Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and
Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina
Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April
21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
also on October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their in-laws.4 A week
after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a
few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and
would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries
on her.5

On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in
Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some
crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail
Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.

On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served
by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990. 9 Subsequently, a
hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence,
only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.

Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their
vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that
Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied
Erlinda and the children.10

Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to
manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation,
the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between
the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. 11

On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court
rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:

"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void.

The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this declaration after
this decision shall have become final and executory .

SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was
prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration
in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13

"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the
Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to
show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these
traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.

In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983. The defendant, while
in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period of time,
actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt

Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only after the marriage.
In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing
can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-
General, these are not common in marriage.

Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous
church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only
in name.

WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED"

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14

On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing thus:

"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a
married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the
plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or
wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)." 16

Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the
facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.

At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides -

"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in
any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis ofa priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:

"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
in will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code 20as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."22

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary
requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently
proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an
opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.

In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for
annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that -

"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II,
Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY
No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

FACTS:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina
Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started
leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear
again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He
would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned
for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City
a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located,
summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of
evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he
would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted
for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors
manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a
Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court
holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a
married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.

ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband
suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from
justice?

HELD:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in
any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary
requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must
be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity
of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for
which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner, G.R. No. 175367

 Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, June 6, 2011

Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the October

6, 2005 Decision[2] and October 26, 2006 Resolution,[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons,

namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage.[4] In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing

and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological

incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be

declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void, even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
 As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition are the following allegations, to wit:

x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of performing
and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the
time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband;
his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy
and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist
in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He
exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass
his wife even in the presence of their children.

Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very
quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom
was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay
to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits
immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the
essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested
psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private
respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and
wife to perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive
(negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations
of a marriage.[5]

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss[6] the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed

to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article

36 of the Family Code.

On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order[7] denying petitioners motion.

On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in an

Order[8] dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion, the RTC ruled that respondents petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend

upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:

A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268
SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the psychological
incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The
manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations
constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The
incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted
in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both parties.
This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing on the merits of the
case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of
 the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on
the merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.[9]

On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari[10] under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court.

On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[11]

In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause

of action.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Courts consideration, to wit:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARIDESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO
DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN,
ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. [12]

Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this present

petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10[13] prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss
in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this

Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving

psychological incapacity, to wit:

(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition.[15]

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements,

particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to

avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on

behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or

suppressed.[16]

Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient to support

a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply

with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that

such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that

the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition.[17]

 First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged

in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were

discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically

identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability

for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality

Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality

Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As

can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states

that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and

support.

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital

obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same

contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been

reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by

the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the

allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each

case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections

or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by

experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. [18] It would thus

be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as

hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.

Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit grave abuse

of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when

the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so

gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation

of law.[19] Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondents petition

are insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of judgment correctible

by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.[20]

Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an

interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari.Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses
in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due

time.[21] The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the CA.[22]

WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006 Resolution

of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

AURELIO V. AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]

DOCTRINE:

The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity: (1) Burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition.

FACTS:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely:
Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and
complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity
was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged among others that said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of
financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited
consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist
in the maintenance of the family.

On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly
from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was
emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when
she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their
relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a
cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void?

HELD:
Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.

RATIO:

First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the
complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were
discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically
identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder
with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.
The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be
easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that the
husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

RELATED ARTICLES:

THIRD DIVISION

ROSALINO L. MARABLE,

Petitioner, G.R. No. 178741

Present:

- versus -
CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,

BRION,

BERSAMIN,
MYRNA F. MARABLE,

VILLARAMA, JR., and

Respondent.
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 17, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-

G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the Decision[3] dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72,
Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioners prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and

void on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were classmates but initially, petitioner was

not interested in respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Petitioner

courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered

petitioners other relationship and demanded more time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture

like a child longing for love, time and attention.

On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio

C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was

blessed with five children.

As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. They

fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when their eldest daughter

transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became worse still when their daughter had an unwanted teenage

pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled

some of them, but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and respondent.

Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the

affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it.But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business

ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses

infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards

respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He

gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their

children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women.

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition[4] for declaration of nullity

of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.

In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at

an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and womanizer. His father left their family to

live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused petitioners mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus,

petitioner became obsessed with attention and worked hard to excel so he would be noticed.

Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined. He rose from

the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Finance Officer

therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his

relationship with his own family.

 In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report[5] of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from

the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that petitioner is suffering from Antisocial Personality Disorder,

characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of

remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family

to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner

is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioners psychological

incapacity.

Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioners psychological

incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she give a concrete explanation as to

how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioners

psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.In

addition, the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of

marriage.

On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision.

Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly proven and correctly

appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag and quotes the latters

findings:

Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the present affairs that
he [has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit,
lies, violence, [and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support
his claim for a much better personal and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he
is, emotional instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in general and changes.
Changes must come from within, it is not purely external.

Clinically, petitioners self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature of Antisocial
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness,
impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.

The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it existed even
before the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable.The root cause of which is deep
feelings of rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed
 attention. Carrying it until his marital life.Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed
the relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the psychological incapacity.[7]

According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that his psychological incapacity is

profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover, petitioner asserts that his

psychological incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently proven. The State, on the other hand, never presented another

psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayags findings. Also, petitioner maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage

failed not solely because of irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioners personality disorder which rendered

him unable to comply with his marital obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the parties to continue to

live under a non-existent marriage.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment[8] maintaining that petitioner failed to prove his psychological incapacity.

The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner suffers from an anti-

social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his claim, it even appears that petitioner acted

responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good

father and provider to his children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a self-centered,

remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially deviant person.

Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his psychological incapacity, the State is not

required to present an expert witness where the testimony of petitioners psychologist was insufficient and inconclusive. The OSG adds

that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his infidelity was due to some psychological disorder, as the real cause of

petitioners alleged incapacity appears to be his general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his

part and the existence of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities. These, however, do not constitute psychological

incapacity.

Respondent also filed her Comment[9] and Memorandum[10] stressing that psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment

of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the essential marital obligations,

not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

The appeal has no merit.

The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and factual bases.

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.

The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious

psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.[11] These are the disorders that result in the utter
insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.[12] Psychological

incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital

covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.[13]

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court

held,

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition.

In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his

psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's

psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of theFamily Code, as amended, the psychological

illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the

report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely

made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for

the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.

As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,[15] the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on

psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a

conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short

of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled

by Dr. Tayags evaluation which became the trial courts basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the

report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly,

there was no established link between petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence

must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.[16]
For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles[17] and differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs, as well

as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring

their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also, the

records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his

family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological

incapacity.

Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in

extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction

with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history.His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such

tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show

that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In short, petitioners marital infidelity does not appear to be

symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in

various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.[18] It must be

shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge

the essential obligations of marriage.[19] That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears

stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital

obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the

time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of

psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to

give meaning and significance to the marriage.[21]

All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of

the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Thursday, July 18, 2013

SYNTHESIZING MARABLE VS. MARABLE AND ITS CASE DIGEST

Title:

ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner, vs. MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent, G.R. No. 178741, promulgated on January 17,
2011.

639 SCRA 557, 567

Legal Issue:
 Is psychological evaluation a necessity for the establishment of psychological incapacity of a spouse for declaration of nullity
of marriage?

Legal Facts:
In 1967 petitioner Rosalino Marable and respondent Myrna Marable were students in Arellano University who became lovers after they
met in a bus. They got married on December 19, 1970, in civil rites of Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra, and that following
day is a church wedding at the Chapel of Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison. Somehow they were blessed with 5 children but several years after
the marriage their relationship got soured with frequent quarrels as a consequence, their daughter rebelled and unexpectedly she got
pregnant at her young age. Eventually, the petitioner had incessant marital conflicts leading to withdrawal of marital
obligations. Rosalino Marable filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of his own psychological
incapacity. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who reported that petitioner is
suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity,
self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse which rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and
that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. The RTC granted the petition; on the other hand the Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC thus judgment of the Court denied the appeal.

Holding and Reasoning:

In this case yes but the examination still doesnt corroborate the contention of psychological incapacity. The Court said that
the petitioner was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities
apparently, it doesnt constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The CA did not err in declaring the marriage
of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners
psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.

Policing:
Psychological examination by means of getting the emotional quotient through test must be properly observed in every couple
prior to marriage. Greater advantage if sets of personality and psychological examination after attending marriage seminars should be
one of the additional requisites prior to the solemnization and in order to prevent any future relationship hostilities before entering
marriage life.

Synthesis:

In Marable v. Marable, 639 SCRA 557, 567, The Supreme Court ruled that conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological
incapacity. Furthermore, the provision in Article 36 does not stress either of its characteristic as to the gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability, indicating such guidelines that the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff to which its medical or psychological
examination clearly explains or bring about such totality of evidence in establishing psychological incapacity.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended
by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above
provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel
persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court
Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel
Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by
Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other
things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised
to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August
1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in
main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-
shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all
these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say
"wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed
out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added
that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of
judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a
ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there
is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph
(7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice
Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated
that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the
Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil
Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no
voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated"
in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and
if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since
otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to
make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean
Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental
faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that
psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very
essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of
consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because
they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice
Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified
as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the
marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when
the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated
that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been
cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that
they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary
periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked
that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice
Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary
and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice
Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity"
is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce,
the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in
this case is to allow him to remarry. 6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise
be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed
that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may
encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other
provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
 "On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence"
is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He
explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of
"psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under
Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to
have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments
of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were
concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity
than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus: 8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the
judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to
be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an
aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10
giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed,
states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden
the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual
anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf.SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether
eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be
some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the
following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops
which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of
assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity.
The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is
due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under
this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment
of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the
degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt
the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on
the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity
of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one
essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been
shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36
of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to
expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her
separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy
way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.

In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific
behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there
any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch
base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia
to do the same.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin
the petitioner or her whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been
irresponsible and incompetent.

f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.

A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are
overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases,
compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner,
her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with
her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.

It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel
the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly,
facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or
women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not
constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life
by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of private respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code
Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the
draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss
the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law."

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also
realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church
and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an
action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested
to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes
on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now
working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind
of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."

"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or annulled on
the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus
rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on
the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance,
cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add
another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same.
Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of
nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it
be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the
court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting
the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately.
Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a
recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal;
thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-
married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the
Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on
the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity
of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one
essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been
shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.

There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36
of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to
expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her
separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy
way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.

In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific
behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there
any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch
base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia
to do the same.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin
the petitioner or her whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been
irresponsible and incompetent.

f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are
overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases,
compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner,
her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with
her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.

It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel
the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly,
facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or
women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not
constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life
by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of private respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code
Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the
draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss
the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law."

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also
realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church
and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an
action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested
to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
 overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes
on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now
working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind
of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."

