Truth, pragmatic theory of

Two distinctly different kinds of theories parade under the banner of the theory of . First, there is
the consensus theory of C.S. Peirce, according to which a true proposition is one which would be endorsed
unanimously by all persons who had had sufficient relevant experiences to judge it. Second, there is the
instrumentalist theory associated with William James, John Dewey, and F.C.S. Schiller, according to which a
proposition counts as true if and only if behaviour based on a belief in the proposition leads, in the long run and
all things considered, to beneficial results for the believers. (Peirce renamed his theory when his
original term was appropriated by the instrumentalists.) Unless they are married to some form of
ontological anti-realism, which they usually are, both theories imply that the facts of the matter are not relevant to
the truth-value of the proposition.

1 Pragmaticism
C.S. Peirce believed that any two minds investigating a given question would tend eventually to arrive at the same
answer, even if they used different methods and different pools of evidence: Let any human being have enough
information and exert enough thought upon any question, and the result will be that he will arrive at a certain definite
conclusion, which is the same that any other mind will reach (Peirce 1931-58 (7): 319). Moreover, this one answer
that all would reach is, by definition, the true answer: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all
who investigate is what we mean by truth (Peirce 1931-58 (5): 407). Indeed, in principle, consensus embodies the
truth no matter what method was used to bring about the consensus. If a general in any way be
produced, though it be by the faggot and the rack, to talk of error in such belief is utterly absurd (Peirce 1931-58 (8):
16). Although Peirce thought that in the long run the only method which could produce and sustain a consensus
agreement is what he called (what is now called to the best ), it is important to
remember that he did not think propositions which would be universally accepted are true because they were arrived at
by abduction; rather, he thought they are true just because they would be universally accepted (see Peirce, C.S. 3).
Whence confidence that investigators would move towards a common conclusion? Ultimately, our evidence
takes the form of perceptions, and these perceptions are controlled by a single fixed reality which is public to all. Since
there is just one objective reality and it is driving all of us to beliefs that accurately reflect it, we are driven to agree
with one another. So, in the long run, the only propositions with which everyone would agree are those that accurately
reflect reality. Hence, is equivalent to reflects . It might seem odd, then, that Peirce turns
his attention away from this equivalence and focuses instead on what would otherwise seem to be an incidental
equivalence between and eventually be agreed to by everyone with sufficient relevant .
But for Peirce it is the former relation which is the trivial one because reality, he thought, is just a construct of the
community of human minds. Specifically, what is real is just whatever we would come to agree is real: the real is the
idea in which the community ultimately settles down (Peirce 1931-58 (6): 610) and everything, therefore which will
be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else (Peirce 1931-58 (8): 12). Peirce called this his
theory of .
But notice now how this ontological doctrine undermines own explanation for why all who investigate a given
question would ultimately come to agreement: on a realist ontology, the notion of reality controlling our perceptions is
based on common sense; but on the social theory of reality, it is an idea in the minds of those who have already
reached the final opinion which is causing those who have not reached it to have certain perceptions. Indeed, matters
are even stranger than this; for the very perceptions that caused those who have reached the final conclusion to reach it
were forced on them, in a reverse-chronological direction, by the final conclusion which, at the time they had the
perceptions, they had not reached. Therefore, some of the perceptions you and I are having right now are forced on us
by an idea which, if we have it at all, we will only have at some future time. Peirce himself was aware of this rather
fantastic implication of his views and attempted to defend it:
At first sight it seems no doubt a paradoxical statement that, The object of final belief which exists only in
consequence of the belief, should itself produce the belief is:
nothing saying that the existence of external realities depends upon the fact, that opinion will
finally settle in the belief in them. And yet that these realities existed before the belief took rise, and were even the

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 cause of that belief, just as the force of gravity is the cause of the falling of the inkstand - although the force of
gravity consists merely in the fact that the inkstand and other objects will fall.
(Peirce 1931-58 (7): 340-4)

But this will not do. On the analysis of causation which Peirce is assuming, the relation between gravity and the
tendency of things to fall is one of identity, not of mutual causation. Moreover, even if we allow that gravity is in some
sense a consequence of the fact that things tend to fall, neither gravity nor the tendency are events in time. Hence, to
assert that the former is both a cause and a consequence of the latter is not to assert the possibility of
reverse-chronological causation. But coming to believe the final conclusion, and the occurrence of the perceptions that
bring about that belief, are both events in time, and they come at different times. Hence, to assert that the
chronologically earlier of these is caused by the chronologically later is to assert something not at all analogous to any
causal relations involving the inkstand.
The problems in account go even deeper. Although Peirce sometimes speaks as if the final conclusion is fated
or destined, on those occasions on which he self-consciously considers whether this conclusion will ever actually be
reached, he is much more cautious: We cannot be quite sure the community will ever settle down to an unalterable
conclusion upon any given can we rationally presume any overwhelming consensus of opinion will be
reached upon every question (Peirce 1931-58 (6): 610).
I do not say that it is infallibly true that there is any belief to which a person would come if he were to carry his
inquiries far enough. I only say that that alone is what I call Truth. I cannot infallibly know that there is any truth.
(Peirce 1966: 398)

