neishi fanting ] (IC 2). The adept
takes the inward journey to discover his true existence. The discovered
inner environment is nothing other than the self-emptied space. Ge Hong
depicts this fundamental reality anthropomorphically. The inner liberty of
immortals moves them freely between heaven and earth. What this inner
liberty does, however, is not just to awaken the adept to what it is be a free
person, but also to harbor plurality inside his empty yet open being.
To translate Ge Hongs thought into Platonic language speaks to two
important issues. (a) The indeterminateness speaks for the inner capacity
to be the other. It is the principle of self-differentiation. (b) The inner
space of not-being can truly contain multiplaced determinations. It is the
principle of indeterminate continuity. What do they mean in more practi-
cal terms?
To be the unity of plural beds, the design must hold together within
itself the multiplicity of whatever many beds collectively stand for. The
Form of bed-ness must be responsible for the variations among different
beds. If the Form causes ordinary beds A and sofa beds not A, the one
over many Form must be F is A and F is not A. Since nothing can be
creative other than the Form, the Form must be solely responsible for the
difference A and not-A as their shared cause. The cause, therefore,
must either accommodate within itself the multiplaced determination or
change the design to meet the variation of A and not A. Since the
principle of the unchanging universal rules out the possibility of internal
change, the only option is to manage multiplaced determinations within
the unchanging being. If this happens, the import of being A and being
not A impels the ideal to be indeterminate.
We can use Platos own example to set the logic. In the Parmenides
(131e132b) Plato records the Largeness Regress argument, or the Third
Man Argument labeled by Aristotle (Metaphysics, book Alpha 9, 990b).
According to the OVM theory, there exists the Form of bed-ness over ordi-
nary beds and sofa beds. If another kind of bed is present beside the Form,
for instance, a waterbed (B), it is necessary to assign a superior Form (F2)
on the top of the unity covering the difference of A and not A. This new
Form constructs a larger one over many structure as F2= F1+B (F1=A+not-
A; B =waterbed). If another kind of bed (C), for instance, a Chinese kang
(a heated brick bed), has been introduced beside the super unity, there
must an even higher unity (F3) to cover the previous unity (F2) plus C
(F3=F2+C). In so doing, Plato will fall into a bottomless pit.
The Third Man Argument pinpoints the problem that the continuity
represented by F is crippled by the discontinuity among many (A, B, C).
The many drag the all-determinate one into multiplaced determinations.
166 comparative ontology

All that one can do is to busy oneself to invent a new universal to bring
the subordinated discontinuity under control, which means that at the
same time the one over many is also controlled by the many. Thus being
becomes indeterminate.
Instead of accusing Plato of falling into logical absurdity as Aristotle
does, Zhuangzi would say that Plato actually is at the doorstep of enlight-
enment, but he is unaware what kind of ontological wonderland he is
standing in. The difference between F is A and F is not A cannot be
simply swept aside and ascribed to the realm of Becoming. Rather, the
wholly other of indeterminateness inheres in all realities. The Forms are
not exempt. If a unity is accountable for many instances, it must contain
many first within itselfnot in the form of Forms but of formlessness. For
Zhuangzi, recognizing the ground of the many as the groundlessness of
not-being marks the beginning of true wisdom. If one can look deeply
enough through one particular reality, one should be able to enter into the
awakening state of mind with the realization that all realities are inwardly
connected through the unawakened not-being.
In the instance of the ideal bed, the key is to conceptualize the prior of
not-being a numerical Bed-itself. A causal design is a realization of this
prior idea. It is a child being born out of this not-being idea. In order to
cause various beds, change must implied within the design. The self-modi-
fication then meets different demands to produce beds of varied kinds out
of the same master plan.

The Collapse of Being and Act in Platonic Causation

What makes an indeterminate unity determinate? This question of inner
change will be investigated in the next two sections. This section discusses
the logical sequence of the inner change at the micro scale. The cosmo-
gonical aspect will be presented in the next section.
When we see a rosewood bed, we may identify a particular Chinese
design. In this situation, the bed exists because a carpenter has actual-
ized the design. To be precise, the craftsmanship is the act that makes the
design determinate to organize rosewood into a bed. The act does not
only give the design a vessel to receive and express its content, but vindi-
cates whether the design is constructive. Therefore for the indeterminate
to become determinate requires both the act and the vessel to transform
an idea into a reality. Here we have a threefold transformation. It includes
(a) the indeterminate design, (b) the determinate act, and (c) the vessel
containing the design.
For Plato, the transformation is expressed as the causation from the
ideal to the actual. For Ge Hong, the change is understood as generation.
 nothing167

We have two models: mechanical and biological. Here I may overstretch

the biological model in order to point out the differences between causa-
tion and generation.

The design (a) The act (b) The vessel (c)

mother birth child

Indeterminate Determinate

In generation, the act and the vessel happen simultaneously as one sin-
gle event. Thus the line of distinction between indeterminate and deter-
minate is situated between the mother and the act. To allocate this line in
the threefold transformation, it is located between the design (a) and the
act together with the vessel (b +c). The line indicates the moment when a
carpenter gives birth to a bed. He transforms a design (a) into a reality
by the act (b) of creating a vessel (c) for his design. Likewise, the line exists
in Platos analogy of the divine craftsman who creates all beds according
to the ideal bed.
One fundamental issue must be cleared up: it is not the ideal bed that
functions as the determinate cause, but rather it is the act that creates
actual beds that is accountable for the determination. We can see the point
of argument clearly within the next threefold transformation (whether it is
called causation or generation).

The design (a) The act (b) The vessel (c)

The ideal (a+b) The actual

Determinate (being) Indeterminate (becoming)

If we look again at Platos ideal/actual causation, we have discovered

that the determinate act has gone missing. Where did it go? Clearly Platos
craftsman analogy contains the ideal model, the act of making, and the
actual copy. What has made the threefold generation into twofold causa-
tion? It is the collapse of the design and the act. They have been swallowed
into the ideal.
The mingling of the ideal and the act corresponds to the claim that
Forms are self-generating causes. The mingling of the subject and the act
within the cause is not the direct problem. What is wrong, however, is the
collapsing of the indeterminate ideal and the determinate act into the
168 comparative ontology

single concept of causation. Since the act is externally determinate, Plato

believes that the design ought to be determinate as well. So the determina-
tion of the act is inserted into the identity of being. The indeterminateness
has been swallowed by the determinate act. Being determinate becomes
an essential characteristic of the ideal.
In the generation schema, however, the mingling of the subject and
the act will not make the mothers identity determinate, because the self-
emptying contraction is essentially the manifestation of the mothers inde-
terminate being. It corresponds to the primary assertion that the Dao is
not-being. In the causation schema, the situation is different. If we discern
once more the premise being without not-being, here it is evident that
the swallowing of indeterminateness is not an accident. It is done on pur-
pose. The Parmenidean treaty to eliminate not-being is designed to secure
the determination of Forms. And it feeds into the assumption that the
causal act must be equally determinate.
Having secured the realm of the determinate, Plato draws the dividing
line between ideal being and actual becoming. The line that maintains the
distinction between indeterminate and determinate has been shifted from
the position between the design (a) and the act (b) to a position between
the causal ideal (a+b) and the caused actual becoming (c). On the side of
the ideal, since the causal design and the act are both present, the realm
of being in totality is determinate. On the side of the actual, that which
is caused cannot be self-generating. It seems to follow that the realm of
becoming can only be indeterminate. However, becoming is both determi-
nate and indeterminate. This is actually the problem.
As we have discussed, the ideal, which contains the design and the act, is
also both determinate and indeterminate. The true difficulty hides behind
the question Where does the feature of being indeterminate come from
if being is all-determinate? If we adopt Platos ideal/actual causation, it
would also follow that the determinate gives birth to the indeterminate,
and the perfect being generates the imperfect becoming. How does this
happen? Since the divine craftsman has the perfect design yet has cre-
ated the imperfect vessel called the physical world, it must follow that the
divine act must be imperfect. If so, the act must be both determinate and
indeterminate.
We have looked at this problem a number of times from various angles.
Let us now formulate the content.

(a)If the ideal model is being, the actual copy is becoming,

(b)the act creates the copy composed of being+not-being,
(c)then it can be formulated that being+act=being+not-being.
 nothing169

The equation suggests that the act has introduced not-being through the
project of creation. In other words, the maker of the world is either inca-
pable of doing a proper job or something has prevented the act from fully
actualizing the design. In either case, the act is insufficient. To blame the
Demiurge for incapability is not going to answer the question, so where
does not-being come from? In the Timaeus, more than halfway through the
narrative of creation, Plato introduces another primary cause, Necessity
(48a). It seems that Necessity is needed to explain the cause of contingency
in the world. However, since Necessity preexisted together with Reason in
the precosmos, its primordiality entails that indeterminate formlessness
was there prior to the creation.
The inference affirms our argument that the element of indetermi-
nateness must have existed prior to the act or not-being existed prior to
both the act and the existence of the vessel. Therefore, the line in the
second diagram in this section must be shifted back to the position prior
to the act. Neither the divine act nor the vessel (the created world) was
responsible for the indeterminateness in the precosmos. If so, the distinc-
tion between the determinate ideal (being) and the indeterminate actual
(becoming) is not viable. Insofar as the preexistence of Reason and Neces-
sity is affirmed, the determinate and the indeterminate must inhere in
the precosmos. For Daoism the partnership of being and not-being is the
intrinsic nature of the world and its origin.

Cosmogony:
Generation or Causation?
Is the world created out of an intelligent design? So far we have assumed
the existence of a design in the threefold schema in order to conduct a dia-
logue with Platos twofold causation. The above discussion has stretched
both schemas beyond their original contexts. This is because the doctrine
of creation has imposed serious demands on both models, more specifi-
cally, the question of how to explain the change from nothing into being.
Here we come to an inquiry into the relationship between the indetermi-
nate and the determinate that underlies the cosmogonical change from
nothing into being.
Plato argues that creation came about as the result of the fact that Rea-
son controlled Necessity by persuasion (Timaeus 48a). But are Reason and
Necessity really two conflicting causes or two sides of a single cause? For
Plato, they are clearly conflicting causes, and neither one is reducible to
the other. In Ge Hongs cosmogony, however, creation is not understood
as the victory of order over chaos. Rather, forms emerge out of formless-
ness as the self-expression of the Dao. Viewing the question from the sub-
170 comparative ontology

ject correlation of Xuan-Qi, Reason, and Necessity could indeed be two

sides of the same creator.
To understand creation as the victory of order over chaos, one relies on
the assumption that the created world has two primordial ancestors. The
feminine indeterminate Necessity subordinates herself to the masculine
determinate Reason; together they produce the child called the cosmos.
In recent scholarship two models have developed out of this reproduc-
tion image. Wright argues the Platonic line that the masculine Reason is
the dominating partner over the feminine Necessity in the construction
of the world.6 Dean-Jones uses Aristotles biological simile of coming-to-be
and argues that the three entities being, space, and becoming can be seen
as sexual reproduction: father (the eternal paradigm), the mother (the
receptacle), and the child (the perceptible cosmos).7
This Aristotelian theory appears to bring Platos doctrine of creation
closer to Daoist cosmogony. But before embracing the reproduction the-
ory wholeheartedly, we should take a step back and clarify what Reason
and Necessity stand for in Platos doctrine. On this basis we can deter-
mine whether the reproduction model and the Daoist biological model
are comparable.
Reason stands for the mind of the Demiurgethe chief organizer
that inserts the first principles exemplified by Forms into the formless
space of Necessity. The act of giving form to formlessness is called the work
of Reason. The doctrine of creation rests upon the principle of Reason to
produce the world of plurality. Could the mind of the creator carry out this
act under the condition that the Forms are preexistent and coeternal with
the mind? If Reason were the OVM unity over Forms, Forms would have
to be created rather than being coeternal with the mind of the creator. If
Forms are created, how does the change from one to many happen within
the mind of the creator or more likely inside the womb of Necessity? To
presuppose Reason as the unity of Forms will bypass the issue of from one
to many completely. But this is the heart of the one and the many problem
in the doctrine of creation.
As has been discussed previously, as long as Forms remain absolutely
determinate, it is neither possible to form a political harmony among
them nor is it possible to attain sovereignty over them, no matter
whether the super unity is called the Form of Good or Reason. The power-
ful and self-subsistent Forms refuse to form a relational unity. But as in the
investigation of the alchemical body, Ge Hong argues that relational unity
is the true unity of harmony. Here in the context of creation, Reason is
not a super universal, but the common character of rational Forms. It is a
false unity of OVM commonality but not a true unity of harmony. In a bag
 nothing171

of frozen vegetables, for instance, to be frozen is the common character,

but it is not unity. Ge Hongs has taught us that harmony is like different
parts of the body forming a whole life, and Qi interconnects the many yet
remains indeterminate and spontaneous.
What Plato has said is very different. All that Reason does in the process
of creation is to overcome the chaos of Necessity. What harmony requires
is that each Form is prepared to lay down self-governance, to discover
mutual support for each other, and to form the interwoven web of rela-
tion. But Forms in the Timaeus are eternal. The mind of the Demiurge has
never created them. Instead, the divine craftsman must obey the regula-
tions set by Forms. He is not a creator but a craftsman. His chief task is
to copy the model composed of many Forms to produce the world in the
likeness of the model. He has no power over Forms, but works within the
limits of them.
Now we can gather what was in the primordial world prior to creation.
There were not only more than two ancestors, but a plurality of eternal
categories. (A) There stood the primordial chaos caused by Necessity. (B)
Multiple Forms existed in the realm of being to be used in the project of
creation. (C) Reason supposedly ruled Forms as their unity but turns out
to be just a common character that marks the contrary of the mystical
Necessity. (D) The divine craftsman stood as the symbolic figure in the
narrative of theogony. His main role was to play out the act of creation, as
if the process of creation came under his command. In reality, he did not
create the world, but only copied it according to the design invented by no
one. (E) The intelligent design rested in the realm of being and contained
within itself whatever organization the Forms had managed among them-
selves. But one thing is sure: the organization is not a unity of harmony. If
we put the preexisting categories together, what we can find is that the cat-
egories in the current cosmos had already existed in the precosmos. This
current cosmos is a mere reflection of the precosmos. Or the precosmos
is a mere projection of this world. The most difficult issue, however, is to
decide which category is accountable for what is most prior in the doctrine
of creation.
To assert Reason and Necessity as two ancestors of the world means to
contradict the proposition mentioned in the beginning of the narrative,
namely, that the world was created by the single creator (Timaeus 30a).
To maintain the proposition of a single creator, the reproduction model
developed in recent scholarship must also face this challenge. Plato has
failed to reconcile the one creator and two causalities. Can we solve this
contradiction?
If we imagine the creator as somewhat of a marriage of Reason and
172 comparative ontology

Necessity, this seems to explain that the child of the marriagethe world
of Becominghas genetically inherited characters of both order and dis-
order. But there is a sense of awkwardness in the marital analogy. Mar-
riage is a relationship of two persons, not a single person. If we externalize
Reason and Necessity as two causes, as Plato does, how can the creator
the single personact as both mother and father at once? To defend the
proposition that the world was created by a single creator entails that the
reconciliation cannot take an external form as the marriage between the
two, but must take place within the creator. Once the two personalities are
internalized, then the creator must also live with two conflicting identities.
If we force the Aristotelian reproduction theory into this changed circum-
stance, the result is alarming. The creator would have to be androgynous.
To compare the birth of a child with the birth of the world, the transi-
tion from the childless state to the birth of the child could be viewed as the
cosmogonical change from nothing into being. In this situation, the transi-
tion from nothing into being must first be pregnant within the creator,
and then the world can be born. To be precise, from nothing into being
cannot simply be the external transformation that belongs to the created
world, which undergoes the change from the chaotic precosmos to the cre-
ated world. It must equally be an internal change that happens within the
creator. How can the very first changefrom nothing into beinghappen
within the creator? From the viewpoint of Ge Hongs cosmogony, Platos
theogony explains nothing about the fundamental change that happens
within the creator.
The doctrine of creation is essentially a creation out of something. To
use the schema in the last section, the change from something to some-
thing can be explained as the sequence that follows:

The design (a) the act (b) the actuality (c)

The Forms Reason over Necessity the world as the mixed result

Platos process of creation is basically a causation model based on the

ideal/actual ontology. We have gone through a torturous path to turn Pla-
tos causation model into the Aristotelian reproduction theory in hopes of
making sense of the generation metaphor for comparison with Ge Hongs
biological model. But what emerges out of the discussion is what initially
stops us from penetrating the doctrine of creation. The same causation of
being/becoming is applied to the creation story. At the end, Platos doc-
trine of creation is merely a mystified version of the doctrine of Forms. It is
not about generation, but is causation through and through.
David Keyt in his The Mad Craftsman of the Timaeus argues this cau-
 nothing173

sation model is false. The craftsman has copied the many Forms to shape
his single living being (the one), and he is not content to stop here but has
further made the physical world (the many) as the copy of the single living
being. In this situation, the craftsman must be mad, because, to rephrase
Keyts argument, the eternal one will not be one but many. The craftsman
has committed the fallacy of division. 8
Keyts criticism basically is a rejection of Platos causation model. But
Keyt has not explored further the ontological limits that Plato imposed on
the doctrine of creation and how it causes the main issue of creation, the
One or the craftsman, to be explained away. Here is an explanation. Since
being without not-being is the treaty for the causal creator, it also implies
that the creator has no room for indeterminateness. The required space
for the gestation of the world has been externalized as Necessity, which
belongs solely to primordial chaos. This ontological denial of not-being
has crippled the creator and prevented him from taking the self-differen-
tiation movethe move from being-itself to not-being-itself. The external-
ization of not-being paints the picture in which the Demiurge stands in
front of chaos and prepares to change the precosmos once for all into the
orderly world ruled by Reason.
But the craftsman cannot take the responsibility of structuring Neces-
sity down to every single detail of the myriad things. Otherwise it becomes
a Form limited by the multi-placed determination. The all-controlling cre-
ator thus has no freedom either. The cause/caused relation will condition
the unity to be totally responsible for the plurality. He would become a
cosmic power station responsible for energizing all electric appliances
in the world. The causing creator, even if he or she had a perfect intelli-
gent design for the world, could neither be contingent nor spontaneous.
Fundamentally, not-being, which enables freedom and spontaneity for
the creator, has been purposefully ruled out from the design of the power
station directed by the one over many doctrine. Without self-differentia-
tion, the creator will be the salve of his own creation. To understand the
point in generation terms, the creator turns himself into the only caretaker
of his progeny. He can neither be free from the duty of fostering the many,
nor can he be creative any more. Each child becomes an increased load
weighing on the maker. In mechanical terms, the world becomes a crafted
clock created by the single act of creation; nothing new can be yielded out
of its motion. Until the creator is willing to let go of the controls, he is not
going to discover the freedom of not-being that has enabled the gestation
of the many in the first place.
Letting go of the controls means letting go of the Forms. Until the
Forms have been abandoned, the divine craftsman will not realize the fact
174 comparative ontology

that none but himself can be creative. This is simply because there was no
other maker in the precosmos.

From Nothing into Being

Daoist cosmogony is closer to Christian creation ex nihilo than to Platonic

craftsmanship. But comparison with Christian thought demonstrates that
creation ex nihilo is heavily influenced by Platos Timaeus, while at the
same time a rejection of it, because the world is created out of nothing
rather than something called Forms. However, traditionally Platonism has
imposed upon Christian theology various limits. On the idea of the cre-
ator, for instance, God is unchangeable. This idea of God rejects any pos-
sibility of change occurring within the creator. So creation ex nihilo refers
primarily to change in the world in its coming to be but not within the
creator. The externalization also yields a problem for God. The unchang-
ing God, who created the world, is left outside the changing world. This is
identical to the picture of the Platonic divine craftsman; the craftsman is
always external to his crafted chair. The core issue again is ontological: the
unchangeable creator and the changeable world.
To the contrary, Daoism affirms from nothing into being primarily as
an internal reality. The inner conversion of Dao gives birth to the outer
transformation of the world.

The Self-Emptying Dao

To designate the Dao as the creative ancestor, for Ge Hong the critical
issue is to explain how from nothing into being occurs. From an alchemi-
cal perspective he argues that everything is subject to change and that
change is the perpetual reality of the world. Pre-Socratic monists also
believed that change was the worlds basic feature. Plato rejected the nat-
ural evolution of a single form of matter because such theories promoted
ontological change. From a Daoist viewpoint, the pre-Socratics were not
ignorant about ontology. They knew that being and not-being were part-
ners. But they had not systematically explained how a single stuff (water,
air, or fire) changes internally to produce different things external to
it. The same question applies to Ge Hong: How does the Dao change
internally?
In the first chapter we encountered Ge Hongs unique negative phi-
losophy shaped by a group of distinctive words. These words need a closer
look to provide insights on the transition from nothing into being.
It is there is not [wu ] because of its submerged stillness [qianji
] (4). It is remarkable that Xuan becomes there is not by the act
 nothing175

of submerging or, better, self-withdrawal. The withdrawal then evokes a

movement described by four words: depth (shen ), smallness (wei
), distance (yuan ), and marvelousness (miao ). These words are
descriptive of the tendency of moving away. Where did the Dao move? If
the precosmos had nothing other than Xuan itself, there was no other
entity into which Dao could move. The only option was to move into Dao
itself. In astronomical terms, it is moving into the infinite depth of the dark
universe, namely, Xuan. In human terms, this is the act of self-limitation.
The first move prior to the conception of Qi was basically the self-with-
drawing act to become indeterminate. But the inward withdrawing is also
paradoxically the outward letting be. The determinate act of letting life be
is associated with the indeterminate act of withdrawing. By withdrawing
the self into itself, Xuan becomes determinate to create a living space, the
very condition for a life to awaken from nothing into being. No matter how
mysterious from nothing into being may sound, it can be understood in
simple terms. Just like Laozis lowly positioned ocean, which draws streams
of living water into it, it does not act determinatively, but life spontane-
ously evolves out of it. The fundamental issue is not how from nothing into
being occurs, but whether a condition or environment is created to make
the evolution of life happen in the first place. Likewise, just as the oceans
inward withdrawing enables the outward letting life be in the irreversible
direction, Xuan also moves inwardly into the darkness and sinks into its
own depth. Ge Hong later describes the depth as the greatness beyond
nothingness (wu wai zhi da ).9
It is to be noted that the self-emptying journey in Daoist internal cul-
tivation and the self-withdrawing move into creation are the same inward
move. Ge Hong calls it to fulfill the real by emptying the vessel (quanzhen
xuqi ) (IC 3). The birth of enlightenment and the birth of the
world are akinfrom nothing into being. Prior to the birth of the world,
there was the internal activity of withdrawing that produced the external
act of letting life be. This relationship between Xuan and Qi, between the
mother and child, was externally imperceptible. But in the cultivation, the
adept is able to experience the Dao still in the making through his bodily
transformation. When the adept moves beyond his limited body, he enters
into the unlimited space and sees the unreachable height and unmeasur-
able depth, wanders in the realm forever drifting, and cruises in the exte-
rior of formlessness.10 Ge Hongs anthropomorphic freedom is almost
identical to Zhuangzis Realized Person (zhenren ) whose formless
peace (yingning ) is at one with Daos formlessness (Zhuangzi 6). The
birth of the world would be like the enlightenment. The first condition
created by the self-withdrawal of Xuan could well be the freedom of letting
176 comparative ontology

life be. It was freedom, not an intelligent design, that created life and its
spontaneous unfolding.
Having noticed the paradox of indeterminate and determinate within
the first move of Dao, we should read again Ge Hongs ontology of change.
Change is the principle of Nature. Certainly, as a universal phenomenon,
change does not need a definition. Just as an ocean changes perpetually
without the need to define what change is, the argument also claims that
change is the way that Nature is. But reading the argument in the light of
the above discussion it has a new meaning. Change is both determinate
and indeterminate, like the evolving life. Evolution overall is open-ended,
thus indeterminate. But the fact that life strives to grow into a genealogical
tree is determinate. Although overall change in the world remains sponta-
neous, change is not entirely chaotic. For Ge Hong, Nature had an inner
drive for the gestation of Qi, and life was unleashed from the cosmogoni-
cal from nothing into being. Thus Nature is not just what we see in the
world, but also refers to the primordial activity between Xuan and Qi that
sets off change and is still active in the world. Thus the argument has a
double meaning referring to both the inner and the outer. And the double
meaning is concealed within the term Nature itself.
In classical Chinese the term ziran applies to external Nature that in
modern terms means the natural world and to internal Nature. Laozi
famously says: The Dao follows its own accord (daofa ziran ). Cer-
tainly Laozi does not mean that ziran is another entity superior to the Dao,
but the Dao moves according to its own Nature or more literally self-so. It
implies a lack of external causation among other things. There is no such
concept in Platos ontology as the self-so. Though the Good could be read
as a self-so entity similar to Neo-Platonists idea of God, Plato clearly calls
it the Form of the Good. In Ge Hongs writings, the same use of ziran can
be found. Among humans there are Laozi and the ancestor Peng, just as
there are [long-lived] pine and cypress among trees. [They] have inborn
Nature [bing zhi ziran ] (IC 46). Here inborn is translated from
the word bing , which refers to natural endowment prior to the manifes-
tation of actual longevity. The double meaning of self-so and inborn in the
term ziran has an ontological significance. The connotation can be further
explained with the modern concept of ontology.
The modern Chinese term for ontology consists of two characters: ben
and ti (). They literally mean basic and body, or philosophically
fundamental and form. Here there is already a distinction between
Platos being, which does not require a body to be a reality (such as the
Form of Beauty), and the Chinese term, which requires both essence and
existence. In Ge Hongs cosmogony the basic can be identified as the
 nothing177

passing on of potency from Xuan to Qi, whereas the form is the body
of the fetus that realizes the evolving life. But the spirit-body clarification
actually is misleading, because it still suggests two natures, one essential
and another existential. It is more Platonic than Daoist. The distinction
in modern ontology is far more equivocal in classical Daoism. Since the
modern concept of benti is completely absent in Daoism from Laozi to Ge
Hong, we ought to look for the ancient equivalent.
What we find is ziranNature. In Ge Hongs argument, there is no
distinction between ben and ti, between the essential and the existential.
The two are one. Even though Ge Hong identifies a conceptual distinction
between something and nothing, between Qi and Xuan, he never treats
them as polarized opposites, but as complements to articulate a more ele-
mentary realityNature, which is change. Just as day and night form a
natural cycle, Xuan and Qi are two parts of the same Dao with the same
Nature. Since ziran literally means self-so, the spontaneous tendency within
ziran is applicable to both the cosmogonical pregnancy and the evolution
of the natural world. So once ontology has been understood in terms of
ziran, there is a striking synthesis. Ge Hong argues that change is the fun-
damental reality of Dao defined by the relational exchange of life between
Xuan and Qi, and change is the universal reality of the world manifested
by the myriad things. But both aspects of change are one single Nature.
Nature requires no external force to move it; it follows its own accord.
If we line up Ge Hongs correlations in a table, the breadth of his rela-
tional ontology becomes evident. The left column in Table 7.2 represents
the concepts that refer to inner reality; the right column designates outer
reality. The interplay of the two is Nature, or ontology.

Reason, the Child of Necessity

Since Ge Hongs cosmogony mainly works with the metaphor of preg-
nancy, it does not have a fatherly figure to co-create the child with the

Table 7.2. Ge Hongs relational ontology and the inner-outer correspondence

Inner Outer
Dao Qi
Nothing Something
Xuan One
Cosmogony Soteriology
178 comparative ontology

motherly Xuan. Since Ge Hong has never spoken of another entity outside
of Xuan, the change from nothing into being is not caused by an external
entity. It is the result of the opposite move of Xuan in the act of self-making
the other. Laozi defines this as By returning to what it is, the Dao moves
(fanzhe dao zhi dong ) (Laozi 40). Ge Hong develops the reverse
movement of Dao in his soteriology as the change from many to the One.
This change is ziran and implies self-change (zihua ).
Self-change is a one to one creativity, not a two to one reproduction.
Viewed from this perspective, Platos two to one schema has a further
problem. Logically, to compress two contrary orders of Reason and Neces-
sity within a single creator would generate the need to manage two perso-
nas with a single being. If we interpret Reason as the cause of being and
Necessity as not-being, we can bring Platonism closer to Daoism. But the
comparison needs to sort out the relation between being and not-being in
terms of what happens internal to the creator. To adopt the mother-child
analogy for not-being and being, this would make the not-being Necessity
the mother and the being of Reason the child. Reason is no longer the
father of the world but the child of Necessity. The suggestion immediately
pushes the comparison beyond Platos intention.
Plato intends to write a theogony. The forming of the formless comes
as a result of Reasons victory over Necessity. So Reason and Necessity are
treated as two causes externally opposite to each other. But being and not-
being must not be externalized. The logical opposition exists internally
within the causing head of the one. The partnership of the two is essen-
tially required for the One to cause the many. But the core of Platos ontol-
ogy prohibits the mingling of being and not-being. Once more the root
problem of from one to many is not the incapability of the Demiurge, but
rather Platos theory of the Forms. In the doctrine of creation, the prob-
lem has been amplified to the cosmic scale. Two ontological dilemmas
identified in previous sections appear to be external issues: the continuity
between one and many, and the discontinuity between them. But they are
actually internal issues.

Unity must be indeterminate in order to limit itself to initiate

the act of creation.
Unity must be determinate in order to give rise to the continuity
of the many.

Both principles reject Platos Reason over Necessity explanation. To meet

the first dilemma, the creator must be ultimately indeterminate. That is not-
being. Reason does not qualify as being the ultimate not-being, so Neces-
 nothing179

sity becomes the candidate. Between the one and the many, there must
exist a discontinuity that enables the creator to hold not-being-itself within
as its chief identity. What the not-being does is to ensure that the creator
and the created are not ontologically alike, which is called transcendence
by Plato. To meet the second dilemma, a determinate creator cannot be
like a Form. Otherwise the continuity either commits multiplaced deter-
mination or discounts plurality represented by the many. Either the many
reinsert not-being back into being, or the world is Parmenidean homo-
geneity. The latter is not an option. For the creator to free itself from the
duty of causing different beings with the single being without not-being
stipulation, the creator cannot externalize not-being-itself by the cause/
caused distinction, but must cooperate with not-being-itself within its caus-
ing being. What the not-being does is to draw an internal distinction that
the creator must be internally free from the commitment of multiplaced
determination and externally to let the continuity spontaneously unfold
and the many rise out of the one. The core of continuity is not determi-
nate but indeterminate.
Both dilemmas affirm the Daoist thesis that the partnership of being
and not-being exist right within the creator and within Nature. Thus not-
being and being cannot be externalized as two separate causes of Necessity
and Reason. In the context of creation, both dilemmas require not-being
to be the chief identity, with Reason the child of Necessity.
But there is still a difficulty ahead. How does Necessity conceive Rea-
son? If they are two irreducible causes, there is no chance for one to pass
into the other. If this relationship between the two cannot be answered,
it ends in eternal dualism within the creator. Ge Hong has offered an
alternative answer. The partnership between the not-being of Xuan and
the first being of Qi is the ontological change from nothing into being.
Is this cosmogony a solution for Platos OM problem within the theory of
Forms?
The comparison here requires two clarifications.

(a)Daoist wu is not absolutely nothing (or non-existence).

(b) Platonic Necessity is not absolutely beingless.

So far we have translated wu as nothing but have indicated that it is not

a perfect translation. In English, nothing refers to nothing at all and
nonexistence. Nothing is the negation of something. But in Daoism wu
correlates to you. Nothing is not nonexistence, but formlessness (xu ).
Formlessness again is not absence of reality, but is conceptualized compar-
atively with concrete things (shi ).11 Xuan does not mean there is abso-
180 comparative ontology

lutely nothing in dark sky, but no-thing is distinguishable in the darkness.

Platos Necessity is the backward trace of the worlds contingency into pri-
mordiality. The entire precosmos is treated as beingless, nonreality, and
chaos, because being rests in Forms in the eternal world of Being. But for
Daoism, the precosmos should not be called chaos but formlessness with
potency. Since Necessity has a continued existence in this cosmos, it has a
life of its own. If Platos logic of subject negation applies to it, the potency
of Necessity is annihilated. When Reason is the true reality by which all
realities are created, then Necessity becomes nonreality. Nonreality in Pla-
tonic language is nothing.
Daoists would not treat Necessity as a negative concept. The forming
of the formlessness could be the active formlessness forming itself rather
than a passive forming by Forms. Change is not external to the craftsman,
but the forming of the formless occurs internally in the creator.
It appears to be a complete denial of the rationalism of Plato to say:
Reason is the child of Necessity. In terms of theogony, Reason can be
viewed as the concrete nature of the creators self-making of the other.
The creator even transcends Reason and rests in indeterminate Neces-
sity. In Zhuangzis language, Reason is the awakened state of the sleep-
ing Necessity. In psychological terms, Reason represents the consciousness
of unconscious Necessity. Cosmogony, thus, is not a divinized model of
human reproduction. It does not require two parents. The first being is
somewhat an apomictic creature that derives from the self-change of the
One. In gestation with the One is the inspirational imagery to visualize
the primordial unity. The creator does not have two personalities, but only
one identity of being indeterminate. The evolving fetus is still in the sleep-
ing mode without a personality until it is born. Likewise the mother-child
relationship defines the Necessity-Reason unity. Reason rests within the
life-bearing environment made available by the self-limitation of Necessity.
The whole process of conception, gestation, and birth of the precosmos
can be viewed as a birth narrativethe organic coming to be of lifebut
not as the craftsmanship of making a copy of an intelligent design. Reason
carries the continuity of life as the child of Necessity. When the child is
born, it will be named the World Soul.

Summary

The chapter began with the question of why not-being is denied an onto-
logical property and then answers that indeterminate not-being is at the
heart of the OM problem. Comparative ontology takes Platos being with-
out not-being and Ge Hongs not-being with being as two propositions
 nothing181

for a dialogue. Though the dialogue operates at an abstract level and uses
language closer to modern philosophy than to that of classic Daoism, the
basic issues are only two. One is to address the relationship between being
and not-being. The other is the implication for cosmogony.
On the first issue, the first section of the chapter investigates Platos
rejection of indeterminate not-being. Then it examines subsequent prob-
lems in having the Good take up the task of being the one over many unity
to embrace Forms into a harmonious whole. Then the relationship of not-
being and being is approached from Ge Hongs biological model. Inde-
terminate Xuan and the determinate life of Qi form a relational ontology
comparable with the motherly womb and its fetus in gestation. The section
then arrives at the issue of subject negation in Platos use of the verb-noun
to be and subject correlation in Ge Hongs double subject of Xuan-Qi.
From this point, the dialogue moves on from ontology to cosmogony.
Should abstruse cosmogony be approached through the biological
model of generation or the ideal/actual model of causation? To answer
this question, the second section takes a step back to discuss the logi-
cal aspects of the partnership of not-being and being. By going back to
examine how not-being (wu ) and being (you ) are used in Ge Hongs
genealogical one and many a creative tension between the inward with-
drawing of the Dao and the outward letting be of life is found. The distinc-
tion between indeterminate and determinate is located between inward
indeterminateness and the outer determinate act of giving birth. But in
Platonic causation, the distinction is the other way around and is situated
between the determinate ideal and the indeterminate actual. Because the
act of causation is determinate, Plato mistakenly infers that the cause too
must be determinate. The collapse of being and act in the ideal has subse-
quently swallowed the element of not-being that is required to shape the
unity of harmony, which Plato has envisioned in the Good.
In the doctrine of creation, the denial of not-being is then amplified
when Plato is compelled to introduce the cause of the worlds contingency.
The introduction of Necessity immediately creates a primordial dualism
and implicitly recognizes that the world cannot be created by Reason
alone but came to be as the child of two parents. But the two-ness of
Reason and Necessity contradicts the oneness of the divine craftsman. The
theogony is complied to reconcile two personalities in one person. This is
the direction in which the third section moves.
By reintroducing not-being back to the creator, Daoist from noth-
ing into being offers a solution to the problem of cosmogonical unity,
which the doctrine of Forms has created but is unable to solve. For the
theogony to work, Plato needs not only to reconsider ontological change,
182 comparative ontology

which the pre-Socratic monists had argued, but also to consider the Dao-
ist feminine model of pregnancy to solve the problem of internal change,
which his masculine causation had externalized as the victory of orderly
Reason over chaotic Necessity. The radical outcome of the internalization
of change is to alter Platos original doctrine. Reason was not the husband
who overcame chaotic Necessity with his rational control. Rather, Reason
is the child of Necessity. Another alteration, perhaps to Greek minds, is
that the birth of the world does not have to have a cause. It could well be
spontaneous self-change that Nature follows by its own accord. No creator
is needed. What does this mean for the created world? We next turn from
cosmogony to cosmology.
 chapter 8

The One

Dao begins with the One, and its prestige is its uniqueness. Qi occupies
each of the categories [ge ju yi chu ] and makes the likeness
heaven, earth, and humanity (yixiang tiandiren ]. Therefore
one says the three ones [guyue sanyi ] (IC 323). According to Ge
Hong, the One can be found in all three categories of existence, heaven,
earth, and humanity. In relation to Xuans nothingness, it is something.
In relation to the world of many, it designates the oneness of natural life.
In cosmogonical terms, the One can complete Yin and give birth to Yang
[yi neng cheng yin sheng yang ] (IC 323). In relation to the
evolving world, it is the formless life that separates itself into the two cre-
ative energies Yin and Yang. From the One a hundred million substances
have been formed, the Twenty-Eight Constellations are made to revolve
(IC 1). From its oneness the myriad things are smelted, as substances are
decomposed into different things in an alchemic vessel. In the context
of instrumental alchemy, the One is called the great materiality. Out
of the self-change of the great materiality (da wu zhi bianhua
) high mountains become valleys, and deep troughs rise into hills (IC
284). In relation to internal alchemy, the One refers to the harmonious
life in which various organisms abide.

The One: The Continuity between

Cosmogony and Cosmology

Two Egg Theories of Ge Hong

The cosmogonical womb is not an isolated idea in Ge Hongs thought.

The same concept is adopted to explain the astronomical contents of the
universe. As I mentioned in the first chapter, the only textual record of
Ge Hongs astronomy has survived in the Astronomical Treatise in the
Jinshu. Now we pursue a closer reading of the text. In the section Com-
mentary on the Armillary Sphere , he writes:

183
184 comparative ontology

Heaven is like a chicken egg and the earth like a yolk in an egg [tian
ru jizhi , di ru jizhong huang ]. It dwells alone inside
heaven. Heaven is large, and the earth is small. The [inner] surface of
heaven has water. Qi supports heaven and earth as they move carrying
water [tiandi ge chengqi erli , zaishui erxing ].
The circumference of heaven is divided into three hundred sixty five
and one-fourth degrees. The degrees can then be divided into halves.
The first half covers the earth, and the other half reaches under the
earth. Therefore the Twenty-Eight Constellations become half visible
and half invisible. Heaven rotates with the movement of a turning
wheel.1 (AT 281)

This passage describes a geocentric cosmology known as the chicken

egg (jizi ) theory. Before Ge Hong, the astronomer Zhang Heng of
the Han dynasty invented the Armillary Sphere; and astronomy took a leap
from theoretical cosmology to instrumental empiricism. It appears odd
that the Jinshu does not quote directly from the widely available works of
Zhang Heng, but provides a summary written by an alchemist, Ge Hong.
To explain this textual evidence, we need to go back to the text, where
we find various indications that Ge Hong defended the emerging world-
view against orthodoxy and that his alchemical view of the universe further
strengthened the new theory by making a crucial connection with Daoist
empiricism and natural philosophy.
The chief argument of the passage is the egg. Heaven is compared
with an egg forming a cosmic sphere, whereas the earth is a yolk floating
inside the cosmic egg. Ge Hong explains that, on the circumference of
the celestial sphere, the sun, the moon, and the stars are attached. They
rotate together with the sphere like a turning wheel in the same direc-
tion from east to west, which is accurate from the point of observation
on earth. The cosmic wheel is mapped out in 365.25 degrees that cor-
respond to the number of days in a solar year displayed on the Armillary
Sphere. Dividing the degrees into two halves, provides an explanation for
the fact that, as the result of celestial rotation, the sun, the moon, and the
constellations appear and disappear from the observation point on earth.
The passage makes only one reference to Qi: Qi supports heaven and
earth as they move carrying water. The reference is meaningful in the
context of the egg metaphor. The cosmos has three layers: earth (yolk),
water (including earthly and meteorological waters), and Qi (egg white).
The reference to supporting Qi speaks for the outer circle farther away
from the sphere of water, where celestial bodies are located. The One
dwells in the great pool of nothingness at the North Polar region (IC
 the one185

324). The Constellations converge at celestial north to give the cardinal

direction to the Armillary Sphere. Therefore, Qi means two things. On
the one hand, it is the potency of the living cosmosthe supportive stuff
that fills the cosmos. On the other hand, its potency is shown through
its astronomical location. Qi functions as the inner energy of the cosmos
that rotates heaven from the east to the west around the axis defined by
the Constellations at the celestial North Pole, which is also Qis position.
The invisible Qi is made visible through celestial motions rotating like a
turning wheel. The movements of the sun, the moon, the planets, and
the stars (unlike Platos fixed stars, the Constellations move on the axis)
collectively display the cosmic potency.
Against this astronomical context, the continuity argument between
the One and the many can be explained. The current cosmos possesses
mathematical orders and contains material contents, whereas the precos-
mos was formless. How does Ge Hong make a connection between cos-
mogony and cosmology? An important connection can be found in the
opening passage of Zhenzhong shu (The Book inside the Pillow).
Long ago Yin and Yang were undistinguished, oceans and heavenly
water were nebulous, heaven and earth and the sun and the moon were
not actualized. The primordial cosmos was in the shape of an egg, and
the center of formlessness was mysteriously like a yolk in an egg. At that
time the creator with the self-proclaimed title the Heavenly Lord of the
Primordial Beginning (yuanshi tianwang ) already existed as the
vigor of the precosmos.2
Apart from turning cosmogony into theogony, the passage contains
another articulation of the egg theory. The shared metaphor draws a
parallel between cosmogony and cosmology. It is the same egg that car-
ries the continuity of the cosmos at two stages. The discontinuity is marked
by primordial formlessness and astronomical patterns. The latter contain
celestial bodies in orderly motions, which the Armillary Sphere has been
designed to imitate. The former has no traceable order; the gravitative
center is mysterious. Prior to the separation of Yin and Yang, formlessness
was the only attribute of the precosmos. Cognitive knowledge requires dis-
tinctions, yet there was no distinction prior to the creation. Thus the pas-
sage demonstrates no precise knowledge except to name the mystery of
the egg. But because of the shared metaphor, an important consistency
of two cosmic eggs has been established.
Compared with the nothingness of Xuan, Qi is something. Ge Hong
once more makes an anthropomorphic image for the vigor of the precos-
mos and calls the immortal the Heavenly Lord of the Primordial Begin-
ning. The divine title, as is indicated in a later edition of the book (DZ
186 comparative ontology

3, 269), may be connected to the older legendary figure Pangu , who

lived within the formlessness alone before he separated heavens Yang
from the earths Yin.3 However, Ge Hong has not mentioned the creator
Pangu elsewhere in the Inner Chapters. The term yuanshi is used only
once in the context of bodily alchemy, where Ge Hong says invite the
three [celestial] forms [of the sun, moon, and stars] into the bright hall
[between eyebrows] and fly the Primordial Beginning [the primordial Qi]
in order to smelt the body (IC 111).4
In bodily alchemy, the Primordial Beginning refers to the primordial Qi,
as Ge Hong calls the whole cultivation procedure the method to preserve
the feminine and to embrace the One (shouci baoyi ) (IC 111).
The principle of internal cultivation involves two important phases: one is
to invite the cosmos into the body so the body can be transformed into a
cosmic vessel; the other is to smelt the primordial Qi in order to transform
the body. At the end, the adept no longer breathes in air, but the primor-
dial Qi, thus becoming an immortal. The state of breathing like a fetus
(taixi ) is akin to the astronomical model. The Primordial Beginning
breathes like a fetus in the womb of Xuan that sets off the great beginning.
In Ge Hongs cosmogony, the term yuanshi is also associated with
the term dashi (the great beginning). The world began when Xuan
breathed out of the breath of the great beginning () (IC 1).
To place the Heavenly Lord inside the precosmic egg is to place a
living identity inside formlessness. The Lord dwells in formlessness just
like an immortal being, who embraces purity and preserves simplicity,
exists without desire and without change, yet his life has infused into the
nothingness and become equal with the creative Nature (IC 3). Overall
the Heavenly Lord is the anthropomorphic equivalent of Qi. Life is the
continuity between the cosmogonical egg and the cosmological egg. They
are the same egg at two different stages of its evolution.

The Continuity of Qi
During the creation, this egg has been hatched into the cosmological
egg. The yolk has materialized into the center of the universe, which
is the earth. The nebulosity has liquefied into the inner circle of oceans
and heavenly water around the earth, and the vigor of Qi has been incor-
porated in the movements of the celestial bodies. The basic categories of
existence have emerged out of the shapeless yet potent life of the cosmo-
gonical egg. The whole image of the egg shares a remarkable feature in
common with another ancient theory known as Xuanye recorded in
the Astronomical Treatise two pages before Ge Hongs essay.
Xi Meng wrote during the Han dynasty: Heaven has no fixed
 the one187

matter. Looking upward, its height is without limit; looking deeply, it is

therefore of such a deep blue color. . . . The sun, moon, and stars flow in
the midst of nothingness. And every aspect of their movements depends
upon the potency of Qi (AT 279). During the process of hatching, the
vigor personified by the Primordial Beginning diversifies into the two
complementary energies of Yin and Yang. The sun, the moon, the earth,
the ocean, and heavenly water solidify out of the single nebulosity. The
motions of celestial bodies animate the movements of the formless form
by turning out circular time divided into 365.25 degrees. Energy, matter,
and forms all come to existence from the single vigor.
Between the two eggs, life persists. The cosmos began with the vigor
of the precosmos and is still supported by the same Qi. The difference
between two worlds lies in the change from formlessness to forms. It is
worth noting that Ge Hong persistently uses the verb to give birth (sheng
). On the one hand, he argues along the medical philosophy exempli-
fied in the Scripture of the Yellow Chamber. Life is the primary form of exis-
tence, not restricted to living things on earth. Rather the whole universe is
alive. On the other hand, similar to Wang Chongs materialism, Ge Hong
argues that life essentially is material, contrary to Platos World Soul. Also
contrary to Platos stationary soul, Ge Hongs notion of life in the universe
evolves. It supports the world of plurality by diversifying itself from the
One to the many.

Life and Its Evolution

Formless life within an egg can evolve into a life with plural organsa
chick. Likewise, the precosmic egg evolves into a cosmic life with the myr-
iad things. Evolution is change. The primordial One first diversifies itself
into the two of Yin and Yang. Out of the interplay of two complementary
energies, the third emerges, the rhythm of cosmic life. Heavenly rotations
of the sun, the moon, and the five observable planets; seasonal changes
on earth; the continuation of human generations all have diversified and
exemplified the formless life with formed existence. Having obtained the
One, heaven becomes clear, the earth becomes peaceful, humans become
reproductive, and the gods become agile (IC 323). Between an egg and a
chick, life is continued by the change from one to many. Between the pri-
mordial vigor and the living world, Qi evolves from the one without the
many to the one with the many.

The External Continuity

Between an egg and a chick, life is continuous. Between the precosmos
and the created universe, Qi is also continuous. The continuity between
188 comparative ontology

the ancestor and the descendants is fundamentally creative. From heaven

to earth and the ten thousand things between them, there is nothing that
does not rely on Qi to be born (IC 114).5 Discerning the pedigree [of
all existing matters], [the truth is that] they have all been inducted out of
Nature (IC 284).6 No external thing can affect this principle of Nature.
All things must follow the ontological course of Nature and become cre-
ative participants in the process of evolution. An egg cannot turn against
the evolution of becoming a chick. Similarly, the precosmos cannot hold
the potency within, but manifests it outwardly as Nature. An egg is the vis-
ible sphere enclosing invisible life. Likewise the cosmos is the visible vessel
into which the invisible Qi unfolds. The whole process of moving outward
rests on the principle of spontaneity, which is the essence of evolution.

Form and Matter

Within an egg, body and the spirit are mingled. A chick hatched from an
egg particularizes a renewed bond of body and spirit that vivifies the same
evolving life. In the precosmic egg, matter and form were mingled in the
unity of formlessness; in the current cosmos matter and form also shape
the basic bond of the myriad existences. The body of the sun without the
form of rising and setting cannot be the sun. The moon without changing
shapes has no meaning to the lunar monthtime. Humans without Qi will
be either corpses or ghosts without bodies. This bond between matter and
form is not created, but preexistent.
Deriving from the harmony of Xuan-Qi, it stages the creative interplay
of nothing and something. Emerging out of the creative Nature, it carries
the unfolding Nature into the harmonious world. The world of plurality
comes to be from nothing into being, from the One to the two (Yin and
Yang), from the two to the three, and from the three to the many. The
three is the bond of form and matter that can also be identified as the
diversified Qi. The myriad things come to be as the result of different com-
binations of matter and form, and their Qi can be different. Each form of
Qi is life, including celestial, herbal, mineral, and immortal existences. But
all forms of life are different because each matter-form unity is unique.
When two egg theories are put side by side, the change from one to
many becomes evident.

