1

Electronic Evidence
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, The Court finds merit in the
Petitioner, objections raised and the motion to strike
out filed respectively by the defendants. The
record shows that the plaintiff has been
- versus - given every opportunity to present the
originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the
documents it offered. It never produced the
HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify
RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING the admission of the photocopies by
COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, contending that the photocopies offered are
INCORPORATED, equivalent to the original of the document
Respondents. on the basis of the Electronic Evidence
(Comment to
Defendant Wallem Philippines Objections
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - and Motion to Strike).But as rightly pointed
- - -x out in defendant Wallems Reply to the
Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox copies do
not constitute the electronic evidence
DECISION defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence as follows:

(h) Electronic
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: document refers to
information or the
representation of
information, data, figures,
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under symbols or other models
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the of written expression,
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. described or however
00848, dated 9 November 2005, which dismissed the Petition represented, by which a
for Certiorari filed by the National Power Corporation seeking right is established or an
to set aside the Order[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court obligation extinguished, or
(RTC) of Cebu, Branch 19 dated 16 November 2004, denying by which a fact may be
admission and excluding from the records plaintiffs (herein proved and affirmed,
petitioner) Exhibits A, C, D, E, H and its sub-markings, I, J, and which is received,
its sub-markings, K, L, M and its sub-markings, N and its sub- recorded, transmitted,
markings, O, P and its sub-markings, Q and its sub-markings, stored, processed,
R and S and its sub-markings. retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of digitally signed documents
foreign registry owned and operated by private and any printout, readable
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and by sight or other means
damaged petitioners Power Barge 209 which was then which accurately reflects
moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, the electronic data
petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages message or electronic
against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the document. For the
alleged damages caused on petitioners power barges. purpose of these Rules,
the term electronic
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint document may be used
dated 8 July 1996 impleading herein private interchangeably with
respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, electronic data message.
contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping
Co. On 18 September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a The information in those Xerox or
Motion to Dismiss which was subsequently denied by public photocopies was not received, recorded,
respondent Judge in an Order dated 20 October retrieved or produced
1998. Bangpai Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion electronically. Moreover, such electronic
to Dismiss which was also denied by public respondent Judge evidence must be authenticated (Sections 1
in an Order issued on 24 January 2003. and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic Evidence),
which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of required Affidavit to prove the admissibility
the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower and evidentiary weight of the alleged
court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits A to V electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid) was
together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, not executed, much less presented in
private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. evidence.
and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to
petitioners formal offer of evidence. The Xerox or photocopies offered
should, therefore, be stricken off the
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge record. Aside from their being not properly
issued the assailed order denying the admission and identified by any competent witness, the
excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits A, C, D, E, H loss of the principals thereof was not
and its sub-markings, I, J and its sub-markings, K, L, M and its established by any competent proof.
sub-markings, N and its sub-markings, O, P and its sub-
markings, Q and its sub-markings, R and S and its sub- xxxx
markings.According to the court a quo:

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Exhibits A, C,
D, E, H and its sub-markings, I, J, and its
sub-markings, K, L, M and its sub-markings,
N and its sub-markings, O, P and its sub-
markings, Q and its sub-markings, and R are
hereby DENIED admission and excluded
from the records. However, these excluded
evidence should be attached to the records
of this case to enable the appellate court to
pass upon them should an appeal be taken
from the decision on the merits to be
rendered upon the termination of the trial of
this case.
Exhibits S and its sub-markings are
also DENIED admission for lack of proper
identification since the witness who brought
these pictures expressly admitted that he
was not present when the photos were
taken and had not knowledge when the
same where taken.[3]
Upon denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
in an Order dated 20 April 2005, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
before the Court of Appeals maintaining that public
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the
admission of its Exhibits A, C, D, E, H and its sub-markings, I, J
and its sub-markings, K, L, M and its sub-markings, N and its
sub-markings, O, P and its sub-markings, Q and its sub-
markings, R, and S and its sub-markings.
On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a
Decision dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari, the
pertinent portions of which elucidate:
After a judicious scrutiny of the
record of the case on hand, together with
the rules and jurisprudence which are
applicable in the premises, we have come
up with a finding that the petition for
certiorari filed in this case is not meritorious.
It appears that there is no sufficient
showing by the petitioner that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed orders in
Civil Case No. CEB-18662.As what our
jurisprudence tells us, grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as would be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction x x x.
In the case at bench, what has
been shown to the contrary by the totality of
the record on hand is that the respondent
judge acted correctly and within the pale of
his sound discretion in issuing the assailed
order, dated November 16, 2004, in Civil
Case No. CEB-18662.
Indeed, it appears that the pieces
of petitioners documentary evidence which
were denied admission by the respondent
judge were not properly identified by any
competent witness. As pointed out by the
respondent Bangpai Shipping Company in
its comment on the petition filed in this case
which reproduces some excerpts of the
testimonies in the court a quo of
Atty. Marianito De Los Santos, Engr. Nestor
Enriquez, Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo I. Pagaling, the
said witnesses did not have personal
knowledge of and participation in the
preparation and making of the pieces of
2
documentary evidence denied admission by
respondent judge x x x. In other words,
there was lack of proper identification of
said pieces of documentary evidence. x x x.
Then another ground for denying
admission of petitioners Exhibits A, C, D, E,
H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, and S by the
respondent judge is that said pieces of
documentary evidence were merely
photocopies of purported documents or
papers. There is no gainsaying the fact that
the respondent judge acted within the pale
of his discretion when he denied admission
of said documentary evidence. Section 3 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines is very explicit in providing that,
when the subject of inquiry are the contents
of documents, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original
documents themselves, except in certain
cases specifically so enumerated therein,
and the petitioner has not shown that the
non-presentation or non-production of its
original documentary pieces of evidence
falls under such exceptions. As aptly pointed
out by the respondent judge in the order
issued by him on November 16, 2004:
x x x The record
shows that the plaintiff
(petitioner herein) has
been given every
opportunity to present the
originals of the Xerox or
photocopies of the
documents it offered. It
never produced said
originals.
So, the petitioner has only itself to
blame for the respondent judges denial of
admission of its aforementioned
documentary evidence.
Of course, the petitioner tries to
contend that the photocopies of documents
offered by it are equivalent to the original
documents that it sought to offer in
evidence, based on the Rules on Electronic
Evidence which were in force and effect
since August 1, 2001. However, such a
contention is devoid of merit. The pieces of
documentary evidence offered by the
petitioner in Civil Case CEB-18662 which
were denied admission by the respondent
judge do not actually constitute as
electronic evidence as defined in the Rules
on Electronic
Evidence. The informationstherein were not
received, retrieved or produced
electronically. The petitioner has not
adequately established that its
documentary evidence were electronic
evidence. it has not properly authenticated
such evidence as electronic documents,
assuming arguendo that they are. Lastly,
the petitioner has not properly established
by affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence the admissibility and
evidentiary weight of said documentary
evidence.
Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is
manifest that the respondent judge did not

commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
admission of the aforementioned
documentary evidence of petitioner.
But even if it be granted just for
the sake of argument that the respondent
judge committed an error in denying the
aforementioned documentary evidence of
the petitioner, still the petition for certiorari
filed in this case must fail. Such error would
at most be only an error of law and not an
error of jurisdiction. In Lee vs. People, 393
SCRA 397, the Supreme Court of
the Philippines said that certiorari will not lie
in case of an error of law. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed
in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed
orders issued by respondent judge in Civil
Case No. CEB-18662.[4]
Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioner
filed the instant petition.
The focal point of this entire controversy is
petitioners obstinate contention that the photocopies it
offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the
functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable
interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both
the trial court and the appellate court, the photocopies it
presented as documentary evidence actually constitute
electronic evidence based on its own premise that an
electronic document as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information
that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an electronic
document can also refer to other modes of written expression
that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as
included in the sections catch-all proviso: any print-out or
output, readable by sight or other means.
We do not agree.
In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not
the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as
contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well
as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall enumerate the
following documents offered as evidence by the petitioner, to
wit:
1. Exhibit A is a photocopy of a letter manually signed
by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with RECEIVED stamped
thereon, together with a handwritten date;
2. Exhibit C is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost of
damages of petitioners power barges 207 and 209
prepared by Hopewell Mobile Power Systems
Corporation and manually signed by Messrs.
Rex Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit D is a photocopy of a letter manually signed
by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with RECEIVED
stamped thereon, together with a handwritten
notation of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit E is a photocopy of a Standard Marine Protest
Form which was filled up and accomplished by Rex
Joel C. Malaluan in his own handwriting and signed by
him. Portions of the Jurat were handwritten, and
manually signed by the Notary Public;
3
5. Exhibit H is a photocopy of a letter manually signed
by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with RECEIVED stamped
thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the
date it was received;
6. Exhibit I is a photocopy of a computation of the
estimated energy loss allegedly suffered by
petitioner which was manually signed by Mr. Nestor
G. Enriquez, Jr.;
7. Exhibit J is a photocopy of a letter containing the
breakdown of the cost estimate, manually signed by
Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with RECEIVED stamped
thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the
date it was received, and other handwritten
notations;
8. Exhibit K is a photocopy of the
Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum written
using a manual typewriter, signed manually by Atty.
Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a handwritten notation
when it was received by the party;
9. Exhibit L is a photocopy of a portion of the electricity
supply and operation and maintenance agreement
between petitioner and Hopewell, containing
handwritten notations and every page containing
three unidentified manually placed signatures;
10. Exhibit M is a photocopy of the Notice of Termination
with attachments addressed to Rex Joel C. Malaluan,
manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with a
handwritten notation of the date it was received.The
sub-markings also contain manual signatures and/or
handwritten notations;
11. Exhibit N is a photocopy of a letter of termination
with attachments addressed to VIrgilio Asprer and
manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-
markings contain manual signatures and/or
handwritten notations;
12. Exhibit O is the same photocopied document marked
as Annex C;
13. Exhibit P is a photocopy of an incident report
manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista
and by the Notary Public, with other handwritten
notations;
14. Exhibit Q is a photocopy of a letter manually signed
by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary Public, together
with other handwritten notations.
On the other hand, an electronic document refers
to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other models of written
expression, described or however represented, by which
a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.[5] It includes digitally signed
documents and any printout, readable by sight or other
means which accurately reflects the electronic data message
or electronic document.[6]
The rules use the word information to define an
electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would
suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms
of the information contained therein, similar to any other
document which is presented in evidence as proof of its
contents.[7] However, what differentiates an electronic
document from a paper-based document is the manner by

which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the
photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of
the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons
who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can
a persons signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were
produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not
preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus
declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to
electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may
not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original
as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a
quo in denying admission and excluding from the
records petitioners Exhibits A, C, D, E, H and its sub-markings,
I, J and its sub-markings, K, L, M and its sub-markings, N and
its sub-markings, O, P and its sub-markings, Q and its sub-
markings, and R. The trial court was correct in rejecting these
photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are
therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of
evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and
modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence
rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent
proof and the introduction of altered copies and the
withholding of the originals.[8] But the modern justification for
the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a
recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law.
[9]
The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world
of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as
reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate
or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the
best evidence rule.[10]
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be
produced; exceptions. There can be no
evidence of a writing the contents of which
is the subject of inquiry, other than the
original writing itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of
the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other
document in the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in
an existing record a certified copy of which
is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the
whole."
When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
4
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.[11] The offeror of secondary evidence is
burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or
destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial
evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents;
[12]
(b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of
evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that
a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been
made for the document in the proper place or places.
[13]
However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in
offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to
establish that such offer was made in accordance with the
exceptions as enumerated under
the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the
Order of the court a quodenying admissibility of the
photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner
continued to obdurately disregard the opportunities given by
the trial court for it to present the originals of the photocopies
it presented yet comes before us now praying that it be
allowed to present the originals of the exhibits that were
denied admission or in case the same are lost, to lay the
predicate for the admission of secondary evidence. Had
petitioner presented the originals of the documents to the
court instead of the photocopies it obstinately offered as
evidence, or at the very least laid the predicate for the
admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not
have unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court
and finally to this Court for adjudication. Had it not been for
petitioners intransigence, the merits of petitioners complaint
for damages would have been decided upon by the trial court
long ago. As aptly articulated by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent
judges denial of admission of its aforementioned
documentary evidence and consequently, the denial of its
prayer to be given another opportunity to present
the originals of the documents that were denied admission
nor to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary
evidence in case the same has been lost.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November
2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170633 October 17, 2007
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 and
its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation
with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of
importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. 3 One of its
suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong),4 an
international trading company5 with head office in Seoul,