"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or annulled on
the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus
rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on
the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance,
cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add
another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same.
Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of
nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it
be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the
court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting
the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately.
Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a
recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal;
thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-
married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the
Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated
October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed
alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January
8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married
on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at
around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria
signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of
MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
counsel.8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared
under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage
License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He
testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19,
1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May
Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the
residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz
further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract
was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office. 17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin
secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and
witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City
Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with
the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license
before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not
read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She
also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an
information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 26

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of
Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons
depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days
returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage
license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed
were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the
existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage
had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the
time were Chinese.31

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria
and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was
acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-
Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence
that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. 37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties
had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him
for bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted
on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24,
2008.41

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN
THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE.42

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which
read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a
valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid
marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that
there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was allowed, as
permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the
Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data.44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a
certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No.
9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification used
stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could
not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the
Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does
exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court.
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage
license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother,
Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have
testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and
submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage
license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that
their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further
held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party
alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 49 Gloria has
failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot
be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license
was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the
CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married
and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal
capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and
appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during the marriage
ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C"
which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on
15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only
after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family
Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among
the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks
to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a
valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is
clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution
dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of
petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

689 SCRA 646 (109 OG 7469) Civil Law Family Code Bigamy Void Ab Initio Marriage Lack of a Marriage License
Remedial Law Evidence Probative Value Public Records
In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate
in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the ceremony
was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who
celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its number, indicated
in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no diligence to search
for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrars certification enjoyed probative value as her duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of
the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued
to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code)
to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have
been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges
and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of
the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this
Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a
year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went
to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king
to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform
some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied
by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union,
his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for
the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a
whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the
instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus
made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it

is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

 Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely
and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument
on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the
case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of
Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still
maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid
marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on
"all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld
petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties,
but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in
the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage
annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to excludemental
inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated
in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after
the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it
as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may
be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really
existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves
in limbo freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as
a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least
not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two
distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore
the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give
valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important
in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent. 2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but
to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to
a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses
to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse
is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of
a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of
reasonable expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case
for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or
carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to
using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to
psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of
the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages
remain valid and subsisting.

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged
that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife
brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
 to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

We declared:

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological
incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most
helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code
explained:

(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage

that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction
of the statutory enactment. 2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a
congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and
41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
 intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity. 4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end
discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and
the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would
suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce;
however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment.
It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved
but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause
more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the
family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that
demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the
case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of
Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still
maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid
marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on
"all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld
petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties,
but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in
the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage
annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to excludemental
inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated
in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after
the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it
as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may
be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really
existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves
in limbo freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as
a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least
not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two
distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore
the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give
valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important
in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent. 2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but
to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to
a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses
to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse
is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of
a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of
reasonable expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case
for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or
carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to
using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to
psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of
the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages
remain valid and subsisting.

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged
that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife
brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

We declared:

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological
incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most
helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code
explained:

(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage

that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction
of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a
congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and
41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity. 4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end
discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and
the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would
suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce;
however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment.
It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

 Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved
but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause
more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the
family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that
demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Footnotes

1 Rollo pp. 25-33.

2 Sixteenth Division composed of J., Segundino G. Chua, ponente and chairman JJ., Serafin V.C.
Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.

3 Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.

4 Solemnized by Fr. Jesus C. Encinas.

5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC Decision is follows:

"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital
obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a
chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics of respondent are based on petitioner's testimony that
the former failed to be gainfully employed after he was relieved from the office of the Government
Corporate Counsel sometime in February, 1986. leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the
family. Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both petitioner-
mother and son except during the first few months of separation when respondent regularly visited his
son and gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months. Respondent is
likewise dependent on his parents for financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to
spend his money with his friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed
petitioner that he bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then
transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were actually renting
the house with the respondent's parents responsible for the payment of the rentals. Aside from this.
respondent would also lie about his salary and ability. And that at present, respondent is living with his
mistress and their child. which fact he does not deny.

It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look at the
background of their relationship. During their college days, when they were still going steady,
respondent observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to believe then
that she would make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent
because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their
relationship because of some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they
were working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became very close
and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature respondent. Believing that they know each other
much better after two years of going steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It would
seem. therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for
married life.

During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and dominated their
life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and respondent failed to respond properly to
the situation. This failure resulted in their frequent arguments and fighting's. In fact, even with the
intervention and help of their parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could
not come to terms.

It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of their opposing
and conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of them can accept and understand the weakness of the
other. No one gives in and instead, blame each other for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they
encounter. In fine, respondent cannot be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage.
Rather, this resulted because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is
unique and requisite in marriage.

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman with the basic
objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code). The unique element of
permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship between the parties.
Towards this end, the parties must fully understand and accept the (implications and consequences of
being permanently) united in marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the
parties, among others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding,
acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires them to live
together, to observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to
observe) and perform these fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the
break-up of the marriage. Such is the unfortunate situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original
Records, pp. 70-73).

6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.

7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.

8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.

9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals of each
archdiocese in the country. Aside from heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also
incumbent president of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-
Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was
also Secretary-General of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines PCP II held from January
20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a parliament or a constitutional
convention in the Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a Council member, had the
privilege of being overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful discernments.

10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice, author, noted
civil law professor and the law practitioner.

Article XV

THE FAMILY

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the state.

Sec. 3. The State shall defend:

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious connections and the
demands of responsible parenthood;

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty. exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;

(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.

Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do so through
just programs of social security.

Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.

14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text used in
Santos v. CA reads:

"Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

 xxx xxx xxx

3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's Memorandum is due to the fact that the
original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differently-worded English translations.

Republic vs CA and Molina

Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the
ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends
on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an
intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which
would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of
the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by
Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither
its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder
but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become
a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized
 that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be
viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August
5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004
Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized
by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the
latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of closeness
towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they
elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they
left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast
depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,
threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.6 The
two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. 7 At one point, Edward
was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with
them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on
their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and
insisted that Edward must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him
from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she
said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the
scheduled hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was collusion
between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following
findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila.
He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married to
and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation
in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity.
He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the
business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each
of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of
meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And
because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s]
on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during
his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not
finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate
relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From
that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because
he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because
petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought
tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to
rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they
should go back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole
family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed
behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to
him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went
home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to
 do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the
idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents
uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract
before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the
parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways
with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will
commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should
perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner
was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him
by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent.
When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are still studying.
Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own
and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would
inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already
settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay,
petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and
since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any
money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-
up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of finding his
fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their
marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to
marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really
sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this
kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent,
as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer
to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be
somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought
that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams
realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is
really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows.
Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the
case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage
for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their
relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to
be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the
grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and
only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them
to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground
that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. 17 The Republic,
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside
the trial courts ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical
psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the
evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 21 needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the
decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or
opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.23 The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.25
 In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He
posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to
both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to
personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter
represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement
of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was
likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties
was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine
the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the
parties is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based
on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v.
Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then
Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of
a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with
or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later,
even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings
on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the
strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector
of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue
the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to
divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil
law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code
and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the
present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind
of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a
man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a
spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
 machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon
their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the
session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that
these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of
one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and
has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in
the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban
B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa
agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence, its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds
of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal
provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model
for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity:
valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the
first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid
down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under
state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not
 ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal
and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion means that the
person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of
due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during
the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological
grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at
the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The
nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to
use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit
the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed as to allow some
resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.
It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by
Article 6840 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and
render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 41 This
interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the second and third
paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential
obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes
to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract,
there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the
conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis
contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of
giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know
well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a
psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not
available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with
positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling
the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to
marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity
different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises
from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and
they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free
human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which
may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania,
satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to
have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill,
although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church
courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A
case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from
properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of
consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it
was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under
duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact,
true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand
perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for
this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and
with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective
because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled
mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the
 inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning
of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and
intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience
difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the
difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person
afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding
and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is
possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free
decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning
a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also,
and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is
incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence
or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the
personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic,
obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the
anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly
renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition
of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or
maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and
sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or
maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise
when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum
partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other
party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of
a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable
of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual
description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be
suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have understood, on the level of the
intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his "constitutional
immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined
not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision. And when this is
applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a
pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the
obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations,
one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec.
1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the
rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality
disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement,
unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the
communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses and of the
children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to
assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible.
Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism,
and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be
invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities
of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to
understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with
charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to
refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person
so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself
affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities
of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so
much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon:
causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of the
 contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something
in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the
person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical
sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the
assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a
source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that
the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a
marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court,
aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining independent,
separate and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
 briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another threeincluding, as
aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much
regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live
with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become
a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards
against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against
collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of
cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation
of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred
bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.54 To indulge in
imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and
foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity
operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again
marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs
the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly
stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate
once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in
such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and
they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades.
There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand
the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
 Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of
marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to
the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial
responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall
short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on
any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis
was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised
(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of
a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the
inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 63 an option
for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation
of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at
an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to
present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that
both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic
and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality
disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality
disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in
which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality
disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and
often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced
self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality disorders.
These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some
disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral,
anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to
derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to
 derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to
engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net However, later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood
events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and
borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family, adoption
and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid
5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of suicide
attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired
smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many
years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at
least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear to
have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be used for other specific
personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-
esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they
actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important
decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 65 and antisocial
personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed
by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse
and a tendency to blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of
remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are prominent in
business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public
scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral,
guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987),
anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on
ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the
witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends
to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by
the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality
disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the
January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
579 SCRA 193 Civil Law Family Code Article 36: Psychological Incapacity Molina Case Merely a Guideline
Every case involving psychological incapacity must be resolved on a case-to-case basis
Note: This case relaxed the application of the Molina Guidelines
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu at a Filipino-Chinese gathering at a school campus. They did not have
interest with each other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the fact that they share the same
angst with their families. In 1996, while still in college, Rowena proposed to Kenneth that they should elope. Kenneth initially
refused on the ground that he was still young and jobless. But due to Rowenas persistence Kenneth complied bringing with
him P80K. The money soon after disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to their respective home.
Subsequently, Rowenas uncle brought the two before a court and had had them be married. After marriage, Kenneth and
Rowena stayed with her uncles house where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner.
Meanwhile, Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was
able to escape and he was hidden from Rowenas family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to live with his parents
instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his inheritance instead so that they could live together separately or
just stay with her uncle.
Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is better if they live separate lives from
then on. Four years later, Kenneth filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Rowena. Rowena did not file an answer.
The City Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot determine if there is collusion between the two
parties. Eventually, the case was tried. The opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that
both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between Kenneth and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly
in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties unreadiness to commitment and their young
age. Kenneth was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while Rowena was still egocentrically involved
with herself. The trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the findings of the expert psychologist. The Solicitor General
(OSG) appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity of
both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did
not personally examine Rowena, and relied only on the information provided by Kenneth. Further, the psychological incapacity
was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements set forth in
the Molina caseto be followed as guidelines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in lieu of the guidelines established in the
landmark case of Molina.
HELD: Yes, such is possible. The Supreme Court ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately imposed a set of
rigid rules in ascertaining Psychological Incapacity in the Molina case. So much so that the subsequent cases after Molina were
ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard for the laws clear intention that each case
is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. The SC however is not
abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both parties psychological disorder as
evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity
and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others. He is too dependent
on others. Rowena cannot perform the essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

VALERIO E. KALAW, G.R. No. 166357

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

 BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Promulgated:

Respondent. September 19, 2011

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court of the

existence of these facts.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004 Resolution[3] in

CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein parties marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision

reads:

WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[4]


Factual Antecedents


Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and

eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976.They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or

Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).

Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in

March 1983.[5]

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.[6] Meanwhile, Tyrone started

living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a

rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever

any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.[9]

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to

learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
 Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and

Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with

their father.[11]

Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based

on Article 36 of the Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential

marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by

her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts:

1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;

2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and

3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.[13]

During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-

law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie

Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.[15] At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was

wearing only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge

Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.[16] They put their agreement in writing before

Atty. Jose Palarca.

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to

testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and

her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).[17] NPD is present when a person is obsessed to

meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.[18] Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a

mother.[19]

Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family

background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role model.[20]

Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son

Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital

duties.[22] He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated
 Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs became secondary.Malyn is so self-absorbed

that she is incapable of prioritizing her familys needs.

Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological

incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of ones familial duties.[23] Fr. Healy

characterized Malyns psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.[24]

He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns

expert witness.[25] He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed

it is the courts duty to do so.[26] Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed true.

Malyns version

Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone

alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.[28] And in those instances,

she always had Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayaswith her.[29] She maintained that she did

not neglect her duties as mother and wife.

Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive

husband.[30] On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He

called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head

and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-laws

room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the house.[31] She never returned to

their conjugal home.

Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her

discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.[32]

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so

drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained

being fully clothed at that time.[33] Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress.[34]

After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of

the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently dismissed for lack of

interest).

As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug

dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert

witness.

 Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations

culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of her mahjong habit,[36] while Malyn was fed up with

Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature.

They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic

impressions are summarized below:

The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even
after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and
affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could take him or leave him. But the minute she started to care,
she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most
important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for
a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming
to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger years,
he was often out seeking other women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun dancing, drinking, or simply
flirting.

Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody man with short
temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n]
he was about spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with high
conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out
of control Their individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.[38]

Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and

compulsiveness.[39]

On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship

with her kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is

unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]

Childrens version

The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would

accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or

feeling abandoned.

The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse

inflicted on her mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in school.[43]

The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was abroad.[44] While they did

not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care of them on

weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take care

of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick.[45]

Other witnesses

 Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the

couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.[46] He likewise testified that Tyrone tested

negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.[47]

Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to

Tyrones version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie

or Malyn half-naked.[48]

Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go

on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.[49]

Social worker

The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor

children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn;[50] and

Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with their children, she

recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family members themselves, Malyn

was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The social worker commended the fact that

even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools. And while

she was only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote

time with them.[51]

On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de facto separation, simply left the children for several years

with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad.[52] The social worker found that Tyrone tended

to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative years of the children, the

social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to

perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:

From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it
entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to become responsible individuals. Parties psychological
incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The
incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.[54]

The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]

 Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on

record. Both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults

tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations.At most, there may be sufficient

grounds for a legal separation.[57] Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain

how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration

of nullity of marriage.[58]

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.[60]

Petitioners arguments

Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position

to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically

incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:

a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession and

self-centeredness were manifestations of respondents NPD;[61]

b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her essential martial

obligations;[62] and

c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family background,

and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]

Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.[64]

Respondents arguments

Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.[65] She argues that the

testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are

sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]

She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn.

Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys testimony, on the

other hand, was based only on Tyrones version of the facts.[68]

Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of

psychological incapacity with factual findings.

 Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for

Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.[69]She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may

really be void on the basis of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice.[70] Her

manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]

Issue

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.[72] The

burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her

actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the

essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must

be incurable.[74]

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies

of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses

were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.Petitioners experts heavily relied on

petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect

of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and

quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In

fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly

played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a

wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a

week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying

that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own

testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons
 repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was

to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not

done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children

were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive

need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with

friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had

affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner

was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be

equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily

constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for

concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair

assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and

parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care

of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care

of her children despite her estrangement from their father.There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of

familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors,

there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in

the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the

allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility

of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion

of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of

themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that

voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004

Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.

ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

 G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

Read the 2011 Kalaw v. Fernandez case digest HERE.

PONENTE: Bersamin, J.

TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:

In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife,
constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the
marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as
they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to
every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family
Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version
of less specificity obviously to enable some resiliency in its application. Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts in recognition of the verity
that no case would be on all fours with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage;
hence, every trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of
experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void

ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician,
because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
 Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed
state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such
other evidence on the causation.

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The experts findings under such circumstances would
not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view
and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of
the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and
treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold
that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article
36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual
premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or absence
of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known
that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other
vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental development. This disregard violated
her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September
19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any
sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the
following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill
the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24
October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of
Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and
affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year
after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was
born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for
nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists
up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself,
the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the
adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single
member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon
show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered
per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to
be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later
found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they
were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher
income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When
he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since
her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since
there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the
foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband.
She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She
presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her
back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2)
years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials
with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a
Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office
hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. 28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez
Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter
if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts. 30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a
finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of
disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which
was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost
anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37During the pendency of the appeal before
the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs
judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that
the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity
had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the
evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor
of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that
the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that
such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to
whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the
case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court
of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is
hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines
which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the
proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its
allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at
the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with
underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under
the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a
party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack
thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages
classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given
which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such
rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined
that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45
(5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time, Tolentino
noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this
would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice)
Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the
intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in
any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account
the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of
the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent
mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is
need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts
in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly
acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a
solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would be
disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36,
and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local
Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic
Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from
canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections
1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of
the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the
importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation
of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the
modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature
to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present
through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional
mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for
the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of
their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article
36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules.
They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement
or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family
Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in
this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the
fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records
and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented
two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to
psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate
court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant
evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
educational attainment, and family background, among others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the
field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are]
terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit.
One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the
person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between
individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is
then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent
has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of
the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic)
that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We
all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently
believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of
the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves
to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about
almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position
to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the
psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept
petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after
their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated
petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief
that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was
dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the
truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic
nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend
the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage,
including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be
accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article,
clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will
give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by
respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse
who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to
her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made
to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is
in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially
ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor
markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of
the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and
premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of
adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its
deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting
a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we
must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a
similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that
are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the
appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to
such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage
work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners
expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.

The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These
events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any
other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of
the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of
psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological
incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in
formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic
of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on
whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the
psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time
of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a medical finding of incurability.
Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date
the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without
expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate
question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those
cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and
their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case,
that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception.
It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would
have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years
ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has
been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was
so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first
place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Antonio vs Reyes
Antonio vs. Reyes

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5
months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted
child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article
36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply
with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that
constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior,
which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious
characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically
identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that
a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner
tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

THIRD DIVISION

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, G.R. NO. 168796

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,

- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

MAY ASCENSION A. Promulgated:

PATALINGHUG and the

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, April 15, 2010

Respondents.

x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision[2] of

the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and private

respondent May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.

Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed that, during their

marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described her as immature,

irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations.

Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had watched a

video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino tried to
 persuade her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored. His persuasions would often lead to

altercations or physical violence.

In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and

the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.

The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May was back

again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found.

He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.

Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.

With Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated

to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The

psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity

started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. [3]

On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on the

Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondents alleged sexual infidelity, emotional

immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and that the

psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or

incurable.

Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and, therefore, issued

without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. [4]

The Court required the private respondent to comment but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate her but to no

avail.

Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public

respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition for certiorari

under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright dismissal.

Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court,[5] the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty

or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an

arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be

capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.[6]

In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA decision

dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the

records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The

incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It

must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the

marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. [7] The Court

likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,

in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[8]Relevant to this petition are the following:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological

incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the

decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must

also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Courts considered view that petitioners evidence failed to establish respondent

Mays psychological incapacity.

Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondents condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-

Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified

as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during

trial.[9]

More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the law

requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially
when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able

to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to

discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.[10]

Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some character

flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that

rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations.[11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

You are here: Home 2013 July Case Digest: LIGERALDE V. PATALINGHUG and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CASE DIGEST: LIGERALDE V. PATALINGHUG AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Published by geline on July 2, 2013

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE V. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and theREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 168796, [April 15, 2010]

DOCTRINE:

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.

Private respondents act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. her duties as wife and mother.
His pleas were ignored.

In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment
of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.

May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to
be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May confessed that she
had no more love for him. They then lived separately.

Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The psychologist
certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she
was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable.

On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on the Psychological
Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondents alleged sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and that the psychologist failed
to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the
marriage null and void due to psychological incapacity.

HELD:

Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

RATIO:
In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA decision dismissing
petitioners complaint fordeclaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological incapacity required by
Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) in-curability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It is the Courts considered view that petitioners evidence failed to establish respondent Mays psychological incapacity.

Petitioners testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondents condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio
failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.

More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the law requires.
Private respondents act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to
establish that respondents unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

THIRD DIVISION

ORLANDO G. TONGOL, G.R. NO. 157610

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 19, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals

(CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March 19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion for

reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which

dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.
The facts of the case are as follows:

Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they begot four

children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in 1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.

On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which was granted in a

Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with

Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of the latter's family; their marriage was not a

happy one because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to break up their union; greatly influenced by her parents,

Filipinas, even at the early stages of their marriage, already treated Orlando with contempt and without the love and respect due him

as her husband; when Orlando started a junk shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him encouragement; later on, his

business became successful and he was able to embark upon another business venture; he put up a pharmaceutical company which

also became profitable; Filipinas then became interested and began to interfere in the operation of the business; however, because of

her bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she also resented the fact that her husband got along well with the employees; as a result,

she quarreled with her husband causing the latter embarrassment; she even suspected that the income of the business was being

given to her husband's relatives; their continued fighting persisted and affected their children; efforts at reconciliation proved futile

because their differences had become irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from

Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition for dissolution of their property relationship; andthe petition was granted in 1995.

In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a

failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations

as a married man.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza Guevara, an employee in the

pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a

psychological examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth of their four children, the

RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas

regarding the spouses' psychological examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her

own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.

On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.

Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S
INADEQUATE PERSONALITY DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND INCURABLE (par. 12, p. 3, Annex A,
hereof).

2. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL (p. 7, ibid.).

3. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (Annex B, hereof).[2]

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case is enough

to sustain a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[3] the term psychological incapacity was defined as:

[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x[4]

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in

a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt

manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[5]
While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[6] wherein the

guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36[7] of the Family Code was laid down, this Court finds it significant to

reproduce the same quoted portion, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage
as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[8]

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[9] which took effect on March

15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have been modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:
 SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.-

xxxx

(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing
that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at
the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition to

the petition. Attachment of expert opinionsto the petition is also dispensed with.

In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that respondent is

suffering from Inadequate PersonalityDisorder. However, both courts ruled that the behavior exhibited by respondent does not amount

to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA for the following reasons:

First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following written evaluation regarding respondent's

psychological makeup:

xxxx

On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family where the mother assumed a
more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of her aunt and developed a basic feeling a (sic) rejection.

The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is low-average. Sudden change
overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to give way, even minor pressures upset her and when
this happens, emotional control could not be relied upon.

In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially with females, she became
(sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to her basic feelings of rejection in early life. She coped
(sic) up with her uncomfortable feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability and dominance, a replica of her
mother's attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.

At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further rejection. Additionally, she
is threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for which she is consulting a neurologist.
 Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Orlando Tongol is suffering from some
depressive features, which seems to be a recent development as a result of marital problems. On the other hand,
Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an Inadequate Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which renders her
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable to cope with the
sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her, due to insufficient psychological inner resources. [10]

In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder in this wise:

ATTY. VILLAREAL -

xxxx

Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?

A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all aspects of her life, she could not function
in the way that she feels or she is confident. She has always been very much in doubt of her own capabilities, Sir.

Q- What about hysterical coloring?

A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her psychological reactions to any stresses, Sir.

Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?

A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would be seeing the husband talking to some
employees then, she is suddenly irritable and would present some tantrums. In short, she cannot control her emotion
at the moment of stresses circulations, Sir.[11]

When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, Dr. Villegas

expounded as follows:

ATTY. RENDOR -

xxxx

Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?

A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically, she has a feeling of rejection from the
start of her development and this was carried on into her adult life. When thehusband started having some good
relationship with his employees, then she started to get jealous and she would embarrass him in front of their
employees and insulted him and would go intotantrums and this was very much resented by Mr. Tongol, Sir.
 ATTY. RENDOR -

Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in such a way?

A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol was already rejecting her as a wife
and being attracted to other people, but it is the way of how Mrs. Tongolreacted to her own feelings of rejection, Sir.

xxxx

Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder, Mrs. Tongol rendered her psychological
(sic) incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage. What is your basis in saying that?

A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very dominant. She always gets what she wanted in
the house. In short, she was the authority in the house and during her growing up stage, she was given up to the
aunt, for the aunt to take care of her. She only came back to the family when she was already a sort of an early
teenager. With this, there has always been a feeling of rejection during her personality development. Besides, she
feels that she is one of those not favor (sic) by the mother during her growing up stage, Sir.

Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as far as the marriage is concerned,
considering that this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?

A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both of
them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering
from some depression, Sir.[12]

The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that as a child, Filipinas had always felt rejected, especially

by her mother; that she never got rid of those feelings of rejection even when she became an adult and got married; that her fits

of jealousy and temper tantrums, every time she sees her husband having a good interaction with their employees, are ways of coping

up with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr. Villegas failed to link respondent's personality disorder to her conclusion that respondent

is psychologically incapacitated to perform her obligations as wife and mother. The Court cannot see how respondent's personality

disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential

marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos, to be trulyincognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly

must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. What has been established in the instant case is that, by reason of

her feelings of inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her

obligations towards her husband, such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has ruled that psychological incapacity

must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. [13] As held in Santos:

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.[14]
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent is grave enough to bring

about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner contends that respondent's exaggerated reactions to

normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of rejection brought about by her dysfunctional upbringing, are all indications of the

gravity of her psychological condition. Even granting that respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the fact remains that there is

no evidence to prove that such condition is of such nature as to render respondent incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required

in marriage.

Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr. Villegas

categorically and conclusively characterize respondent's inadequate personality disorder as permanent or incurable. Dr. Villegas was not

sure of the permanence or incurability of respondent's illness as shown by her following statement:

I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both of them
because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from
some depression, Sir.[15] (Emphasis supplied)

Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of

psychoses.[16] The fourth guideline inMolina requires that the psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family

Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of

a profession or employment in a job. In the present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and respondent as well as the other

witnesses regarding the spouses' differences and misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to their disagreement

regarding the management of their business. In fact, respondent herself, in her Memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed

that their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to run their business. [17] This is confirmed by the testimony of

petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for a considerable period of time.[18] However, a mere showing of irreconcilable differences

and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.[19]

In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the Family Code include the mutual

responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide support for the family, which means that compliance with this

obligation necessarily entails the management of the income and expenses of the household. While disagreements on money matters

would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to

declare a marriage null and void. In the present case, respondent's disagreement with her husband's handling of the family's business

and finances and her propensity to start a fight with petitioner spouse regarding these matters can hardly be considered as a

manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial

notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands and

wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's obligation toward their children. In

the present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent had been remiss in performing her obligations toward their

children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code.[20]

It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the

causes therefor manifest themselves.[21] It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of

marriage.[22] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the

matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[23] In the instant case, the Court finds no error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the

CA, that the aversive behavior of petitioner and respondent towards each other is a mere indication of incompatibility brought about

by their different family backgrounds as well as their attitudes, which developed after their marriage.

In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder. However, the totality of the evidence presented

in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as

jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married

life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.[24] Hence, any doubt should be

resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March 19, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 162049 April 13, 2007

NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the Decision1 dated January 8, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65677, reversing the Regional Trial
Courts declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals Resolution dated
February 4, 2004 denying reconsideration.
In Civil Case No. 94-70727, filed by petitioner Narciso Navarro, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, he sought the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent.

As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they got married, both in civil and church ceremonies, they were
awaiting their first child. Since petitioner was still a medical student, while respondent was a student of pharmacy, they lived with
petitioners parents, on whom they were financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four children.

Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didnt have time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him
even before marriage when he could not give her the things she wanted. He added that she was not supportive of his career. Even
marriage counseling did not work. Petitioner stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and even told him to
look for other women. He filed the petition for nullification of their marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made
pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him.

Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly accredited by the Department of Social Welfare and Development, testified that
when petitioner saw her on April 6, 1994, he was distraught, harassed, and unhappy. She concluded from meetings with the
petitioner that the marriage was dysfunctional, destructive, and reconciliation was out of the question since he claims he would go
insane if he were to go back to his wife. Relying on the view of another expert, one Dr. Gerardo Velasco, witness de Castro opined
that professionals are per seincapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage because they spend a lot of time in the
pursuit of their profession and have very little time to spend with their family. She concluded that respondent was also
psychologically incapacitated to perform the marital obligations because she knew, from the start, that her husband was going to be
a doctor, yet she did not give him the support and understanding that was expected of a doctors wife.

Lilia Tayco, the housemaid of petitioners parents also testified that petitioner and respondent were always quarreling because
respondent was always jealous of petitioners classmates.

A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who conducted a psychiatric test on petitioner, testified that tests showed that petitioner was a
perfectionist, short-tempered, critical, argumentative and irritable when people do not meet his expectations. He married Cynthia
only after he got her pregnant. He had depressions and tended to escapism when beset with problems. He was vocal about his
marital problems. He believed that the lack of communication, absence of quality time, inadequacy in problem-solving, and many
problems caused the failure of the marriage.

For her part, respondent refused to submit to the psychiatric examination asked by the petitioner, but said she would do so only
when her defense requires it. She averred that she had no marital problems, not until petitioner had an illicit affair with a certain Dr.
Lucila Posadas. Petitioner denied the affair. Respondent narrated that early 1984, she caught petitioner and Lucila inside the Harana
Motel in Sta. Mesa where a confrontation ensued. After the incident, petitioner seldom went home until he permanently left his
family sometime in 1986. Respondent claimed petitioner and Lucila continued to see each other and had gone abroad together
several times. She explained that she uttered she would not make love with her husband and dared him to look for other women
only out of frustration and anger upon discovery of the affair. She admitted hiring someone to spy on petitioner, but added that she
still loved her husband.

Cynthias friend since high school, Miraflor Respicio testified that Cynthia was a good, stable, and mature person; that she was a
loving and caring mother who gave up her career to take care of her children; and that petitioner and respondent were happy during
the early days of the marriage.

On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that petitioner and respondent were both psychologically incapacitated to perform their
marital obligations. The dispositive portion of the courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the marriage between the parties is (sic) dated June 2, 1973 is hereby declared null and void with the following
effects:

1. The Plaintiff is hereby directed to support his children with the Defendant in the amount of forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) a month, which sum shall be payable on or before the 5th day of each month, effective September, 1998;

2. The parties are hereby disqualified from inheriting from each other by way of testate or intestate succession;

3. Either of the parties may revoke the designation of the other as beneficiary in a life insurance policy;

4. The parties children are hereby declared legitimate, and the custody of the parties minor children is hereby awarded to
the Defendant with the Plaintiff exercising his right to visit them at least once a week;

5. The properties in the name of the parties consisting of a house and lot located at 15 Bronze Street, Filinvest, Quezon City
are hereby deemed as their advance legitime to their children.

SO ORDERED.2
Respondent appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. She averred that the trial court erred when it annulled their marriage instead
of decreeing their legal separation, with the ruling that petitioner was the guilty spouse.

In a Decision dated January 8, 2003, the Court of Appeals held that the constant arguments, bickerings and conflicts between the
spouses did not constitute psychological incapacity. It ruled that petitioner failed to show that any psychological incapacity in either
of the two parties existed at the time of the celebration of marriage. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared that the marriage still subsists.

Petitioner now comes before us raising the following as issues:

(1) Are the decision and resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals proper subject for review by the Honorable Court
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?

(2) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals that the lower court (RTC) erred in finding the parties (petitioner
and respondent) both psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of The Family Code correct or not?

(3) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals that the evidence failed to show that the parties (petitioner and
respondent) were completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage correct or not? and

(4) Which is more in accord with existing law and settled jurisprudence, the decision of the Court of Appeals or the decision
of the trial court?3

Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on the ground of the parties psychological incapacity.

Petitioner contends that the decision of the trial court was well-founded, based on the evidence indicating that the marriage was
beyond reconciliation, and allowing the marriage to subsist would only prolong the spouses agony. Respondent counters that
petitioner failed to prove psychological incapacity, and that their psychological incapacities existed as early as the time of the
celebration of their marriage.

We shall now resolve the issue.1a\^/phi1.net

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,4 we categorically said that psychological incapacity required by Art. 36
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. These include the obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.5

We likewise have repeatedly reminded that the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.6 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,7 the Court gave the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 which
are as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity...

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision...

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable...

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage...

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts...

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition... 8

In the present case, the spouses frequent squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do
not constitute psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the first few years
of their marriage, which bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations,9 it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness10 existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

It will be noted that respondent did not undergo psychological tests. Witness de Castros diagnosis was based solely on petitioners
avowals and not on personal knowledge of the spouses relationship. Hence, de Castros diagnosis is based on hearsay and has no
probative value.11

Further, de Castros statement that professionals are per se incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage because
their profession allows them little time for family life is highly debatable.

Lastly, petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the part of both spouses, existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Their bickerings and arguments even before their marriage and respondents scandalous outbursts in
public, at most, show their immaturity, and immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity.12 Thus so far, both petitioner
and respondent have not shown proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in their personality
structure that effectively incapacitates them from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 13

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 8, 2003 and the Resolution dated February 4,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 65677 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002]

LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided
the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or
speedy under the circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiffs evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to prove the complaint, it would
be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the defendant to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting
case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the courts docket and an assault on the defendants resources and
peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision[1] and
the May 22, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[3]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[4]

The Facts

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and
Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a Complaint[5] for
the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098.Afterwards he filed an Amended
Complaint[6] dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged psychological
incapacity.

The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his Formal
Offer of Exhibits[7] dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to
Evidence)[8] dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.

Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order[9] denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that [respondent]
established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert.[10] After her Motion for Reconsideration[11] was denied in the
March 22, 1999 Order,[12] petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari,[13] docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to
take an appeal therefrom.[14] In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent judge in issuing the assailed
Orders.[15]

The CA also ruled that the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the [trial]
courts discretion.[16] Further, the [p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved arbitrarily or without
basis.[17]

Hence, this Petition.[18]

The Issues

In her Memorandum,[19] petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under obligation, as
a matter of inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when an unfavorable [verdict]
is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law, despite the palpably and patently weak and grossly insufficient
or so inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of marriage case, grounded on psychological
incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such circumstances, can the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be directly and
immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and

2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did the Court of Appeals wantonly violate, ignore or
disregard in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268
SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA 17)? [20]

Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its denial,
did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
 Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of
respondents evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing the CA,
respondent counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.

We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.

However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21] this Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time was
indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.

In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower court acts
with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:

No appeal may be taken from:

xxxxxxxxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxxxxxxxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65. [22]

In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:

SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.[23]

Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari.[24] In Cruz v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:

Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court
may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of
discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.[25]

Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence

Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances, this Court is now tasked to determine
whether the present case falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a patent error or grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the
issue.[26] The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict.[27] In passing upon the sufficiency of
the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.[28]

We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence against respondent (herein
petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the
parties marriage.