The cosmogonical egg The cosmological egg

The creative Nature The created Nature
Precosmos Cosmos
Xuan+Qi form+matter=diversified Qi
One Many
 the one189

Huntian Cosmology
In three hundred years of history from Han to Jin, astronomical debates
evolved around three theories: Xuanye , Gaitian , and Huntian
. The famous British Sinologist and historian of natural sciences Joseph
Needham translated these terms as the following respectively: the Infinite
Empty Space theory, the Hemispherical Dome theory, and the Celestial
Sphere theory.7 A more recent trend, for example, in Christopher Cul-
lens 1996 study, is simply to keep the names in pinyin without any transla-
tion.8 Here I follow the new trend. Instead of stretching each term through
translation, the pinyin terms invite people to go deeper to understand the
distinctive contents of each theory.
Needhams translations are not always helpful, and they can also be
misleading. For instance, the first theory does not suggest that space is
completely empty, as if it is Newtons empty spaceontologically mean-
ingless. The Chinese word is night (ye ) and refers to the night sky.
The ancient text clearly explains that heaven has no fixed matter, look-
ing upward, its height is far reaching without limit (AT 279).9 This oldest
astronomical model depicts the universe as like the night sky, dark and
impenetrably deep, and the scope of the cosmos as extending infinitely.
This is why Needham chose to label it infinite. He further argues that
the ancient Chinese conceived the model of an infinite universe before
any other tradition.10 By looking through the lens of modern astronomy,
Needham found the worldview of infinite space at its infancy. However,
Needhams idea of the infinite universe is more Newtonian then Daoist.
The key concept of the night sky is closer to Ge Hongs theory of Xuan
dark, formless, and infinite.
The second model, Gaitian, depicts heaven as being in the shape of a
lid covering the earth. It is translated by Needham as the Lid of Heaven
theory. But the lid imagery explains nothing about the Confucian eth-
ics behind the astronomical model, a hemispherical lid covering a flat
and square earth. The model reflects the Confucian orthodoxy whereby
heaven is round and earth is square (tianyuan difang ). It is
interesting that here the underlying principle of astronomy is not natu-
ral philosophy but ethics. Spherical heaven contains boundless kindness,
whereas the square earth encompasses definable human morality reach-
ing out in four cardinal directions. The highest virtue that humans can
achieve is to live out moral lives in conformity with the cosmos. The mor-
alization of cosmology occupied an important position in Chinese politics,
particularly as cosmology justified imperial sovereignty. At the same time,
cosmology was constantly adjusted by the political process.11 The interplay
190 comparative ontology

of cosmology and politics can be also found in Platonism and throughout

the Christian era.
The third model, Huntian, is a geocentric model. Unlike Needhams
translation, Celestial Sphere theory, the concept of Huntian denotes a
scope of comprehensive and complete. To understand the full content of
the astronomical model, we need to ask a further question. Are Xuanye
and Huntian related or disassociated? According to Needham, the Hun-
tian model is comparatively similar to the geocentric worldview ordained
by the Catholic Church in the prescientific era, whereas the Xuanye model
is the earliest equivalent of the modern infinite universe model. 12 Read-
ing the Chinese models through Western categorizations, therefore, the
Xuanye and Huntian models are not closely related. But our studies of the
two egg theories indicate exactly the opposite. Ge Hongs originality in
the astronomical debate can only be recognized by comprehending this
connection.

The Huntian Model and the Armillary Sphere

To establish the connection between cosmogony and cosmology, two issues

need to be investigated. First, the Xuanye and Huntian theories are much
closer than modern scholars have imagined. The link between the two
theories is the astronomical background against which all alchemical prac-
tices are conducted. Second, alchemy and astronomy are closely associ-
ated through the study of change. Both empirical studies are connected by
the same methodmatching theory with reality. These two points will set
the comparative platform for the dialogue between Ge Hongs alchemi-
cal universe and Platos mathematical universe, between empiricism and
idealism.
While Confucians favored the Gaitian theory, Daoist alchemists and
some Confucians influenced by Daoism defended the egg cosmology,
which evolved into geocentric astronomy. Among the latter, Zhang Heng
was most famous for his instrumentalism. He not only invented the Armil-
lary Sphere, but also built an earthquake detection unitthe Seismometer
(didong yi ).13 He also wrote two texts on the Sphere and its theory:
The Marvelous Decree (Ling xian ) and the Commentary on the Armillary
Sphere (Huntianyi zhu ). Ge Hongs commentary quoted previ-
ously summarized the development of the theory up to his time. Evidently
the text is short, and many details have not been preserved.
To reconstruct the Huntian theory is not a simple task, mainly because
neither was it written systematically in a single text, nor was its content
explained geometricallythe parameter of modern astronomy inher-
 the one191

ited from the Greeks. Modern scholars, however, have reconstructed the
theory out of various historical records. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 represent the
geometric content. By using these illustrations, we are able to gain some
insight into why Ge Hong defended this new worldview.
Figure 8.1 represents the cosmic egg. Historically there were two ver-
sions of the theory differentiated by the key issue of whether the earth was

Fig. 8.1. Two disputed models of Huntian cosmol-

ogy: an earlier model with a flat earth (above);
a later model with a spherical earth (below).
(Reprinted by permission of Nanjing Daxue Chu-
banshe from Xu Jie, Zhang Heng pingzhuan [Bei-
jing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe], 210. The original
diagram is from Chen Jiujin, Huntian Shuo de
fazhan lishi xintan, in Keiji shi wenli, edited by
Zhongguo Tianwenxue Shi Zhengli Yanjiu Xiaozu
[Shanghai: Shanghai keji chubanshe])
192 comparative ontology

flat or spherical. As shown in the upper drawing, the earlier version shows
the earth as flat. The belief in a flat earth was central to the Gaitian theory
of a semispherical lid covering the flat earth. Evidently this version did not
completely break away from the Gaitian theory. Ge Hongs writing indi-
cates a later correction: the earth is spherical like a yolk in an egg. Qi
supports heaven, and the earth flows on the water. Heaven rotates with
the movement of a turning wheel on the axis defined by North and South
poles. Ge Hongs version corresponds to the lower drawing in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.2 contains three diagrams. The top left circle is the celestial
sphere. The cosmos has two celestial poles forming the axis of rotation,
and the axis is aligned on an angle with the line formed by the zenith
and the nadir. The great circle at the horizontal level is the earths hori-
zon; another great circle intersecting the horizon is the celestial equator.
The spherical circle represents the meridian movements in a solar year.
The top right drawing represents the terrestrial sphere. The intersection
of the zodiac and the equator produce four points: two intersectional
points indicate the vernal equinox and autumnal equinox; two tangen-
tial points represent the summer solstice and the winter solstice. These
four points define the seasons of the solar calendar. The Chinese calendar
from very early times adopted a system based on combined solar and lunar
movements.
The lower diagram in Figure 8.2 is a detailed map of the top right dia-
gram, looking at the cross-section where zodiac and equator intersect. It
shows that the celestial equator and the zodiac are not imaginative circles,
but are defined by the Twenty-Eight Constellations. The Constellations
form two overlapping circles. The vernal equinox and the autumnal equi-
nox are two points produced by the intersecting circles. For many centu-
ries the Constellations have been central to the entire Chinese astronomi-
cal system. When the Jesuits arrived in China, they were surprised by the
unique system distinct from the Greek and Egyptian astronomies. But they
failed to understand it.
Greek astronomy relies on the stars heliacal risings and settings near
the ecliptic. The disadvantage of this system, as Needham points out, is
inconsistent observability in different seasons.14 The Constellations, how-
ever, are oriented toward the North Pole. Ge Hong clearly points out that
the Twenty-Eight Constellations become half visible and half invisible
within a turning wheel. The reference is a key to explaining how the
Constellations shape the astronomy.
Even though not all of them are observable at any given time, the
appearance of the stars on two different circles forms a circumpolar ring.
Dividing the ring into 365.25 degrees that radiate from the pole form a
 the one193

system like a navigational compass. Modern astronomy has realized that

within the celestial compass the sidereal position of the full moon is exactly
in opposition to the invisible position of the sun.15
This principle of opposition is remarkable and practical in observa-
tory astronomy. The Greek heliacal stars have an invisibility problem in
that the risings and the settings can happen within a very short time when
stars are near the horizon. So it is difficult to have accurate observations
in certain periods of the solar year. But for the Chinese, even when the

Fig. 8.2. The celestial and terrestrial spheres of the Twenty-

Eight Constellations: the celestial sphere is at top left; the
terrestrial sphere at top right; the Twenty-Eight Constellations
below. (Reprinted by permission of Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe
from Xu Jie, Zhang Heng pingzhuan [Nanjing: Nanjing daxue
chubanshe, 1999], 265)
194 comparative ontology

Constellations are half visible above and half invisible below the horizon, it
is possible to work from the navigational compass shaped by the stars and
defined by the principle of opposition according to which every point is
definable on the celestial equator. The only practical problem is to build
an instrument to map the celestial movements and to demonstrate the
navigational compass.
Zhang Hengs Sphere is essentially a model of the cosmos based on
empirical observation. The invention of the Sphere a century before Ge
Hong provided a physical instrument to visualize and predict celestial
movements. Various rings were attached to the center of the sphere on
which to designate celestial bodies. Just as modern astronomy requires a
timing mechanism to keep precise time for astronomical instruments, the
Sphere works with a timing vessel called ke lou , which is a water clock
that measures time with water drips (Figures 8.3, 8.4). The vessel usually
contains a group of containers that are arranged in stages by fixing them
at varied heights. Time is measured by reading the amount of drip water
as cumulated on a continuous scale. The same principle of gravity is used
to power the sphere. Water constantly flowing from a fixed height provides
a defined and constant hydraulic force to move the instrument at a stable
speed. The Sphere enabled the imperial astronomers Zhang Heng and Lu
Gongji to calculate and predict the movement of constellations
accurately and to examine the appearance and disappearance of celestial
bodies.
Ge Hong writes:

The copper armillary sphere is placed in a secret chamber and powered

by flowing water. An operator is asked to sing a chant inside the cham-
ber with the door closed. He would inform the observer on the tower
according to the superposition of the instrument that so-and-so star
begins to appear, moves to the center above, and disappears. Two move-
ments [of the constellations and of the Sphere] are perfectly matched
just like two matching talismans [hefu ]. The inscription by Cui
Ziyu has praised the achievement: Arithmetic has explained
the truth of the cosmos. The crafted sphere matches Natures own mak-
ing. Excellent ability and marvelous skill have brought humans and
divines together. (AT 281)

The passage shows Ge Hongs precise knowledge of how the instrument

works in accordance with the theory. The first half of the passage provides
crucial information about the operation of the Sphere. The Sphere in this
passage must be larger in size than the later models shown in the illustra-
 the one195

Fig. 8.3. The Armillary Sphere and the water clock: An eleventh-century
reproduction of the Sphere (left); a seventh-century water clock with five stages
(right). (Reproduced with the permission of the Needham Research Institute
from Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1959], vol. 3, 350, 325)

tions. Ge Hong indicates that there is an isolated chamber below in which

an operator can stand with the door closed and a tower above on which
an observer looks at the sky. The central feature of the operation is the
synchronization of the celestial and the instrumental movements. Ge Hong
even emphasizes that the operator inside the closed chamber rather than
the observer on the tower announces the approach of a particular star.
The second half of the passage reveals Ge Hongs own thought. His
instrumental alchemy runs a parallel course with Zhang Hengs empirical
astronomy. Like Zhang Heng, he believes the changing phenomena of
Nature conceal universal principles. The movements of the macrocosm
can be artificially reproduced in a microcosmic instrument. The Sphere is
an instrumental egg. It brings celestial changes and the theory of changes
196 comparative ontology

Fig. 8.4. A pictorial reconstruction of the astronomical clock tower built by Su

Song (10201101) and his collaborators at Kaifeng in Hunan Province
in 1090. The clock combines three main instruments: an armillary sphere on the
top platform, a celestial globe in the upper story, and the clock driven by water-
wheel in the lower chamber. (Original drawing by John Christiansen, reproduced
with the permission of the Needham Research Institute from Joseph Needham,
Heavenly Clockwork: The Great Astronomical Clocks of Medieval China [Cambridge: The
Antiquarian Horological Society at the University Press, 1960], opening page)

together by creating a match. Ge Hong uses a rather unique Daoist term

two matching talismansto pinpoint the essence of natural study. Tal-
ismans (fu ) are believed to be divine inscriptions written in the sky
as astronomical patterns. Ge Hong says, Talismans came from the Lord
Lao [the divinized Laozi]. They all refer to astronomy [tianwen ] (IC
335).16
 the one197

Here the key word is matching. To create a match means to recapture

divine signatures with human knowledge of them. Astronomical phenom-
ena contain divine signatures, whereas the artificial Sphere displays empir-
ical knowledge of Nature by matching instrumental changes with Natures
own changing course. In Ge Hongs words, To correspond [artificial] pat-
terns with [celestial] realities, no other device works more precisely than
the instrument of the Huntian model (AT 281).17
The idea of correspondence exemplified in the word yan speaks
for Ge Hongs empiricism. Unlike modern scientific empiricism that seeks
explicit proof(s) for a hypothetical theory, Ge Hongs empiricism mainly
referred to correspondence between theory and reality. For him, corre-
spondence with movements observable in the macrocosm is an impor-
tant element in natural study. An attempt to prove the geocentric theory
through instrumental means (which may be an implicit feature), however,
is not directly evident in this text. What is evident is the belief that theory
and reality must correspond just like two matching talismans.
Here two types of fu are selected to show diversity as well as similarity.
The top part of Figure 8.5 shows a map of constellations. The celestial
inscriptions represent how certain constellations appear at a particular
time and are observed from a specific viewing degree. At the lower right
is a group of divine inscriptions in seal script characters. The lower left
shows a Daoist checking time on the gnomon. This illustrates the motif of
matching talismans. In this case, what is to be matched is invisible.

Cyclical Time
What is common to the cosmic egg and the instrumental egg is change.
Zhang Heng has an instrument of changethe Armillary Sphere; Ge
Hong also has an instrument of changethe alchemical crucible. Heav-
enly truths are manifested through the change in the likeness of a rotating
wheel. The key word rotation or turning (zhuan ) is exactly the same
word used to describe the number of cycles of change in instrumental
alchemy. By ascertaining circular changes, the alchemical vessel assimilates
the process of change in Nature. The Sphere recapitulates celestial pat-
terns of rotation; the cycles of alchemical change make alchemical prin-
ciples perceptible.
For Ge Hong there is an intrinsic connection between astronomy and
alchemy. The connection is change. Because the world is made of Qi, it
turns the Twenty-Eight Constellations in motion (IC 1) and moves the
circle of seasonal change on earth (IC 323). It also enables the alchemi-
cal rotation such that lead is white, but by the change of becoming red
it turns into cinnabar; cinnabar is red, but by the process of whitening it
Fig. 8.5. Heavenly inscriptions: A map of constellations (tianwen ) (above);
a Daoist reading the gnomon (below left); a group of divine inscriptions (fu )
(below right). (The first two illustrations are reproduced with the permission of
the Needham Research Institute from Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in
China, vol. 3 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 277, 306]. The last
one is a group of talismans in Ge Hongs Inner Chapters [311, 314] rewritten in
calligraphy by the author)
 the one199

becomes lead (IC 284). The astronomical instrument and the alchemical
vessel explore the same origin of the changes, by a similar instrumental
method to assimilate change. Like the astronomical instrument of change,
the alchemical vessel is a miniature of the cosmic egg. By reenacting the
cosmic egg, which is potently awakening, it too becomes an alchemical egg
in which Qi is spontaneously in the making through cyclical reconstruc-
tion of matter. The crucial part of the assimilation is the knowledge of what
governs changes. Alchemical principles inhere inside the crucible where
matter is decomposed and recomposed. But to unveil these principles,
alchemists must know how to create rotation.
Rotation is motion through time. Unlike modern time, which is an
abstract concept, for the ancient Chinese time is filled with material changes.
Therefore, time is a concrete process. For astronomers, the Sphere is a time
mechanism. It correlates celestial time with its internal clockthe timing
vesselregulated by water. The essence of time is change. For alchemists,
time is also measured by the number of cycles. But the timing of each cycle
is the most secret part of compounding elixirs. It is regulated not by the flux-
ing water, but by the changing fire. Minerals and metals can neither yield
changing phenomena, nor can they produce elixirs, unless the regulation
of fire is done under the specific timing measured in cycles. The growth of
new matter has its internal clock too. And this clock is artificially re-created
by the regulation of fire, with which elixirs are refined and linked to sote-
riological effects, which are also related to time. Similar to the cosmic vessel
with the sun and the moon to display circular time in the heavens, com-
parable to the earthly vessel with seasonal changes to display earthly time,
the alchemical vessel incubates the growth of matter by inserting circular
timethe material time represented by elixirsinto the decomposition
and recomposition of matter. What the insertion of time achieves is change
at an accelerated speed. But no matter whether time is at a natural rate or
an accelerated speed, the essence of time is still observable change.
Against the alchemical unity of change, there is a methodological ques-
tion here. We can ask Needham and scientifically minded Daoist scholars
a one and many question. Could Qi be a unity for astronomy, alchemy,
and medicine that have been understood separately because of scientific
categorizations? Insofar as the astronomy-alchemy comparison has been
viewed through the OM perspective, no matter whether the means of natu-
ral study is astronomical or alchemical, the common subject is change.
Ge Hong did not explain change in plural contexts by distinguishing
astronomical change and alchemical change as two categories of material
change. Rather, he envisioned that change itself was essentially a unity.
Change is the irreducible reality of cosmic life.
200 comparative ontology

The unity in the astronomical sense is the Qi that supports and turns
the wheel of celestial phenomena. The unity in the alchemical sense is the
Qi that shapes and reshapes matter. But both forms of Qi are material in
nature, just as the cyclic time. It brings matter and form together into a
natural bond that has potency of its own. And this material unity of matter
and form is called by alchemists dan elixir. The material essence, which
has been incubated out of the alchemical egg, shares the same potency as
the Qi in the cosmic egg. The Sphere gives a visible expression to the one
and the many in astronomical theory. The alchemical crucible gives Ge
Hongs alchemical OM theory a laboratory instrument. The Sphere stud-
ies Nature in the present process, whereas the alchemical crucible stud-
ies the process of Nature in its original form. The former has shaped the
empirical study of cosmology; the latter has pioneered the instrumental
study of cosmogony. The former aims to know the oneness of the many,
the latter the manyness of the One.

Empiricism: To Match Theory with Reality

Needham is correct on Chinese empiricism. Contrary to Greek theoretical

and geometrical astronomy, which as we shall see shortly is traceable to
Plato, Chinese astronomy participated in a fundamental empiricism.18
In the Jinshu, apart from the short passage on the commentary on the
Sphere, a large portion of Ge Hongs astronomical writings are argu-
ments on empirical issues. Without adequate answers, the Huntian theory
could easily fail to explain reality. This was the way that Ge Hong became
involved in the debate between the Gaitian and Huntian theories. The
debate also indicates that Ge Hongs astronomical study is not simply a
detour from his alchemical tradition. He was immersed in the debate and
defended and advanced geocentrism. The main reason for him to advance
astronomy as an alchemist can be put as simply as his metaphor of two
matching talismans. Idealism hopes to fix realities into a grand unifying
theory. Empiricism aims to combine theory and reality by verifying theory
against reality.

The Shape of the Earth

Is the earth flat or spherical? Zhang Heng wrote in his Lingxian : The
form of the heavens derives from Yang; therefore, it is round and moves.
The form of the earth derives from Yin; it thus appears to be flat and at
rest. This particular passage made the egg theory problematic but consis-
tent with the Confucian orthodoxy of the round heavens and flat earth
worldview. Zhang Hengs compromising acceptance of the orthodoxy cre-
 the one201

ated an ambiguity for the astronomical model historically that still causes
confusion and debate among modern scholars.19
Like many Confucians of his time, Zhang Heng lived in the shadow
of the famous Confucian scholar Dong Zhongshu (179104 BC).
Historically the idea heavens and humans become one (tianren heyi
) has been a shared vision of Confucian and Daoist intellectu-
als. However, it was Dong Zhongshu who first systematized the idea and
transformed it into an even more forceful argument called the induc-
tion between heaven and humanity (tianren ganying ). In his cel-
ebrated work Chunqiu fanlu , Dong said: The Yin Qi of heaven
and earth emerges; subsequently the Yin Qi of humans rises. The rising of
Yin Qi in humans also causes the Yin Qi of the cosmos to emerge. The Dao
is the same (book 13). The argument does not only state that heaven has
profound influences on human existence, but also that humans can influ-
ence the course of heaven. The influence is bidirectional, because humans
and the heaven principles share the same origin in the Dao. Therefore, it
is called induction.
The induction theory had a profound influence on astronomy during
the Jin period. But it also has its limits. In the Astronomical Treatise, the
passage on the five perceptible planets clearly reflects the need to corre-
spond natural phenomena with Confucian ethics. The content is highly
systematized; Table 8.1 provides a summary.20
In the table, the induction theory explains the correspondence between

Table 8.1. The Five Phases and celestial-moral correspondence

in the Astronomical Treatise

Direction Ancient Name Modern Name Five Phases Virtue

East The Year Star Jupiter Wood Kindness

South The Twinkling Star Mars Fire Decency

West The Morning White Venus Metal Honesty

North The Hourly Star Mercury Water Wisdom

Middle The Exorcist Saturn Earth Faith
202 comparative ontology

five planets and four cardinal virtues. The philosophy is clearly the tradi-
tional Yin-Yang and Five Phases system, but further developed by Dong
Zhongshu. Thus five directions, five planets, the Five Phases, and five vir-
tues form a unique system of semi-astrology and semi-astronomy. However,
the purpose of the system is not to explain planetary patterns, but rather
to use cosmic phenomena to explain historical affairs. The core interest is
not natural studies, but ethics.
Viewed against the historical background, it is not difficult to under-
stand why Zhang Hengs astronomy was entangled in and limited by moral-
ity. Contrary to Zhang Hengs ambiguity, Ge Hongs astronomical writing
indicates the abandonment of the flat earth orthodoxy. Consequently
natural studies were freed from the contemporary ethics. The egg model
stood out clearly; heaven and earth were concentric spheres. The correc-
tion from the flat earth to the round earth represents a remarkable
step from ethical astrology to empirical astronomy. This step took nearly
two hundred years to complete, and it was made possible by Zhang Heng
and Ge Hong, who created two instrumental models to study the changing
universe. While many contemporary thinkers still lived in the shadow of
Dongs induction theory, Ge Hong showed no attachment to the lingering
orthodoxy. Instead, his writings continued to focus on empirical matters.

The Problem of Sunset

In the Gaitian theory, heaven rotates like a lid horizontally. This raises
a problem regarding sunset. If the sun rotates with the semispherical
heaven, where does the sun go after dark? According to Wang Chong, a
strong advocate of the old theory, the sun never sets but only horizontally
moves far away toward the North Pole. To understand the argument and
Ge Hongs critique and correction, it is necessary to explain the underly-
ing problems from which Wang Chong is unable to cut loose.
Two versions of the Gaitian theory have been preserved in the Astro-
nomical Treatise. (a) According to the early school called Zhou Bei Jia
, the heavens are round like a lid, the earth is square like a cheese-
board. The heavens rotate just like a millstone turning left. The sun and
the moon rotate right inside of the left-turning heavens. Therefore both
the sun and the moon actually travel eastward while the heavens pull them
westward (AT 279). Modern scholars generally agree that this round
heavens flat earth model was the first stage in the appearance of the
Gaitian theory.21 (b) This early version was superseded by the double-lid
model, one large lid enclosing another small lid. The Astronomical Trea-
tise provides the following description of the second version, attributed
to Cai Yong .
 the one203

Heaven is similar to a bamboo hat, and the earth is like a basin turned
upside down []. Heaven and the earth both are ele-
vated in the middle and low on the periphery. Under the North Pole
is the center of heaven and the earth, where the land is situated at the
highest position; the surrounding land slopes down from the center.
The appearance and disappearance of the sun, the moon, and the stars
determine day and night. On the day of midwinter, the heavens [at the
North Pole] are higher than the outermost barrier-declination-circle
[waiheng ] by 60,000 li .22 The earth under the North Pole is also
higher than its peripheries under the outermost barrier-declination-
circle by 60,000 li. The heavens outermost barrier-declination-circle is
higher than the earth beneath the North Pole by 20,000 li. The heavens
and the earth are like concentric domes with a constant distance of
80,000 li from the sun to the earth. The sun attaches to and shifts with
the heavens. Between the seasons of winter and summer, the movement
of the sun covers the map of seven barriers and six paths [qiheng liujian
].23 The diameter and circumference of each barrier in li can
be calculated according to the similar right triangles [gougu chongcha
] and the shadow lengths of the gnomon; the obtained measure-
ments either far or near can all come from the calculation methods.
Therefore, the methods are called Zhou Bei . (AT 278279)

The text describes the complex Gaitian theory. Modern scholars have
shown a great degree of interest in the mathematical nature of the theory.
Figure 8.6 presents a detailed reconstruction.24 A recent study by Cullen
rightly argues that the primary feature of the theory is to define celestial
time for a functional calendar, and this practical issue has been overlooked
in previous studies.25 Since Ge Hong never disputed the agricultural pur-
pose of the Chinese calendar, we go directly to the astronomical structure
in the Gaitian theory.
Certainly, mathematics had found an important role when the Gaitian
theory was developed. However, for the current purpose, it is only neces-
sary to highlight two features of the text to explain Ge Hongs argument
on the issue of sunset. The main feature is the location of the celestial
axis at the North Pole. The heavenly lid rotates around the axis just like a
turning millstone; the sun also orbits the pole like a circumpolar star that
never sets but illuminates different portions of the earth at different times
of the day. Ge Hong explores the empirical problem. He argues, The sun
rises from the east, moves upwards, sets in the west, and disappears in the
night. The phenomena prove that the sun never goes to the [upward]
North Pole (AT 283).
Fig. 8.6. Reconstruction of the Gaitian theory. (Original drawing by Herbert Chatley; reproduced by permission of
the Needham Research Institute from Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1959], vol. 3, 212)
 the one205

The second feature is the mathematics related to two principles. The

first one derived from the early school of Zhou Bei . In the early part
of the passage, the word bei is given a strained interpretation as gu ,
thigh, gnomon of zhou, which is the second word of the term Gou Gu
the right triangle principle. The gnomon works on this right triangle
principle. 26 The fixed height of the gnomon casts a moving shadow of the
sun on a table with preconfigured points divided in hours. By knowing
the height of the gnomon (A) and the measurable shadow (B), one can
calculate the hypotenuse (C) according to the equation A2 + B 2 =C 2 . An
astronomical hypothesis is hidden in the principle. As the gnomon shows,
the Gaitian theory holds that celestial movements and time are mathemati-
cally connected through the same right triangle principle.
Another principle is the circumference principle c =2r. Based on the
already known value =3.1415926, the Gaitian theory explains the semi-
spherical heaven and earth with the principle of circumference. By placing
the right triangle inside the semispheres, mathematically it becomes pos-
sible to do key calculations about the cosmos based on the right triangle
principle and the circumference principle. The measurements in the text
of the Astronomical Treatise derive from the calculations by applying
both principles to the astronomical structures.27 Certainly the measure-
ments are incorrect. But they betoken a major attempt to explain the cos-
mos mathematically. The attempt is comparable with Platos mathematical
astronomy.
The advance in mathematics it entailed made the Gaitian theory more
appealing to generations of thinkers, including Wang Chong, prior to the
invention of the Armillary Sphere. The theory is certainly sophisticated,
but, as Ge Hong points out, it failed to explain the phenomenon of sun-
set. Wang Chong knew the problem and attempted to solve it. When
the sun appears, it is closer; when it sets, it becomes too far away to be
seen. Thus it appears to have disappeared from the earth (LH 2, On the
Sun, 490491). He further argues: To prove this point, it only requires
a person to hold a torch and walk on a path in the night. This is quite
easy and has no danger. When the torch has moved to less than a mile
away, the light seems to disappear. In fact it does not disappear, but it is
too far away to be seen (LH 2, On the Sun, 491492). The argument
is false. The illusion of disappearing and the fact of disappearing are not
interchangeable.
Ge Hong exposes this fallacy. If the sun does not disappear but only
becomes distant, it should get smaller. But when the sun rises and sets,
it in fact appears to be bigger. Ge Hong certainly did not know that light
traveling through different mediums could cause refraction. But his argu-
206 comparative ontology

ment has a shape point. And it is based on observation, not speculation.

He further says, Wang Chongs supporting example should agree with
what the sun demonstrates. But it actually contradicts the fact; therefore,
it is fallacious (AT 283).
What destroys Wang Chongs argument is another crucial observation
that Ge Hong employs. During sunrise and sunset, the sun changes from a
full circle to a semicircle just like a mirror broken into half horizontally
and then disappears below the horizon. This proves the sun ascends from
the horizon and descends under it. Wang Chongs Gaitian theory could
not explain this basic fact. Wang Chong attempted to refit reality into the
old theory, but the new theory simply explains the phenomenon of sun-
set by viewing the sun as one of many celestial bodies that rotate with the
cosmic wheel.
Ge Hong further points out that the theory can explain eclipses of the
sun and varied shapes of the moon (AT 283). Unfortunately he has not
explained how, but only left a reference. The radius of the sun is mea-
sured in thousands of miles. Its circumference is more than three times
the radius. There are about ten smaller celestial bodies between the sun
and the earth (AT 283). The reference to celestial bodies between the
sun and the earth is the key to explaining eclipses, even though Ge Hong
has not explained it for us. The Huntian theory can explain eclipses as
long as eclipses are viewed as shadows of celestial bodies. A solar eclipse
is the shadow of the moon that moves to the line between the sun and
the earth. And a lunar eclipse is the shadow of the earth in the same line
between the sun and the moon.

The Rotation of Heaven

Zhang Heng argued, The earth floats on water (zaishui erfu ). If
we look at Figure 8.1 at the beginning of this chapter, we can see a prob-
lem. The earth is either a flat plane or a solid sphere floating on water like
a ball. Water occupies the great circle horizontal to the eyes of observers.
According to the theory, the rotation of heaven implies that heaven must
enter into the water and emerge out of it, as do all celestial bodies within
this cosmic wheel. Wang Chong makes his critique by asking: How does
heaven pass through the water? It is absurd (AT 281).
Ge Hong addresses this crucial question by attacking Wang Chongs
preoccupation with the Gaitian theory. The old model did not have the
same problem, because the lid of heaven does not rotate vertically but only
horizontally around the North Pole. However, Ge Hong has made a mis-
guided attack. Wang Chongs question has an empirical point that appears
in his book Arguments Weighed in the Balance. If one digs twelve feet into the
 the one207

earth, water appears. How can heaven travel through this water? It cannot
be true (AT 281).28 The problem becomes more acute for the rising and
setting sun. It seemed that the sun would have to set in the west, go under
the water, and emerge from the east.
Again Wang Chongs argument is problematic based on generaliza-
tion. Underground water does not represent all water. Ge Hong should
have explored this problem and argued that even in the lid model heaven
envelops the water around the earth but does not travel through it. Instead
he addresses the background Yin-Yang philosophy used by Wang Chong.
According to that philosophy, the sun belonged to the positive Yang,
whereas water belonged to the negative Yin. Wang Chong argued that this
order could not be disturbed (LH 2, On the Sun, 500). Ge Hong quoted
a phrase from the Book of Changes and replied with the analogy Heaven is
the dragon. The analogy suggests that the dragon (symbolizing the Yang
of the sun) was able to reach heaven and dive into the water (the sphere
of Yin) (AT 282).
Has Ge Hong answered Wang Chongs question at all? Some mod-
ern scholars mistakenly believe that Ge Hong has avoided the question
completely. 29 But they have overlooked the context of the astronomical
debate. It is already implied that if Wang Chong had followed Ge Hongs
version rather than Zhang Hengs version of the Huntian theory, he would
not even have raised the question. The solution is simple. The problem is
not about heaven going through water, but about the shape of the water.
The argument can be reconstructed.
Wang Chongs attack is based on the old version that has a flat earth
and flat water:

The water is a flat plane on which the earth floats.

Heaven rotates.
Thus heaven must somehow go through water.

Ge Hongs defense was based on the new version that has a spherical
earth and spherical water:

Water is a sphere surrounding the earth.

Heaven rotates.
Thus heaven does not go through water.

These arguments diverge on the premises that set the Gaitian and the
Huntian theories apart. Ge Hong establishes the premise in the first para-
graph of his essay. Heaven forms the shape of an egg. The egg theory has
208 comparative ontology

three spherical layers: heaven, atmospheric water, and the earth, just as
there are three layers in an egg: a yolk, egg white, and eggshell.
The commentator Qiu Guanting of the Five Dynasties period
made these layers geometrically more distinct. The Master Embracing
Simplicity says: Four thousand miles away from the earth, there is the
sphere in which Qi is hard, so celestial bodies do not fall. . . . Heaven
encloses Qi, Qi encloses water, and water encloses the earth. 30 We can
explain the egg theory accordingly.
(A) The center is the spherical earth like a yolk. (B) The middle
layer is the meteorological heaven like egg white. Ge Hong has made the
point explicit by saying, There is water on the inner surface of heaven.
From an earthly point of observation, the inner surface of heaven indicates
the surface of heaven closer to the earth. Wang Chong focuses only on
groundwater and underground water on earth. Ge Hongs heavenly water
is located on the inner surface of heaven as moisture in clouds to gener-
ate rain and snow. (C) The central feature of the geocentric cosmos is the
outer layer of heaven. Ge Hong says: Qi supports heaven and the earth as
they move by carrying water. This supporting Qi in the geometry of the
egg means the outer layer of heaven where the celestial bodies are located.
This three-layer cosmology negates Wang Chongs criticism. Neither
the turning heaven nor any celestial bodies need to enter into water at
all. They never travel through water, but travel through Qi. This is the
essence of the Huntian theory. The theory and the empirical knowledge
of heavens rotation cohere.
There is one more outstanding question. Why does Ge Hong employ
the symbolism of a dragon to defend the theory on another front attacked
by Wang Chongs knowledge of Yin-Yang philosophy? There is a hidden
argument about Qi here. The dragon can go between Yin and Yang: the
symbolism rejects the criticism based on the assumption that the division
between heaven and water cannot be disturbed. The symbolism would
have been clear to ancient ears. The dragon could also symbolize vitality.
Ge Hong describes with regard to inner cultivation that the cosmic Qi is
encircled by dragons and tigers (IC 324). In the cosmological sense the
invisible vigor of universal Qi is made visible through the dragon. Thus the
dragon offers an alternative explanation to the duality of Yin and Yang. Qi
was the formless unity prior to the rising of Yin and Yang. Qi is Ge Hongs
real defense.
The introduction of Qi also invites a crucial question that leads to
another contribution made by Ge Hong. Why do celestial bodies float
in the sky without falling down? Ge Hong says: Qi supports heaven and
earth. The point is later made explicit by Ma Yongqing (1109?) of
 the one209

the Five Dynasties. The master said: Forty li away from the earth, there
is a sphere in which Qi is hard, so celestial bodies do not fall. 31 It can be
inferred that the outer sphere possesses the supportive strength, not the
earth alone, which contains material Qi. Therefore, the reason why the
sun, the moon, the stars, and the planets are supported without falling is
all about this hard Qi [gangqi ]. 32 Modern scholars have pointed out
that Ge Hongs concept of hard Qi had an irreversible impact on later
thinkers. For instance, the renowned Song scholar Zhu Xi argued
that the heaven had nine rotating layers, and celestial bodies moved like
objects in a vortex. 33 Certainly the commentary by Ma Yongqing suggested
a distinction between the hard Qi supporting heaven and the soft Qi in
internal alchemy. No matter whether it is hard or soft, it has the common
feature of being supportive.
It might appear odd to think that the layers of heaven are supported
by Qi. But one can make a comparison with Newtons law of gravity. Prior
to Newtons discovery of gravity, there was no clear explanation as to why
celestial bodies float in the sky by themselves. According to Newtons law,
gravity is associated with mass. As long as material objects are there, gravity
will be there. Gravity functions as a force that brings celestial bodies into
the balanced relationship. In other words, gravity is the internal web of the
material cosmos. But this web attached to nothing, where matter is gravity
also. The theory of supportive Qi can produce a similar answer. In the cos-
mic egg, the web of Qi attached to nothing. As far as celestial bodies exist,
the web of material Qi is there because Qi is the unity of form and matter.
Similar to Newtons gravity between celestial bodies, Qi is the supportive
medium.
Modern scholars have not realized the crucial connection. Ge Hong
neither invented the idea of supportive Qi, nor did he create the cos-
mic egg theory. The concept of universal Qi already existed in the oldest
Xuanye theory. The sun, the moon, and stars naturally float inside form-
lessness. Their movements all depend upon the single Qi (AT 279). Ge
Hong knew the theory. He accepted the idea of Qi and criticized the idea
of heaven-human induction in The Thesis of Heavenly Peace (Antian
lun ) recorded just two pages before his own essay (AT 280).34 He
also partly accepted the egg theory, though he criticized its incomplete-
ness. According to ancient Confucian theory, the body of heaven and
earth is in the shape of a birds egg (AT 285). He accepted the egg theory
shared by both Daoists and Confucians, but he rejected measurements
of the cosmos because for him the cosmos was infinite in the likeness of
Xuan. To put these two points together in their historical setting, Ge Hong
created a hybrid theory, though it is not directly evident in his text. He
210 comparative ontology

kept the essence of the Xuanye theory, namely, the infinite universe. But
he extracted the old mathematical content and inserted the idea of Qi into
this ancient Confucian egg.
What he has achieved is a new life. The cosmic genealogy has been
continued in the new form. The Daoist concept of supportive and soterio-
logical Qi becomes the core of two cosmological models. This Qi has reju-
venated the ancient Confucian egg. In the historical background, where
Daoist heterodoxy lived under the shadow of Han Confucian orthodoxy,
Ge Hong not only turned the tables of argument, but also reconciled the
Xuanye and Huntian theories, one associated with Daoist cosmogony and
the other representing empirical astronomy.
The reconciliation in itself is an argument about cosmic evolution from
one to many. And this argument has already been anticipated in the first
paragraph of the Inner Chapters, where Ge Hong names the infinite Xuan.
Contrary to the Gaitian theory, which calculated the scope of the cosmos
mathematically, Ge Hong never attempted to fit the cosmos into any mea-
surable limits. In the same passage by Ma Yongqing, there is a conclusive
sentence yet to mention. Having been inspired by Ge Hongs hard Qi, the
commentator says, Now I will not believe that there is any definite distance
from the ground to heaven. 35 The cosmological egg is an infinite one.

Natural Studies as Two Matching Talismans

In the Astronomical Treatise Ge Hong recounts the following story to
describe his method of natural studies. Huan Tan (40 BCAD 30)
demonstrated a point to the cosmologist Yang Xiong (53 BCAD 18)
at the Western Gallery of White Tiger Hall during the sunset. As the sun
set in the west, Yang Xiong, with his back facing the sun, could no longer
feel the warmth. Huan Tan then explained, If heaven could be compared
with a millstone turning right [the model of the Gaitian theory], the sun
should turn accordingly, and the light should cast the shadow of this gal-
lery and move gradually eastward but should not fade away. In fact it has
just set. This reality agrees with the geocentric theory whereby the sun
rotates to the other side of the earth (AT 282).
By recounting this story, Ge Hong makes his point vividly. The Gaitian
theory first fitted heaven and earth into the round heavens and square
earth ethical orthodoxy, then used mathematics to explain the cosmos,
as if the entire cosmic structure were determined by two principles. But
both mathematical and ethical models failed to explain the phenomena of
the sun. The geocentric theory, however, exemplified the maturing school
of empiricism that emphasized the correspondence between theory and
reality. On the one hand, it explained astronomical realities. On the other
 the one211

hand, the realities became the criteria of the theory. Theory and reality
formed a balanced tension.
For Ge Hong, the tension can be as simply put as the story. Yang Xiong
could no longer feel the warmth of the sun after the sunset. The Gaitian
theory cannot explain this primary fact away because the fact also veri-
fies whether the theory is true. If the theory is true, then it does not only
explain why one feels the warmth of the sun, but also gives the reality a
coherent expression when the warmth has gone.
The method of two matching talismans contains two OM models:
one intellectual and another empirical. But both are the reflections of
the same reality. That reality is the cosmos. The Huntian theory provides
an intellectual telescope through which one can gaze at the night sky with
a fresh OM lens. Any observer would be impressed by the new theory or
the technological achievement of the Sphere. But what really inspired the
ancient minds were the astronomical phenomena. Cosmological studies
can be impressive and sophisticated. Nonetheless they are approximate
representations of the complex cosmos. No matter how the Huntian the-
ory was advanced at the time, it was still a glimpse of the boundless uni-
verse. Two matching talismans is not a fixed balance. It is creative and
evolving. Every generation has the responsibility to play out the tension by
including new empirical data. The play can be seen through the liturgical
use of talismans that aims to reactivate the fusion between the macro and
the micro in the moment of ritual performance. But through the perfor-
mance, Daoist naturalism is implicitly expressed. Fundamentally natural
studies recapture what has already existed and are at work in Nature. All
that studies can do is to make the hidden reality apparent.
Ge Hongs lifetime empirical study was alchemy, not astronomy. He
believed that Nature follows its own creative accord. The principle of inde-
terminate action seeks no control over Nature. Rather Daoists act like
an astronomical instrument or an alchemical crucible as vessels so that
Nature can display invisible signatures in and through visible means. What
instrumentalism can achieve is rather like an enlightened Daoist adept
who becomes an instrument to animate the creative core of Nature. As
the eulogy quoted by Ge Hong says, Zhang Heng made the Sphere to
animate Natures own making. Likewise, alchemists are not magicians
who give people the illusion of creating something out of nothing. They
are mediators who construct an artificial instrument in which Nature takes
care of the making. What happens inside the reaction chamber is entirely
beyond alchemists control. The only thing that they can control is the
circular time regulated by the cycles of fire that accelerate the cosmic pro-
cess of change. This ethical principle of indeterminate action functions as
212 comparative ontology

the backbone of Daoist empiricism. It radically opens alchemists toward

Nature while they actively work to preserve what Nature unveils in the ves-
sels, which is materialized life, called Qi.

The Creation of the World Soul:

Platos Cosmological Unity

In comparing Qi with Platos World Soul, we face two immediate difficul-

ties. Qi is the evolving life, whereas the World Soul is the rational principle
of the changing world. Qi is material, whereas the Soul is psychological. Qi
is one, whereas the Soul contains three parts. To create a dialogue between
the concepts, we must first work within the conceptual limits through the
texts and then move beyond them.

The Creation of the World Soul

The book Timaeus has been closely studied by ancient and modern schol-
ars, primarily because it represents Platos natural philosophy. Although
the book is written in a mystical genre of theogony, in the past century
scholars have turned their attention to Platos wide-ranging engagements
with pre-Socratic thinkers, especially the mathematical content, which are
enveloped in the arguments on the World Soul and the architecture of
matter. Among the major studies, Cornfords Platos Cosmology remains the
milestone work.36 More recent studies, not all but to a large degree, still
walk in the shadow of Cornfords commentary.37 This is because the com-
mentary has provided many rational explanations regarding this histori-
cally mystical text, which have inspired generations of scholars to compre-
hend Platos natural philosophy yet proven to be resilient to the efforts
at demythologization. My study, therefore, engages with Cornfords scien-
tific interpretation but attempts to prove that many aspects of his rational
explanation are actually false, even though they appear to be self-explana-
tory. On this basis, I offer a Daoist evaluation with the premise that ancient
and modern cosmological studies are not meant to be a representation of
the universe but an approximation of it.
Against pre-Socratic materialism, Platos doctrine of creation is the full-
scale elaboration of his idealism. The Demiurge personifies immaterial
Reason as the cosmogonical One. The precosmos was in a state of flux
and had no homogeneity or balance to fill the chaotic space (52e). Prior
to the creation, the elements were disorderly in a dreaming state unorga-
nized and disjointed with eternal Forms. Similar to a human craftsman
standing before a pile of disorderly materials, the Demiurge took over
the discordant and unordered motions (30a) and once for all organized
 the one213

the elements according to Forms. Out of this divine act, the first born out
of Reason was the World Soul. By implanting Reason in the Soul (30b),
the world was virtually awakened by the divine mind. In the likeness of
the creator, the Soul was created as the living being (30c).
Platos Reason and Soul stand for the continuity between cosmogony
and cosmology, which is comparable to Ge Hongs Qi that carries the con-
tinuity between the precosmic egg and the egg of the current universe.
Reason is comparable with the creative Qi in the precosmic egg, whereas
the Soul is comparable with the Qi supporting the living universe. How-
ever, the key difference is the emphasis. Ge Hong uses the single word
Qi to highlight the continuity between cosmogony and cosmology. The
discontinuity is articulated in terms of the genealogical difference between
the ancestor and his progenies. Plato employs the logic of causality to
emphasize the discontinuity between Reason and the Soul, the creator and
the created. The continuity, in contrast, is expressed through the word
likeness. Although the Soul is created in the likeness of Reason, it is
nonetheless the visible living being of the invisible Reason. The conti-
nuity of likeness comes as the determinative act of the creator to infuse
intelligence into the created.
Another comparative issue more relevant to Plato is the tension of
motion and rest. Since Qi is always evolving, what is at rest is therefore
in relation to the mother Xuan. Qi inheres within the world and remains
to be the inner drive to turn the wheel of change. Similarly the Soul is
the moving image of the resting Reason. Plato says, The god created a
single visible living being, containing within itself all living beings of the
same natural order (30d) and established a single spherical universe in
circular motion according to the order of the Soul. Compared with Qi,
the Soul also is accountable for the unifying order to move the universe
in circular motionthe astronomical sign of life. However, beyond this
similarity, once more an ontological question is concealed. Is the rest truly
at rest while it causes motion? From the perspective of evolutionary Qi, it
moves; therefore it moves others. Can Platos Soul bridge the distinction
between unchanging Reason and the changing world?

The Structure of the Soul

Prior to the creation of the material universe, the Demiurge first created
the Soul and made it the dominating and controlling partner of the
body (34c). Using the metaphor of a blacksmith making a model, the mak-
ing of the Soul is described as a mechanical process to craft various parts
into a structural universe. First a long strip was cut into two narrow strips
214 comparative ontology

(36b). One strip was folded into a large ring and became the outer ring to
allocate fixed stars. Another strip was bent into a smaller ring and formed
the inner ring to accommodate moving planets (38c). Plato calls the first
ring Sameness and the second ring Difference (35a). Out of these two pri-
mary realities, the craftsman smelted the two and then produced a third
alloy reality called Existence (35a). Later the craftsman subdivided the
second strip Difference into seven unequal parts to form different orbits
for the sun and the moon and the five known planets (38c39e).