South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines.6 The two corporations conducted business through
telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions.7 Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices
containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the
latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature
on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by
fax.8
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a
letter9 addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager [also the
President10 of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to
confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric
tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate
of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the corporations,
assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of
the letter.11
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro
Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO40112 containing the terms
and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to
Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature 13 of
Chan. As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the
ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable
letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong.14 Following
their usual practice, delivery of the goods was to be made
after the L/C had been opened.
In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with
MCC, Ssangyong placed the order with its steel manufacturer,
Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO), in South
Korea15 and paid the same in full.
Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the
order for 220MT of steel was split into two, 16 one
for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-
POSTS0401-117 and another for 110MT covered by ST2-
POSTS0401-2,18 both dated April 17, 2000.
On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office,
informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by way of a fax transmittal,
that it was ready to ship 193.597MT of stainless steel from
Korea to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the
L/C be facilitated.19 Chan affixed his signature on the fax
transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to Ssangyong. 20
Two days later, on June 22, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office
informed Sanyo Seiki, thru Chan, that it was able to secure a
US$30/MT price adjustment on the contracted price of
US$1,860.00/MT for the 200MT stainless steel, and that the
goods were to be shipped in two tranches, the first 100MT on
that day and the second 100MT not later than June 27, 2000.
Ssangyong reiterated its request for the facilitation of the
L/C's opening.21
Ssangyong later, through its Manila Office, sent a letter, on
June 26, 2000, to the Treasury Group of Sanyo Seiki that it was
looking forward to receiving the L/C details and a cable copy
thereof that day.22 Ssangyong sent a separate letter of the
same date to Sanyo Seiki requesting for the opening of the
L/C covering payment of the first 100MT not later than June
28, 2000.23 Similar letters were transmitted by Ssangyong
Manila Office on June 27, 2000.24 On June 28, 2000,
Ssangyong sent another facsimile letter to MCC stating that
its principal in Korea was already in a difficult
situation25 because of the failure of Sanyo Seiki and MCC to
open the L/C's.
The following day, June 29, 2000, Ssangyong received, by fax,
a letter signed by Chan, requesting an extension of time to
open the L/C because MCC's credit line with the bank had
5
been fully availed of in connection with another transaction,
and MCC was waiting for an additional credit line. 26 On the
same date, Ssangyong replied, requesting that it be informed
of the date when the L/C would be opened, preferably at the
earliest possible time, since its Steel Team 2 in Korea was
having problems and Ssangyong was incurring warehousing
costs.27 To maintain their good business relationship and to
support MCC in its financial predicament, Ssangyong offered
to negotiate with its steel manufacturer, POSCO, another
US$20/MT discount on the price of the stainless steel ordered.
This was intimated in Ssangyong's June 30, 2000 letter to
MCC.28 On July 6, 2000, another follow-up letter29 for the
opening of the L/C was sent by Ssangyong to MCC.
However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a
letter of credit.30 Consequently, on August 15, 2000,
Ssangyong, through counsel, wrote Sanyo Seiki that if the
L/C's were not opened, Ssangyong would be compelled to
cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for damages for
breach thereof amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of
warehouse expenses, related interests and charges.31
Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-132 and ST2-
POSTS080-233 dated August 16, 2000 were issued by
Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. The invoices slightly
varied the terms of the earlier pro forma invoices (ST2-
POSTSO401, ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2),
in that the quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice and
the price was reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. As can be
gleaned from the photocopies of the said August 16, 2000
invoices submitted to the court, they both bear the conformity
signature of MCC Manager Chan.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank
for US$170,000.00 covering payment for 100MT of stainless
steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-
2.34 The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped
to and received by MCC.35
MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000
signed by Chan, requesting for a price adjustment of the order
stated in Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1, considering
that the prevailing price of steel at that time was
US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of money due to a
recent strike.36
Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000,
sent a demand letter37 to Chan for the opening of the second
and last L/C of US$170,000.00 with a warning that, if the said
L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong
would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC
liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost difference,
warehousing expenses, interests and charges as of August 15,
2000) and other damages for breach. Chan failed to reply.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to
MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract
under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and
demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses,
warehousing expenses, interests and charges.38
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for
damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC,
Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City. In its complaint,39Ssangyong alleged that
defendants breached their contract when they refused to
open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer
to Evidence40 alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the
original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil
action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court
denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence
presented had already been admitted in the December 16,
2002 Order41 and their admissibility finds support in Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both testimonial and
documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material
allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed
for purposes of a prima facie case.42
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 43 on
March 24, 2004, in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled
that when plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to
buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of US$1,860 per
MT, the contract was perfected. The subject transaction was
evidenced by Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1
and ST2-POSTS0401-2, which were later amended only in
terms of reduction of volume as well as the price per MT,
following Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-
POSTS080-2. The RTC, however, excluded Sanyo Seiki from
liability for lack of competent evidence. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is
hereby rendered ordering defendants MCC Industrial
Sales Corporation and Gregory Chan, to pay plaintiff,
jointly and severally the following:
1) Actual damages of US$93,493.87 representing the
outstanding principal claim plus interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from March 30, 2001.
2) Attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00
plus P2,000.00 per counsel's appearance in court,
the same being deemed just and equitable
considering that by reason of defendants' breach of
their obligation under the subject contract, plaintiff
was constrained to litigate to enforce its rights and
recover for the damages it sustained, and therefore
had to engage the services of a lawyer.
3) Costs of suit.
No award of exemplary damages for lack of sufficient
basis.
SO ORDERED.44
On April 22, 2004, MCC and Chan, through their counsel of
record, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, filed their Notice of
Appeal.45 On June 8, 2004, the law office of Castillo Zamora &
Poblador entered its appearance as their collaborating
counsel.
In their Appeal Brief filed on March 9, 2005,46 MCC and Chan
raised before the CA the following errors of the RTC:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANTS VIOLATED THEIR
CONTRACT WITH APPELLEE
A. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS
AGREED TO PURCHASE 200 METRIC TONS
OF STEEL PRODUCTS FROM APPELLEE,
INSTEAD OF ONLY 100 METRIC TONS.
6
1. THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN ADMITTING
IN EVIDENCE THE PRO
FORMA INVOICES WITH REFERENCE
NOS. ST2- POSTS0401-1 AND ST2-
POSTS0401-2.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES TO APPELLEE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO APPELLEE.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
FINDING APPELLANT GREGORY CHAN JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH APPELLANT MCC.47
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision 48 affirming
the ruling of the trial court, but absolving Chan of any liability.
The appellate court ruled, among others, that Pro Forma
Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-
2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F") were admissible in evidence,
although they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel
orders.49 The dispositive portion of the appellate court's
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court holds:
(1) The award of actual damages, with interest,
attorney's fees and costs ordered by the lower court
is hereby AFFIRMED.
(2) Appellant Gregory Chan is hereby ABSOLVED from
any liability.
SO ORDERED.50
A copy of the said Decision was received by MCC's and Chan's
principal counsel, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, on September 14,
2005.51 Their collaborating counsel, Castillo Zamora &
Poblador,52 likewise, received a copy of the CA decision on
September 19, 2005.53
On October 4, 2005, Castillo Zamora & Poblador, on behalf
of MCC, filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.54 Ssangyong opposed the motion contending that
the decision of the CA had become final and executory on
account of the failure of MCC to file the said motion within the
reglementary period. The appellate court resolved, on
November 22, 2005, to deny the motion on its
merits,55 without, however, ruling on the procedural issue
raised.
Aggrieved, MCC filed a petition for review
on certiorari56 before this Court, imputing the following errors
to the Court of Appeals:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A LEGAL
QUESTION NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
JURISPRUDENCE AND SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE
FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY REVERSING THE COURT A
QUO'S DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 02-124 CONSIDERING THAT:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE ADMISSIBILITY IN
EVIDENCE OF THE PRO-FORMA INVOICES
WITH REFERENCE NOS. ST2-POSTSO401-1

AND ST2-POSTSO401-2, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE SAME WERE MERE PHOTOCOPIES
OF FACSIMILE PRINTOUTS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO
APPRECIATE THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT, EVEN
ASSUMING PETITIONER BREACHED THE
SUPPOSED CONTRACT, THE FACT IS THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT
SUFFERED ANY DAMAGES AND THE
AMOUNT THEREOF.
III. THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF US$93,493.87 IS SIMPLY
UNCONSCIONABLE AND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN AT LEAST REDUCED, IF NOT DELETED
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.57
In its Comment, Ssangyong sought the dismissal of the
petition, raising the following arguments: that the CA decision
dated 15 August 2005 is already final and executory, because
MCC's motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the
reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof,
and that, in any case, it was a pro forma motion; that MCC
breached the contract for the purchase of the steel products
when it failed to open the required letter of credit; that the
printout copies and/or photocopies of facsimile or telecopy
transmissions were properly admitted by the trial court
because they are considered original documents under R.A.
No. 8792; and that MCC is liable for actual damages and
attorney's fees because of its breach, thus, compelling
Ssangyong to litigate.
The principal issues that this Court is called upon to resolve
are the following:
I Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already
final and executory;
II Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile
transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such;
III Whether there was a perfected contract of sale between
MCC and Ssangyong, and, if in the affirmative, whether MCC
breached the said contract; and
IV Whether the award of actual damages and attorney's fees
in favor of Ssangyong is proper and justified.
-I-
It cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals,58 we
held that receipt of a copy of the decision by one of several
counsels on record is notice to all, and the period to appeal
commences on such date even if the other counsel has not
yet received a copy of the decision. In this case, when Atty.
Samson received a copy of the CA decision on September 14,
2005, MCC had only fifteen (15) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration conformably with Section 1, Rule
52 of the Rules of Court, or to file a petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45. The period
should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005 (when
Castillo Zamora & Poblador received their copy of the
decision) because notice to Atty. Samson is deemed notice to
collaborating counsel.
We note, however, from the records of the CA, that it was
Castillo Zamora & Poblador, not Atty. Samson, which filed both
MCC's and Chan's Brief and Reply Brief. Apparently, the
arrangement between the two counsels was for the
7
collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the appeal brief
and subsequent pleadings in the CA. This explains why it was
Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed the motion for the
reconsideration of the CA decision, and they did so on October
5, 2005, well within the 15-day period from September 29,
2005, when they received their copy of the CA decision. This
could also be the reason why the CA did not find it necessary
to resolve the question of the timeliness of petitioner's motion
for reconsideration, even as the CA denied the same.
Independent of this consideration though, this Court
assiduously reviewed the records and found that strong
concerns of substantial justice warrant the relaxation of this
rule.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction and
Development Corporation,59 we ruled that:
In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held
that where strong considerations of substantive
justice are manifest in the petition, this Court may
relax the strict application of the rules of procedure
in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction. In addition to
the basic merits of the main case, such a petition
usually embodies justifying circumstance which
warrants our heeding to the petitioner's cry for
justice in spite of the earlier negligence of counsel.
As we held in Obut v. Court of Appeals:
[W]e cannot look with favor on a course of
action which would place the administration
of justice in a straight jacket for then the
result would be a poor kind of justice if there
would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders,
such as the one subject of this petition, are
issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-
compliance is to be dealt with as the
circumstances attending the case may
warrant. What should guide judicial action is
the principle that a party-litigant is to be
given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint or defense rather
than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities.
The rules of procedure are used only to secure and
not override or frustrate justice. A six-day delay in
the perfection of the appeal, as in this case, does not
warrant the outright dismissal of the appeal.
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, we gave due course to the petitioner's
appeal despite the late filing of its brief in the
appellate court because such appeal involved public
interest. We stated in the said case that the Court
may exempt a particular case from a strict
application of the rules of procedure where the
appellant failed to perfect its appeal within the
reglementary period, resulting in the appellate
court's failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case.
In Republic vs. Imperial, Jr., we also held that there is
more leeway to exempt a case from the strictness of
procedural rules when the appellate court has
already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case.
We emphasize that:
[T]he rules of procedure are mere tools
intended to facilitate the attainment of
justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and
rigid application of the rules must always be
eschewed when it would subvert the rule's
primary objective of enhancing fair trials
and expediting justice. Technicalities should