First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latters psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury,[29] false
testimony,[30] concubinage[31] and deportation.[32] According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that
his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that this is
very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the father of her children, had acted to
the contrary.[33]

We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital
obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the
prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally
erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
 Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings, sufficient to
prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:

Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. What do you mean by that?

A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want it aborted by taking pills.
She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.[34]

xxxxxxxxx

ATTY. CHUA:

And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please elaborate on this
what you mean by carefree approximating psychologically incapacitated?

ATTY. MIRANO:

I think we better ask the witness what he means by carefree.

ATTY. CHUA:

Okay.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

WITNESS:

She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants me to hire an attendant in
order to take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not bother to let the children see a doctor.[35]

xxxxxxxxx

STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):

ATTY. CHUA:

Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any characteristic or
traits which you consider as psychological incapacity?

WITNESS:

Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she wont talk to me when I call her up by
telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am busy with some other
things. So, I think that is all.[36]

Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioners personality; namely,
her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative sexuality. None of these
three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Far from it.

In Santos v. CA,[37] this Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability.[38] Said the Court:

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.[39]

Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,[40] we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or
a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each
other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital
union.

Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the disability
of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity.The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.[41]

Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative sexuality is easily belied by the fact that two
children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect was already existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.

Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent. His
witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically,
his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it
was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of
his testimony are quoted thus:

ATTY. CHUA:

And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband and the wife in the
present case have a personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?

WITNESS:

They are normal, but they cannot mix together.

Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they are not compatible with each other?

A. Yes.

Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder, bordering on abnormality?

A. Yes.

Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?

A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to handle marriage, that
should try to intervene.

Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call maximum tolerance and give and take,
will that serve the purpose?

A. That would served the purpose of getting well.

Q. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?

A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot be harmonized. So this
case, if only they have tried professional help to take care of their marital problem, it could have been solved.

Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?

A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any from Tom, Dick and Harry could
handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities which they were incompatible. So if anybody
would handle that, they will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each other. They should not have got
married.[42]

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Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that both are normal?

A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.

Q. Normal, simply incompatible.

A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last page. That they are like oil and
water, immiscible. Like oil and water, they will not mix.

Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the frequent quarrels had with the
wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major quarrel?

A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.[43]

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Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?

 A. Yes.[44]

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Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the necessary [expertise]
could be worked out?

A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.[45]

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Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. Because of the

A. The incompatibility.

Q. Incompatibility.

A. Yes.[46]

His testimony established merely that the spouses had an incompatibility, a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated
through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the psychological
incapacity of petitioner.

Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by
respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his
Professional Opinion[47] began with the statement [I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x.[48]The expert witness
testified thus:

ATTY. CHUA

Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the plaintiff who is the husband?

WITNESS

A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and he said, he doesnt know.

ATTY. CHUA

Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and written psychological
examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that?

WITNESS

A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile.[49]

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.

Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioners character, not only through the
descriptions given by respondent, but also through the formers at least fifteen hours[50] of study of the voluminous transcript of records
of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment
of petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.

As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never been objected to, the objection raised thereafter
was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of admissibility of
evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be disregarded whether objected to or
not, because it has no probative value.[51]

We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.[52] Here, however, the totality
of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without
any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed further
with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly insufficient to support a
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the
Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation would have been a total
waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.

We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[53] Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a judicial
pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion. [54]

There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal
would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless action of
respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which would further clog the court dockets with
another futile case.[55]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer
to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner
is DISMISSED. No pronounc

Choa vs Choa
Choa vs. Choa

GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002

FACTS:

Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an
annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based
on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that
Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.

Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity
because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified
and complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of
procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a
difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through
psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more
so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 152577

Petitioner,
Present:
 PUNO,

Chairman,

- versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

CRASUS L. IYOY,

R e s p o n d e n t. September 21, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented

by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30

July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30

October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of

Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus

on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial

Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos

who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a

nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children,

the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent

Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in

1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom

she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu

City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she
had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in

1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American

family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For

the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the

Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of

reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the

family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being

incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and

72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an

American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent

Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She

explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on

certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to

contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money

for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning

as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with

respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was

able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for

divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed

divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American

citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status

shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living

with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she

advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC
 declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00

she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present

their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. [6]

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September

1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health

Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds,

such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son,

wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]

Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus,

Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where

the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders[12] and Commissions[13]issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and

California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to

the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to

exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her right

to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and

void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings

The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed,
plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual
love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man
and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a
wife who is already married to another man in another country.
 Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY
CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the
wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.

Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred
and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is
quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards
her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily
proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her
excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there
at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And
for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the

Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding

no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null

and void, to wit

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing
in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of
nullity of their marriage

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY

CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust
situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has
undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot
 see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually
embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as
married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff
to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which
this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial
courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.[16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,[17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner

Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute psychological
incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence
considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after

a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage

of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality

of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the

Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General,

to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to

be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
 ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for

determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus

. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated [21]

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties

required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt

manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party

involved.[22]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed

down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be

reproduced below
 (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
 A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should

be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on

psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during

the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence

presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there

is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put

into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of

evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus

and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest

son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to

respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave

mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to

take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the

part of the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical

abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of

psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27]

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the

marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party

even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties

and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.

Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her

flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply

with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not

identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it

be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of

Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the

Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have complied

with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as

a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the

policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. [32]

II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
 As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino

citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said

provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her

divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed

before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after

which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since

1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in

Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,

and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize

divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney

or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of

marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article

48 provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for

annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent

the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,

investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the

Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34]

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected

in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication

or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the

land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart

it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or

the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. [35] While it is the prosecuting

attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of

marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this

Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is

only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General

can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the

protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and

declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
 agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State[37]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable

Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority

of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General

to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal

to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to
the court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the
Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from
the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the
case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the
decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action,
the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant
shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity

and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of

nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously

shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the

specific answer to every individual problem.[39]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,

affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and

SET ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for thereversal of the
decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and
Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe
same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand
had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich
she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family
and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their
marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was already an
American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the
CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").

Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and
before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to
adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.

On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife
exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose
nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in
his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial
matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial
Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she
cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her
psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as
lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if
treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that
he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.

In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan;
that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother;
that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was
stated in the complaint.

In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:

1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;

2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his
petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the
seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his
parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental 5 to him and his
parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source of their quarrels.7 He, however, characterized
their union as happy during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new
house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it was then that he felt that he
and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or
distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office and remark that
the curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table; 11 when
she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused
the tenant of having an affair with him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters
continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment
as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to celebrations
of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent
Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.18

Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuels
office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office.20 One time,
witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address book while the latter
was in Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter
that she was looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner
Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked
drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent
Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"22

As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were
admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:

To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a
partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support and understanding.

The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in
a defective communication pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.

Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve
their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-
compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego
to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his
failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other
maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each others needs and feelings.
The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their
psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their
patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with
code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits
which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery. 25

In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had their
own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26 which he had
admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her
husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school
to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered
that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.30

DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a
psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:

Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco,
was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough
psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is
respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing
and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is
reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.

In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.32

CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each
other.33 The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their
community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw
respondent Manuel there.36

On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita
holding in part that:
 The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was]
happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life together continued years thereafter in
peace and prosperity.

The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties
relationship sometime in the early 90s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.

xxx xxx xxx

The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on
marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of
irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in
such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen
even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.38

On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding
both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals. 39 Thus:

The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita.
It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is a shared feeling which between husband and
wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital
union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value
as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).

This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower
court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only
of defendant but also of himself.40

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred

I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED

II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT
THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE
PRESENT

III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V.
MOLINA

IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE

The Courts Ruling

Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely
scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of
Appeals did not heed.

The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at
bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May
1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity
of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an essential
marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity."

On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly
embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his
wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint,
c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.45

With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.

A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL

We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life
and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind,
we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent
Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.

In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.
The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita,
the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:

She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at
gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs
because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child
with his girl now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I think that it was
 the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but,
that she still is willing to pursue it.

x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told
her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to
fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."48

What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that
the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. 49 Sexual
infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be
shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that
particular point."52

B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA

As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case
at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her
outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any
showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. 53 In fact, Dr. Maaba,
whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.54

The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there
supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows
that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but
from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood,55 her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcias report paints a story
of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier
and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his
direct examination.58

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have
perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband
consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to
speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.61

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is
reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

The Case:
Judge Manuel Siayngco filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to his wife, Juanita, based on psychological
incapacity. To support his petition, he alleged that his wife exhibited a domineering and selfish attitude towards him; was extremely
volatile and bellicose, and complained about anything and everything connected with him; she showed no respect or regard for the
prestige and position of his office as a judge and would yell and scream at him or throw objects at him within hearing of their
neighbours. That the incapacity was borne about by the perceived lack of love and support she received from her own parents since
childhood, which she carried over to the marriage. Answering, Juanita denied the allegations, alleging that Manuel merely invented
stories about her so he could be freed to marry his paramour; it was Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations and
she supported Manuel in all his endeavors; and she was raised in a real and happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to
Manuels allegations.
To support each others positions, both parties presented their own expert witnesses to disprove psychological incapacity. Manuel
present Dr. Valentina Tan, who concluded that both Manuel and Juanita had a partner relational problem which affected their
capacity to sustain the marital bond.

She stated: The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a
defective communication pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to maintain the
love and respect that they should give to each other.

On the other hand, Dr. Eduardo Maaba testified for Juanita. He found her capacitated to perform the obligations of marriage.

After presentations of witnesses and documentary evidence, the trial court dismissed the petition. In so ruling, it stated:

The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital
relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain
lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to
some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may
sound like a firetruck.

On appeal to the CA, the latter reversed the RTC decision. It found both parties psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. Since marital union is a two-way process, an expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amore gignit amorem, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise
conscious of its value as a sublime social institution, the CA held.

Juanita appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Issue:
Whether or not the parties a psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations toward each other, warranting
the dissolution of their marriage.

The Ruling:
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag 1 is apropos. There, we held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be
closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on all fours with another. This, the Court of
Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at
bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May
1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity
of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an essential
marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly
embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his
wallet irritants and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals 2 where we declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. 3 In Republic v. Court of Appeals 4 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 5
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.

A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL

We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life
and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. 6 With this cardinal state policy in
mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals 7 that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff
(respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.
The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita,
the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:

She talked about her spouse, My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In
spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have
a child. I believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now. He started his
relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the
petition. She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] paulit-ulit, but, that she still is willing to pursue it.

x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, You
and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family. She answered and said, Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right.
Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin. 8
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that
the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. 9 Sexual
infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. 10 It must be
shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state 11 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that
particular point. 12
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA

As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case
at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her
outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any
showing that these defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. 13 In fact, Dr. Maaba,
whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. 14
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there
supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows
that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but
from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood, 15 her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him, 16 and her inability to conceive. 17 Dr. Garcias report paints
a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt,
becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel
himself during his direct examination 18.
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have
perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband
consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. 19 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos: 20
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a
marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answers to every individual problem. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is
reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001]

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound
for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as
petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a
month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build
their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year
that they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez,
11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to
perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was
cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the
morning.When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he
chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not
spared from physical violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City
as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to
give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of
the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital,
which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was
filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced
to eleven days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent
an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking
psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.
 Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff.
As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city
prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report
to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties.