Mathematics and Astronomy

Plato warns early in the discourse that any cosmological study is merely
a likely story (29c). The account of the making of the Soul is also an
approximate account conditioned by the astronomical knowledge known
to him. Plato may have had an armillary sphere in mind. What the divine
blacksmith builds is a three-ring sphere with visible patterns to recapitu-
late invisible orbits. But the real content of the sphere is astronomy and is
presented within the discourse of creation. Thus the creation of the Soul
and the making of the sphere have been told as a single story. The Soul
is made of two primary stuffs: Sameness and Difference. They correspond
to two primordial causes: the always-same-Reason and the always-different-
Necessity. The third part of the Soul is the alloy called Existence, which is
smelted out of Sameness and Difference. But the divine craftsman did not
stop there. He went on to make subdivisions like a Pythagorean mathema-
tician; hence each portion of the Soul contained a mixture of Sameness,
Difference, and Being (35b).
Plato explicitly tells readers Sameness is made for the placements of
countless fixed stars and Difference for moving planets and, most obvious
of all, the sun and the moon. But Plato does not define the concept of
Existence. Without the help of astronomical knowledge from later peri-
ods, Existence is intangible just by looking at the text (35a39e). We are
told that Existence intermediates Sameness and Difference. But what does
it mean in astronomy?
Ancient and modern commentators have spread much ink on the
issue,38 but Existence remains one of many uninstructive notions in the
book. The chief difficulty in understanding Existence is the metaphori-
cal arrangement. The text mixes metaphors to generate a mystical genre,
yet the exchange of metaphors becomes too complex to follow. Readers
are led by the metaphor of building an armillary sphere, which seems to
be the direction of Platos argument on the structure of the cosmos. But
the key to understanding Existence lies somewhere else. The discourse of
time-eternity carries the same metaphor. The motif that the Soul is the
 the one215

moving Being of eternal Reason is echoed in the definition of timethe

moving image of eternity (37d).
The creation of time (37c38c) is one of Platos creative and influential
ideas. There was no time prior to the creation, only eternity. Time is cre-
ated together with the world. By implication, the world did not exist before
time but always exists in time. Since the world is created, it is also finite.
Contrary to Ge Hongs infinite universe, Platos finite universe is viewed
against its relation with the creators mindReason. Even the Soul cannot
be eternal because it is created.
Existence is similar to time. Time is neither Sameness nor Difference.
It is a composite of both. As the moving image of the eternity, time has an
imperceptible existence. Existence also has an imperceptible pattern only
demonstrable on the armillary sphere as the second ring. Its astronomical
reality is shown through the planetary movements and the rising and fall-
ing of the sun and the moon.
The definition of time refers to the astronomical clock made of celestial
bodies in motion. Existence represents the astronomical clock intermediat-
ing Sameness and Difference, and changes unstoppably as long as the celes-
tial bodies move. The planets are located in the inner ring of Difference
close to the earththe center of the geocentric worldview. Their planetary
movements form a clock located in the invisible second ring of Existence.
The motions are unsynchronized, but they collectively manifest time that is
synchronized with the pattern of Existence rotating around eternity. Time,
which is manifested through the planetary rotations on the ring of Differ-
ence, contains the change of was, is, and will be. However, its essence
is not defined by Difference but by Sameness. This is why Plato depicts time
as a moving circle around the eternal center. Its essence is the isthe
presentin relation to eternity. We should only say [time] is, reversing was
and will be for the process of change in time: for both are motions (38a).
What is this is for Existence? Time is the model of Existence, similar to
the measurability of time according to the circular motions of the planets,
Existence contains a measurable principle. Circular time and the second
ring of Existence exemplify the same eternity and share the same princi-
ple as the Soulequidistance from the center. The distinction between
Sameness and Existence lies in the mediating nature of Existence, which
influences the celestial bodies in the ring of Difference. In the principle
c=2r, the equidistant radius is a variable. Each orbit of the five planetary
movements differs from the others because each has a different radius.
But each one has a common sameness because different orbits connect to
the same axis presumably defined by Sameness. Existence, therefore, is a
collective notion for invisible orbits.
216 comparative ontology

There is an empirical problem in Platos three-ring astronomy. Where

are the two points that define the celestial axis? The circles cannot simply
rotate around the earth. In solid geometry, these circles represent orbits,
and orbits are planes. For planes to rotate requires an axis, not a point.
Therefore, to build an armillary sphere, the chief difficulty actually is to
define the axis running through the center (the earth). Chinese astron-
omy defines the axis with the converging point of the Constellations. The
other point is the earth. Plato, however, has never stated what constella-
tions actually define the axis.
Commentators like Taylor and Cornford have overlooked this empiri-
cal point on which the theory that the armillary sphere is the Souls
model depends. Without the axis, the divine blacksmith simply cannot
build an armillary sphere; even if three rings have been crafted, there is
nowhere for them to join. The real challenge for the divine blacksmith is
where he is going to look for these points in the sky. Apart from the obser-
vation point on earth, only one point permanently located on the outer
ring is required to define the axis. But there are countless fixed stars on
the outer ring of Sameness. Which one is the defining point? Plato dem-
onstrates no knowledge of navigation by the stars, nor does he mention
any gods belonging to Greek mythology. Although he mentions the Good
here and there, unlike Ge Hongs astronomical location of Xuan, Plato
has never identified a celestial location for the Good. Possibly he was not
even aware of the problem. He was too occupied with the mathematical
Form of equidistance from the center to realize the empirical challenge
ahead.

Cosmology and Ethics

Apart from its mathematical nature, the Souls structure shares a similar-
ity with human souls. The human soul consists of three elements (41d),
and the World Soul also has three parts. The parts are arranged in a psy-
chological hierarchy and explained in two contexts of forming a whole:
physiology and astronomy.

Physiology Astronomy
Head rational part Outer ring Sameness
Heart emotional part Middle ring Existence
Belly appetitive part Inner ring Difference

Sameness corresponds to the rational part of the human soul that is

located in the head. Difference is comparable with the appetitive part
located in the belly. Existence associates with the emotional part in the
 the one217

heart. Desire and emotion in human souls subordinate to rationality.

Likewise the World Soul demonstrates the rule of Reason over celestial
bodies. The correspondence of the cosmic Soul and human souls recalls
Platos doctrine of immortal souls. In the Phaedrus, he argues that the
human soul is the identity of human existence.39 The harmonious, immor-
tal, and self-generating aspects of the soul form the ethical unity of virtues.
All these attributes also belong to the Would Soul in the Timaeus, except
the World Soul and human souls are created.
The creation of the Soul sets the stage for the creation of the human
soul. By writing about the creation of the Soul, Plato virtually repeats the
same ethics but elevates it to theogony. What harmonizes the cosmos is
exactly the same substance of human rationality. In Platos words, human
souls are made from the same mixing bowl in which he had mixed and
blended the soul of the universe (41d). In this same bowl of substance,
Plato finds an intrinsic connection that makes the world intelligible to
human minds. Apart from the continuity, Plato clearly identifies a cru-
cial discontinuity. The Demiurge infuses Reason into the mixture of three
parts of the Soul to realize the purpose of Good.
Interestingly, the Soul does not have an original sin. It exemplifies
the perfect Good without any internal rebellions from Difference and
Existence. But human souls can commit evil deeds against their rational
will. To maintain psychological harmony is always a challenge for humans,
as if a charioteer rides a wagon pulled by two horses running in different
directions (Phaedrus 246a). In the Timaeus, Plato attributes this constant
struggle, or original sin, to careless gods. Gods were created first. They
were given the task of framing the human body to contain the human soul.
Unlike the soul, which was the handiwork of the Demiurge himself (41c),
building the frame of the body was assigned to inferior gods. Those care-
less gods, according to Plato, are responsible for the genetic defects of the
human body. Having learned a lesson, or perhaps because it was too big
a project for the gods, the Demiurge took the responsibility to shape the
body of the universe himself. Hence, heavenly movements follow the exact
order of the Soul. Here the theology seems to have explained the harmony
of the natural world, but it has failed to explain the existence of Necessity
in the created world.
Ge Hong would agree with Plato on the continuity argument. Insofar
as Daoist soteriology is concerned, the human body is created as perfect
as the cosmos, both of which are capable of becoming vessels to harbor
creative life of Qi. The cosmic life (or the World Soul) and human life
(or the human soul) are intrinsically alike because they derive from the
same origin. The connection between the cosmos and ethics is funda-
218 comparative ontology

mental because it is the fusion between the One and the many. In every
single human, there inheres an element of cosmic origin. For Ge Hong it
is called Qi. For Plato, in every human being there is an element of the
divine infused by creative Reason. It rests upon the continuity between
Reason and rational minds, which Plato calls it Sameness.
But Platos correspondence between the World Soul and the human
soul falls short in answering the question why humans alone can possess
the rational aspects of life. For Ge Hong, humans are gifted to understand
Qi, but Qi is universally present in the world, in herbs, animals, and miner-
als. In every creature there is an intrinsic nature of Qi. Do humans alone
have souls that resemble the cosmic Soul? Does humanity alone have a
monopoly on cosmic lifethe gene traceable to the creator? For Plato,
the human soul alone has the intrinsic nature of Reason. Crafted beds,
beautiful roses, and geometrically shaped objects have no intrinsic nature.
Because Forms are ontologically independent, independence rejects there
being a Form in the likeness of the soul, which is both immanent and
composite.
Why cannot the soul have the same transcendence as Forms? It is sim-
ply because the body must be ensouled to be alive; likewise the body can-
not exist without the mind. If the Soul designates the unity of the worlds
body, it implies that the Soul must be immanent in the body. If the Soul
had the ontological independence of Forms, then the absolute transcen-
dence would make the body of the universe soulless, or the Soul disembod-
ied. Therefore, it is right to call the vitality of the universe the Soul and
not a Form. Plato has already arrived at this point, when he argues that the
Soul, as the self-mover, is the ultimate cause of motion and moves celestial
bodies. But he cannot stay away from the Pythagorean kind of mathemati-
cal Forms, so he assigns the mathematical equation c = 2r to the Soul to
be the Form of the Soul. From here onwards, a problem begins to unfold.
Does this mean that this mathematic Form becomes immanent in the
world through the Soul? If it does, Plato suggests that Forms can be imma-
nent. In fact they have to be immanentwe will see why shortly. If so, he
would have turned away from the theory of transcendental Forms. Daoism
would regard the move actually as a remarkable effort to close the gap
between the one and the many, which have previously been kept apart by
the division of being and becoming.

The OM Argument
To understand the OM argument in the Soul, we need to demonstrate
some distinctions between Forms and the Soul. Cornford has shown that
the three parts of the Soul correspond to three attributes of Forms. Same-
 the one219

ness: a Form is the same as itself or being itself. Difference: it is different

from any other Form. Existence: it exists as a being.40 Cornfords compari-
son is actually misleading.
The Would Soul cannot be one of the Forms, no matter how similar the
rational part of the Soul is in comparison with Forms. The Soul is a created
composite that changes through the body of the universe. A Form is an
uncreated numerical One that does not change under any circumstances.
The Soul can be traced back to the theology of the historical Pythagoras,
to which Plato adds algebra and geometry developed by the contemporary
Pythagorean School. The former is the schema; the later is its contents.
Cornfords comparison only draws the parallel between Forms and the
rational part of the Soul. Clearly the Soul is not absolutely rational. Similar
to two irrational parts of human souls desire and emotion, the cosmic Soul
contains Difference and the indeterminate Existence that are not reduc-
ible to Reason, but traceable to Necessity. In particular, the earth, which
occupies the center of the geocentric universe, represents the most turbu-
lent realm of change in the whole cosmos.
The misleading comparison comes from Cornfords own categori-
zation. He misleads himself because two sets of concepts are secretly
exchanged. The three elements of Forms are only attributes, but not com-
ponents. Socrates is himself; he is different from others; he exists. These
are three attributes of Socrates but not three components of him. There-
fore, the Soul cannot be compared with Forms simply by replacing compo-
nents with attributes. This is the fallacy of distribution.
The meaningful question is why Plato does not simply make the Soul a
Form. According to the Neoplatonist Proclus (411485 CE), the Soul is an
intermediate entity because Existence has three parts: (a) intelligible
and ungenerated things; (b) perceptible and generated things; (c) inter-
mediate things that are intelligible and generated. 41 The intelligible part
is not indivisible and noncomposite; hence it is ungenerated. The percep-
tible part is composite and divisible, hence generated. The intermediating
part is both intelligible and generated, both indivisible and divisible, both
simple and composite. The intermediation runs the course of Sameness,
Existence, and Difference. What Proclus has interpreted basically gives a
new meaning to the ambiguous notion called the divided and bound
three portions (36e). Therefore, the chief function of the Soul is media-
tion. And the mediation closes the gap between the uncreated and the
created, the eternal singularity of the creator and the transitory plurality
in the world.
Proclus Neoplatonist interpretation also alters Platos position. The
idea of mediation represents a different OM argument from the One Over
220 comparative ontology

Many of Forms. Forms are ideal causes, whereas sensibles are created as
physical copies of Forms. They belong to two separate orders of being
and becoming. But nothing mediates the never-changing causes and
ever-changing caused. Through the mediation of the Soul, however, Pro-
clus interpretation intends to close the Parmenidean gap in Platonism.
This remarkable shift does not exist in the Republic. Even the prologue of
Timaeus states that the paradigm of Being/Becoming is the condition that
the Demiurge has to work with.
Why does Proclus modify the model/copy paradigm on behalf of
Plato? If planetary motions display a celestial clock, then time must be
immanent in the motions, so that times was, is, and will be become
perceptible through astronomical observation. This is exactly the same
dilemma as having immanent Forms. Ethical Forms ( Justice, Beauty,
Good) must be personified in a persons life in order for the virtues to
be perceptible through bodily behaviors. What stops Plato from accept-
ing the immanence is the combined influence of Parmenidean ontology
and Pythagorean mathematics. The being without not-being ontology
prohibits Forms to be entangled in the Becoming. Two equal sticks can
be destroyed, but the algebraic equality remains transcendental of the
objects. This is idealism. But the dilemma is equally powerful. To be the
ultimate cause of motion, the Soul cannot enjoy the transcendent state
as Forms but must be entangled in becoming. To solve the problem that
is entangled in, yet unaffected by, Becoming, the solution does not come
from mathematics, but from ethics. The Soul must hold all three elements
together in harmony to exemplify the purpose of creationthe Good. The
only way to hold them together is to coordinate the three parts, similar to
the philosophical charioteer in the Phaedrus who coordinates two winged
horses with the skill to keep them from breaking their wings because of
conflict between them.
The core argument of Proclus is basically intermediation. It is the same
argument in the intermediation of Qi between the One and the many.
The coordination among the three parts of the Soul speaks for a relational
ontology other than a causal ontology. Proclus interpretation also shifts
the ontological ground on behalf of Plato. Plato wants to prioritize math-
ematical Forms over the Soul in the text, but Proclus, with Aristotelian
criticism in mind, hopes to insert the neglected issue of mediation back
into Platos ontology. From a Daoist point of view, this is the right move to
solve the OM problem.
The World Soul is an attempt to reconcile the Parmenidean gap of
Being and Becoming. Created to be the sole copy of the eternal model, the
Soul becomes the only model identity according to which the body of the
 the one221

universe is further constructed. The Soul, therefore, mediates Forms and

sensibles. This capacity of intermediation is already implied in the Repub-
lics discussion of the ethical soul. Human souls are inborn with the natu-
ral capacity to engage rational thought; the divine logos functions as the
induction between human beings and transcendental Forms. To accept
that the human soul is composed of three parts inevitably leads to the con-
sequence that the soul is both transcendent and immanent. On the one
hand, the rational part incarnates the uncreated logos so that human souls
are transcendental in this regard. On the other hand, both emotional and
desiring parts are closely associated with the body. They keep human souls
embodied. It is this capacity of embodiment that enables the Soul to medi-
ate Forms and sensibles.
The creation of the Soul carries the chief motif of incarnation. For
gods purpose was to use as his model the highest and most completely
perfect of intelligible things, and so he created a single visible living being,
containing within itself all living beings of the same natural order (31a).
By the virtue of incarnation, the Soul then becomes the self-mover that
moves the sun and the moon and the five planets.
It should be recognized that, as in the paradox of Qi, the Soul also con-
tains a paradoxical identity: both uncreated and created. In the Phaedrus
and Laws X the Soul has been clearly identified as the self-mover, which
is the uncreated cause of all things. In other words, it is the creator. But
in the Timaeus the Soul is the created. How does Plato explain the para-
dox of created and uncreated? It is not directly explained, but indirectly
implied in a relation scheme of the divine modelthe Soulphysical
motions. The Soul incarnates the divine model as a living being; it then
becomes the cause of all motions. Plato certainly has this mediating status
in his mind when he says, The maker implanted reason in soul and soul in
body. Such a relational paradox is similar to the paradox of Qi.
From Ge Hongs perspective, Qi as the fetus of Xuan is created, but Qi
is the creator for the myriad things because the creativity of Xuan unfolds
in Qi. Likewise individual life is of course created, but the essence of life,
which derives from Dao, is uncreated. Therefore, individual life is like Qi
containing within itself the paradox of uncreated and created. For Dao-
ism this paradox is not just a given status of the world inhered through
the act of creating the World Soul. It is a process. Life evolves through
the discourse of embodying uncreated inherence from the ancestor but
unfolds the created and creative features of diversity through genealogical
changes. On the contrary Plato consistently uses the analogy of model
and copy to explain the creation of the Soul. This is the rule of the game
that the Demiurge must obey. He has made one copy and rested.
222 comparative ontology

The Mathematics of the Soul

Prior to Plato, the pre-Socratic Pythagoras in Italy argued for pluralist

immaterialism. Some Pythagorean followers later settled in Greece and
developed the doctrine all things are irreducibly numbers. According
to Aristotles recollection, Pythagoreans argued, Numbers appeared to
be the first things in nature as a whole (Metaphysics 985b24) and held the
cosmology of the infinite universe corresponded to unlimited numbers
(Physics 203a). The Pythagorean tendency evidently has surfaced in the
Timaeus. 42 Plato first rejects the notion of the infinite universe by the argu-
ment that the Soul was created. Then he applies mathematics to astron-
omy. Platos tactic is to envelop the Pythagorean influence within the argu-
ment for the Soul. The Soul has mathematical structure and content. And
the content is demonstrable with a principle of division. Plato writes: First
he took one portion [1] from the whole and next a portion double this
[2]; the third half as much again as the second and three times the first
[3]; the fourth double the second [4]; the fifth three times the third [9];
the sixth eight times the first [8]; and the seventh twenty-seven times the
first [27] (35bc).
Various ancient commentators have closely examined the passage and
concluded that the divine project of division is actually about numbers.
Arranged into two distinct groups, they yield the pattern of being odd and
even numbers, the Pythagorean pattern that Aristotle already had pointed
out (Metaphysics 986a). According to Cornfords study, these numbers can
be arranged as in Figure 8.7 (as shown on p. 226): 1, 2, 4, 8 represent the
numerical evens and 1, 3, 9, 27 the odds.43
Cornfords interpretation reveals an idea of Plato that has influenced
astronomy until modern times. It is the hypothesis that the universe is
ruled by orderly truths, and the truths are mathematically demonstrable.
Cornford even goes the extra distance to show that the numbers can be
played out as musical concords.44 But his commentary has not come to
terms with a hidden OM argument in the passage.
The OM argument is basically a principle of division. In order to
explain the change from one to many associated with numbers, we can
explain the above two arms in Figure 8.7 with exponential equations. The
left arm is the side of the odds: 2 n =1,2,4,8 (n= 03). The right arm is the
side of evens: 3n =1,3,9,27 (n=03). As a way to advance the OM analysis,
we can ask three questions about the numbers: (a) Why does n not exceed
3, instead of having infinite extension? (b) Why is 1 the primary number
for both evens and odds? (c) Why is the number 0 excluded from the
universal structure?
 the one223

Zero to Three
Ancient commentators answered the first question. Plato aims to explain
the mathematical structure of the Soul in terms of solid geometry. The
reason for stopping at the cube is that the cube symbolizes body in three
dimensions. 45 The Soul is a three-dimensional sphere equidistant in all
directions from the center (34a). The body of the universe is built three
dimensional because the Souls determinate order is diffused through
the whole and enclosed body (34b). In descending order, n = 2 refers to
plane geometry; n=1 becomes arithmetically the primary even 2 and the
odd 3. In algebra, of course, 3 is not the primary odd, but 1.
Corresponding to the building of the astronomic model by the divine
blacksmith, Plato gives the spatial characterises of arithmetic numbers.
The condition n =13 summarizes the move from arithmetic numbers to
planes and from planes to solids. It seems Plato has brilliantly managed
to adopt all three Pythagorean ideas in the principle of division. (A) The
world is made of numbers. (B) Numbers can be divided into two different
groups: even and odd. (C) Geometry is explainable with numbers. How-
ever, if we have a closer look at the numbers involved in division, there are
some inconsistencies.
When n equals 0, 2n and 3n produce the common root number 1.
The Soul is a unity of Sameness symbolized by the numerical one. When n
equals 1, they yield the even 2 and the odd 3. The numbers can be divided
into two contrary groups. When n equals 2, there come 4 and 9. They
symbolize plane geometry. The numbers 4 and 9 could be the area of a
square with bases of 2 and 3 respectively. But the square is only one of
many planes. Why are circles and triangles not included? When n equals 3,
8 and 27 appear. They symbolize solid geometry. But 8 and 27 are only the
volumes of the cubes with bases of 2 and 3. Why are pyramid, sphere, and
other solids not included? Does Plato suggest that squares and cubes are
primaries of all planes and solids respectively? But we have been told: the
Soul fundamentally is a sphere. Unless Plato can show an inscribed circle
in a square and an inscribed sphere in a cube, there is no direct correspon-
dence between the numbers and the Soul. The numbers become symbolic
to express the Pythagorean tendency.

The Primary 1
The second question is an explicit OM question. Why is 1 the primary
number for both even and odd numbers? For Plato, the numerical 1 has
a higher order than any other number. The numerical one is indivisible,
irreducible, and the root number. These characters only Forms can pos-
224 comparative ontology

sess. They correspond to three attributes of Forms: they are noncompos-

ite, unique beings, and causal universals. As Plato defines it, the odd 3
derives from the root number 1 as the result of three times the first,
the even 2 as double the first. In fact, all numbers in the passage derive
from the root number 1. Figure 8.7 shows that both arms converge into
the same origin. The numerical 1 carries metaphorical meaning as the
root cause of the Soul and symbolizes the singularity of Reason personified
by the divine maker. Of course, exponential equations were not available
in Platos time. But the structure of 1 over many even and odd numbers
shares the same ontological premise as one over many in the doctrine of
Forms. In the diagram, the divine project of transforming 1 to the many
evens and odds also symbolizes the creative order of from one to many.
To arrive at the real sense of the OM argument, we face the problem
of mixing symbols. First, what is the 1? The text describes the numerical
one as a single strip of soul-stuff. But the stuff is not material, even though
Plato treats it as the divisible stuff. The Demiurge first makes a section
of the whole and then begins the mathematical division (35b). Second,
does the division explain the multiplicity? The division of the whole strip
of soul-stuff fits the narrative of building an instrument, which involves
the cutting down of the whole into parts, then assembling the parts into
a spherical whole (36b). The construction of the Soul also symbolizes the
change from the one divisible stuff to many divided numbers. Ancient and
modern commentators generally have understood that Platos downsized
division really means the upside multiplicity, insofar as the diagram has
shown. This is the right direction to explain the change from a simple
order to complex realities. But the division from one to many will make
1 divisible.

Fig. 8.7. Mathematical order of the World Soul

 the one225

Third, what does the single stuff really mean to Plato? To enlarge the
picture by placing the division within the creation of the Soul, we face
another problem. From the very beginning Plato states that the Form
equidistance in all directions from the centeris the chief and single
identity of the Soul. To construct the Soul in the cosmogonical background
means to incarnate the immaterial Form with cosmological structures. The
mathematical division symbolizes the divine act to make the Form embod-
ied. Fourth, how is it possible to divide this Form? If the Form is indivisible,
as the doctrine of Forms insists that anything divisible cannot be the most
fundamental, then the Demiurge must be bound by the rule. Consequently
he cannot divide the strip of soul-stuff, even if his Pythagorean conscience
tells him otherwise. The construction of the Soul becomes impossible. If
the Form can be divided, then it implies that each Form must be divisible.
Plato has borrowed Pythagorean numbers to explain the change from one
to many but arrives at an inconsistency that can overturn his crowning
theory. All in all, the construction of the Soul exhibits a real challenge for
the doctrine of Forms.
The most difficult part of the one and the many is not about the divis-
ibility of the Form, but about the Form itself. Is the equation c = 2rnot
complex at allcapable of turning the entire universe? Is it the ultimate
cause of motion? The prominent reason for Plato being committed to the
Form is ideal perfection. In his words, the figure with extremes equidis-
tant in all directions from the center has the greatest degree of complete-
ness and uniformity, as he [the Demiurge] judged uniformity to be incal-
culably superior to its opposite (33c). Certainly Pythagorean mathematics
has played a key role in the construction of the Soul. But the perfectionism
belongs to Platos idealism. He has idealized mathematics by turning r into
the one over many principle with a familiar ontological twist. Once he has
done so in this context, he has boxed himself inside the idealismthe
perfection of the Form of the Circle, which simplifies cosmology into the
order of the circumference.
But Ge Hong would ask two questions: Why should the universe be
a sphere, not an egg? Why should all living souls in this world be in
conformity with this single idea, and what about each individual is exem-
plified by the immortals? These questions cannot be answered by scru-
tinizing the single passage about division. We can ask another question
instead.
Does mathematics actually explain the change from one to many?
Commentators ancient and modern have agreed that Platos passage is
about division. But Cornfords diagram shows multiplication. The single
soul-stuff is not meant to be 1, but a whole. If it were 1, then by divi-
226 comparative ontology

sion the Demiurge could only get , , 8, 3, 9, and 27. The division
from 1 to the fractions involves quantitative variation, but no qualitative
transformation. Here we again run into the contrast between two modes
of change: Greek physical variation and Daoist alchemical transformation.
Plato explains the change from one to many as physical variation. But
from the whole to the parts explains nothing about the from one to
many transformation. If Plato plans to explain cosmological unity, there is
an ontological dilemma in showing the discontinuity between the One and
the many and how discontinuity other than quantitative variation comes
about. The ancient interpretation maintained above foresees the problem
by interpreting the change in the sequence of numbers, planes, and sol-
ids. However, mathematically solids consist of planes, planes are made of
lines, and lines are numbers. They can all be explained by 1/2n and 1/3n
as numbers. There is no change in kind involved. Just as the pre-Socratic
materialists explained change in terms of physical variation, Platos math-
ematical division too has failed to explain the change in kind.

The Problem of Zero

Why is 0 excluded from the universal structure? This is a Daoist ques-
tion. Plato excludes zero because zero means nothing. As for Parmenides,
nothingness is unthinkable and unknowable for Plato (Republic 447a). No
positive truth can be abstracted from nothing. But mathematically zero is
much more complex than one. It is neither the prime even 2 nor the
prime odd 1. It is a neutral number that can neither be divided nor mul-
tiplied into other numbers. Zero added to a number or subtracted from a
number does not change the original value.
If Xuan is zero, neither addition nor subtraction will change its origi-
nal state. Ge Hong says: Adding will not cause Xuan to overflow, nor
will taking exhaust it, just as the effort of adding and taking water from
the Yellow River and the Wei River (IC 1). To multiply any number by
0 will swallow the value of that number. Zero cannot be multiplied by
any external cause. Likewise, the Nature of Dao cannot be multiplied by
external things, unless it chooses to realise from nothing into being. The
value 2/0 is meaningless, because the base number zero is indivisible. Any
attempt to divide by zero will be in vain. Laozi says, The greatest virtue
of Dao is comparable with soft water (Laozi 8). To cut water with a sword
will achieve nothing. Likewise to be as soft as water means the greatest
uniformity.
For Ge Hong, zero can mean Xuan. Xuan is not a numerical singularity
but a formless unity. Contrary to Xuan, he persistently uses numerical 1 for
Qi. If we use numbers, then 0123 represents the change DaoQi
 the one227

Yin and YangQi. The first Qi is 1. It designates the cosmogonical Qi

in the precosmic egg. It bears a something-nothing relation with the 0 of
Dao. The second Qi is 3. It refers to the cosmological Qi. No matter how
Qi changes from one to three, the not-being and being relation is never
lost. Life is both indeterminate and determinate. The most fundamental
reality is indeterminate. This is why Zhuangzi argues that the totality of
the world is zero. Nothing exists outside of the nothingness of Dao, yet
everything is penetrated through and through by this zero. Contrary to the
Demiurge, who consciously cuts a strip into smaller portions, the diversi-
fication of Dao is spontaneous and requires no intervention.
In the cosmological egg, zero can mean the balance of Yin and Yang.
The total amount of positive and the total amount of negative are bal-
anced. Day and night are equal in length within a solar year. Astronomy
has two celestial poles. The world neither ever evolves nor constantly
devolves because creation and contraction form a circle. Four cardinal
directions on a compass derive from and are balanced at a resting center
with no directions. During the time of Ge Hong, even the five planets were
explained alchemically as the Five Phases (water, metal, wood, fire, earth)
with two opposite orders of generation and degeneration. Within the bal-
ance of the cosmos, there exist limitless changes moving in the dialectic
opposite directions. Neither day nor night can be understood without the
other. The common ground between the two is the true nature of the two.
The one of the two is change. Cosmological life, no matter whether it is
called Qi or the Soul, essentially possesses dialectic opposites.
Pythagoreans had already arrived at the same point when they viewed
the world as the mixed result of two contrariesevens and odds. If we
return to the two arms of the diagram in Figure 8.7 with the exponential
equations 1/2n and 1/3n, then we come to a realization. When n equals
zero, we get 1/2 0 =1/3 0 =1. 1 is not the root cause of many numbers, but
the same result of two distinctive orders. Hence 1 really means the soul-
stuff (whatever that means). Two contrary principles, which the Demiurge
actually works with, are countable for creativity causes. They are evens and
odds in Pythagorean terms. For Daoism, they symbolize Yin and Yang. The
remarkable feature is this. The Demiurge first separated two orders. Then
in the same way he made the world as the mixed result of Reason and
Necessity, he joined the opposites to compose the Soul as the mixture of
both. Ge Hong would say cosmic life was born out of the balanced Yin and
Yang. The interplay of the opposites gives birth to plurality. The Demiurge
played the same game from the two to the many.
To make the point concisely, the Soul cannot be a numerical 1. Platos
initial idea of the composite Soul is correct. The unity of cosmic life is
228 comparative ontology

internally as plural as human life. But the mathematical Form has mis-
led the ethical intuition without realizing the harmonious rotation of the
cosmos is a balanced zero. Within the harmonious unity, the Form gov-
erning the rotation happens to be one of many orders within the totality
of change balanced by the dialectic opposites. Each single order in the
cosmos bears the relation of zero and one to form the unity of harmony.
This relationship derives from the creative core of the universe, which is
the bond of Xuan-Qi (zero and one). Ge Hongs hagiographic tradition
depicts the OM relation vividly. Many immortals have preserved the bond.
They dwell freely in the cosmos and collectively animate the creative core
of the universe with their plural personalities. The zero and one bond of
immortal life shares the same genesis as cosmic life. What does this bond
imply for the Soul? In order for the Soul to be a balanced one, there must
be a hidden reality of zero somewhere.

Two OM Problems for the Soul

In the past section we have gone the extra distance to engage the com-
mentary tradition and have arrived at the conclusion that there must be
an element of zero that symbolizes the indeterminate nature hidden in the
Soul. Plato originally intended the Soul to be a harmonious unity for the
body of the world. But Pythagorean mathematics alters the ethical model
by assigning the equation c =2r to the Soul. This shift from the ethical to
the mathematical creates two OM problems.
The first one is the relationship between a single Soul and multiple
Forms. If the Soul is the Form of circumference, why is the equation c = 2r
singled out as universal over the rest of Forms? How can all principles of
the world be reduced to this determinate structure? The second one is the
relationship between the Soul and the myriad things in the world. How
can a single Soul form the harmony shared by the many?

The Continuity Problem of the One

As I have said before, the biggest assumption that preconditions the doc-
trine of creation is the doctrine of Forms. Prior to the creation the uncre-
ated, Forms were already there. So the Demiurge works within the limits
of Forms defined by preexistence. How does the created Soul manage the
uncreated Forms in a unity of harmony if the Forms are self-subsistent?
This question refers back to the previous discussion of the Good and
Forms. Recall that as long as Forms are self-subsistent beings, there will be
no harmony among them. The underlying issue is the dilemma of partici-
pation. Here is the diagram.
 the one229

A a B

The overlapping (a) is the common property that both A and B share.
It is neither a whole A nor a whole B. And this section of not a whole A
and not a whole B is essentially required for relational harmony. We call
this (a) blood in modern medicine or Qi in ancient alchemy.

But the ontology of Forms prohibits the participation.

Each Form must be a numerical one and contains only being without
not-being.
Not-being is mainly understood as the negation of being.

Applying these points to the above graphic yields two results. First, the
overlapping (a) is not a complete A and not a complete B. Accord-
ing to the negation, it becomes not-A and not-B. Second, A must be
an indivisible one A without not-A. In order to meet the requirement
that A is a numerical 1, A cannot contain not-A. Thus the relational (a) is
excluded from A. The same logic applies to B. The denial of the shared (a)
leads to the denial of participation between A and B. But to be a relational
being, somehow A must contain this property (a). If it is denied, then rela-
tionshipboth like and unlikeis not possible. In the biological model, if
blood is denied, then there will be neither participating harmony between
the heart and the kidneys, nor is human life as a whole possible.
Now we come to a problem that relates to Platos strange idea of
numerical being. By the principle of noncomposition, not-A is rejected.
So A is one in the sense of numerical oneness. This is Platos idealism that
any universal must be a numerical being. But two numerical beings can-
not participate in each other. Plato often speaks of the two mathematical
Forms most frequent in the doctrine of creation: the circle (the structure
of Soul) and the triangle (the structure of the elements). Is it possible to
form a participatory relationship between the two? Since circles and trian-
gles cannot be reduced to each other, it is not possible to find a common
resemblance between them. In theory, triangles should not participate in
circles. If so, how can the Soul form a harmony, a Form contain all Forms?
The root problem of numerical being is the ontology of being with-
230 comparative ontology

out not-being. Numerical being is an abstract concept in many Platonic

terms. Since a being with numerical oneness is difficult to conceptualize,
we can employ numbers.
Two numerical beings can either be adjacent to each other or stand
apart from each other. For example, 1 and 2 are integrals; they can only
relate to each other as two adjacent numbers. However, 1 and 3 can stand
apart from, not next to, each other. One may question why the numbers 13
and 31 are excluded. The same logic also applies to the physical arrange-
ments three apples next to one banana. When three apples are placed
next to one banana, the best they can manage is attachment or contiguity.
For the sake of argument, they are fruit and fresh, presumably the same
age and grown by the same farmer. But these are external similarities with
a Platonic one over many structure. What we are looking for is the shared
life of participating in each other.
Compared with the shared blood between the heart and the kidneys,
neither the apples have life in the banana, nor must the banana have any-
thing to do with the apples. There is no inner continuity between them.
There is only a situation of togetherness. Now when the same nonpartici-
patory togetherness is applied to 13 and 31, the numbers should not
be formed at all. This is simply because neither is 13 thirteen nor 31
thirty-one. The 1 and the 3 are only put next to each other. But what 13
and 31 really represent mathematically are two sets of relations. In 13, 1
represents ten, and, in 31, 3 represents thirty. Ten and thirty are some-
thing new, and they represent a set of new relations. Therefore, in order
for the attachment 13 and 31 to be meaningful, the relation between two
numbers is essential. This is also the point of the argument against numeri-
cal beings.

A B A B

The 1 and 2 and the 1 and 3 situation can be shown in the diagrams
above. Let us see the crucial change that numerical beings make to our
original diagram. Originally, A and B are not numerical beings. They are
relational beings, and both share the common property (a). Since numeri-
cal beings are meant to be noncomposite beings that deny this shared
not-being, they cannot relate to each other as overlapping coalitions.
They can either be next to each other or apart from each other. This is
the implication of being without not-being. All that the exclusion of not-
being does is to promote ontological individualism.
 the one231

We should remember that the ideal world contains many numerical

beings. If two beings cannot form a relational participation, nor can all
Forms do otherwise. Plato envisions that the ideal world is perfectly ruled
by Reason. But this investigation shows the opposite situation. The ideal
world is a false unity of nonparticipatory togetherness. Reason is merely
a common character that Forms share. It is the OVM structure, but not a
relational web by which universals are interwoven. Has Plato escaped the
critique of atomism? Originally Plato wanted to reject the nonrelational
plurality that atomism argues, but in reality Plato has not escaped plural-
ism. To give Forms an OVM structure is not enough to form a unity of har-
mony. In the previous discussion, the one over many is shown actually to
be not a harmony, but a political crisis. Independent Forms neither allow
any relationship between them nor permit another Formthe Goodto
bring them under the umbrella of one over many. No matter how supe-
rior the emperor Good is, participatory relationship is not possible. It is
because the feudal lordsFormsare too powerful and subsistent.
If the Demiurge obeys the doctrine of Forms, then what he is about
to copy is a model that contains fragments. To maintain the doctrine of
Forms, both A and B would have to be pure beings-themselves. They are
indivisible and numerical ones. They are self-subsistent and ontologically
independent. What sort of entity can meet these criteria? Again we can use
mathematics to conceptualize Forms. In mathematics, two independent
entities with numerical oneness can only be seen as two spots, rather than
composite areas. The divine model prior to the creation contained many
noncomposite spotsForms. The best relations that they can achieve are
the two kinds shown in the above diagrams. One is attachment; A is adja-
cent to B. The other is detachment; A is separated from B. Hence par-
ticipatory harmony is not possible. If the Demiurge must obey this false
unity, the best he can achieve is the adjacency of Forms. It is just like a bag
of frozen vegetables in which carrots have nothing to do with the other
vegetables.
From the Daoist biological perspective, the togetherness of adjacency is
only a mechanical assembling but has no life in itself. Even if the Soul has
the determinate principle equidistant from all directions, the geomet-
ric Form cannot be the organizational order above other Forms. This is
because to single out this order means that all other mathematical orders
must be ultimately conformed to the principle of the sphere. Thus the
OVM model will restrict mathematics to one single principle. What the
spherical Soul really does is to act as a cosmic container, the single living
being containing all living things within itself. In this container, Forms
are mixed together randomly as adjacent entities. Yet random adjacency
232 comparative ontology

neither has any mathematical order nor possesses an organic harmonya

life of its own. It is chaos.
With Ge Hongs Xuan and Laozis wu in mind, the alternative way to
have a unity of harmony is that the Creator must be indeterminate and
infinite. In fact, this is not a strange idea to Plato. Plato has already envi-
sioned that at the intellectual summit there exists a visionary unity, which
he occasionally calls the Vision of the Good. A vision is not a noncompos-
ite being, but a composite reality. It is fundamentally not a determinate
principle, but an indeterminate harmony. The Good can manage plurality
by containing them within its indeterminateness. Consequently, the Good
cannot be a master Form over the other Forms in the OVM sense, but
a unity of one under many. The chief identity is its indeterminateness
that sustains the identities of individuals, just like blood sustains different
organisms. In Laozis metaphor, the Good is like a self-humbling ocean
that takes a lowly position. By providing the freedom of letting plurality
be, the indeterminate Good becomes the emptying vessel in which Forms
gain interdependence. The Good then become comparable with the Dao.
In Platos cosmogonical vocabulary, the only concept that is primarily
indeterminate is Necessity. Thus the visionary Good shares the same ontol-
ogy with the cosmogonical Necessity. It is the not-being of the Good, or the
mother of the Soul. In the creation the character was rightly inherited by
the child but wrongly labeled as Difference by the rational father Reason.
Furthermore, the Forms must surrender their self-subsistence. By giving
up their individualism, they achieve a radical openness toward each other.
Paradoxically they find mutual participation is the only way to maintain
their individuality. This is exactly what human life is about. Heart, lungs,
kidneys, and other organisms participate in the life-giving Qi. Through
participation they exist as one among many. They are indeterminate over
each other but support each other. In other words, Forms must have an
ethical humility in them. What has been achieved is a relational ontology.
The life of the cosmos can be seen as the life of the ocean. It is the collec-
tive manifestation of the myriad lives, and the oceanic potency intercon-
nects each species into a harmonious whole while individuals strive for
their evolving existences. Likewise each single one of the universals must
allow the indeterminate Good to contain it as one of many related beings.
At the same time they open to and participate in each other through some-
thing that they all share, which is the common Good for all.
The common property (a) in our original diagram is the common
Good. It is the essence of the Soul. For Ge Hong, it is the cosmological Qi.
This common property does not only bring A and B into participatory rela-
tion, but also interweaves the myriad things into a single cosmic life. The
 the one233

Soul, therefore, is not governed by the Form of equidistant in all direc-

tions from the center, but actively incarnates the creative wisdom, which
is as indeterminate as the vision of the Good or Necessity.
To accept this model of one over many, however, Plato must abandon
the doctrine of Forms. What Plato will gain is the liberation of the Demi-
urge. He will no longer be a craftsman stranded by the eternal Forms, and
he will not be an assembler putting together matter according to Forms.
Instead he will be the creator. He is capable of creating Forms out of noth-
ing, with the same kind of creative capacity as the ontological cause of
Formsthe Good. Prior to the creation, there was neither time and mat-
ter nor orderly Forms and characterless space. There was only the formless
Necessitythe chief virtue of the Demiurge. From Necessity, there awoke
the mind of the Demiurgecreative Reason. Necessity and Reason first
formed a cosmogonical unity and coexisted through a shared relation.
Out of this creative bond, the world came to be as the mixed result of
Necessity and Reason. The fetal universe gradually took shape through
the awakening of the mind and the formation of the body. Forms were not
preexistent causes, but they were created together with the universe. The
coming-to-be of order belonged to the evolving process. Plurality evolved
out of the formless unity of Necessity and Reason.
Universals did not exist prior to the birth of the physical universe, nor
did they have determinative capacity prior to the birth of the universe.
Rather they were activated together with time, space, and matter. The uni-
verse was born into these defining categories. The universals existed as
plural parts of the body; their existences are bonded together with the
distribution of matter. Thus these principles never had existence separate
from material things. But their true essences were in the formless unity
of Necessity/Reason and then became apparent in material existences by
forming the myriad unities of form/matter. What the Soul does principally
is to sustain the plurality of orders by unifying them into a cosmological
whole, just as Qi circulates through different parts of the body. And the
Soul is embodied, hence alive.
Plato could reject this Daoist reconstruction of his doctrine of creation.
He might return to the model/copy theory of creation, thus protecting
the theory of Forms. What he would abandon is the cosmogonical answer
to the OM problem, which the pre-Socratics envisioned and Daoism artic-
ulated. Such abandonment would subsequently sacrifice the harmonious
unity, which the Soul desperately needs. From the above analysis, because
of the ontological individualism, the unity of Forms is not possible. If the
Demiurge copies from the eternal model of Forms, then the Soul will
be genetically crippled. Since the model is disharmony, the created Soul
234 comparative ontology

cannot reshape radon adjacency into harmony unless the Soul continu-
ously evolves after creation, thus changing independently from the divine
model. If it does mutate into a harmonious unity, then the Soul becomes
the rebellious child of the maker. The Soul has rejected this genesis but
become the creative life of the universe.

The Discontinuity Problem for the Many

The doctrine of Forms raises the problem of unity for the Soul. It also
generates the problem of plurality for the world. We can first visualize two
distinct theories of creation (Figure 8.8).
Ge Hongs two eggs theory presents a model from one to many. The
cosmogonical egg contains the formless One, and the cosmological egg
contains the formed many. In this model, both ontological dilemmas of
continuity and discontinuity are involved in the evolution from one to
many. The continuity between the two eggs is sustained by the sameness
of Qi in two different stages of the cosmos. The discontinuity is marked
by the change between the two eggsfrom the formless One to the many
formed by the One.
On the contrary, Platos model/copy theory presents a model of cau-
sation: Many Formsthe single intelligence infused in the Soulmany
parts of the body. Within this M-1-m causation, the continuity between

Fig. 8.8. Two distinctive schemes of the One and the many
 the one235

the world of Forms and the world of actuality is defined by the sameness
between Reason and the Soul. The discontinuity is stated as the unchange-
able model and the changeable copy. The former is ruled by Reason,
whereas the latter is ruled by the Soulthe cause of motion.
Now let us examine the problem of plurality caused by the Forms. Plato
says, It is impossible for the best to produce anything but the highest
(30b). Thus the Demiurge made the copy of the Soul to incarnate Rea-
son. If the universe is a perfect copy of the divine model, then Plato will
face the problem of creating two worldsone duplicating the other. The
causation explains nothing about the phenomenon of change. The world
of Forms contains no change. But the fact is that, like human souls, the
World Soul is not entirely rational. The entire cosmos cannot be viewed
as a monad ruled by rational Sameness. It also contains Existence and Dif-
ference. Similar to the appetitive part of the human soul located in the
belly, the inner ring of difference contains the earth, in which becoming
is the primarily reality. If the universe contains irrational elements, then
not all phenomena are reducible to a single intelligence. Even if the Soul
is assumed to rotate by the principle of Radius, it does not follow that
everything within the rotating sphere is regular. For instance, four sea-
sons form a circular change. But neither atmospheric motions nor oceanic
changes are irregular. If we borrow Ge Hongs theory of two matching tal-
ismans, we can put the uncreated world of Forms and the created world
of actualities side by side. They are unmatched. Then the question is this:
where does change come from?
Platos model/copy is a theory of craftsmanship. To adopt the theory
leaves change unexplained. But the doctrine of creation requires this dis-
continuity. What does this discontinuity mean? We have encountered two
approaches in the diagrams above. The two eggs theory explains change
by affirming that the One changes itself in order to create principles of
change. This is the change from one to many. The model/copy theory
presupposes the principles as preexistent. Preexistence seems to have
avoided the discontinuity problem by emphasizing the continuity between
the model and the copy. Yet insofar as the doctrine of creation stands, the
discontinuity is unavoidable. The paradox of continuity and discontinuity
is about change.
We can reduce the size of cosmic change to a small scale. By taking only
one Form from the world of Forms, we can see the OM problem. For one
Form to create many instances is to change from one to many (Figure 8.9).
How does the causality work if change has been ontologically denied?
We have already examined this problem. For instance, to create differ-
ent beds, Plato believes that only one ideal Bed is required. But normal
236 comparative ontology

Fig. 8.9. From One to many through the creative act

beds, sofa beds, and water beds represent a horizontal discontinuity. They
are different from each other as well as called beds. The discontinuity is
change. If the Form is the cause for them, then it must accommodate the
external discontinuity (change) represented by the many. In a schema of
design-act-instances, the craftsman must modify the design and act upon
three versions of the design in order to build the different beds. Modifica-
tion is internal change, which happens within the one. Though Plato has
externalized the change by placing the Demiurge outside the one to carry
out the act of building the many, the modification must first occur within
the divine mind so the maker can act accordingly to actualize the internal
change in the context of external change in those beds.
What does internal change mean? It means that the Form must contain
the element of change rather being absolutely changeless. The argument
is not just specific to Plato, but also of general application. On the latter,
suppose a bed is an article of furniture designed to sleep on. It appears
that there can be all sorts of variations without the basic specification
being changed. However, the definition to sleep on is an OM unity. A
multiplicity of instances that satisfy the functionality are implied in the
definition. Furthermore, the causal design is not strictly one idea, but a
unity of many possible applications of the idea. So the definition in itself
 the one237

cannot be understood in the Platonic sense of one without many, but as

a unity of one with many.
In the context of creation, to create all beds in the world the divine
mind must have the power to modify the ideal Bed rather obeying the
unchanging Form wholeheartedly. Platos insistence on unchangeable
being is wrong. This internal capacity to change speaks for the ontologi-
cal paradox of continuity and discontinuity. If discontinuity is denied by
being without not-being, it turns a Form into a homogeneous One. Thus,
the many are the isomeric miniatures of the one. Normal beds, sofa beds,
and water beds must not have distinctions, and they must be exactly like
the unchanging design. They must be identical with each other. The plu-
rality of the Form is denied. If one Form cannot create the many under its
domain, then all Forms cannot create the myriad things as long as internal
change has been ontologically denied.
If, however, the paradox of continuity and discontinuity is kept as the
core of ontological being, then the Form is paradoxically one and many at
the same time. This ontology has profound implications in natural studies.
For Plato the variety of chairs requires a single cause to explain their var-
ied existences. But for Ge Hong, the change represented by those chairs
shapes our understanding of the changing being. On the cosmic scale, it is
not just the world of Being that causes the world of Becoming, but Becom-
ing also defines Being. To fully understand the Daoist hypothesis, we need
to move the comparative study into the context of alchemythe study of
the many.

Summary

The One shapes different progenies of the One, and the One unfolds its
essence into the plural existence of the many. This is the first argument
concerning Ge Hongs two eggs theory in the context of various astro-
nomical writings. This cosmogonical answer to the OM problem basically
rejects Platos doctrine of creation. In particular Forms cannot be ontolog-
ical permanents. They can only have relative permanency in the evolving
cosmos. This is the second major argument on the critical reading of the
World Soul. The composite Soul is designed to be a solution to bridge the
gap between Being and Becoming. Compared with Ge Hongs method of
two matching talismans, Platos natural studies are set within the limits
of his idealism. The problem of the Soul is basically the problem of Forms.
 chapter 9

The Many

This chapter is situated against the background of two distinct natural phi-
losophies: Ge Hongs alchemical universe and Platos geometrical world.
The comparative study is textually based. It starts with my critique of the
alchemy as chemistry thesis in Daoist studies with the aim to free alchemy
from the need to explain itself by the means of modern science. Then I
introduce my alchemy-cosmogony approach and place Ge Hongs instru-
mental studies of minerals in dialogue with Platos geometrical structures
of matter.