never be used to defeat the substantive
rights of the other party. Every party-litigant
must be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.60
Moreover, it should be remembered that the Rules were
promulgated to set guidelines in the orderly administration of
justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise,
the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to
technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion.
Technicalities must take a backseat to substantive rights. After
all, it is circumspect leniency in this respect that will give the
parties the fullest opportunity to ventilate the merits of their
respective causes, rather than have them lose life, liberty,
honor or property on sheer technicalities.61
The other technical issue posed by respondent is the
alleged pro forma nature of MCC's motion for reconsideration,
ostensibly because it merely restated the arguments
previously raised and passed upon by the CA.
In this connection, suffice it to say that the mere restatement
of arguments in a motion for reconsideration does not per se
result in a pro forma motion. In Security Bank and Trust
Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,62 we held that a motion for
reconsideration may not be necessarily pro forma even if it
reiterates the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by
the appellate court. A movant may raise the same arguments
precisely to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous.
Furthermore, the pro forma rule will not apply if the
arguments were not sufficiently passed upon and answered in
the decision sought to be reconsidered.
- II -
The second issue poses a novel question that the Court
welcomes. It provides the occasion for this Court to pronounce
a definitive interpretation of the equally innovative provisions
of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis--
vis the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the
original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data
messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the
Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as
inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile
transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first
whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the
coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the
photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this
Court has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when,
in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy,
there is a need to make its own findings in order to support its
conclusions.63
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro
forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove
the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are
inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of
R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best
evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand,
respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal
of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is
an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence
under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that
the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under
the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently
explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.
8
In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows:
Admissibility of Pro Forma
Invoices; Breach of Contract
by Appellants
Turning first to the appellants' argument against the
admissibility of the Pro Forma Invoices with
Reference Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F", pp. 215-
218, Records), appellants argue that the said
documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of
the best evidence rule.
The argument is untenable.
The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted
by the appellee are admissible in evidence, although
they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of
appellant's orders. Such facsimile printouts are
considered Electronic Documents under the New
Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into effect
on August 1, 2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No.
01-7-01-SC).
"(h) 'Electronic document' refers to
information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or
by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed
documents and any printout or output,
readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, the term 'electronic
document' may be used interchangeably
with 'electronic data message'.
An electronic document shall be regarded as the
equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect
the data accurately. (Rule 4, Section 1, A.M. No. 01-7-
01-SC)
The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No.
8792,64 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document
for evidentiary purposes.65 The Rules on Electronic
Evidence66 regards an electronic document as admissible in
evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is
authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said
Rules.67 An electronic document is also the equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.68
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data
message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of
an original document under the Best Evidence Rule,
the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or
an "electronic document."

The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data
message and electronic document as follows:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this
Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.
xxx
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established
or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may
be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
8792,69 which was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then
Secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry, the
Department of Budget and Management, and then Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, defines the terms as:
Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this
Act and these Rules, the following terms are defined,
as follows:
xxx
(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means, but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy. Throughout these Rules,
the term "electronic data message" shall be
equivalent to and be used interchangeably with
"electronic document."
xxxx
(h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or
the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right
is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. Throughout
these Rules, the term "electronic document" shall be
equivalent to and be used interchangeably with
"electronic data message."
The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the IRR's
definition of "electronic data message" is copied from the
Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL),70 from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792 were taken.71 While Congress deleted this phrase in the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR
reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is
significant and pivotal, as discussed hereunder.
9
The clause on the interchangeability of the terms "electronic
data message" and "electronic document" was the result of
the Senate of the Philippines' adoption, in Senate Bill 1902, of
the phrase "electronic data message" and the House of
Representative's employment, in House Bill 9971, of the term
"electronic document."72 In order to expedite the reconciliation
of the two versions, the technical working group of the
Bicameral Conference Committee adopted both terms and
intended them to be the equivalent of each one.73 Be that as it
may, there is a slight difference between the two terms. While
"data message" has reference to information electronically
sent, stored or transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that
it will give rise to a right or extinguish an obligation,74 unlike
an electronic document. Evident from the law, however, is the
legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court
defines the said terms in the following manner:
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. For purposes of
these Rules, the following terms are defined, as
follows:
xxxx
(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established
or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may
be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents
and print-out or output, readable by sight or other
means, which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document. For purposes of
these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be
used interchangeably with "electronic data
message."
Given these definitions, we go back to the original question: Is
an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic
data message or electronic document?
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its
IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance,
convey the impression that facsimile transmissions are
electronic data messages or electronic documents because
they are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition of
an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with
the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory
considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy." And to telecopy is to send a document
from one place to another via a fax machine.75
As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory
construction, Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000 provides that
 10
Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the Senator Magsaysay. Please go ahead, Senator
interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its Santiago.
international origin and the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance of
Senator Santiago. We are in Part 1, short title on the
good faith in international trade relations. The
Declaration of Policy, Section 5, Definition of Terms.
generally accepted principles of international law and
convention on electronic commerce shall likewise be
considered. At the appropriate places in the listing of these terms
that have to be defined since these are arranged
alphabetically, Mr. President, I would like to insert the
Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this section
term DATA and its definition. So, the amendment will
can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the
read: "DATA" MEANS REPRESENTATION, IN ANY
UNCITRAL's definition of "data message":
FORM, OF INFORMATION OR CONCEPTS.

"Data message" means information generated, sent,

The explanation is this: This definition of "data" or
received or stored by electronic, optical or similar
"data" as it is now fashionably pronounced in
means including, but not limited to, electronic data
America - - the definition of "data" ensures that our
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
bill applies to any form of information in an electronic
telecopy.76
record, whether these are figures, facts or ideas.

is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an

"electronic data message."
However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy," and replaced the term "data message" (as
found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with "electronic data
message." This legislative divergence from what is assumed
as the term's "international origin" has bred uncertainty and
now impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true intent
of the framers of the law. Indeed, in the construction or
interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to
search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. 77 A
construction should be rejected that gives to the language
used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to
defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the
enactment.78
Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., the
principal author of Senate Bill 1902 (the predecessor of R.A.
No. 8792), sponsored the bill on second reading, he proposed
to adopt the term "data message" as formulated and defined
in the UNCITRAL Model Law.79 During the period of
amendments, however, the term evolved into "electronic data
message," and the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy" in the UNCITRAL Model Law was deleted.
Furthermore, the term "electronic data message," though
maintaining its description under the UNCITRAL Model Law,
except for the aforesaid deleted phrase, conveyed a different
meaning, as revealed in the following proceedings:
xxxx
Senator Santiago. Yes, Mr. President. I will furnish a
copy together with the explanation of this proposed
amendment.
And then finally, before I leave the Floor, may I
please be allowed to go back to Section 5; the
Definition of Terms. In light of the acceptance by the
good Senator of my proposed amendments, it will
then become necessary to add certain terms in our
list of terms to be defined. I would like to add a
definition on what is "data," what is "electronic
record" and what is an "electronic record system."
If the gentleman will give me permission, I will
proceed with the proposed amendment on Definition
of Terms, Section 5.
So again, the proposed amendment is this: "DATA"
MEANS REPRESENTATIONS, IN ANY FORM, OF
INFORMATION OR CONCEPTS.
Senator Magsaysay. May I know how will this affect
the definition of "Data Message" which encompasses
electronic records, electronic writings and electronic
documents?
Senator Santiago. These are completely congruent
with each other. These are compatible. When we
define "data," we are simply reinforcing the definition
of what is a data message.
Senator Magsaysay. It is accepted, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Thank you. The next term is
"ELECTRONIC RECORD." The proposed amendment is
as follows:
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" MEANS DATA THAT IS
RECORDED OR STORED ON ANY MEDIUM IN OR BY A
COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE,
THAT CAN BE READ OR PERCEIVED BY A PERSON OR
A COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE. IT
INCLUDES A DISPLAY, PRINTOUT OR OTHER OUTPUT
OF THAT DATA.
The explanation for this term and its definition is as
follows: The term "ELECTRONIC RECORD" fixes the
scope of our bill. The record is the data. The record
may be on any medium. It is electronic because it is
recorded or stored in or by a computer system or a
similar device.
The amendment is intended to apply, for example, to
data on magnetic strips on cards or in Smart
cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes
or faxes, except computer-generated faxes,
unlike the United Nations model law on
electronic commerce. It would also not apply to
regular digital telephone conversations since the
information is not recorded. It would apply to voice
mail since the information has been recorded in or
by a device similar to a computer. Likewise, video
records are not covered. Though when the video is
transferred to a website, it would be covered
because of the involvement of the computer. Music
recorded by a computer system on a compact disc
would be covered.

In short, not all data recorded or stored in digital
form is covered. A computer or a similar device has
to be involved in its creation or storage. The term
"similar device" does not extend to all devices that
create or store data in digital form. Although things
that are not recorded or preserved by or in a
computer system are omitted from this bill, these
may well be admissible under other rules of law. This
provision focuses on replacing the search for
originality proving the reliability of systems instead
of that of individual records and using standards to
show systems reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a
computer system such as printouts are themselves
electronic records being just the means of intelligible
display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of
the printout would be paper record subject to the
usual rules about copies, but the original printout
would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this
bill.
However, printouts that are used only as paper
records and whose computer origin is never again
called on are treated as paper records. In that case,
the reliability of the computer system that produces
the record is irrelevant to its reliability.
Senator Magsaysay. Mr. President, if my memory
does not fail me, earlier, the lady Senator accepted
that we use the term "Data Message" rather than
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" in being consistent with the
UNCITRAL term of "Data Message." So with the new
amendment of defining "ELECTRONIC RECORD," will
this affect her accepting of the use of "Data
Message" instead of "ELECTRONIC RECORD"?
Senator Santiago. No, it will not. Thank you for
reminding me. The term I would like to insert is
ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE in lieu of "ELECTRONIC
RECORD."
Senator Magsaysay. Then we are, in
effect, amending the term of the definition of
"Data Message" on page 2A, line 31, to which
we have no objection.
Senator Santiago. Thank you, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Santiago. Mr. President, I have proposed all
the amendments that I desire to, including the
amendment on the effect of error or change. I will
provide the language of the amendment together
with the explanation supporting that amendment to
the distinguished sponsor and then he can feel free
to take it up in any session without any further
intervention.
Senator Magsaysay. Before we end, Mr. President, I
understand from the proponent of these
amendments that these are based on the Canadian
E-commerce Law of 1998. Is that not right?
Senator Santiago. That is correct.80
Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term
"electronic data message," it was consonant with the
explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would
11
not apply "to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated
faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic
commerce." In explaining the term "electronic record"
patterned after the E-Commerce Law of Canada, Senator
Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term "electronic data
message." This term then, while maintaining part of the
UNCITRAL Model Law's terminology of "data message," has
assumed a different context, this time, consonant with the
term "electronic record" in the law of Canada. It accounts for
the addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the
phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." Noteworthy is
that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, explains the term
"electronic record," as drafted in the Uniform Electronic
Evidence Act, in a manner strikingly similar to Sen. Santiago's
explanation during the Senate deliberations:
"Electronic record" fixes the scope of the Act. The
record is the data. The record may be any medium. It
is "electronic" because it is recorded or stored in or
by a computer system or similar device. The Act is
intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic
strips on cards, or in smart cards. As drafted, it would
not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-
generated faxes), unlike the United Nations Model
Law on Electronic Commerce. It would also not apply
to regular digital telephone conversations, since the
information is not recorded. It would apply to voice
mail, since the information has been recorded in or
by a device similar to a computer. Likewise video
records are not covered, though when the video is
transferred to a Web site it would be, because of the
involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a
computer system on a compact disk would be
covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in "digital"
form is covered. A computer or similar device has to
be involved in its creation or storage. The term
"similar device" does not extend to all devices that
create or store data in digital form. Although things
that are not recorded or preserved by or in a
computer system are omitted from this Act, they may
well be admissible under other rules of law. This Act
focuses on replacing the search for originality,
proving the reliability of systems instead of that of
individual records, and using standards to show
systems reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a
computer system, such as printouts, are themselves
electronic records, being just the means of intelligible
display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of
the printout would be paper records subject to the
usual rules about copies, but the "original" printout
would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this
Act.
However, printouts that are used only as paper
records, and whose computer origin is never again
called on, are treated as paper records. See
subsection 4(2). In this case the reliability of the
computer system that produced the record is
relevant to its reliability.81
There is no question then that when Congress formulated the
term "electronic data message," it intended the same
meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada law.
This construction of the term "electronic data message,"
which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated
faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's
focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional
equivalent approach"82 that it espouses. In fact, the

deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions on
paperless and digital transactions.
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but
verily are paper-based.
A facsimile machine, which was first patented in 1843 by
Alexander Bain,83 is a device that can send or receive pictures
and text over a telephone line. It works by digitizing an image
dividing it into a grid of dots. Each dot is either on or off,
depending on whether it is black or white. Electronically, each
dot is represented by a bit that has a value of either 0 (off) or
1 (on). In this way, the fax machine translates a picture into a
series of zeros and ones (called a bit map) that can be
transmitted like normal computer data. On the receiving side,
a fax machine reads the incoming data, translates the zeros
and ones back into dots, and reprints the picture.84 A fax
machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a
computer printer combined into a highly specialized package.
The scanner converts the content of a physical document into
a digital image, the modem sends the image data over a
phone line, and the printer at the other end makes a duplicate
of the original document.85 Thus, in Garvida v. Sales,
Jr.,86where we explained the unacceptability of filing pleadings
through fax machines, we ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving
the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade
or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current. The current is transmitted as a signal over
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is
used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the
elemental area in the proper position and the correct
shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other
device that produces a printed record on paper
referred to as a facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all
the marks of an original. Without the original, there is
no way of determining on its face whether the
facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may,
in fact, be a sham pleading.87
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists
an original paper-based information or data that is scanned,
sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end.
Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be
the functional equivalent and to have the same legal
function as paper-based documents.88 Further, in a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy
to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the
same, in all respects, and are considered as
originals.89 Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data
message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
"electronic document," could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as
sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two
copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal
effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology90 when it drafted
the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like
telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated
faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the
ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it
defined the term "electronic data message."
12
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law
when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's
definition of "data message," without considering the
intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." The inclusion of this phrase
in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-
making power of administrative agencies. After all, the power
of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is
found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing
rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the Legislature.91 Thus, if a discrepancy
occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law
cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuancean
administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress.92 Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax
transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit
of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Incidentally, the National Statistical Coordination Board Task
Force on the Measurement of E-Commerce, 93 on November 22,
2006, recommended a working definition of "electronic
commerce," as "[a]ny commercial transaction conducted
through electronic, optical and similar medium, mode,
instrumentality and technology. The transaction includes the
sale or purchase of goods and services, between individuals,
households, businesses and governments conducted over
computer-mediated networks through the Internet, mobile
phones, electronic data interchange (EDI) and other channels
through open and closed networks." The Task Force's
proposed definition is similar to the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) broad definition as
it covers transactions made over any network, and, in
addition, it adopted the following provisions of the OECD
definition: (1) for transactions, it covers sale or purchase of
goods and services; (2) for channel/network, it considers any
computer-mediated network and NOT limited to Internet
alone; (3) it excludes transactions received/placed using fax,
telephone or non-interactive mail; (4) it considers payments
done online or offline; and (5) it considers delivery made
online (like downloading of purchased books, music or
software programs) or offline (deliveries of goods). 94
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data
message" and "electronic document," as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is
not admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data
message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be
considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater
reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not
electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma
Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2
(Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the
original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary
to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.
- III -
Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being
electronic evidence, this Court finds that respondent has
proven by preponderance of evidence the existence of a
perfected contract of sale.
 13
In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is
essential that the claimant proves (1) the existence of a
perfected contract, (2) the breach thereof by the other G Letter to defendant SANYO SEIKE To pr
contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she dated 20 June 2000, contained in date
sustained due to such breach. Actori incumbit onus probandi. facsimile/thermal paper defen
The burden of proof rests on the party who advances a
proposition affirmatively.95 In other words, a plaintiff in a civil
G-1 Signature of defendant Gregory
action must establish his case by a preponderance of
Chan, contained in facsimile/thermal
evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is more
paper.
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.96

In general, contracts are perfected by mere consent,97 which H Letter to defendants dated 22 June To pr
is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance 2000, original succe
upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the plain
contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance the s
absolute.98 They are, moreover, obligatory in whatever form
they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present.99 Sale, being a I Letter to defendants dated 26 June To pr
consensual contract, follows the general rule that it is 2000, original defen
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds Lette
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon refus
J Letter to defendants dated 26 June the p
the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally 2000, original of de
demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law
governing the form of contracts.100 L/Cs.
K Letter to defendants dated 27 June
The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent or 2000, original
meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price, (2) object certain which is the subject
L Facsimile message to defendants
matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the obligation which is
dated 28 June 2000, photocopy
established.101

In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected contract
of sale between the parties, respondent Ssangyong formally
offered in evidence the testimonies of its witnesses and the
following exhibits:
Exhibit Description
E Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April
2000 with Contract No. ST2-
POSTS0401-1, photocopy
E-1 Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April
2000 with Contract No. ST2-
POSTS0401, contained in
facsimile/thermal paper faxed by
defendants to plaintiff showing the
printed transmission details on the
upper portion of said paper as
coming from defendant MCC on 26
Apr 00 08:41AM
E-2 Conforme signature of Mr. Gregory
Chan, contained in facsimile/thermal
paper faxed by defendants to
plaintiff showing the printed
transmission details on the upper
portion of said paper as coming from
defendant MCC on 26 Apr 00
08:41AM
F Pro forma Invoice dated 17 April
2000 with Contract No. ST2-
POSTSO401-2, photocopy
M Letter from defendants dated 29 To pr
June 2000, contained in liabil
facsimile/thermal paper faxed by "mor
defendants to plaintiff showing the the L
printed transmission details on the unde
upper portion of said paper as
Purpose coming from defendant MCC on 29
June 00 11:12 AM
To show that defendants contracted with
plaintiff for the delivery of 110 MTSignature
M-1 of stainless
of defendant Gregory
steel from Korea payable by way of an contained in facsimile/thermal
Chan,
irrevocable letter of credit in favorpaper
of plaintiff,
faxed by defendants to
among other conditions. plaintiff showing the printed
transmission details on the upper
portion of said paper as coming from
To show that defendants sent theirdefendant MCC on June 00 11:12 AM
confirmation of the (i) delivery to it of the
specified stainless steel products, (ii)
defendants' payment
N thereof by way of an
Letter to defendants dated 29 June
irrevocable letter of credit in favor2000,
of plaintiff,
original
among other conditions.
O Letter to defendants dated 30 June To pr
2000, photocopy defen
requ
defen
To show that defendants sent their there
confirmation of the (i) delivery to it of the total
of 220MT specified stainless steel products, (ii)
defendants' payment
P thereof by way of an
Letter to defendants dated 06 July
irrevocable letter of credit in favor2000,
of plaintiff,
original
among other conditions.
Q Demand letter to defendants dated To pr
15 Aug 2000, original enga
effor
To show that defendants contracted with
plaintiff for delivery of another 110 MT of
stainless steelRfrom Korea payableDemand letter to defendants dated
by way of To pr
23 Aug
an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of 2000, original in fav
plaintiff, among other conditions. postp
amou
time,
 14

will cancel the contract. 100 m

plain
MCC.
S Demand letter to defendants dated To show defendants' refusal and failure to
11 Sept 2000, original open the final L/C on time, the cancellation of
Significantly,
the contract among these thereof,
as a consequence documentary
and evidence presented
final by respondent,
demand MCC, in its to
upon defendants petition
remit before
its this Court, assails
the admissibility only of Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
obligations.
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F").
After sifting through the records, the Court found that these
W Letter from plaintiff SSANGYONG to To prove that are
invoices there was photocopies
mere a perfected sale and original fax
of their
defendant SANYO SEIKI dated 13 purchase agreement
transmittals. betweenavers
Ssangyong the parties for documents were
that these
April 2000, with fax back from 220 metric
prepared tons of steel
after MCC products
asked forat the
the price of the original order
splitting
defendants SANYO SEIKI/MCC to of US$1,860/ton.
into two, so that the latter can apply for an L/C with greater
plaintiff SSANGYONG, contained in facility. It, however, failed to explain why the originals of these
facsimile/thermal paper with back- documents were not presented.
up photocopy
To determine whether these documents are admissible in
W-1 Conforme signature of defendant evidence,
To prove we apply the
that defendants, ordinary
acting Rules on Evidence, for as
through
Gregory Chan, contained in discussed
Gregory Chan, above
agreedweto cannot
the saleapply
and the Electronic Commerce
facsimile/thermal paper with back- Act ofof2000
purchase 220 and thetons
metric Rules
of on Electronic
steel productsEvidence.
up photocopy at the price of US$1,860/ton.
Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are
simply secondary evidence, admissible only upon compliance
W-2 Name of sender MCC Industrial Sales To prove
with that
Ruledefendants
130, Section sent their conformity
5, which states, "[w]hen the original
Corporation to the sale and has
document purchase
been lostagreement by
or destroyed, or cannot be produced
facsimile transmission.
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
X Pro forma Invoice dated 16 August To prove that defendant MCC agreed to adjust
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
2000, photocopy and split the confirmed purchase order into 2
witnesses in the order stated." Furthermore, the offeror of
shipments at 100 metric tons each at the
secondary evidence must prove the predicates thereof,
discounted price of US$1,700/ton.
namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad
faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown
X-1 Notation "1/2", photocopy by circumstantial
To prove that the present evidence of routine practices of destruction
of documents;
was the first of 2 pro (b) the proponent
forma invoices. must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference
of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must
X-2 Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080-1, photocopy be shown
To prove that thethat a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful
present
search
was the firsthas
of 2been made for the document in the proper place
or places. It has been held that where the missing document
is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is
X-3 Conforme signature of defendant To prove that than
required defendant
whereMCC, acting through
the document is only collaterally
Gregory Chan, photocopy Gregory Chan,103agreed to the sale and
involved.
purchase of the balance of 100 metric tons at
the discounted price of US$1,700/ton, apart
fromGiven these
the other norms,
order andwe find that
shipment ofrespondent
100 failed to prove
the existence of the original
metric tons which was delivered by plaintiff fax transmissions of Exhibits E
and F, and
SSANGYONG and likewise
paid for didbynot sufficiently
defendant MCC.prove the loss or
destruction of the originals. Thus, Exhibits E and F cannot be
admitted in evidence and accorded probative weight.
DD Letter from defendant MCC to To prove that there was a perfected sale and
plaintiff SSANGYONG dated 22 purchase agreement
It is observed, betweenthat
however, plaintiff
respondent Ssangyong did not
August 2000, contained in SSANGYONG
rely merely andon defendant
Exhibits EMCC andfor the
F to prove the perfected
facsimile/thermal paper with back- balance of 100Itmetric
contract. tons, apart
also introduced in from the a variety of other
evidence
up photocopy otherdocuments,
order and shipment
as enumeratedof 100above,
metric together
tons with the
which was delivered
testimonies of itsbywitnesses.
plaintiff SSANGYONG
Notable among them are Pro
and paid
Forma forInvoice
by defendant MCC.
Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-
2 which were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC.
As already mentioned, these invoices slightly varied the terms
DD-1 Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080-1, contained To prove that there was a perfected sale and
of the earlier invoices such that the quantity was now
in facsimile/thermal paper with back- purchase agreement between plaintiff
officially 100MT per invoice and the price reduced
up photocopy SSANGYONG and defendant MCC for the
to US$1,700.00 per MT. The copies of the said August 16,
balance of 100 metric tons, apart from the
2000 invoices submitted to the court bear the conformity
other order and shipment of 100 metric tons
signature of MCC Manager Chan.
which was delivered by plaintiff SSANGYONG
and paid for by defendant MCC.
Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1 (Exhibit "X"),
however, is a mere photocopy of its original. But then again,
DD-2 Signature of defendant Gregory To prove that defendant
petitioner MCC doesMCC, actingthe
not assail through
admissibility of this
Chan, contained in facsimile/thermal Gregory Chan, agreed
document to the petition.
in the instant sale and Verily, evidence not objected
paper with back-up photocopy purchase of the balance
to is deemed admitted of 100
and metric
may betons,validly considered by the
apart from the other order and shipment of

