GR No. L-22320, 29 July 1968
Perez now
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ
(represented by their counsel, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas and
Associates) V. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the CFI of
Manila, RICARDO HERMOSO, City Sheriff of Manila
J.Castro
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer's duty to the court and to the
legal processes must be highly observed rather than providing /
assisting clients legal needs.
This is a case for a motion for partial reconsideration of the SC
decision dated 22 May 1968, directed against the following observation
that the SC feel compelled to observe that during this protracted
litigation, the spouses petitioners resorted to a series of actions
and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their
counsel for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a
simple money claim judgment which has long become final and
executory. Some actions were filed, only to be abandoned or
withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing
courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to
use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
SC assessed treble cost against the petitioner spouses to be paid by
their counsel. The movants, Attys. Baizas and Bolinas, seeks
reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon
their professional conduct and condemns them to pay the treble
costs adjudged against their clients.
The SC concluded that the protracted litigation was designed to cause
delay and the active participation of the petitioners counsel is in this
adventure is clear.
In an 15 November 1962 judgment of the Court of Appeals in
sustaining Damaso Perezs position with respect to the extent of the
levy the subsequent proceeding interposed alternatingly by the
petitioner spouses as their maneuvers expected to be overthrown
by the court but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Petitioner and their counsel chose to attack the execution in a
piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected
execution sale six times (more than eight years after the finality of the
judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied).
In their determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses
and counsels,, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to
restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from
courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected,
initially or ultimately deny their prayer.
In prolonging the litigation, they sought the issuance of preliminary
injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case
39407, from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as
expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer (for instance, after
Damaso bowed out temporarily from the scene following the
rendition of the decision of the CA, his wife Mercedez intruded
into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction from the CFI of Rizal in connection with Civil Case 7532
which she filed while knowingly fully well that the basic civil case
39407 was decided by the CFI of Manila which is court is the
proper forum for any action to the execution).
It is clear that Mrs. Perez and her counsel know or ought to have
known beforehand that the CFI of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to
issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the
recall of the writ issued before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in
the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution
issued on 15 August 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature
of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso
Perez's judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil
case 7532 which was then still pending in the CFI of Rizal.
Mrs. Perez and her counsel failed to adduce any evidence in support
to their motion and in fact failed to appear during the scheduled
hearing. Thus, Judge Lantin issued an order - waiving the rights of
Mrs. Perez to present any evidence in support of his motion to recall
and lift the writ of execution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge
Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction and since the execution sought
to be enjoined was order by another tribunal, Mrs.
assisted by her husband prayed for another issuance of a another
injunction, this time in Branch 12 of the CFI of Manila (different
branch) in connection with civil case 7532 - that still pending in
CFI of Rizal.
As anticipated by the spouses and their counsel, Branch 12 denied the
injunction sought on the ground that said branch has no jurisdiction or
power to interfere with e judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. In her motion, it was merely an offer to replace
the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez
spouses as stock holders in the Republic Bank. When the motion was
set for hearing, the counsels for Damaso Perez promise to produce the
said cash dividends within 5 days, but the promise was never fulfilled.
However, the husband prepared and filed a motion for reconsideration
on the same day for the civil case 39407, to the same branch (12)
which denied his wife's motion, which said Branch denied the same.
From the chronology of events, the facts becomes inescapable that the
Perez spouse, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a
stratagem of remedies projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple
money judgment. Counsels obviously foreshadowed their own
reversals in the remedies they ventured to adopt, such that even
before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until
the case reached the SC for the second time.
According to the SC, the filed civil cases was not the proper remedy in
so far as they sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
from the CFI of Rizal and Manila where civil cases 7532 and 55292
were filed respectively, for the said court did not have jurisdiction to
restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by CFI of
Manila Branch 7, under the settled doctrines that that Courts are
without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction or
interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. But the fact that Mrs. Perez abandoned civil
case 7532 when she instituted the urgent motion to recall writ of
execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored in the same
ground which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil
case was 7532 was dismissed upon her own motion.
Civil case 55292 was virtually deserted the same by the spouses when
they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of
preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said
civil case - until the latter was dismissed with the consent of the parties
because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
According to the spouses, if there was delay, it was because their
counsel happened to be more assertive (a quality of a lawyer
which is not to be condemned). What the SC cannot countenance
is a lawyers's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client (a layman), on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounded duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the intro-convertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. Its
primacy is indisputable.
The counsels finally state that the petitioners have several counsel in
this case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited
implying that the decision of this court ordering the 'treble costs are
assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel'
is not clear. The word counsel may be either singular or plural in
construction. That is why SC meant the counsels on record of
the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in
the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407,
after the CA had tendered its decision - and it is on the records
that movants are the said counsels.
Atty. Bolinas admitted that he entered his appearance in the case
when the CFI of Manila dismissed the petitioners relief in case
3947 and even before the CA render its decision. On the other
hand, Atty. Baizas claims that he became counsel only in October
1963 when he filed with Atty. Bolinao the case 55292 before the
CFI of Manila Branch 12, althoufh it appears on records that the
urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the
case 39407, was signed by one Ruby Zaida of the firm of Crispin
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.1
Baizas and Associates as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be
recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed
above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in case 7532.
DISPO: Motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Herein Attys. to
pay jointly and severally the treble cost assessed against the
petitioners.
CASE TITLE: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON.
TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL
CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998
PONENTE: Chief Justice Davide
FACTS: In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of October 29, 1996,
COMELEC resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i)
of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada
Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben
Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in
partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional
Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code were filed with Branch 23 of the RTC of Allen,
Northern Samar.
In an Order issued on August 25, 1997, respondent Judge Noynay, as
presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the
cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to
file the cases with the appropriate MTC on the ground that pursuant to
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases
since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not
exceed six years of imprisonment. All the accused school personnel
are uniformly charged for Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a
penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of
imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold
public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Two motions for reconsideration were separately filed by the
COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC
itself through its Legal Department but both were denied by Judge
Noynay. Thus, COMELEC filed the present special civil action.
COMELECs POSITION: It contends that Judge Noynay has
erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in
arguing that the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide election offenses because pursuant to Section 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code and the SCs ruling in Alberto vs. Judge Juan
Lavilles, Jr., RTCs have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election
offenses. Thru the OSG, it claims that the challenged orders of Judge
Noynay are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and
jurisprudence.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: They maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has
divested the RTCs of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable
penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691
expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with
its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then
conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with
imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by MTCs.
ISSUE: The pivotal issue in this special civil action for certiorari with
mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691 has divested RTCs of jurisdiction
over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding 6 years.
SC RULING/RATIO: SC granted the petition.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, RTCs have
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote. It reads as follows:
SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional
trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of this Code, except
those relating to the offense of failure to register
or failure to vote which shall be under the
jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial
courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal
will lie as in other criminal cases.
Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those
enumerated in Section 261 thereof, paragraph (i) of which was
allegedly committed by the accused school personnel. Under Section
264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense, except that of
failure to register or failure to vote, is imprisonment of not less than 1
year but not more than 6 years and the offender shall not be subject to
probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691,
provides as follows:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations
of city or municipal ordinances committed within
their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective
of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence,
they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
The Court have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals that by
virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section
32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs
does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of RTCs and of the
Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor.
Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional,
arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the
RTCs or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code,
election offenses also fall within the exception.
As stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by
Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII
of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress
may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a
special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law
on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691
can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is
merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not
have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon RTCs or the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No.
7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from
the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of
B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.
It is obvious that Judge Noynay did not read at all the opening
sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an
opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his
duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with
due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful
to the law, and to maintain professional competence.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.2
Counsel for COMELEC, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of in the letter-request, the respondent misrepresented
COMELECs Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter
that there was already a pending case in the RTC of
carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles,
Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration he filed with the court below and Makati before November 9, 2005;
in the instant petition before the Supreme Court, Atty. Balbuena
deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions in Lavilles case 4. refused to receive the complainants Answer with
were the Courts findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, its own
Compulsory Counterclaim so that she could file on
words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the
memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision. behalf of her client an Amended Complaint without
leave of court and without presenting the Deed of
Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Absolute Sale;
mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
the text of a decision or authority.
5. induced her witness Agnes Heredia (Heredia) to sign a
Further, if Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known false Affidavit by telling her that it would only be for
that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is purposes of compelling Fernandez to pay additional
neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration sums to her client; however, Atty. Villalon used it as
nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. evidence to frame the complainant Fernandez for her
Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme
own personal gain;
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the
paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA.
6. only submitted the Deed of Donation for signature
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the examination and certification by the NBI and
instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of public
intentionally failed to submit the Deed of Absolute Sale.
respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17
October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449
are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide IBP:
said cases with purposeful dispatch.
Commissioner Funa issued a recommendation to dismiss the case.
PENALTY IMPOSED: Judge Noynay is ADMONISHED to faithfully
There is no sufficient basis to hold Atty. Villalon accountable
comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and
for failure to mention in the Complaint and in the Amended Complaint
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
the existence of the Absolute Sale. No such duty is imposed upon the
legal counsel under any law or the Rules of Court. It cannot be argued
Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is likewise ADMONISHED to be more careful in
that there was suppression of evidence on the part of the Atty. Villalon
the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of
as she is not the only person who had access or possession of the
Professional Responsibility.
said Deed of Absolute Sale. It was a document readily available to the
FERNANDEZ v. ATTY. VILLALON general public through the Notarial Office. A person cannot possibly
suppress the existence of a document which everyone else, especially
FACTS:
the opposing party-litigant, knows about.

Fernandez was the respondent in a civil case which Palacios

Assuming Atty. Villalon had knowledge about the existence
sought to nullify a Deed of Donation he purportedly executed in favor
of the Deed of Absolute Sale before the civil complaint was filed, her
of Fernandez. On September 27, 2005 discovered that Fernandez had
role as the legal counsel is limited by the clients choice of cause of
Falsified a Deed of Donation that Palacios that Palacios purportedly
action. Moreover, its mere existence as a document is not an
executed in Fernandez favor. Palacios name was cancelled and a
affirmation of its validity or due execution. In other words, the client,
new TCT was issued in Fernandez name. Palacios employed the
possibly believing in the invalidity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, may
services of ATTY. VILLALON to file a complaint for the declaration of
have chosen to refute the validity of the document at a later time when
nullity of the Deed of Donation that became the basis for the issuance
and if its existence is raised. This is a choice within the discretion of
of a title in Fernandez name.
the party-litigant. The opposing party cannot impose it as a duty upon
the other party or his legal counsel.
In Fernandez answer, he claimed that his name in the TCT
is proper on account of an existing Deed of Absolute Sale between him
SC: No sufficient ground. Dismissed the case.
and Palacios. Palacios did the Deed of Donation in order to cheat the
Government by paying a donors tax which is lower that capital gains A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to be truthful
tax if the transaction is represented as sale. in all his dealing. However, this duty does not require that the lawyer
advance matters of defense on behalf of his or her clients opponent. A
Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
lawyer is his or her clients advocate; while duty-bound to utter no
Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01, Rule 7.03, Rule 10.01, Rule 10.02
falsehood, an advocate is not obliged to build the case for his or her
and Rule 10.03. Alleging:
clients opponent.

1. suppressed and excluded in the Original and Amended

Palacios, approached her to file a complaint for
Complaint her knowledge about the existence of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 12, 2005; the annulment of the Deed of Donation. This was the cause of

action chosen by her client. Assuming arguendo that the respondent

2. used the fake and spurious Deed of Donation to
knew of the presence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, its existence, is,
deceive the court into trying Civil Case No. 05-1071, the
action for the annulment of TCT No. 220869, despite indeed, a matter of defense for Fernandez. We cannot fault the
her knowledge of the existence of the Deed of Absolute respondent for choosing not to pursue the nullification of the Deed of
Sale;
Absolute Sale. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for a

lawyer to conclude, whether correctly or incorrectly, that the Deed of

3. committed misrepresentations as follows: to verify
whether the attached Deed of Absolute Sale was Absolute Sale was immaterial in achieving the ultimate goal the
properly notarized, the respondent Villalon personally recovery of Palacios property.
inquired before the notarial section of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City thru a letter-request,
whether a record of the deed existed in the said office;

wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.3

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the
complainant. Considering the gravity of the penalty of disbarment or
suspension as a member of the Bar, a lawyer may only be disbarred or
suspended if there is clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof that he
or she committed transgressions defined by the rules as grounds to
strip him or her of his professional license.
In this case, we find no clear evidence we can satisfactorily
accept showing that the respondent improperly induced Heredia to
sign the affidavit of December 11, 2005, as alleged in Heredias
affidavit of retraction.
The issue about affidavits executed by Heldia does not have
convincing and satisfactory proof therefore cannot stand
meritorious basis for the case against Atty. Villalon.
JOSE A. RIVERA, complainant, vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL,
respondent.
Complaint and Ground/s:
Jose A. Rivera instituted a Complaint for Disbarment charging Atty.
Napoleon Corral with Malpractice and Conduct Unbecoming a Member
of the Philippine Bar.
Facts:
The complaint alleges, inter alia -
(1) That on February 12, 1990, a Decision was penned by the
Honorable Presiding Judge Gorgonio Y. Ybaez on (sic) Civil Case No.
17473 for Ejectment.
(2) That such decision was received by Annaliza Superio, Secretary of
Atty. Napoleon Corral, on February 23, 1990.
(3) That on March 13, 1990, a NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed in court
by Atty. Napoleon Corral, a copy of which was served on plaintiffs
counsel.
(4) That on March 14, 1990, [at] about 1:50 p.m. Atty. Napoleon Corral
came to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Branch 7, Bacolod City and
changed the date February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing
later that there is no 29th in February 1990, he filed a REPLY TO
PLAINTIFFS MANIFESTATION claiming therein that he received the
Decision not on the 29th in (sic) February 1990 but on the 28th of
February 1990.