Ge Hongs Alchemy: A Natural Study of the Many

Alchemy as chemistry has been the dominating thesis in alchemical

studies. It started in 1930 with an essay on Chinese alchemy by two MIT
scholars.1 Since then there have been three important scholars in the field.
In 1953 the Chinese chemist and canonical scholar Chen Guofu
published his famous essay A Brief Draft Discussion on the Study of Chi-
nese Outer Alchemy and the Yellow-White Technique. 2 Chen proposed
the well-accepted thesis that Outer Alchemy and the Yellow and White
Technique were essentially a form of proto-chemistry, and inner alchemy
was an ancient form of physiology-hygiene .
Based on this thesis, he further argued that the study of outer alchemy
must be conducted together with the study of inner alchemy texts. Often
an alchemic term is found in both inner and outer alchemical texts, and
it is hard to pinpoint its concrete meaning.3 Facing this primary textual
problem, Chen argued that without revealing alchemical terms embedded
in encoded text, the study of outer alchemy is always condemned to wan-
der around the outside of this secretive tradition and never goes beyond
the protective door of those terms. His work Daozang yuanliu xukao
,4 was designed to deal with two primary difficulties: on the one
hand, to examine each alchemical terms and to speculate on its actual
chemical composition; on the other hand, to date major alchemical texts
in the Daoist Canon and place them in the transmission lineages to which
they belong.5

238
 the many239

The British Sinologist Joseph Needham, who was also trained in chem-
istry, argued that Chinese alchemy was an early form of chemistry (includ-
ing biochemistry) within the history of sciences. The thesis of alchemy as
chemistry fit well within the scheme of Needhams Science and Civilisation
in China, which is based on categorizations of modern sciences. We will
come back to the philosophical problem in greater detail later.
Nathan Sivin, an American historian of science who was trained as a
chemist as well, applied the alchemy as chemistry thesis in his study on
Essential Formulas (Oral Transmission) of the Alchemical Scripts attrib-
uted to Sun Simo (581682) of the Tang.6 Sivin argued that any
conclusions about alchemy would be premature until the chemistry of
the text was fully reconstructed.7 His textual study reflected this scientific
method. It reconstructed the composition of each ingredient, recovered
the measurements from ancient prescriptions, analyzed applied methods
for the art of elixir making, and conducted laboratory tests on recogniz-
able chemical reactions. Sivin has identified alchemy as follows:

Chinese alchemy might be defined after the fact as a discrete entity

having to do with the construction of a chemical model of natural pro-
cess and with the production by chemical means of substances capable
of certain unique functions which involve timemaking individuals
immortal, maturing gold and silver from a base matrix at a greatly
accelerated rate, and so on. But it would be mistake to let such a defini-
tion obscure alchemys continuity with medicine and chemical technol-
ogy, and indirectly with moral philosophy and social thought.8

Sivins description acknowledges the broad scope of alchemy in direct

association with medicine and chemistry and its indirect connections with
moral philosophy and the Daoist worldview. Most significant is the recog-
nition that alchemy was an attempt to construct a chemical model of a
natural process. His approach did not restrain alchemy within the scope
of chemistry, but used chemistry as a tool to unveil the lost tradition that
he characterized as the parallel search for a chemical model of cosmic
process at one end, and elixirs of immortality at the other. 9
Is the natural process fundamentally chemical, or is it alchemical as
such? The question is not just for Sivin, but also for three generations
of scholars committed to the alchemy as chemistry thesis. Has chemistry
freed alchemy from its ancient esotericism, as they have claimed? Or have
they actually clothed alchemy in chemistry and imposed philosophical lim-
its on alchemical activities?
The following analysis does not claim that the textual evidence and
240 comparative ontology

chemical formulas in this chapter are new discoveries. Various canonical

scholars and historians of chemistry have already discussed these matters.
The analysis does, however, contest the alchemy as chemistry thesis. Chem-
istry, which interprets alchemy, must also be interpreted by it. Alchemy
should not be examined under the magnifying glass of inorganic chemistry,
but seen as an instrumental telescope through which to view the formation
of the universe. Alchemy is an instrumental study of the One becoming the
many and the changing unity of the many. This alchemical model of one
and many raises questions regarding the material pluralism of chemistry.

The Tradition of Instrumental Alchemy

Many [alchemists] have collected fragmentary scripts but have not
obtained true scriptures (IC 71). Alchemical texts were regarded as the
cumulative wisdom of people who had conducted countless experiments.
Only those who were truly worthy could be a part of this sacred tradition.
Ge Hong belonged to the tradition of instrumental alchemy as part of a
family lineage shaped by three distinctive alchemists. From the master Zuo
Ci , Ge Hongs granduncle Ge Xuan received a body of texts. His
granduncle then passed them down to his own master, Zheng Yin . Ge
Hong subsequently received the following texts: three volumes of Taiqing
danjing (Scripture on the Grand Purity Elixir), one volume of
Jiuding danjing (Scripture on the Nine Tripods Elixirs), and one
volume of Jinye danjing (Scripture on the Golden Liquor Elixir)
(IC 71).
Historically these three texts formed the major corpus of the early tra-
dition. According to Chen Guofus canonical study, the three volumes of
Grand Purity are lost. One volume of Nine Tripods and one volume of Golden
Liquor still exist.10 Ge Hongs inheritance of these texts suggests that Ge
Hong belonged to a lineage of several hundred years. Joseph Needham
has demonstrated in Figure 9.1 how various alchemical traditions were
developed and converged over a period of five centuries between the Han
and Jin dynasties. By the fourth century, this lineage did not only speak
for Ge Hongs authority on the subject, but also added to his chances of
success. His writings continued the tradition and further brought together
medicine and instrumental studies under the general framework of Daoist
soteriology.
Historically Ge Hong had a profound impact on later traditions. For
instance, the Baopuzis Script on the Bubbling Gold (Potion) of the Immortals
(DZ 19), a later text attributed to Ge Hong, listed the
three ancient texts mentioned above in the same order. A later editor cop-
ied almost the entire fourth chapter of the Baopuzi, on Golden Elixirs,

He Shang Zhang Ren



Zhang Ling
375

An Qi Sheng
375

Mao Xi Gong Ma Ming Sheng

Ye Xia Gong

106 p728-9
Le Chen Gong 375

Gai Gong

Cao Can
Yin Chang Sheng 375380

Li Zhong Fu

Wei Bo Yang L Zi Hua Zhu Xian Sheng
Zuo Ci

Y Sheng X Cong Shi Wang Si Zhen
Bao Jing

Chun Y Shu Tong Ge Xan

Zheng Ying
Ding Yi X Mai

Ge Hong
Wu Meng Yang Yi

Fig. 9.1. Alchemic traditions between the Han and Jin periods. The
reconstruction is based on the studies of Joseph Needham and Chen Guofu as
well as my own research. Here I adopt the general scheme of alchemic traditions
proposed by Needham in Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 5, part 3, 77.
During my research I only managed to find some of the historical records on
Ge Hongs side of the tradition. The text notes in the diagram demonstrate the
intergenerational continuation from Zhang Ling to Ge Hong.
242 comparative ontology

to form the first portion of the text, yet the later portions evidently used
instrumental alchemy to explain internal alchemy. Moreover, the titles of
early texts mentioned in Ge Hongs writings were often wholly or partially
borrowed by texts of later writers in the present Daoist Canon to claim
some form of lineage.
One of Ge Hongs greatest achievements was to make the secret tradi-
tion public. He was the first alchemist to publish the sacred texts. Forty-one
detailed prescriptions can be found in the chapter on Golden Elixirs (IC
7487) and another seven in the chapter on Yellow and White (IC 289291).
In the chapter on the Bibliographical Tradition (19),11 he documented
many alchemical texts among 204 ancient texts, with specific indication of
the number of fascicles in each (IC 333335). The publication was revolu-
tionary. By making the sacred texts public, Ge Hong was making a political
move to invite many educated Confucians like himself to leave their social
commitment behind and engage in the empirical study of Nature.

The Golden Liquor

Among the three sets of alchemical texts mentioned earlier, the third text,
the Golden Liquor , has not survived. In the Canon, the Scripture on
the Golden Liquor Elixir of Grand Purity has a similar title, but
it is a later edited text of a different sort. The Scripture on the Immortal Bub-
bling Gold (Potion) of the Immortals by Baopuzi in the pres-
ent Daoist Canon belongs to the group of later editorial works based on
the entire chapter on Golden Elixirs. Therefore, the reconstruction of the
original text relies on Ge Hongs writing because it is the first appearance
of the original text. The following is Ge Hongs recollection of the method.

To synthesize it, take one measure of liquid gold [jinye ] and mer-
cury and cook them for thirty days. When the reaction is complete
[when they liquefy], pour it into a yellow-earth vessel, and then seal it
with Six-One Mud [liuyi ni ]. Fire the vessel for sixty two-hour
periods [liushi shi ]; [the sublimated liquor] will form the elixir.
If one takes the elixir of the size of a small bean, the person should
become an immortal. Use one spatula [yidao gui ] of this elixir
powder, and project it into one jin () of mercury; the mercury will
be turned into white silver. Take one jin of this elixir and heat it with
intense fire, and it will form red gold and flow as liquor. Colloidal gold
is called elixir gold [danjin ]. (IC 83)

The passage describes a very early method, if not the earliest recorded
method, used to form a solution of natural gold. The procedure first
 the many243

involves the wet method (shuifa ) by placing natural gold in liquid

mercury in a vessel for thirty days, then employs the firing method (huofa
) by placing the vessel sealed with Six-One Mud in a fire for sixty two-
hour time periods.
The term period (shi ) is an ancient unit of time. One day is divided
into twelve two-hour periods. Sixty two-hour periods equal five days. Thus
the solubilization process takes thirty-five days to liquefy natural gold into
colloidal gold. Another key component of the text is the so-called elixir
powder. Ge Hong does not explain what it is. Instead he points out that
the elixir is used in the alchemical projection (dianjin shu ) to turn
base metals into artificial gold or silver. The text, then, indicates two sepa-
rate projections. A small quantity (one spatula) of the powder transforms
one jin (five hundred grams) of mercury into artificial silver. Under the
firing method, a large quantity (one jin) of the powder will form the red
and flowing colloidal gold called elixir gold.
Evidently Ge Hong has omitted many details to protect the secrecy of
the Golden Liquor method. Hence the method is nowhere near intelli-
gible enough to explain how the alchemical change happens. Fortunately
this influential text appears with more details in a later version. The same
method with commentary notes has survived in the Canon and appears in
the first chapter of The Scripture on the Immortal Bubbling Gold (Potion) of the
Immortals by Baopuzi . According to Needhams transla-
tion, the procedure is identified as forming a cyclical-transformed elixir
(huandan ), or the Return Elixir.

12 liang of gold and 12 liang of mercury are first mixed to form an

amalgam, then washed several times with water and sealed in a bam-
boo tube after adding 2 liang each of realgar and saltpetre, with some
vinegar, after 100 days a suspension will be formed. Then 2 jin of mer-
cury are introduced into this suspension and heated in the presence of
vinegar for 30 days. After this time the mercury, having turned purple
in colour, is taken out, sealed in an earthenware pot (and presumably
heated) for a day and a night. Then the cyclically-transformed elixir
is completed.12

The text mentions that the same base materials, gold and mercury, are
used. Compared with the previous text, the main method is acidification,
or the wet method, followed by the firing method, which the text does not
mention explicitly. Reading this text in conjunction with the last text, the
two methods become more intelligible.
Additional realgar, saltpeter, and vinegar are employed in the second
244 comparative ontology

method. They may be used to assist the long process of dissolving a gold-
mercury alloy into the colloidal form. With this additional information,
it is evident that Ge Hong has omitted the following crucial details in the
first stage of acidification:

Gold and mercury must first form an amalgam;

Additional materials are used to assist the acidification;
The slow process requires one hundred days;
A bamboo tube is used as the reaction vessel;
No heating is involved.

Natural gold is one of the most nonreactive metals. To directly dissolve

it requires a strong acid, such as nitro-hydrochloric acid, known to modern
chemistry. Ge Hongs text reveals an indirect approach. Gold and mercury
first form an amalgam that is chemically less stable. Realgar, saltpeter, and
vinegar may hold the key to dissolving the gold-mercury alloy. Heated,
realgar, saltpeter, and vinegar may react with each other to produce the
strong acid required for dissolving the alloy. The nonheating method may
be a later improvement to ensure a slower process (not thirty but one hun-
dred days) inside the bamboo tube.
In the second stage of the heating process, the thirty days of heat-
ing is significantly longer than the five days cooking time in the previous
text. A large quantity of mercury (two jin) and some vinegar are later
added to the gold-mercury alloy. The heated acidification turns the mer-
cury purple. And then the product is sealed in an earthenware pot (a
yellow-earth vessel in the previous text). Probably intense heat is applied
to the pot, which may be sealed with Six-One Mud, to withstand the high
temperature (as mentioned in the previous text). The outcome of the
whole alchemical process may produce a colloidal alloy called Returned
Elixir. Compared with the previous text, here there is no mention of the
projection, which produces artificial gold and silver for commercial and
technological purposes. The naming of the elixir has created great confu-
sion. Is the final product the Golden Liquor or the Returned Elixir? Are
the two the same?
Historically, Ge Hongs method belonged to the elixir tradition of Tai
qing . By tracing the lineage, another reconstruction by Fabrizio Preg-
adio reveals even clearer details of the process.13 Ge Hongs method actu-
ally compresses in a single text two separate processes of compounding
the Gold Liquor and the Returned Elixir. In the making of Golden Liquor,
an amalgam of powdered gold and mercury is placed in a bamboo cylin-
der, adding saltpetre and realgar; it is said that former dissolves the latter,
 the many245

which in turn neutralizes the toxicity of gold. The cylinder is sealed with
silk and lacquer, and is immersed in vinegar. In one hundred days gold
and mercury will dissolve forming the Gold Water (colloidal gold) and
the Mercury Water respectively, that will be separated and distinguishable
from each other. 14 The key element in the passage is the separation of
the end products. The Gold Water is heavier than the Mercury Water, so
the colloidal gold can easily be retrieved from the bottom of the vessel.
The second phase in making the Returned Elixir is a sublimation pro-
cess: Additional mercury is boiled in the Gold Liquor; vinegar is then
poured over it. The mercury is then heated for thirty days, after which it
takes on a purple colour, and is placed in a crucible luted with Six-One
Mud. 15
As the result of the sublimation, a small quantity of sublimated metal
forms small beans on the top part of the crucible, the cooling part. It then
can be collected as the Returned Elixir. A small quantity of it can be used
in the alchemy of projection to turn a large amount of base metal into
artificial gold or silver. This projection is mentioned in the first text.
In 1964 the Chinese chemist Wang Kuike published a recon-
struction with detailed chemical formulas to explain the alchemical pro-
cess. The key part of the reaction consists of two consecutive changes: 16

4Au + 8NaCN + O2 + 2H2O 4Na[Au(CN)2] + 4NaOH

4Au + 8KCN + O2 + 2H2O 4K[Au(CN)2] + 4KOH

The theoretical model is said to have been recently demonstrated in a

chemical laboratory.17 The chemical reconstruction has made Ge Hongs
method historically valuable. In the history of chemistry, it is the first
recorded method that can practically dissolve natural gold and make pota-
ble gold.
Modern scholars have overlooked the philosophical significance of Ge
Hongs method as compared with its contribution to chemistry. To dis-
solve unchangeable gold is an ancient proof that everything is subject to
change. The key question is, What can be regarded as unchangeable?
Not long ago, it was generally accepted that molecules were the primaries
in chemistry. Soon physics argued that the atom was the core matter, which
consists of an atomic nucleus and extranuclear electrons. Then atomic
physics for the first time rejected Greek atomisma plurality of changeless
Parmenidean Beingsby the proof that the atom, which cannot be cut (or
had no parts), can be split. The atomic nucleus was made of smaller par-
ticles, protons and neutrons. Using a particle accelerator, quantum physics
now proves that these particles again are subject to change. In the highly
246 comparative ontology

energized instrumental egg, they are breakable into increasingly smaller

and smaller entities.
To view the matter against its scientific background, the dissolving
of gold made two arguments. One was to define what is unchangeable;
the other was to paradoxically to show its changeability. For many centu-
ries before the rise of modern chemistry, natural gold had been gener-
ally accepted as the most unchangeable natural mineral. It can be melted
hundreds of times but remains the same (melting is a change of physical
state but not a chemical change). But Ge Hongs method indicates that
gold can be changed into something else through alchemy. The real point,
however, is not about the dissolvability of gold, but the changeability of
the most unchangeable. It is similar to the breaking up of an atom. Like-
wise, by targeting the most enduring mineral, gold, Ge Hongs method has
proven that all matter is subject to change. This is a significant philosophi-
cal point. The point is universal change or in Ge Hongs words: Change
is the principle of Nature. This principle is not a generalization made on
the basis of a single discovery but has been conceived during countless
practical experiments. The dissolving of gold was a serendipitous discovery
that belonged to Ge Hongs family lineage. Yet the discovery happened to
be the instrumental proof for Ge Hongs hypothesis. For Ge Hong, two
talismans of reality and theory did actually match.
Chemistry will certainly not reject change as a universal phenomenon,
but it has trouble with a single principle of change for all changes. Any
chemical change must be explained within the limits of indestructible ele-
ments and unchangeable chemical laws. The multiple elements and the
plurality of laws form the chemical system of material pluralism. Plural-
ism by nature denies alchemical monism. As the above formulas show, the
two changes contain the matter-form orders that modern chemistry calls
formulas. Although they are irreducible to each other, they are connected
as two phases of the general change from natural gold to artificial gold.
Perhaps this is as far as chemistry will go with alchemy. It can accept the
relative unity of plural orders within a specific reaction. But chemistry will
not drift beyond its pluralist boundary to accept the monist proposal. Is Ge
Hongs principle of change merely an ancient dream for a grand unity?

The Returned Elixir

The Returned Elixir was mentioned in the first classic text, the Scripture on
the Elixir of Grand Purity. According to Ge Hong, the original text had nine
fascicles (juan ): The first three juan have never been transmitted to
anyone. The middle three shall be submerged in the pool of Three Wells,
because none is qualified to be the recipient. The last three volumes form
 the many247

the first upper book, the middle book, and the last book of the current
Scripture on the Elixir of Grand Purity (IC 76). The description confirms that
the version Ge Hong possessed during the Jin dynasty was composed of
three fascicles. However, Ge Hongs version again was lost. It is nowhere to
be found in contemporary texts. The only surviving portion of the origi-
nal text appears in Ge Hongs recollection in the chapter on the Golden
Elixir. In the Daoist Canon, the first part of the Oral Instructions of the Heav-
enly Master on the Grand Purity Scripture (DZ 18, 787792)
bears some textual resemblance to it. It may belong to the same textual
tradition, but it is a later edition.18 Therefore, the primary textual source
for the retroversion of the Returned Elixir is Ge Hongs recollection. The
Oral Instructions is the secondary source.

The Master Embracing Simplicity says: the method of the Grand Purity
elixir derives from Yuan Jun , who was the master of Laozi. . . . This
Grand Purity elixir is harder to synthesize than are the elixirs of the
Nine Tripods, but it is the superior method to ascend into the heavens
during daylight. To synthesize the elixir, first the Flowery Pond [huachi
] must be constructed. Red Salt [chiyan ], Hard Snow [genyun
], Mystery White [xuanbai ], Flying Talismans [feifu ], and
Three-Five Divine Water [shenshui ] must be prepared, and then
the fire may be lit.
To achieve immortality requires ingesting the elixir of the one-cycle
for three years, of the two-cycle for two years, of the three-cycle for one
year, of the four-cycle for half a year, of the five-cycle for one hundred
days, of the six-cycle for forty days, of the seven-cycle for thirty days, of
the eight-cycle for ten days, and of the nine-cycle for three days. Place
the nine-cycle elixir inside a divine tripod, expose it under the sun after
the summer solstice. Once the tripod becomes hot, insert a jin of
Red Child [zhuer , cinnabar] beneath the lid. Watch over it and
wait for the essence of the sun shining upon it. After a while something
suddenly happens as the result of sunshine. The compound will pro-
duce sparking and splendid five-colored divine light, and immediately
be transformed into the Returned Elixir [huandan ]. Whoever
takes a spatula of the returned elixir will at once ascend into heaven in
daylight. The script also mentions that the nine-cycle elixir should be
placed in a sealed earthenware crucible and heated by a chaff fire, first
gentle then intense. From one to nine, the elixirs are formed in varied
number of days, so the effectiveness can be differentiated. The fewer
the cycles of the elixir that has been transformed, the less its strength.
Therefore, by ingesting the less transformed elixir, immortality will be
248 comparative ontology

attained slowly. The greater the number of transformations that the

elixir has, the greater its strength. Therefore, by ingesting the multi-
cycled elixir, immorality will be attained quickly.19 (IC 76, 77)

Most alchemical texts claim divine authorship, and it is believed that

the cosmic creator Yuan Jun revealed the Grand Purity text. Yan Jun is the
head of all immortals under the heavens, who is capable of conciliating
Yin and Yang and commanding spirits and the gods of wind and rain.
For Ge Hong, the supremacy of Yuan Jun is the result of learning the
Way and ingesting the elixir rather than his congenital nature (IC 76).
It is certainly contradictory to say his creativity is both ungenerated as
the creator of all and attained through the means of cultivating virtue
and ingesting the elixir. But such a style of claiming divine authorship
is a common practice in Daoism. The claim is soteriological. One can
attain immortality through alchemical means. The real author may be the
master Yin Shady Longevity (Yin Changsheng ), a contemporary of
Zuo Ci who lived some years earlier at the end of the Han dynasty.20
By attributing the script to Yuan Jun, Ge Hong makes a claim with a
familiar soteriological-cosmogonical outlook. On the one hand, the elixir
is the authentic path toward the immortal state called Grand Purity.21 On
the other, in his usual anthropomorphic style, Ge Hong has attributed
the method to a creator figure who possessed two cosmic essences: the
capacity to conciliate Yin and Yang, and the ability to create natural forces
through self-change. These two essences are synthesized in the material
Dao called the elixir of Grand Purity.
With the references to Yuan Juns omnipotence, the elixirs are said
to have the superior effect of attaining a soteriological end. And the
effectiveness of each the nine-cycle elixirs is in direct proportion to the
number of cycles through which the elixir has been transformed from a
composite of material substances to a single embodied essence. The num-
ber nine is the largest integer in a base-ten number system and symbol-
izes the maximum number of cycles of transformation. In astronomy, Ge
Hong uses the term jiuxiao (nine heavens) to describe the totality of
heaven capped inside of Xuan (IC 1). The number nine is also used in
three kinds of talismans: jiutian fu , jiuling fu , and jiutai fu
(IC 335). In alchemy, the cyclical nine changes also correspond to
stages in the transformation that the universe has undergone to reach its
current condition.
Against the cosmogonical background, the scripture ranks the strength
of the elixirs in an increasing order from the one-cycle elixir to the nine-
cycle elixir. The nine-cycle elixir is the strongest because it has material-
 the many249

ized the essence of Nature in the same degree as the creator, who has
transformed the primordial formless Qi through nine cycles of self-change.
Contrary to the spiral evolution of the cosmos from one to many, the mak-
ing of the elixirs represents a return from the many to the one. The name
Returned Elixir makes this reverse clear. The whole alchemical process
is about the return from multifarious base materials to a single essence.
As is commonly the case in Ge Hongs alchemical texts, this particu-
lar description only gives an impression, not a prescription. There is just
enough information for alchemists to know what the solution and fire
methods and key ingredients are. Nevertheless, the information is nowhere
near enough to make the text intelligible to outsiders. In fact, no alchemi-
cal texts are intended to be fully intelligible without oral instructions, which
were never written down but passed on through a strict master-apprentice
relationship. Even with oral instructions, texts are meaningless unless they
have been turned into praxes, which is the essence of instrumentalism.
In other words, the text, written in obscure technical language, contains
introductory and invitational messages for those seeking immortality, but
it is not a scientific manual written as a step-by-step guide. To understand
hidden connotations, one is required to have practical experience, during
which a master instructs an apprentice in the practice by revealing crucial
points with oral instructions, such as cyclical time regulated by fire.
This praxis-instruction-realization procedure is the same method used
in the Preservation of the One and evidently becomes the key phase in
later internal alchemy. For alchemists, it is common knowledge that the
greatest difficulty is not to obtain scriptures, but to gain instruction. To
gain instruction, as his autobiographic passages show (IC 71, 83, 287), Ge
Hong holds that one must live a contemplative life within a Daoist order,
prepare the mind and the body for years to achieve a pure state of simplic-
ity, and prove himself to be worthy as the bearer of the instruction in order
to carry on the lineage.
With these hermeneutical difficulties in mind, it is still necessary to
make the text at least more accessible to modern minds. In the first para-
graph, the text mentions two instruments: the Flowery Pond (huachi )
and the earthenware crucible (tufu ). These terms indicate that both
the dissolving method and the firing method are used. Four key ingredi-
ents include Red Salt, Hard Snow, Mystery White, and Three-Five Divine
Water. Among them the first three ingredients are mentioned with greater
explanatory details in the Oral Instructions: Alchemists shall mix a special
mud with White Lead [qianbai , Mystery White in Ge Hongs text] and
the great vinegar [dacu ]. Having been well stirred, the mixture can be
applied to the top of an earthenware crucible. Then a lid made of the base
250 comparative ontology

material Red Salt is used to cover the crucible. Reapply the mixture to the
joint in order to seal the crucible (DZ 18, 788).
Red Salt in the text is an impure mineral salt and possibly contains iron,
which would explain its red appearance. It is said that a lid of the earth-
enware crucible is made of the mineral. The lead-based substance Mystery
White is used as a material to provide the seal that the earthenware crucible
requires to survive intense heat without cracking. These two explanatory
details correspond with Ge Hongs warning: in order to achieve success,
the earthenware crucible must be completely sealed during the heating
procedure. Hard Snow is also known as Masculine Snow (xiongxue ):
this is possibly a sort of alchemical mercury directly involved in the reac-
tion as a key ingredient. The Oral Instructions say: To use Hard Snow one
shall place the Six-One Mud in a big flat pan and pile it up to form a square
container like a dry measuring unit for grain [shengxing ]. Dry it com-
pletely in the shade [not in the sun, in order to have an even shrinkage].
Place Hard Snow at the bottom, cover the top with a copper sheet, and
spray some great vinegar inside the container. After being heated in a coal
fire, Hard Snow and the copper sheet will disappear (DZ 18, 788).
Here the text reveals that coal fire is applied in comparison with the
use of a chaff fire specified in Ge Hongs version. It is a common knowl-
edge that intense fire (wuhuo ) and gentle fire (wenhuo ) can yield
completely different results even with the same base materials. Heated by
a chaff fire, first gentle then intense is perhaps the most important clue
to obtaining the elixir by knowing the degree of firing (huohou ). The
use of a chaff fire rather than a coal fire is certainly intended to produce
a lower temperature, probably with the aim of gaining easier and more
responsive regulation.
It should be noted, though, that the name Returned Elixir appears
many times in various alchemical texts, and the heating method differs
from text to text. Compared with the description in the Nine Tripods, Ge
Hongs text records a solar heating method.22 By exposing the tripod
under the sun after the summer solstice and adding extra cinnabar, the
heated tripod will transform the nine-cycle elixir into Returned Elixir.
To what extent alchemists used solar energy is unclear, but the method
is strikingly similar to the technique used in modern solar heating systems.
In order to use solar energy, the construction of the tripod becomes essen-
tial. The tripod had a double-layer construction with metal outside and
clay inside. The metal tripod would usually be painted black in order to
have the best heat reception from the summer sun. The clay layer had
perhaps three layers. The metal interior is first covered with the material
called the Six-One Mud. On the top of it is a layer of Red Salt. Then a cop-
 the many251

per sheet is placed on the top part of the vessel to reflect heat traveling
upward. The interior, therefore, functions as insulation to cumulate and
preserve heat. Modern solar heating systems are usually constructed with
a double-layer glass tube with a transparent outer layer and an inner layer
painted black. Air is extracted between layers to create a vacuum for insu-
lation. On a normal sunny day, the interior temperature can reach over
200 degrees Celsius. Likewise, if the tripod is well insulated and heat is not
radiated back into the air, its interior could reach a very high temperature
during a summer afternoon.
From the modern point of view, the key is the temperature. But Ge
Hong says nothing about temperature, merely revealing how the instru-
ment is constructed. As long as the instrument is correctly constructed,
reaching the temperature is just a matter of time. Under these conditions,
Ge Hong provides another instruction. When the tripod is hot, one jin
(five hundred grams) of red cinnabar (Red Child ) is placed under
the lid (IC 76). As the essence of the sun shines upon the tripod, the
text says, the compound will produce sparking and splendid five-colored
divine light.
This spectacular phenomenon can be explained by chemistry.23 Cin-
nabar (HgS) when heated by solar energy begins to decompound at a rela-
tively low temperature of 285 degrees Celsius. The reaction produces liquid
mercury and sulfur dioxide gas. Mercury at this temperature is unstable
and quickly reacts with oxygen, forms hydrargyrum oxide (HgO), and pro-
duces more heat for subsequent reaction. The end product, the Returned
Elixir, could be a mixture of sulfuretted hydrargyrum and hydrargyrum
oxide (HgS + HgO), both red in color. The chemical reactions that take
place on the top of the tripod can be explained by the following formulas:

HgS (red) + O2 Hg (white silver) + SO2 (yellow smoke)

Hg (white fog) + S (yellow) HgS (black) HgS (red)

Modern chemists are convinced that the mystical Returned Elixir is

all about the cyclical changes of HgS.24 Ge Hong had already revealed
the truth to other alchemists in a short and frequently quoted sentence:
Heated cinnabar can become mercury, and the rapid change makes it
cinnabar again (IC 72).
To complete the discussion of the chemical aspect of change in the
reaction vessel, it is necessary to explain the function of Six-One Mud. The
text does not explicitly say how the mud is used. But it is mentioned in the
secondary source the Oral Instructions (DZ 18, 788). During the construc-
tion of the reaction vessel, it is a common practice that mud is used as the
252 comparative ontology

insulation material inside of the vessel. Ge Hong revealed that the term
Six-One was an esoteric name used by alchemists, and it actually meant
seven ingredients. But he never revealed the actual ingredients of Six-
One Mud. Apparently he kept the making of this material secret simply
because the success of the entire practice relied on this first stagecon-
structing the reaction vessel.
The ingredients were made public in many later alchemical texts, but
the proportions were either unknown or vary from text to text. According
to the study of Sivin on the prescription by the alchemist Sun Simo ,
the ingredients can be chemically identified as shown in Table 9.125
A test conducted by Sivin demonstrates the application of the mud
made of seven materials. The compound can stand the intense heat at 900
degrees Celsius without showing any signs of cracking.26 Using the mud as
the covering material actually constructs the reaction vessel as a chemically
stable and physically insulated and sealed environment.
From Sivins study, we can further speculate that a possible reaction
could take place in the middle of the tripod. The energy generated from
the oxidization process on the top part of the tripod can create intense
heat and bring the interior temperature to 450 to 500 degrees. This tem-
perature (above the evaporation temperature of mercury, 375 degrees
Celsius) is required for the Mystery White to react.

Oxidization: Hg + 1/2O2 HgO (red)

The reaction of Mystery White: 6PbO + O2 2Pb3O4

During the reaction, the splendid five-colored divine light may partly
derive from the burning of minerals: Na+ (yellow), Pb+ (white) contained
in Mystery White, the cyclical change of HgS (red), and Cu+ (blue) in the

Table 9.1. Six identified ingredients of the Six-One Mud

Arsenolite As2O3
Red bole A red siliceous clay
Left-oriented oyster shell
Kalinite Kal(SO4)2.12H2O
Talc 3MgO.2SiO2.2H2O
Turkestan salt impure NaCl
Lake salt Na2CO3.NaHCO3.2H2O
 the many253

copper sheet. These reactions would have inspired Ge Hong. The spec-
tacular phenomena energized by the sun displays the remarkable transfor-
mation of the elixir.

Alchemy beyond Chemistry:

The Induction of Change and Life

The Separation of Change and Life in Inorganic Chemistry

Sivins chemical reconstruction and laboratory tests make the text more
intelligible. But these chemical formulas bear no reference to the effica-
cious Returned Elixir. All that can be said about the elixir can be sum-
marized as the cyclical reaction of cinnabar. There is nothing more to it.
Inorganic chemistry treats these base materials as lifeless matter, externally
objectifies the reactions, and pays no attention to the induction between
the changes in the instrumental egg and the soteriological change in the
human egg of the alchemists.
One particular criticism against alchemy, perhaps the most damaging,
is also articulated by chemistry. Some elixirs are toxic because they contain
the heavy metals mercury and lead as well as highly toxic arsenide. Ingest-
ing elixirs can cause slow or rapid poisoning to the body. The result is death-
dealing rather than life-giving. Thus chemistry completely rejects the syn-
thesis of change and life behind instrumental alchemy.27 The driving force
for alchemists to find the medicine of life has been denied. Chemistry was
born out of the magic play of alchemy but divorced it long ago during the
rebirth of reason. That elixirs became associated with death rather than
life contributed to the death of instrumental alchemy.28 Finding the pill of
immortality belonged to a Daoist hallucination that historically faded away
as more and more people died by ingesting elixirs.29 Instrumental alchemy
lasted over one and a half millennia before it died away. During its dying
phase, internal alchemy was born through the maturing spirituality under
the influence of Buddhist soteriology.
Certainly inorganic chemists, Sivin and Needham alike in the West
and Chen Guofu and Zhao Kuanghua in China, have made considerable
contributions to the study of alchemy. Chen Guofus canonical studies
are undoubtedly groundbreaking. Yet after almost a century of diligence,
the studies have revealed their limits and blind side. On the one hand,
the alchemy as chemistry thesis claims that it has explained alchemical
changes chemically. On the other hand, its rationalism has explained away
the synthesis of change and life. Historians of chemistry have worn protec-
tive glasses of rationalism during their research, and what they have found
254 comparative ontology

is the same body of chemical knowledge, the chemical reactions reproduc-

ible in a modern lab. Apart from arguing for a lineage between chemistry
and alchemya lineage that was named long ago by moral philosopher
Rousseau before the French Revolutionthe thesis has added nothing
new to the pool of knowledge that modern chemistry has already mas-
tered. Apart from making the point that Chinese alchemy evolved inde-
pendently from Western chemistry, the thesis does not give due credit to
Daoism because it has rejected the core value of the soteriological dimen-
sion of alchemy.
Apart from grieving over the loss of instrumentalism, modern scholars
should also look at the decline of instrumental alchemy in the light of the
marriage of Confucian intellectualism and Buddhist soteriology. Daoist
bodily enlightenmentthe material unity of change and life symbolized
in the elixirswas turned into a Buddhist spiritual enlightenment that
argued life beyond change. The core of Buddhist soteriology was basically
to go beyond sufferingthe antithesis of change and life. The marriage
of Confucianism and Buddhism was the Chinese equivalent of Platonic-
Christian soteriology focusing on spirituality. Historically since the Song
dynasty, it formed a political force that removed Daoism and accepted
Buddhism as the state religion. The rise of internal alchemy was the Daoist
response to the Buddhist challenge. Though instrumental alchemy faded
away, internal alchemy maintained the core value of Daoism by cultivating
the synthesis of change and life within another form of alchemical egg
the pneumatic body.
Alchemy cannot be reduced to inorganic chemistry. If we look to bio-
chemistry, we find a different view. The change-life synthesis is the starting
point for the life sciences. Darwins theory of evolution can be considered
the fundamental philosophy of the life sciences. Life and its material evolu-
tion are understood in the context of change. After Hegelian spiritualism
and Marxist materialism, Darwins naturalism was the first major attempt
to bring ancient Heraclitus and Anaximander to life. What Darwinism has
presented is a one and many argument. The evolution of species is gov-
erned by change; change is one perpetual principle, rather than a tem-
porary phenomenon, of the many. Like Ge Hongs genealogical one and
many, the diversity of life unfolds out of the process of material change.
In alchemical terms, the process is the synthesis of change and life,
an induction of natural change and life transformation. Each life can be
viewed as an alchemical egga unity of matter and form. Cyclical change
governs the evolution of life. Similar to the cyclical change of the Returned
Elixir, the ceasing-to-be of some gives rise to the coming-to-be of others.
And the collective life of all lives manifests the unceasing cyclical change
 the many255

the One. The unfolding nature of the One shapes the evolution of the
many. Is this unity determinate? For Darwin, although natural selection
is determinate, evolution is an open-ended. Thus it is indeterminate. For
Daoism, the unifying One is the creative Nature. The One is only deter-
minate in relation to the many by giving birth to them. But in itself it is
indeterminate. Because the ending is the beginning in the cyclical change,
there is no inbuilt teleological purpose in the change.

Alchemical Change as Cosmogonical Change

What does the comparison with Darwinism imply? Alchemical change
should not be restricted to chemical changes, but rather considered in
the context of cosmogonical change. Change is the universal phenom-
enon of the world. Plato also recognizes the universality of change, except
that he categorizes it as becoming subordinate to being. Chemistry follows
the ontological path of Plato by explaining changing phenomena with
unchangeable formulas. Alchemical change relies on the Daoist ontology,
similar to Heraclitus changing logos, that change manifests the Onethe
opposite of Parmenidean-Platonic Being. Becoming defines Being. Being
gives rise to Becoming.
In chemistry one also tends to view chemical elements as unchange-
able matter. Chemical elements can combine with each other, for example
(HgS), but they cannot mutate from one to the other. Such an understand-
ing of irreducible materials can be traced to Aristotelian indestructible
matter or, in a plural sense, atoms and Empedocles four elements. Aristo-
tle mainly understands change on a scale with two opposite ends (Physics
188b2126). For instance, various temperatures are located on a continu-
ous scale between cold and hot. The regulation of alchemical fire repre-
sents a similar understanding of variation of degree. But alchemical change
of minerals is not scaled in degrees as variation of the same genus, but is
generative in kind. This concept of substantial change can also be found in
Aristotle. For instance, a house burns down and thus ceases to be a house.
However, one of the chief difficulties to conducting a dialogue with Aris-
totle is the general definition of change: change involves the principle of
privation and actualization of a form (201a1012). For instance, the form
of tree is implicit in a seed but explicit in a grown tree. Change is mainly
the actualization of the potential within the same substance. But Ge Hongs
method of dissolving gold cannot be explained by potential-actual change.
The external acid solution plays a more fundamental role than the internal
potentiality that makes gold dissolvable. Unlike a burnt house, the sort of
substantial change in alchemy is generative rather than degenerative.
Chemistry, of course, rejects the Aristotelian view on change as varia-
256 comparative ontology

tion of the substance. It maintains the principle of potential-actual change

in chemical formulas, insofar as the basic elements can be regrouped and
not destroyed. This indestructibility makes chemical elements closer to the
atomists view of matter. The combinability of the basic elements, in con-
trast, is similar to Empedocles theory that argues that the four elements
can be regrouped into something new. As we shall see later, one crucial
point sets the Daoist understanding of material change apart from the
Western views. The Chinese Five Phases can change and mutate into one
another in a cycle. This changeability of the primaries defines alchemical
change as transformation of kinds. Moreover, change within a reaction ves-
sel is not narrowly viewed as one particular instance. Rather, the process
of change overall involves a correspondence between the micro and the
macro, between an alchemical egg and the cosmogonical egg. The change
that Ge Hong emphasizes the most is generative change in essence with
the generative Qi.

Induction
Alchemy believes in induction between change and life. Induction refers
to indirect but consequential correspondence between the two, like two
coils in an inductor. The alchemical view of life is not restricted to human
life; rather it is the other way around: human vitality is viewed against cos-
mic potency. The synthesis of change and life emerges from the cosmo-
gonical egg, from which Qi evolves through generative change. Ge Hong
believes that Qi is the foundation of all lives. Plato also argues that human
life, though defined psychologically, shares the same substance with the
World Soul. For Plato, immortal souls have an eternal home in the ratio-
nal, immaterial, and changeless realm. For Ge Hong, the most authen-
tic form of immortality is the body-spirit unity. The essence of life is not
unchangeable, but creative. Ge Hongs soteriology argues that changing
life from finite being to infinite existence does not mean the breaking up
of the body-spirit unity, but carries the same natural bond by partaking in
the cosmic continuity of change and life.
Though modern biology denies physical immortality, its Darwinian
philosophy accepts the continuity of change and life from species to spe-
cies. The continuity of evolution is cosmogonical in essence. Its dialectical
opposite is the discontinuity of natural selection. The change-life continu-
ity persists through the selective discontinuity that the extinction of one
species gives rise new ones. If the paradox of ontological continuity and
discontinuity is denied, the denial of the change-life relation implies that
there should be no life at all. However, the birth of a new life, such a
human infant, is the very synthesis of change and life.
 the many257

The key idea behind alchemical evolution is the metaphor of the chang-
ing egg. Human life is viewed as an alchemical egg that changes within the
cosmic egg. Other creatures also evolve into various eggs. Each creature
comes into existence as the result of internalizing external change; what
happens in the time-space matrix is engraved in the individual formation
of matter-form. Thus, each living entity is pregnant with change, and
carries cosmic change within its vessel. The pregnancy of each creature
is as creative as Xuan that is in constant gestation of Qi. Even minerals
are not considered as lifeless matter. They can biologically grow inside
an alchemical eggan instrumental miniature of the cosmic time-space
egg. For instance, Ge Hong points out that the essence of cinnabar can
generate gold, and if the mountain has cinnabar, one can often find
gold below the cinnabar layer (IC 286). For chemistry, the generalization
in the first part of the sentence is false. But geologically the second part
is true.30 Gold seems to grow out of cinnabar orea matrix of new mat-
terin the macrocosm.
Instrumental alchemy aims to reenact the evolution of the macrocosm
inside its microcosm and to shorten the long natural time taken by natu-
ral transformation by alchemical means using cyclical transformation.
The growing of gold artificially inside the alchemical time-space egg cor-
responds to the growth of gold in the natural time-space egg. Ge Hong
concludes, The elixir gold made from alchemical change contains the
essences of base minerals and is superior to natural gold (IC 286).31 Again,
chemistry will reject the superiority of artificial gold because it is not gold
at all. But it overlooks a philosophical point beyond the norms of chemis-
try. By interrupting natural cyclical change, alchemists break up base mate-
rials and reinsert change into the formation of matter through the instru-
mental method. Inserting change into matter is an artificial means of the
natural process of change but happens far more quickly than the process
of internalizing evolution into a species. The primary goal is not balancing
chemical formulas, but the study of matter in its most fundamental form,
namely, matter in transformation. The essence of alchemy, therefore, is
not about chemistry, but physics.

Alchemy and Physics: Two Forms of Cosmogony

I shall set three limits to the comparison between physics and alchemy
by saying what this comparison is and is not. (1) Alchemy is not physics;
alchemy is alchemy. But the OM arguments in alchemy and physics are
comparable. The analogy does not replace the alchemy as chemistry the-
sis with another alchemy as physics one. Rather it explores the OM issue
258 comparative ontology

hidden within alchemical practices and draws references from popular

physics so that alchemical concepts of time, space, change, and matter can
be made more intelligible. The point is not to show physics as an inter-
pretative norm, but to highlight cosmogonyan ancient form of the OM
argumentthat is shared by both alchemy and physics. This OM inquiry is
ignored in the alchemy as chemistry thesis.
(2) Alchemy is not modern scientific empiricism, but an ancient instru-
mental study of Nature. Empirical study in alchemy is not strictly empiri-
cism by modern standards. As we shall see shortly, alchemy is closely asso-
ciated with correlative thinking that draws an analogy between a crucible
and the universe, between elixirs and the Dao. For modern empiricism the
correlation is unwarranted. There is no direct correspondence between
the physical dimension of a crucible and the actual universe governed by
a complex web of principles, nor is there empirical proof to verify that
the correlation is true. But Ge Hongs alchemy represents an empirical
study of Nature through instrumental means to reenact Natures cyclical
change. This instrumentalism stands in contrast to Platos idealism without
any instrumental study. Thus the instrumentalism shared by alchemy and
physics defines a perspective to view Platos idealism through Ge Hongs
naturalism.
(3) Alchemy is in no way a well-defined field in Daoism. Much of the
textual tradition in the Daoist Canon was and still is a realm of mystery in
Daoist studies. The soteriological attachment in natural studies has been a
source of inspiration and a problematic for Daoism to gain more explana-
tory answers for its praxis. From the time of Ge Hong to the modern day,
the central dispute has been the doctrine of physical immortality behind
all alchemical practices. This section does not endorse Daoist soteriology
as an infallible doctrine, but seeks to show its positive side. Here the focal
point is the issue of change: the transformation of matter in particle phys-
ics and the transformation of life in alchemy. Behind the phenomenon of
change there is a concept of material time exemplified by particles and
elixirs. Therefore, the analogy between alchemy and physics once again
aims to explore the OM argument by discussing change in the context of
time.

The Nine-Cycle Elixir and Its Internal Clock

It is necessary to recognize that the induction of change and life in instru-
mental alchemy is justified by two activities: technological induction and
soteriological induction. The first one involves the construction of the
instrument, the prescription of minerals, and the utilization of cosmic
energy from the sun or the regulation of artificial fire. These activities cre-
 the many259

ate a time-space environment for the reenactment of change. A text pos-

sibly belonging to the Tang period, the Mysterious Scripture on the Nine Times
Recycled Great Elixir of the Numinous Sand for the Benefit of the Sagely
, vividly describes the correlation between the macrocosm
and the microcosm:

The tripod has three feet that correspond to three forms of support-
ing knowledge [heavenly, earthly, and human]. The unity of the upper
and the lower parts corresponds to the merging of Yang and Yin. The
legs four inches tall symbolize the four changing seasons. The inner
chamber eight inches deep symbolizes eight points on the compass.
The lower part containing eight doors allows winds to blow in from
eight directions. The burning coal divided into twenty-four portions
corresponds to the consecutive twenty-four fortnightly periods on the
lunar calendar. . . . The Dao of the great elixir is hidden in the activity
that reenacts many thousands years natural making with twelve-hour
periods [of artificial making]. (DZ 19, 1)

Similar to Ge Hongs description of the alchemical body in cosmic

terms, in this text, the technical induction between Nature and alchemy is
also described in cosmic terms. Contrary to Platos thing-idea differen-
tiation, alchemy emphasizes the thing-to-thing correlation. The tripod
has three supporting feet that correspond to the three branches of classic
knowledge: heavenly astronomy , earthly geology , and human
ethics . The upper and lower parts correspond to the order of heav-
enly Yang and earthly Yin. The measurement of the feet as four inches
tall designates that the tripod is supported by the rotation of the four sea-
sons. The chamber with eight doors corresponds to the eight-directional
exchange between cosmic Qi and internal growth of material life. The
coal used for firing is divided into twenty-four portions; each portion is
subsequently used in each period divided according to the lunar year with
twenty-four fortnightly joints (jie). And finally, the text summarizes the
natural philosophy behind alchemical practice. It is to reenact Natures
thousand years of making with days (twelve-hour periods) of instrumental
making.
Such a passage demonstrates the intention to build a microcosm that
corresponds to the macrocosm. But this correlative thinking has its weak-
ness, namely, idealism. The same idealism appears in the writings of the
Gaitian cosmology (Gaitian shuo ) that hopes to fit the world into
perfect measurements. Like the measurements in the Gaitian theory, the
inches and other measurements in this text are arbitrary and have nothing
260 comparative ontology

to do with the physical universe. But they are conventional in the con-
temporary cosmology. For modern empiricism, the correlation based on
measurements is not convincing. But is it convincing for alchemists like
Ge Hong?
Arbitrary standards are regarded as innate in the world as people knew
it. The three forms of supporting knowledge in Confucian society, four
changing seasons in agriculture, eight points on the compass in navi-
gation, and so on, are basic categories that give expression to the orderly
universe. The same is true in Platos natural studies. Astronomical mea-
surements were also arbitrary, but nonetheless they are representations of
the created order in the intelligible world. But unlike Platonic knowledge
that is purely about knowing ideas through ideas, alchemical measure-
ments, such as the Nine-Cycle transformation, have a critical role in the
induction theory based on fundamental correlative thinking. There is a
direct correspondence between Natures making and alchemical transfor-
mation. One may question whether an instrument of the universe can be
successfully built according to ancient measurements and categories of
the world. But the significance of correlative thinking cannot be brushed
away.
Technical induction certainly is not an alchemical ambition. Beneath
the Jura Mountains near Geneva, Switzerland, the worlds most power-
ful accelerator is now ready. The European Organization for Nuclear
Research will conduct some of the most important scientific experiments
of recent times, helping scientists to unravel how and why the universe
came to exist. The modern particle accelerator works on the same prin-
ciple as an alchemical vessel, that is, to create artificial conditions in which
those imperceptible conditions pertaining in the early universe can be
assimilated. By accelerating protons to near the speed of light and then
smashing them together, physicists expect to see the breaking down of
protons revealing phenomena related to the structure of matter at the
primordial level. The search for the so-called god particle is basically
cosmogonical-alchemical.
Technical inductions ancient and modern aim at the same purpose
to reenact change. The phenomena of change associated with the cosmog-
ony of matter are still present in the universe, but they are not perceptible
by ordinary means. By shortening time and energizing space, the induc-
tion reverses time-space to its primordial unity. And the unity within the
most elementary matter becomes an empirical window through which the
evolution of the cosmos may be observed at the level of the most basic and
creative unity. From an alchemical perspective, this creative core does not
belong solely to the beginning of the universe, but also transcends time-
 the many261

space and continues in and behind the myriad things made of this pri-
mary matter. Ge Hong says, That which is Dark is the primordial ancestor
of Nature and the Great Forebear of the myriad different [things] . . . Its
unbroken continuity is named as excellence. . . . Therefore, where Xuan is,
happiness is unceasing; where it withdraws, spirits depart and substances
become fragments (IC 1).
To build a sealed time-space environment, alchemists use a key mate-
rial oddly called Six-One Mud (). According to Pregadios study,
the term Six-One conceals a metaphysical idea called the reenactment
of cosmogony. 32 The total number seven recalls a seven-staged creation
out of chaos in the Zhuangzi 5. And the concept of chaos is repeated in the
story in chapter 21. There was an emperor titled Chaos (Hundun )
who lived in the middle land. Unlike a normal person he lacked the seven
openings (eyes, ears, and so on). Two kings from the north and the south
came to create one physical opening each day as their way to repay his
previous hospitality. On the seventh day, the emperor died as the result of
forced differentiation (Zhuangzi 5). From this story Pregadio draws a paral-
lel with the seven-day genesis in Judeo-Christian theology.33 Although he
speculates in the right cosmogonical direction, the parallel is not entirely
apt. Zhuangzi does not have a seven-staged creation in mind.
The term Hundun should not be translated as chaosa disorderly
precosmosa term that is also adopted by Sivin.34 The translation chaos
derives from Greek mythology and is called Necessity by Plato to designate
the opposite of Reason. In Chinese the characters themselves indicate that
the concept is related to water. According to Shuowen jiezi , hun
refers primarily to massive flows of water (hun feng liu ye ),
and the meaning of turbid or muddy water is secondary.35 The word dun
refers to formlessness. For example, hunhun xi in Laozi 20 and hun-
hun dundun in Zhuangzi 11 both carry the meaning of unable to
identify a particular form. 36 Moreover, in Daoist ecology the term carries
a positive meaning referring to the wholeness of the world and its origin,37
rather than the negative connotation in Platos Timaeus (52d, e).
We need to continue to translate it as formlessness. In alchemical
terminology, it also refers to the divine chamber (shenshi ), a name
for enclosed vessels, or a crucible is directly called hundun.38 What is this
enclosure? It is a time-space environment or an embryo of matter. In one
instance Ge Hong says, Unless people have penetrated the most primor-
dial core of things, they will not see the true shape of [Nature] (IC 284).39
The key application of the Six-One Mud is to create a sealed cham-
ber that is physically insulated and chemically stable. This is the spatial
aspect of the Mud. Another aspect is time. Six-One corresponds to seven
262 comparative ontology

days; seven days is a basic time unit in alchemy. The number Nine in
Nine-Cycle Elixir refers to nine times seven days. The final elixir is the
end product of a sixty-three-day (97) period of cyclical change. The key
reason for Ge Hong to keep the prescription for the Mud secret is that a
successful construction of the alchemical egg holds the key to the techno-
logical induction. The time-space environment is the biological womb
for the growth of matter.
Similar to the cosmic egg, in which Xuan is the embryo of the primal
matter Qi, an alchemical egg space covered with the Mud only becomes
an embryo when it has been filled with minerals. Otherwise it is merely
an empty vessel. And the alchemical embryogenesis will not be pregnant
with the essence of life unless it is activated by the energy of fire. Other-
wise, the time-space environment only contains disassociated minerals
an assembly of parts without relational ontology. Once the various miner-
als are energized, what happens inside the time-space environment is not
chaosabsence of orderat all. It contains the orderliness of change. Ge
Hong believes that the orderliness is biological. Alchemical embryogenesis
happens in and through the change measured by cyclical time and ener-
gized by formless space. Like a human fetus, change produces a matter-
form bond that internalizes external time-space.
When we put the time-space order in Ge Hongs description of the
nine-cycle elixirs into the chart and diagram in Figure 9.2, we can see two
symmetrical trends in the time-space coordinates.
In the chart on the left, we face again the Daoist concept of material
time. Time is not an abstract idea, but is expressed by concrete things,
namely, elixirs produced by various cycles of change. This material time
is shown as the horizontal line in the graph, which corresponds to the
second column in the table. And space is not an empty space either, like
the space in atomism and the Newtonian mechanical universe. It is also a
concrete notion symbolized by the material space of the elixirs. The more
incubation days that it has, the smaller the elixir becomes. The last col-
umn in the table corresponds to the vertical line in the graph as space.
The organizing principle of the table is change. But the change is nei-
ther a Platonic abstract idea of being and becoming, nor a scale between
two opposites like Aristotelian variation. Change is interwoven together in
the matrix of time and space, and materialized as different elixirs defined
by its soteriological effects. The whole activity of forming elixirs defines
change as a process.
This process shapes various elixirs in stages. The elixirs represent the
products that have gone through different incubation periods. Each elixir
has internalized a specific matrix time-space in the alchemical embryo and
Fig. 9.2. Cycles of change and material time-space
264 comparative ontology

grows into a matter-form unit. The nine-cycle elixir occupies the smallest
material space because it has internalized the cyclical time turned by fire
and is closest to the Xuan-One in the scale of time. The one-cycle has the
biggest size because it has had the least internal time to form the bond of
matter-form. These nine unities are categorized according to time (num-
bers of cycles) and space (physical size). They are shown in Table 9.2 as
a decreasing trend. The nine-cycle elixir is held to be the most superior
medicine to transform human life by strengthening the bond of change
and life within the human body because it is believed to have mingled in it
the natural evolution of change and life. This aspect of longevity is shown
in the increasing trend in the graph.
These two trends are symmetrical. The decreasing order refers to the
change from the many to the One. Against the background of cosmogoni-
cal change, it shows the return from actuality to primordiality. This is the
reverse order of creation. Many minerals possess different material forms
in which the primal matter Qi has varied presences. The more alchemical
change happens to the base materials, the simpler and stronger the bond
matter-form becomes. The final elixir corresponds to materialized Dao in
which Xuan is eternally pregnant with Qi. The elixir is spatially the small-
est but the most everlasting in time. The materialized Dao corresponds to
the creative core of the universe. When time and space are infinitely small,
there is only formlessness. When the matrix of time-space is closer to zero,
even matter and form are undistinguished.
By ingesting the bean-sized elixir, Daoist adepts anticipate a new cre-
ation within themselves. Today bodily alchemy, which has superseded
instrumental alchemy, maintains the same idea of transfiguration through
the means of ingesting bodily elixirs produced in the crucibles of elixir
fields through the pneumatic body. The transformation would put the cre-
ative core of all changes at the center of their beings. The increasing trend
refers to longevitya bond of change and life. The more the elixir has
undergone the incubation of material life, the more enduring is the bond
between change and primal matter, Qi. The most evolved material form
occupies infinite space, contains a countless number of changes, and has
the most diverse forms of life. This is the current cosmos. It is this cosmic
life that all immortal beings aim to animate.