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, was
admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He
also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however,
the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding
that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid
and subsisting. The appellate court said:

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave,
has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not
physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert;
and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.

The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."[1]

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine
enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court
of Appeals and Molina,[3] promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that
the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not
mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dictashould warrant only a remand of
the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence
that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
has been explained by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. [4] The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds
itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit.

The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the
relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first
time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts
and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not
overturned, Santos.
 At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration
of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family[6] that the State
cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally
terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given
up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001
FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking,
her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the
presence of their children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months later,
they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. But he didnt. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11
days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina should be taken in consideration in
deciding in this case.

HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the category of psychological
incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature.
Petition denied.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet
that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004
denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February
24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.

On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision 1 denying the petition for declaration of
nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that
respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record
did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and
already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the
substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent
has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential
marital obligations.5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.
As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any
reversible error.

Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to
comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.

After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more
than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It
is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant case.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 14 It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to
convincingly demonstrate.

As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that
can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do
not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that
those are incurable.

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-
called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological
malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or
so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the
company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x.
Their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about
the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought
her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.

xxxx

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from
such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm
of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the
petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's
answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the
supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that
there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital
obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed
even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the
 onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more
time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom
he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the
Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not
always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null
and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.20

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be
taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab
initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for
review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error,
is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Article 36: Psychological Incapacity

Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about
a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company
of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting
Brix fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner,
and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a
psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs
leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support,
and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the expert
was not able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, Dr.
Dayans answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder can be part of his family upbringing She stated
that there was a history of Brixs parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is of course inconclusive for such has no direct
bearing to the case at bar.
What is psychological incapacity?
The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this
reason that the Courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007

ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Courts ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition."2

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the (a)
Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled
"Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras, Defendant-Appellee."

On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children,
namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.

Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a
complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She
alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following
circumstances:

(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;

(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;

(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and

(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.

To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.

This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. 5He courted her,
frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding
was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.7

After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their honeymoon. 8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at her
parents house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they were able to build a house of their own. 9 For the first five (5)
years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children because he shouldered his sisters schooling. 10 Consequently,
she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using the income from her "Botica" and store. 11

Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning.
Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their childrens well-
being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication.
Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier
advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop.15

To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. Her sisters supported them throughout their two-
year stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines,
she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he
disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.16 At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline
from their gas station free of charge.

She endured all of Justos shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that
prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their
cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy
Rose Paras.17

As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.

He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila.18 He frequently spent time in her
store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married.
However, it was postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964 upon his mothers signing a
deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa.20

He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of sugar and not to his alleged profligacy. 21 Due to
his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand their store, establish their gasoline station,
and purchase several properties. He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not
dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosapersonally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the banks
authorized employee.22

As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosas attitude after her return from the United States. She became
detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the familys businesses.23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her "new
attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that their relationship was blissful.24

He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had tourist visas. When they were there, their
childrens tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For his part, he was granted only three (3)
months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines.25

He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides,
their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed to give
them financial support because of his lack of income.26

What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not
prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her
lack of concern.27 This was further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area.28

As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was
impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.

After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did
not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal
assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary;30 and (c) the
charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the
existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage. 32 And lastly, it ruled that there
appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage. 33

Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same
charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding
him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was
suspended from the practice of law, thus:

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the
charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1)
YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality andabandonment of his own family, the penalties to be
served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney, and notice of the same
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned.

SO ORDERED.

On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required
by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the
evidence," thus:

Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record first, the income which supported their children came from the
earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly from Rosas industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to
his children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from the conjugal property; third, he was booted out
from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as such did not voluntarily abandon his home;
and fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality, Justos alleged infidelity came after he was driven out
of his house by Rosa. x x x.

The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosas inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation
of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina.34 Thus, she failed to substantiate her allegation that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.35

Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently,
the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in
May, 1993, well before this Courts pronouncement in Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could have
presented an expert to prove the root cause of Justos psychological incapacity had she been required to do so. For relief, she prays
that her marriage with Justo be annulled on the bases of the Courts conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the
alternative, remand this case to the court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due process.

In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new matter completely foreign and removed" from
A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in
A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and documents.

The parties opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:

first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;

second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of Justos alleged
psychological incapacity is necessary; and

third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Whether the factual findings of this Court in

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.

Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no reason to
feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to
declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:

Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we assume Justos alleged infidelity, failure to
support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is
unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage
void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his
alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show incurability, such that while his acts violated the covenants of
marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents
him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.36

The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosas motion for reconsideration, thus:

Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the disbarment case appellant filed against her
husband, namely, appellees falsification of documents to obtain loans and his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do not
conclusively establish appellees psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we
already went as far as to presume the existence of such seeming depravities in appellees character in our
earlier judgment. However, as we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such eventualities is not
necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the part of appellee to discern and perform the rudiments of
marital obligations as required under Article 36.37
Clearly, Rosas insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered "conclusive" on the present case is unmeritorious.
The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the existence" of Justos depravities, however, even doing so could not
bring about her (Rosas) desired result. As Rosas prayer for relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul her marriage
on the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333.38Obviously, she is of the impression that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found
to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of law, the same charges are also sufficient to prove his psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Her premise is of course non-sequitur.

Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different
from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third
and vice versa.39 The Courts exposition in In re Almacen40 is instructive, thus:

x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.

Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean ones unfitness as a husband or vice versa.41 The yardsticks
for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage. While Rosas charges sufficiently proved Justos unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he
is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-
existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party
from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justos acts are not sufficient to conclude that
he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.

II

Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.

The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One of the Guidelines set forth
therein states:

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important
is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition."

Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked a bit when it held inRepublic v.
Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on the
alleged psychological incapacity of one party.

Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,45 promulgated
by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d)
states:
 (d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What must
be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being
procedural in nature, apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.

Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated November 15, 1995,
decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial courts Decision, applying theGuidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter
was brought to this Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application, the Guidelines being
merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper application of Santos and Molina warranted only a
remand of her case to the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to remandPesca51 on the premise
that the Santos and Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:

The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non replicit.

The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to remand it to the trial
court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.

III

Whether the totality of evidence in the case

shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.

The last issue left for this Courts consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the marriage in question.

At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the States policy on marriage. Article XV of the Constitution
mandates that:

SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total development.

SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which states that:

ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
 whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has held fast to the position that any doubt as to the
validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.

Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.

The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to reiterate: psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.

A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosas main grounds in seeking the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification of her signature
in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, andabandonment of the family. Both the courts below found
the charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to
support Rosas charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and abandonment of family, thus:

ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANTS SIGNATURE

The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras
and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan
documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following results:

CONCLUSION:

1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person.

2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same
person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)

The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis
of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y.
Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.

To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to
negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the
presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did he
have to falsify his wifes signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the
attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the principal using his own name.

ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three other persons who
used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent
has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the
father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and
his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is
carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.

While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her
signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing
that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show
that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4) children. The early
days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading his mother to give her
a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to be responsible
couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their children when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage of time
appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship. The acts committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable
differences between them caused by the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the
mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent
attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego and lowered his self-esteem.

There is no evidence that Justos "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the
latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law
practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only
after almost 30 years of their marriage.

Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos "defects" are incurable or grave.

The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between Justo and Rosa should not be annulled.

In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one of her many paramours, this
Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity absent a
showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the marriage, thus:

x x x. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent that
she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What
is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites,
and which produced four children.
 Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.

In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wifes inability to conceive led her husband to other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish
to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in the
contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her
husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these
acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or
mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of marriage; and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36.

What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting relationship with his
wife and her family and repeated lifes setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is
psychologically incapacitated.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.59 As this Court
repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of
the Family Code.60

Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but
on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and
the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.61

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. While this Court commiserates with Rosas
plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chief Justice, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

Rosa Yap-Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras [A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005]
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Saturday, February 04, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong namely Conegunda, Justo,

Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of

land located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority to their mother to sell the subject real properties previously

registered in the name of the heirs of Vicente Paras wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein.

Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed

of Absolute Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was with

the respondents full knowledge since he was residing at the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family

had been in possession of the subject real property up to the present.Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention

was called to the fact that a free patent title to the aforesaid property was issued in respondents name and upon verification with the

DENR, Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was able to get copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining

to the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by the respondent; over the aforesaid lots previously sold by
Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over Real Property executed by Ledesma

de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized

officer to administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order of Approval dated August 19,

1985 signed by District Land Officer Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras.

Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the respondent without her knowledge and consent and those

acts of deceit, machinations and falsification of documents were deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the respondent in

violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of

Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a free patent title over real properties which

had been previously sold by his own mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the control and possession of complainants natural

family, a fact respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which he had full knowledge in successfully causing the release

of a free patent in his name and unjustly and unlawfully deprived the rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in

betrayal of the court to pervert the administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of office.

Issue: Whether or not respondent may be suspended for violating the Canons of Professional Responsibility.

Held: The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession as the bar

should always maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing among its members. By and large, a

lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.

To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidenceand

trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that

respondent violated his lawyers oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty

to society and to the courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court.

Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court in his acts of

applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by

his mother to complainants sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed before this Court when he alleged

that the said properties were public land under the Forestal Zone when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some

portions of entire occupancy of the Parases. Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in hisapplication for free patent

over the said properties when he manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands

despite the fact that these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainants family, as evidenced no less by

respondents own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio
sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid." [2]

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6,
1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is
dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery
of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner
subject to the visitation rights of respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized,
the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action
consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their
marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential
Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's
Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military
service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and
he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually
became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which
she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did
not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the
head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict
physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during
their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would
first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang.When she was discharged from the military service, she
concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The
following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were
diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for
their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them
with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to
them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-
216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his
failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towardsappellee and their children, x x x."[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It
ratiocinated in this wise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be
medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven
to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in
Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings
about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally
or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable
to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of
his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert.Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which
[was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the
incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable." [4]

Hence, this Petition.[5]

Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological
incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not
subject himself to psychological evaluation.

II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
 The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply
because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances,
she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
refused to submit himself to such tests.

In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred
to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,'
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by
the state.

xxxxxxxxx

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

xxxxxxxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may
be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,
and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but
on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring
a marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide
material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of
the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by
CA.

Issues

Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and
may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to
the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he
is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to
observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009

MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,1 and its Resolution dated November 20, 2007.2

Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their first meeting, they got married on
July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City. At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while
respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no children.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.

Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon him. Because of this, the trial court
directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether there was collusion between the parties. In a report dated August
16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between the parties.

On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and submitted a
written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on the States behalf under the supervision and control of the Solicitor
General.

In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually
failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance.
When they were married it was Rodolfos mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who
paid the monthly rental.

Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even bought him a newspaper every
Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job
interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave him money. Sometime later, her
husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner was
informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered
that her husband didnt actually get a job and the money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother.
When she confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have a job so that
petitioner would stop nagging him about applying for a job. He also told her that his parents can support their needs. Petitioner
claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in conformity with
those of his mother.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards her.
Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they
discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even
want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to another
place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their
residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfos first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece of
Rodolfos father, was living with Rodolfos family. She corroborated petitioners testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully
employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his mother. This witness also confirmed that it
was respondents mother who was paying the rentals for the room where the couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she
saw respondent going to his mothers house in business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in
truth he had none. She also stated that respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not living together with
petitioner.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner for her
psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature, independent, very responsible, focused and has direction and ambition
in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based on the information gathered from petitioner, she
found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas
concluded that he was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine
strivings.