(5) That Atty. Napoleon Corral violated the proper norms/ethics as a
lawyer by tampering with particularly by personally and manually
changing entries in the courts record without the Courts prior
knowledge and permission, conduct unbecoming of a member of the
Philippine Bar much more so because in so doing he was found to
have been motivated by the desire of suppressing the truth.
(6) That on July 13, 1990 Atty. Napoleon Corral filed a MOTION TO
DISMISS, among other things he stated that the court is without
jurisdiction to try and decide the case at issue.
Defense of the Respondent
Respondent claimed that the correction of the date was done on the
paper prepared by him. He also alleged that the correction was
initiated and done in the presence and with the approval of the Clerk of
Court and the other court employees. According to respondent, the
correction was made because of typographical error he committed. He
denied that Annaliza Superio, who received the decision in his behalf,
is his secretary.
IBP Investigation
Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez submitted his report
on August 21, 1997 finding respondent guilty as charged and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
Allegations under the Respondents Motion for Reconsideration
1. THAT THERE WAS NO DUE PROCESS OR HEARING WHICH
HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT FROM THE
BEGINNING;
2. COMPLAINANT RIVERA COMMITTED PERJURY WHEN HE
CLAIMED THAT RESPONDENT ALTERED THE COURT RECORDS;
3. THAT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN BACOLOD CITY UNDER
JUDGE IBAEZ COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In fact
as . . . a respondent in an administrative proceeding is not entitled to be
informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating
committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is
entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial
evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet
the charges and the evidence presented against him during the
hearings of the investigating committee.
Respondent cannot feign he was denied an opportunity to be heard in
this case because as borne out by the records, hearings had to be re-
scheduled several times by the investigating commissioner to afford
him the chance to present his evidence. The records disclose that
when the case was referred to the IBP by Resolution of the Court
dated January 30, 1993, Investigating Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez issued a Notice of Hearing dated July 12, 1993 ordering
complainant and respondent to appear before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline on August 19, 1993.
In response, complainant, who is based in Sta. Fe, Bacolod City, sent
a letter dated August 10, 1993 informing the Commission that owing to
his limited finances as a Baptist Pastor he could not afford the
expenses involved in attending the hearings and in view thereof, he
requested that the hearings be held without his presence and that the
case be decided based on the evidence submitted. Nothing was heard
from respondent, although the records show that he was furnished a
copy of the notice.
On the scheduled hearing of August 19, 1993, both complainant and
respondent did not appear. The investigator, however, noted the letter
of complainant dated August 10, 1993. The hearing was reset for four
(4) times, due to the failure of both parties to appear. The investigator
issued an order re-scheduling the hearing for the last time to February
24, 1994 giving respondent a last chance to present his evidence with
the warning that respondents failure to do so will compel the
Commission to render a ruling based on the evidence submitted by the
complainant. The investigator, however, noted the complainants letter
of November 4, 1993 wherein the latter manifested that he was resting
his case based on the evidence submitted by him together with the
complaint.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that:
1.] the complaint filed is not verified;
2.] in the hearings set by the Commission, complainant failed to
appear;
3.] unless complainant appears personally, be sworn to and questioned
personally under oath, the complaint is defective;
4.] the complaint which could be filed by anybody is a form of
harassment;
5.] in view of the repeated failure of complainant to appear and be
sworn to, the letter-complaint is merely hearsay.
On March 3, 1994, the investigator denied the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit and set for the last time the hearing on April 21, 1994 for
the reception of respondents evidence.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.4
On April 4, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Postponement praying
that the hearing be reset on the last week of July 1994. Accompanying
said motion was an Answer To The Order Of The Commission Dated
March 3, 1994.
To accommodate respondent, the Investigating Commissioner reset
the hearing on July 28, 1994 with the warning that said setting is in
transferable and that the Commission will proceed with its investigation
on said date with or without respondents presence. For failure of
respondent to appear on said date, the investigator issued an order
considering the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence presented.
Respondent cannot now complain that he was denied due process. On
the contrary, the Commission was lenient to a fault in accommodating
his numerous requests for continuance. Indeed, the chronology of
events shows that the prolonged silence of respondent and the belated
filing of his motion to dismiss followed by the Answer to the
investigators March 3, 1994 Order, were deliberately resorted to hinder
the proceedings.
The quintessence of due process is simply that a party be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side and to adduce any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. Entrenched is the rule
that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but
simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings and opportunity to explain ones side.
Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER
The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the correction
introduced by respondent was made not to reflect the truth but to
mislead the trial court into believing that the notice of appeal was filed
within the reglementary period. The Decision rendered in Civil Case
No. 17473 was duly received by a certain Annaliza Superio, the
secretary of respondent, on February 22, 1990. Respondent filed the
Notice of Appeal on March 13, 1990 which was clearly out of time. To
extricate himself from such predicament, respondent altered the date
when he allegedly received the Decision from February 23, 1990 to
February 29, 1990. Realizing that there was no February 29, 1990 in
the calendar, he sought to change the date again to February 28, 1990
by means of a reply to Plaintiffs Manifestation.
The Investigating Commissioner further pointed out that respondents
claim that the correction was made in the presence of the Clerk of
Court and other court employees was denied by Nilda P. Tronco, the
Branch Clerk of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City, who declared
that the alteration was surreptitiously made and would have been left
unnoticed were it not for the timely discovery thereof.
ISSUE
Whether the act of Atty. Corral in altering the date that he allegedly
received the Decision in February 29, 1990, instead of February 23,
1990 will be a ground for any disciplinary action by the Court
COURT
The Court finds the facts as summarized by the investigator fully
supported by the evidence. However, the recommended penalty is not
commensurate to the misdeed of respondent.
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not
only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to
safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the
public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal
profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyers oath have
proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney on the following grounds, to wit: 1.] deceit; 2.] malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office; 3.] grossly immoral conduct; 4.]
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5.] violation of the
lawyers oath; 6.] willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court; and 7.] willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.
While the prevailing facts of the case do not warrant so severe a
penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of the Court to discipline an
errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be exercised because it
cannot be denied that respondent has violated his solemn oath as a
lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.
The relevant rules to the case at bar are Rules 1.01 and Rule 19.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.01 states in no
uncertain terms that: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. More specifically, Rule 19.01 mandates
that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.
The Court cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and
to his clients. Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, the
Court ruled that the ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers
to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in
the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity. Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by
the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus,
every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of
Appeal was timely filed, respondent committed an act of dishonesty.
Under pertinent rules, dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct upon
which the Court, in a recent case, imposed a one-year suspension on
respondent therein for inserting in the records of the case a
certification of non-forum shopping and making it appear that the same
was already part of such records at the time the complaint was filed. A
one-year suspension was similarly imposed on respondent in Reyes v.
Atty. Rolando Javier for deceiving his client into believing that he filed
the petition on time when in fact it was filed on a much later date. It
should be stressed that brazenly resorting to such a legal
subterfuge to mislead the court and to cover up for his failings
toward his client is not only a disgraceful indictment on
respondents moral fiber and personal fitness to his calling as a
lawyer. It is also an embarrassment to his brethren in the Bar.
Such misconduct warrants a similar penalty for the Court cannot
tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an
honorable profession.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Napoleon
Corral is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
CONRADO QUE, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.
Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the
following violations of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and
processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of
title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for
annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a
petition for declaratory relief before the RTC
(collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the
final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court2 (MeTC)
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.5
and RTC3 in the unlawful detainer case rendered
against the respondents clients. The respondent in this
regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well
that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful
detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly
attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over
the property subject of the unlawful detainer case;
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping
by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct,
and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for
his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the
complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and
RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect
towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to
falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and
impede the due administration of justice. The
respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for
annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary
order issued by the presiding judge in open court which
allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the
respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged
that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of
preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients
(who were all squatters) in supporting the above
falsehood.4
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood
that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name
and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty.
Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondents
clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and
unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for
annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom
are already deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance
in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines without being
authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of
representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-
03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to
him.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance
on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762,
Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan8
(Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the
charges against the respondent meritorious. In his
Report and Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to
defend and protect the cause and rights of his client
with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet,
it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the
lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of
the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not
at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his
clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor.
He may not and must not encourage multiplicity of
suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.
On the first charge on abuse of court processes,
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the
unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies
to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the
MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against
his clients.
On the second charge, the Investigating
Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in
filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for
annulment of judgment and later on a petition for
declaratory relief were all done to prevent the
execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer
case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence showing
that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the
court as shown in his petition for annulment of
judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to
Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which
were untrue.
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating
Commissioner disregarded the respondents
explanation that he had no intention to represent
without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom
were already deceased) in the petition for annulment
of judgment. To the Investigating Commissioner, the
respondent merely glossed over the representation
issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority
of the litigants complied with the certification of non-
forum shopping requirement. The Investigating
Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondents
argument regarding his misrepresentation in the
second complaint for annulment of title since he knew
very well that only the Solicitor General can institute
an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent
solely signed the amended complaint for and on behalf
of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline recommended that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced
the respondents suspension from the practice of law to
one (1) year.
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether
the respondent can be held liable for the
imputed unethical infractions and professional
misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the
conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct for abusing court procedures and
processes to shield his clients from the execution of the
final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful
detainer case against these clients:
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.6
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order to question the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction.
In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the
petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be
rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily
demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the
ejectment case.
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the
petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned
the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of
before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of
a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis
of the motion to dismiss filed.
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions
for annulment of the complainants title to the property
involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records
show that these petitions were both dismissed "for lack
of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs" to file
the petition.
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for
annulment of judgment and the petitions for
annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a
petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and
his siblings from exercising their rights over the same
property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The
respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of
the complainants title because the property is a part
of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for
injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in
several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition
for annulment of judgment, the second petition for
annulment of complainants title and the petition for
declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence
in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final
decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the
unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated
attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by
professional ethical rules in defending the interests of
his client. These are already uncalled for measures to
avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC
and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated
Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to
"observe the rules of procedure and not [to] misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice." By his actions, the
respondent used procedural rules to thwart and
obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of
justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in
that case.
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule
12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the rule against forum
shopping, both of which are directed against the filing
of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both
violations constitute abuse of court processes; they
tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak
havoc on orderly judicial procedure; and add to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the
courts.
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question
the lower courts jurisdiction may be a procedurally
legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the
respondents subsequent petitions involving the same
property and the same parties not only demonstrate
his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different
fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the
execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the
unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is
most obvious with respect to the petitions for
annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both
geared towards preventing the execution of the
unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had
become final.
The records also reveal that the respondent
committed willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the
lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed
before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the
respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds
for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was
alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants
therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper
remedy then available after receipt of the denial of
their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly sold out
the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by
keeping them away to the Court and in complete
ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of
compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging
representing them when in truth and in fact, have
connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at
his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants
therein)
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the
respondent alleged that no second motion for
reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition
with the CA had been filed, as he believed "that the
decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are
null and void." These conflicting claims, no doubt,
involve a fabrication made for the purpose of
supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it
involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the
reputation of a law office colleague, another violation
we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious
subterfuge when he filed his second petition for
annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt
to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General
may commence reversion proceedings of public lands.
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This
second petition, filed by a private party and not by the
Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his
clients requested that they be represented by the
Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of
the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended
petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the
respondent signed the amended petition where he
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.7
alone stood as counsel for the "plaintiffs." In this
underhanded manner, the respondent sought to
compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources
on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his
motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his
petition for annulment of judgment where he
misrepresented to the court and his clients what
actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in
this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing
show, that after both counsel have argued on the
aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding
Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within
the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their
counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants
resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND
DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER
TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD.
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled
hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the
respondents application for temporary restraining
order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys
motion to dismiss. The records also show that RTC-
Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents
application for injunctive relief pending the resolution
of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party. As
stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch
101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the
transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the
Stenographer, the same will indicate that the
allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not
true.
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of
the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took
advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him
by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them
to support.
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under
Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional
Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe
candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This
provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor
shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead
by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an
attorney and his oath as a lawyer "never to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law." The respondent failed to
remember that his duty as an officer of the court
makes him an indispensable participant in the
administration of justice, and that he is expected to act
candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work. His duty as a
lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the
court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter
how demanding his duties to his clients may be. In
case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty
to deal candidly with the court.
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also
failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS
CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his clients x x x
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client,
to employ only such means as are consistent with truth
and honor. He should not prosecute patently frivolous
and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless
actions. The recital of what the respondent did to
prevent the execution of the judgment against his
clients shows that he actually committed what the
above rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition
for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked
(as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late
Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect,
corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for
the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to
demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against
Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission,
only participated in the cases previously assigned to
Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time,
the respondents petition for annulment of judgment
also represented that no second motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC
and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the
reason that the respondent believed the said decisions
were null and void ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the
respondent has been less than fair in his professional
relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for
violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to
"conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and
candor toward his professional colleagues." He
was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty.
Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he
effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead
and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans
finding that the respondent twice represented parties
without proper authorization: first, in the petition for
annulment of judgment; and second, in the second
petition for annulment of title.
In the first instance, the records show that the
respondent filed the petition for annulment of
judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave
their consent while the other 15 individuals did not. We
cannot agree with the respondents off-hand
explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the
litigants who signed the certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition already gave him the
necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it
highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have
been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.8
respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of
law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and
strict training as he so proudly declares, from the
University of the Philippines College of Law and in the
two law firms with which he was previously
associated.39 As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan
found, the respondents explanation of compliance with
the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping
glossed over the real charge of appearing in court
without the proper authorization of the parties he
allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second
complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew
that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the
Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of
land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where
he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff
without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious
way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he
signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the
plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections
21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when
he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The
settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a
litigant without authority from the latter or from
the latters representative or, in the absence
thereof, without leave of court
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
"Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain
from taking unconscientious advantage of another.
Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said
that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention
to abstain from taking undue advantage of
another, even though the forms and
technicalities of law, together with the absence
of all information or belief of facts, would render
the transaction unconscientious." Bad faith, on
the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior
purpose. As both concepts are states of mind, they
may be deduced from the attendant circumstances
and, more particularly, from the acts and statements of
the person whose state of mind is the subject of
inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in
bad faith in defending the interests of his
clients. We draw this conclusion from the
misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he
made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the
execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC.
That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and
experience and misread the Rules immeasurably
strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part
of the respondent in pleading the soundness and merit
of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the
execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering
his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his
petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a
desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief
he claims; these are simply scattershot means to
achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the
unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his
discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to
note that this was the same defense he raised in the
first disbarment case.
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim
that the disbarment case was filed because the counsel
of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind
against him. We reject this argument, considering that
it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment
case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this
case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate
disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders
the underlying motives of the complainants
unimportant and with very little relevance. The
purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to
determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as
an officer of the court and a participant in the
dispensation of justice an issue where the
complainants personal motives have little relevance.
Disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be
no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged
personal motivation that drove the complainant Que
and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the
respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the
exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the
Bar.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not
the respondents first ethical infraction of the same
nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and
Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his
willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for
misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the
execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with
non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed
leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for
six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn
any lesson from his past experience and since then has
exhibited traits of incorrigibility.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found
liable for professional misconduct for violations
of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and
10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.9
12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d),
21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
However, we modify the penalty the IBP
imposed, and hold that the respondent should be
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
JESSIE R. DE LEON, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO, Respondent.
Facts:
This administrative case, which Jessie De Leon (De Leon)
initiated, concerns Castelos alleged dishonesty and falsification
committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the defendants in the
civil action in which De Leon intervened.
The Government brought suit (Civil Case No. 4674MN) for
the purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
covering two parcels of land located in Malabon City then registered in
the names of defendant spouses Lim Hio (Hio) and Dolores Chu (Chu)
due to their encroaching on a public callejon and on a portion of the
Malabon-Navotas River shoreline.
De Leon, having joined the case (Civil Case No. 4674MN),
as a voluntary intervenor two years later, now accuses Castelo
(counsel of defendant spouses Hio and Chu in Civil Case No.
4674MN), the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and
falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney.
Castelos sin was allegedly committed by his filing for defendant
spouses Hio and Chu of various pleadings (answer with counterclaim
and cross-claim in relation to the main complaint; and answer to the
complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim) despite
said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.
De Leon:
Castelo made it to appear that spouses Hio and Chu have
participated in an act or proceeding (making and filing of the
Answers) when they did not in fact so participate. They could
not have so participated because they were already dead as
of that time, which is punishable under Article 172, in relation
to Article 171, paragraph 2, of RPC.
Castelo committed the crime of Use of Falsified Documents,
by submitting the said falsified Answers in Civil Case No.
4674MN.
Made a mockery of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by
representing dead persons therein who, he falsely made to
appear, as contesting the complaints, counter-suing and
cross-suing the adverse parties.
That, as a consequence of the above criminal acts, Castelo
violated the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Castelo:
The persons who had engaged him as attorney to represent
the Lim family in Civil Case No. 4674MN were William and
Leonardo Lim, the children of spouses Hio and Chu.
Upon his initial queries, William Lim stated:
a. That the Lim family had acquired the properties from
Georgina Flores.
b. That William and Leonardo Lim were already actively
managing the family business, and now co-owned the
properties by virtue of the deed of absolute sale their
parents, spouses Hio and Chu, had executed in their favor.
c. That because of the execution of the deed of absolute
sale, William and Leonardo Lim had since honestly assumed
that their parents had already caused the transfer of the
TCTs to their names.
Considering that William and Leonardo Lim themselves
were the ones who had engaged his services, he (Castelo)
consequently truthfully stated in the motion seeking an
extension to file responsive pleading dated February 3,
2006 the fact that it was "the family of the defendants" that
had engaged him, and that he had then advised "the
children of the defendants" to seek the assistance as well of
a licensed geodetic surveyor and engineer.
He (Castelo) prepared the initial pleadings based on his
honest belief that spouses Hio and Chu were then still living.
He (Castelo) had no intention to commit either a falsehood
or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the death
certificates of spouses Hio and Chu in order to apprise the
trial court of that fact.
The Office of the Prosecutor for Malabon City even
dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification brought
against him (Castelo). The same office denied De Leons
motion for reconsideration.
De Leon submitted a reply, whereby he asserted that Castelos
claim in his comment that he had represented the Lim family was a
deception, because the subject of the complaint against Castelo was
his filing of the answers in behalf of spouses Hio and Chu despite their
being already deceased at the time of the filing. De Leon regarded as
baseless the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for
Malabon City in dismissing the criminal complaint against Castelo and
in denying his motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not Castelo is guilty of dishonesty and falsification in Civil
Case No. 4674MN.
SC usually first refers administrative complaints against members of
the Philippine Bar to (IBP) for investigation and appropriate
recommendations. For the present case, however, SC foregone the
prior referral of the complaint to the IBP, in view of the facts being
uncomplicated and based on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN.
Ruling:
No. SC found that Castelo did not commit any falsehood or
falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN.
All attorneys in the Philippines, including Castelo, have
sworn to the vows embodied in the following Lawyers Oath,
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.
The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyers Oath,
providing:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as
officers of the Court, to act with the highest standards of honesty,
integrity, and trustworthiness. All attorneys are thereby enjoined to
obey the laws of the land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out
of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court and to conduct
themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients. The least
they can do in that regard is to refrain from engaging in any form or
manner of unlawful conduct (which broadly includes any act or
omission contrary to law).
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.10
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." He should bear in mind
that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the
court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusion.
Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not
only the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their duties, but
also the immunity from liability to others for as long as the performance
of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their character
as servants of the Law and as officers of the Court. In particular, the
statements they make in behalf of their clients that are relevant,
pertinent, or material to the subject of inquiry are absolutely privileged
regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such cloak of privilege is
necessary and essential in ensuring the unhindered service to their
clients causes and in protecting the clients confidences. With the
cloak of privilege, they can freely and courageously speak for their
clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution
or actions for damages
Castelo did not violate the Lawyers Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He did not misrepresent that spouses Hio
and Chu were still living. On the contrary, he stated in the answer to
the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, and in
the clarification and submission, that the spouses Hio and Chu were
already deceased. He was acting in the interest of the actual owners of
the properties when he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-
claim. As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion
any action against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at
the start that the spouses Hio and Chu were no longer the actual
owners of the affected properties due to the transfer of ownership even
prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners (i.e.,
Leonardo and William Lim) needed to be substituted in lieu of said
spouses, whether the spouses Hio and Chu were still living or already
deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial. And,
lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the spouses Hio and
Chu were no longer living. De Leons joining in the action as a
voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons
interested in the litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such
other persons, as his own complaint in intervention, bear out in its
specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim, and their
respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist that the
respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him
or to any other party.
Good faith must always motivate any complaint against a
Member of the Bar. "xxx the fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of
wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. A lawyers
reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court must shield such
fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious.
It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous
complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith
from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct.
De Leon initiated his complaint possibly for the sake of
harassing Castelo, either to vex him for taking the cudgels for his
clients in connection with Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an
imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter of the pending action,
or to accomplish some other dark purpose.
SC dismissed the complaint for disbarment or suspension filed against
Castelo for utter lack of merit.
IN RE: ALMACEN
G.R. No. L-27654; Feb. 18, 1970
FACTS:
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case
entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due
hearing, rendered judgment against his client. 20 days after the receipt
of the copy of the decision, he filed a motion for reconsideration with
which, he served on the adverse counsel a copy but did not notify the
latter of the time and place of hearing. To prove that he did serve on
the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty.
Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration
to which he attached the required registry return card. This second
motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the
trial court upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who had
already perfected the appeal.
Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on
appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals. However, the court dismissed the appeal reasoning that
the first motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Almacen does not
contain a notice of time and place of hearing and is therefore, a
useless piece of paper (Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co.) which did not interrupt the running of the period to
appeal and consequently was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging
that the cited jurisprudence is not decisive and filed a pleading entitled
"Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza as the applicable case. CA denied the motion contending
that there is no substantial distinction between this case and that of
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We
refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal.
Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as
his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for
extension of time. It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen expressed
his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," as he claimed that it is useless to continue
practicing his profession when members of the high court are men who
are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his
client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and
that he became one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy.
His petition adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court
as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented
as it is unprofessional. Nonetheless, the court withholds action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate.
The court then required Atty. Almacen to show cause as to
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. He asked for
permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him in an open and public hearing and the
court required him to state within 5days from notice his reasons for
such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and
incident submitted for decision.
To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to
answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so
that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked
for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no
time to hear him in person." His written answer, as undignified and
cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology, with abundant sarcasm
and innuendo, reaffirming his statements with the truth , compatible
with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual
members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.
Atty. Almacen (respondent) stands that his statement is
borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE
AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest
of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE. He contended
that what he attacks was the decision of the court and not the
members itself because he was provoked and compelled by force and
necessity to act; that although he was angry, he waited for the finality
of the decision and yet the court ruled against his client, thereby
sensing that the court did not perform its duties with circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom. In the same breath, he alludes to
the classic symbol of justice; he ridicules the members of this Court,
saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.11
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be disciplined for his
acts of condemning and attacking the court and its members.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are
needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write
full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court
would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The
proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those cases which
present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals
opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High
Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a
lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a
veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for
reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time
and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained
by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why
his client lost. Almacen was SUSPENDED.
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL.
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL
FACTS:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to
respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General
brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by
Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran
Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action
be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a
show-cause order.
In the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of
an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous
executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic
tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our
decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a
presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary
injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the
case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless
manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of
this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is
the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of
the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President,
a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this
backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles
thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any
judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to
itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed
conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that
there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case
of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to
engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or
party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation
suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect
their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all
times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal
or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country,
"although the process has already begun." It is true that Santiago
voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as
disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He
explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which
paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because
of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a
distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was
belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion
to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes
with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they
are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before
them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is
truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as
seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their
mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial
sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two
judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for
such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our
government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of
"unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of
"unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a
favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a
lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about
loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement
that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or
indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-
petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should
also inhibit themselves.
In the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the
statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore
quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and
wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He
describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying
bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges
petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not
only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.
Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling
of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is
made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of
context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements.
They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in
the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession."9 It is
Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged."
Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2,
1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27,
1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this
case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his
associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's
behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads
inquired from him whether he could appear in this case; that he
advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence
and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned
down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to
terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not
participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any
pleading or any other document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of
the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.12
subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six
months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as
one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to
have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in
this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14,
1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M.
Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a
fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said
motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following
paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned
by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he
was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time
of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case which condition is
prohibited by the New Rules of Court Section 1, Rule 51, and we
quote: "Justices; who may take part. ... . only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part
in its consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is especially
significant in the present instance because the member who penned
the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately
four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable
Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the
Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and
corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12,
1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the
Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation
of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States
Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the
grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of
law and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting
off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the
sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18,
1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5)
days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for
contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He
there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was
already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and
requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that
he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know
anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated
in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently
explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of
the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F.
Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the
motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was
misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not
revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the
case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this
Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of
Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for
contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that
the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton
Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27,
1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all
of them will be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his
explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he
(Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to
Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked
him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another
motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling;
he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads'
desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never
prepared the motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads'
version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's
office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself
prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to
make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when
Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to
file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one.
They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion
to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After
reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same
after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According
to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time
the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one
hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and
Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads
asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth
motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because
said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings
to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the
announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In
fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L.
Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with
respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first
and second contempt incidents seriatim.
Issue:
1 Whether or not Atty. Santiago and Atty. Sotto is guilty of
contempt
2 Whether or not Atty. Regala and Atty. Uy should be
exempted for contempt
3 Whether or not the fourth motion for reconsideration an act
of contumacy
Ruling: Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law.
The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition
is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received
favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any
members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including
the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For
one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and
in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from
the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a
case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not
certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to
paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking
havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country.
Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge?
There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing
litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross
disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the
dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith,
counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in
Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as
follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common
place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in
categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit
is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of
the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a
corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.13
oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good
fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an
attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself,
an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1 His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
"not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the
statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's
cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and
license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that
"[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of
society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to
the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly
subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice
Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his
position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and
no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary
and the incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice
Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for
attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to
the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of
the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the
court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges
may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-
restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are
necessary for the orderly administration of justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are
not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of
Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration
of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules
against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
justice8 is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of
court.
Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto
In the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702,
708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of
the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a
poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has
never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a
chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life.
A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would
transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a
palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of
wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed."
We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront
to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or
his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case.
This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There
should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for
contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power
"[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial
officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case
before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an
officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he
too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is,
therefore, guilty of contempt.
2. In the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper
for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala
without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist
and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents that he
had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled
case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-
counsel in this case. He is exonerated. With respect to the first
contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the
record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation
of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be
held exempt from contempt.
3. First. It was filed without express leave of court. No
explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of
context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may
take part. ... only those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought should be
read thus
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All
matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will
be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any
and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at
the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and
adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the
date of submission; however, only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration
and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to
that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not
attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a
distorted quotation came about the portion left out was anyway
marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22
of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his
conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not
candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton
Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the
deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a
qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally
omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the
case to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must
be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying
to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion
announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting
to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this
Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World
Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the
decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has
already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it
would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a
threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no
aboveboard explanation.
Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court
that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He
knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the
fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has
been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to
have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings
contemptuous in character.
As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared
the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the
contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is
guilty of contempt.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.14
 Atty. Vicente L. Santiago insistence that he had nothing to do
with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even
read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes
against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it
was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads
explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the
case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would
not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that
Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even
started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too,
that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite
some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly
improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for
reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent
MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as such
lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client
takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed,
Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him
that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his
clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to
do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such
wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be
protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather
than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith
with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of
disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of
justice.