Alchemical Embryogenesis and

Structural Layers of the Universe
Here we can draw an analogy between alchemy and modern physics. In
an energized vessel, minerals are like accelerated protons. The change
measured in cyclical time is the build-up for the final reaction, just as the
 the many265

circular acceleration in a particle accelerator accumulates energy for mov-

ing protons. Different stages of change during the formation of the nine-
cycle elixirs correspond to different stages of protons crashing into each
other that reveal the structural layers of matter. Each layer of matter rep-
resents an evolutionary embodiment of change. And change is measured
with time and space. Each particle contains an internal clock of evolu-
tion and an external spatial dimension. Protons and neutrons are larger
in mass and size and less primordial than smaller particles such as quarks
and leptons.
On a larger scale, simple viruses are smaller in size and earlier in the
scale of evolution than living organisms. The current universe takes the
longest time to evolve and occupies the largest space. Overall, various
structures of matter-form gradually come into existence during the pro-
cess that materializes and internalizes time-space. This process produces
various entities from small particles to large organisms, even the current
universe. If we rank these entities and place them in time-space coordi-
nates, we get a graph similar to the one presented earlier (see Figure 9.3).
The structural layers of the universe and alchemical embryogenesis
appear to be symmetrical, but they are really the same because the com-
parative idea behind them is the same. It is the internalization of time-
space in matter-form structures. What the top graph shows is the transfor-
mation of matter comparable with alchemical change. And this change
shares something remarkable with modern physics. First, between alchemy
and physics, there exists a shared goalto understand the world at the
most fundamental level. The final formation of elixir matter, which dis-
plays a spectacular show of five-coloured divine light, is like the final
smashing of protons at near the speed of light. Here the point is not to
make the metaphor far-fetched or to argue an alchemy as physics thesis.
Rather physics is a better analogy for alchemy than chemistry, and alchemy
can help us to name the search for cosmogony in modern physics. Physics
and alchemy share a similar quest to understand the One and the many
of the world.
According to E = mc 2, when protons are smashed together at high veloc-
ity, the released energy at the astronomical scale will tear protons apart and
reveal the phenomena of change. Change is the fundamental reality. And
change is closely associated with the origin of matter. Subatomic changes
reveal what matter is. From the alchemical perspective, the most funda-
mental may be neither a form of matter physically substantial and mathe-
matically calculable nor a numerical unity after all. It could be intrinsically
dark, like Ge Hongs Xuan, and as infinitely formless as Zhuangzis noth-
ingness. The universe could have emerged out of darkness and formless-
266 comparative ontology

Fig. 9.3. Embryogenesis of matter and the alchemic structure of the universe

ness. Within the formless dark there rests its external reality in the mode of
changing formlessness into matter-form unity, namely, Qi. This ontologi-
cal One keeps expanding. The primordial changeability is still present in
the universe and still engaged in the making of the many.
To examine the analogy of alchemy and physics closely, I shall bring
in some theories of physics. As physicists predict, the current universe is
made mostly of Dark Matter and Dark Energy, and the Dark Energy causes
the expansion of the universe to accelerate in the first place.40 What is this
 the many267

dark entity? Before the Dark energy-matter hypothesis, physicists in recent

years established the Standard Model. According to the model, there
are six leptons and six quarks that interact by means of four force-carrying
particles called bosons. These particles are the basic building blocks of the
universe, and the model can be visualized as in Figure 9.4.
According to the model, the universe and everything in it is made up
of these primary particles. The model has been highly influential in the
past two decades, and its theoretical framework has led to the discovery of
previously unknown particles. But a fundamental limit of this model is that
gravity, one of the elementary forces, is neither included nor explained by
the force-carrying particles. Another limit is the lack of explanation for
the active Dark Matter that is now understood to occupy a large portion
of the universe. In order to correct and improve the Standard Model, just
like Einsteins theory of gravity has done to the Newtonian law of gravity,
physicists have proposed further theories, among which the supersymme-
try theory has created much enthusiasm.
Supersymmetry is a theory to unify matter and force, in particular
gravity, with the other fundamental forces. It predicts that every matter
particle should have a massive shadow or dark force carrier particle,
and every force carrier should have a massive shadow or dark mat-
ter particle. For example, for every type of quark there may be a type of
particle called a squark. The symmetrical shadow or dark partners
are significantly large in mass comparing to their visible partners.41 They
are collectively called superparticles. This symmetry in theoretical physics
hopes to create a synthesis between particles and forces, between quantum
mechanics and general relativity,42 which is an unsolved problem for the
Standard Model. By conceiving a unifying energy for three basic forces
(strong, weak, and electromagnetic), the supersymmetry model predicts
that superparticles could exist everywhere without being detectable by cur-
rent instruments.43
In high energy physics, the point of focus now is Where are the super-
particles? It has been a realistic hope that the next generation of accelera-
tor, such as the one in Geneva, will find them through new experiments.
If superparticles could be found, the discovery would place physics in a
better position to determine whether those superparticles could be candi-
dates to explain Dark Matter in cosmology. At the same time, a new theo-
retical vacuum would be created to further explain the key question: does
a type of superparticlethe lightest in mass and the lowest in energy
constitute the universe? If so, then could the universe have a single origin
such as this? Is a superparticle God or Dao?
No matter what theory comes later, supersymmetry has pointed out a
Fig. 9.4. The Standard Model and the Supersymmetry
Model: The Standard Model (top) (Original illustration
from Advancing Science, Servicing Society, reprinted from
http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/S/
standard_model.html [accessed June 2006]). The
Supersymmetry Model (below). (Used with the permission
of The ATLAS Experiment at CERN, reprinted from
http://atlas.ch/etours_physics/etours
_physics14.html [accessed April 2010])
 the many269

meaningful direction in modern phenomenology.44 The Standard Model

argues that nature is made up of basic particles verifiable through experi-
ments. But the supersymmetry model makes a correction to the model:
Nature at its fundamental level might be symmetrical. The partnership
between particles and superparticles has a comparative similarity with the
Daoist relational ontology between something and nothing. The range
of concepts like Dark Matter, Dark Energy, and shadow particles chal-
lenge the traditional understanding of nothing, which can be traced to the
Parmenidean-Platonic doctrine nothing as not-being or non-existence,
and move closer to a relational perspective. Nothing is not an existen-
tial concept, but a primordial one related to the formation of something
itself. More important, what is normally considered to be shadow reality is
viewed as more real and universal. In Daoist language, nothingness is the
mother of something.
To further understand this relational ontology, both physics and
alchemy rely on instrumental studies to reenact Natures making. Physi-
cists gaze at elementary particles through the microscope of the accelera-
tor, whereas alchemists have visualized the creative core of the universe as
the materialized Daothe elixirs. The true nature of the elixir is not the
matter itself, but the relational bond with the formlessness of Dao, just
like the hidden connection between particles and their shadow partners
in physics. It is this bond that reveals the secrets of the creative Nature and
defines the essence of change.

Alchemical Model of the One and the Many

Both modern physics and alchemy share a process philosophy, and the
evolution of matter is inferred from the generative schema of cosmogony.
The search for the universal(s) in physics seems to follow the deductive
argument by reducing the world to elementary particles, like the ancient
theory of four elements argued by Empedocles. But the Big Bang theory
has turned the deductive argument into modern cosmogony. The radia-
tion evidence discovered by Edwin Hubble that shows that distant galaxies
are moving away from us, which later won a Nobel Prize, directly supports
the theory of the exploding and expanding universe. Certainly the origi-
nal explosion related to the formation of elementary particles still remains
hypothetical and requires supporting evidence from high energy physics.
But it has been a well-accepted view that the universe is neither stable nor
in equilibrium, but expanding at a rapid rate.
Change is the basic reality of the universe. Within this general frame-
work, the deterministic worldview (as in Platos Timaeus) based on timeless
natural laws is wrong. But the philosophical question is this. If the world is
270 comparative ontology

an open system, then what can be seen as relatively closed? Without the
closedness, the very openness could lead to endless expansion and thus
dissolution. This is the same philosophical question about difference and
sameness in change.
The figures above illustrate two comparable trends. One is alchemi-
cal embryogenesis. Change is represented by the trend from the formless
Dao to various elixir-matters and is closely associated with transforming
cyclestime. The other is the trend from superparticles in the supersym-
metry to sixteen matter-force particles in the Standard Model, from pro-
ton and neutron to atom, from the smallest living entity molecule to the
largest living universe. Strictly speaking, this increasing trend in physics
is not evolution, but represents the structural layers of the world. So the
question is how these structural layers can be viewed as evolutionary. The
crucial issue is time and its effects on change.
Like the alchemical form of material time, the trend from particles to
the more complex entities of the sophisticated world can also been under-
stood as a scale of time in material forms. In alchemy, this material time
scale is related to the closeness to the primordial Dao. In the scale from the
one-cycle elixir to the nine-cycle elixir, each one is an independent materi-
alized Dao. These nine elixirs categorized by the soteriological effects are
the hypostases of Dao but differed on the basis of their closeness to the
cosmogonical One. So time has a crucial effect on the end product. And
each elixir is a unique product of change containing sameness and differ-
ence in relation to the origin. Insofar as the order from one-cycle elixir to
nine-cycle elixir goes, we can see the sequence by which one gives rise to
the other. In OM language, each elixir is a one and many of the Dao in
essence. But they are differentiated by change. An independent one and
many of the Dao gives rise to another one and many through change.
More precisely they have different internal clocks numbered by the cycles
of change. This is the alchemical model of one and many.
From this alchemical perspective, a hidden OM argument can be artic-
ulated from the trend represented by the structural layers. The elementary
particles are not, strictly speaking, reducible elements following deduc-
tive analysis. But in the generative schema each thing in the world is the
hypostasis of primary superparticles. Different layers of matter, atoms, mol-
ecules, living entities, and so on represent different relational bonds with
the primaries. On the scale of time, each single one of them is an inde-
pendent OM unity. Therefore, the one and many is not defined as a single
universal and plural products of it, but each single one of the many is a
paradoxical unity of the one and many. Elementary particles are many in
relation to something more primordial, namely, superparticles. An atom is
 the many271

a unity of one and many containing a nucleus and extranuclear electrons.

A red cell is a unity of one and many. A human body is a unity of one and
many. The universe is a unity of one and many that is called Nature. The
basic universals are not transcendent from these layers of the world, but
immanent in each individual system. Unlike a Platonic OVM structure, the
universals form a sustainable model of the One under many envisioned by
the alchemists. It is out of this system of individual one and many, which
yet supports plurality, that the world is formed. What holds each OM unity
together is not a superstructure of an intelligible design. Rather it is an
indeterminate and evolving life still in the making.
From the point of view of alchemical embryogenesis, each layer of
the world from a superparticle to a universe can be seen as an alchemical
egg. Each evolutionary layer of material life embodies an internal time
clock and an external spatial dimension. When the increasing of the spa-
tial dimension unfolds in time, there comes the stability of change and
life. The universe possesses longevity because it has an enduring form of
relational unity containing a complex plurality and a complex system of
change. Compared with embryos, viruses have shorter life and simpler
style of mutation. Compared with an atom, a proton has only a fraction
of its existence, and its instability quickly draws energy on an atomic scale
to form an atom, which is the reverse of a nuclear explosion. In the dia-
gram called structural layers of the universe (the upper image in Figure
9.3), the mirror-imaged line indicates the primordiality of these structural
layers. Superparticles could well be the primal matter that existed at the
beginning of the universe and still participates in the making of the chang-
ing universe. In summary, these symmetrical lines demonstrate two para-
doxical orders. The increasing order shows the cosmogonical change from
one to many, whereas the decreasing one is the instrumental study from
many to the One. These two orders are not logically opposed, but are two
directions of change.
Evolution is indeterminate, because it is open-ended. This evolution
also leaves us with a problem mentioned before: sameness within differ-
ence. In Darwinism, there is no cosmogony. The beginning of becoming
is assumed, thus open to interpretation. Perhaps the genesis of evolution
was started by God or began without a causal beginning, like Daoist spon-
taneity. Evolution refers to an increasing sophistication through which a
simpler organism becomes a complex species. Therefore, change is about
potentiality. But this is only one side of the change, namely, differentiation.
A model of one and many requires both continuity and discontinuity.
For example, a duck egg is not so full of open-ended potential that it can
naturally transform itself into a horse. There must be a paradoxical side of
272 comparative ontology

change, namely, sameness, to prevent a duck to mutate into a horse. Life is

self-organizing to embody both sameness and difference, both continuity
and discontinuity. The self-organizing mechanisms of nature are topics of
modern biology, in particular, the study of genetics.
It must be admitted that Ge Hong and his contemporaries knew little
about what constitutes the continuity of change, so the balance between
self-organizing and open-ended potentiality (between the continuity and
the discontinuity of change) is something they were able to discuss only
on a fairly abstract basis, like Qi. But alchemists like Ge Hong conceived
an important idea: life in its original form is simple and intrinsically beau-
tiful. Like the double helix in genetics, the origin of life in alchemy is
also understood in a relational ontologythe double subject Xuan and
Daoarticulated by the philosophy of Yin and Yang. This origin of simple
life gives rise to the alchemical model of one and many. Although the
OM model is not directly perceptible in Ge Hongs texts, the comparison
with modern science makes it intelligible, even inspirational to further the
quest for cosmogony in modern science. Having contextualized alchemy,
now we shall see how much this alchemical OM model departs from Pla-
tos mathematical OM model and how far modern physics has distanced
itself from Platos idealism.

Platos Mathematical Universe

Contrary to Ge Hongs spiral evolution from one to many, Platos one over
many ontology argues the linear hierarchy of the ideal/actual. This subor-
dination evidently carries the chief motif in the creation of the world. The
body of the universe came after the Soul (34c). Since the Soul animates
Reason, the Demiurge also makes the irrational body ruled by the rational
Soul, and the body is the visible image of the invisible Soul (31a). Although
Plato calls the divine craftsman a godnot Zeus, the supreme god of the
Greek pantheonthe whole discourse of constructing the body is basically
ontological. Because of the distinction between causing Forms and caused
matter, the creation of the parts of the body becomes the resemblance of
Forms by the elements.
The Demiurge first overcame chaos with Forms, then structured four
disorganized element with Forms, and finally assembled the parts into the
whole of the Soul. Although Platos view on the structure of matter has
little originality, because the four elements and the atomistic irreducible
particles had already been argued, in the narrative on making the body,
Plato more specifically than in other dialogues applies the ontology to
natural philosophy. Nature refers to the ideal world that determinates the
 the many273

actual world and the metaphysical Forms that rule physical things through
causation.

Geometrical Interpretation of Empedocles Elements

Plato argues that the body of the universe has an inbuilt geometrical struc-
ture. The argument is presented after two discourses: the physical world
has only a secondary reality (2829), and the motive for creating the body
is mainly to make a unique copy of a unique perfect model (3031).

So god, when he began to put together the body of the universe, made
it of fire and earth. But it is not possible to combine two things prop-
erly without a third to act as a bond to hold them together. And the
best bond is . . . a continued geometrical proportion. So god placed
water and air between fire and earth, and made them so far as possible
proportional to one another. . . . By these means and from these four
constituents the body of the universe was created to be at unity owing to
the proportion. . . . The construction of the world used up the whole of
each of these four elements. . . . A suitable shape for a living being that
was to contain within itself all living beings would be a figure that con-
tains all possible figures within itself. Therefore, he made it a spherical
shape, with the extremes equidistant in all directions from the center, a
figure that has the greatest degree of completeness and uniformity, as
he judged uniformity to be incalculably superior to its opposite [plural-
ity]. (31b33b)

Plato has packed many ideas into this text: the four elements, geomet-
rical continuity, a spherical universe, uniformity, and others. He clearly
accepts Empedocles material pluralism, but he does not explain why
the limited plurality of fire, air, water, and earth is more suitable than
the unlimited plurality of the atomists for the starting premise. However,
Plato argues a monist position in addition to pluralism, which indirectly
explains his position. A close reading can reveal that the chief argument is
the familiar OVM structure.
The text has features distinctive of geometrical immaterialism. The
Demiurge made the body as a living being that was to contain within itself
all living beings, turned the whole into a spherical shape, and judged
that the spherical figure has the greatest degree of completeness and uni-
formity and is superior to its opposite, plurality. Again the spherical uni-
verse was Empedocles idea. But Empedocles did not mean that the world
was physically spherical, but historically cyclical (Simplicius, Commentary on
the Physics, B17). Plato evidently gives a geometric twist to the original idea.
274 comparative ontology

Moreover, prior to his assertion of the spherical cosmos, Plato describes

how the elements are organized. The maker began the construction of
types of matter by setting fire and earth apart (31c). The separation of fire
and earth defines the perimeter with two opposite ends. This is the first
move to arrange the disorderly elements. The perimeter of the opposites
has little to do with Empedocles contrary forces of Love and Strife. The
forces function as the creative force of change. The former is a geometric
interpretation of this older idea. It gives a geometrical structure to the ele-
ments to provide continuity for the discontinuity of the four. We shall see
the full function of the fire-earth perimeter shortly. In the meantime, it is
necessary to identify Platos intention.

Greek Four Elements and Chinese Five Phases:

The Issue of Interchange
A short dialogue between Empedocles four elements and the Chinese
Five Phases will reveal more about Platos intention. Empedocles argued
that cyclical history turned the cosmic wheel in which the elements never
cease their continual change, now coming together by Love all into one,
now again all being carried apart by the hatred of Strife (B17). The
together and apart of the four elements can be seen in the right side of
Figure 9.5. The arrangement of the Five Phases is shown in the left side of
the diagram.45 Compared with the Greek four elements, the Chinese Five

Fig. 9.5. Interchangeable Five Phases and unchangeable elements

 the many275

Phases contain an extra phase called Wood, and the phase Metal is absent
in the Greek elements; the Greek element air is not found in the Chinese
Phases.
The diagram on the right demonstrates that the elements can change
from the state of unification to the state of separation under the forces of
Love and Strife. The diagram on the left demonstrates two orders among
the Five Phases. The outer circle represents the ring of generation (sheng
).

Water sustains the growth of wood;

Wood can be burned to generate fire;
Incinerated things return to earth;
Earth is the geological embryo of metal;
Metal can be solubilized into water (the change from metal to water
is an alchemical view, such as the view that gold can be solubilized
into the Gold Liquor).

The inner pentacle describes the order of degeneration (ke ).

Water extinguishes fire;

Fire melts down metal;
Metal cuts wood;
Wood takes nourishment from earth and impoverishes it;
Earth conditions flowing water.

These two orders shape the dialectical relations among the Phases. The
most striking feature of the Phases is its interchangeability. Empedocles
elements can be mixed but not interchanged. By Love they are compressed
together and by Strife expanded apart.
What does the interchangeability imply for change? Wood, for exam-
ple, relies on water for natural growth and takes root in earth for nourish-
ment, thus impoverishing the soil. It can be burned to generate fire; fire
returns the ash to earth and enriches the soil with the constituent miner-
als. The order of degeneration is wood-earth-water-fire-wood. Similar to
a tree, the change of wood is balanced by generation and degeneration.
Generation and degeneration are basically continuity and discontinuity.
Daoism traditionally uses Yin and Yang to symbolize two orders. Because
Yin and Yang form a relational whole, wood contains an inner balance in
the likeness of the balanced cosmogonical energies.
The same conjunction of continuity and discontinuity exists in each
Phase. Since each Phase in the circle represents a point of correlated bal-
276 comparative ontology

ance, each one becomes relational to the others through the same bal-
anced Yin-Yang. What the balance represents is essentially change. And
change is the fundamental reality of Nature that manifests as a cosmic
turning wheel, as the diagram depicts. Once the wheel starts turning, the
Phases interchange through the cyclical process. There will not be more
wood than the other Phases, because each one is weighed in the balance
with the others by the same orders of generation and degeneration. The
unceasing circle of change expresses remarkable similarity with Emped-
ocles homogeneous Sphere. Love is not the only force at work to bring
about change in the cosmos, but Strife also.
The similarity between the two systems of change is the dual involve-
ment of the contrary orders. Contrary to the Five Phases, however, the
interchangeability among the elements is strikingly missing. Why is it
important? It is the continuity that connects the elements by forming a
relational bond among them. The bond is change. Love and Strife must
not simply compress or expend the four. To generate plurality beyond
the universals, as in the case of alchemical change among minerals, it is
fundamental to establish the interchangeability among them. Empedocles
knew the problem. He said: Painters take the many-colored pigments in
their hands and, harmoniously mixing them, some more some less . . .
[the mixing of the four] create trees, men and women, beast, birds, and
fish (B23).
The metaphor of mixing many colors seems to have explained the
interchangeability. But the metaphor implies that to mix varied quanti-
fies of the four can generate a new one, such as tree, human, and animal.
To mix four requires the change that all four must pass into one another,
just as four colors are mixed into one. The essence of the mixing is the
creation of something new. The mixing of water and pebbles does not
produce a new entity, but a situation in which the pebbles are surrounded
by water. It is again a situation of attachment, not a unity of harmony. In
the instance of a tree, once the four elements are mixed, they form an
organic life where all four need to be woven together in harmony of unity.
The metaphor has pointed in the right direction by saying harmoniously
mixing them. But how does this passing into each other exactly happen
in the painters mixing? Empedocles did not answer.
Passing into each other means change within and upon each element.
It is relatively easy to speak of the discontinuity of change. For instance,
the different colors of the rainbow can be reunited into white. But what
is the continuity between the seven-colored rainbow and white? This con-
tinuity principle is missing in Empedocles. Plato takes this challenge and
comes up with an answer.
 the many277

Geometrical Continuity
Similar to the Chinese categorization in which fire symbolizes the positive
heaven and earth represents the negative earth, Plato also treats fire and
earth as the two extremes of the four, between which there exist air and
water. By setting fire and earth apart, Plato is able to hang a conceptual
string called a continued geometrical proportion (31d) between two
poles. This geometric proportion organizes air and water, and becomes
the best bond of their difference. The bond then functions as the miss-
ing continuity in the midst of discontinuity among Empedocles elements.
Interesting here is a hidden change. The continuity is not a material sub-
stance in the likeness of the elements, but a geometrical proportion. Here
Plato makes his Pythagorean advance beyond Empedocles pluralism.
One would expect that the geometrical proportion somehow should
reconcile the difference between geometrical immaterialism and the par-
ticles theory of Empedocles material pluralism. But Plato does not put in
the effort to reconcile the difference in the overall schema of the creation
of the body. Instead he still relies on the ethical model of the souls ruling
nature over the body. Therefore, the content of the continuity is familiar.
It comprises exactly the same algebraic divisions and involves the same
numbers that have structured the Soul. The proportion contains the num-
bers (1, 3, 9, 27) and (1, 2, 4, 8) with cube and square characteristics
(32a). Again, what do these numbers really represent? The branch of odds
contains the pattern of 3 n =1, 3, 9, 27 (n = 03), and the branch of evens
shows the order of 2 n =1, 2, 4, 8 (n = 03). When n = 0, both branches pro-
duce the primary number 1, which symbolizes the numerical oneness of
the Soul. Here Plato has interpreted Empedocles Love and Strife algebra-
ically as even and odd numbers but gives Pythagorean numbers material
and spatial dimensions.
The mathematical treatment of Empedocles materialism continues
where Plato later links each element to a particular solid shape: earth-
cube, air-octahedron, fire-pyramid, and water-icosahedron (55d56c).
Since all solid shapes are distinct, four elements also become the build-
ing blocks for constructing the body of the universe. This hypothesis of a
universe made up of mathematical particles in essence turns the material-
ism of Empedocles into Pythagorean idealism.
The crucial question is whether this insertion of geometrical soul stuffs
into material elements actually serves the purpose of reconciling the dif-
ference between Being and Becoming. We must keep this question in
mind. The question is similar to one in modern stem cell research. The
most crucial part of the development of new life is not the insertion of
278 comparative ontology

genetic information into the cell, but the embodiment of the genes within
the new environment of the emptied cell. If the difference of Being and
Becoming is not reconciled, then the project of constructing the body of
the universe is in serious doubt.
In the meantime, we shall stay with the text and examine how geomet-
ric proportion is used to explain the continuity among the four. Once the
proportion has been transformed from algebraic division into solid geom-
etry, Plato explains that the construction of the body is made possible by
the determinate structure to the proportion. He claims that once the four
have been put together, they produce the cosmos-dodecahedron like a ball
with twelve faces stitched togetherthe structure first mentioned in the
Phaedo (110b).46 (See Figure 9.6.) Now let us examine the claim.
In solid geometry it is not possible to construct a dodecahedron by

Fig. 9.6. Four elementssolids, cosmos-dodecahedron

(Timaeus 77)
 the many279

using any of the solids shown above. Therefore, the cosmos-dodecahedron

cannot be constructed out of the element-solids. The change from the four
to the one cosmos is impossible. Perhaps Plato knows the problem and
explains that the dodecahedron is the figure closest in volume to a sphere.
But Plato is not interested in a comprehensive account of geometry.
If Plato follows geometry, then there is no particular reason to claim
that the assembly of the four must produce an approximate sphere. There
are many possibilities when the four solids are put together. And each out-
come depends on factors such as the size of each one and the number of
each solid involved in the mixing. To claim that the universe is spherical is
not supported by a calculated argument from the four to the one. How-
ever, it reminds readers of a connection: the spherical universe derives
from Empedocles homogeneous Sphere. By adopting the Sphere, Plato
should first address the issue of the shape of the body, that is, to argue in
the direction from the four to the one how the elements can produce a
sphere. Instead, he presupposes the ideal sphere, which is the structure of
the Soul, and goes on to find a dodecahedron as the approximate shape to
the sphere. In reality, this is the OVM argument that we are familiar with
from elsewhere. Plato tries to fit the elements into the idealism of the per-
fect sphere, but it does not fit geometrically. He continues the argument
without realizing the difficulty.
On the spherical body, he argues that the shape has the greatest degree
of completeness and uniformity. Spheres are equidistant in all directions
from the center. But again, how does the assembly of differently shaped
elements produce the spherical unity? The question points out a missing
premise of the OVM structure. Plato could say the sphere has the largest
volume of any solid shape (including the cube, octahedron, pyramid, and
icosahedron) with the same distance from the center. Thus the sphere can
contain the largest number of objects with the smallest dimension. But the
enclosed volume is a metaphor for the shape of the cosmos, similar to
the image of the alchemical egg containing many minerals. So far Plato
has only provided a cosmic container to carry the elements, but what the
creation of the body really needs is the insertion of a mathematical prin-
ciple into the elements.
However, a mathematical argument must demonstrate that the four to
the one is a real possibility. A cube is irreducible to a sphere, no matter
from which direction we look at them. Unless Plato can show the inter-
changeability of four solids similar to alchemical changes of minerals, the
geometric proportion between four and one remains as a broken discon-
tinuity rather a claimed continuity. Nothing about interchangeability has
been established.
280 comparative ontology

Being Defines Becoming, or Becoming Refines Being?

Plato has an anthropomorphic theory for why the universe is spherical.
God did not think there was any purpose in providing it with hands as if
it had need to grasp anything or defend itself, nor with feet or any other
means of support (33d). Without hands, the body of the universe can-
not take nourishment from external sources. Nothing material is located
outside of the body since the construction of the world used up the whole
of these four elements (32d). The body is a self-sufficient sphere with-
out eating and drinking that contains all realities within itself as a liv-
ing being. Without feet, the body cannot move on foot. Among the
seven physical motions (34a), the maker precluded all six locomotive
motions: up/down, right/left, and forwards/backwards. Without being
locomotive, the remaining motion is autorotation on an axis, just as an
armillary sphere works.
With the reference to without hands and feet, Plato hopes to establish
that the body of the universethe becominghas the minimum change.
Autorotation represents the stationary state of the universe, which is the
essence of being. Compared with Parmenides Being without change, the
universe is evidently changeable for Plato. Nevertheless, change has been
minimized by the stationary autorotation. Hence on the scale between
Parmenides and Heraclitus, Plato tips the balance and leans toward the
Parmenidean cosmology in which nothing changes and rejects Hera-
clitus doctrine of perpetual change. The becoming body animates the
being of the Soul in the most changeless status that geometry can possibly
conceive. The schema of Reason-Soul-body is run through and through
by the ontological motif of changelessness: from the eternal logos to the
cause of all motions (the Soul) and all the way down to the structure of
the body.
Has the without hands and feet analogy answered the question why
is the sphere the greatest unity? No. It has only reinforced the premise
that the sphere is the enclosing unity of the elements. Compared with
Ge Hongs cosmic egg, it seems both Platonism (strictly speaking, what
Plato has borrowed from Empedocles) and Daoism agree on the spherical
cosmos based on astronomical phenomena of rotation. But the two differ
on the scope of the universe: Platos universe is finite, and Ge Hongs is
infinite. For Plato, the body of the universe is finite not because it has a
limited size defined by the limited radius of the sphere, but because it is
created. Causation rather than relation is the ontological condition by
which the universe has been enclosed as the finite and created body.
To be a great unity has nothing to do with the shape of the universe,
 the many281

but with its scope. For Ge Hong, it is the infinite Xuan that provides the
environment for plurality to be interwoven into a whole. If Plato aban-
dons the idealism of the spherical soul and the body, then he might find
that there is an infinite layer enclosing the cosmos, a layer of the Good
of its otherness similar to the Daoist Xuan. The perfection of this infinite
(or transcendental) layer is not about its spherical structure, but about
its indefinite depth. Of course, this Daoist reading was not the direction
in which Western philosophy evolved. Influenced by Plato, Aristotles
geocentric worldview had an unshakable impact on Western cosmology
until the rise of modern astronomy. What the infinite scope really means
for the one and many is that the unity of plural elements is intrinsically
indeterminate.
Plato is correct to imagine that the spherical world contains all ele-
ments in it and correctly has not established the determinate structure
of the sphere over other geometric solids because the sphere mathemati-
cally is indeterminate over the element-solids. However, because of the
determinative soul/body structure, Plato is unable to see the indetermi-
nate unity of the Soul that by nature does not, and cannot, control every
aspect of change in the world with the determinate Form of sphere. On
the contrary, Ge Hong argues the cosmos is like an alchemical vessel and
allows the material substances to undergo interchange based on their
inner capacities to change insofar as the condition for change has been
provided.
What has really imprisoned the universe is the unchangeable geomet-
ric Form of the sphere. The Form minimizes change and causes the body
of the world to be as close as possible to the ideal perfection of change-
lessness. What would happen if the Form were infinite in scope? Would
infinity set the universe free? Mathematically an infinite radius will not
produce an infinite sphere because an infinite dimension has no specific
shape at all. The infinity of the Form will reject the ideal sphere. Without
the ideal, the Demiurge cannot turn the world in autorotation, nor can
he actualize the idea of the greatest degree of completeness and unifor-
mity through it (33b). Therefore, in order to preserve the idealism, it is
necessary to locate the universe in the finite norm.
The subordination of finite becoming to unchanging being consti-
tutes the relation of the body and the Soul. This subordination comes as a
direct result when the OVM ontology has been applied to natural philoso-
phy. The body of the universe also shares the same status of becoming as
the human body that undergoes the process of birth, growth, aging, and
dying. The finitude of the universe relates to its status of coming to be,
thus implied opposite of ceasing to be. Under this physical condition, the
282 comparative ontology

Demiurge puts the Soul in the center and diffuses it through the whole
body (34a), and hence the universe incarnates the divine logos with its
finite body.
To be sure, this is a remarkable turnabout from the nonparticipation
principle in the doctrine of Forms. The ideal bed is eternal and thus does
not participate in the actual bed subject to change and decay. Here, the
Soul is diffused through the whole body. It is the spiritual, rational, and
changeless identity to persist through material becoming. Unlike a Form,
this determination remains within the body to keep it ensouled and vital.
Contrary to the short-lived human body, the secret for the body of the
universe to have longevity is to reduce change to the minimumautorota-
tionby engaging Reason.

Change

The Soul: The Cause of Change

It is clear that in Platos mind the best way to minimize change is to be

motionless. Like Empedocles cyclical history, autorotation has no specific
beginning and ending. But unlike the constant change of the contracting
Love and expanding Strife that moves the wheel of history, Plato does not
realize that in order for the principle equidistant in all directions from the
center to shape a sphere and to produce rotation, three excluded pairs
of motion (up-down, right-life, and forward-backwards) must be included.
Like a laser beam forming a sphere, the actual formation of the sphere
involves the motions of up and down, right and left, and forward and back-
wards. The amount of each motion is exactly equal. We can employ analyti-
cal geometry and place each motion in x, y, and z coordinates to explain
what this means. Strictly speaking, a sphere defined by a certain radius is
not really a sphere, but rather an assembly of infinitely many points. Each
point occupies a particular location of the three coordinates. And each
point is a unique combination of six motions in three pairs.
These infinitely many points come as a result of the principle of equi-
distance from the center. But the precondition to produce the conse-
quence is that the principle itself must forever change. Therefore, Plato
has not really excluded the six motions through intelligent design. Instead,
any circular motion in three-dimensional space is primarily about the six
motions. Furthermore, if the Soul is believed to be the self-mover of all
motions, then it must not be the ultimate cause of change without self-
change. On the contrary, it changes as long as the body is alive, just as the
laser must move all the time for the sphere to exist. The Souls constant
 the many283

changing nature is the rejection of changeless Forms but the affirmation

ontological change.

Change: A Product of an Unchanging Principle

or a Principle Itself?
Plato has also failed to see the distinction between a changeless Form that
underlies changes and a changing principle that produces changes.
The former is based on the logic of causation, the latter on the ontology of
relation. The above argument shows that each spot on a spherical surface
is produced by the ever-changing principle that equal distance from the
center rotates three-dimensionally to produce the sphere. What can be
seen as changeless is only the center to anchor one point of the radius.
But this changeless center is only a reference point in geometry and not a
reality in astronomy.
There is nowhere to locate the center point of the infinite universe.
Ancient geocentric cosmology solves the problem simply by taking the
earth as the center. When modern infinite-space astronomy emerged,
observatory astronomy did not entirely abandon the earth center because
the earth represents the anchoring point of observations. The earth is the
relatively changeless center and is situated within the celestial phenomena
of change of the heavens. The spherical heaven contains regular orbits
(mostly nonspherical) and irregular motions. For Plato orbits represent
underlying principles of motions in the second ring of the cosmic struc-
ture called Existence. But in reality, for instance, planets produce motions
by being self-changing. And their relative fixture of being spherical princi-
ples is situated in the totality of cosmic change. If we put these aspects back
into Platos three layers of cosmic structure, the order must be reversed
into Difference-Existence-Sameness. Like Ge Hongs alchemical egg, the
outer ring of the cosmos always changes (Xuan), whereas the inner ring
around the earth is relatively inert. The middle ring intermediates what
is perpetually changingthe wheel of change. In Chinese astronomy, the
Five Planets are named after the Five Phases.
The above criticism of Platos idealism of the unchanging sphere
tips the balance toward Heraclitus flux theory, contrary to Platos Par-
menidean intention. What underlies the changeless appearance of the
rotating sphere is that the principle perpetually changes. This is exactly
the principle of instrumental alchemy. By creating the changing envi-
ronment, the alchemical egg is constantly in gestation of new material
existence, as it brings the Five Phases into the process of change. For
Plato rest and motion are causational; the resting principle of the sphere
defines circular motion. Alchemy reverses the order: rest is the product
284 comparative ontology

of change. Ge Hongs Change is the principle of Nature shares the

general view of change with Heraclitus flux and Empedocles changing
elements. Within the alchemical egg, everything is subject to change, but
the Five Phases remain as resting forms of matter within the changing
environment. They pass into each other but are not lost in the process of
interchange.
For Ge Hong, Plato has misinterpreted Empedocles. The mixing of
four colors does not mean that change will diminish the elements. But
they are proportionally rearranged into a new color containing all four.
Thus the elements are the true universals. Through change created by
Love and Strife, the true resting nature of the four is revealed. In other
words, there is no need to reinvent a new geometric continuity to explain
their discontinuity. It is simply a matter of acceptance that the four is a col-
lective form of continuity, not a geometric one over many, but the oneness
is about their fourness.

Motion and Rest

Having gone the extra distance to discuss the changing unity of the four
material elements, we must come to terms with Platos narrow understand-
ing of change. Although Empedocles has not established the passing
into each other of the elements, the creation of plurality out of the four
really is meant to be the formation of various things from the four to the
one, such as trees, humans, and animals. Comparable with the dialectic of
Yin-Yang, the cause of change for Empedocles is concealed in the tension
of Love-Strife. Similar to Heraclitus flux, the unity of the four is perpetu-
ally in motion. But Platos geometric proportion is basically about the rest-
ing cause and caused motions. Change belongs to the body of the universe
and is narrowly defined as motion.
In the light of alchemical change, the fundamental question is why all
changes have to be explained in terms of motionmechanical, lifeless,
and self-repeating. Nothing new has been created out of circular change.
To be more provocative, why should all changing phenomena in the world
be caused by and reduced to this single geometrical principle? If the Soul
is the determinative cause of all changes, then circular motion becomes
the foundational change to which all other changes ultimately have to
conform. Astronomically the regularity of circular motion leaves no room
for the existence of other non-circular orbits. Comets move in oval pat-
terns, as do most of the planets. An oval has an elliptical closed curve like
an egg. And each point on the curve has an equal distance to two cen-
ters. Compared with a circle, an oval is more primary: when two centers
collapse into one, it becomes a circle. Irregular shooting stars move in a
 the many285

near linear pattern when they enter earths atmosphere. How is it possible
for these motions to be reduced to the single and determinative circular
motion? Or how is it possible for the circular motion to produce irregulari-
ties within its defining norm? In short, the world cannot be fit into a model
of ideal perfection.
Plato may argue that noncircular motions are enclosed in the regular-
ity. The enclosure argument is heading in the right direction. But he has
not shown how the regular Soul vessel contains irregular patterns. This is
the same continuity connection between geometric proportion and the
plurality of the elements that we have been looking for since the begin-
ning of this study. The enclosure argument, however, could be interpreted
as indeterminate. Psychologically the human soul is not always in control
of emotions and appetites. It has room for itself being indeterminate. Bio-
logically various lives on earth would be caught up in the wheel of becom-
ing without any capacity to escape. Yet the circular motion can produce no
evolution but repetition.
Once change has been defined as repetition, what happens between
coming to be and ceasing to be is insignificant. Life is passively caught up
in the self-contradictory statue of changebeing and not-being. And each
moment of the circular motion is identical and shifts between coming to
be and ceasing to be. Therefore, no one is unique in the self-repeating
circulation. Our previous analysis shows exactly the opposite. If the prin-
ciple of the sphere is to be demonstrated in three coordinates, then each
moment of the circular motion is a unique spotno other moment has
the same coordinates. What is happening here? In analytical geometry,
the principle has been given precise measurements and locations to map
out the coherent surface that which the principle produces. Without these
unique spots, the principle is not demonstrable. This is an OM argument.
The argument basically reinserts change back into Platos causation.
The argument further entails that the uniqueness of individual change
cannot be swallowed by the polarized definition of coming to be and ceas-
ing to be. From the alchemical perspective, there is a cumulative evolution
in every moment of coming to be and ceasing to be. Alchemy does not only
view cyclical change as the incubation environment for changing minerals
(or elements), but the minerals must internalize the matrix of time-space
created by external cyclical changes into the products of changeelixirs.
Alchemical change does not only produce variations in degree, but the
accumulation of degrees transforms the kind. Being gives rise to Becom-
ing, and Becoming refines Being. On the contrary, individual changes in
Platos circular motion are insignificant against the defining background
of coming to be and ceasing to be. The rest/motion causation puts the
286 comparative ontology

differentiation in two worldsbeing and becoming. This OVM structure

diminishes the power that the cumulative change of degrees has to also
transform the kind for the essence of cosmic life.

The Architecture of Matter

The overview of Platos limited understanding of change will help us to
come to terms with his version of particle theory. Now we return to the
crucial topic of the geometrical continuity among the four elements.
A second text for study contains Platos explicit discussion of the inter-
nal continuity of four elements. Plato argues that four elements can be
reduced to two geometric Forms, and out of the two the four are con-
structed (53c57d).
Interestingly, the discourse on the architecture of matter is presented in
the context of a creative play. The Demiurge plays a cosmic puzzle imme-
diately after the description of primordial chaos (52d53c). First, he has
two elementary triangles in hand; second, he constructs solid shapes out
the primaries; then he assigns each shape to a corresponding element; and
finally he structures the body of the universe out of these building blocks.

The Mingling of Empedocles Limited Pluralism

and Atomism
The creative play begins with a claim: it is clear to everyone that fire, earth,
water, and air are bodies, and all bodies are solids (53c). The second half
of the claim is acceptable with a condition. Obviously Plato has solid geom-
etry in mind, not fluids. Solid bodies must occupy a three-dimensional
space and take shapes. Liquefied things, such as water and mercury, have
bodies but no solid shape. The first half of the claim is problematic.
Empedocles originally thought that the elements were metaphysical
stuffs and physically shapeless. He never treated the elements as physical
bodies. It was the atomists who insisted that atoms are indivisible particles,
and each atom was a physical body in the likeness of Parmenides corpo-
real Being but much smaller in size. Plato purposefully alters the elements
into those shapes definable with solid geometry. The following sentence
says, All solids again are bounded by surfaces, and all rectilinear surfaces
are composed of triangles (53c). Again the sentence is disjointed. It is
true all solids have surfaces, but not all surfaces are regular with rectilinear
plane surfaces. A mountain is solid with a continuous surface, but the sur-
face is not a regular plane reducible to triangles. Even though some peaks
may appear to be triangles, they actually are more like irregular cones than
triangles. Here the introductory sentences point out Platos intention. He
 the many287

intends to introduce geometrical Forms into the discussion of elementary

matter. But he has neither established why the elements are solids nor
explained why they must meet the criterion to be only those regular solids
reducible to triangles.
Why is it necessary to turn Empedocles shapeless elements into regu-
lar solids? Turning Empedocles materialism into Pythagorean idealism
has been mentioned previously, but there is another assumption. Plato
assumes that the elements were preexistent in the primordial chaos but
they were shaken inside the Receptacle as chaotic, formless, and purpose-
less matter (53a). He makes the distinction earlier (49d). The elements in
a process of cyclical transformation indicate a difference in qualities,
but they are not concrete enough to be called orderly substances. Again
Empedocles did not believe the four elements were chaotic types of mat-
ter waiting to be transformed. Four root causes, or four mortal gods in
Empedocles language, existed in the tension of the two immortal gods
of Love and Strife.47 To be changeable is the intrinsic nature of the four.
But Plato has unchangeable universals in mind. So what Empedocles
regarded as changing universals are treated as chaotic types of matter.
Instead of imagining that the creator is a painter who is endlessly mixing
four colors into a new reality and the process of creation is indefinite as
long as the creator keeps painting the picture of the world with four ele-
ments, Plato wants to have a maker insert an intelligent design for the ele-
ments once and for all. Immediately following the narrative of the chaos,
the assigning of orders to the elements becomes the preparation for the
maker to further structure material pluralities. Change from formless ele-
ments to four properly shaped solids marks the fundamental act of bring-
ing order out of chaos.
But before the structuring the elements, there is another material plu-
ralism that needs to be cleared out of the way, namely, atomism. Dem-
ocritus atomism particularly argued that all particles possessed physical
shapes. If the elements are physically shaped, as atomism argued, rather
than metaphysically shapeless, as Empedocles intended, then there is a
problem. The problem is not Democritus nor Empedocles, but Platos,
because he wants to mingle two systems. On the one hand, since all atoms
are irreducible and indivisible, and atoms are limitless in quantity, they
would need to possess infinitely many physical shapes. If atomism is not
cleared out of the way, how is it possible to arrange infinitely many atoms
with four shapes? The problem of atomism could be solved if all atoms
were identical, like Parmenides One. Then only one shape is required.
But this solution is not what Plato has in mind, since he wants to argue for
two shapes.
288 comparative ontology

On the other hand, if the elements are irreducible like atoms, then
four solid shapes should not be reduced to a simpler kind. Again, this
is not Platos intention, since he wants to reduce four shapes to two tri-
angles. As far as Plato is concerned, the vice of atomism is its rejection
of any unity. As in the Parmenides, the hypothesis of if the one is not
has demonstrated (164b166e), once unity has been eliminated, that the
denial of unity does not yield the result that all atoms are freestanding
universals. In fact, without the one, there will be no homogeneity among
them. Without homogeneity, for Plato, the limitless plurality is the pri-
mordial chaos: no single one of many existed. The denial of one leads to
the denial of many. To accept atomism means to leave the organization
of matter entirely to chance. That would defeat the whole purpose of the
creation of orders.
With this background in mind, Plato is more willing to modify Emped-
ocles limited four elements than the atomists unlimited pluralism. But
he has borrowed the atomist idea of physically shaped atoms to modify
Empedocles four root causes. Having done that, to bring the four into
unity becomes manageable.

