Tecson vs Comelec

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. Filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines. He represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petitioned before the COMELEC to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. He further alleged that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
alien mother. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of
merit. On 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Is Fernando Poe Jr. A natural born citizen?

Held: The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis had been in vogue. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship
by birth. In case of illegitimate child, in order that the birth certificate could then be
utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate
was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement
rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
There must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the
child as his or her. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who
in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died
on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently,
in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time
of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of
petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr.
was a Filipino citizen. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
Republic vs Lim

Respondent Chule Y. Lim claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an,
Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She
alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four
erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected. The trial court set the hearing
on December 27, 1999. During the hearing, the respondent testified that she claims
that her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using Yu in all her school
records and in her marriage certificate. [2] She presented a clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) [3] to further show the consistency in her use
of the surname Yu. Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was
written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian). Third,
her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino
considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father
was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered
voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen. Finally, it was erroneously
indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should
have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never
married.

Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her
parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters
father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage
contracted in China. In this connection, respondent presented a certification
attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To
from 1948 to the present.

Issue:

Held: The constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she

reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic
invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate
children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. The above
constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only
to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was
concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino
mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino
upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. the records show that
respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She
registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship. The Court of Appeals did not allow
respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her
fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can
remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her
to use her fathers surname. While judicial authority is required for a change of name
or surname, there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which
a person has already been using since childhood.

In re: Application for Admission to the Bar of Vicente Ching

Facts: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen,
and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. On 17 July 1998, Ching, after
having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City,
filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court,
dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. In
compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, several
documents. On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released
and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful
Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable
status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. He was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship. OSG filed its comment
on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to
be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" in
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by
election upon reaching the age of majority." In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two
(2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be
effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of
the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority:". The OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship
and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by
present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's
case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of
the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine
Bar.

Issue:

Held: In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-
five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June
1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on
the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election
was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to
exercise the privilege.

even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in
the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the
OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The
span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority
until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way
beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of
majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right (A legal right or entitlement that is in progress
and is neither ripe, vested nor perfected. In reference to a claim in law, or an
entitlement, that has not yet vested.) to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.

Cabiling Ma vs. Fernandez

Facts: Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., Valeriano Cabiling Ma , Lechi
Ann Ma, Arceli Ma, Nicolas Ma, and Isidro Ma are the children of Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. Records reveal that
petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935
Philippine Constitution. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in
this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and
received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak
nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know
any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have
already raised their respective families in the Philippines. During their age of
minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they
claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that (t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship are
citizens of the Philippines. Thus, Balgamelo, Felix Jr and Valeriano executed their
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their respective oath of
allegiance. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners,
however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as
required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625. It was only more than 30
yrs after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.

Issue:

Held: The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement
of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government
of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath
with the nearest civil registry. Petitioners complied with the first and second
requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the
documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect
Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the
statutory requirements for such election. Notably, the petitioners timely took their
oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was
commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of
their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.

Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their
present status having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any
national identity except that which they chose upon reaching the age of reason.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners
to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat
the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino
mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they
submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the
civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the
appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements
embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of
Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within a
reasonable time.
Maquiling vs COMELEC

Facts: Respondent Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a

consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA
and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On
the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favour. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30
November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte. Linog Balua filed a petition to disqualify Arnado for being a foreigner.
Arnado won as the mayor of Kauswagan.

Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects ones qualifications to run for public office.
Held: The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not
divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took
the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that
after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run
for public office. Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first,
on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the
execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, Arnado reacquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise
possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen. After
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility
to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of
the foreign country.

However, between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions
that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American,
in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an
American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. While the
act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an
act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen
who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position. We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that
Arnados act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation. It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive
acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office
pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Yu vs Defensor Santiago
Frivaldo vs Comelec
Republic vs Dela Rosa
Labo vs Comelec
Aznar vs Comelec
Mercado vs Manzano
Bengzon III vs HRET
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration

Facts: On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she
was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure
trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one
month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was
permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On
the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or
within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962. On January 25,
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the
hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

Issue:
Held: We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act providing:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain
permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and
procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination
by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.

does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors,
legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of
nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently
or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities
may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. We cannot see any reason why an
alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a
Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to
apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled
to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary
concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been
conferred upon him. In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that
the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect
of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being
entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and
express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to
citizens of the Philippines.

Altajeros vs Comelec

Facts: Ciceron Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto,
Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On January 15, 2004,
private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San
Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify petitioner on the
ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy that [he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a
foreign country. Private respondents alleged that petitioner was a holder of a
permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigration
Certificate of Residence by the Bureau of Immigration. petitioner filed an Answer
stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application
for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already
issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization,
after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus,
petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was
qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the
dismissal of the petition. Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for
Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be
disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate.

Issue: Is the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and
with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?

Held: The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No.
8171:

Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the
pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as
Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.

The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the
proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the
repatriation of a citizen.

In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his
Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only
after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on
March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation
only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position,
but before the elections. The Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be
construed as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence. The Court ruled that
the repatriation of Frivaldo (in Frivaldo vs Comelec) RETROACTED to the date of the
filing of his application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein
declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is
retroactive in nature. Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he
filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a
mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the
COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.