Adm. Case No. 7252 November 22, 2006
JOHNNY NG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR, Respondent
FACTS:
A verified complaint1 dated February 15, 2005 was filed by Johnny Ng
(complainant) against Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), for Disbarment.
Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor case
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed as
NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while respondent is the counsel for
complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision2 affirming the decision of the
LA. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Inhibit (MRMI),3 pertinent portions of which read:
x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under consideration
was merely copied from the pleadings of respondents-appellees with
very slight modifications. But we cannot accept the suggestion, made
by some knowledgeable individuals, that the actual writer of the said
decision is not at all connected with the NLRC First Division.
x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in
maintaining that the separation pay should be only one half month per
year of service? Is jurisprudence on this not clear enough, or is there
another reason known only to them?
x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC,
First Division, it is ignominious ignorance of the law on the part of the
commissioners concerned.
The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire actually
resulted in prosperity and not losses. xxx Respondents failed to prove
their claim of losses. And the Honorable Commissioners of the First
Division lost their ability to see these glaring facts.
x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One month per
year of service and all of it to the affected workers not to some
people in the NLRC in part.
x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent practices
of employers xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners, of the First Division
do not know this, they are indeed irrelevant to real life.
x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division to
see for themselves the evidence before them and not merely rely on
their reviewers and on the word of their ponente. If they do this
honestly they cannot help seeing the truth. Yes, honesty on the part of
the Commissioners concerned is what is lacking, not the evidence.
Unfair labor practice stares them in the face.
If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the
Honorable Commissioners of the First Division are doubly so and
with malice thrown in. If the workers indeed committed an illegal strike,
how come their only "penalty" is removing their tent? It is obvious that
the Labor Arbiter and the Honorable Commissioners know deep in their
small hearts that there was no strike. This is the only reason for the
finding of "illegal strike". Without this finding, they have no basis to
remove the tent; they have to invent that basis.
x x x The union in its "Union Reply To The Position Paper Of
Management" and its Annexes has shown very clearly that the so
called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to believe the
myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on the tent in front of the
wall and closed his eyes to the open wide passage way and gate
beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and egress of the premises, are
blocked by something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired
vision cannot be trusted, no doubt about it.
Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money claims.
Whereas, before, the established rule was, in cases of money claims
the employer had the burden of proof of payment. Now it is the other
way around. x x x For lack of a better name we should call this new
rule the "Special Dinopol Rule". But only retirable commissioners are
authorized to apply this rule and only when the money claims involved
are substantial. When they are meager the ordinary rules apply.
x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips
proved that the sixteen (16) claimants were already paid their service
incentive leave pay. This finding is copied verbatim from the cross-
eyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .
The evidence already on record proving that the alleged blocking of the
ingress and egress is a myth seem invisible to the impaired sight of
Commissioner Dinopol. He needs more of it. x x x
Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration (as
ponente [of] the decision that he signed and caused his co-
commissioners in the First Division to sign) has shown great and
irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of discretion and ignorance of the
law. He is a shame to the NLRC and should not be allowed to have
anything to do with the instant case anymore. Commissioner Go and
Chairman Seeres, by negligence, are just as guilty as Dinopol but,
since the NLRC rules prohibit the inhibition of the entire division,
Chairman Seeres should remain in the instant case and appoint two
(2) other commissioners from another division to sit with him and pass
final judgment in the instant case.
In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005, respondent
Alar contends that the instant complaint only intends to harass him and
to influence the result of the cases between complainant and the
workers in the different fora where they are pending; that the Rules of
Court/Code of Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at
the NLRC when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on
disciplinary matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it; that
Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for adequate
sanctions against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in
cases before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing at the NLRC, the
latter not being a court; that LAs and NLRC Commissioners are not
judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do not
apply to them, not being part of the judiciary; and that the labor lawyers
who are honestly and conscientiously practicing before the NLRC and
get paid on a contingent basis are entitled to some latitude of righteous
anger when they get cheated in their cases by reason of corruption
and collusion by the cheats from the other sectors who make their lives
and the lives of their constituents miserable, with impunity, unlike
lawyers for the employers who get paid, win or lose, and therefore
have no reason to feel aggrieved.
Attached to respondents counter-complaint is an affidavit made by the
union president Batan alleging that the Attys. Paras and Cruz are the
ones who violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when they
filed multiple suits arising from the same cause of action and when
they deliberately lessened the number of complainants in the labor
case.
The findings of the Commission on Bar discipline led the IBP to
conclude that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 8 and 11, while
the lawyers of the complainant did not violate any canons of the Code.
It recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning
that severe penalties will be imposed in case a similar conduct will be
committed again.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the misbehaviour of Atty. Alar before the NLRC
susceptible of the provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct?
RULING:
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.15

Yes. The misbehaviour of Atty. Alar before the NLRC is susceptible of
the provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking
both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations
of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used
improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not admit
any justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba, the Court ratiocinated as follows:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. Though a lawyer's
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem
in the courts and trust in judicial administration.
In Uy v. Depasucat, the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of
expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. A lawyer's language should
be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.
Submitting pleadings containing countless insults and diatribes against
the NLRC and attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly
measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its
commissioners, not being judges or justices and therefore not part of
the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does
not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla, the Court held
that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the
NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound
servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
Respondents argument that labor practitioners are entitled to some
latitude of righteous anger is unavailing. It does not deter the Court
from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave
or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the
Bar.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that
bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief." Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the
Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of
overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that
enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or
the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction.
However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and
with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of
government.16
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of
the legal profession.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the
IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondents violation
of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he
deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz, the
Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved by
the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to
substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do so.
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar
GUILTY of violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00
with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and
Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
CARMELITA FUDOT, petitioner, vs. CATTLEYLA LAND,
INC., respondent.
FACTS: On 9 November 2007, the Court received from De La Serna a
request for the inhibition of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, claiming
that Justice Tinga received P10 Million from Mr. Johnny Chan in
exchange for a favorable decision in the instant case. Justice Dante O.
Tinga is the ponente of the Decision subject to this Motion for
Reconsideration.
Atty. De La Serna relates that sometime in 2006, he was prevailed
upon by former BIR Commissioner Tomas Toledo to meet with Mr.
Chan. In the meeting, Mr. Chan informed him that he had already
bought the interest of Cattleya Land, Inc. over a property adjacent to
the property subject of the case and that he was interested in putting
up a resort/hotel in the property. He wanted to purchase Carmelita
Fudots interest in the property as well to put an end to the litigation.
They did not reach an agreement on the purchase price.
Another meeting was set, this time, through the intercession of Atty.
Dionisio De La Serna, former Secretary of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, and upon the request of Mr. Chans lawyer, Atty.
Paulino Petralba. In this meeting, Atty. Petralba offered P4 Million.
Again, no agreement was reached on the purchase price, De La Serna
narrates.
Sometime in August 2007, Atty. Petralba sought out Atty. De La
Sernas son, Atty. Victor De La Serna, Jr., and informed him that the
Supreme Courts decision in the instant case was forthcoming. This
advance knowledge of the decision only confirms the bribery bragged
about by Mr. Chan, De La Serna claims.
In another meeting on 26 September 2007, Mr. Chan told Atty. De La
Serna that there would no more negotiations for the purchase of
Fudots rights and he had already given P10 Million to Justice Tinga.
By way of consuelo de bobo, Mr. Chan offered De La Serna a legal
retainer of P200,000.00 down and a monthly fee of P15,000.00 to act
as his lawyer in Bohol. A day later, or on 27 September 2007, as De La
Serna notes, the decision in this case was mailed at the Central Post
Office, a copy of which was received by him on 10 October 2007. Atty.
De La Serna adds:
ALL WE NEED TO HAVE IS A LITTLE COMMON SENSE TO
CONCLUDE THAT INDEED, THE FAVORABLE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT WAS OBTAINED THRU BRIBERY. This is
what JOHNNY CHAN was bragging and this is what happened.
III. THE DECISION OF JUSTICE TINGA IN THE CASE REEKS OF
BRIBERY. HE HAS REPUDIATED ALL THE DOCTRINES HE HAS
SUMMARIZED AND ENUNCIATED IN LIM v. JORGE, A DECISION
HE PENNED ONLY IN 2005.
Only two years ago, in Lim v. Jorge, (G.R. No. 161861, March 11,
2005) Justice Dante Tinga made a learned treatise when he
summarized and further expounded on all the long-established
doctrines on the law and jurisprudence governing the Torrens System
of land titles in the Philippines. It was indeed a brilliant anthology
worthy of publication into a book. In this instant Decision however,
Justice Tinga has swallowed all the noble doctrines he has enunciated
so brilliantly, and instead repudiated and contradicted everything he
has said just to accommodate JOHNNY CHAN and all his cohorts
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.16
and his money. If this is not a CLEAR CASE OF BRIBERY, then we
dont know what is. The Decision of Justice Tinga in this case is simply
a ROGUE DECISION. It is illegal. It is immoral. And like a "mad dog,
it should be slain at sight."
Atty. De La Serna also finds it surprising that the instant case was
decided less than two (2) years after it was submitted for resolution. He
compares the instant case to a criminal case which has been pending
for ten (10) years before the Court. Atty. De La Serna also adds:
There is a difference of some 20,000 intervening cases
between Oppus and Fudot. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN THE
REASON WHY THIS INSTANT CASE WAS SELECTED AND
PLUCKED OUT FROM UNDERNEATH 20,000 OTHER CASES, AND
DECIDED IN LESS THAN TWO (2) YEARS? Your Honors, the
answer is in Your hands, but it seems quite obvious.
On 6 February 2008, the Court issued a Resolution requiring Atty. De
La Serna to explain in writing why he should not be punished for
indirect contempt of court. On 27 March 2008, De La Serna submitted
his explanation, stating that he believes in utmost good faith that all the
statements he made in recent pleadings he submitted in this case do
not constitute improper conduct and that his statements were not
intended to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice,
as they were made, on the contrary, to prevent the commission of a
grave injustice.
In a resolution dated 14 April 2008, the Court set the hearing on the
charge of indirect contempt on 18 June 2008. In the hearing, Atty. De
La Serna, together with his son Atty. Victor De La Serna, Jr., Mr. Chan,
Atty. Petralba and Atty. Alex Monteclar (Atty. Monteclar) of Cattleya
appeared.
Mr. Chan related that during the 25 September 2007 meeting, he
offered Atty. De La Serna P4 Million and an additional incentiveas
retainer of their company. Moreover, Atty. Petralba clarified that the
third meeting he had with Atty. De La Serna was on 4 September 2007,
and not in August as what De La Serna claimed, presenting his
detailed diary for the purpose.
Atty. Monteclar confirmed that Mr. Chan bought a land adjacent to the
property subject of the petition, and that Mr. Chan, interested in buying
the property of Fudot, told them that he would try to expedite the
matter and talk to De La Serna. He mentioned that he and his client,
Cattleya, refused to negotiate with De La Serna because they had a
sad experience with him when he accused one of Cattleyas lawyers of
making Cattleya a milking cow. Said lawyer even filed an
administrative case against De La Serna for making baseless
accusations and using intemperate language against opposing lawyers
in his pleadings in this very case when it was still before the trial
court. Atty. Monteclar admitted that he was the one who informed Atty.
Petralba of the Supreme Courts decision. He denied any knowledge
about the attempt to bribe any of the Justices of the Court.
Mr. Chan and Atty. Petralba both admitted that they had never met
Justice Tinga before and it was only during the hearing on 18 June
2008 that they saw Justice Tinga in person. On the other hand, Atty.
Monteclar stated that he had not known Justice Tinga personally,
although he met Justice Tinga way back in 2003.
The parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda.
Atty. De La Serna submitted a two-page Memorandum of Points. He
pointed out that it was Mr. Chan who sought him out using different
intermediaries and who acted as if he had advance knowledge of the
decision; moreover, it was Mr. Chan who said that he had given P10
Million to Justice Tinga. Thus, if there was anyone guilty of
contemptible conduct, it was Mr. Chan, and not him. De La Serna
added that anyone in his situation would have acted similarly.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.
RULING:
Yes. Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting up
an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a
willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders but such conduct
that tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of
law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the
presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or
embarrass the court and justice. Any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice has also been considered to constitute indirect contempt.
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, the
complainant must present panoply of evidence in support of such an
accusation. It will take more than the uncorroborated and independent
statements of Atty. De La Serna to cast an aura of credibility to his
accusations.
We reviewed the records of the case and find that the decision was
made in accordance with law and established jurisprudence. The
principles enunciated in Lim v. Jorge, now being invoked by Atty. De La
Serna, simply do not find application in this case. His insistence is not
only groundless; it is also downright contemptuous.
In the first place, Mr. Chan, the person most involved had categorically
denied making the statement to the effect that he gave P10 Million to
Justice Tinga, or to any other justice in the division.
Atty. De La Serna claims that Mr. Chan and Atty. Petralba had advance
knowledge of the Courts decision, based on the fact that Atty. Petralba
and Mr. Chan were already intimating a favorable decision even before
the decision was released. He points out that the decision was
released only on 27 September 2007, when it was mailed at the
Central Post Office, implying that if not for the fact that Mr. Chan paid
for the decision, he would not have known of the outcome of the case
even before the decision was released on 27 September 2007.
The decision was promulgated on 13 September 2007. Decisions of
the Court are posted in its website a few days after their promulgation.
In this case, the decision was published in the web on 19 September
2007, or before the decision was posted in the Manila Central Post
Office on 27 September 2007. However, Mr. Chan stated that he
learned of the decision only sometime in October of 2007, after Atty.
Petralba had told him about it. On the other hand, Atty. Monteclar
admitted that he was the one who called up Atty. Petralba to inform him
about the outcome of the case after he received a copy of the decision.
Moreover, Atty. De La Sernas attribution of advance knowledge to Mr.