Two Right Triangles

As the discourse above shows, Plato has left atomists out of the divine play
and reinterprets Empedocles changing order of Love-Strife into the vic-
tory of Reason over Necessity. Once the hidden arguments are recog-
nized, the opening sentences clear the way for the geometrical interpreta-
tion of the elements that follows: There are two basic types of triangle,
each having one right angle and two acute angles; in one of them these
two angles are both half right angles, being subtended by equal sides; in
the other they are unequal, being subtended by unequal sides. This we
postulate as the origin of fire and the other bodies (53cd).
Among modern commentators, it is only Cornford who has come to
the awareness that the continuity problem between the four elements and
the plurality of created things holds the key to explaining the transforma-
tion of the world. Thus he has gone an extraordinary distance to explain a
rather strange geometrical particle theory invented by Plato.
According to Cornfords study, the passage presents two right triangles
as the elementary structures of matter, and their selection is determined
by the choice of the regular solids for the elements.48 Here Platos tac-
tic is similar to cooking a dinner: one decides what dishes to cook and
then shops for the right ingredients to produce them. We can come to
terms with why four element-solids need these triangles (see Figure 9.7)
by summarizing Cornfords argument, which seems to run in the opposite
 the many289

direction of the cooking metaphor and flows from the selection of the
triangles to the predetermined regular solids. This is the direction that
Plato hopes readers to follow.
The isosceles triangle on the left in Figure 9.7 represents what Plato
means by both half right angles with two equal sides. But the one on
the right has no connection to what the text infers. Unequal sides can
refer to infinitely many right angle triangles as long as they are not equi-
lateral or isosceles. Plato later makes reference to a pair that composes an
equilateral (54a). Farther down in the text, he says, Three are composed
of the scalene, but the fourth alone from the isosceles (54c). Reading this
in conjunction with the assignments of shapes to elements (55d56c), it is
not difficult to work out the basic ingredients required for the element-
solids shown in Figure 9.6. Earth-cube alone has a square surface that
requires two identical isosceles triangles to make. The isosceles triangle
on the left in Figure 9.7 refers to the basic triangle for the earth-cube. Air-
octahedron, fire-pyramid, and water-icosahedron are structured out of a
single equilateral.
An equilateral triangle can be divided symmetrically into right triangles
with unequal sides. The diagram on the right in Figure 9.7 indicates
division to produce the second elementary right triangle. These two pri-
marily triangles are all that the element-solids require to form their sur-
faces. Cornford further suggests that Plato knew the Pythagorean theorem
(which historically was not discovered by Pythagoras). Plato says one isos-
celes and the other having a greater side whose square is three times that
of the lesser (54b). This phrase can be interpreted as the numbers (1,
1, 2; 1, 3, 2). And these numbers represent the sides AB, BC, AC, and
A' B', B' C ', A' C '. They can be explained by the right triangle principle:
AB 2 +BC 2 = AC 2 .

Fig. 9.7. Mathematics of triangles

290 comparative ontology

Cornfords suggestion is misleading. Why does Plato not make the the-
orem the single Form for these two right triangles? Since Plato is arguing
overall for the internal continuity of passing into each other for the four,
it would be more unifying to say that all these solids can be reduced to
the theorem. The theorem alone governs the chosen right triangles, and
two right triangles produce the four element-solids. The one-two-four
schema would explain the change ruled by Reason alone, not the mixture
of Love and Strife. In this way, the argument would be more consistent with
his argument on outer continuitythe Form of the sphereto enclose all
matters within. However, Plato is quite clear that the right triangles are
the basic ingredients, not the theorem. Cornford is partly right when
he identifies the selection of the regular triangles as determined by the
regular element-solids. Plato has selected the dishes and then gone back-
wards to find the ingredients determined by the selection. But Cornford
is partly wrong. This line of argument suggests that the theorem is not the
universal of the four. For some reason Plato does not apply it to the struc-
turing of matter.
Why does Plato stop at the triangles? The solids consist of the plane
triangles. The triangles are made up of lines. And lines are numbers. It is
not difficult for Plato to realize that the theorem represents the unity of
numbers. If Plato reduces the solids to numbers, then he goes all the way
to the Pythagorean doctrine that all things are made of numbers. Because
the theorem determines that only those numbers that meet the criterion
of AB 2 +BC 2 =AC 2 can be selected to construct the element-solids, the rest
will be ruled out. Yet to trim the Pythagorean infinite many numbers down
to limited orderly numbers will still end up with many numbers that meet
the criterion of the theorem: /n=( = infinity, n= any finite number).
This is the first problem of infinite plurality. Plato originally wanted to
use only four elements to manage the interchangeability among them.
To work with numbers, he would easily slip back into an infinite plurality,
similar to atomism, which he has already rejected.
Second, what is the theorem for? In Chinese astronomy, the ancient
Gaitian theory also applies the principle of the gnomon (3 2 +
4 2 = 5 2 ) mainly to calculate measurements of the universe. It is only a math-
ematical tool and is never meant to be the primary unity out of which
astronomical phenomena are structured. Instead the general unity is met-
aphorically put as the heavenly lid turning as a stone mill. The Chinese
use of the theorem is inspirational. The theorem can only be one of many
mathematical principles, not a cosmogonical algebra. If Plato selects the
theorem to be the elementary unity of the elements, then the selection will
single out the particular. The creation of the body of the world requires
 the many291

all preexistent Forms. Why does the theorem alone rest at the most funda-
mental level of matter and all others work on top of what the theorem has
preconfigured?
Having argued against Cornfords interpretation, it is necessary to
point out that the text displays confusion mainly because of Platos ideal-
ism over natural study. The same problem of idealism over empiricism
occurs in modern physics. The standard particle model put the fundamen-
tal structure of matter into a neat mathematical description during the
1970s. The next twenty-five years research empirically showed the deter-
minative structure had left many elements out of the model, one of which
was gravity. In Platos case, the problem is the mixing of metaphors in the
mystical genre. The theorem could be a mathematical Form. If the theo-
rem was supposedly the most fundamental, then Plato would end up with
an empirical difficulty. For instance, the Demiurge hopes to build a bed
according to the Form of Bed. The wood in his hand is material made of
some kind of combination of the four elements. But the four elements are
all reducible to the single theorem. Then to structure a bed out of wood is
really about subordinating the theorem to the Form. This subordination
would exist in every single creature because the theorem exists in all mate-
rial things. The most fundamental of matter becomes the most secondary.
This is the second problem that the first becomes the last.
Third, is the theorem material or immaterial? The question arises out
of Platos mixture of geometrical immaterialism and the materialism of
the elements. The transformation of the elements relies on the premise
that the most elementary must be material. This is the proposition from
chaotic matters to orderly elements. Prior to creation, four elements had
already existed inside the mother of all becomingthe chaotic vessel of
the Receptacle. They were not substantial things but chaotic stuffs with
four qualities (49d). They were waiting to be transformed into order with
homogeneity. It seems to be appropriate to use the theorem to arrange
four chaotic qualities into substances. But to arrange them means to give
structure to them. There are many right triangles that can be produced
from the theorem. Eventually the Demiurge must decide on only two right
triangles that meet his ideal of perfection. To have two right triangles in
hand he cannot rely on the nonparticipatory principle of Form, but on the
immanence of Soul in the body. This is essentially because the theorem
must be ensouled in chaotic qualities to bring them into orderly things.
Thus the immaterial theorem must take material form in order to be sub-
stances. Two right triangles become the material form of the theorem.
These material ingredients are required for composing the element-sol-
ids, not the immaterial theorem. Here, where Plato is dealing with matter,
292 comparative ontology

he turns away from his contemporary Pythagoreans and turns toward the
materialism of Empedocles.

From the Two to the Four

What do these two triangles really represent? They do not represent the
Form of right triangle, but the most fundamental particles. As if they were
two golden elixirs containing cosmogonical essence, Plato has invented
them out of the mixing pot with atomist and Pythagorean ingredients.
Subsequently he argues the two to four schema that becomes the second
stage of the divine play. So let us assume that these are two triangles from
which fire and the other bodies are constructed (54b). Having assumed
the dual particles, arbitrary as they appear, Plato arrives at the central issue
of material transformation.
How can the transformation passing into each other first take place
among the elements? If passing into each other is possible, then the dual
particles can mutate through this change. Again this is a continuity issue. If
the continuity goes all the way down to the two triangles, they can turn into
a monist material, something like Qi out of which the Five Phases come to
exist. But Plato denies the possibility of internal change between the par-
ticles. It appeared as if all four types of body could pass into each other in
the process of change; but this appearance is misleading (54c). Then he
goes on to explain: For, of the four, three are composed of the scalene but
the fourth alone from the isosceles. Hence all four cannot pass into each
other on resolution. . . . This can only happen with three of them (54c).
It can be easily worked out with geometry that the surfaces of the
four elements are composed of two types of right triangles. Fire-pyramid,
air-octahedron, and water-icosahedron all have the same surface shape,
namely, the equilateral triangle. The earth-cube alone has a square sur-
face. Since the half of the equilateral and the isosceles are assumed to be
irreducible particles, this entails that the earth made up of two isosceles
triangles is the unique element. Fire, air, and water are all made up of the
scalene of the half of the equilateral. Therefore, the cube-earth is unique,
but the others are interchangeable.
Why is earth the noninterchangeable element? There seems to be no
particular reason for Plato to attribute uniqueness to earth and not to one
of the interchangeable elements. If we recall Platos polarization of fire
and earth, we get a hint of what we are dealing with. Compared with heav-
enly fire, the solid earth is concrete and immobile. Compared with hydro-
static air and water, earth is stable and infusible. There is a scale of physical
stability of the four in the rank earth-water-air-fire. But the scale does not
completely justify the assignments of pyramid to fire and cube to earth. To
 the many293

treat the element earth as the most changeless contradicts Platos three-
layer cosmos. The body of the earth represents the most turbulent part
of material Difference, whereas the element of fire belongs to the most
tranquilized heavenly ring where fixed stars locate.
Alchemists view fire as the most stable element because in an alchemi-
cal vessel everything (including the most stable gold) is subject to change,
whereas the fire remains the same through its changeability. From the
alchemical viewpoint, Platos order of stability should be reversed. The
earth is the most changeable and the fire relatively permanent. And the
order fits well with Platos three-layer structure. In failing to explain why
the earth is the most stable, Plato says, It would be too long a story to give
the reason, but if anyone can produce a proof that it is not so, we will wel-
come his achievement. So let us assume that there are two triangles from
which fire and the other bodies are constructed (54ab).
We shall take up Platos challenge and prove his assumption is wrong.
Contrary to alchemical stability, Plato has fixed his mind on a locomotive
sense of mobility and immobility. Here the usual tactic of Platofinding
the most changeless universalshows up again. He argues that the cube
is most immobile because it is made of the isosceles particle, and the
isosceles has a naturally more stable base than the scalene (55e). This is
a sound explanation, but it is false. What has gone wrong with Platos geo-
metric knowledge? He has overlooked a fundamental change that occurs
in the process of constructing four element-solids from two geometrical
particles, which are the triangles in Figure 9.8. (see Figure 9.8). We will
need to have plane geometry in mind in order to work out the change
in solid geometry. In plane geometry the isosceles has a longer base (2)
than the sides (1). Plato assumes that the scalene must also be set upright,
as Cornfords commentary accepts. But if the hypotenuse of the scalene is
equally treated as the base, then it has the longer base (2) than the isosce-
les (2). Therefore, the scalene is more stable than the isosceles.
Now, the change occurs when the Demiurge starts to play with the cos-
mic puzzle. If two isosceles are put together to form a square, the square
is no longer standing on the longer hypotenuse (2) but on one of the
sides (1). So the cube is set on a square with four equal sides (1). When
two scalenes are put together, they form an equilateral. A pyramid is made
of four equilaterals. And it is set on one equilateral with three equal sides
(2). In solid geometry, the pyramid is the most stable shape of all regular
solids. A cube only needs to be turned 90 degrees or more to be turned
to another side. A pyramid requires 120 degrees or more to be turned
to another side. Thus, solid geometry disproves Platos assumption. The
cube (earth) is not the most stable; the pyramid (fire) is. The geometric
294 comparative ontology

Fig. 9.8. Transformation from triangles to solids

stability of fire agrees with the alchemical view that the most unchanging
is fire.
Platos judgment of stability is built on the false assumption that the
isosceles triangle is more stable than the scalene triangle. Behind the
assumption is the idealism of perfection. The isosceles has two equal sides
with symmetrical angles whose sum becomes a right angle (45 + 45 = 90).
And the square with two isosceles has the ideal shape of four equal sides
(1). Similar to the heavenly ideal shapethe spherethe material parti-
cle with the perfect shapesquarerepresents the earth. For Daoism this
idealism is not strange. What Confucian ethics called spherical heaven
and square earth overshadowed the Gaitian theory of astronomy with
its idealism. The fundamental method was to use natural science to jus-
tify moral and political orthodoxy. Here in Platos assignment of the four
regular solids to the elements, the ideal-driven false assumption has a real
consequence in the project of creation: the earth-cube is more resistant to
change than the fire-pyramid; and, between the least and the most change-
able, there are the water-icosahedron and the air-octahedron in the same
order of changeability. The order of stability is ranked as earth-water-air-
 the many295

fire according to their geometric appearances. So to sum up, the figure

that has the fewest faces must be in the nature of things the most mobile
as well as the sharpest and most penetrating (56b).
Is the figure with the fewest faces the most mobile? No. In solid geome-
try, the fire-pyramid, which has the fewest faces (4), must be the most immo-
bile. The water-icosahedron with twenty faces must be the most mobile,
because its shape is the closest to a sphere. (In the Chinese Five Phases, fire
and water oppose each other in the order of degeneration.) The next most
stable element is the earth-cube with six faces, and the second most unstable
one is the air-octahedron with eight faces. So instead of having an earth-
water-air-fire order, we would have the order of mobility as fire-earth-air-
water. To be sure, the order is geometrical. It could have nothing to do with
the elements. The assignment of the solids to the elements can be a random
choice in reality. Has the Demiurge arranged them by chance or in order?
If we have a closer look at Platos earth-water-air-fire, it is the order
of physical density. The divine puzzle has a hidden rule. Perhaps this is
another criterion that indicates the assignment is not a random choice.
But the physical density order does not correspond to the order of solids.
For instance, earth should take the icosahedron form if it is to have the
most surfaces to corresponds to its density. The right assignment accord-
ing to the physical density order should be earth-icosahedron, water-octa-
hedron, air-square, fire-pyramid. The divine assignment has got it wrong
again not because the earth-icosahedron does not have the most faces, but
because it is the least stable. This again confirms the alchemical view of
earth. If Plato believes that the square is the unique universal, then a Dao-
ist would agree with the assignment of air-square. Air or Qi is the genera-
tive universal of all elements.
Table 9.2 shows three arrangements of the elements with conflicting
organizing principles. In the two to the four schema the Demiurge has
committed the epistemological mistake of judging things according to
physical impressions rather than a priori thought, which is intrinsically cal-
culated knowledge. The basic mistake takes place in the false assumption
that the isosceles has a naturally more stable base than the scalene. The
assumption in itself serves the purpose of justifying Platos sphere heaven
and square earth idealism. The assignment of the solids to the elements
builds upon this false assumption.
The original arrangement reflects the cosmological-layer order with
the most stable elementearthas the closest to the body of the earth
and the most active element of fire the farthest. But the order is the other
way around compared with the three-layered structure defined by the Soul:
Sameness, Existence, and Difference. Then. by counting the number of
296 comparative ontology

Table 9.2. Conflicting principles in the organization of particles

Cosmological Earth- Water- Air- Fire-pyramid 1

layers square icosahedron octahedron
Geometric Fire- Earth- Air- Water- 2
stability pyramid square octahedron icosahedron
(4) (6) (8) (20)
Physical Earth- Water- Air-square Fire-pyramid 3
density icosahedron octahedron

surfaces, the Demiurge had another idea about the order of stability, like
a player who changes the rules of the game once the game is under way.
The quantification of faces in the second row does not reflect the divine
arrangement in the first row. Furthermore, the physical density order in
the third row is a rational explanation entirely different from the geomet-
ric stability order. But geometry and physics do not cohere. After all, the
divine assignment has no order. Plato has attempted to give Empedocles
elements geometric and traceable orders, but he has achieved a result no
more intelligible than his predecessor had articulated.
Could the second stage of the divine play, structuring the elementary
particles, be governed by chance? Plato has claimed but not established
that the earth-cube is nonchangeable. Without this anchoring base, all ele-
ments can be cyclically interchanged. Compared with the complete inter-
changeability in the Chinese Five Phases and the mixing and separation
of Empedocles four elements, Plato is more interested in finding rational
orders for the element-solids. He has invented two geometric irreducibles.
But seeking order among the elements becomes entirely meaningless if
three of the four are interchangeable. Once three start to changethe key
for internal continuitythe cosmological-layer order (rest/motion), the
physical density order (heavy/light), the geometric stability order (sharp/
round), and any other order become meaningless in the process of inter-
change. For example, even the heaviest elementwatercan become the
lightestfire because they share the same geometric particle. And the
change is reversible.

The Process of Transformation

The entire second stage of the cosmic puzzle is conditioned by the third
stage of internal transformation. The central issue is what makes the inter-
 the many297

change happen. In this stage, Plato sets the play in the backdrop where
Necessity plays the role of an equal contributor of the transformation.
When the Demiurge has brought the numbers, motions, and powers of
the elements together, every detail of the construction is made to the
most exact perfection permitted by the willing consent of Necessity (56c).
Compared with the ideal world of Forms above, in which Necessity has no
role, the physical realm is the territory of the goddess Necessity.
Since Plato declares, The world arrives as the mixed result of Reason
and Necessity, we should expect Plato to elaborate the role of Necessity
in relation to the partner Reason and the Receptaclethe mother of all
becomingin relation with Forms. In particular, we wish to hear the story
of how the most exact perfection permitted by the willing consent of
Necessity has been implemented in material things. However, the text dis-
appoints us. Plato does not go back to the feminine concepts. This leaves
us with little to go on, apart from wondering how Necessity gives consent
to transform the elements to embody divine perfection. Why is the god-
dess left out of the tableau? It is as if a boy and a girl are assembling a
puzzle together: the girl has some crucial pieces in her hands, and the boy
has persuaded her to give them to him. After the puzzle has been finished,
the story of the girl has not been told.
Plato believes in geometric particles as small as atoms, far too small
to be visible (56c). Then how is it possible to form a cosmos out of these
particles of atomic scale? The maker first engages in the process of dis-
mantling the elements into their primary particles and then rearranges
the particles into something else. When earth meets fire, it will be dis-
solved by its sharpness and, whether dissolution takes place in fire itself or
in a mass of air or water, will drift about until its parts meet, fit together,
and become earth again; for they can never be transformed into another
figure. But when water is broken up by fire or again by air, its parts can
combine to make one of fire and two of air; and the fragments of a single
particle of air can make two of fire (56de).
The first part of the passage explains the circular change of earth. It
indicates that the sharpness of fire-pyramid can dissolve earth-cube into
individual isosceles right triangles. Then the mass of heavier air or water
will recombine the particles into earth-cube again. Plato again empha-
sizes that earth alone cannot pass into other elements by the nature of its
unique isosceles right triangles. The second half of the passage explains
the process during which water, air, and fire undergo the process of inter-
change. Platonic scholars have already worked out the precise nature of
the process with two mathematical equations.49
298 comparative ontology

(a) W=F+2A; 40=8+216

(b) A=2F ; 16=2 8
(W=water, A=air, F=fire)

Equation (a) explains the calculation in terms of a base triangle parti-

cle. Water-icosahedron contains twenty sides, and each side is composed of
two triangles. Therefore, it contains a total of forty triangles. The amount
equals fire-pyramid (4 sides times 2 base triangles) and is twice air-octa-
hedron (8 sides times 2 base triangles) combined. Equation (b) explains
that air can be transformed by assembling two fire elements because
water-octahedron has sixteen triangles, twice the triangles in fire-pyramid.
Once the equations are explained, the sophisticated transformation can
be explained by algebraic calculation. In the next sentence, Plato further
calculates the transformation of air into water. And when air is forcibly
broken up, half of its figures will unite to make up a single figure of water.

(c)2.5A=W; 2.516=40

In all dissolution processes, Plato suggests that air and water dissolve
into the primary particles by the cutting power of fire-pyramid. The
sharp angles of the pyramid cut and decompose the solids of air and water,
while fire itself does not dissolve. Compared with Empedocles metaphor
of mixing four colors, Plato has revealed mathematical exactness in his
interchange. Compared with Thales, who thought of transformation as
physical and meteorological changes of waters evaporation and condensa-
tion, Plato also treats the interchange as a physical process with two phases:
heating-decomposition and cooling-recomposition. Hot fire dissolves air
and water. When air and water have been broken down, they can be totally
consumed by fire, and become fire (57b). When fire slakes, the cooling
causes the condensation to yield the heavier element of air and further
liquefaction, water (57c). Contrary to material monism, Platos particle-
based interchange has explained the physical process of the heating/cool-
ing process mathematically.
How does fire become air or water? If the shape fire-pyramid does not
naturally dissolve, then it does not provide a starting point for the reverse
change. On the issue of what causes fire to change, Plato introduces a
large mass theory to be the opposite cause (57b). When fire is surrounded
by the predominating mass of heavier and larger elements, air and water
cause fire to cool and break down. The cooling breaks down fire into par-
ticles and recomposes them into heavier elements.
The explanation is similar to the Daoist degenerating circle in which
 the many299

water extinguishes fire. The softness of water does not overcome the sharp-
ness of fire by cutting power, but by its natural capacity to break down
fire. For Daoism, the degeneration circle (water-fire-wood-earth-water) is
generated by the unbalance of Yin more than Yang. Again, as in the Daoist
explanation that Yin and Yang unbalance can cause change, Plato suggests
that the cooling process is caused by the unbalanced mass between the
light fire and the heavier elements. Water causes fire to cool down and
recombines base particles into the intermediate air or the end result of
water. The transformation of air can go both directions, if fire and water
are unequal in mass. It could either break down into fire by losing weight
or regroup into water by gaining weight.
The introduction of the predominating mass makes the cutting
power of fire redundant. For instance, we have a situation of total balance:

Fire Air Water

10F = 5A = 2W
104 = 58 = 220

Obviously, balance does not mean equality, as if it there were two equal
weights on two sides of a scale. It means an active balance in which fire, air,
and water constantly interchange and have reached the balancing point.
The balance is mainly determined by the total particles of each element,
and the weight balance of each element makes the cutting power of fire
secondary. As the example shows, the total amount of fires cutting power
is counterbalanced by the total softness of water. Without taking the earth-
cube into consideration (a problem to be dealt with separately), the body
of the world must have an equal mass of each element. Any unbalance
among them will create further interchange until the active balance has
been reached. This alchemical reading provokes a further question. How
does the world attain this balance?
We can first pursue a Platonic question. What is the cause of the bidi-
rectional interchange of three elements? Since in Platos mind everything
material that moves must be moved by something else (57d), the inter-
change must owe its cause to something other than self-governance. If the
interchange is attained by self-governance, then the whole point of seek-
ing mathematical orders among the elements becomes meaningless. The
interchange could be spontaneous, and spontaneity requires no involve-
ment of Forms. In fact, Forms could be the very products of the spontane-
ous process of interchange. This indeterminateness would be blasphemy
to the doctrine of Forms. Yet to cause the interchange, the cause(s) must
be qualified for bidirectional change. Forms can be ruled out. The Form
300 comparative ontology

of Beauty cannot cause a rose to undergo the process of becoming ugly

and then becoming beautiful again.
In a short reference, Plato contributes the cause to the Receptacle. For
owing to the motion of the receptacle the main bulk of each constituent
collects in its own separate place, while any part of it that loses it own form
and takes on anothers is drawn by the shaking to the place of the one
whose form it has taken (57c). According to Cornford, Plato has a win-
nower in mind when he describes the change of location of the elements.50
A winnower functions as a device to separate unlike and to collect like.
Likewise, the Receptacle shakes the elements in it and sorts them out by
separating the heavy and the light.
Cornfords analogy certainly helps to visualize the works of the Recepta-
cle. But the analogy is misleading. The winnowing basket works according
to the principle of gravity. It is a weight distribution device. The heavier ele-
ments of air and water get closer to the person holding the basket, whereas
lighter fire naturally lands at the edge away from the person. Change in
this situation is mainly about relocation. From an alchemical point of view,
this is merely a physical process of placement and displacement. And it is
unidirectional. Once heavy and light elements are separated, they should
not be shaken back toward the opposite direction if the person shakes the
winnower properly, not tipping it forwards and backwards all the time.
But the chief function of the Receptacle, as Plato puts it, is to be the
nurse of all becoming. Becoming includes both coming to be and ceasing
to be. It is the cause required for bidirectional change. Yet in Cornfords
explanation the relocation produced by the winnower explains nothing
about the bidirectional change. It sorts out water and fire by placing them
at two edges and air in the middle. If we read the text carefully, Plato actu-
ally suggests the bidirectional change: Any part of it that loses its own
form and takes on anothers is drawn by the shaking to the place of the one
whose form it has taken. Having said that, Plato quickly moves beyond the
sentence without dealing with the bidirectional change anymore, as if the
issue has been settled. The sentence can be interpreted as, for instance,
two fires break down into two times eight triangles and regroup into one
air: 2F= A; 16=2 8. It is change in the opposite direction, from the outer
edge of the winnower to the middle. Therefore, this relocation or recom-
position is the consequence of the change caused by the Receptacle.
However, Plato has missed a crucial point that he established earlier, or
modern commentators have attributed to Plato a misleading metaphor. To
start with the Receptacle cannot be the bidirectional cause. It is not a cause
at all. It is a plastic material. On the one hand, the female Receptacle func-
tions as a motherly womb containing the elements; on the other hand, its
 the many301

noncausal and characterless status make it a precosmic hot wax to be

stamped by Forms. If the Receptacle cannot be the self-governing cause of
change, then Cornfords metaphor is wrong.
The vessel of the elements or the winnower does not shake by itself.
It requires someone to shake it. (Or, like a crucible, it requires a reactive
condition created by alchemists.) Who is holding the cosmic basket? That
could be the Demiurge who plays with the puzzle of structuring the ele-
ments. But if the maker were responsible for the bidirectional change, he
would become the cause of becoming. His divine intelligence is supposed
to construct things according to Forms. Furthermore, as the passive plastic
material, the Receptacle cannot shake the elements. Metaphorically it is
not the winnower, but a womb. It is the vessel to receive the imprint of
Forms when its ruling cause Necessity gives willing consent to Reason.
Thus, Necessity must be involved in the shaking.
Without Necessity the relocation of the elements cannot happen, nor
can the interchange have an unleashing point. Why? Again Forms cannot
be bidirectional causes. They can only create the unidirectional coming
to be and not ceasing to be. On the contrary, the unmentioned Neces-
sity is always the errant cause for disorderliness. What is more alarming
is that Necessity cannot be solely responsible for the bidirectional inter-
change. It has to work together with Reason. The interchange of the ele-
ments takes place in the tension of Reason and Necessity, just as Yin and
Yang hold the creative tension for the Five Phases to mutate.
Once the ultimate causes have been found, the Receptacle can be
seen as a vessel of transformation. By providing the environment in which
bidirectional change can be nursed, it becomes the mother of all becom-
ing, just as a crucible allows minerals to come to be and cease to be. The
bidirectional change is the driving force to create new things through the
ongoing process of decomposition and recomposition of matter. In Platos
case, it is the change from the four elements to the myriad existences. To
allow this change to take place, Reason cannot work alone, but Necessity
has to be a major player. If the Demiurge still holds the winnower, then his
wisdom is not only rationally instructed by Reason, but also spontaneously
nourished by Necessity. Without Necessity, there would not be bidirec-
tional change among the elements. Without interchangeability among the
elements, there cannot be the creation of the myriad things. Subsequently,
the construction of the body of the universe would not be possible.
As the text has demonstrated so far, Plato has certainly put Necessity
backstage in the divine play. But our investigation shows that the untamed
wife of Reason is acting behind the ontological curtain. 51 The rational
husband Reason wants to create order out of chaos by forming everything
302 comparative ontology

into perfect order running as if a heavenly clock were animating its eternal-
ity. But the untamed wife secretly and naturally gives the only childthe
physical worldthe genes of spontaneity to live a creative life of change.

The Creation of the Many

From the Four to the Many by Unbalance

If Necessity needs to be reinstated as a partner player, then how is it pos-

sible to reconstruct the final stage of the divine play? According to Plato,
the Demiurge alone plays in the final stage of the play that goes from four
elements to the myriad things. However, he adds a long argument, which
can be summarized as follows. The disequilibrium between the elements
is the chief cause for the change from the four to the many, and the
unceasing process of interchange among the elements goes on continu-
ously until the myriad things are formed (57d58c). Is this disequilibrium
the work of Reason or the work of Necessity? Since disequilibrium belongs
to the primordial chaos (48a), in which there was only Necessity but no
Reason, disequilibrium must be the works of Necessity. If Plato clearly
recognized Necessity in the divine play, the final story of creation would
be entirely different. However, the story maintains the motif of the work
of Reason.
In the central claim of the long argument, Plato states: So we must
assume that rest and equilibrium are always associated, motion and equi-
librium are always disassociated (58a). What does Plato mean by equi-
librium? He does not explain, but gives notes that all elements move in
a circuit and return to their original position (58a), as planets move on
the circumference of the spherical Soul. Recall that the whole physical
universe moves in a spherical motion. For Plato autorotation represents
the most changeless motion. Thus, equilibrium could mean the balance
of motions achieved by forming a self-repeating rotation. The rotating uni-
verse is at the equilibrium state of rest. But the explanation only explains
half of the sentence about rest and equilibrium.
Why are motion and equilibrium disassociated? To grasp the antithesis
of change and balance, we need to switch the scene back to the inter-
change of elements. The chief reason for the elements to decompose and
recompose is the imbalance of masses among the elements. If fire is the
dominating element, then its angles will cut the others into base trian-
gles. If water is the predominating mass, then water breaks down fire and
regroups the elementary particles into air or water. Within this general
background, change is due to the imbalance between the mass of fire and
 the many303

of those of air and water. This inequality of masses causes the process of
interchange among the four elements.
Based on this argument, Plato makes a generalization that the transfor-
mation from the four to the many is governed by the same principle of
unbalanced masses. Platos general idea is as if the unbalanced masses had
tipped the cosmic scale, and the trend of the decomposition and recom-
position process was to roll downhill to transform the elements into the
myriad things. But the text shows nothing of how the disequilibrium func-
tions as the continuum to make the transformation from the four to the
many. Instead Plato concentrates on the various sizes of the basic triangles
as another basic factor in forming plurality (57cd).52 And he repeats what
has been said about the distribution of the elements with the additional
comment that the distribution relates to the occupation of empty space
(58bc). The reference to the occupation of empty space is probably an
implicit criticism of atomism, which regards infinite space between atoms
to be the continuum. Plato hopes to point out that space does not func-
tion as the continuum to bring atoms into an orderly uniformity. Overall
these lines of argument have not explained the change from the four to
the many.
As I have mentioned, Daoism views that balance does not mean rest,
but active motion in balance. If we use Platos rest-equilibrium synthesis,
we can see what Daoist active balance implies. For instance, the moon is
always in the motion of orbiting the earth, but its motion is basically an
active balance of revolution. Likewise Platos spherical rotation is about
active balance. Every point on the surface of the sphere is a moving point.
And the sum of individual motions produces the whole sphere both in
motion and at a balanced rest. Thus, balance is indeed associated with
motion.
The second half of Platos claim is false. To further explore the antith-
esis of motion and balance, we can ask, Is the interchange among the
four caused by disequilibrium? Taking air as the example, the fact that
air does not fully decompose into fire or recompose into water can be
caused by the balanced masses of fire and water. Here air represents the
Daoist point of active balance in constant interchange. There could be
an equal amount of fire recomposing into air and of water decomposing
into air. In this situation, the decomposition and the recomposition can
go on indefinitely as long as there is a point of balance where the heat of
the fire is offset by cooler water. The balance produces the result that the
amount of the airs mass is equal to the masses of fire and water at the
two ends. The balance could externally appear to be at rest, but internally
the interchange never ceases. Similar to a crucible in which each cycli-
304 comparative ontology

cal change represents an active balance of decomposition and recomposi-

tion, the Receptacle must also contain the active balance produced by the
interchange of elements.
The antithesis of motion and balance leads to another mistaken
assumption. Plato believes, Motion can never take place in conditions of
uniformity (57e). Here Plato is stuck on the being/becoming duality. In
being, no change is allowed. Since motion is locomotive change, it cannot
happen in being. We have already encountered the problem: in order for
the Soul to produce a spherical structure for the body, it must change all
the time, just as a laser beam produces a sphere. When the condition of
uniformity is viewed as active balance, change constitutes every moment
of the uniformity. In other words, motion always takes place in conditions
of uniformity. Rainfall involves downward motion within which each drop
of rain contains an active balance. Air resistance upon each single drop
equals the weight of each drop. So rainfall represents actively balanced
uniformity always at motion. Gravity is not the only force at work, but air
resistance too. Daoist Yin-Yang symbolizes a more general balance. Day and
night, positive and negative, growing and decreasing, coming and going
are balanced in totality. The balance theory speaks for the equal contribu-
tion of two seemingly opposite yet related forces. There would be no air
resistance without gravity that creates the state of motion. Empedocles
Love-Strife also has the same both-and correlation rather than Platos
either/or treatment of balance and imbalance, rest and motion.
The Daoist critique leads to an important correction to Platos theory.
The imbalance among the elements is not the cause for the transforma-
tion from the four to the many to take place. Rather, it is the balance that
brings about all changes. The creation of the myriad things requires the
Daoist active balance. Platos single disequilibrium force cannot produce
a new material form. To form a new one requires active balance; otherwise
whatever has been made will quietly change into something else.
We can further demonstrate why disequilibrium will not stop inter-
nal exchange. For instance, Plato has mentioned the creation of planets
(77ac). Unfortunately, having given a speculative account of the geomet-
ric structures of the elements, Plato has never actually applied the particle
theory to any concrete things. Otherwise, he might have seen the problem
of the disequilibrium cause. Let us suppose wood possesses the following
particle structures:

1.Wood = 1 earth + 12 fire + 4 air + 2 water

2.The number of individual particles: Wood = 1 6 2 (isosceles
triangles) + 12 4 2 (scalene triangles) + 48 2 + 220 2
 the many305

3.The masses of the three exchangeable elements: Fire=96;

Air = 64; Water=80

Since earth cannot be changed into any other element, its influence
on the interchange can be ruled out. Since wood possesses twelve fire,
four air, and two water, according to the particle theory, the masses of
the elements will be unbalanced in the order of ninety-six, sixty-four, and
eighty. If disequilibrium exists among the masses, under the principle of
unbalanced masses further interchange among the three must continue to
happen to reach a balance point. The process would decrease the mass of
fire (96 16=80), increase air (64 +16 =80), and keep water (80) the same.
The exchange results in a structural change in the original formula.

4.? = 80 + 80 + 80
5.? = 10 4 2 + 5 8 2 + 2 20 2
6.? = 10 fire + 5 air + 2 water

Thus the structure of wood (6) will not be same as originally (1). It
turns into something else.
For the sake of argument, let us imagine another situation to see the
further problem of disequilibrium. If we alter the formula by adding the
total mass of water to fire, we get something similar to alchemical fire. I
call it X.

7. X = (96 + 80) + 64
8. X = 22 fire + 4 air
9. X = 80 + 80 + 80
10. X = 10 fire + 5 air + 2 water

Because the formula in (8) represents a disequilibrium state, it is not

sustainable until it reaches a balanced state. It would end up with the same
balanced masses of (80 + 80 + 80). The altered formula (10) will be the
same as (4). Here both wood and alchemical fire change their original
identity into something else.
In the natural world, tree and fire could belong to two distinctive
causal Forms, according to Plato. But the particle theory shows that nei-
ther causal Form can remain the same. They could mutate into a new
material (?= X ) (based on the supposed formulas, they will be turned into
the same stuff). And the new material would be more fundamental than
the irreducible Form of wood and the Form of fire. If Plato recognizes
the alterable Forms according to the particle theory, then they must be
306 comparative ontology

changeable beings rather than unchanging universals. This is actually the

essence of Empedocles elements. Consequently, the particle theory could
produce a different worldview. The cause(s) for both Forms to change is
(are) superior to the nonchangeability of beings.
From the alchemical viewpoint, however, formula (1) could represent
an internal balance (not imbalance) that constitutes what wood is. The
formula itself does not alter in the material form of wood. Once wood
is set on fire, the external energy will break down the internal balanced
structure. Thus wood will be returned to earth as ashes. To have wood
recomposed again, the generation cycle must go through the process of
fire-earth-metal-water-wood. The regrowth of wood takes root in soil,
absorbs minerals for nourishment, and sustains its growth with water. Here
the alchemical change from wood back to wood is not a linear structure
caused by unbalanced masses. Instead, the complete cycle of change is
an active balance. The cycle keeps rolling out in the natural world. Once
the wood has grown into a material form, it naturally returns to earth.
Alchemical fire has just accelerated the process.
Moreover, alchemy views each creature as an alchemical egg in the great
cosmic egg. Wood is not defined solely by the formula of particles above
(as basically chemical in nature). It is intrinsically biological. It evolves
under the influence of the cosmological circle of change. For instance, a
tree is different from a fish. The two are different not only because they
have different beings, but because they have internalized external change
occurring in the environment. A tree can survive drought as the result
of adapting to a harsh environment. A fish cannot survive drought but
can breathe under water. Their different beings are shaped by their liv-
ing environments. As Being defines Becoming, so can Becoming reshape
Being. Any single one of the myriad things is an active balance of Being
and Becoming.

Cosmogonical Change Is Not Physical Variation

For Plato, however, Becoming can never reshape Being. There is neither
internalization of time-space in the matter-form structure, nor can any
interchangeability happen among the basic particles. Without the capacity
for passing into each other, indeed the capacity of ontological change,
there is an even greater difficulty for the divine project. How is the change
from the four to the many possible under Platos particle theory? The
short answer is that it is impossible.
Plato has never demonstrated the transformation that his particle the-
ory is designed to explain. It is as if a crowd of people have waited to see a
magician perform his final demonstration and are disappointed because
 the many307

the promised trick was not produced. Readers with the expectation of see-
ing the Demiurge finish the cosmic puzzle have not seen the divine truth
revealed. Instead of demonstrating how four elements are composed into
new material things, Plato briefly groups plurality into categories. Fire
includes flame and glowing things that causes radiating light for people
to see (58c). Air does not have characteristics, similar to atomist space. Its
chief purpose is to be transparent for passing light generated by fire (58d).
Water includes all liquids and fusible things (including gold) (58d60b).
Finally, earth includes all solids (60b61c). If all solids are made of non-
interchangeable earth particles, then the alchemical phenomenon of cin-
nabar becoming mercury should not be possible. In fact, alchemy shows
earth and water are interchangeable.
In the elements-kinds categorization, Plato has an unacknowledged
equivocation between two different concepts. The fundamental concept
of cosmogonical change, which is required to produce the myriad things,
has been replaced with the notion of the physical variation of the elemen-
tary particles. Compared with the Daoist Five Phases, among which change
connects them in a circle of continuous interchange, Platos particle the-
ory falls short of achieving the continuity of change among the elements.
As discussed earlier, solid cinnabar can become liquefied mercury, and
the change is reversible. For Plato, this required change between elements
has been limited by the two types of right triangles that are irreducible
to each other and unalterable to become something not-being-itself. The
particles, just like Platonic Forms and atomists particles, represent two
unique beings, each of which excludes anything not-being-itself. There-
fore, physical variation of the elements must conform to this basic rule
implied by the nonchangeable particles. Therefore, change is not possible
between two types of particles.
Working with this fundamental limitation, Plato can only explain physi-
cal variations of the elements in terms of geometric grouping of the par-
ticles but cannot go beyond the discontinuity of the particles in order
to seek continuity through heterogeneity. This is again the ontological
paradox of continuity and discontinuity. Without the internal continuity
between the elements, the external cosmogonical change cannot move
from the four to the myriad things.
The categories named after four elements, in fact, have explained
nothing. They are merely universals in the likeness of Forms over many
instances. The chief virtue of Empedocles plurality has been swallowed
by the doctrine of Forms at the final stage of the divine play. Like an art-
ist, Empedocles mixed four basic colors into a variety of colors to paint a
picture of the world. The artist was a bit moodyLove some moments and
308 comparative ontology

Strife at other times. Nonetheless, he still produced at the end a colorful

picture of the world with abstract strokes. Contrary to Empedocles artist,
Platos divine maker is more like the storekeeper of a cosmic warehouse.
He wants to demonstrate to people how to put together the puzzle of cre-
ation, but offers nothing finished at the end. He sorts things out into four
corners with partitions for four elements among them and says to people,
These are the ingredients of the world. The storekeeper has promised
people two things: First, the particle theory has unlocked the secret of
the architecture of material things. One can understand the theory in the
same way as one studies geometry. Second, by following the particle the-
ory, people shall be able to work out how to put together the puzzle of the
universe themselves. If the divine maker has not completed the project
that he set out to do, why should modern commentators spread so much
ink on the subject and, like Cornford, try to prove that the particle theory
is true?

Reason and Necessity

Why could the Demiurge not finish the cosmic puzzle? He does not have
the ontology of change to produce the OM model that the particle theory
requires to achieve the transformation from the elementary particles to
the myriad things.
During the construction of the world, even if he had a growing idea
about what kind of change was required, he was bound by the rules of the
game defined according to Forms. Having constructed the basic building
blocks, the next logical step ought to be simply to apply the theory to the
rest of the regular solids and demonstrate how they further shape the myr-
iad things out of the elementary elementsmore specifically how these
two irreducible particles pass into each other to create the mutation that
the four elements must have to cause the intermixing that further yields
something structurally new. But he faces the same dilemma, naming the
unchanging being. On top of this crucial limitation, the preexistent Forms
are nonimmanent structures. But to construct the world, the divine maker
must use Forms as immanent structures to bring building blocks into many
unified wholes. If he is determined to complete the puzzle from the four
to the many, then his empirical experience tells him that Forms must be
the structures, not just the causes of the structures. The rules of the game
set by the idealism of Forms are simply wrong.
One option that he has is to change the rules of the game. He can be
a creative player. By using Forms as structures to produce material things,
he can alter the Forms from merely being the causes of material structures
into the sustaining structures themselves. In this way, he turns transcen-
 the many309

dental Forms into immanent substances. This creative move, similar to

that of Aristotles doctrine of Substance, is still not enough. The next alter-
ation has to do with the preexistent universals that create a parallel uni-
verse prior to the creation. Forms cannot be preexistent universals. Under
the preexistent conditions, all he can do is to make a material copy of the
transcendental world above. Becoming is predefined by Being. However,
he can do more radical things than that. He can overturn the game condi-
tion of the preexistence of Forms. Instead of let Being define Becoming,
following his empirical experience he might discover that Becoming can
equally reshape Being. The world of Becoming is the crucible for the gen-
eration of new beings. If he could manage to take a radical step like this,
then he would discover the liberty beyond Forms.
Creativity is not entirely the expression of his cognitive mind, but the
animation of his changing being. Once he discovers the inward connec-
tion between himself and the origin of the world, he will not act as the mas-
ter builder with the intelligent design all worked out in his mind. Instead
he wishes for no more than to follow the accord of Nature that brings
everything from nothing into being. The orders of the universe are nei-
ther preexistent nor created by him. They spontaneously unfold out of
the marriage of Reason and Necessity. They were created together with
material things. Natural principles cannot exist independent of material
things. Truth can only be reviewed through the understanding of the cre-
ated unity of form-matter. Forms were in the making together with the
formation of the body of the universe when the four elements were devel-
oping inside the cosmic womb called the Receptacle. Then the child was
born as a unity of material elements with genetic influences from both
Reason and Necessity. Persistent characteristics of the growing child can-
not be viewed as independent beings and irreducible to each other. They
must be relational parts woven together by a single life to be a living body.
And the Demiurge happens to be the caretaker of the world rather than
the maker of this child. His true wisdom is not to isolate himself from the
changing world because of his unchangeable intelligence, but to become a
part of the growing change in this child because of his freedom above the
division between being and becoming. He then will let the childs becom-
ing reshape his being.
To allow the child to change his being means to attain the openness
to allow the becoming to flow into his emptied yet secure being. Moving
beyond the self-isolation in the world of changeless Forms, he comes to the
realization of a new life by turning himself into the cosmic play. Enlight-
enment arrives at the very moment of letting go of his fear of becoming.
The creation of the world requires neither his intelligent design nor his
310 comparative ontology

craftsmanship. The creation is not a once-and-for-all construction, but an

ongoing process. It only needs him to open himself to the world and allow
the growing child to teach him the true beauty of life. Then he will dis-
cover that what actually is in the making within his very being is a process
that follows its own spontaneous accord. He cannot reject the way he is.
He should not pretend to live a life in which he rides a divine chariot and
manages to rule his wild passion with a rational mind. He can ride the
rhythm of the cosmos in a process always changing but always the same.
Instead of looking into the heavens, when he aligns himself with the cos-
mic process, he will open his eyes and pay attention to the creativity of the
world in small and simple details. By knowing the world of change, he then
can reenact changes and discover the hidden path from the many to the
One. Then he can become a true co-creator of the worldan immortal
player.
The Demiurge may find this approach too radical to accept. Instead
of allowing becoming to reshaping his being, he may retreat to familiar
ground. He can employ the intermediating Soul to carry out the immanent
work to rule matter with Forms. In this situation, the Soul gets its hands
dirty and implements the causing Forms into the elements by becoming
the structures itself. The Soul becomes many souls, as many as the plural-
ity of living beings require. This path will lead to a future life filled with
pain and suffering. Just as a human soul struggles to rule irrational desires
and passions with rational thoughts, the Soul would act on the behalf of
Reason to ride the cosmic chariot on endless waves stirred by Necessity. He
would see himself as the one to protect the world from falling into anomie.
But still, to control Necessity is not simple task. Since the very beginning
of the world, the goddess was there. The whole project of creation did not
fully contain her wild passions. To assign the job of ruling this errant cause
to the Soul, the Soul must be in constant pain. Why? It is simply because he
would struggle to rule his mother. And his mother still lives in his worldly
passions.
If the Soul is to be embodied in the body of the world, the child must
incarnate both Reason and Necessity. The Soul would push the bound-
ary of his obedience to the commandments laid down by the doctrine of
Forms. The Forms must incarnate wisdom by taking material elements
upon themselves so the radiating truth of Reason could shine through
well-ordered material characters. This incarnation of unchanging Forms
in and through the changing elements essentially is the married life of
Reason and Necessity. It crosses the boundary between being and becom-
ing. In fact, being has become becoming, so becoming may act like being.
However, even if the Soul wishes to exercise his creativity to make the
 the many311

incarnation possible, the fatherly Reason could intervene and stop the
Souls brave activity in order to protect his orthodoxy about Forms. After
all, the world is created, thus mortal. Yet Forms are immortal. If the Soul is
allowed to be creative, there is too great a danger of letting the child run
free. Fallen immortals have always been given the punishment of living
mortal lives. They are subject to decay, suffering, and death. Yet the Soul
is created in the image of the fatherly Reason, and therefore its immor-
tality must be defended at all cost. If the Demiurge maintains Reasons
orthodoxy, he can preserve the crown idealism of the tradition. But he will
return to the same dilemma with which his trouble begins and witness the
misery of the divine child. The immortal Soul is always homeless in the
passionate body.
The longer he sees the suffering of the child, the more deeply he
understands two contradictory prophecies. Parmenides once said: Being
and Becoming are predestined to be in the state of separation. If Par-
menides was right, Reason and Necessity should never get married. Yet the
Pythagorean theology predicted the incarnation of the Soul. The marriage
of Reason and Necessity was bound to happen. The Demiurge is caught
in between these two prophecies. As the project of creation has gone this
far, he knows for a fact now that the universe is the mixed result of Reason
and Necessity. The Pythagorean theology was right. Yet his Parmenidean
mind tries to resist the force that the incarnation brings. Incarnation by
definition is the full realization of Being in Becoming. Parmenidean Being
must be incarnated into Heraclitus Becoming; Forms must be mixed with
Empedocles elements. Since the divine child has already been born, and
named the Soul with the body of the world, it is the time for the divine
player to relearn his wisdom based on this fact. The new life has the free-
dom to embrace the omen of the future. And the freedom is more pre-
cious than the ancient dispute on being.