court in arriving at its judgment.104 Issues not raised on appeal
are deemed abandoned.
As to Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 (Exhibits "1-A"
and "2-C"), which was certified by PCIBank as a true copy of
its original,105 it was, in fact, petitioner MCC which introduced
this document in evidence. Petitioner MCC paid for the order
stated in this invoice. Its admissibility, therefore, is not open
to question.
These invoices (ST2-POSTS0401, ST2-POSTS080-1 and
ST2-POSTS080-2), along with the other unchallenged
documentary evidence of respondent Ssangyong,
preponderate in favor of the claim that a contract of sale was
perfected by the parties.
This Court also finds merit in the following observations of the
trial court:
Defendants presented Letter of Credit (Exhibits "1",
"1-A" to "1-R") referring to Pro Forma Invoice for
Contract No. ST2POSTS080-2, in the amount of
US$170,000.00, and which bears the signature of
Gregory Chan, General Manager of MCC. Plaintiff, on
the other hand, presented Pro Forma Invoice
referring to Contract No. ST2-POSTS080-1, in the
amount of US$170,000.00, which likewise bears the
signature of Gregory Chan, MCC. Plaintiff accounted
for the notation "1/2" on the right upper portion of
the Invoice, that is, that it was the first of two (2) pro
forma invoices covering the subject contract between
plaintiff and the defendants. Defendants, on the
other hand, failed to account for the notation "2/2" in
its Pro Forma Invoice (Exhibit "1-A"). Observably
further, both Pro Forma Invoices bear the same date
and details, which logically mean that they both
apply to one and the same transaction.106
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half
of the transaction if there was no first half to speak of?
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of
both parties, started with the petitioner and the respondent
agreeing on the sale and purchase of 220MT of stainless steel
at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial contract was perfected.
Later, as petitioner asked for several extensions to pay,
adjustments in the delivery dates, and discounts in the price
as originally agreed, the parties slightly varied the terms of
their contract, without necessarily novating it, to the effect
that the original order was reduced to 200MT, split into two
deliveries, and the price discounted to US$1,700 per MT.
Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and failed
to open an L/C for the other 100MT. Notably, the conduct of
both parties sufficiently established the existence of a
contract of sale, even if the writings of the parties, because of
their contested admissibility, were not as explicit in
establishing a contract.107 Appropriate conduct by the parties
may be sufficient to establish an agreement, and while there
may be instances where the exchange of correspondence
does not disclose the exact point at which the deal was
closed, the actions of the parties may indicate that a binding
obligation has been undertaken.108
With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear
that when petitioner did not open the L/C for the first half of
the transaction (100MT), despite numerous demands from
respondent Ssangyong, petitioner breached its contractual
obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the failure of a
buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach of the
contract between buyer and seller. Indeed, where the buyer
fails to open a letter of credit as stipulated, the seller or
exporter is entitled to claim damages for such breach.
15
Damages for failure to open a commercial credit may, in
appropriate cases, include the loss of profit which the seller
would reasonably have made had the transaction been carried
out.109
- IV -
This Court, however, finds that the award of actual damages
is not in accord with the evidence on record. It is axiomatic
that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed,
but must be proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty.110 In Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals,111 we explained
that:
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded
in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss
he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural
justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong done.
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. It is hornbook
doctrine that to be able to recover actual damages,
the claimant bears the onus of presenting before the
court actual proof of the damages alleged to have
been suffered, thus:
A party is entitled to an adequate
compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such damages, to be recoverable,
must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree
of certainty. We have emphasized that these
damages cannot be presumed and courts, in
making an award must point out specific
facts which could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or
actual damages are borne.112
In the instant case, the trial court awarded to respondent
Ssangyong US$93,493.87 as actual damages. On appeal, the
same was affirmed by the appellate court. Noticeably,
however, the trial and the appellate courts, in making the said
award, relied on the following documents submitted in
evidence by the respondent: (1) Exhibit "U," the Statement of
Account dated March 30, 2001; (2) Exhibit "U-1," the details of
the said Statement of Account); (3) Exhibit "V," the contract of
the alleged resale of the goods to a Korean corporation; and
(4) Exhibit "V-1," the authentication of the resale contract
from the Korean Embassy and certification from the Philippine
Consular Office.
The statement of account and the details of the losses
sustained by respondent due to the said breach are, at best,
self-serving. It was respondent Ssangyong itself which
prepared the said documents. The items therein are not even
substantiated by official receipts. In the absence of
corroborative evidence, the said statement of account is not
sufficient basis to award actual damages. The court cannot
simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend
on competent proof that the claimant had suffered, and on
evidence of, the actual amount thereof.113
Furthermore, the sales contract and its authentication
certificates, Exhibits "V" and "V-1," allegedly evidencing the
resale at a loss of the stainless steel subject of the parties'
breached contract, fail to convince this Court of the veracity of
its contents. The steel items indicated in the sales
contract114 with a Korean corporation are different in all
respects from the items ordered by petitioner MCC, even in
size and quantity. We observed the following discrepancies:
 16
List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "V": From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC
that Ssangyong did not adequately prove that the items
resold at a loss were the same items ordered by the
COMMODITY: Stainless Steel HR Sheet in Coil, Slit Edge
petitioner. Therefore, as the claim for actual damages was not
SPEC: SUS304 NO. 1 proven, the Court cannot sanction the award.

SIZE/Q'TY: Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner knowingly

breached its contractual obligation and obstinately refused to
pay despite repeated demands from respondent. Petitioner
2.8MM X 1,219MM X C 8.193MT even asked for several extensions of time for it to make good
its obligation. But in spite of respondent's continuous
accommodation, petitioner completely reneged on its
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.736MT contractual duty. For such inattention and insensitivity, MCC
must be held liable for nominal damages. "Nominal damages
are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.885MT
must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no
actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.629MT breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual
damages whatsoever have been or can be
shown.'"117 Accordingly, the Court awards nominal damages
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.307MT of P200,000.00 to respondent Ssangyong.

4.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.247MT As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well settled that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate and not
every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C 8.450MT attorney's fees. The party must show that he falls under one
of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.118 In the instant case, however, the Court finds the
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C 8.870MT award of attorney's fees proper, considering that petitioner
MCC's unjustified refusal to pay has compelled respondent
Ssangyong to litigate and to incur expenses to protect its
5.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.391MT rights.

6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 6.589MT WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal

is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 is MODIFIED in that the
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.878MT award of actual damages is DELETED. However, petitioner
is ORDERED to pay respondent NOMINAL DAMAGES in the
amount of P200,000.00, and the ATTORNEY'S FEES as
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.397MT awarded by the trial court.

TOTAL: 95.562MT115 SO ORDERED.

List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "X" (the

invoice that was not paid): EN BANC

DESCRIPTION: Hot Rolled Stainless Steel Coil SUS 304

SIZE AND QUANTITY:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH A.M. No. CA-05-20-P

2.6 MM X 4' X C 10.0MT

VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-

3.0 MM X 4' X C 25.0MT
OF APPEALS, 81-CA-P)
4.0 MM X 4' X C 15.0MT
Complainant,
4.5 MM X 4' X C 15.0MT
Present:

5.0 MM X 4' X C 10.0MT

6.0 MM X 4' X C 25.0MT

- versus - CARPIO,

TOTAL: 100MT CIELITO M. SALUD,

 17
CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated: On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the
National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of
release in the Lagua case. The respondent left the prison
Respondent. compound at around 2:30 p.m.[8]

September 9, 2005 In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a

telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced
herself as Laguas relative. It was about 2:00 p.m. The caller
x--------------------------------------------- asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate
-----x Laguas provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang
that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of
DECISION the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal case
originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be
given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the
respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and
asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Laguas
relative.

What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty.

CALLEJO, SR., J.: Madarangs Affidavit dated December 8, 2003, as follows:

4. That upon telephone queries made

with the office of the Clerk of Court of
RTC Pasig, I learned that Rhodora
Cielito Salud, Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial Valdez is the incumbent Process Server
Records Division, Court of Appeals (CA) stands charged with of RTC, [Branch] 163, Pasig City, from
the following offenses: which the original case against
accused-appellant Lagua originated.
1. Inefficiency and incompetence in the Disguising myself as accused-appellant
performance of official duties; Laguas relative, I dialed [Branch] 163,
2. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best RTC, Pasig (6314273) but Rhodora
interest of the service; and Valdez did not report for work that day,
3. Directly or indirectly having according to Baby (also known as
financial and material interest in an Ester), her officemate (who) answered
official transaction, under Section my call. She added that Rhodora Valdez
22, paragraphs (p), (t) and (u), Rule has been waiting for us (Laguas
XIV of the Omnibus Rules relatives) to call. Her exact words were
Implementing the Civil Service Law. these: Wala si Rhodora. Meron lang
[1]
siyang nilakad. Pero kahapon pa nya
hinihintay ang tawag nyo. May kulang
pa kayo eh. Kailangan kasing i-en banc
The Facts sa Court of Appeals ang kaso ni Lagua.

5. That I coordinated with Ms. Cecil

Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Secarro, the Acting Chief of the Mailing
Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H before the Section, to inquire if it was usual/normal
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. [2] On appeal, the for her to text her process servers on
case was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of the field for an update of their
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. Lagua, who was deliveries, to which she answered in the
then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in affirmative. While she was in the office,
Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding she texted Salud for his whereabouts
the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution and he replied, that he was on his way
on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond. back to Quezon City. That was before 4
p.m., adding that his deliveries were ok.
Laguas bond was approved in a Resolution[3] dated
November 6, 2003, where the appellate court also directed 6. That I got Saluds mobile phone
the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The number from Ms. Secarro and started
resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk texting him at about the same time Ms.
of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang, for Secarro did. I represented myself as
promulgation. Arlyn, Laguas relative. Most of his text
messages are still stored in my mobile
Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the phone. In fact, I received one text
respondents unusual interest in the Lagua case. The message from him while I was at the
respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the office of Justice Magtolis, (the Chairman
appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of the 6th Division and the ponente of
of release in the said case and was initially told there was C.R. No. 27423) in the late afternoon of
none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were November 7, 2003 while reporting to
eventually found.[4] Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of her this incident. Those stored in my
the Order of Release Upon Bond, [5] and to notify the mailing phone are the following:
section that there were orders requiring personal service. [6] At
around 4:00 p.m., the respondent then went to Atty. 1. bkit, C rhodora to.
Madarangs office and assisted in arranging and stapling the 639204439082. Nov.
papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and other 2003, 15:36:15
papers himself to the Mailing Section.[7]
 18
2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT 17. Ano m ba Melchor
ANONG PANGALAN MO Lagua 639184470111 7
639204439082, 7 Nov Nov 2003 21:15:52
2003 16:14:47
18. Between 5 and 5:30
3. SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY ng hapon. Bkit.
N KAMI 639204439082, 7 639184470111 7 Nov.
Nov 2003 16:40:21 2003 21:54:24

4. TAWAG K S AKIN 19. 3 PM PUWEDE KB

639204439082 7 Nov 639004039082 10 Nov
2003 17:18:47 2003 12:09:32

5. NARELEASE N C MR. 20. Kilala mo b c rhodora.

LAGUA. NAGKITA N B KAYO Nagkita na b kayo. Ala
639204439082-7 Nov naman problema sa
2003 19:44:52 kanya. Ok naman
639184470111 7 Nov
6. Magkano b and binigay 2003, 21:57:13
nyo sa middle nyo. Puede
bang malaman 21. MAGKITA N LANG TAYO
639184470111-7 Nov 639204439082 10 Nov.
2003 20:32:05 2003, 12:20:16

7. Gud evening. May gusto 22. A, OK, NAGKITA N B

lng akong malaman. Sana KAYO NG KAMAGANAK MO
alang makaalam kahit 639204439082 10 Nov
cino. Lito 6391844701117 2003 15:12:14
Nov. 2003 19:54:20
23. D TALAGA AKO
8. Cno ang kausap n DARATING DAHIL WALA
Rhodora. Pwede bang AKONG KAILANGAN S IYO.
malaman 639184470111- 639204439082 10 Nov
7 Nov 2003 20:37:57 2003 18:36:03

9. May landline ka. 7. That Salud called me up in the

Tawagan kta bukas nang morning of November 8, 2003 at around
umaga 639184470111-7 7:33 but I purposely did not answer
Nov 2003 20:56:31 him. Why did he need to call me up?