Chan, apart from being incongruent with the declarations of the other
personalities, does not dovetail with logic and common sense. For one,
Mr. Chan was earnest in asking for, and pushing through with, the
meeting on 25 September 2007 with De La Serna. Had he known
about the decision earlier, and more importantly, had he really
paid P10 Million for a favorable decision, he would not have reiterated
his offer or suggest any further meeting with De La Serna for the
purchase of the subject property. The exercise would be downright
irrational.
From a related perspective, it would be plainly foolhardy for Mr. Chan
to go through all the trouble and risk of bribing a Supreme Court
Justice in the amount of P10 Million when he could have directly
acquired the property by paying off De La Serna with the same amount
which the latter had demanded in the first place. This aspect was
clearly demonstrated during the hearing.
Atty. De La Sernas other basis for believing that the decision was
prompted by bribery was the time it took for this case to be decided,
which he intimated was uncommonly short. He bewails that the case
was pinpointed, then plucked out from underneath 20,000 other cases,
and thereafter resolved in less than two (2) years. He also compared
the case with Oppus v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150186; a case
which he previously handled, claiming that accused Oppus continues
to languish in jail because the Supreme Court had not resolved his
appeal even after the lapse of more than ten (10) years. De La Sernas
plaint is baseless and non sequitur.
Atty. De La Serna seems to be unaware that the Supreme Court is
mandated by the Constitution to decide cases within two (2) years from
the date of submission.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.17
As for the Oppus case, it appears from the records that De La Serna
used to be Oppuss lawyer, but he was replaced upon Oppuss motion.
Moreover, the case was already deemed closed and terminated as of
15 October 2007, when the Court granted Oppuss Motion to Withdraw
Petition/Appeal filed on 19 September 2007. Contrary to De La Sernas
claim, the case is no longer pending as it was already being disposed
of. Moreover, the Oppus case was assigned to another ponente, not
Justice Tinga. The period during which the Oppus case was pending
cannot serve as sound basis for comparison with this case.
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. Corollary to his
duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers is to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. His
duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to which he
owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice, as
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.
As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a lawyer is
expected to bring to the fore irregular and questionable practices of
those sitting in court which tend to corrode the judicial machinery.
Thus, if he acquired reliable information that anomalies are perpetrated
by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon him to report the matter to the
Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission or even a
delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the publics
trust in, the judicial system. The Court is perplexed by the actuations of
Atty. De La Serna. Claiming that he had been informed that a member
of the Court was involved in bribery, yet he chose to remain silent in
the meantime and to divulge the information long after he had come to
know that he lost the case.
That De La Serna did not report the matter immediately to the Court
suffuses unshakeable dubiety to his claim that Mr. Chan had uttered
the statements attributed to him. That De La Serna brought up the
issue of bribery after an unfavorable decision was issued makes the
allegation all the more a contrived afterthought, a hastily concocted
story brought to cast doubts on the integrity not only of Justice Tinga,
but also of the entire Supreme Court.
This is not to say, however, that as an officer of the court, Atty. De La
Serna cannot criticize the court. We have long recognized and
respected the right of a lawyer, or any person, for that matter, to be
critical of courts and magistrates as long as they are made in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
Everything considered on the basis of the proofs on record, reason and
normal discernment, Atty. De La Sernas statements bear the badges
of falsehood while the common version of the witnesses who disputed
his statements is imbued with the hallmarks of truth. There is more. De
La Sernas declarations were maliciously and irresponsibly made. They
exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. The libelous attack
on the integrity and credibility of Justice Tinga tend to degrade the
dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that should be
accorded to it.
Atty. De La Serna has transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and criticism. His irresponsible and baseless statements, his
unrepentant stance and smug insistence of his malicious and
unfounded accusation against Justice Tinga have sullied the dignity
and authority of this Court. Beyond question, therefore, De La Sernas
culpability for indirect contempt warrants the penalty of a fine not
exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months
or both under the Rules.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor De La Serna is found GUILTY of indirect
contempt of court. He is hereby FINED in the amount
of P30,000.00 to be paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution and WARNED that a repetition of a similar act will
warrant a more severe penalty.
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
Facts:
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment with the Commission on
Discipline of the IBP against Battung, alleging that the latter violated
Canons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, Battung was
shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone
down his voice but instead, Battung shouted at the top of his voice.
When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, Battung
shouted, "Then cite me!" Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt
and imposed a fine of P100.00. The Battung then left. While other
cases were being heard, Battung re-entered the courtroom and
shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid
of you!" Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the Battung out of
the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second
time. After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw Battung at the
hall of the courthouse, apparently waiting for him. Battung again
shouted in a threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance
against you! I am not afraid of you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not
afraid of you!" and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers
escorted him out of the building. Judge Baculi also learned that after
the he left the courtroom, he continued shouting and punched a table
at the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the Battung filed dilatory pleadings in Civil
Case No. 2640, an ejectment case. Judge Baculi rendered on October
4, 2007 its decision, which he modified on December 14, 2007 then it
became final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a
certificate of finality. Battung filed a motion to quash the previously
issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed
by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that
Battung knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the
jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Battung filed his Answer, essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi
who disrespected him. He claims that he was provoked by the
presiding judge that is why he shouted back at him. But after hearing
the tape Commissioner De la Rama is convinced that it was Atty.
Battung who shouted first at the complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for
their cases to be called who must have observed the incident. In fact,
in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they stood as
one in saying that it was really Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge
that is why the latter cautioned him "not to shout."
Commissioner De la Rama found that Battung failed to observe Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to
observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers.
Battung also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the courts. Battungs argument that Judge Baculi
provoked him to shout should not be given due consideration since
Battung should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so,
he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated.
What Battung should have done was to file an action before the Office
of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act
according to the norms of judicial conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.18
evidence submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that Battung had
misused the judicial processes to frustrate the ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the Battung be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that Battung be
reprimanded.
Issue: WON Atty. Battung violated Canon 11 for shouting at Judge
Baculi while his case was being heard in court.
WON Atty. Battung violated Canon 12 for filing the ejectment case
before the MTC when the CFI actually has the jurisdiction over the
case.
Ruling:
We agree with the IBPs finding that the Battung violated Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung
disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom
during court proceedings in the presence of litigants and their
counsels, and court personnel. The Battung even came back to harass
Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be
allowed. We note that the Battung continued to threaten Judge Baculi
and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position
even after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially
leaving the court, the Battung returned to the courtroom and disrupted
the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only against the
person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the
court as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted,
and brought to disrepute by the Battung.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position
and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule,
demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. The
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr. that it is the duty of a lawyer,
as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution; without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on
very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards
the latters role, stature and position in our justice system. When the
Battung publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he
would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the
Battung effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to decide
cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled
with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an
objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the
courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be
reprimanded, while the Investigating Commissioner recommended a
penalty of six (6) months suspension. The Court believes that these
recommended penalties are too light for the offense.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is
found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this
Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
FELICITAS BERBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. WENCESLAO
BARCELONA, respondent.
A.C. No. 6084. September 3, 2003
PONENTE: Per Curiam
FACTS: In a sworn Affidavit-Complaint dated March 11, 1999 filed
before the IBP, Berbano seeks the disbarment of Atty. Barcelona for
Malpractice and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming a Lawyer, Dereliction
of Duty and Unjust Enrichment. Berbano is one of the heirs of Rufino
Hilapo who in a settlement of land proceedings had appointed as
attorney-in-fact a certain Mr. Daen. However, this Mr. Daen was
arrested by a Muntinlupa police by virtue of a standing warrant of
arrest and was detained. Since Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a
lawyer for his release from incarceration, Berbano hired the services of
Atty. Barcelona (whose wife is a relative of Berbanos friend).
Sometime in January 1999, Atty. Barcelona arrived at the Muntinlupa
City Jail and conferred with Mr. Daen. After their conversation, Atty.
Barcelona told us Berbano to produce P50,000.00 for the release of
Mr. Daen from prison the next day. Since it was late in the evening,
said money can no longer be produced but Atty. Barcelona insisted.
Berbano found a way and was able to raise P15,700.00 which she
gave to Atty. Barcelona who accepted the same. He reiterated his
promise to secure the release of Mr. Daen the following day. Before he
left, he asked us to meet him at Max Restaurant at around 12:00 noon
at EDSA Crossing. He thereafter left because according to him, he
would go and see somebody, (a justice) from the Supreme Court who
could help the release of Mr. Daen. On the next day, he told Berbano
that he just came from the Supreme Court where he fixed the case of
Mr. Daen. To Berbabos surprise though, he did not have with him any
single document at the time. Then, Berbano handed him a pay-to-cash
check for P24,000.00. Although, he said that the Justices of the
Supreme Court do not accept check he nonetheless accepted it saying
that he will have the same rediscounted. The following morning, Atty.
Barcelona called Berbano to say that since he was unable to have the
check rediscounted, she has to produce the amount of P5,000.00 and
give the amount to him at around 12:00 noon. Berbano went to Atty.
Barcelonas house where she was met by his daughter who called her
mother to whom she gave not only P5,000.00, but P10,000.00. In the
afternoon of that same day, they went to see Atty. Barcelona at
Putatan, Muntinlupa. She informed him that she left the P10,000.00
with his wife at their house. Since Atty. Barcelona informed her that he
could not secure the release of Mr. Daen because the check had not
been encashed, Mr. Gil Daen, a nephew of Porfirio Daen, gave him
another 15,000.00 in cash. Berbano also gave him an additional
P1,000.00 for his gasoline expenses.
The next time Berbano saw Atty. Barcelona was a week after Mr. Daen
was jailed. He said that he just came from the city jail where he had a
conversation with Mr. Daen. He told us that he is going to release Mr.
Daen from prison the next day, February 4, 1999. However, in the
morning of February 4, Berbano learned from the wife of Atty.
Barcelona that her husband had left for Mindanao early that morning
on board a private plane owned by Chiongbian allegedly to attend a
peace talk with the Muslims.
After more than a week, Berbano went to Putatan, Muntinlupa,
because she was informed by the son of Mr. Daen that he saw Atty.
Barcelona there. Berbano confronted him about his undertaking to
release Mr. Daen from prison, but he only advised her not to worry and
promised again that he will return the entire amount of P64,000.00
more or less, on Thursday, February 18, 1999. But Berbano never saw
him again since then and have repeatedly called him but to no avail.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint.
INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: The Investigating Commissioner
J. Virgilio A. Bautista of the IBP-CBD issued an Order which required
Atty. Barcelona to submit his answer to the complaint, with a warning
that he will be considered in default and the case will be heard ex
parte, if he fails to do so. Despite due notice, Atty. Barcelona failed to
file his answer. Thus, complainant filed a motion to declare respondent
in default, a resolution of which was held in abeyance by the
Commissioner Bautista who required the parties to appear for hearing
before the Commission on August 13, 1999. On said date, Atty.
Barcelona again failed to appear despite due receipt of notice.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.19
Commissioner Bautista was thus constrained to consider respondent in
default and complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.
Commissioner Bautista submitted his Final Report and
Recommendation on December 23, 2002 finding respondent guilty of
malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommending that respondent be disbarred and
ordered to return to complainant the amount of P64,000.00.
IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS: Adopted Commissioner Bautistas
findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law
for six years.
SC RULING/RATIO: The Court disagrees with the IBP Board of
Governors in reducing the penalty and upholds the findings and
recommendation of Commissioner Bautista. Under the facts
established by complainant, respondent should not only be suspended,
but disbarred from practice.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice
by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of
the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose
disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
Quoting several decided cases, the SC said:
In In re Almacen, the Court expounded on the
nature of disbarment proceedings, viz.:
. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis . Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by
the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. . . .
As in the Ricafort case, herein respondent chose to
forget that by swearing the lawyers oath, he
became a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and
an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice a vital function of
democracy a failure of which is disastrous to
society. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against
the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the
serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence
is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.
The act of Atty. Barcelona in not filing his answer and ignoring the
hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice,
emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Thus, the Court finds
no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating Commissioners
judgment. Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of several
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times upholds the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal
processes and the courts but also mandates the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted
to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Instead of promoting
respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously
demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the
pretext of having connections with a Member of this Court.
(Baka ask ni Maam how nag come up yung court sa penalty) The
Court has taken into consideration the penalties imposed in other
administrative cases involving similar offenses, e. g.:
In Judge Angeles vs. Atty. Uy, Jr., the respondent
was suspended from the practice of law for one
month for failing to promptly report and remit the
amount of P16,500.00 he received on behalf of his
client.
In Gonato vs. Atty. Adaza, the respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for six months
for charging his clients the amount of P15,980.00 as
filing fees when in fact no such fees were due.
In Dumadag vs. Lumaya, the Court ordered the
indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to
his client the amount of P4,344.00 that he had
received pursuant to an execution.
In Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., vs. Atty.
Naldoza, the respondent was disbarred for obtaining
from his client the amount of US$2,555.00 allegedly
as cash bond in an appealed case before this Court,
when in fact no such amount has been paid or that
the Court required such payment.
In the present case, Atty. Barcelona collected money from the Berbano
and the nephew of the detained person in the total amount of
P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the detainee through his
alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme Court. He deserves
to be disbarred from the practice of law.
This is not the first time that respondent has been charged with and
found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In Gil T. Aquino vs. Atty.
Wenceslao C. Barcelona, he misrepresented to the complainant that
he could secure the restructuring of the complainants loan with the
PNB through his connection with a certain Gonzalo Mericullo, legal
assistant in the PNB. Based on such misrepresentation, respondent
asked and received the amount of P60,000.00 from the complainant
allegedly to be paid to the PNB. It turned out that there was no such
employee in the PNB by the name Gonzalo Mericullo and the
complainants property was eventually foreclosed. As in the present
case, respondent did not appear before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline despite receipt of the notices sent and duly received by him.
After due proceedings, the IBP Board of Governors found respondent
guilty of professional misconduct, and recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for six months and ordered to
render the accounting and restitute whatever remained of the
P60,000.00 to the complainant. The Court adopted such finding and
recommendation and respondent was ordered suspended from the
practice of law for six months, effective immediately.