Summary

This chapter has covered four major topics: (1) Ge Hongs instrumental
alchemy, (2) a critique of the alchemy as chemistry thesis and a com-
parison with physics, (3) Platos mathematical structures of the elements,
and (4) the unreconciled Parmenidean Being and Pythagorean Soul. The
sections above contain complex and unfamiliar content because neither
Daoists nor Platonists would normally venture into the textual tradition of
the other. However the one and many question has brought them together
and placed them on the same philosophical table. This is done through
the investigation of two overlapping issues: how two distinctive forms of
312 comparative ontology

ontology shape two very different forms of natural philosophy and how
different ontologies also give rise to different epistemologies. Alchemy
engages the world with the empirical method and operates in the tradi-
tion of instrumentalism. Platos idealism applies Pythagorean mathematics
to Empedocles material elements and formulates the natural philosophy
that the material world is explained by immaterial ideas.
The study of alchemy begins with textual analysis and demonstrates
what has been produced by the alchemy as chemistry thesis in Daoist stud-
ies. However, the protochemistry label has limited and reduced alchemy
to the small body of knowledge rationally explainable by chemical formu-
las. In alchemy, the synthesis of change and life, which inorganic chem-
istry proves to be a fatal antithesis, actually becomes the very foundation
of modern biochemistry. On the scale of Darwinian evolution, change is
the essence of life, and life is the product of change. Moreover, alchemy
cannot be demythologized as a religious means of seeking immortality. As
the comparison with physics has demonstrated, instrumental alchemy is
basically instrumental cosmogony, a search for the origin of the universe
through empirical means. The subject matter, the cosmogonical one and
many is also at the heart of modern physics. The concept of material time
in the formation of elixirs can also be explained through comparison with
the structural layers of matter from small particles to large organisms to
the living universe. The underlying argument, therefore, is OM in kind.
Being does not only give rise to Becoming, but Becoming also redefines
Being.
The comparison leads to a critical reading of Platos mathematical
model of the universe. That section takes a long path to investigate the
internal coherence of Platos particle theory of the elements. It focuses on
the key issue of interchangeability of the element-solids, and disproves the
claim that the myriad things are made of two irreducible triangle particles.
The section basically is a calculated rejection of Platonic scholarship that
turns a mystical genre to rational science.
The criticism of Platos natural philosophy also reveals a major source
of inconsistency in Platos ontology: the transcendental Forms inherited
from Parmenides Being and the doctrine of the souls traceable to the
historical Pythagoras. The Pythagorean idea of the incarnated soul has
not helped Plato to realize that truths must be embodied in mundane
life. What has preoccupied Platos thought is the immaterialism devel-
oped by the contemporary Pythagorean School. The immaterial nature
of mathematical truths fits well with the transmigration of souls. Idealism
has blinded him to what Pythagorean theology implies. It is the marriage
of Reason and Necessity in the Timaeus, not the Parmenidean division of
 the many313

Being and Becoming in the Republic. Consequently, there is an unsolved

tension of being and not-being that is projected onto natural studies.
The tension was already present in Platos earlier dialogues. He depicts
the only authentic soul to be the one like the philosopher-king in the
Republic. He escapes the imprisonment of the dark cave and emerges into
the enlightened state where Forms and his soul meet face to face for the
first time. After the enlightenment, the philosopher returns to the cave to
save his fellow citizens. But he is not truly happy since the mountaintop
experience. He can help others to break free from the imprisonment of
ignorance, but he cannot keep his enlightened soul from being impris-
oned in his mortal body. His mind will never be happy until it can find
true rest in eternal Reason. By telling the story of the souls journey after
death at the end of Republic, Plato has envisioned the chief reward that
philosophers can gain, namely, the immortality of the soul. Socrates knew
this affliction all too well. Before he took charge of his death, he reflected
deeply on his life. Then, in front of his pupils, he drank the cup of death,
as in the Phaedo, while he anticipated the homecoming of his soul to the
world Soul. He labored hard in his life to achieve the virtue in which his
body was ruled by Reason. But the incarnation of Reason in his bodily
existence was always accompanied by the shadow of infinite sadness. At last
he was free.
Behind the Socratic tragedy one can recall another tale told by Plato
in the Timaeus. The primordial marriage of Reason and Necessity was sup-
posed to be a celebration between being and becoming. But as it unfolded
it proved to be a painful life for both. Necessity was always suppressed,
while Reason strove to bring up their only childthe created world
alone under strict order. The child was taught to be rational and orderly to
animate the fathers eternality. But in his dreams the child ran back to his
mother to seek answers for his irrationality and deep passion for change.
Although he was never able to reconcile Reason and Necessity in his very
existence, he gradually discovered the power of the inhered antithesis.
Whoever rejects the changing worldhis very soul and bodyby which he
or she shall be rejected.
 Conclusion

Comparative Methodology

I mentioned in the introduction that I would not treat methodology as a

precondition of this comparative study, but as a conclusion of it. Now, at
the end of this study, I still maintain the proposition, but something has
changed. The becoming has reshaped the being.

Comparing Is Contrasting, and

Contrasting Is Comparing

First, the method of comparing and contrasting is conditioned by two

sets of texts. Hence it is not a scientific principle universally applicable
to every situation. Instead of accepting methodology as another Platonic
one over many structure that caps all intertraditional engagements, the
act of comparing and contrasting is a one under many discourse. The
one refers to open-ended discourse. The many designates the nature
of pluralism in comparative studies. Although the exercise of comparing
and contrasting works interchangeably throughout this book, the dis-
course of the comparative study has two phases. It begins with the phase
of contrasting and arrives at a deep respect for the irreducible differences
between traditions. Then it follows the phase of comparison that involves
comparing the contrasts. Unlike the method frequently used in natural
and social sciences, which first presents a hypothetical methodology and
then either proves its validity or critically evaluates its weakness at the end
of a study, the comparative method is a process. It was conceived at the
time of topic selection, evolved from the primary core of the ontological
interest, changed spontaneously through the translation and commentary
studies, and was infused with critical insights and comparative synthesis.
When the method was conceived, it was marked with two chief characteris-
tics: comparative pluralism rather than universal principles and a process
of evolution rather than a premise subject to evaluation.

315
316 conclusion

The second main feature of the method is the unusual starting point.
Comparison does not have to start from categorical similarities; knowing
the contrary provides a beginning for comparison. We must not assume the
existence of a metaphysical chair against which Platonic chairs and Daoist
chairs can then be meaningfully compared. On the contrary, alchemy and
geometry can be compared as long as they are understood within the con-
texts of Ge Hongs cosmogony and Platos theogony. On the acceptance
of difference, we can recognize the shared quest to name the origin of the
world. In classical studies, it would be too arrogant to invent a methodol-
ogy predefined by modern perception so that the past can be understood
by the present. Any historical study must relearn the lesson of letting his-
tory speak to us. In searching for the ultimate concernwhat the world
consists of or derives fromhistory shaped two intellectual traditions; now
with humility toward the ancient wisdom, a comparative thinker can bring
the traditions together by reengaging the one and many discourse. The
current study, therefore, is a continuation of this one and many debate.
Comparing and contrasting are two forces, just like Yin and Yang, and
together they shape the dialogical process.
Since it is a discourse, strictly speaking the method is neither monism
nor pluralism. Rather it is a process of both one and many. In this regard,
the method embeds a critique of postmodernism. The god of modernism
demands the universalism of one over many, and the goddesses of post-
modernism celebrate the many without one. Certainly postmodernism
has abandoned the assumption that all philosophies could converge on
the same metaphysical mountaintop, an assumption that entails the uni-
versalism of reason underlying all activities in natural sciences and even
liberal arts. Nevertheless, postmodernist pluralism is not a problem-free
paradigm. The willing acceptance of many without one assumes that no
unity is required in the pluralistic world. We should take a warning from
Platos Parmenides that the denial of the one will lead to the denial of the
many too. The many without the One is the primordial chaos. For Daoism,
the world overall cannot be seen as a place of endless fragments. Endless
pluralism is also relativism.
Postmodernist pluralism recalls the ontological individualism argued
by ancient atomists. Atomism rejects unity and endorses infinite plural-
ity, thus leaving the relationship among the many entirely meaningless.
However, the underlying assumption of such pluralism is that no dialogue
should be necessary as long as individual traditions have their own right
and space to evolve independently without any need to be interwoven
into a living whole. The space between the many, just like the empty space
between atoms, is ontologically meaningless. The ancient material plural-
 conclusion317

ism, or the modern notion of multiculturalism, cannot create an abiding

unity of the many. They can only form a sort of togetherness. But this is
a false unity in which interchange among the many is neither necessary
nor possible. Postmodernism praises such ontological individualism, yet
its pluralism mutates into relativism. Like a rebellious child of the rational
father, postmodernist pluralism is merely a reaction against, rather than a
correction to, modernist universalism. From one over many to the post-
modernist many without one, the underlying principle is negation.
The contemporary study of religious Daoism has not yet completely
removed the lingering shadow of modernist rationalism but quickly finds
itself slipping into postmodernist relativism. Some scholars seem happy to
be in this position without realizing two hidden dangers. The first is that it
is a powerless position to be in. Relativism makes Daoism insignificant in
the large and crowded intellectual pool that has traditionally been domi-
nated by rational players. The second is loss of confidence. Daoism actu-
ally has an answer to relativismthat is, to turn the external space inward.
The ocean is the greatest, according to Laozi, because it takes the lowest
positioning. By drawing all forms of living into its emptiness, the ocean
does not act, but nothing is left undone. By creating the space for others to
be, life evolves out of this self-humbling space. And this ocean must exist in
everyones being. The embodied ocean will create a relational space for
others to be, thus transforming ontological individualism into the ocean of
openness in which the evolution of life is sustained by relational ontology.
The comparative method wants to break down the lifeless space
between traditions, in this case, the space between religious Daoism and
Platonic rational philosophy. To engage Plato, the primary task is to rein-
sert the relational space into the self-subsistent Forms, in which there is
only being, a kind of being that rejects anything that is not-being of the
same kind. The second part of this book makes a single argument: that
the one and many problem cannot be solved by Platonic beings, but Ge
Hongs cosmogonical one and many is an answer to the ontological prob-
lem. The argument empowers Daoism to take a position of initiative, to
be confident enough to voice criticism of Plato. Moreover, against the
modern projection of searching for the roots of chemistry, the dialogue
between alchemy and physics exposes the limits of chemistry, while at the
same time creating a platform for Ge Hongs alchemical empiricism to
conduct a dialogue with Platos geometric idealism in the overall schema
of cosmogony in which modern physics also seeks the origin of matter
through instrumental means.
Reading Plato through Ge Hong is not undertaken for the sake of
criticism as such, but Daoism is introduced through the dialogue with
318 conclusion

Plato. Perhaps this book has created a protected and secure environment
to introduce Daoism on the international stage. Nonetheless, any engage-
ment is relational and thus bidirectional. A critical reading of Plato
presents tremendous challenges for a comparative thinker, like myself,
to understand Plato by revealing logical arguments hidden in the dra-
matized dialogues and to demonstrate the level of complicity in Platos
thought, which is foreign to Daoists. In reality, the critical reading of Plato
offers no protection to Ge Hong at all. The dialogue actually increases
the level of difficulty by not only inviting Daoists to read Platos dialogues
in their original context, but also to gain insights from modern analytic
philosophy. The process of comparing and contrasting equally challenges
Daoist thinkers to learn from Platonism and learn the language of reason
in order to understand the other. Whoever interprets Zhuangzi will also
be interpreted by him. This is the paradoxical saying Daoists must always
remember. Every step of translating and interpreting Daoist texts requires
a comparative scholar to give expression to Daoism beyond its abstruse
appearance and to allow Daoists to be challenged by the charity and the
coherence of Platonic reasoning. The end result is the creation of the
inner space that is also required for Daoists to appreciate Plato and his
tradition.

Rediscovering the Existential Ground

Is an ideal objectivity possible in comparative study? Comparative study

requires one to travel constantly between traditions. In the early stage of
my research, the ideal objectivity in modern science imposed on me a
demand to be both Daoist and Platonist at the same time. The feeling of
being caught in between caused an existential crisis. Who am I? Where
do I stand? What do I hope to achieve in the between? Then I real-
ized a simple factI cannot be both. Daoists and Platonists do not come
to natural acceptance of each other. Yet through the dialogue, I some-
how became the only connection between Plato and Ge Hong. The ideal
objectivity, therefore, needs to be rethought under this newly discovered
relational proposition. I cannot simple engage the subject matter and treat
it as something external to myself, which then can be brought under the
scrutiny of objectivism. I cannot do it because the subject matter is some-
thing fundamentally about myself. Somehow the objectivity must be chal-
lenged by an existential quest for reconciliation.
In the course of five years, I took various field trips to visit Daoist tem-
ples and institutions in China, in particular to trace Ge Hongs intellectual
journey, which has been preserved by three Daoist temples. Philosophers
 conclusion319

usually stay in academies and chew books. But the field trips took me to
see places where history is still in the making. To answer the existential
questions, I needed to rediscover my cultural home within which I am
accepted. When I was surrounded by morning mist, listening to the falling
rain, breathing in the fresh air, and drinking spring tea with the female
master of the monastic order, a renowned artist in residence, and a Daoist
scholar, I came to realize what the surrounding mountains have done to
them culturally and what the geographical location could equally do to
me. I came to accept where I was. The journey had taken me outside of
the familiar self to unvisited places, to understand as well as to be under-
stood by the other.
The journey of going outside the self is paradoxically the journey
to rediscover the inner self. This is exactly what Ge Hongs cultivation
method had predicted. When the finite self is emptied into the infinite
Nature, the Real-One begins to emerge. Unlike the Platonic dialectician
who gazed at the heavenly sun when he attained enlightenment at the
intellectual mountaintop, I looked downwards from the peak of Mountain
Qingcheng to search for the gate where I had entered the temple. There,
gazing at the world below, I discovered the fact that Nature is inward con-
nectedness. I did not achieve the enlightenment of otherworldly truths,
but the ascending and descending routes at different sides of the moun-
tain were a journey of self-discovery about my intellectual and cultural
home. More than a cognitive exercise, comparative philosophy involves
this empirical journeyto understand the self through the other. The
shifting of geographical location, the fact of standing in the temple, and
the act of following the liturgical life of the monks all produced insights.
As I went, I discovered that the existential crisis could be turned into a
creative tension. Until I have reconciled with myself, I am not ready to
reconcile the tensions of history.

Creative Hermeneutics and Textual Criticism

Like alchemical cyclic transformation, comparative philosophy is an intel-

lectual crucible constantly in the making. No matter how sophisticated the
philosophy may turn out to be at the end, the cyclic transformation always
starts with the primary texts, then moves through textual and contextual
studies, and finally arrives at the point of comparative insights. This is a
hermeneutical circle rather than a linear teleology. Like the method of
comparing and contrasting that is conditioned by the texts, again there is
no single hermeneutics that can be applied to both Platonic dialogues and
Ge Hongs poetic genre. Like the forces of Love and Strife in Empedocles
320 conclusion

composition and decomposition of the four elements, the hermeneutical

circle also has two forces at work.
Trained in Western scholasticism, I am more familiar with the critical
method that is traceable to Aristotles critique of Plato and even earlier
among the pre-Socratics. As I go back to the Chinese tradition, I realize
something different. Intellectual training gives a strong emphasis to a
master-disciple relationship. Contrary to the Western tradition of critical
negation, Daoism represents a Chinese style of interpretive affirmation.
Ge Hongs family lineage is one of many telling types of evidence. After
some years of involvement in politics as a Confucian scholar, Ge Hong
returned to his family roots; subsequently he was chosen by his master
Zheng Yin to be the heir to the tradition. Ge Hong was not a critic of
his master, but a creative interpreter. He established his credentials by his
affirmative reinterpretation of the past rather than negation of the past.
This kind of intellectual succession has become a pattern throughout the
history of Daoism. The Daoist Canon, in fact, exhibits this tendency by
collecting commentarial writings of later times that have reinterpreted the
earlier scriptures; in so doing they take a legitimate place in the genealogy
of Daoism.
The hermeneutical process is intrinsically creative. Like the Dao that
unfolds itself into Nature, the process of creative hermeneutics
involves the principles of affirmation and reinterpretation. Following
these principles, Ge Hongs originality is affirmed while his texts are rein-
terpreted with creative insights to give the past new meanings. To affirm
Ge Hongs originality, the hermeneutics places Ge Hong within the lin-
eage to which he belonged and the contemporary debates in which he
was involved. The affirmation is basically the issue of historical faithful-
ness in classical studies. To reinterpret Ge Hongs religious philosophy, the
hermeneutics places his thoughts in the crucible of comparative philoso-
phy. Thus comparative insights become new alchemical fires at work to
regulate changes in the process of reinterpretation. The new is nonethe-
less the recomposition of the old.
Creative hermeneutics involves both textual and contextual studies.
These two submethods are often used interchangeably in this comparative
study. Introducing a Daoist concept for comparison often involves a step
back before taking steps forward, to carefully read and grasp the original
connotation in order to rediscover another layer of denotation unrealized
previously. Unlike the descriptive nature of English, classical Chinese is
far more elastic and symbolic, thus inviting readers to imagine and cap-
ture new meanings that overflow from the fountain of poetic language.
Moreover, the dialogue with Plato adds a new dimension to the exercise of
 conclusion321

reinterpretation. Frequently Platos explicit thinking challenges creative

hermeneutics to clarify deep philosophical issues never imagined by Ge
Hong. In fact, the dialogue provides a new language of reason for Daoists
scholars today to communicate Daoist riches with the world. Therefore,
the hermeneutics is a positive force in the making of comparative philoso-
phy. Moving from the past to the present, it has changed the historical
location of Daoism from being interpreted by others to being an inter-
preter of the other.
Western philosophy evolves out of a history that consists of major criti-
cisms of the past, which produce landmark corrections of the past. Plato
argued against the pre-Socratics, and then Aristotle turned against Plato.
More recently Marx learned from Hegel yet became the thinker the most
critical of the master. Reading Plato from a Daoist perspective follows this
tradition of critical hermeneutics .
Even though the study of Plato mainly takes the form of criticism, it
does not follow that critical hermeneutics is unattractive to Daoists. On
the very contrary, criticism is a form of engagement. Otherwise there is
no point in having an in-depth engagement. In fact, the hermeneutics
requires a high level of commitment from both parties. It calls on Dao-
ists not to run away from Plato and not to turn away from the challenges
brought by Platonic scholarship, but to stay the course of the dialogue to
make it worthwhile. To learn the art of criticism equally requires Daoists
to listen carefully to what Plato has to say and read the texts. The herme-
neutics, therefore, involves textual and contextual studies. Contextual and
critical insights can only arrive after a diligent reading of the original texts.
When Daoist scholars become involved in textual study, they shall real-
ize a striking similarity to their own canonical studies. Textual study is a
form of discipleship. Aristotle was a follower at Platos Academy before
he turned away from Platonism. Likewise, critical hermeneutics requires
a long discourse of engagement with Plato before creating a critique with
penetrating depth.
Historically, Platonism has endured a love-hate relationship with Chris-
tian theology for nearly two thousand years. Neither Christian theology
nor Platonism is swallowed up by the other. For nervous Platonic gatekeep-
ers, the historical lesson is still of value here. Platonism will not and should
not be devalued in the dialogue with Daoism. The hermeneutics is the
second force in the intellectual crucible of comparative philosophy. Like
alchemical fire constantly turning whatever is unsustainable into ashes yet
refining what is life-giving out of the earth, the very reason that Plato has
attained its crowning status in Western philosophy is not because of its
separation from change, but because of its capacity to be creatively inter-
322 conclusion

preted by the history of change. The dialogue has tabled a crucial criticism
at the heart of Western ontology. It also has offered a Daoist answer. The
criticism now invites a Platonic response.
If Platonists take up the challenge, they must also learn the language
of Daoism and read Ge Hong for what he is. Then they would realize that,
without the dialogue with Plato, Ge Hongs philosophy would not be as
readily recognizable in the rhapsodical genre; without the comparative
connections, one would easily become lost in the historicity of Daoist tra-
ditions. Moreover, the philosophical language adopted for the dialogue is
far closer to Platos than to Ge Hongs. Indeed, it has made the religions
tradition more accessible to modern philosophical minds. After all, the
comparative method has opened an intellectual door not just to under-
stand the other, but also to understand the self through the other. Who
would step across the line between the self and the other?

A Bridge between Cultures

Historically, Plato and Ge Hong never met, but the dialogue has brought
them together. If Daoism should be modernized, as is currently argued
by the school of New Daoism , Daoist scholarship should neither
isolate itself within the protective walls of antiquity, which are still guarded
by the method of historical-textual analysis, nor sacrifice its originality for
scientific rationalism. The comparative method has demonstrated a Dao-
ist apologetics in the world of pluralism. The strategy is not one of passive
defense, but of active engagement.
By moving out of the self into the world of many, Daoism can truly redis-
cover, and be empowered by, what it stands for in the course of history. But
to reunderstand oneself through dialogue requires the elementary step of
seeking understanding about the dialogue partner. Unfortunately, basic
training in Western thought is commonly lacking among Daoist scholars
in China. The rise of New Confucianism in the West has already
testified to a successful experience. Three generations of Confucian schol-
ars went to the West and learned from the West to accommodate science
and democracy. They then actively taught Confucianism in various institu-
tions, making the argument that the West shall learn from China and from
Confucianism in particular. To learn from this lesson of active engage-
ment, the modernization of Daoism is neither a simple matter of learning
natural science nor a collective effort to carve an intellectual property in
a Confucian society. It needs to be an outward journey of self-rediscovery.
This study has taken the outward journey and thus discovered that reli-
gious Daoism is capable of engaging with rational philosophy and that it
 conclusion323

already contains the synthesis to close the gap between natural and moral
philosophers.
Instead of seeking approval by the other, the core value of the com-
parative method is to offer a path of reconciliation. As mentioned before,
the reconciliation starts with the self. My journey began with the exercise
of comparing and contrasting and then turned this simple method into
a relational discourse. As I go back and forth between comparing ideas
and contrasting premises, I come to discover that the tension between two
philosophies has a radical opening. Unless I stand there, they have noth-
ing in common. Once this was a polarizing tension defined by the logic
of opposition and causing an identity crisis; now it has become a creative
tension linked by relational ontology. By standing in the radical opening,
by holding the tension of the two, I become a bridge over the cultural gulf.
This is the same existential position in which I once stood. But now I have
changed. I can participate in a dialogue with two great minds.
Philosophers can live in different parts of history and belong to differ-
ent cultures and linguistic traditions. But they live in the same world, and
they have some shared concerns about the world. This is where a compara-
tive thinker really standson the same earth under the same heaven. I
am standing in the middle of the radical opening between heaven and
the earth. The cosmos is constantly inviting seeking minds to participate
in its wholeness; even in a confirmed existential location, as long as I am
open to the world, I am able find the oneness of the world at the pres-
ent moment. The realization of this simple truth is indeed liberating. It
marks a complete circle in my intellectual journey. Starting from a long
and unmapped journey to the West through theological landscapes, I then
returned to the cultural home, taking the philosophical route in the jour-
ney to the East. Ge Hong systematized religious Daoism and wrote the tril-
ogy on the doctrine of Xuan Dao, the doctrine of the Golden Elixir, and
the doctrine of Immortals. Plato founded the Academy and created the
categories of ontology, natural philosophy, and ethics. I have brought them
together through the categories of the heavens, the earth, and humanity.
I am standing at the place where philosophers are the inductions between
heaven and earth.
Apart from making an academic contribution, I believe that intellec-
tual adventure is intrinsically autobiographical. Therefore it has a life of its
own. The wisdom that a person can attain from a book is limited in scope,
but the dialogical method can unleash the thought yet to evolve into a
fuller life. If one seeks to reconcile the many with a single unifying theory,
one becomes a monist philosopher, increasingly isolated in the pluralistic
world. If one transforms oneself into a bidirectional bridge to shorten the
324 conclusion

traveling distance between traditions, then one becomes a pluralist with

openness toward other traditions. Comparative thinkers are bridge build-
ers. Once intercultural bridges have been constructed, people on both
sides of the bridges find unprecedented freedom to go across to the intel-
lectual other shore, where they discover the simple truth that humans are
basically relational beings. On their way home, they shall realize that the
journey is fundamentally not about the other, but about the relearning of
the self through the other. One empties the self into the many so our inner
many may become one. It is this outward and returning journeyenabled
by the bidirectional bridgethat sets people free.
In the future, when more people have traveled to the other shore,
many Daoists may arrive at the gate of Platos Academy. Many will have
come previously to seek education. Now they will have returned as messen-
gers. Some messages may come as appreciations, while others may take the
form of criticism. But the underlying message is the same, namely, further
dialogue. If Platonist guardians can look beyond their pride, they will real-
ize that something has profoundly changed. Once they trained the world
to speak the same rational language, and they have succeeded. Now those
who arrive at the doorstep all can speak the language, yet the people inside
the scholastic castle have never felt the need to learn another language.
The outsider can understand the insider, but the insider is not in the posi-
tion to understand the outsider. The reality is easy to explain but too pain-
ful to accept. Plato once defined philosophy as the love of all wisdom, but
the guardians somehow have fostered progeny within the confined walls of
homogeneity. They have offered protection but lost freedom.
However, if the guardians had happened to pass on the invitation to the
founder of the school, Plato would well have had the intellectual virtue to
entertain the criticism in the breadth of his enlightened mind. Even at an
advanced age, he would have been happy to accept the invitation and leave
his Academy for a journey to the East. Then, when he arrived at Mount
Luofu, he would see the Master Embracing Simplicity standing at the gate
waiting for him. When friends come from a far distance, how can one not
be happy? He has come to welcome the honorable guest to accompany
him on the journey to the temple. Two great minds immediately engage
with each other. The conversation leads to the acceptance of what has
already been said in their books. Plato still maintains his ontology divided
in degrees, whereas Ge Hong repeats the discourse of life from the one to
the many. When they meet face to face, they find that to hear the speech
of the other directly is a real pleasure and the conversation in the present,
not the repeating of thoughts written in the part, truly inspirational.
As they arrive at the temple on the mountaintop something begins
 conclusion325

to change. While Plato is explaining how the sun, the source of light for
everything to be seen, had enlightened the ascending path that they have
just taken, he looks into the heavens. At that very moment he discovers
that the sun is too bright to gaze directly into its brilliance. The intense
light actually makes him temporarily blind. When he has recovered his
sight, he sees Ge Hong pointing below with his right hand. Indicating the
land under the sun, he notes the beauty of the sun; the myriad things have
made the goodness of the sun visible. Walking toward the crucible stand-
ing in the courtyard, Ge Hong relates a parable. The sun is like alchemical
fire. Alchemists do not know what fire is until they go to collect what the
fire has done to the elixirs. These flowers and trees and countless living
beings in this mountain collectively give expression to what the sun has
done to this place. You have labeled them physical objects a degree away
from truth, while making the sun transcendent. But alchemists see them
as Natures elixirsthe materialized Qiin the crucible of life. There can-
not be two separate natures, one above and another one below. There is
only one Natureto freely be what is to be. Isnt this what the sun does?
The ascending journey does not stop at the courtyard; they move to
the seventh floor of the pavilion, where the spring tea has just been pre-
pared. Plato walks along the eight windows opened to the surroundings
where dark mountain peaks stand out like islands in a sea of white. He
is overwhelmed by the breathtaking view, which previously he has seen
only in paintings. The mountain is indeed beautiful, but is harmony tran-
scendent? Ge Hong relates another parable. Harmony is like the view
before us, always changing, therefore always the same. Harmony is like the
immortal being who lives in these mountains. He always opens himself to
harbor the myriad things within his all-embracing emptiness. While they
continue the conversation, the morning clouds drift away with the east
wind, and the sun reveals the path of their ascending journey. Looking at
the horizon where heaven and earth met, Ge Hong tells his guest, That
is where Daoist immortals live, and this is where we philosophers stand.
You may not know it, but we are already in the community of immortal
beings. All we need to do is to remove the heaven-earth distinction. Nature
has already shown us the harmony between them. If we can do the same,
heaven and earth may also become onein us.
On his descending journey, one thing keeps coming back to Platos
mind. He should not be that elderly man who occupies the center stage
of philosophy together with young Aristotle, as Raphael portrayed him in
the School of Athens on the wall of the Sistine Chapel, looking face to face at
the Son of God on the opposite side. He wonders, Is the division between
Reason and Revelation a mere illusion?
 Notes

Introduction: The One and Many as an Ontological Problem

1. There are two theories on the number of years Ge Hong lived. (1)
According to Wang Ming, Ge Hong was born in 283 and died in 363, when he
was eighty-one years old. Wang Mings study is based on the single reference
in Jinshu Ge Hong zhuan (Wang Ming 1980, 383). For a detailed
argument along the same lines, see You Xinxiong 1977, 1. (2) According to
Hu Fuchen, Ge Hong was born in 284, and the year of his death is 344. The
key reference is Luofu ji . For a full historical study of the reference, see
the work of the historian Wang Chengwen (2003). Hus essay bears similarity
to Chen Feilongs essay in the same conference proceedings (Chen Feilong
2003).
2. , , ,
3. , ,
4. Neville 1992, 113.
5. Moltmann 1985, 119.
6. Honderich 2005, 670.
7. Gao Yongwei 1985, 907.
8. Ware and Ge 1966; Campany 2002.
9. Chen Guofu (1997) has pioneered the study to understand alchemical
terms.
10. In the past twenty years, there have been some comparative studies
published in Chinese, but they are general studies rather than topic based. See
Li Zhilin 1988; Cheng Zhongying 1991; Wang Miaoyang and Fan Mingsheng
1994; Wu 1997; Zhang Zailin 1999; Shanghai Zhongxi Zhexue yu Wenhua
Bijiao Yanjiuhui 2000.
11. Yang Ruzhou 1983. Yangs title claims to be a comparison between two
philosophical traditions. In reality, he has not gone the distance to conduct
actual comparisons beyond propositional differences stated in the opening
chapter (Chenyang Li 1999). In a relatively short first chapter (pp. 134), Li
makes an ontological distinction between the one-only in the Western ontol-

327
328 notes to pages xxxxiii

ogy and the one-many in the Chinese ontology. Although Lis works contains
specific discussion on Zhuangzi, unfortunately the comparison of Daoism and
Western philosophy is done with broad strokeswithout penetrating details.
12. Throughout this book Daoism is translated from the Chinese term
, the School of Dao, which can be traced to the bibliographical chapter in
the History of the Sui Jingji zhi *.
13. In many textbooks on Chinese intellectual history, Ge Hong is men-
tioned along with other Daoist thinkers in the Wei-Jin period. However, his
thought is mainly seen as a religious sidetrack along the main philosophical
stream and is not considered to be directly comparable with his philosophi-
cal contemporaries. For this general treatment see Ren Jiyu 1963, 2: 247253;
Beijing Daxue Zhexuexi Zhongguo Zhexue Jiaoyanshi 2001, 203207; Xiang
Shiling 2004, 339344.
14. Three important works on the philosophy of religious Daoism have
removed the division and established important connections between so-
called philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism. See L Pengzhi 2000; Li
Dahua 2001; Li Dahua, Li Gang, and He Jianming 2003.
15. There is a new trend in Sinology that regards religious Daoism as the
larger paradigm within which philosophical Daoism is an important stream.
This new approach does not only remove the division between religion and
philosophy, but also sets philosophy within religion. For an influential argu-
ment see Bokenkamp and Nickerson 1997, 1015.
16. Schipper 1993; Schipper and Verellen 2004; Robinet 1997.
17. Kohn 1991, 2000.
18. Bokenkamp and Nickerson 1997.
19. Lagerwey 1987.
20. Campany 2002.
21. Ware and Ge 1966.
22. The formula by Xi Zeyan summa-
rizes the overtones of the multivolume collective work The History of Chinese
Daoism and Scientific Technology ( Jiang Sheng and Tang Weixia 2002, iv).
23. Needham 1968, 1960, 1971.
24. Jiang Sheng and Tang Weixia 2002; Needham 2001; Zhao Kuanghua
and Lu Jiaxi 1998; Rong Zhiyi 1998; Zhao Kuanghua 1996; Sivin 1995, 1968,
1969.
25. In my postgraduate education, I became engaged in the dialogue
between science and religion, through which I encountered a number of insti-
tutions that aim to bridge the gap between religion and science: the Center for
Theology and the Natural Sciences run by the Graduate Theological Union
(GTU) in Berkeley, California, http://www.ctns.org/ (accessed June 2006);
the John Templeton Foundation in Philadelphia, http://www.templeton
.org/ (accessed June 2006); the European Society for the Study of Science
and Theology at Leiden University in the Netherlands, http://www.esssat
.org/ (accessed June 2006).
 notes to pages 29329

Chapter 1: Ge Hongs Doctrine of Xuan Dao

1. As for this passage, long quoted passages throughout this book are not
provided with full texts in Chinese. I assume that readers will go back to the
primary source for an in-depth reading. But some key terms are given in pin-
yin and Chinese characters.
2. Ware and Ge 1966.
3. In Chinese literature the genre of rhapsody (chang ), as exemplified
in the title Chang Xuan, is associated with the poetic form called rhapsody
(fu ) (Nienhauser 1986, 388391).
4. Wang Ming 1980.
5. The only surviving copy is held in the Liaoning Provincial Library
. Its scholarly abbreviation is Song zhe ben . Wang Mings work
does not solely rely on this edition, but also on the text in the Ming dynasty
Daoist Canon (Daozang). It is based also on some newly discovered fragments.
For the full background of Wangs textual work, see Wang Ming 1980, 18,
396399.
6. See Wang Mings text note 7 (ibid., 4).
7. As indicated in the Introduction, the distinction between philosophical
Daoism and religious Daoism is a modern division, not a historical one. But
occasionally the distinction is used in dialogue with Daoist scholarship.
8.
9. ), Lou Yulie 1980, 2.
10. See Wang Mings text notes 2 and 3 (1980, 4).
11. Chen Zungui 1980, 8688.
12. The umbrella image is explored in David Holms study on the liturgical
dances still present in modern China, in which an umbrella is used to symbol-
ize the turning heavens. The particular correspondence between the liturgy
and the ancient belief is the Nine Luminaries (jiuyao ) (Holm 1990, 192,
193).
13. The commentary refers to the religious commentary tradition on Laozi,
Xianger zhu . For a systematic study see Bokenkamp and Nickerson
1997, 22, 2977.
14. Wang Ming 1980, 4.
15. Qing Xitai 1996, 307.
16. Wang Ming 1980, preface, 4.
17. I gathered this impression from the First International Conference on
Ge Hong in November 2003, held at Zhejiang University, China.
18. He Shuzhen 2002, 11.
19. Ibid., 27.
20. ZHDZ is the abbreviation for Zhonghua Daozang (Li Zeng 1997). This
is a newly published and punctuated version of the Daoist Canon. The classic
Daozang (DZ) is referenced by volume and page. For Yang Xiongs method of
divination in English, see Yang 1993, 2732.
330 notes to pages 921

21. The connection between the Book of Changes and the Tai Xuan has been
well identified by Michael Nylan (1994). For a systematic study and commen-
tary, see Yang 1993.
22. Wang Qing 2000, 130. For the list of tetragrams (translated into Eng-
lish) used in the Tai Xuan see, Yang 1993, 2528.
23. The autobiography is only collected in ZHDZ and not in DZ.
24. Ge Hongs relation with Wei Poyang will be discussed in Chapter 9,
The Many, on Ge Hongs alchemy.
25. The number following the abbreviation indicates the page number in
the edition published by Zhonghua Shuju .
26. Wang Ming 1980, preface, 34; Yang Mingzhao 1991, 1997, preface,
12.
27. The details of the Gaitian model will be discussed extensively in the
chapter on the One. For a brief discussion of the contrary views of the two
models, see Zheng Wenguang 1979, 104107.
28. Ge Hongs astronomical texts will be closely studied in the context of
the alchemical universe in the chapter The One.
29. Chen Zungui 1980, 305, 306.
30. Cullens study of the Constellations in the Gaitian astronomy makes
an important correction to Needhams study. Cullen argues that Chinese
astronomy was not motivated merely by intellectual curiosity, but rather
aimed to produce an accurate calendar for agricultural demands, so such
operations as sowing and harvesting could be carried out at the proper time
(Cullen et al. 1996, 5; for a general background on calendrical astronomy,
see pp. 427).
31. Wang Mings textual notes 4 and 5 in Wang Ming 1980, 4.
32. ,
33.
34. The connection between alchemy and astronomy will be discussed in
the chapter on The One.
35. For details see Wang Mings comparison (1980, preface, 12).
36. , The sentence literally means change and
transformation are the self-so-ness of heaven and earth. Here I interpret ziran
as principle. The interpretation requires a separate discussion of ziran as an
ontological concept in Daoism. The detailed discussion will be presented in
the chapter on Nothing.
37. For a brief introduction see Hu Fuchen and L Xichen 2004, 178201;
for a comprehensive study see Kang Zhongqian 2003.
38. For a full philosophical discussion, see Zhou Shaoxian and Liu Guijie
1996.
39. I borrow the expression from Zhou Shaoxian. Ibid., 120.
40. Tang Yijie 2003, 64.
41. Ibid., 66.
 notes to pages 2128331

42. Tang has published a fuller account of the School of Xuan and Dao-
ism in the Wei-Jin Period (Tang Yijie 1988). But there is no direct comparison
between Ge Hong and the School of Xuan.
43. Kang Zhongqian 2003, 618.
44. The seven include Ruan Ji (210263), Ji Kang (223262),
Shan Tao , Wang Jie , Xiang Xiu , Liu Ling , and Ruan Xian
. For bibliographic details see Lin Li-chen 2005, 1:3374.
45. Commentary by Wang Bi in Xiao Tianshi 1977, 391; for an English
translation see Wagner 2003, 122.
46. Commentary by Wang Bi in Xiao Tianshi 1977, 392; Wagner 2003, 123.
47. The point is summarized by the editor, his son Tang Yijie (Tang Yong-
tong 2001, 12).
48. Hu Fuchen and L Xichen 2004, 181.
49. During the conference on Ge Hong, I heard this claim repeatedly from
various scholars.
50. (Cosmology or Cosmogony)
(ontology or theory of being) (Tang Yongtong 2001, 44).
51. Kang Zhongqian 2003, 125139.
52. Xiao Tianshi 1977, 392. The passage creates a high level of difficulty for
a translator because the philosophical argument is concealed in the ambigu-
ity of the classical language. Here I have sacrificed textual fidelity but focused
on the philosophical meaning of the text. For a literal translation see Wagner
2003, 122, 123.
53. , ; ,
54. McGrath 1994, 493.
55. , , ,
56. , , , , ? For
those [Confucians] who have failed to grasp the breadth of the universe, even
though it is a simple matter of observation, how can they understand Xuan
upon Xuan and the wonder of all wonders? (IC 154).
57. Hu Fuchen and L Xichen 2004, 179.
58. The concept of Nothingness interprets the phrase
to designate the meaning of beyond the door of conceptual norms. (Laozi
1) The concept of potency comes from the phrase Dao is potent, its works are
beyond measure (Laozi 4). According to Heshang Gongs
interpretation, here the word chong is used interchangeably with
the word zhong denoting the sense of inner life. See Heshang Gongs com-
mentary in Xiao Tianshi 1977, 540.
59. Ge Xuan et al. 1977, 525, 526.
60. Bokenkamp and Nickerson 1997, 39.
61. , Ware has translated the sentence as he exists
through the zenith and enters through the nadir. Wares translation is rhe-
torically more satisfying for describing immortal existence. My translation is
332 notes to pages 2838

more literal in order to highlight the idea of wu, leaving the cosmic back-
ground of Daoist immortals to be extensively investigated in another chapter.
62. , , ,
63. Graham (1989) reviews scholarly work on this key stream of Chinese
intellectual history.

Chapter 2: Platos Answer to the Pre-Socratic Debate

1. In this section I rely on Jonathan Barnes recent study in presenting the
sources of textual fragments. These fragments are traditionally attributed to
the Milesian, and Barnes evidently has accepted the historical interpretations
of the fragments, which I also follow (Barnes 1987, 927).
2. A version of the Laozi written on bamboo strips had been discovered and
closely studied. It belonged to the Chunqiu period dating to about 700500
BC (Yin Zhenhuan 2001).
3. Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz work Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker is
a scholarly edition of the ancient fragments of the Presocratic philosophers.
Many translations use Diels-Kranz numbers when referring to specific passages.
The system refers to three sections: A contains testimonia, B contains fragments,
and C contains imitations. Here the reference 11B3 refers to chapter 11, sec-
tion B, the third item. I will give the original source wherever possible.
4. Stokes provides a summary regarding whether the Milesians used the
word unlimited in the way that Aristotle attributed to them (Stokes 1971,
2830).
5. Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, I vi 17.
6. Censorinus, On the Day of Birth, iv 7.
7. The medical application of element theory goes back to ancient Greece.
See Mental Health in Platos Republic in Kenny 1973, 3.
8. Plutarch, The Primary Cold, 947f.
9. Plutarch, Opinions of the Philosophers on Nature, 876AB.
10. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1407b1418; Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, IX
ix 1-x 9.
Again I rely on Jonathan Barnes study (1987, 49, 51).
11. The circumference of a circle the beginning and end are common
(Burnet 1930, 138).
12. Herodotus, Histories, II 123.23.
13. Aristotle, On the Pythagoreans, fragment 191 Rose, 3rd ed., in Apollo-
nius, Marvellous Stories, 6.
14. Aristotle 1998, 1078b, 402.
15. This is my reconstruction of Burnets insight that the Forms had a
Pythagorean origin (Burnet 1930, 309).
16. Kirk 1957, 71, 277282.
17. Ibid., 71, 352, 277.
18. Burnet says: The truth Herakleitos proclaimed was that the world is at
 notes to pages 4055333

once one and many, and that it is just the opposite tension of the opposites
that constitutes the unity of the One (Burnet 1930, 143).
19. Taylor 1956, 351.
20. Cornford 1939, 114.
21. Ryle 1965, 98.
22. Ibid., 97.
23. Runciman 1965 [1959], 149.
24. Ibid., 184.
25. According to Runciman the following passages were written after the
Parmenides: Timaeus (51b52c), Philebus (15ab), Theaetetus (185d), Politicus
(284e286a), Sophist (249cd), Phaedrus (277a), and Laws (965 be). Runci-
man 1965 [1959], 152.
26. Robinson 1953.
27. Allen 1997, preface, xi.
28. Plato and Scolnicov 2003.
29. Cornford 1939, 87.
30. I rely on Taylors study to identify this asymmetrical participation. It
is in fact a relation of resemblance + derivation, and this relation is not sym-
metrical. My reflection in the glass is a reflection of my face, but my face is not
a reflection of it (Taylor 1956, 358; also in Cornford 1939, 9394).
31. Kirk 1957 (1971), (344), 269.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., (352), 277.

Chapter 3: Ge Hongs Preservation of the One

1. TPJ 67, 254, is the abbreviation for the chapter 67, page 254, in Wang
Mings (1997) punctuated edition of the Taiping jing .
2. ,
3. , , ,
4.
5. The list is presented in the concordance on the Inner Chapters (Schipper
and Chen 1965, 597).
6. ,
7. Henrick translates wuwei as to act without acting in his translation of
Laozi and further clarifies this as to spontaneously say and do what is genu-
inely felt rather than putting on a show for others (Henricks 1989, xxvi).
Graham translates the concept as doing nothing but also points out that
doing nothing also includes the motif of doing but . . .. Certainly Graham
has recognized the paradoxical nature of the concept yet has failed to capture
it in the translation (Graham 1989, 232234).
8. , , According to Wang Mings text note,
the first sentence comes from Zhouyi fanci , whereas the second sen-
tence is from the Zuozhuan . (Wang Ming 1980, 260).
334 notes to pages 5566

9. , Zh u Xi 1996, 322.
10. In Chapter 7, Nothing, the logical aspects of ontological change will
be discussed in the context of change as both continuity and discontinuity.
This paradox of sameness and difference will be then put in comparative con-
text with Platos disassociation of being and not-being.
11. Ware and Ge 1966, 2829.
12. Chen Feilong 2002, chap. 1.
13. , , ,
14. , , ,
15. , , , ,
The references follow the commentary by Huang Hui . LH 23, 949, is the
abbreviation for Lun heng, chapter 23, page 949 (Huang Hui 1990).
16. The reference follows the commentary by the
modern scholar Liu Kangde . (2001).
17. , , , ,

18. OC 43, 423, is the abbreviation for Outer Chapters, chapter 43, page 423.
The reference follows the annotated edition by Yang Mingzhao (1991,
1997).
19. ,
20. ,
21. , , , ,
22. Hu Fuchen 1989, 202.
23. The inner/outer distinction is absent in Ge Hongs writing. Historically
inner alchemy and outer alchemy came to be distinguished during the latter
period of the Tang dynasty. Hu Fuchen and L Xichen 2004, 527.
24. Robinet 1997, 80.
25. Campany translates the term fangshi as masters of esoterica ( 2002, 6).
26. Bokenkamp and Nickerson 1997, 67.
27. Chen Guofu 1963, 258.
28. Qing Xitai 1996, 336.
29. Chang Minyi 2003, 5759.
30. The translation is modified from Wares (1966) translation.
31. , ,
32. , , , ,
33. I have discovered some text notes in the work of Gu Jiu (1995, 463464),
but as I began to trace the notes to their original sources (Ding Fubao n.d.,
book 9), I discovered that many references are either incorrect or belonged
to texts of much later periods. Here I have created a table to demonstrate the
connection between Ge Hongs text and the early medical text the Scripture of
the Yellow Chamber. The asterisk indicates changes that I have made.
34. The Scripture of the Yellow Chamber in the Daoist Canon has three fas-
cicles: the Inner, the Outer, and the Middle. According to Hu Fuchen, the
earliest text, known as the Huangting jing , appeared in the Western
 notes to pages 6881335

Jin period. During the Eastern Jin period, the Inner fascicle appeared as the
Neijing jing , and the earlier Huangting jing was then retitled
as the Outer fascicle or Waijing jing . The Middle fascicle or Taishang
huangting zhongjing jing belonged to a later period. So the
chronological order of the three with reference to Ge Hong is Waijing
jing, Baopuzi, Neijing jing (Hu Fuchen 1989, 225228). For a
study of the Huangting jing, see Schipper 1975; for a study of the Wushang
biyao, see Lagerwey 1981.
35. For a detailed study on the heavenly city and its relation to the cosmos,
see Wheatley 1971.
36. , ,
37. , , ,
38. Hu Fuchen 1989, 228.
39. , , ,
40. , , , ,
41. The argument turns out to be a massive study of Chinese sciences cat-
egorized into branches defined by Western sciences (Needham 19542003).

Chapter 4: Platos Doctrine of Forms

1. The dates of Platos dialogues are disputed. The dating is associated
with various factors, such as stylometry, Aristotles references, Platos own
development of thought, and some unclassifiable features. Here I follow Rich-
ard Krauts study and group Platos dialogues in the following chronologi-
cal categories: the early dialogues, the transitional and middle dialogues, and
the later dialogues. (1) The early dialogues include Apology, Charmides, Crito,
Euthyprhro, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, and Protagoras. (2) The transitional dia-
logues contain some stylistic similarity to the middle dialogues. They include
Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus, and Republic, book I. The
middle dialogues consist of Meno, Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic 2 to 10,
Phaedrus, Parmenides, and Theaetetus in chronological order. (3) The later dia-
logues contain Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, and Laws. Richard
Kraut, Introduction to the Study of Plato, in Kraut 1992, 515. For discus-
sion of chronology based on stylometry, see Brandwood 1990. For the dating
of the early dialogues (also called the Socratic dialogues) based on the argu-
ment that the speeches of Socrates in this group represent the thought of the
historical Socrates, see Vlastos 1991.
2. Taylor 1956, 187; Ross 1951, 25; Shorey 1965, 172173.
3. Irwin 1994, chap. 10; Nehamas 1999, 171191.
4. Fine 1984.
5. Fine 1986.
6. Vlastos 1987, 212.
7. Devereux 1994, 64.
8. I have modified the diagram from the version presented by Desmond
336 notes to pages 81101

Lee in his translation of the Republic (Plato 1955, 250). The texts from the
Republic are also based on his translation.
9. Here I borrow Cornfords phrase (1941 [1955], 217).
10. Cross and Woozey argue that Platos attitude on poetry and art as illu-
sion in book 10 fits well into his scheme of knowledge presented in the Divided
Line (1964, chap. 12).
11. Just as ancient commentators had recognized the Pythagorean origin
of Platos idea of the harmonious World Soul, Cornford points out that the
harmony is musically demonstrable (1935a [1977] , 71, 72).
12. Taylor 1956, 187.
13. Ross 1951, 38.
14. Modern scholars have identified this mistake that has a Parmenidean
origin. See Cornford 1935b, 296; Owen 1999, 418421. The original publica-
tions are in Vlastos 1970.
15. Cornford 1935b, 208.