10. Wag s Court of Appeal. 8. That I personally called up the Bureau

Txt na lang kta kung saan. of Prisons for the exact time the Order
639184470111-7 Nov of Release was delivered and when
2003 20:52:58 accused appellant Lagua was released.
I learned that the Order of Release was
11. Gusto mo bukas nang received at 9:15 A.M. and that Lagua
umaga magkita tyo. was released between 5-5:30 P.M. of
639184470111 7 Nov November 7, 2003.
2003 20:57:10
9. That I was able to talk to Rhodora
12. D ba pwede bukas tyo Valdez the following Monday, November
kita. May gusto lang ako 10, 2003. Again, I introduced myself as
malaman 639184470111 Laguas relative, Arlyn and told her I
7 Nov 2003 21:02:41 only wanted to know how much more
we had to pay for Laguas release. She
13. D 2ngkol kay rhodora refused to entertain me because
duon sa kasama ko according to her, Hindi ikaw ang kausap
kaninang lalakeng pinsan ko. Duda ako sa yo. Kung gusto mo,
639184470111 7 Nov puntahan mo ako dito bukas, para
2003, 21:04:28 magkita tayo. Pero lumabas na si
Lagua. Itinawag sa akin ni Lito Salud.
14. Ala po ako sa Lunes sa Then, she [hung] up.
opis. Sa hapon po puede
kyo 639184470111, 7 Nov 10. That on Tuesday, November 11, 2003, I
2003 21:07:23 brought Salud, accompanied by Ms.
Secarro to Justice Magtolis. Out of the
15. Kay Melchor Lagua confrontation, we discovered that Salud
639184470111 7 Nov did not properly serve the copies of the
2003 21:08:19 Resolution and Order of Release upon
the accused-appellant and his counsel,
16. Kasama ko cya kanina Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo of the Quimpo
nang lumabas Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates. He
639184470111 7 Nov. gave them to a certain Art, allegedly
2003 21:13:05 Laguas relative who he claimed
approached him at the Bureau of

Prisons in the morning of November 7,
2003. He told Justice Magtolis that he
gave these documents to Art, who
promised to take care of them, even
before he could deliver the copy
addressed to the Director of Prisons. He
never mentioned that this Art was
connected with the office of accused-
appellants counsel. Because of this
information from Salud himself, I did not
sign the Certificate of Service, Annex C.
11. That several days later, Salud
accompanied by Ms. Secarro, came to
my office to apologize. But before he
could even say a word, he broke down
in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he
uttered, Boss, patawad po, alang-alang
sa aking mga anak.[9]
On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the
respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent
denied extorting or receiving money for Laguas release, or in
any other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of
resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his
counsel to Art Baluran.[10] Justice Magtolis then called the
respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie L.
Gatmaitan, who stated that she would transfer the respondent
to another office which has nothing to do with cases.
Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the
respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003, containing,
among others, the following allegations:
The delivery of resolutions/orders
to unauthorized persons and complete
strangers who promised to take care thereof
(siya na raw ang bahala) constitutes not
only neglect of duty but also conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Staying for the whole day within the
vicinity of the National Bilibid Prisons to the
point of failing to fulfill his other duties for
the day constitutes inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official
duties. On the other hand, the use of my
name and that of our Division Clerk of Court
to illegally solicit financial or material
benefit from parties with pending cases
before this Court is illegal per se.
In view of the foregoing, it is
respectfully requested that Cielito Salud be
subjected to an administrative investigation
and disciplinary action.[11]
Attached to the complaint were the following documents to
support the charges:
ANNEX A - Record of the cases received by
Salud on November 6, 2003 for
delivery/service the following day,
November 7, 2003. Please note that in each
of the 3 cases assigned to him, there are
several parties/counsels to be served.
ANNEX B - Certificate of Service signed by
Salud, attested by the Acting Chief of the
Mailing Section and Division Clerk of Court
Ma. Ramona L. Ledesma, showing that the
parties/counsel in SP-67586 were served
only on November 10, 2003 (not on
November 7, 2003).
19
ANNEX C - Certificate of Service for CR-
27423, and corresponding Delivery
Receipts.
C-1 - Delivery Receipts for Defense Counsel
Salvador Quimpo signed by someone whose
signature was identified by Salud [as] Art a
cousin of appellant Melchor Lagua.
C-2 - Delivery Receipt for the accused-
appellant, received by the same Art and not
served thru the Director of Prisons.
C-3 - Delivery Receipt for the OSG,
showing that it was delivered/received by
the said office on November 10, 2003, not
on November 7, 2003.
C-4 - Delivery Receipt for the Director of
Prisons showing receipt on November 7,
2003.
ANNEX D - Record of Resolutions in 3 other
cases (SP-80241, SP-65404 and SP-77957)
received for service by Salud on November
10, 2003. The resolutions/processes in these
3 cases were delivered/served to the
parties/counsel on November 10, 2003
together with undelivered resolutions left
unserved/undelivered on November 7, 2003.
ANNEX E - Certification signed by Salud
showing service to parties/counsel in SP-
65404 (received by Salud on November 10,
2003) on November 10, 2003 (same date)
ANNEX F, F-1 & F-2 - Delivery Receipts for
parties/counsel in SP-65404, showing
service/delivery on November 10, 2003 in
contrast to his minimal delivery/services on
November 7, 2003 only in Muntinlupa.
ANNEX G - Copy of the resolution dated
November 6, 2003 of the 6 th Division
approving the appellants bond and directing
the issuance of an order of release.
ANNEX H - Copy of the Order of Release
upon Bond, which Salud was supposed to
deliver, among others on November 7, 2003
to the defense counsel, the appellant and
the OSG.[12]
In his counter-affidavit,[13] the respondent vehemently
denied the charges. He never demanded money from Laguas
relative; his name had been used by someone and was, thus,
a mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover, the fact that he
immediately released the CA order in question was clear proof
that he had no financial interest in the transaction. His version
of the events that occurred that day is as follows:
4.1 That on November 6, 2003 at
around 1:38 p.m. the Acting Chief
of the Mailing Section gave me an
assignment to deliver the Writ of
Habeas Corpus (hearing on
November 26, 2003 at RTC,
Zamboanga) for CA-G.R. SP No.
80238 for delivery to NBI, PAO,
Quezon City, Muntinlupa;
4.2 That I delivered a copy of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus to [the

National] Bureau of Investigation
(NBI);
4.3 That while I was at the NBI, I
received a text message from my
boss, requesting me to return to
the office immediately because
there is another notice of resolution
coming from Atty. Ledesma which I
have to serve to Quezon City and
Las Pias;
4.4 In compliance with the request, I
returned to the Office and arrived
at around 3:15 p.m.;
4.5 That when I received the
resolution, I read the same and
found out that the hearing is still
scheduled on December 10, 2003
at 10:30 a.m.;
4.6 That when I was about to leave
to deliver the Writ of Habeas
Corpus and the Notice of Hearing
to the PAO, Quezon City, my
officemate Jun Vicencio told me to
wait because Irma, the staff of Atty.
Madarang requested me to standby
because I need to deliver the Order
of Release to the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa;
4.7 That because of the request I
waited until 4:00 p.m.;
4.8 That because its already late, I
decided to go to Atty. Madarangs
office to inquire about the Order of
Release which I need to deliver to
the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa;
4.9 That Atty. Madarang told me to
wait a little while because the order
is about to be finished. So I waited.
4.10 That Atty. Madarang gave to me
the Order of Release at 4:15 p.m.
4.11 That because I am aware that I
may not reach [the] New Bilibid
Prison on time, I told Atty.
Madarang that I can deliver it on
November 7, 2003, early in the
morning. She agreed and told me
THANK YOU Ikaw na ang bahala;
4.12 That I informed my boss about
the Order of Release that was
assigned to me and she had it
listed in our logbook. I asked my
boss [Cecil Secarro] if I can deliver
the Notice of Hearing for SP 67586
and the others on Monday if I
cannot finish delivering them on
November 7, 2003. She agreed but
told me to be sure that the Order of
Release will be served first and the
others be served not later than
Monday, November 10, 2003.
Thereafter, I went home.
4.13 That on November 7, 2003, I
went straight to [the] New Bilibid
Prison and arrived there before
20
8:00 [a.m.] Unfortunately, all the
staff wearing white uniforms and
the security guards were falling in
line in front of the building of the
New Bilibid Prison. So I could not
enter the administration office.
4.14 That while I was standing in front
of the building where the
administrative office is located, a
certain ART approached me and
asked me if I am the personnel of
the Court of Appeals who will
deliver the Order of Release.
4.15 That I said yes, and he told me
his name and said that he is a
relative of MELCHOR LAGUA
(prisoner) and is connected with
the office of Atty. [Quimpo].
4.16 That at around 9:30 [a.m.] I was
able to enter the administrative
offices but because there was no
staff inside I went to the
documentation office. The staff in
the documentation office told me
to submit the Order of Release to
the administrative office. He said
that they will prepare the
documents of MELCHOR LAGUA
(prisoner) but also told me that the
prisoner might be released on
Monday yet because the
signatories are busy attending the
ongoing 98 anniversary
celebration;
4.17 That I returned to the
administrative office and was able
to find Mr. JUANITO TORRES,
Administrative Officer III, who
received the copy for the Director
but refused to receive the copy of
Mr. LAGUA. He told me to wait for
his staff to receive the copy of Mr.
LAGUA;
4.18 That because the staff were not
around, I went to the canteen to
buy softdrinks to quench my thirst;
4.19 That Mr. ART followed me in the
canteen and told me to assist in
the release of Mr. LAGUA because
there were no personnel attending
to the Order of Release;
4.20 That since my boss told me to
insure the release of the prisoner, I
waited for my staff to arrive who
will attend to the matter;
4.21 That I delivered the copy of Mr.
LAGUA to the staff. But ART told
them he can receive the copy of
Mr. LAGUA because he is his
relative so, the staff told me to give
the copy to ART.
4.22 That I gave the copy of the Order
of Release for the accused to ART.
ART also told me that he is
authorized to receive the copy for
Atty. Quimpo because he is also the