Atty. Barcelona has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to
clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they
seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to
such connections. In this case, he misrepresented to Berbano that he
could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with a
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.20
Supreme Court Justice. Not only that, respondent even had the
audacity to tell Berbano that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not
accept checks.
In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public
contempt. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, the Court
expounded on a lawyers duty to the courts, viz.:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, and
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. [People ex rel.
Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity
and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602].
Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine
the judicial edifice is a disastrous to the continuity of the government
and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. [Malcolm Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said a lawyer that
[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of
corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to
further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such
irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.
Atty. Barcelona made a mockery of the Judiciary and further eroded
public confidence in courts and lawyers when he ignored the
proceedings in the Aquino case and in the present case. More so,
when he misrepresented to Berbano that he has connections with a
Member of the Court to accommodate his client and that Justices of
the Court accept money. Indubitably, he does not deserve to remain a
member of the Bar any minute longer.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence
to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its
members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why
respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct,
respondent Wenceslao C. Barcelona is DISBARRED from the practice
of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He
is further directed to return to complainant Felicitas Berbano the
amount of Sixty Four Thousand Pesos (P64,000.00) within thirty (30)
days from notice of this Decision.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
PENALTY IMPOSED: DISBARMENT
SEBASTIAN v. ATTY. BAJAR
FACTS:
Atty Bajar is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance (BALA) of the DAR who represents Tanlioco in numerous
cases which raises same issues.
Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee of a land owned by
Sebastians spouse and sister-in-law in which the land owners filed an
ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of
the land use from agri to residential. RTC rendered an order of
ejectment and was affirmed by the CA.
Atty. Bajar as Tanliocos counsel, filed another case for
Specific Performance to produce the conversion order which RTC
dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and lack of cause of
action. Atty. Bajar filed another case fo Maintenance of Possession
with the DAR Adjudication Board which raises the same issue.
Sebastian raises that Atty. Bajar violated Rule 10.03 of CPR since she
misused the rules of procedure through forum-shopping.
Atty. Bajar submitted her Comment saying that Sebastian is
not the real party in interest and not authorized to prosecute the
disbarment and that she only availed all legal remedies to obtain
benefits secured for Tanlioco by law. Sebastian filed his reply saying
that he did not confront the issue for disbarment. The Court required
Atty. Bajar to file Rejoinder within 10 days from receipt, instead she
filed a manifestation after 3 months.
The court issued a Resolution ordering the arrest and
detention for 5 days of Atty. Bajar. NBI arrested her and was detained
for 5 days. The Court referred the case to IBP. CommissioPR that
rendered her unfit to continue the practice of law:
1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which
amounted to an obstruction of justice.
2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts.
The duplication or multiplication of suits should be
avoided, and respondents acts were tantamount to forum-
shopping which is a reprehensible manipulation of court
processes and proceedings.
3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted
at everybody during the hearing on 25 May 1995. The want
of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful language
used.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
Investigating Commissioner Joses recommendation that respondent
be "suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for Unethical
Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible
character to violate the basic tenets and requirements of the Code of
Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to continue in the
practice of law." Governor Angel R. Gonzales recommended her
"outright disbarment. The court directed Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to circularize the resolution of IBP.
Atty. Bajar filed a Motion to Consider the Case Closed and
Terminated. Court referred the case to IBP. In the hearing, respondent
admitted that she continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in
Mandaluyong City despite her suspension because she believed that a
notation by the Court in the 20 January 1997 Resolution did not mean
an implementation of the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite suspension
and she reiterated that complainant is not the real party-in-interest
since the property that was litigated was owned by complainants wife.
IBP:
The IBP adopted Investigating Commissioner Ravals Report
and Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for her "manifest
flagrant misconduct in disobeying the SC Order of her Indefinite
Suspension.
SC: Suspended Atty. Bajar for the practice of law for 3 years with stern
warning.
Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis and they belong to a class of their own. They are neither civil
nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of its officer. They involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance.
A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect
the administration of justice from the misconduct of its officers. This
Court requires that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and
reliable men in whom the public may repose confidence. "Lawyers
must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may
disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the
Court."
Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension proceedings.
Atty. Bajar failed to file Rejoinder within 10 days, she filed Rejoinder
after about 8 months after being detained by the NBI. She was
required to comment on complainants manifestation on Feb. 3, 1993,
but she instead submitted 4 months thereafter.
These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A
Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.21
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts
orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also
underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only
too deserving of reproof."
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes
and respondents deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.
Respondents failure to comply with the Courts directive to
file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes gross
misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable,
shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person
concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause." It is a
"conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or
intentional purpose."
Atty. Bajars contention that Sebastian is not a real party in
interest fails. The person who called the attention of the court to a
lawyers misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome. A compromise or withdrawal of charges does
not terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
Furthermore, Atty. Bajar avers that she merely availed of all
the legal remedies for her client, her act of filing cases with identical
issues in other venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of
the law. Atty. Bajar abused her right of recourse to the courts. She filed
cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession
despite the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves
the same issues.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the
bounds of the law. It is evident from the records that respondent filed
other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the
Ejectment case. Clearly, respondent violated the proscription in Canon
19.
In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity to
disregard court orders. Respondents acts of wantonly disobeying her
duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court
and the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if
it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
JOHN CHRISTEN S. HEGNA, Complainant, - versus
ATTY. GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, Respondent.
Complaint and Ground/s
Before this Court is a letter-complaint filed by complainant John
Christen S. Hegna with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) against
respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga for deliberately falsifying
documents, which caused delay in the execution of the decision
rendered by the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), Branch 8,
Cebu City, in Civil Case No. R-45146, entitled John Hegna v. Mr. &
Mrs. Eliseo Panaguinip.
Facts
Herein complainant was the lessee of a portion of Lot No. 5529,
situated at Barangay Quiot Pardo, Cebu City, which was owned by the
heirs of Sabina Baclayon. The heirs of Baclayon, through their
representative Gema Sabandija, entered into a contract of lease with
complainant for a period of ten (10) years, commencing from June 26,
1994, with a rental of P3,000.00 per year, or P250.00 per month.
On September 26, 2001, complainant filed a complaint for forcible
entry against therein defendants docketed as Civil Case No. R-45146,
entitled John Hegna v. Mr. & Mrs. Eliseo Panaguinip, with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 8 of Cebu City. In said complaint,
he alleged that in about the second week of March 1996, therein
defendants entered the vacant portion of the leased premises by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; destroyed the
barbed wire enclosing the leased premises of complainant, then built a
shop on the said premises without complainants consent. He averred
that despite his demands upon therein defendants to vacate the
premises and demolish the structure built thereon, the latter failed and
refused to comply.
When therein defendants failed to file their Answer, complainant filed a
motion that judgment be rendered in default.
On December 21, 2001, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of
complainant, ordering therein defendants to vacate the leased
premises and to pay complainant compensatory damages for illegal
occupation and use of the subject property, as well as attorneys fees
and costs of suit.
On February 8, 2002, the MTCC granted the Motion for Execution of
Judgment filed by complainant, and issued a Writ of Execution on
February 18, 2002.
On February 21, 2002, Sheriff Edilberto Suarin of the MTCC, Branch 8
of Cebu City levied on certain personal properties of therein
defendants.
On March 1, 2002, therein defendants requested the complainant to
move for the dismissal of the complaint against them so as to prevent
the issuance of the writ of execution thereon. While therein defendants
wanted to amicably settle the case, however, they failed to mention the
proposed settlement amount stated in the decision dated December
21, 2001.
Subsequently, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga filed an
Affidavit of Third-Party Claim dated March 5, 2002 before Sheriff
Suarin, the sheriff executing the judgment in the said civil case. In the
said affidavit, respondent claimed that he was the owner of Lot No.
3653-D-1 and a FUSO (Canter series) vehicle, which he bought from
therein defendants on November 27, 2001, and December 12, 2001,
respectively, both of which could be erroneously levied by a writ of
execution issued in the civil case.
On April 3, 2002, Sheriff Suarin tried to levy therein defendants parcel
of land and motor vehicle, but failed to do so because of the third-
party claim filed by respondent. Subsequently, on April 24, 2002,
respondent filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment with prayer
for the issuance of an injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO)
with damages against complainant before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 13 of Cebu City, docketed as Case No. CEB-27614,
entitled Mr. Eliseo Panaguinip, Mrs. Ma. Teresa Panaguinip and
Goering G.C. Paderanga v. John Hegna, Mila Hegna, Judge Edgemelo
C. Rosales and Edilberto R. Suarin.
In an Order dated May 13, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the MTCC to desist from further proceeding with
the civil case, and the Sheriff to desist from conducting a public auction
of the levied properties of therein defendants. The RTC subsequently
dismissed respondents complaint for annulment of judgment in its
Decision dated June 29, 2006.
Complainant filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against respondent; false testimony and perjury against
therein defendants; and falsification under paragraph 6, Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code against Atty. Elena Marie Madarang, notary
public, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City dismissed the criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents against respondent for
lack of prima facie evidence of guilt, as the allegations therein were
similar to the instant administrative complaint.
Respondents Comment
Respondent argued that he did not falsify any document and
maintained that he had already satisfactorily explained the irregularities
before the Office of the City Prosecutor. He added that the
genuineness and due execution of the deeds of sale had not been
affected by the fact that he failed to register the same. Also, he alleged
that the MTCC Decision dated December 21, 2001 was unjust and
void due to lack of jurisdiction, and for being based on spurious claims.
IBP (Investigating Officer)
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.22
III. FINDINGS:
According to the Respondent, it was perfectly normal for him to obtain
properties without registering the same under his own name. In his
Position Paper, he even cited several other transactions where he
merely possessed Deeds of Sale but not Certification of Registration or
Transfer Certificates of Title. He alleged that for ESTATE PLANNING
purposes, he intentionally left these properties in the name of the
previous owner. The alleged discrepancies in the notarization were
fully explained as well. The notary public explained that the erasures in
her Notarial Register were made to correct mistakes so that entries will
speak the truth. These corrections include the entries under entry
number 177 to indicate the correct entry which was the Deed of Sale
executed [by] the spouses Panaguinip. The original entry, Affidavit of
Two Disinterested Persons, was actually notarized but was later
cancelled at the request of the same affiants. The full explanation of
these affiants, very doubtful and highly suspect, was nevertheless
taken into consideration by the Prosecutor for reasons known only to
him. The Respondents also managed to convince the Cebu Prosecutor
that the discrepancy in the Residence Certificates was due to human
error.
Not necessarily disagreeing with the findings of the City Prosecutor of
Cebu City, the Resolution dismissing the case for falsification is not
entirely convincing. There were certainly evidentiary matters which
could have been better addressed by a judge, namely, the affidavit of
the secretary of the notary public, the explanation in the incorrect
entries in notarial register, the affidavit of the two (2) witnesses who
sought the cancellation of their original affidavit, and the explanation of
Paderanga himself regarding the difference in the dates.
Complainant is a layman who filed his own Position Paper unaided by
counsel while Respondent is a lawyer. Nevertheless, Complainant
managed to present one (1) piece of evidence not squarely addressed
by Respondent Paderanga: the letter handwritten by Respondents
clients, written in Cebuano, asking the Complainant for mercy and
forgiveness in relation to the forcible entry case. Such letter was no
longer necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE transfer of
ownership of properties owned by the Panaguinip spouses to their
lawyer, Respondent Paderanga. This letter, attached to the Complaint,
was never refuted in any way by Respondent Paderanga who may
have skirted the issue by inadvertence or by design. The letter dated
March 1, 2002 indicates that the Panaguinip spouses still believe and
assert ownership over these properties despite the existence of a
Deed of Sale allegedly dated March 5, 2002. Complainant also went
further by attaching an Affidavit by a Third Person who stated that the
Panaguinip spouses still assert ownership over the parcel of land and
vehicle.
Moreover, Complainant alleged that Respondent invited him
consecutive times after the issuance of the writ of execution in the
lower court; the first was at the Majestic Restaurant, the second was at
Club Cebu at Waterfront Hotel. There was an offer to settle the
judgment award of P100,000. During the first meeting, the offer was
P3,000, on the second meeting, this time with the Panaguinip spouses,
the offer was P10,000. When Complainant refused to settle with
Respondent, he received a copy of the Affidavit of Third-Party Claim a
few days later.
Article 1491 of the Civil Code. It specifically states that:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigations or levied
upon execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act
of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to
the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
xxx
This is a classic case where a lawyer acquired the interests of his
client in certain properties subject for execution. Regardless of the
courts apparent lack of jurisdiction, Respondent Paderanga acquired
the two (2) matters subject for execution in the forcible entry case in
violation of [the] Canon of Legal Ethics. A thing is said to be in litigation
not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also the
moment that becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. x x x
In all likelihood, although Complainant failed to get a favorable
resolution from the City Prosecutors office in Cebu City, the Affidavit of
Third Party Claim was simulated to defeat the rights of Complainant
herein. It is immaterial that the decision of the lower court granting a
judgment award was subsequently reversed or nullified. It is immaterial
that the City Prosecutor did not find a prima facie case of falsification.
The fact remains that there was a MULTITUDE of irregularities
surrounding the execution of the Affidavit and, coupled with the letter
sent by the Panaguinip spouses left unrebutted by Respondent
Paderanga, there is substantial evidence that the Affidavit of Third
Party Claim was purposely filed to thwart the enforcement of the
decision in the forcible entry case.
It is worthy to note that the proceedings before the prosecutors office
did not take into consideration the handwritten letter from the
Panaguinip spouses. For whatever reason, Complainant did not
present such letter, which if he did, the prosecutor may come up with a
different resolution.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
While Complainant cannot fully prove the existence of falsity in the
execution of the Affidavit of Third Party Claim, this Commissioner is
convinced that there was indeed an anomaly which constitutes a
violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the property of
his client which is in litigation. x x x Respondent necessitates a heavy
penalty since the circumstances surrounding the transfer of ownership
of properties tend to indicate an anomalous transfer aimed to subvert
the proper administration of justice. The numerous discrepancies in the
transfer document, some dismissed as clerical errors and other
explained by incredulous stories by way of affidavits, compounded by
the letter left uncontested by Respondent Paderanga, inevitably lead a
rational person to conclude that Paderanga may not have acquired the
properties prior to the judicial action of execution. Even if the City
Prosecutor found no prima facie case of falsification, this
Commissioner finds substantial evidence to support a conclusion that
Respondent Paderanga committed an ethical violation and should be
meted the penalty of suspension of five (5) years from the practice of
law.