She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose response to ordinary way of life was
ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem was a cross-identification with the mother
who was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondents father was a seaman and always out of the house. She
stated that this problem began during the early stages in his life but manifested only after the celebration of his marriage. According
to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected
of a married person. It was incurable because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.

Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage between petitioner and
Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and
obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement.
He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as
expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on his
responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the
respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of respondents severe and
incurable psychological incapacity.

xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby declared null and void
abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.

The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the
parties pursuant to judgment of the court.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.3

On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision4 to correct the first name of Rodolfo which was erroneously typewritten as
"Gerardo" in the caption of the original Decision.

The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based solely on the
information provided by petitioner and was not based on an examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the alleged
psychological defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were grave, permanent and incurable.

Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the psychological
incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder existed prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable. In setting
aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:

The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondents alleged irresponsibility and over-dependence on his mother is
symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.

xxx xxx xxx

Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellees failure to prove that respondents supposed psychological malady existed even before the
marriage. Records however show that the parties were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage and were living on
their own in a rented apartment. That respondent often times asks his mother for financial support may be brought about by his
feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the family coffers, considering that it was his wife who is working for the
family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that respondent does not like to have a child on the pretense that respondent is not yet
ready to have one. However this is not at all a manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown that he has a
full grasp of reality and completely understands the implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed. The only problem
besetting the union is respondents alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which was not proven in this
case to be psychological-rooted.

The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional immaturity which by themselves, do not
constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has
utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations, it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007).

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C.
Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains VALID.5 (emphasis ours)

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly ruled that the "totality of evidence
presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouses psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and settled
jurisprudence.

We grant the petition.

Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.6 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone
of the family members.7

Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 stringent guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
 (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.9 (Emphasis supplied)

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.11 It should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."12 The
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 13

However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36.14 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.15 With the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court encourages a reexamination
of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the
Molina doctrine.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment
of the parties marriage under Article 36.

First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband.

The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, highlights the lack of personal examination of Rodolfo by said
doctor and the doctors reliance on petitioners version of events. In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held that there is no requirement that
the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is
adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which the
psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony.18 Significantly, petitioners narration of facts was corroborated in material points by the
testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to elaborate on her report and fully explain the link
between the manifestations of Rodolfos psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate
courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate
their candor or lack thereof.19 Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witness. 20

Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition,
sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision.

The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas from petitioner,
he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the couples daily
sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfos refusal to have a child
stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.1avvphi1
These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical causes by an expert
witness with more than forty years experience from the field of psychology in general and psychological incapacity, in particular. In a
portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:

Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education. Being the eldest, she is expected to be the role model
of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and physically punished, in order to tow the line. But on the other hand, she
developed growing resentments towards her father and promised herself that with the first opportunity, shell get out of the family.
When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 months after they met, without really knowing anything about him. Her obsession
to leave her family was her primary reason at that time and she did not exercise good judgment in her decision making in marriage.
During their 4 years marital relationship, she came to realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and responsibilities, in
terms of loving, caring, protection, financial support and sex.

On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to be weak, and his two elder brothers were all
working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his mothers needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her system.
The relationship became symbiotic, that led to a prolonged and abnormal dependence to his mother. The mother, being the stronger
and dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but the reversal of roles became confusing that led to ambivalence of his identity
and grave dependency. Apparently, all the boys were hooked up to his complexities, producing so much doubts in their capabilities in
a heterosexual setting. Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious
guilt feelings of defying the mothers love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so that his
continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and crippled him psychologically.

Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is the opinion of the examiner, that Mrs.
Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible and is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and
obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems she has difficulty in handling her considerable anxiety, at present.
There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder associated with
severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to a
period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self confidence,
independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital
stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his life and therefore
became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with
his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustment.21

These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of which we quote
below:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your psychological evaluation?

A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured, independent, very responsible, focused, she has
direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she wanted, maam, and therefore, I concluded that she is
psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage, maam.

Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological evaluation with regards to the respondent?

A: Based on my interview, Ive found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically incapacitated to perform
the duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric classification as Dependent Personality Disorder
associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings, maam.

Q: In laymans language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do you mean by Dependent Personality
Disorder?

A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response to ordinary way of life are ineffectual and
inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt with himself and inability to make his own decision, quite
dependent on other people, and in this case, on his mother, maam.

Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of respondent, Rodolfo Azcueta?

A: Very much, maam.

Q: Why?

A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a husband and as a father,
maam.
 Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this psychological problem?

A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the mother who is the dominant figure in the
family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family while the father was a seaman and always out of the
house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very submissive and passive to the authority of the wife,
maam.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind of psychological problem manifested?

A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his early stages in life, maam.

Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the respondent in this case,
before the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with thethat the manifestation came too late?

A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no stresses, no demand on
his life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished college degree of Computer Science, there is no demand on
himself at least to establish his own, and the mother always would make the decision for him, maam.

Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?

A: Yes maam.

Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?

A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is expected of a married person, maam.

Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?

A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became so deeply ingrained into his personality,
and therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage, maam.

Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?

A: It is permanent in nature, sir.

Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological problem as far as the marriage
relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?

A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard expectation is, the husband has to
work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of course, to function on (sic) the sexual duties of a husband to the wife, but in this
case, early in their marriage, they had only according to the wife, experienced once sexual relationship every month and
this is due to the fact that because husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is a result of the unconscious guilt
feeling of the husband in defying the mothers love when they will be having heterosexual relationship and therefore, at that
point, he will not be able to distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore, sex relationship will not be
satisfactory according to expectation, maam.22

In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties."23

Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce here for
emphasis:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and
obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement.
He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as
expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on his
responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the
respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of respondents severe and
incurable psychological incapacity.

Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. Contrary to the CAs finding that the parties lived harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage,
witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and
abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder must
have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

The Court is wary of the CAs bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The CAs reasoning that Rodolfos
requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family
coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his "responsible" realization that he should not have a child since he is
unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support these views. Again, we must point out that
appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where
the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by evidence.

We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be attributed to his
immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the
fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.

In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality disorder and how one afflicted with such
a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital obligations, to wit:

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.24

Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the
medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms or manifestations and
in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize
the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and
cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together, observe mutual
love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot
independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot
contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital
obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by
evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.

At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances when it is tasked to
interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With
respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in science and medicine but
also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on
increasingly important roles in the financial and material support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that the
family should be an "autonomous" social institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and
well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit
based on mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.
This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of
families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological
disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of
in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is
proper under the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo
City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Facts: Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and always depended on
his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was Rodolfos mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and
paid the monthly rental. Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually came from Rodolfos
mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his parents could support their needs. They had sex only
once a month which Marietta never enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be
enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta asked Rodolfo if they could move to another
place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave and see if he would follow her. He did not.

Rodolfos first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfos family, corroborated Mariettas testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully
employed and relied on the allowance given by his mother who also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The psychiatrist
who examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused, responsible, had a direction and ambition
in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered
from Marietta, the same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-
confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people. The psychiatrist explained that
the root cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfos mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering
that Rodolfos father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house. She added that the problem began during the early stages of Rodolfos
life but manifested only after his marriage. She stated that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the
responsibilities of a spouse, and incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply ingrained in his personality.
She, thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities.
Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City Prosecutor found no collusion between the
parties. Based on the evidence presented by Marietta, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio.

The Solicitor General appealed the RTCs decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was based solely on the information given by
Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged psychological disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was
grave, permanent and incurable.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs decision. Marietta, thus, brought the case to the Supreme
Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held: Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his Dependent Personality Disorder. His
marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.

Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husbands psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos vs. Marcos [397 Phil.
840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the totality
of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Mariettas testimony was corroborated in material
points by Rodolfos close relative, and supported by the psychiatrists testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfos psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted
the veracity of Mariettas factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
her expert witness.

The root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by
testimony of an expert witness with more than 40 years experience in the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and clearly
explained in the trial courts decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009), (b)y the very nature of Article 36,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Rodolfos psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility, overdependence on his
mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfos Dependent Personality Disorder must
have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a by-product of his upbringing and family life.

Furthermore, Rodolfos psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to render him unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals opinion that Rodolfos requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been
due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was a responsible
realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High Court for being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The
Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the Court of Appeals finding that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother
could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony
identified a grave clinical or medical cause
for Rodolfos abnormal behavior Dependent Personality Disorder.

A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others,
allows others to make most of his importantdecisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they
are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra)

One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic
matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse,
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is automatically deemed psychologically
incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully
examine the type of disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.

Finally, it has been established that Rodolfos condition is incurable, having been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years.

THIRD DIVISION

BENJAMIN G. TING, G.R. No. 166562

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,*
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.
 Promulgated:

CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, March 31, 2009

Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court

of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and

resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage

between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4]

The facts follow.

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were

classmates in medical school.[5] They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already

pregnant with their first child.

At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born, the couple

decided to move to Carmens family home inCebu City.[7] In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations[8] and

thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979,

Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by

Carmens family, as member of its active staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.[11]
 The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes

Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born

on June 16, 1991.[12]

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two

years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on

Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of

their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. [13]

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble

occasionally with his friends.[14] But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about

midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault

her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their

house.[15]Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to

answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his

services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latters drinking problem,

but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.[16]

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family and would even get angry

at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking

and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.[17] He rarely stayed home[18] and even neglected his obligation

to his children.[19]

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.[20] He would gamble two or three times a week and would

borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own

jewelry to finance his gambling.[21] There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the

lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts. [22] Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in

1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be

banned from the gambling establishments.[23]

In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
 3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and

the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the

same; and

4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support

to his family.[24]

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his

peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social

reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.[25] As for his alleged failure to

support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees

from VelezHospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.[26] In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he

gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his

hard-earned money on unnecessary things.[27] He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children,

while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.[28]

During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated

by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses children from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed

instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.[30]

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview,

however, Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition

because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of

stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent

are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.[32]

To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of

Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto MemorialMedical Center, as his expert witness.[33] Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior

based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist

from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr. Oates findings,

Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship with his fellow

doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.[35]

 On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision[36] declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null

and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and

found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found

Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person

with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The

decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between
plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[37]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It

faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically

incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on established

fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[41]

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this

case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition

with the RTC.[42] She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle

of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent

thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit.

Undaunted, respondent filed a petition forcertiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the

petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration.[45]On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous

ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision[46] reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial courts

decision.[47]

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004

Resolution.[48]

Hence, this petition.

 For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth
under the Santos and Molina cases;

II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and

III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void [is]
in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final

decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and

closed to further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,[50] necessary for two simple reasons:

economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. [51]

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the United

States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his

dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections[52] is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm.
The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation. As the rule evolved,
early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where
courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the actual
principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
According to Hamilton, strict rules and precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion in the
courts. Madison agreed but stressed that x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing
the law, it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison disagree about the countervailing
policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He added that their ideas reveal a deep
internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction.
It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.
 Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare
decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisishave been isolated by legal scholars.
The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher
courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts
must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an
obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command.
Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare decisis and
statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution
while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more
flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisisin constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of
the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is
not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed
or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided. In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare
decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: after a statute has been
construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires
a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself. This stance reflects
both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be
bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2)
it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts
while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its
decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy
v. Ferguson's separate but equal doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be
segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is
inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the
colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be
straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc.
v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly,
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a
private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the
factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening
developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants:
closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations
is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule
has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind
of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more
than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.[53]

To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively

for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca
v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts

constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different

view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and

have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,[56] we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate

for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead

of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into

and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological

incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours with another.[57]

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions

furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical

antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not

conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such opinions as

decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough

to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be

resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert

opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36

must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own

attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and

researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of

the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
 To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity
and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too
expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are
provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or
clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-
trial conference.[60]

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the

root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,

accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such

psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the

appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders

clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[61] The psychological illness

that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of

awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[62]

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage.