So the causal action of the final conclusion on our present actual perceptions is not only reverse-chronological, it is
also action from within a hypothetical domain to the actual domain.

2 Instrumentalism
William James always claimed to accept the definition of truth embodied in correspondence theories of truth, namely
that a true belief or statement is one that with (see James, W. 5). But, for James, the reality to which
true ideas must agree is mind-dependent: By "reality" humanism [one of names for his philosophy] means
nothing more than the other conceptual or perceptual experiences with which a given present experience may find
itself in point of fact mixed up. And, we are not required to seek [truth] in a relation of experience as such to
anything beyond itself. And, reality is an accumulation of our own intellectual inventions. These inventions include
the notions of one Time and of one Space as single continuous receptacles; the distinction between thoughts and
things, matter and mind; between permanent subjects and changing attributes; the conception of classes with
sub-classes within them; the separation of fortuitous from regularly caused connexions. Unlike Kant, however, James
does not think that these constructs are built into our minds. Rather, these constructs are inventions of our ancestors.
They made the world this way, by so conceiving of it. Why did they choose to structure the world with these features
and not some other features? answer is that they found it more useful to organize the world in this manner.
The last quotation continues:
surely all these were once definite conquests by our ancestors in their attempts to get the chaos of their
crude individual experiences into a more shareable and manageable shape. They proved of such sovereign use as
denkmittel [instruments of thought] that they are now a part of the very structure of our mind.
(James 1909: 42)

James also wants to give the word , in the phrase with , a different sense from the typical
correspondence theorist. Given that reality is just useful mental constructs of the collection of past and present minds,
a belief agrees with reality by proving useful to those who believe it. The examples James offers suggest that useful
beliefs are those which: (1) enable us to manipulate the objects of the world; (2) allow us to communicate successfully
with our fellows; (3) provide good explanations for other occurrences; and (4) lead to accurate predictions.
It should be kept in mind, if for no other reason than to forestall overly facile counterexamples, that James identifies
truth with beliefs that are useful over the long run and all things considered:
"The true",to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as "the right" is only the

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 expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the
whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight will not necessarily meet all farther
experiences equally
(James 1907: 106)

Still, opponents of instrumentalism would insist, it might be useful throughout a life for them to believe that
they are better at their job than anyone else (because, for example, the increased confidence it gives them pays huge
dividends.) And this can be the case even if they are not in fact better at their job than anyone else. James, however,
denied that there can be any cases in which the truth and the facts are disjoint, and the reason for his denial lies in his
ontology: if the facts are themselves just mental constructs which have proved useful, then there cannot be a case of a
useful belief that does not agree with the facts.
So, both Peirce and James can happily accept what have been called - - sentences of the form "p is true"
if and only if . But for both of them, this coordination of truth and reality is itself an incidental side effect which
distracts from, rather than reveals, the essential nature of truth.
See also: Meaning and truth; Pragmatism; Realism and antirealism; Schiller, F.C.S.; Truth, coherence theory of;
Truth, correspondence theory of; Truth, deflationary theories of
RICHARD L. KIRKHAM

References and further reading

James, W. (1907) Pragmatism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.(A superbly produced critical
edition of the most famous work, in which he attempts to provide a survey of his philosophical views.)
James, W. (1909) The Meaning of Truth, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.(A collection of essays
on truth, mainly written in the last few years before the death, in an excellent critical edition.)
Kirkham, R.L. (1992) Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.(An introduction to
theories of truth. Sects 3.2-3.4 expand on the issues in this entry.)
Peirce, C.S. (1931-58) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 8
vols, C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (eds) vols 1-6, A.W. Burks (ed.) vols 7-8.(The views on truth are
scattered throughout his works, so the reader will have to look under in the index of this collection.
References in this entry to this work have been by volume and section.)
Peirce, C.S. (1966) Letters to Lady Welby, in P.P. Wiener (ed.) Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings, New York:
Dover.(An interesting selection of writings.)

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