representative of the law office.
Hence, I also gave the copy for
Atty. Quimpo to ART;
4.23 That I was able to finish my duty
at the New Bilibid Prison at around
2:30 [p.m.] and I proceeded to
Purok I, 6A Bayanan, Muntinlupa to
serve the Writ of Habeas Corpus in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80238;
4.24 That because of [sic] the address
of the addressee was incomplete, I
found a hard time locating the
address of the addressee and when
I found Purok I, 6A, the persons
thereat do not know JOEL DE LA
PAZ. I asked for their help but
nobody in the place knew JOEL DE
LA PAZ;
4.25 That I left Muntinlupa late in the
afternoon and due to the lack of
time I decided to deliver the other
documents on the next working
day which is Monday, November
10, 2003;
4.26 That I delivered the other
documents on Monday, November
10, 2003, without any problem;
4.27 That I was surprised when Atty.
Madarang later on accused me that
I used her name and the name of
Justice Magtolis to demand money
from Mr. LAGUAS relative.[14]
Considering the gravity of the charges, then Acting
Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia [15] referred the matter to
Atty. Elisa B. Pilar-Longalong, Assistant Clerk of Court, for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Investigation
The requisite hearings were held from December 12,
2003 to August 4, 2004.
Atty. Madarang affirmed the contents of her Affidavit [16] dated
December 8, 2003. She testified that the respondent later
came to her office along with Ms. Secarro. Amidst his cries, he
pleaded, Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak.
She replied, Wait, wala ka namang kasalanan sa akin. Ikaw
ang nagpasimuno ng lahat ng ito. The respondent repeated,
Boss, patawad po alang alang sa aking mga anak, and Atty.
Madarang answered, Okey lang, pinatawad na kita. Hindi
naman ako galit sa iyo.[17]
Justice Magtolis testified that Atty. Madarang
reported having received a telephone call from the alleged
relative of Lagua. She narrated that she gave the name Arlyn
to the caller, and, thereafter, exchanged text messages with
the respondent. Justice Magtolis instructed Atty. Madarang to
continue communicating with the respondent and, if possible,
to see it through a possible pay-off where a National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) agent would be asked to assist them.
However, the entrapment did not materialize. The respondent
thereafter came to her office, where he was asked why he was
unable to serve all the other papers and documents that day.
[18]
He also admitted that he served a copy of the resolution to
the wrong person (Baluran). Justice Magtolis also stated that
she threatened to transfer the respondent, and that the latter
21
vehemently objected, pleaded, and cried saying, Huwag
naman pong pa-transfer. When asked why, the respondent
said that he has children in school and something like, Dyan
po ako kumikita.[19]
Another witness was Cristy Flores, convicted of three
counts of estafa who served time at the Correctional Institute
for Women in Batangas City. She testified that the respondent
was introduced to her in December 1998 by a certain Crisanta
Gamil.[20] Gamil was also detained at the correctional facility;
the respondent had worked on her appeal bond papers and
asked for P20,000.00 to facilitate the issuance of the appeal
bond.[21] The payment was made right in front of her, and the
respondent issued a receipt.[22] The witness also testified that
Gamil told her, O, at least dyan mo ipalakad ang papel mo.
Okay yan, sigurado.[23] The respondent visited her in May
1999, as she had asked him to fix her appeal bond. During the
visit, the respondent took the pertinent documents from her.
[24]
The witness also stated that she gave the respondent a
partial payment of P7,000.00[25] on May 16, 1999 and he
issued a receipt.[26] They then proceeded to the Documents
Section where they secured copies of the court decision,
certificate of manifestation and her picture. She made the last
payment of P13,000.00 in June 13, 1999, and also issued a
receipt. The respondent was also asking for an additional
payment of P15,000.00, which she was unable to give.
Flores narrated that she introduced another detainee
to the respondent, Dalawangbayan, whom the latter was also
able to help. She stated that according to Dalawangbayan, the
respondent asked for P200,000.00. She further testified that
she knew the respondent as Joselito M. Salud, and not Cielito
Salud.[27] After the incident, she wrote a letter to Associate
Justice Conrado Vasquez, Jr. to ask for assistance regarding
her appeal bond.
Atty. Salvador Quimpo, Laguas counsel, testified that
it was Engineer Art Baluran who hired him as counsel of the
said accused. He stated that he gave an oral authorization to
Baluran to get the CA resolutions or orders; Baluran was the
one who furnished him a copy of the resolution. [28] He called
Mr. Baluran to say that an order for Laguas release had
already been issued by the appellate court. The witness
stated, however, that he had never seen the respondent
before.[29]
The respondent testified that he has been a CA
employee since 1991. He admitted that he knew Flores, and
met her in January 1999 when he brought Gamils order of
release in the Batangas City Jail. He claimed that he was
waiting for the relatives of Gamil as they were the ones who
would pay for his fare home, and while waiting, he talked to
the jailguard/warden. Flores then approached him and asked
him if he was from the CA. When the respondent answered in
the affirmative, Flores replied that Justice Vasquez was her
neighbor in Bian, Laguna.
The respondent admitted that he was in the
Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong City on May
16, 1999, as he was then visiting Vilma Dalawangbayan. He
also saw Flores.[30] When asked why he visited
Dalawangbayan, the respondent replied that Flores had
written a letter to him (which he dubbed as maintrigang sulat)
[31]
addressed Lito Salud, Mailing Section, Court of Appeals. In
the said letter, Flores asked him to help Dalawangbayan, just
like he had helped Gamil. The respondent then showed the
letter to then Chief of Office Prudencio B. Aguilar, who told
him, Puntahan mo yan, Lito at maintriga yang sulat na yan,
baka tayo mapahamak dyan.[32] Thus, he went to the
Correctional Institute in Mandaluyong City to sort things out
with Dalawangbayan and Gamil. The respondent, however,
stated that he could not find the letter anywhere and had
already been lost.[33]
During his May 16, 1999 visit to the correctional
facility, Flores approached him in the visiting hall, and said
suddenly, Sandali lang, Kuya, then left. He then talked to

Dalawangbayan about the controversial letter, explaining that
his job in the Court of Appeals was only to remand the records
and deliver the Orders for release, just like what he did in
Gamils case. [34] He again visited Dalawangbayan on June 13,
1999[35] as evidenced by the entries in the visitors logbook. He
was no longer able to speak to Flores, but made five other
such visits to Dalawangbayan in the correctional facility.
The Findings of the Investigating Officer
In her Report dated January 21, 2005, Atty. Longalong
found that the respondent was guilty as charged, and made
the following recommendation:
In view of all the foregoing, there
is substantial evidence to hold respondent
liable for the offenses charged. He is liable
for inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of his official duties and for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service when he admittedly served the
copies of the resolution and order of release
in the Lagua case intended for detained
appellant and his counsel on Mr. Baluran
whom he admitted to have met only on that
day, against the rules and normal office
procedure on personal service. His long stay
in the Bureau of Prisons also caused the
delay in the service of other court processes
assigned to him for service on that day. He
is also liable for having financial or material
interest in an official transaction considering
his undue interest in the service of the order
of release and actual release of Lagua to the
point of staying almost the whole day in the
Bureau of Prisons and the aborted deal as
can be concluded from the phone call of
Melissa Melchor to Atty. Madarang and
subsequent exchange of text messages with
Atty. Madarang disguising as Laguas
relative.
RECOMMENDATION:
1. Rule IV, Section 52 of Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 19, S. 1999, issued pursuant to Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987, provides
that the penalty for the first offense of
inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and for directly or indirectly having financial
and material interest in any official
transaction is suspension for a period of 6
months, 1 day to 1 year. Pursuant to Section
55 of the same Memorandum Circular, if the
respondent is found guilty of 2 or more
charges, the penalty to be imposed should
be that corresponding to the most serious
charge and the rest shall be considered as
aggravating circumstances. Section 54-c of
the same Memorandum Circular provides
that the maximum of the penalty shall be
imposed where only aggravating and no
mitigating circumstances are present. Since
in this case, the penalty is the same for all 3
offenses, the maximum of the penalty for
the first offense which is suspension for 1
year [may be] imposed on the respondent.
2. Considering that the prescribed
penalty for the offense exceeds one month
suspension, the case may now be referred
22
to the Supreme Court for appropriate action,
pursuant to Circular No. 30-91 of the Office
of the Court Administrator.[36]
The Ruling of the Court
On the charge of inefficiency, the respondent is
clearly administratively liable. After serving Laguas copy of
the resolution and order of release to the prison Director, he
should have immediately returned to his station or served the
other resolutions and documents for personal service. As an
officer of the court, the respondent plays an essential part in
the administration of justice. He is required to live up to the
stringent standards of his office, and his conduct must, at all
times, be above reproach and suspicion. He must steer clear
of any act which would tend to undermine his integrity, or
erode somehow the peoples faith and trust in the courts. [37] As
the respondent himself admitted, he stayed on until 2:30 p.m.
without any valid reason, despite the fact that he knew he still
had to serve several orders and resolutions. As pointed out by
the Investigating Officer, inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties is classified as a grave offense,
and is punishable by suspension for six months and one day
to one year.[38]
Indeed, the complainant in administrative
proceedings has the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint by substantial evidence. If a court employee is to
be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him
must be competent and derived from direct knowledge; as
such, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
cannot be given credence. Thus, if the complainant fails to
substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery, relying on
mere conjectures and suppositions, the administrative
complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit. [39] However, in
administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to
establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt
but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, is required.[40] The findings of
investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are
given great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity
to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.[41]
To determine the credibility and probative weight of
the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be
considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To
determine which contradicting statements of a witness is to
prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received must be
considered.[42] Thus, while it is true that there is no direct
evidence that the respondent received any money to facilitate
the release of detained Lagua, the following circumstances
must be taken as contrary to the respondents plea of
innocence:
First. The respondent admitted that he was the
sender of the first three text messages in Atty. Madarangs
cellphone: bkit, C rhodora to; CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG
 23
PANGALAN MO; and SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI. The
respondents testimony on the matter is as follows: ATTY. ROSERO:

Q: In the hearing of December 2, 2003, in No objection, Your Honor.

the TSN on page 32 onwards
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
ATTY. ROSERO:
All these text messages were
Is that the testimony of Atty. Madarang, checked by us with your counsel in
Justice? the cellphone of Atty. Madarang
which were preserved until we
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS: allowed her to erase these. There
are exchanges here:
Oo. I will just refer to your 6392044390[8]2, November 7.
admission through your counsel When she texted she answered,
that Cellphone No. Bkit c Rhodora 2 and then second
6392044390[8]2 is yours. You was, Cnong kamaganak anong
admitted that? pangalan mo? This is addressed to
you, this is your telephone?
ATTY. ROSERO: A: Opo.

I think we made an admission as to Q: But the one who answered is Rhodora?

that matter, Justice. Well just check
the affidavit of Atty. Madarang.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Here, admitted. Basahin mo.
ATTY. ROSERO:
A: Ako po yun.
Q: Ikaw ang sumasagot. Why did you say
that you are Rhodora?
A: Justice, nung ma-receive ko po yong text
niya apat na beses ko pong na-
receive ang text ni Arlene.

Yes, Justice, admitted but not the cellphone INVESTIGATOR:

number
Who is Arlene?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
A: Atty. Madarang. Arlene, sa text po niya sa
Sige, ulitin natin, 6392044390[9]2. akin, Sir Lito, kamaganak po ito ni
Mr. Lagua. Magkano pa po ba ang
ATTY. ROSERO: kakulangang pera para ibigay ko sa
Yes, admitted. That is his cellphone. inyo. Si Rhodora ba kasama? Hindi
ko po sinagot yon. Pangalawa, yun
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS: din po ang message nya. Ano ito?
Sa akin pong kuan, sa pag-iisip ko
This cellphone is yours. lang po, bakit dahil si Mr. Art
Baluran kamag-anak na, ano ito?
Q: Do you also admit that you called Atty. Text pa ulit pa sya ng pangatlo.
Madarang several times on Nang-iintriga na to. Pang-apat,
November 7, 2003? intriga to. Text ko nga rin to,
lokohan lang tayo. Bkit si Rhodora
ATTY. ROSERO: to yun po ang sagot ko sa kanya.