Chapter 5: Two Forms of Enlightenment

1. For some older discussions of Platos idea of good in the Republic, see
Ross 1951, 3969; Taylor 1956, 285298; Cornford 1965.
2. For a list of puzzling questions about the Platonic good, see White 1976,
100.
3. For a study on Platonic Forms and good in Platos Eleatic dialogues, see
Dorter 1994.
4. For a connection with the One in the Parmenides see Brumbaugh 1961.
5. Santas has argued that the Form of the good in the three similes of the
Republic has formulated the first grand philosophical synthesis but nonethe-
less is paradoxical in nature. See Gerasimos Santas, The Form of the Good
in Platos Republic, in Fine 1999, 247274 . I am indebted to his analysis and
reinterpretation on Paul Shoreys translation and commentary on the three
similes. But I disagree with Santas on two issues. (1) He consistently treats the
Form of the good as a Form, but I maintain the term the vision of good also
used by Plato. I shall argue in the following that the good is neither a Form
nor a kind of knowledge, but a teleological unity through which the mind
and Forms become communicable. (2) He argues the distinction of ideal/
proper attributes (by Vlastos) is the key to understanding the ontological-
epistemological priority of the good. I argue the supreme status of the good is
self-explanatory if the OM argument is closely examined.
6. Reflecting on the passage of the Cave, Richard Kraut has identified
theoretical studies and public ruling as two divergent tasks: self-interest and
justice. His solution to the divergence, on the one hand similar to Reeves
argument, is that ruling promotes the greatest good by the philosophers over
the long run; on the other hand based on his reading, justice and ones own
well-being (including the self-interest of intellectualism) coincide in the idea
 notes to pages 102111337

of good (Kraut 1999; also see Reeve 1988, 201203). I think Krauts interpre-
tation offers a moral lesson critical of modern individualism. Nonetheless the
so-called divergence of self and public interest, I argue from here onward, is
not as great as he perceives.
7. Taylor 1956, 295.

Chapter 6: Ge Hongs Doctrine of Immortal Beings

1. Michael Loewes study on Han China assesses a wealth of archaeological
evidence to uncover the belief in immortality relating to death and the hereaf-
ter. In particular Loewe closely examined three major subjects of Han art and
iconography: a recently found silk painting from central China dating from
around 168 BC; numerous bronze mirrors of the so-called TLV pattern rich
in cosmological symbolism; and representations of the Queen Mother of the
West (Loewe 1979). The last subject, although a popular figure and a leading
motif of Han art and literature, clearly belonged to the Daoist tradition at a
very early period (Kohn 1991).
2. Schipper and Chen 1965, 425427.
3. Ibid., 662, 663.
4. I am indebted to Lis scholarly work on the historical background of
Ge Hongs doctrine of immortals (Li Gang 1995; Li Dahua, Li Gang, and He
Jianming 2003). In particular, I appreciate his scholarly openness to engage
in dialogues with Western thought as well as his hospitality while I conducted
field research in Sichuan.
5. Under the influence of material philosophy, modern Chinese scholar-
ship in the past tended to interpret the Daoist belief in immorality through
Marxism as a form of feudal superstition . Li Gangs study marks
a brave breakthrough in interpreting valuable ethics from religion (1995,
141160).
6. Ibid., 21, 24.
7. Other scholars have closely followed Lis thesis, especially his pupil Li
Xiaoguang in his published dissertation Transcendence beyond Life and
Death and Its Connection to Humanity (2002).
8. Li Gang 1995, 143.
9. Three are three separate autobiographical sources: the preface of the
Inner Chapters, the preface of the Outer Chapters, and the biography of Ge Hong
recorded in the Jinshu. All three have been collected in Wang Mings edition
(1980, 367383).
10. , ,
11. For an earlier analysis see Taylor 1956, 185, 186. For a more recent
study of the Phaedo and, in particular, analysis into Platos proof of the immor-
tal soul, see Bostock 1986, 5154.
12. ,
13. , ,
338 notes to pages 111131

14. ,
15. Qing Xitai 1996, 1: 311, 312.
16. The original text says: (IC 15).
17. (IC 13).
18. , , (IC 15).
19. (IC 13).
20. ,
21. , ,
22. Hu Fuchen 1989, 128.
23. , , ,
24.
25. , , , ,
26. Ge Hong 1991; Campany 2002.
27. Campany 2002, 912.
28. Ibid., 98102.
29. Ibid., 4, 5.
30. Campany does not give a satisfying explanation on why transcen-
dent is a better translation than immortal, but he indicates that the term is
intended to argue against the philosophical interpretation by David Hall and
Roger Ames (Thinking through Confucius, 13). For details see Campany 2002,
5, n. 5.
31. See Campany 2002, 32, n. 48.
32. Here I borrow Schippers (folk) etymology, which recognizes the bodily
nature of immortality. But I have given mountain an extended interpreta-
tion as Nature to bring out the connotation that xian expresses the unifica-
tion of humanity with Nature (Schipper 1993, 164).
33. In his opening chapter, Campany says, My approach has been to avoid
using big labels, ists or isms at all. And Ge Hong is best seen as a collec-
tor and unifier, but hardly a systematizer. His hagiography tells people about
the roots of Daoist religion and, more broadly, about the history of Chinese
religions and the history of religions in general (Campany 2002, 5, 8, 9).
34. Ge Hong, He Tang, and Wang Mo 1880, 1.
35. , ,
36. , , ,
37. ,
38. Bigu is a Daoist art practiced by generations of adepts. I was told dur-
ing the First International Conference on Ge Hong in 2003 that the famous
scholar Hu Fuchen (at the same dinner table with me) had managed to live
on water and a couple of pieces of fruit daily for forty-eight days. His face did
appear to me vigorously pink, and he looked ten years younger than others of
similar age.
39. , , ,

40. Irwin 1977, 191195.

 notes to pages 134160339

41. , ,
42.
43.
44. Lunyu , .
45. In the Laws 9, the concept of injustice is defined as the mastery of the
soul by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy and desires, whether they lead to any
actual damage or not (863e).
46. Here I borrow Irwins phrase. See Irwin 1994, 224.
47. The Daoist idiom literarily means first looking and
hearing inwardly, second being at peace as if having no heart rate like a dead
body. According to Inner Alchemy, this particular idiom refers to the commu-
nication of inner and outer environments and the unification of bodily form
and pneumatic vigor (deriving from Dao). Here my translation mainly corre-
sponds with the method of Preservation of the One, which has been discussed
with respect to the doctrine of Xuan Dao.
48. ,

Chapter 7: Nothing
1. The original idea of the paradox of continuity and discontinuity was
conceived through the study of the Daoist relational ontology of nothing/
something. But the articulation was inspired by Neville, with whom I did a doc-
toral seminar in 1999. The details can be found in his book under the section
The Fundamental Dilemma of Ontology. The principle of the ontological
ground of differences states: Two differing determinations of being presup-
pose a common ground in virtue of which they are relevantly determined with
respect to each other and from which each delimits for itself a domain over
and against the other. The principle of the ontological equality of reciprocal
contrast states: If two determinations of being are contrasting terms from each
other, then they must be on the same ontological level and the categories
descriptive of them must be on the same logical level. Neville further develops
the dilemma in the creator-created distinction. For details see Neville 1992,
4042, 94106.
2. Owen 1999, 447453.
3. To be what is not a general statement. It has some exceptions. For
example nonexistent is the negative form of to be without a predicate. But I
have already been argued that the equation of not-being with nonexistence is
ontologically false.
4. Here I borrow Owens distinction to express the aspect of subject nega-
tion that happens to the English verb to be. But unlike Owens linguistic
scrutiny, I do not see any difference between to be not-something and to
not-be something. Socrates is not-beautiful may mean that Socrates can be
anything in appearance but beautiful. And Socrates is-not beautiful may spe-
cifically designate Socrates cannot be beautiful. But they mean the same thing
340 notes to pages 164197

in that both rule out the possibility Socrates is beautiful. See Owen 1999,
450453.
5. For Daoism if all trees had been destroyed in the world, the ideal tree
would be gone with physical trees. This is because the ontological status of
tree-ness is not conceived as an independent being, but the relationship
between the ideal and the actual. Here for arguments sake I have followed
Platos notion of independent Forms to articulate the point that all beings are
ultimately indeterminate.
6. Wright 2000, introduction.
7. Dean-Jones 2000, 102.
8. Keyt 1971, 232, 234.
9. In the second chapter of the Inner Chapters, Ge Hong argues that to
encounter the far reaching meaning of immortal existence and the peaceful
mystery of Dao and De, one must leave behind ones doubt and enter into
the greatness beyond the nothingness (IC 1415).
10. , . , (IC 2).
11. The point is inspired by Grahams study, where something and nothing
are compared to solid and tenuous (1990, 345).

Chapter 8: The One

1. The page number following the abbreviation indicates the page in the
Zhonghua Shuju edition of 1974 (1998 reprint).
2. Ge Hong, He Tang, and Wang Mo 1880, 1.
3. The sentence comes
from Yuanshi shangzhen zhongxian ji . This text purports to be
a revelation to Ge Hong during his time at Mount Luofu , but the text
was reedited several generations after Ge Hong and was attributed to him. For
a brief discussion see Schipper and Verellen 2004, 1:107, 108.
4. ,
5. ,
6. ,
7. Needham 19542003, vol. 3 (1959): 210, 216, 219.
8. Cullen et al. 1996, preface xixiv, 35, 3739.
9. , ,
10. Needham 19542003, vol. 3 (1959): 210.
11. Aihe Wang 2000, 129172.
12. Needham 19542003, vol. 3 (1959): 216.
13. Fang Xuanling 1990, 282.
14. A comprehensive study on the constellations can also be found in
Needhams study (Needham 1981, 234238).
15. Ibid., 232.
16. ,
17. ,
 notes to pages 200209341

18. The Chinese were the most persistent and accurate observers of celes-
tial phenomena anywhere in the world before the Arabs (Needham 1954
2003, vol. 3 [1959]: 171172).
19. Tang Rushan (1962) argued that this passage is telling evidence
that Zhang Heng originally combined the flat earth theory with the Gaitian
theory. Later Zheng Wenguang argued that Tang misinterpreted
the general advance of the Huntian theory because even the Gaitian theory
had abandoned the round heaven and flat earth (Zheng Wenguang 2000,
212215).
20. The table is reconstructed from passages in the Astronomical Treatise
(Fang Xuanling 1990, 318320).
21. Needham follows the study by Qian Baocong and indicates that
the first appearance of this version is in chapter 13 of Lshi chunqiu
(Needham 19542003, 3: 210, note h). Zheng Wenguang also follows
the first version of the Lid theory with regard to this passage (2000, 216).
22. The concept of waiheng designates the outer boundary of the heavens.
Here I follow Needhams translation as the outermost barrier-declination-
circle to provide the geometric shape of radian declination on a half circle
(Needham 19542003, vol. 3, section 20, 213).
23. Needham translates qiheng liujian literally as the seven barriers [dec-
lination-circles] and the six roads. But according to the Gaitian theory, the
term represents the celestial map that calculates the movement of the sun.
Therefore, I translate the term as the map of seven barriers and six paths
accordingly.
24. Here I use the diagram in Needhams book; he, in turn, follows the
study of Herbert Clatley (Needham 19542003, 3: 212). Qian Baocongs (1998)
reconstruction of the theory has been published in Chinese.
25. Cullen et al. 1996, 720, 92102.
26. For a detailed discussion of the geometry, see ibid., 105.
27. For the geometry of the calculations, see ibid., 136.
28. The sentence is Ge Hongs rephrasing of Wang Chongs argument,
which is in LH 2, On the Sun, 500502.
29. Jiang Sheng and Tang Weixia 2002, 671.
30. Qiu Guangtings commentary was written under the title Haichao lun
(A Discussion on Tides). See Quan Tangwen (Complete Writings
of the Tang), fascicle 899. Here I rely on recent Chinese scholarship in the
collective study edited by Jiang Sheng and Tang Weixia (2002, 671). The title
resembles that of the lost book Chaoshuo (On Tides) by Ge Hong. See the
bibliography of Ge Hong in Wang Ming 1980, 391.
31. , , IC 275.
32. The quotation has various sources. According to a Chinese study, the
passage comes from The Complete Writings of the Tang , fascicle 899 (Jiang
Sheng and Tang Weixia 2002, 671). But during my research I was not able to
trace the original document. According to Neehdams study, the author is not
342 notes to pages 209242

Qiu Guangting , but Ma Yongqing, and the book title is Lanzhenzi

, not Haichao lun . Following Needhams footnote, I have found the
passage in Ma Yongqing 1984. Because the reprinted book does not have page
numbers, I can only indicate that it is under the title Lanzhenzi, 7:4a. For Need-
hams translation and text notes, see Needham 19542003, vol. 3, chapter 20,
Astronomy, 222, footnote h and translation note 5.
33. Jiang Sheng and Tang Weixia 2002, 671.
34. In the theory the stability of the earthly kingdom is projected to
heaven, as it argues that celestial bodies are stationary, and their movements
are illusions.
35. Ma Yongqing 1984, Lanzhenzi, 7:4a.
36. Cornford 1935a [1977].
37. Wright 2000; Reydams-Schils 2002; Johansen 2004.
38. Cornford 1935a [1977], 6163.
39. Plato models the World Soul from his understanding of human souls.
In earlier dialogues, particularly Phaedrus, Plato has already developed a doc-
trine of the immortal soul. The World Soul in the later dialogues of the Laws
and Timaeus is evidently an enlarged and developed version of the human soul.
40. Cornford 1935, [1977], 6163.
41. Ibid., 63.
42. According to Burnet, Platos mathematical cosmology is directly bor-
rowed from the Pythagoreans, who professed the world essentially consists of
arithmetical numbers that make things knowable, while the ultimate essence
of things is not intelligible (1930, 285).
43. Cornford 1935a [1977], 67.
44. Ibid., 6972.
45. Ibid., 68.

Chapter 9: The Many

1. Davis and Wu 1930.
2. Chen Guofu 1963, vol. 2, appendix 5, 370437.
3. Chen Guofu 1983, authors preface, 2.
4. Chen Guofu 1983.
5. Ibid., authors preface, 12.
6. Sivin 1968.
7. Ibid., preface, xv.
8. Ibid., 19.
9. Ibid., preface, xv.
10. Chen Guofu 1983, 3.
11. Ge Hongs bibliography is a rare resource for the study of Daoism in
early Chinese history. However, most of the books mentioned have been lost.
For a discussion of the bibliography see Schipper and Verellen 2004, vol. 1,
89.
 notes to pages 243253343

12. Needham 1976, vol. 5, pt. 3, 109.

13. Pregadio 1991. Robert Campany provides a summary of Pregadios
work ( 2002, 3147).
14. Pregadios two-stage description appears to be almost identical with
Needhams description of the cyclically-transformed elixir . However,
the textual source in Needhams study is chapter 1 of The Scripture on the Immor-
tal Bubbling Gold (Potion) of the Immortals by Baopuzi (Pregadio 1991, 575576).
15. Campanys summary of Pregadios work from ibid.
16. I have not been able to find Wangs study published in Chinese in 1964.
However, Needham has summarized Wangs research and provided his own
evaluation of the hypothesis (Needham 19542003, vol. 5, pt. 3, 8998).
17. During the First International Conference on Ge Hong in 2003, Hu
Fuchen informed me, All three of Ge Hongs alchemical texts have been
proven in laboratories. However, I have not been able to find documentation.
18. Here I rely on Pregadios study as the chief resource for reconstructing
the textual tradition (Pregadio 1991, 572).
19. I have based this translation partly on Robert Companys version,
which follows Sivins reconstruction of the chemical terminology. I also have
consulted the translations by Pregadio and Ware (Campany 2002 36, 37; Sivin
1980, 256; Pregadio 1991, 572; Ware and Ge Hong 1966, 81, 82).
20. Ge Hong writes, Recently, at the end of Han, the adept Yin Changsh-
eng of Xinye succeeded in synthesizing the elixir of Grand Purity. Thus
he attained the immortal state. Based on this reference, Chen Guofu infers
that Yin Changsheng is the real author of the Scripture on the Elixir of Grand
Purity (1963, 380).
21. Daojiao yishu explains: The Scripture of Grand Purity elucidates
the theory of golden elixirs. Whoever ingests the elixir will ascend into the
realm of Grand Purity. This is the reason for naming it [the elixir of] Grand
Purity (vol. 2, part 7).
22. Having worked in the solar-electric energy industry for ten years, I
quickly recognized the solar heating method and its potential outcomes.
23. The chemical reactions and their formulas in this section are my own.
Based on my knowledge of chemistry from my early studies in natural science,
I propose the hypothesis that the whole process could be energized by solar
energy.
24. Hu Fuchen and L Xichen 2004, 466; Jin Zhengyao 2001, 159.
25. Sivin 1968, 160, 161.
26. Ibid., 182, 183.
27. This general line of discussion of the pros and cons of alchemy is most
evident in Rong Zhiyis (1998) work. Also see Jin Zhengyaos essay Crazed
Dynasty during the Wei and Jin Dynasties for the background of the ancient
drug culture (in Jin Zhengyao 2001, 6165).
28. The dominant position of instrumental alchemy started to give way
to bodily alchemy in the Song period. It declined in the Yuan, when bodily
344 notes to pages 253274

alchemy responded to Buddhist spiritualism. During the Qing, it was almost

phased out, especially when China opened to Western sciences. For the his-
torical background, see Hu Fuchen and L Xichen 2004, 446448.
29. See Jin Zhengyaos essay Daoist Alchemy in the Tang Dynasty for an
assessment of the decline of instrumental alchemy after the Tang dynasty (in
Jin Zengyao 2001, 9094).
30. Here I rely on Hu Fuchens study on the geological coexistence of gold
and cinnabar. For details see Hu Fuchen and L Xichen 2004, 452.
31. , ,
32. Pregadio 1991, 597600.
33. The cosmological change from Dao to myriad things is not strictly a
once-and-for-all event, but an ongoing creative unfolding of Dao.
34. Sivin 1980, 292297.
35. Hanyu da zidian , 3/1648.
36. Ibid., 3/1561.
37. For an ecological understanding of the world and its origin, see Girar-
dot, Liu, and Miller 2001.
38. Hu Fuchen and L Xichen 2004, 463.
39. ,
40. In his essay Dark Matter Fills the Cosmos ( June 1999), Paul Preuss
responds to an article titled The Cosmic Triangle: Revealing the State of the
Universe in the May 28, 1999, issue of the journal Science. A group of cosmolo-
gists and physicists from Princeton University and Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory wrote that a range of evidence is forcing us to consider the pos-
sibility that some cosmic dark energy exists that opposes the self-attraction of
matter and causes the expansion of the universe to accelerate. The leader of
the Supernova Cosmology Project headquartered at Berkeley Lab, Saul Perl-
mutter, also supports this view by saying, The universe is made mostly of dark
matter and dark energy. For details see http://www.lbl.gov/Science-Articles/
Archive/dark-energy.html (accessed June 2006).
41. For details see http://particleadventure.org/particleadventure/
frameless/supersymmetry.html (accessed June 2006).
42. For explanatory details see http://www.lns.cornell.edu/public/lab
-info/quark.html (accessed June 2006).
43. For details see Introduction to Supersymmetry by Hitoshi Murayama
at http://hitoshi.berkeley.edu/public_html/susy/susy.html (accessed June
2006).
44. Michael Dine, Supersymmetry Phenomenology (Santa Cruz Institute
for Particle Physics, University of California, Santa Cruz), from http://arxiv
.org/abs/hep-ph/9612389 (accessed June 2006).
45. The Chinese Five Phases is a sophisticated system of change, which can-
not be covered in detail here. Here the discussion only serves a comparative
purpose. The system of change originates from the ancient Book of Changes.
Prior to Ge Hong, it was developed in the cosmology of Yang Xiong in
 notes to pages 278303345

his Taixuan , the alchemy of Wei Poyang in his Can Tong Qi

, and the ethics of Dong Zhongshu in his Chunqiu fanlu .
46. Together with the other four shapes shown in Figure 9.6, this figure
is presented in Lees commentary notes, which rely on Cornfords study. Lee
1965, 77; Cornford 1935a [1977], 218219.
47. Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies VII xxix 1423, in Barnes 1987, 116.
48. Cornford 1935a [1977], 211, 212.
49. Here I follow Lees commentating note. Lee 1965, 80, footnote 1.
50. Cornford 1935a [1977], 199202, 228229.
51. The metaphor comes from a story. The female emperor Ci Xi
of the Qing dynasty ruled male officials by sitting behind a curtain.
52. Cornford has argued exhaustively the merits of differently sized par-
ticles, but he has overlooked the key issue of how the unbalanced masses func-
tion as the continuity from the four to the many (Cornford 1935a [1977],
230239).
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 Index
Academy, 45, 88, 138, 150, 323324
air: Anaximenes changeable matter, 34;
mathematical interpretation, 273,
277, 290, 307; as mathematical par-
ticle, 277, 289, 292, 294305; one of
four Empedocles elements, 273, 275;
Thales primal matter, 33
alchemy: astronomy and, 199; bodily,
xxiii, 66, 186, 264; and chemistry, xix,
xxii, 238240, 245246, 251, 253254,
258, 311312; instrumental, xvii, xxiv,
8, 19, 5859, 104, 114, 121, 130, 183,
195, 197, 240, 242, 253254, 257,
264, 283, 311312; internal (Inner),
59, 6567, 72, 183, 209, 244, 249,
253254; lineage, 238, 240242, 246;
and physics, 257258, 265266, 269,
317; theoretical, 10, 19, 122
Anaximander, xvii, 3334, 254; biology,
3334
Anaximenes, xvii, 3334
Aquinas, 56
Aristotle: biological simile, 170; on
change, 255; criticism of Platos
theory of Forms, 48, 88, 150, 320;
doctrine of substance, 309; geocen-
tric worldview, 281; on Presocratic
ideas, 3334, 36, 41, 222, 255; the
Third Man Argument, 40, 150, 165
Armillary Sphere, 15, 183185, 190,
194197, 205, 214216, 280
art: of elixir making, 239; of healing, 60;
and iconography, 104; Platos nega-
tive view of, 81; of revealing the self,
64; of ruling, 137
ascension, 125
astronomy, xxiixxiii, 65, 94, 184,
189190, 192194, 196, 281; and
alchemy, 190, 197, 199; Chinese,
16, 200; empirical, 15, 195, 202,
210; g eocentrism, 14, 200; infinite-
space, 283; instrumental, 14, 1819,
31; mathematical, 9597, 205, 214,
216; and music, 81; observatory,
283; physiology and, 105, 216; three
theories of, 189
Athens: City of, 138, 155; School of, 325
atomism: critique of, 231; Democritus,
287; material pluralism, 37, 148;
problem of pluralism, 288, 290, 316;
space and void, 262, 303
Augustine, 102
Being and Becoming: xvii, 37, 4445,
4951, 75, 84, 147, 153, 172, 218,
220, 237, 262, 277278, 286, 304,
306, 311313
benti, xvi, 177
biology, 17, 66, 106107, 256, 272
body: alchemical, 7073, 7677, 117,
170, 186, 259; body-soul, 107, 109;
body-state unity, 133135, 137, 139
141; Buddhist, 68; celestial, 118119;
Daoist, xxiii; as empty vessel, 98, 262;
physical, xxiv, 57, 60, 253, 264; Pla-
tonic, 158, 217218; and the spirit,
357
358 index
xxv, 64, 69, 74, 119, 123, 125, 129,
132133, 144, 177, 188, 256; of the
universe, 64, 217219, 223, 272273,
277278, 280282, 284, 286, 301, 304,
309; World Body, 131, 218, 228
Book of Changes, 6, 910, 14, 19, 26, 30,
34, 207
breath: breathing like a fetus, 186; of the
cosmos, 62, 64; of the great begin-
ning, 1, 28, 53; pattern, 66, 74; the
rhythm of, 73
Buddhist: enlightenment, 132; other-
worldly transcendence, 108; soteriol-
ogy, 253254; Three Realms, 118;
view of the body, 68
celestial: axis, 203, 216; bodies, 69,
7374, 96, 119, 164, 184187, 194,
206, 208209, 215, 217218; cen-
ter, 18; clock, 16, 96, 199, 215, 220;
equator, 192, 194; gods, 119, 121;
movements, 1819, 75, 95, 186187,
194, 205; poles, 192, 227; time, 119,
197, 199, 203, 205; world, 6869, 73,
119
chance, 75, 288, 295296
change: alchemical, 129, 197, 199,
243, 253, 255257, 264265, 276,
279, 284285, 306; Anaximanders
biology, 3334; Aristotles substan-
tial, 255; Change is the principle of
Nature, 19, 30, 75, 176, 246, 284;
cosmogonical, 17, 169, 172, 255,
271, 306307; Empedocles (mixing
elements), 274276; evolutionary,
57; Heraclitus (changing river),
3435, 3738, 100, 255; and life, 254,
256258, 264, 271, 312; motion and
rest, 213, 283285, 296, 304; non-
contradiction principle (Plato), 84,
87, 154; particle theory (Plato), 286,
288, 304306, 308, 312; Pythagorean
(numbers), 222223, 225, 277, 290;
the Soul as the cause of, 282, 284;
Thales (meteorological), 33; as trans-
formation of matter, 19, 258. See also
from nothing into being
chaos: of Necessity, 171; order over,
169171, 301; primordial, 43, 89,
137, 171, 173, 261, 286288, 302,
316. See also Necessity
Chen Guofu, 238, 240, 253
Chunqiu fanlu, 20, 201
cinnabar, 34, 147, 197, 247, 250251,
253, 257, 307; fields, 6570
Commentary on the Armillary Sphere,
183
Confucianism: xxii, 20, 108109, 113,
142, 254, 322; New Confucianism,
xxii, 322; New Text Confucianism,
19, 30, 142
Constellations, 17, 185, 192, 194, 197,
216; the Twenty-Eight, 2, 1517, 25,
119, 183184, 192
Cornford, F. M.: mathematical structure
of matter, 289290; the mathemat-
ics of the Soul, 225; on Parmenides,
40, 47; unchangeable Forms, 87; the
World Soul, 222
cosmogony, 2, 45, 17, 2122, 2728, 30,
56, 143, 170, 174, 181, 210, 258; and
cosmology, 22, 143, 182183, 185,
190, 213; Ge Hongs, xvi, xxv, 4, 69,
118, 169, 172, 176177, 186, 316;
Heraclitus, 35; instrumental, 200,
312; Laozis, xv, 20, 28; of the Mile-
sian School, 36; in modern physics,
265; ontology and, 22, 181; reenact-
ment of, 261; soteriology-cosmogony,
xvii, 129, 177; theogony and, 56, 118,
143, 172, 185, 316. See also alchemy;
change; cosmology
cosmology: egg, 190; empirical study
of, 200; Gaitian, 259; geocentric, 184,
283; of the Han period, 23; Huntian,
189; of the infinite universe; 222;
mathematical, 222; modern, 267; Par-
menidean, 280; Platos, 79, 212, 216
 index359
Creation ex nihilo, xvi, 56, 174
crucible, 19, 3435, 72, 74, 197,
199200, 211, 245, 250, 301, 303,
309; body and, 74; called hundun,
261; earthenware, 247, 249; intel
lectual, 319, 321; and the universe,
258
Daodejing, 22, 28, 76
death, 88, 107, 109111, 128; life after,
104, 106107, 131133; life and,
63, 110, 114; life without, 104106;
Socrates, 132, 313; Wang Chong on,
113, 114
degeneration, 114, 227, 275276, 295,
299
democracy, 138139, 322
Democritus, 36, 287
Dong Zhongshu, 20, 201202
dualism: cause and caused, 89; Form/
sensible, xvii; good and evil, 159;
Parmenidean, 45; primordial, 181
earth: earth-cube, 277, 289, 292297,
299; one of elementals, 3334, 36,
286, 299; one of Five Phases, 201,
227, 275, 283; flat, 15, 189, 192, 200,
202, 207; planet, 15, 18, 72, 184187,
203, 206, 208209, 215216, 219, 235,
283; square, 189. See also heaven:
and earth
egg: alchemical, 199200, 254, 256
257, 262, 271, 279, 283284, 306;
cosmological, 186, 188, 210, 227,
234; instrumental, 195, 197, 246,
253; precosmic, 186188, 213,
227; theory, 15, 184186, 191, 200,
207209, 234235, 237
Eleatic School, 44, 79
elements: chemical, 246, 255256;
Empedocles, 3637, 212213,
255256, 269, 273288, 290291, 297,
302303, 307309, 311312, 320; of
Forms, 219; mathematical (Plato),
289, 292, 294301, 304307, 312;
of the soul, 216, 220, 229. See also
Empedocles
elixir: bodily, 70, 72, 98, 264; field, 66,
72, 98, 264; Golden Liquor, 240,
242244; Nine-Cycle, 247248, 250,
258, 262, 264, 270; Returned,
244247, 249251, 253. See also
cinnabar: fields
Empedocles, 3637, 255256, 269,
273277, 279280, 282, 284, 286288,
292, 296, 298, 304, 306307, 311312;
Love and Strife, 274277, 282, 284,
287289, 290, 304, 312, 319
emperor, 133, 135, 139142, 147150,
153, 231, 261
enlightenment: bodily, 72, 108, 142, 254;
Buddhist, 108, 132, 254; intellectual,
52, 92, 98, 108, 133, 319; state of, 26,
64; the Way of Opinion to the Way
of Truth, 35; Zhuangzi, 64
epistemology: Ge Hong, 27, 53; Laozi,
26; Parmenides, 86; Plato, 51, 8182,
9192; Zhuangzi, 63
equality: algebraic, 220; Athenian, 102;
to its Nature, 64
eternity, 116, 133, 214215
ethics: Confucian, 108, 111, 113114,
142, 201, 294; Ge Hongs, 114, 115,
131, 134, 142; Platonic, 91, 104, 110,
135136, 142, 216217, 220, 323;
Socratic, 38, 47
evil, 156158, 217; good and, 36, 84, 120,
156, 159160; and not-being, 156,
158159
fangshi, 60, 76
fangshu, xxiii, 60, 62, 76
fate, 114, 132
fire: alchemical, 35, 255, 305, 306,
320321; bodily, 7374; chaff, 250;
chamber of, 70; coal, 250; Fire-
pyramid, 277, 289, 292298; one of
the Five Phases, 227, 275, 299; (one
of Four Elements, 33, 273286, 288;
360 index
gentle (wenhuo), 250; Heraclitus
irreducible, xvii, 3435; intense
(wuhuo), 250
Five Phases, 10, 14, 201202, 227, 256,
274276, 283284, 292, 295296,
301, 307
flux (Platonic interpretation of Heracli-
tus), 38, 45, 83, 212; theory (Heracli-
tus), 3435, 3839, 283284
from nothing into being, xvi, xxv, 26,
2930, 56, 143, 151, 154, 163, 169,
172, 174176, 178179, 188, 226, 309
fu, 197, 248. See also talismans
Gaitian (cosmology), 1516, 189190,
192, 200, 202207, 210211, 259260,
290, 294
Ge Xuan, 2829
genealogy, 45, 17, 129130, 162, 210,
320
generation (as positive change), 9293,
130, 154, 161, 163, 166168, 172173,
181, 227, 275276, 306
geometry: analytical, 282, 285; Anaxi-
manders, 33; celestial, 95; plane and
solid, 94, 216, 223, 278279, 286, 293
God, xvi, xxi, xxiii, 23, 24, 42, 5557, 91,
102, 106, 116, 174, 176, 267, 271, 325
gods: Empedocles mortal and immortal,
287; internal, 65, 134; natural, 6870,
7374, 111, 117121, 123, 128130;
primordial, 117118, 129; in Timaeus,
217
Good (the Form of), 42, 80, 9194, 99,
103, 110, 131, 145146, 149150, 170,
176
Grand Purity, 240, 242, 246248
Guo Xiang, 2021
hagiography, 115116, 123, 125, 128
Han dynasty, 19, 60, 184, 186, 248
harmony: astronomical, 70; bodily, 70;
Confucian (social), 108, 134135;
cosmic, 96, 149; formless, 25; of the
Good, 95, 150; indeterminate, 232;
musical, 96; participatory, 231; politi-
cal, 149150, 170171, 181, 228, 232,
276; psychological, 217; relational,
221, 229; with the surroundings, 65,
69, 7374; a system of, 44; three ele-
ments (of the soul), 137, 220; tran-
scendental, 82; a unity of, 150151,
170171, 276; of the World-Soul, 82;
of Xuan-Qi, 188. See also unity
He Yan, 20
heaven: and earth, 56, 23, 25, 53, 57, 64,
154, 165, 184185, 201203, 205, 208,
210, 277, 323, 325; the nine heavens,
1, 6, 209, 248; the realm of, xxiii, 1,
5, 9, 15, 18, 53, 57, 70, 72, 116, 125,
135, 183189, 192, 199, 201203,
207208, 210, 247, 325; rotation of,
16, 187, 206, 208; spherical (Platos),
283, 295
Heraclitus, xvii, 3435, 3739, 56, 83, 87,
100, 254255, 280, 283284, 311. See
also change; fire; flux
Heshang gong, 60
hierarchy: of (immortal) beings, 116,
118; the linear, 79, 272; one over
many, 94, 103; ontological, 138;
psychological, 136, 216; social, 102,
113114, 135137, 139140; of the
three (parts of the soul), 131
Hu Fuchen, 22, 58, 69, 113
Hua Tuo, 60
Huainanzi, 58
Huntian (cosmology), 15, 19, 190, 197,
200, 206208, 210211
immortal: beings, 7, 69, 104105, 108,
112, 117, 137, 142, 264, 325; humans,
121, 123, 125129; life, 105106, 108,
111, 113115, 129130, 137, 142, 228.
See also gods
immortality: arguments on, 107109;
attain, xvii, 28, 118, 128, 248; belief
in, xxv, 104, 106, 108109; and
 index361
longevity, 105106, 128; the method
of, 54; physical, xxv, 104, 106107,
256, 258; quest for, 78, 30; of the
soul, 109110, 132133, 159, 313
incarnation: of the Dao, 122; of God, 56;
of heavens order, 139; of the World
Soul, 221, 310311
indeterminate action, xviii, 54, 56, 73,
134, 162163, 168, 211. See also
wuwei
infinity, 281, 290
inner environment, 68, 71, 75, 165
instrumental alchemy, xvii, xxiv, 8, 19,
5859, 104, 114, 121, 130, 183, 195,
197, 240, 242, 253254, 257, 264, 283,
311312. See also alchemy; waidan
intelligence, 51, 81, 83, 85, 96, 213,
234235, 301, 309
internal alchemy, 6566, 72, 183, 209,
242, 249, 253254. See also alchemy;
neidan
Ji Kang, 20
Jin dynasty, 15, 247
Justice, the Form of, 46, 85, 89, 146, 157,
220
Lady of Taixuan, 127
Laozi, xivxviii, xxv, 5, 7, 17, 2023,
2629, 32, 54, 56, 75, 118, 121, 134,
149, 154, 162163, 175178, 196, 226,
232, 247, 317
law: Platonic, 135, Newtonian, 267
Leucippus, 36
Li Gang, 107
Liexian zhuan, 104
Liu An, 122, 126
longevity, xxv, 58, 62, 76, 101, 103,
105106, 108, 114, 117118, 123, 125,
127128, 134, 140141, 176, 248, 264,
271, 282
mathematics, 36, 47, 91, 9697, 203, 205,
210, 214, 220, 222, 225, 228, 231, 312
matter: architecture of, 212, 286; dark
energy and, 266267, 269; evolution
of, 269; and force, 267, 270; geomet-
ric matter particles, 267, 269, 270;
and internal clock, 258, 265; and life,
57; matter-form, xxiii, 53, 63, 174,
188, 200, 209, 246, 254, 257, 262,
264266, 306, 309; primal, 57, 262,
264, 271; the transformation of, 19,
257258; structure of, 238, 260, 265,
272, 288
medicine, xxiixxiii, 60, 76, 128, 133
134, 139, 199, 229, 239240, 253, 264
meteorological, 6, 34, 184, 208; change,
33, 298
mind: cognitive, 77, 94, 309; the divine,
213, 236237; human, 7, 5051, 75,
9091, 99, 106, 217
Moltmann, Jrgen, xvi
monism: alchemical, 246; Daoist, xxiv;
material, 33, 39, 57, 298; ontological,
xviii; Parmenides, 45; and pluralism,
xvii, 32; pre-Socratic, 153
motion: active, 303; celestial, 185, 187,
215; circular, 213, 215, 282, 284285;
heavens, 1, 18, 96; locomotive, 280;
and rest, 213, 285, 296, 304; ultimate
cause of, 218, 220, 225
Mount Luofu, 138, 324
Necessity, 158159, 169171, 173,
178182, 214, 217, 219, 232233,
261, 297, 301302, 310, 313. See also
Reason and Necessity
Needham, Joseph, xxiixxiii, 76, 189
190, 192, 199200, 239240, 243, 253
neidan, xxiii. See also internal alchemy
night sky, 56, 18, 62, 154, 164, 189, 211.
See also Xuan
nothingness: cultivation, 140; as the
foundation of all (Hu Fuchens
interpretation), 22; the ground of
(Tang Yongtongs interpretation),
21; Primordial, 28; and something,
362 index
xviii, 23, 113; unthinkable (Plato),
86, 88, 226; Wang Bis (ontology of ),
2324, 2627, 30; as wu, xviii, 23, 27,
28, 113, 175; of Xuan (Ge Hong), 53,
69, 183186
numbers: odd and even, 222224, 227,
277; Pythagorean doctrine of, 36, 95,
222
oligarchy, 138
One: cosmogonical, 22, 35, 55, 57, 161,
183, 188, 212, 270, 312, 317; form-
less, 29, 234; gestation of the (as Qi),
5354, 180181, 257; numerical,
4, 47, 99100, 146, 148, 161, 219,
223224, 227, 229231, 277; Par-
menidean, 35, 41, 83; preservation of
the, 58, 60, 7677, 119, 134, 140, 249;
primordial (as Yi), 1, 4, 28, 53, 159,
187, 269; Real-One, 59, 6465, 6869,
73, 134; Xuan-One, 5960, 62, 64,
6869, 130, 134, 264
one within many (Ge Hong), 103,
134135, 142
one without many (Parmenides), 39,
4142, 50, 83
ontological degrees, 80, 94, 117
opinion/sensibles, 83, 94;
opposites: dialectic, 17, 154, 161, 227,
228; logical, 25, 27, 34, 50, 85, 110,
153, 262, 274
oral instructions, 59, 247, 249251
outer environment, 68, 73
Parmenides: Book of, 32, 39, 41, 165;
denial of not-being, 145; denial of
plurality, 37, 39, 83; Platos spokes-
man, 4352; Way of Opinion, 35,
3738, 83; Way of Truth, 35, 3738.
See also Being and Becoming; One;
one without many; opinion/
sensibles
philosopher-king, 101103, 135136,
138, 313
Planets: the creation of, 304; the five (in
Chinese astronomy), 73, 119, 187,
201202, 221, 227, 283; in Timaeus,
214215, 283284, 302
pluralism: atomist, xxiv, 288; chemical
and material, 240, 246; compara-
tive, 315; Empedocles, 36, 273, 277,
286; monism and, xvii; postmodern,
xxi, 316317; Pythagorean, xvii, 36;
religious, xv, 56
Proclus, 48, 219220
purification ritual, 59
Pythagoras, 36, 219, 222, 289, 312
Qing dynasty, 3
Reason and Necessity, xviii, 156, 169,
170172, 178181, 227, 233, 297, 301,
307313
receptacle, 170, 287, 291, 297, 300301,
304, 309
Ruan Ji, 20
sages, 58
salvation, 56, 106
Scripture of the Yellow Chamber, 68, 76,
187
sensibles: and belief, 51, 98; the episte-
mological problem of, 8283; Forms
and, xviii, 3940, 44, 49, 8283, 153,
156, 221; and images, 82. See also
opinion/sensibles
sexual arts, 128
Shanhai jing, 6, 18
shenxian, xxi, 104, 116
Shenxian zhuan, xviii, xxi, 104, 115
simplicity, 20, 142, 186; the Mater
Embracing, 1, 208, 247, 324
Simplicius, 33
Sivin, Nathan, 239, 252253, 261
Song dynasty, 254
soteriology: Buddhist, 253254; Chris-
tian, 254; cosmogony and, 129, 177;
the doctrine of, 58, 258; four degrees
 index363
of, 128; genealogy and, 129; reli-
gious, xxv; system of, xxv
soul: disembodied, 106, 132; human, 49,
51, 95, 216217, 219, 221, 235; just,
137; structure of, 213, 216, 222223,
277, 279, 281; the World, 50, 82,
9596, 131, 143, 180, 187, 212213,
216221, 223225, 228, 234235, 237,
256, 272, 280, 284, 310311, 313; See
also immortality: of the soul
space: in atomism, 262; dark, 75; empty,
54, 189, 262, 303, 316; formless, 170,
262; free, xiiixiv; indeterminate,
54, 148; infinite, 56, 62, 75, 189, 264,
283, 303; inner, 165, 318; material,
262, 264; relational, 317; three-
dimensional, 282283, 286. See also
time-space
spontaneity, xxiv, 54, 70, 73, 75, 173, 188,
299, 302
state: awaken, 166, 180; cognitive, 77, 94;
of enlightenment, 26, 64; of gesta-
tion, 33; ideal, 102, 135, 138139;
just, 135138; longevity of the, 135;
paradoxical, 63
Tai Xuan, 78, 19
Taiping jing, 7
talismans, 120, 246248; matching, 194,
196197, 200, 210211, 237
Temple of Cleansing Vacuity, 138
tetragrams, 9
Thales, xvii, 3235, 298
theogony, 56, 118, 143, 171172, 178,
180181, 185, 212, 217, 316
Three Pure Ones, 118
time: alchemical, 17, 258; the beginning
of, 29, 5455; celestial, 17, 119, 199,
203; concept of, 17, 130, 258; the
creation of, 215; cyclical, 187, 249,
264265; and eternity, 116, 214;
material, 130, 199, 312; a scale of
genealogical, 118, 130; unit of shi,
243
time-space, 119, 257, 259265, 285, 306
transmigration, 36, 68, 131, 312
tyranny, 138
unity: alchemical, 199; of body and
spirit, xxv, 69, 74, 188, 256; of Dao,
xv, cosmogonical, 181, 233; of the
elements, 280281, 290, 309; form-
less, 208, 233; of form-matter, xxiii,
188, 209, 254, 266, 309; of Forms,
xix, 44, 90, 100, 145, 170; of har-
mony, 150151, 170171, 181, 228,
232, 276; material, 48, 200, 254;
Necessity-Reason; 180, 233; of the
numerical one, 100, 265; ontological,
90; Parmenidean, 45; primordial, 38,
180, 260; relational, 141, 170, 271;
of togetherness, 100, 147149, 231
waidan, xxvi. See also instrumental
alchemy
Wang Bi, 2027, 30, 113
Wang Chong, 5758, 77, 111114, 187,
202, 205208
Wang Ming, 3, 79, 1920, 22
Wei Boyang, 122, 126
wu, xviii, 1, 23, 75, 113, 143, 164,
174175, 179, 181, 232. See also
nothingness
wuwei, xviii, 54, 73, 162. See also indeter-
minate action
Xiang Xiu, 20
Xuan: as dark night sky, xv, 56, 18, 62,
154, 164; rhapsody of, 13, 6, 59,
62; Xuan-Dao, 1, 3, 7, 28, 30, 5558,
124, 142, 272, 323; Xuan-One,
5960, 62, 64, 6869, 130, 134, 264;
Xuan-Qi, 4, 18, 53, 55, 57, 62, 69,
75, 161, 170, 175177, 181, 185,
188, 228, 264; Xuan upon Xuan,
5, 23, 26, 29
Xuanye (cosmology), 187, 189190,
209210
364 index

Yang Xiong, 710, 1415, 1820, 2931,
210211
Yuhan Fang, 60
Zeno: denial of plurality, 42; of Elea, 45;
logic of exclusion, 55; paradox, 46;
Parmenides and, 40
Zhang Daoling, 122, 125126
Zhang Heng, 15, 19, 184, 190, 194195,
197, 200202, 206207, 211
zhuan: alchemical, 19; astronomical, 197
Zhuangzi, xiv, xxiv, xxv, 17, 20, 21, 6364,
75, 108, 134, 166, 175, 180, 227, 265,
318
ziran, xviixviii, 24, 5455, 75, 162,
176178
Zuo Ci, 60, 240, 248
 About the Author

Ji Zhang is formerly a Sanderson Fellow and now Research Associate of the

Uniting Church Theological College, which, through the United Faculty
of Theology, forms part of the Melbourne College of Divinity. He is also
an ordained minister of the Uniting Church in Australia. He was born in
China and educated in science. Later he trained in systematic theology
in Melbourne and Boston, and lectured at the associated schools of the
Melbourne College of Divinity. His doctorate is in the field of comparative
philosophy from the University of Melbourne. During his research he has
been a visiting scholar to Boston College and Harvard University in North
America, the University of Tbingen in Germany, and Fudan University
and Sichuan University in China.
SO C I E T Y F OR A SI A N A ND
C O M PA R AT I VE PHI L OSOPHY
MO N O G R A P H SER I E S
John W. Schroeder, Editor

No. 1. The Sage and Society: The Life and Thought of Ho Hsin-Yin,
by Ronald Dimberg, 1974.
No. 2. Studies in Comparative Aesthetics, by Eliot Deutsch, 1975.
No. 3. Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Chung-Yung,
by Tu Wei-Ming, 1976.
No. 4. Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese, by Gottfried
W. Leibniz, translated with an introduction, notes, and
commentary by Henry Rosemont, Jr., and Daniel J. Cook, 1977.
No. 5. The Logic of Gotama, by Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, 1978.
No. 6. Commentary on the Lao Tzu by Wang Pi, translated by Ariane
Rump, introduction by Wing-tsit Chan, 1979.
No. 7. Han Fei Tzus Political Theory, by Wang Hsiao-po and Leo S.
Chang, 1986.
No. 8. The Mkya Upanisad and the Agama stra: An Investigation
into the Meaning of the Vedanta, by Thomas E. Wood, 1990.
No. 9. 
Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the
Vijnavda, by Thomas E. Wood, 1991.
No. 10. Accomplishing the Accomplished: The Vedas as a Source of Valid
Knowledge in Sankara, by Anantanand Rambachan, 1991.
No. 11. Ngrjunian Disputations: A Philosophical Journey through an Indian
Looking-Glass, by Thomas E. Wood, 1994.
No. 12. Chen Liang on Public Interest and the Law, by Hoyt Cleveland
Tillman, 1994.
368 series list

No. 13. Definition and Induction: A Historical and Comparative Study,

by Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, 1995.
No. 14. Let the Cow Wander: Modeling the Metaphors in Veda and Vedanta,
by Michael W. Meyers, 1995.
No. 15. The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emperor: Original Mawangdui
Texts with Complete English Translations and an Introduction,
by Leo S. Chang and Yu Feng, 1998.
No. 16. Perceptual Error: The Indian Theories, by Srinivasa Rao, 1998.
No. 17. Hindu Ethics: A Philosophical Study, by Roy W. Perrett, 1998.
No. 18. Skillful Means: The Heart of Buddhist Compassion, by John W.
Schroeder, 2001.
No. 19. On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought,
by Jane Geaney, 2002.
No. 20. A Companion to Angus C. Grahams Chuang Tzu: The Inner
Chapters, by Harold D. Roth, 2003.
No. 21. Contexts and Dialogue: Yogcra Buddhism and Modern Psychology
on the Subliminal Mind, by Tao Jiang, 2006.
No. 22. One and Many: A Comparative Study of Platos Philosophy and
Daoism Represented by Ge Hong, by Ji Zhang, 2012.

Manuscripts should be directed to John W. Schroeder, Department of

Philosophy and Religious Studies, St. Marys College, St. Marys City,
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Production Notes for Zhang/One and Many
Design and composition by Josie Herr with text
and display in New Baskerville
Printing and binding by Sheridan Books, Inc.
Printed on 60 lb. House White Opaque, 500 ppi
Comparative philosophy
This is a work of great intellectual daring, requiring immense erudition
and impressive power of synthesis. The topic, comparing the ontological
ideas of Plato and Ge Hong with special reference to their implications
for the one-many problem, is unique, stimulating, and highly important,
identifying a crucial area for cross-cultural and comparative research and
producing a creative, informed, thoughtful, incisive, and skillful response
to the considerable challenge of making such an ambitious project
bear fruit. Brook Ziporyn, professor of religion and philosophy,
Department of Religious Studies, Northwestern University

I am very impressed by the focus and consistently solid argumentation

of this work. Comparisons can be odious, but this one works because
the author has placed Plato and Ge Hong in the contexts of Greek and
Chinese philosophical and religious thought, and with some aplomb
has been able to test the two thinkers strengths and weaknesses against
modern scientic ndings. Garry W. Trompf, emeritus professor
in the History of Ideas, Department of Studies in Religion, The
University of Sydney

This work is an exploration and an instantiation of cross-cultural

dialogue. But unlike most work in cross-cultural studies, it looks at the
common questions facing humankind at a fundamental philosophical
level, uncovering differences in basic assumptions about the world and,
latent far below the surface, differences in logical operations. It makes
a scholarly contribution that is not confined to any single humanistic
discipline, for it points to the ways in which the worldand the ways in
which we think about the worldcan remain open. David Leopold
Holm, National Cheng Chi University, Taiwan

Ji Zhang is formerly a Sanderson Fellow and now research associate

of the Uniting Church Theological College, which, through the United
Faculty of Theology, forms part of the Melbourne College of Divinity.
He is also an ordained minister of the Uniting Church in Australia.

University of Hawaii Press ISBN 978-0-8248-3554-5

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Cover design: Cameron Poulter www.uhpress.hawaii.edu