IBP Board of Governors
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
viz:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that a lawyer
ought to know that he cannot acquire the property of his client which is
in litigation, Atty. Goering Paderanga is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
Issue
Whether Atty. Paderanga engaged in unlawful and deceitful conduct
that will result in disciplinary action by the Court
Court
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of
the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers oath; (6) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority. In the present case, the Court
finds respondent administratively liable for engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct.
Although respondent denied having acted as counsel for therein
defendants, the Spouses Panaguinip, in the forcible entry case filed by
complainant, his involvement in the said case was still highly suspect.
After the writ of execution had been issued on February 18, 2002, he
went with defendants-spouses to amicably settle with complainant on
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.23
two separate occasions, ostensibly to protect his own interests.
Complainant claimed that during those two meetings, respondent did
not disclose his ownership over the properties in question, leading the
former to believe that respondent was, in fact, the counsel for
defendants-spouses. He averred that respondent and defendant
spouses initially offered a settlement of P3,000.00, which he refused
as he had already spent P10,000.00 on court expenses. On their
second meeting, the offer had been raised to P25,000.00, which again
complainant declined, as the latter had, at that time, spent P25,000.00.
Complainant maintained that it was only after said meetings had
transpired that he received the affidavit of a third-party claim executed
by respondent, stating that the latter was the owner of the property and
motor vehicle. On the other hand, respondent claimed that the
meetings took place in April 2002, after he had filed a third-party claim.
Had respondent been the rightful owner of a parcel of land and motor
vehicle that were still registered in the name of defendants-spouses,
he should have immediately disclosed such fact immediately and filed
a third- party claim, as time was of the essence. Moreover, in their
letter dated March 1, 2002, defendants-spouses did not mention any
transfer of ownership of the said properties to respondent, as the
former still believed that they owned the same. The continued
possession and ownership by defendants-spouses was also attested
to by a certain Brigida Lines, who executed an Affidavit in favor of
complainant.
Based on the foregoing, the Court is more inclined to believe that when
complainant and defendants-spouses failed to reach an agreement,
respondent came forward as a third-party claimant to prevent the levy
and execution of said properties. He, therefore, violated Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Under this rule, conduct has been construed not to pertain exclusively
to the performance of a lawyers professional duties. In previous cases,
the Court has held that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor; or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Notably, in the falsification case earlier filed, complainant was able to
cite several irregularities in the documents evidencing the deeds of
sale in question: the non-registration by respondent of the sale
transactions; a Community Tax Certificate number appearing on said
deeds which was different from that issued to defendant Ma. Teresa
Panaguinip; and the erasures of the entries pertaining to said deeds
from the Notarial Register.
Of these irregularities, only one can directly be attributable to
respondent his non-registration of the sale transaction. He argues that
the sales were valid despite non-registration, and maintained that it
was perfectly normal and regular for a lawyer like him to choose not to
register and cause the transfer of title of the land and the FUSO
jeepney after the execution of the Deeds of Sale, so the transactions
would not appear in the records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the
City Assessor or the Register of Deeds, on the Land Registration
Office. He added that he had also bought four lots, which had not yet
been transferred to his name, for estate planning or speculation
purposes. He claimed that he found it legally wise not to immediately
register after buying so that he would not pay for the expenses of the
sale and transfer twice, once he decided to sell; or place them in his
childrens name, and avoid paying estate and inheritance taxes upon
his death.
Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he
should support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do no falsehood
or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has also failed
to live up to the standard set by law that he should refrain from
counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. Respondents act of non-
registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal
per se; but, as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an
exemplar for others to emulate. The responsibilities of a lawyer are
greater than those of a private citizen. He is looked up to in the
community. Respondent must have forgotten that a lawyer must refrain
from committing acts which give even a semblance of impropriety to
the profession.
In cases wherein lawyers have similarly engaged in deceitful and
dishonest conduct, the Court has imposed the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law ranging from six (6) months to one (1) year.
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board
of Governors recommended a penalty of suspension to be imposed
upon respondent for five (5) years and one (1) year, respectively. The
Court, however, believes that a penalty of one (1) year is more
commensurate to respondents deceitful and dishonest conduct.
Dispositive Portion
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga is found
guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
would result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
ATTY. GODOFREDO C. MANIPUD, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
Atty. Godofredo C. Manipud filed a complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista for alleged commission of forum
shopping in violation of his attorneys oath and in violation of Canon
1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for
improper conduct.
Complainant narrated that he was a mortgagee of the property
allegedly owned by Jovita de Macasieb. When the mortgagor failed to
pay despite demands, he filed an application for extra-judicial
foreclosure of the said property with the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City. Thereafter, a Notice
of Extrajudicial Sale was issued and the public auction was scheduled
on April 1, 2005.
However, on March 22, 2005, Atty. Bautista, as counsel for the
mortgagor, filed with the Regional Trial Court a verified complaint for
"Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Notice of Extrajudicial Sale
with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order with Damages".
Thus, upon application of complainant-mortgagee, the sheriff caused
another Notice of Extrajudicial Sale. The public auction was scheduled
on July 29, 2005. However, on July 20, 2005, Atty. Bautista filed
another case for annulment of real estate mortgage .
According to complainant, the two complaints for annulment of real
estate mortgage filed by respondent contained the same allegations,
involved the same parties, the same subject matter, the same facts,
the same issues and sought the same relief. Complainant argued that
the act of respondent of filing the two complaints constitutes a clear
case of forum shopping, an improper conduct which tends to degrade
the administration of justice, and a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which commands all lawyers to
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession.
In his Comment, Atty. Bautista alleged that the filing of the second
complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial sale was a desperate
attempt on his part to restrain the sale of his clients property; that he is
not guilty of forum shopping because he did not act willfully, maliciously
and with ill-intent; that he disclosed in the Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping of the second complaint the pendency of the first complaint,
as well as in paragraphs 18, 20 and 22 of the said second complaint;
that he filed the second complaint out of pity for his client who was
about to lose her family home due to the unconscionably high monthly
interest being charged by complainant; and that his prompt filing of a
motion to withdraw the second complaint was indicative of his good
faith.
On January 29, 2007, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Position Paper, complainant alleged that herein respondent,
Atty. Bautista, is a nephew of Jovita de Macasieb. Although the
loans which were obtained in 2003 appeared to have been received by
Jovita de Macasieb, complainant learned, particularly on October 3,
2006, that Macasieb has been dead since October 16, 1968.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.24
Complainant alleged that respondent collaborated with an impostor in
filing the two complaints for annulment of extra-judicial sale. Although
the plaintiff in said complaints was referred to as JOVITA DE
MACASIEB, the complaints however were signed by one JOVITA
MACASIEB. Complainant argued that respondent intentionally resorted
to this ploy in order to mislead the former. Since respondent was the
one who notarized both complaints hence, he should know that
JOVITA DE MACASIEB who was his aunt, and JOVITA MACASIEB
who signed both complaints, are two different persons. Complainant
averred that respondents act of resurrecting a dead person not
once but twice for the purpose of unjustly enriching themselves
demonstrates a character not befitting a member of the legal
profession.
In his Reply to complainants Position Paper, respondent alleged that
the only issue for resolution before the IBP is whether he violated the
rule on forum shopping; that assuming the IBP could validly take
cognizance of other issues, still it was complainants fault that he
transacted with an impostor; and that he did not know the person of
Jovita Macasieb until the latter hired his services as lawyer.
In the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, she found that respondent is not
administratively liable for lack of showing that the filing of the
second complaint was done deliberately and willfully to commit
forum shopping. Thus:
To merit disciplinary action, forum shopping must be willful and
deliberate. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that,
should there be any pending action or claim before any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency, a complete statement of its status should be
given.
The respondent should not be blamed for the institution of the second
complaint. He was misled by the very act of the complainant.
Complainant had filed the application for foreclosure on December 20,
2004. All that he had to do was request the sheriff with whom he had
filed the application to proceed with the foreclosure. There is absolutely
no need for complainant to make a second application. In making the
second application, it was impressed upon the mind of the respondent
that it was another foreclosure.
In sum, respondent acted in good faith in filing the second
complaint since it was established that it was his immediate
reaction upon finding out that a second application for
extrajudicial foreclosure was filed. If, indeed, there was intent to
commit forum-shopping, he would not have alleged in the second
complaint the fact of filing of the first complaint and attached a copy of
the same.
The objective of the rule against forum-shopping was cited in
Municipality of Taguig, et al vs. Court of Appeals. Said the
Supreme Court
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum
shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and
parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.
In this case, no undue vexation was caused to the Court and petitioner
as the fact of filing of the first case was alleged in the second complaint
and secondly, soon thereafter, inasmuch as both cases were raffled to
the same branch, the first case was dismissed by the said Court.
Hence, there was no danger of different courts ruling on the same
issues.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that
the Complaint against respondent ATTY. FELICIANO C. BAUTISTA
be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
findings and recommendation of the Investigating .
Complainant filed before this Court a Comment on the Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors with Motion for Reinvestigation. He
claimed that forum shopping was not the sole issue raised for
resolution but also respondents alleged violation of the Oath of
Attorney in relation to the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for improper conduct. He argued that the IBP
should have also discussed and resolved respondents act of allegedly
resurrecting Jovita de Macasieb from the dead and for allowing
an impostor to impersonate the dead.
Even assuming to be true complainants allegation that he only learned
on October 3, 2006, that the mortgagor, Jovita de Macasieb, has been
dead since 1968, still he failed to raise this issue at the Mandatory
Conference before the IBP where the issues were defined. The
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the mandatory
conference on September 13, 2007, long after complainant allegedly
knew of the death of Jovita de Macasieb, shows that respondents act
of allegedly resurrecting Jovita de Macasieb from the dead and for
allowing an impostor to impersonate the dead was never raised as an
issue.
Thus, since respondents act of allegedly resurrecting Jovita de
Macasieb from the dead and for allowing an impostor to impersonate
the dead was never raised as an issue before this Court or the IBP,
then complainant could not raise the same in this late stage of the
proceedings.
ACCORDINGLY, Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
DISMISSING the complaint for alleged commission of forum
shopping in violation of his attorneys oath and in violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for improper
conduct filed by Atty. Godofredo C. Manipud against Atty. Feliciano M.
Baustista, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES,
respondents.
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY,
ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-OLALIA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL
AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL.
VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC.,
respondents.
Facts:
During the period July 8-10. 1987, Union of Filipro
Employees (Filipro), and Kimberly Independent Labor Union (Kimberly)
intensified the pickets (group of people standing or marching near a
place to protest something) they had been conducting since June 17,
1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court (SC)
building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the
SC building, at times obstructing access to and egress from SCs
premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen
and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard
of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and
placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long
with the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been
received by Justices Pedro Yap and Marcelo Fernan as Chairmen of
the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose Espinas
(Espinas), counsel of Filipro , had been called in order that the pickets
might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for
the same constitutes direct contempt of court. The pickets were also
told that SC would not entertain their petitions for as long as the
pickets were continued. Thus, SC En Banc issued a resolution giving
the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously. It required
Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante
Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno (union leaders of Filipro) in
the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Espinas; and Messrs.
Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales (union
leaders of Kimberly) in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court.
to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.25
Espinas was further required to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with.
Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders
concerned, apologized to the SC for the above-described acts,
together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He also
manifested to the SC that the cited persons understand why their
actions were wrong and are willing to suffer the required penalty. He
further prayed for SCs leniency as the picket was actually
spearheaded by "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan"
(PAMANTIK), and not by Filipro or Kimberly. To confirm for the record
that the persons cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the
citation and that they will abide by their promise that said incident will
not be repeated, SC required Filipro and Kimberly to submit a written
manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with.
Issue:
Whether or not Espinas, as their counsel, is liable for the acts of
Filipro, that resulted to the latter being cited for contempt.
Ruling:
No. SC accepted apologies offered by Filipro and Kimberly
and waived the imposition of the sanction warranted by their
contemptuous acts. However, the SC will not hesitate in future similar
situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt
those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the
other in any case pending before it.
Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper
channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other
pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial
administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration
of justice."
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the
citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and
inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the
standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. "It is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and
juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from
every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies."
The individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not
knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws.
They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of
assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or
influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts
to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional
protection,. They also did not realize that any such efforts to influence
the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and
responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and
heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record, Espinas,
when his attention was called by SC, did his best to demonstrate to the
pickets the untenability of their acts. Let this incident therefore serve
as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their
duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on
matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice,
and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational
program for their members.
The contempt charges against Filipro and Kimberly are
dismissed. No demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or
influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending
cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any
and all courts.
FOODSPHERE v. MAURICIO
FACTS:
Foodsphere Inc. (complainant) is a corporation engaged in
the business of meat processing manufacture and distribution of
canned goods and grocery products under the brand name "CDO,"
filed a complaint against Atty. Melanio Mauricio Jr. (respondent)
popularly known as "Batas Mauricio", writer/columnist of tabloids and a
host of a television and radio program for (1) grossly immoral conduct;
(2) violation of lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to
investigating prosecutors.
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero bought from a
grocery canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread, and as he
and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they
found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms
inside the can. His wife filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and
Drug Administration (BFAD) and a laboratory examination confirmed
the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
The BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing during which the
spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from Foodsphere.
The latter refused to heed the demand, for being in contravention of
company policy and, in any event, "outrageous." Complainant instead
offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by
the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer
was turned down and the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to
the attention of the media.
Mauricio (respondent) sent Foodsphere via fax a copy of the
front page of the tabloid containing articles maligning, discrediting and
imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent
threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the
P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant reiterated its counter-
offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000,
P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his Batas
Foundation directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the
tabloids and television program. The Corderos eventually forged a
KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the
BFAD, however, it was dismissed, and respondent affixed his signature
as a witness then later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid
that he prepared the document.
Respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract
asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid for its next 24 weekly
issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a
Program Profile of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS
also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the
following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot
buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26
spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000. As a sign of goodwill,
complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid
amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots
of 30-second TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total
of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer, respondent relayed to it that
he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and
threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.
In his radio program, respondent announced the holding of a
supposed contest sponsored by said program, which transcribed as
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-
contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-
contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-
7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna
ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya
ang gumagawa niyan? respondent further wrote an article captioned
KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD and other articles and episodes
aired which put Foodsphere in bad light.
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against
respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish
Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the
Office of the City Prosecutor. The complaints were pending at the time
of the filing of the present administrative complaint. Further,
complainant also filed civil case against respondent. The pending
cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order
notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against
complainant and to malign complainant through his television shows.
IBP granted the issuance of TRO and that all the defendants,
their agents, representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are
hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or
broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case
more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and
its products.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.26
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Atty. Mauricio violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and thus should be sanctioned.
HELD: The court suspended Atty. Mauricio from the practice of law
for a period of 3 years.
Said respondent violated Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional
Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make public statements
in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party. The language employed by respondent
undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City
Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office.
Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said
Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to
submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations.
The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his
pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 and the fundamental
Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Respondent
defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a
member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities.
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, and by failing to
live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the
legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times
uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.
ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
FACTS:
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings
in Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard
before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge
Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order
dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the
Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented
by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and
not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense
filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio
Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized
prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the
original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not
subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself
from further trying the case because of the "harsh insinuation" of
Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold
neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing
of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City,
presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November
12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount
of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an
Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent
appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10,
2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent
caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to
the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge
for allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for
allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel
Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City
for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands
charged with murdering a policeman . . . .
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense.
But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder
suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is
weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously
handled it, Judge Floripinas Buyser, described the evidence to be
strong. Buyser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of
Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari
against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge
Tan.
"This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges
there who are displaying judicial arrogance." he said.
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch
29, directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of
the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20,
2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of
court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its
presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco
admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of
the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference, stated
that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court
why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source
was respondent. Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging
that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear
reason, the phrase "for an unclear reason," was added by the
newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press
conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in
the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his
refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court
pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and ordered to suffer
the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is ordered to arrest Prosecutor
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself
to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked
the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court's disposition in the
proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch
29, required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days
from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his
media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and
why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of
Canon 118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by
Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September
30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on
October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October
1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In
those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge
who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord
due process to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4,
2003. Respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the court of
his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003
cancelling the hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances
he asks for," and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain
in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court
pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003.
However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of
January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer
dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought
to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He justified his response
during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of
freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and
was without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor
Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and
[is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.27
to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which
he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for
ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the
maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future
acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.
The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his
interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of
the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING: Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or
have you not changed your mind yet?
BAGABUYO: If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all
judges who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred. That's it.
That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are
ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new
jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment
case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that
he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should
not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take
a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .
Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states
that this Order was "given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did
not state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . .
Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right
to appeal." Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo."
He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will
see his gross ignorance of the law. . .
TONY CONSING: So what is your plan now?
BAGABUYO: As I have said, I will only stop if he is already
disbarred. . .
He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know
that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . And
what I said was based on the law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not
conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder...
I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come
in order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted
me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the
BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan?
Please read the law. What is your thinking? That when you are a
judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you
did not accord me due process of law. . .
TONY CONSING: So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that
this be given action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.
BAGABUYO: I am not worried because I have a truckload of
jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed
from the Bench. But what law has he been reading? I heard that he is
a mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is studying
mahjong.
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and
an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority
of the court, and should not promote distrust in the administration of
justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from
the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for
any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 27 of the same Rule. Respondent
was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus,
it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant
found that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the
court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's
Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station
DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave
violation of oath of office by respondent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of
the trial court's order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a
stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr. that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a
patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an
attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office;
grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not
preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover
practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his
professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions
precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to
"observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05
of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a
judge to the proper authorities only."
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly
caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements
against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in
Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that
Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled,
Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect
to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article,
which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court,
also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent
violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress
of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon
11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that
Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he
was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a
liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to
"conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his]
clients."
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should
have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity
and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the
oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring
judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure
for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always
be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo
is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02,
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of
violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent
This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment against
Atty. Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza) for the latter's demand for and
receipt of exorbitant sums of money from her client purportedly to
expedite the proceedings of their case which was pending before the
Court.
FACTS:
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.28
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005,
he, along with his siblings engaged the services of Romero De Taza
Cruz and Associates to represent them in the case of Eliza T.
Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R.
No. 174552.2 The complainant claimed that sometime in February
2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) from him to expedite the proceedings before the
Court. This amount was over and above the parties stipulated retainer
fee as evidenced by a contract.
According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a
month earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded
and received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00)
from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza
proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of their case
before the Court. Handwritten receipts4 signed by one Atty. Norlita De
Taza were submitted by the complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received P300,000 shall be used to expedite the case
which, in turn shall result in the following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said
amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should
not be included in the Decision, the 300,000.00 shall be returned.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza
18 Jan. 2007
Receipt
The amount of P500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic]
to expedite the process before the courts. The said amount has been
advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the same should be reimbursed to
her by her siblings upon winning the case with finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza
On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre
Faura, Manila and learned that the Court had already denied the
petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Tazas
representations that the case was still pending. He tried to
communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be found.
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a
complaint for disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He also attached
several affidavits and documents from other individuals who attested
that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her
debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit which
was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11
checks in her favor amounting to P481,400.00, which were all
dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit
was attached to the complaint, averred that Atty. De Taza issued a
check for P50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was
dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit,
stating that Atty. De Taza owes her P29,560.39 and failed to pay the
said amount despite repeated demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15 informed
the Court that Atty. De Taza is planning to leave the country as she was
joining her husband in the United States of America (U.S.A.).
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated
December 10, 2007 with the complaint was returned; this time, with the
postal carriers notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolution
dated September 9, 2009, held that the said copy of the Resolution
was deemed served and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as having
waived the filing of her comment. The case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In its Report and Recommendation dated January 4, 2011, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be
suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar
Disciplines recommendation in a Resolution dated January 3, 2013,
viz: Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year.25 (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. De taza should be held administratively liable for
issuing bouncing checks, demanding and/or receiving money from her
clients under the guise of having the proceedings before the court
expedited.
RULING:
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to
refute the accusations against her. Numerous attempts were made to
afford her an opportunity to defend herself from the complainants
allegations, but all these efforts were only met with silence. Whether
her transfer of residence was an unscrupulous move on her part to
evade her creditors, only she would certainly know. But as far as the
Court is concerned, all means were exhausted to give Atty. De Taza an
avenue to oppose the complainants charges. Her failure and/or refusal
to file a comment will not be a hindrance for the Court to mete out an
appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are
investigations by the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be
one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. As this Court
held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, citing
In the Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty.
Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay: "Disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is their
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required."29 Based on the
documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it appears that
Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing
bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid without any
reason. The complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty.
De Tazas involvement in an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor in
Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a closed
account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other
creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an
ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited
by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember
that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity
and fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows
a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her
unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless
checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful
to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public
order. It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the
oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and
irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in
high esteem."
Atty. De Tazas actuations towards the complainant and his siblings
were even worse as she had the gall to make it appear to the
complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be expedited
and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money.
Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money
from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Tazas actions are
reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when she even used
the name of the Court to defraud her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose,
the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that
the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does not
use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately
return the money to his client.31 In this case, the purpose for which
Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus,
her demand should not have even been made in the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6)
violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.29

"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed
only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically
and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law
and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large,
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."37 "The
Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption
and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke
the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible
representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated."
All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the
report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two
years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO YEARS with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction would be dealt with more severely.
PATROCINIA H. SALABAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANDRES C.
VILLARUEL, JR., Respondent.
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Patrocinia H. Salabao
against Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. for abuse of court processes in
violation of Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Salabao narrates that in 1995, she filed a case against Elmer Lumberio
for his deceitful or fraudulent conduct of taking her precious real
property situated in Taguig City. After hearing, RTC issued its
resolution in her favor in 2002. Atty. Villaruel then entered the picture
as counsel for Lumberio. From then on, Salabao complained that Atty.
Villaruel had made her suffer because of his abuse of processes and
disregard for her rights as a litigant. She narrates as follows:
In 2002, Branch 162 of RTC, Pasig City, which tried Civil Case No.
65147 issued its resolution in her favor. In order to delay the case, Atty.
Villaruel brought the case on appeal to CA under CA-GR CV No.
76360. CA decided in her favor on January 13, 2004 but Atty. Villaruel
again filed an appeal before SC under GR No. 167413. Lumberio lost
and the case became final and executory. Undeterred, Atty. Villaruel
tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, by bringing to
CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under CA-GR SP No. 97564.
When rebuffed, he again appealed to SC under GR No. 181243
without a clear or new arguments other than what he had presented
before CA. Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to
annul the 29 November 2007 Order of the RTC before CA under CA-
GR SP No. 101992 which was however dismissed. From thereon,
there was not stopping the Atty. Villaruel. Once again he filed a new
complaint before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil
Case No. 08-0666-M. Apart from this, Respondent filed several Motion,
Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay the resolution of the
case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge Briccio
Ygaa of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City. Salabao then complained that
Atty. Villaruel had done more than enough to suppress her rights as a
winning litigant and filed this case for abuse of processes pursuant to
Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12
of the CPR. Atty. Villaruel, for his part, denied the accusation and
clarified that the several pleadings he had filed had centered on the
legality of the court's decision ordering the cancellation of the title of
Lumberio in such ordinary proceeding for cancellation of the title. To
his mind, the said ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title before
the RTC Branch 153, Taguig City was void because the law vests upon
the government through the Solicitor General the power to initiate a
reversion case if there is such a ground to cancel the title issued by the
Land Management Bureau in favor of Lumberio. With respect to the
civil case before the RTC of Mauban, Branch 64, he explained that the
said case does not show that herein counsel committed any act of
dishonesty which may subject him to any prosecution as he is just
exercising his profession to the best of his ability.
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent relentlessly
filed petitions and appeals in order to exhaust all possible remedies to
obtain relief for his client which he considered as tantamount to
abusive and a spiteful effort to delay the execution of Judgment. He
noted that after the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
162 issued a Resolution in Civil Case No. 65147 adverse to his client,
respondent filed a barrage of cases/pleadings such as an appeal to CA
which affirmed the RTC ruling, a petition for review with SC which was
denied for having been filed out of time; a petition for annulment of the
RTC judgment which was dismissed by the CA; another petition for
review before this Court which was again denied; a petition for
certiorari which was dismissed by the CA; another civil case before the
RTC of Mauban, Quezon which was dismissed for improper venue, res
judicata, and violation of the anti-forum shopping law and that it
involved the same issues as the one filed in Pasig RTC. Moreover, he
filed several inhibitions, motions and an administrative complaint
against the presiding judge.
He thus recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of
suspension for four months. In its Resolution No. XX-2013-251 dated
20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Atty.
Villaruel filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 20, 2013, stating
that he had only exhausted all possible remedies available under the
premises. With all candor and honesty, he believes that he was only
doing his legal duty as a lawyer to exhaust all legal remedies taking
steps within its framework. He has not done any wrongdoing while
taking such routes. He has never been dishonest. Atty. Villaruel
believes that he deserves an acquittal given the fact that it was not
shown that he acted in bad faith in taking such legal remedies. He
cannot also be charged with abuse of judicial process because
Salabao has other recourse available to execute the said decision in
her favor while there were petitions filed, complainant also did not
allege that respondent has abused the judicial process. The courts to
which the said petitions were filed also did not cite the respondent in
contempt of court nor was a warning given. Moreover, he is now
suffering from renal failure which requires him to undergo dialysis three
(3) times in a week. To suspend him for four months would mean that
he would stop his dialysis for four moths which may cause his
immediate death. This Honorable Commission would not be too happy
to see one of its members begging for alms from PCSO and
government officials to shoulder his dialysis of about P100,000.00 per
month.
In a subsequent Resolution No. XXI-2014-182 dated March 23, 2014,
the IBP Board of Governors affirmed its earlier Resolution and denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, saying that there was no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Villaruel is guilty of violating Rules 10.03 and 12.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their
clients, it cannot be emphasized enough that their first and primary
duty is not to the client but to the administration of justice. Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice." Thus, in the use of Court processes,
the lawyer's zeal to win must be tempered by the paramount
consideration that justice be done to all parties involved, and the
lawyer for the losing party should not stand in the way of the execution
of a valid judgment. This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics and
professional responsibility.
Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court:
Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney: To counsel or
maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just,
and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law; Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause,
from any corrupt motive or interest;
Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.30
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the
same cause.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the
administration of justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and
justifies disciplinary action against him. In this case, the judgment in
favor of complainant had become final and executory by July 27, 2005.
Respondent however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12)
motions and cases in various courts subsequent to the Entry of
Judgment.
From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is
clear that respondent's intention was to delay the execution of the final
judgment. His other actions belie his claim of good faith.
It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial
process by abusing Court processes, employing dilatory tactics to
frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of
his duties as an officer of the court. He has breached his sworn duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated
the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court. In so
doing, he is administratively liable for his actions. Rule 138, Sec. 27 of
the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and
suspension as follows: Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. In light of the
following aggravating circumstances - multiplicity of motions and cases
filed by respondent, the malice evinced by his filing of various motions
to prevent the judges and sheriff from fulfilling their legal duties,
feigned ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court, and his lack
of remorse for his actions - the Court finds that a penalty of suspension
for 18 months would be commensurate to the damage and prejudice
that respondent has inflicted on complainant Salabao for his actions.
wenji.nuel.izo.zhel.mae.narika.zarah.em.janeth.juvy.eurice.31