November 7 is a Friday. Tumawag Q: So at that time you already knew about

ka daw several times kay Atty.
Madarang, November 7?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Texted, Im sorry I will correct that, texted.
A: Nauna po siyang magtext sa akin, Justice,
hindi po ako nagtext sa kanya.
Nagtext po siya sa akin sumagot po
ako sa kanya.
Q: There was an exchange several times?
A: Nuong pong text niya sa akin hindi po
several times dahil kung makita
nyo po dyan.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Let me see the affidavit of Atty. Madarang.
After this question, may I ask for a
continuance?
Rhodora?
A: Hindi po, dun, duon po sa text niya
nakalagay po dun eh, Si Rhodora
kasama ba? So ikinuan ko po na si
Rhodora to, dun po sa text nya.
Q: Nakipaglokohan ka?
A: Sa text niya nakalagay dun na Si Rhodora
ba kasama kaya po ako
nakipaglokohan dun.[43]
As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, the
respondents claim of joking around (nakipaglokohan) with an
unknown sender of a text message by replying thereto is
contrary to a normal persons reaction. This is made even
more apparent by the fact that the respondent even admitted
that he called Atty. Madarang twice, and when asked why,
gave a vague answer, and, when further questioned, even
broke down in tears.[44]
The respondents claim that the admission of the text
messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of
his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been
classified as ephemeral electronic communication under
 24
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, [45] and Q: On page 5 of your affidavit, you said in
shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party paragraph 8 That I made some
to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. Any question inquiry and some personnel of the
as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and Court of Appeals told me that there
academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, is indeed a deal between a staff in
already admitted that he was the sender of the first three the Criminal Section and Rhodora
messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone. of RTC, Pasig. Can you tell us who is
this staff?
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent A: Ah dito po Justice, hindi po siya
case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao.[46] In that case, the nagpakilala, sa telephono po.
Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed
to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for
a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The INVESTIGATOR:
Court had the occasion to state:
Sino siya?
The text messages were properly
admitted by the Committee since the same A: Hindi po siya yong tawag po niya sa akin
are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of sa telepono nang malaman po dito
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which sa CA na ako ay kinasuhan ninyo
provides: tumawag po siya sa Personnel.
Ephemeral electronic JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
communication refers to
telephone conversations, text Q: Who is siya?
messages and other electronic A: Ay hindi po siya nagpakilala.
forms of communication the
evidence of which is not recorded INVESTIGATOR:
or retained.
Lalaki o babae?
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the
[said rules], Ephemeral electronic A: Una po babae tapos yong pangalawa po
communications shall be proven by the lalaki.
testimony of a person who was a party to
the same or who has personal knowledge INVESTIGATOR:
thereof . In this case, complainant who was
the recipient of the said messages and Sinong kinakausap?
therefore had personal knowledge thereof
testified on their contents and import. A: Ako po.
Respondent herself admitted that the
cellphone number reflected in complainants INVESTIGATOR:
cellphone from which the messages
originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt Hinahanap ka?
respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been A: Hinahanap po nila ako.
laid to rest when she and her counsel signed
and attested to the veracity of the text JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
messages between her and complainant. It
is also well to remember that in Q: What did he tell you? He, lalaki, ano?
administrative cases, technical rules of A: Sa babae muna po?
procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. We have no doubt as to the Q: Oo, babaet lalake ba?
probative value of the text messages as A: Opo.
evidence in determining the guilt or lack
thereof of respondent in this case. Q: Who was the first caller, the lady or the
gentleman?
A: Babae po.
Second. The respondents testimony during the
hearings held before Investigating Officer Atty. Longalong is Q: Were you the one who answered the
replete with inconsistencies and loopholes. He claimed that he phone?
made inquiries from other CA staff and learned that there was A: Hindi po.
indeed a deal between someone in the criminal section and a
certain Rhodora of the RTC, Pasig. He further claimed that the INVESTIGATOR:
said parties wanted to get back at him for immediately
serving the release order which prevented them from Hinahanap daw siya.
demanding the balance of the deal from Laguas relative.
However, this bare claim was not corroborated by any JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
witness. Moreover, the respondent alleged that two
anonymous callers claimed to know something about the case Q: Hinahanap ka, okay, when you answered
against him; when asked about it, he stated that he no longer the phone, what did you say?
exerted efforts to find out who they were as they did not give A: Ang sabi ko po sa kanya, pupuwede mo
out their names: ba akong matulungan sa paggawa
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS: ng affidavit dahil kinasuhan nga
ako ni Justice Magtolis.

Q: But you do not know who you were
talking to?
A: Tinanong ko nga po kung sino siya eh
tumutulong lang daw siya sa akin
dahil ang naririnig niyang tsismis
din dyan eh baka po si Rhodora
ang may ka-kuan sa Criminal.
Q: Saan yong ka-kuan?
A: Ang may kausap sa Criminal.
Q: Who said na baka si Rhodora ang may
kausap sa Criminal?
A: Yon pong kausap ko sa kabilang linya.
Q: The name you do not know?
A: Eh tinanong ko naman po kung sino siya
ayaw naman po niyang
magpakilala. Matutulungan mo ba
ako, ibinaba na po ang telepono.
INVESTIGATOR:
Anonymous caller.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
You are very fond of answering calls. You
dont even know the name.
Q: That anonymous caller told you that
there must be some deals between
Rhodora and someone from the
Criminal Section?
A: Yun din daw po ang naririnig niyang
tsismis dyan sa labas.
Q: Tsismis, that was that the caller told you?
A: Opo.
Q: And she wanted to help you?
A: Kaya po sinabi din sa akin na tsismis eh
hindi pa po pwedeng
Q: What did you answer her?
INVESTIGATOR:
Anong sagot mo raw?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Anong sagot niya sa tulungan kasi
nakakarinig siyang tsismis?
INVESTIGATOR:
Q Ano ang sagot mo?
A: Eh iyon nga ang gusto kong malaman,
ang katotohanan. Baka naman
pupuwede mo akong matulungan.
Sino ba to?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Di ba she was the one who offered to
help?
A: Ay ayaw daw po naman niyang masabit
po ang pangalan niya.
Q: But she was the one who called you?
A: Opo.
25
Q: Okay. How did your talk end with this girl
or lady?
A: Nung pagsalita ko nga pong baka
pupuwede akong tulungan, wala
na.
Q: How about the man, the gentleman or
the boy who called?
A: Same kuan din po ang kanilang kuan e.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Dont use kuan.
ATTY. ROSERO:
Sige, Lito, ipaliwanag mo.
A: Same kuento rin po, sinabi niya na
ganuon din po na narinig din po
niya sa labas.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Alright, you were not the one who
answered the call?
A: Hindi po.
Q: Somebody called you that theres a phone
call?
A: Opo.
Q: When you answered, what was your first
word?
A: Hello!
Q: What was the answer at the other end of
the line?
A: Hello rin po.
Q: What next?
A: Alam mo, ang sabi po niya sa akin ganito
po
Q: Who was the first one who said
something other than hello?
A: Siya po ang nauna.
Q: What did she say, the exact words?
A: Exact words, sa naalala kong sinabi niya
Alam mo, Mr. Salud, Salud po ang
kuan niya sa akin, narinig ko sa
labas, istoryahan dyan sa labas na
baka si Rhodora ang may ka-kuan
dito sa Criminal. Ang sabi ko po sa
kanya Iyan din ang itinawag sa akin
kahapon. Eh dalawa na kayo eh
baka naman pupuwede nyo akong
matulungan. Puede ko bang
malaman ang pangalan mo? Ganun
din po, ayaw na pong magsalita
ibinaba na [ang] telepono.
Q: Do you know Rhodora?
A: Hindi po.
Q: You never met her?
A: Hindi po.
Q: You never talked to her?
A: Nung pong ipinakiusap nyo sa akin sa
telepono po nung tayo poy
Q: After the conversation with the lady and
that gentleman who called you to

offer some help and afterwards did
not help at all, what happened?
A: Wala na po.
Q: Did you not check with Rhodora, What is
this they are talking about that it
might be between you and
someone in the Criminal Section?
You never asked her that?
A: Hindi ko na rin po
Q: You did not. But I thought you wanted
help from those people who can
help you?
A: Eh hindi na nga po sila nagbanggit po ng
pangalan dahil po sabi ng unang
babae ayaw nga rin po niyang
sumabit sa kaso.[47]
This respondents actuation on this matter, if at all
true, is again contrary to the normal reaction of one who has
been administratively charged, and wants to clear his name of
any wrongdoing.
The respondent also admitted visiting an inmate
(Vilma Dalawangbayan) at the correctional facility eight times
for no apparent reason. This admission lends some credence
to the testimony of Flores, that she was the one who
introduced him to Dalawangbayan, the person he was visiting.
When asked why he frequently visited, he stated that he
found her beautiful (Maganda po siya, Justice), and was on the
verge of courting her (Para na nga po akong nanliligaw). The
Court believes that this allegation was concocted by the
respondent as a mere afterthought, to cover up for his
misdeeds.
The Investigating Officer also found that the
respondent was high-strung during his testimony, and this
finding must be accorded respect. Indeed, when the issue is
the credibility of witnesses, the function of evaluating it is
primarily lodged in the investigating judge. The rule which
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal
cases where preponderance of evidence and proof beyond
reasonable doubt, respectively, are required, applies a
fortiori in administrative cases where the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence. The investigating judge
is in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of
witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified,
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
[48]
Thus, the following findings of Atty. Longalong are well
taken:
However, respondent denied
receiving P20,000 from Gamil and P15,000
from Flores and signing LM Salud on Flores
notebooks (Exhibits E-1 and F-1) but
admitted visiting Vilma at the Correctional
Institute for Women 8 times from May to
August 1999. Respondents denial here
appears self-serving and incredible
considering his admission of going to the
Correctional Institute for Women several
times for no valid official reason. Moreover,
although Flores is a convict for estafa, her
testimony on the matter was more
consistent and credible. Likewise,
respondent admitted seeing Flores at the
Correctional Institute for Women and that
Flores mailed her letter to him on May 16,
1999 which he called maintriga. He also
admitted that he told Flores to seek the help
of Justice Vasquez on her case. The
foregoing, plus the fact that Flores
26
eventually wrote Justice Vasquez, confirms
the truth of Flores testimony on the matter.
With the aforecited admissions by
respondent, the substantial evidence
presented by the complainant and her
witnesses with their positive and forthright
testimonies deserve more credence than
respondents self-serving denial and
inconsistent and vague testimony. Even the
demeanor of complainant and her witnesses
give credence to their testimonies than the
nervous and [high-strung] demeanor of
respondent during his testimony. Moreover,
complainant and her witnesses, including
the superiors of respondent, have no reason
or motive whatsoever to testify falsely
against him. Respondents defense of denial
is inherently a weak defense. It is well
settled that denial, to be believed, must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability, otherwise the denial is purely
self-serving and with nil evidentiary value
(People of the Philippines v. Arlee, 323 SCRA
201). Like the defense of alibi, denial
crumbles in the light of positive declarations
(People of the Philippines vs. Ricafranca,
323 SCRA 652).
Indeed, the Court is looked upon by people with high respect,
a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts
settled and justice solemnly dispensed with. Misbehavior
within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and
dignity. The conduct and behavior required of every court
personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must
always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must, at all times, be
characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum
so as to earn and keep the publics respect and confidence in
the judicial service.[49] Public service requires the utmost
integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity
not only in the performance of his official duties but in his
personal and private dealings with other people.[50]
While there is no direct evidence to suggest that he
actually extorted money to facilitate the issuance of the
appeal bond and release order which he himself served, the
surrounding circumstances, as well as the inconsistencies in
his testimony, point towards administrative culpability. The
respondents actuations fall short of the standard required of a
public servant. He is guilty of gross or grave
misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
improper or wrong behavior,[51] while gross, has been defined
as out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful;
such conduct as is not to be excused.[52] Under the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is
punishable by dismissal from the service even for the first
offense, as it is classified as a grave offense. However,
considering that the respondent has not been previously
charged nor administratively sanctioned, the Court finds that
a penalty of suspension for one year and six months will serve
the purpose of disciplining the respondent.
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the
clerk of court or any position lower than that of a judge or
 27
justice, are involved in the dispensation of justice, and parties
seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon
them as part of the Judiciary. They serve as sentinels of The Office of the Court Administrator is
justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably also DIRECTED to conduct a discreet investigation on the
affect the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples possible involvement of Rhodora Valdez (Utility Worker), and
confidence in it.[53] Thus, any conduct which tends to diminish other personnel of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
the image of the Judiciary cannot be countenanced. Branch 163.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent SO ORDERED.

Cielito M. Salud is found GUILTY of inefficiency and gross
misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for a period of One (1) Year
and Six (6) Months, effective immediately. He is
further DIRECTED to inform the Court as to the date of his
receipt of this Decision to determine when his suspension
shall have taken effect.