She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends;

but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the

evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage

between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened

respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr.

Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra maintained that there is

nothing wrong with petitioners personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from

analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological
evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africawho personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras)

personal interview with Benjamins brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against

his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his

spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as the totality of

evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro

matrimonio.[65] In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended

Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET

ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Ting vs Ting
BENJAMIN G. TING,

Petitioner,

- versus -

CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 166562

March 31, 2009

Facts:

Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they were
wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being
married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed
that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only
became manifest thereafter.

Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he
inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would
confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with
her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondent declaring the marriage null and void.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTCs decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina
guidelines should not be applied to this case

Issues:

1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases,

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized,

3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void is in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.

Held:

1. No. respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for
being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.

2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago.

SECOND DIVISION

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, G.R. No. 166738

Petitioner,

Present:

*
CARPIO-MORALES, J.,

Acting Chairperson,

- versus - **
CARPIO,
***
CHICO-NAZARIO,
 ****
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

EDWARD RUMBAUA,

Respondent. August 14, 2009

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her petition for review on certiorari,[1] the decision dated

June 25, 2004[2] and the resolution dated January 18, 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095. The challenged

decision reversed the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward

Rumbaua (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand,

denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The present petition traces its roots to the petitioners complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage against the

respondent before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated

to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to

live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mothers death; he

represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another

woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.

Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as personal service proved futile.[5] The RTC ordered

the provincial prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no fabrication or suppression of

evidence would take place.[6] Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongsons report negated the presence of collusion between the parties. [7]

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition.[8] The OSG

entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all hearings of the case. [9]
 The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate her charges.

The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime

in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but the respondents family did not approve of their relationship. After graduation

from college in 1991, the respondent promised to marry the petitioner as soon as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when the

Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first

have a secret marriage in order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; they were married in Manila on February 23,

1993. The petitioner and the respondent, however, never lived together; the petitioner stayed with her sister in Fairview, Quezon City,

while the respondent lived with his parents in Novaliches.

The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six months of their marriage. At that point, the

respondent refused to live with the petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application for a PAL

scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couples daily meetings became occasional visits to the petitioners house

in Fairview; they would have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, the respondent enrolled at FEATI University after he lost his

employment with PAL.[10]

In 1994, the parties respective families discovered their secret marriage. The respondents mother tried to convince him to go

to the United States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued living separately from the petitioner. The respondent

forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. The

respondent indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.

In April 1995, the respondents mother died. The respondent blamed the petitioner, associating his mothers death to the pain

that the discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondents action, the petitioner severed her relationship with the

respondent. They eventually reconciled through the help of the petitioners father, although they still lived separately.

In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her mother

went to the respondents house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia). When she confronted

the respondent about it, he denied having an affair with Cynthia.[11] The petitioner apparently did not believe the respondents and

moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish that her discovery brought.[12]
 The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication between her and respondent had ceased. Aside

from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;[13] and the testimony, curriculum

vitae,[14] and psychological report[15] of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).

Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following tests on the petitioner: a Revised Beta

Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a Sachs Sentence

Completion Test; and MMPI.[16] She thereafter prepared a psychological report with the following findings:

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual level. Logic and
reasoning remained intact. She is seen to be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into most situations
especially if it is within her interests. She is pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had reservations
from negative criticisms such that she normally adheres to social norms, behavior-wise. Her age speaks of
maturity, both intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her compliant attitude which makes her a
subject for manipulation and deception such that of respondent. In all the years of their relationship, she
opted to endure his irresponsibility largely because of the mere belief that someday things will be much
better for them. But upon the advent of her husbands infidelity, she gradually lost hope as well as the sense
of self-respect, that she has finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of being aggressive and very
cautious at times so as to fight with the frustration and insecurity she had especially regarding her failed
marriage.

Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner as he

believes that the world revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to
deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an extreme air of confidence and
dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards others especially
to that of petitioner.

REMARKS

Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the expectations people
tagged with it. In love, age does matter. People love in order to be secure that one will share his/her life
with another and that he/she will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow
or let love die it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she expected.

In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really happened for her towards
the young respondent who used love as a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she
extended towards him. He made her believe that he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful only to
reveal himself contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that
he was able to engage himself to promiscuous acts that made petitioner look like an innocent fool. His
character traits reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to be grave, severe and
incurable.[17] [Emphasis supplied.]
 The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the

petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and concluded as follows:

xxxx

Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent imposed limited or block
[sic] out communication with his wife, forgetting special occasions, like petitioners birthdays and Valentines Day;
going out only on occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel to have sexual intercourse.

It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case which show the psychological
incapacity of respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful marriage
and to discharge his marital responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is declared grave,
severe and incurable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and
respondent Edwin Rumbaua is hereby declared annulled.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The CA Decision

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.[19] The CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed and set

aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of the parties marriage.[20]

In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayags psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the respondents so-called

narcissistic personality disorder; it did not discuss the respondents childhood and thus failed to give the court an insight into the

respondents developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondents incapacity

was deep-seated and incurable.

The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to be psychological, although its manifestations may be

physical. Moreover, the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill so that he or she

could not have known the marital obligations assumed, knowing them, could not have assumed them. In other words, the illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the essential obligations of marriage. In

the present case, the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly refused to live with her because of his parents objection

to their marriage.

The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution of January 18, 2005. [21]

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that

1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina[22] (the Molina case) cannot be dispensed with because A.M.

No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;

2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the

defects in her testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and

3. Dr. Tayags testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report.

The petitioner prays that the RTCs and the CAs decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC

for further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CAs decision be set aside and the RTCs decision be

reinstated.

The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took effect after the

promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial courts decision and remanding the case for further proceedings were not proper; and

(c) the petitioner failed to establish respondents psychological incapacity.[23]

The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.

THE COURTS RULING

 We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable

In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for

the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24] -- which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003 and duly published -- is geared towards the

relaxation of the OSG certification that Molinarequired. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides:

SEC. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with
the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum
if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of
court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without
the memoranda.

The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered despite

the absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took effect

only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.

The petitioners argument lacks merit.

The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or remove

any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural

laws may be given retroactive effect,[25] as we held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[26]
 Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
the retroactive operation of statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied

retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior to

its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-

11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting

attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case,

not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioners objection regarding the Molina guideline on

certification lacks merit.

A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper

The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are

procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and

asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of counsel

bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.

We do not find her arguments convincing.

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section

1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new

trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake

or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved partys

rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not

have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.

In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a

remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima facie shows

that the petitioners counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Grantingarguendo that the petitioners counsel had been

negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel

Corporation where we explained:[29]

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid
reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed
to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a
premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the
event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.

Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioners requested remand.

Petitioner failed to establish the

respondents psychological incapacity

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on

Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of its celebration, was

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such

incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court first declared that psychological

incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to no less than

a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be

assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v.

Court of Appeals where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
 such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be

characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.[31] These requisites must be strictly complied with, as

the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of

personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define psychological incapacity, fleshing out its terms is left to us to do so on a case-

to-case basis through jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[33] when we explained:

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application
of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.

In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence insufficient to

prove that the respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.

a. Petitioners testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondents condition
 The petitioners evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b)

visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during special

occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was

working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be

distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize

some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,[34] we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had

difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening

disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from

complying with his essential marital obligations had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.

In the present case, the respondents stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was

never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioners testimony reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit

with her for fear of jeopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family. The respondents

failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner

for his mothers death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness,

insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondents act of living with another

woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence

was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent

was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.

To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of these imperfections, however,

does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered him incapable

of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:[35]

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity
or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said
rule.
 b. Dr. Tayags psychological report and court testimony

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the respondents psychological incapacity were based on the

information fed to her by only one side the petitioner whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance

alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more

rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.[36] For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent

from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted

and responded to the doctors probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioners narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a

self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who believes that the world revolves around him; and who used love as

adeceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him. Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of

love; made a generalization that respondent was a person who lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse, and who engaged

in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool; and finally concluded that the respondents character traits reveal him

to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable.

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a

psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to

identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage.

Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling

his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayags

conclusion in her Report i.e., that the respondent suffered Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality

Disorder declared to be grave and incurable is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization

and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess

her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondents condition. To make conclusions

and generalizations on the respondents psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not

different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayags subsequent testimony in court cured whatever deficiencies attended her

psychological report.
 We do not share this view.

A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married,

respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and

responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondents condition was grave

and incurable. To directly quote from the records:

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:

Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as Exh. E-7, there is a statement
to the effect that his character traits begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of
antisocial personality disorder. What do you mean? Can you please explain in laymans word,
Madam Witness?

DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:

A: Actually, in a laymans term, narcissistic personality disorder cannot accept that there is something
wrong with his own behavioral manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the world; they are
eccentric; they are exemplary, demanding financial and emotional support, and this is clearly
manifested by the fact that respondent abused and used petitioners love. Along the line, a
narcissistic person cannot give empathy; cannot give love simply because they love themselves
more than anybody else; and thirdly, narcissistic person cannot support his own personal need and
gratification without the help of others and this is where the petitioner set in.

Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?

A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral manifestation under personality disorder
[sic] this is already considered grave, serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this,
a kind of developmental disorder wherein it all started during the early formative years and brought
about by one familiar relationship the way he was reared and cared by the family. Environmental
exposure is also part and parcel of the child disorder. [sic]

Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?

A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long before he entered marriage.
[Un]fortunately, on the part of the petitioner, she never realized that such behavioral manifestation
of the respondent connotes pathology. [sic]

xxxx

Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is now lying [sic] with somebody else,
how will you describe the character of this respondent who is living with somebody else?
 A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic] because an antisocial person is
one who indulge in philandering activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of
another person, and this [is] again a buy-product of deep seated psychological incapacity.

Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep seated [sic], how would you describe
the psychological incapacity? [sic]

A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would say incurable in nature and at this
time and again [sic] the psychological pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not
being able to give meaning to a relationship in terms of sincerity and endurance.

Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of the respondent and the petitioner,
Madam Witness?

A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative years and so if it takes enough
that such psychological incapacity of respondent already existed long before he entered marriage,
because if you analyze how he was reared by her parents particularly by the mother, there is
already an unhealthy symbiosis developed between the two, and this creates a major emotional
havoc when he reached adult age.

Q: How about the gravity?

A: This is already grave simply because from the very start respondent never had an inkling that his
behavioral manifestation connotes pathology and second ground [sic], respondent will never admit
again that such behavior of his connotes again pathology simply because the disorder of the
respondent is not detrimental to himself but, more often than not, it is detrimental to other party
involved.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:

Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the respondent never appeared at my clinic.

Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with the petitioning wife to annul their marriage with
her husband in general, what can you say about the respondent?

A: That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to give meaning to their relationship. If
you analyze their marital relationship they never lived under one room. From the very start of the
[marriage], the respondent to have petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their
family knew of their marriage [sic]. Respondent completely refused, completely relinquished his
marital obligation to the petitioner.
 xxxx

COURT:

Q: Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the petitioner, can you really enumerate the
specific traits of the respondent?

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the dependent attitude of the respondent.

Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?

A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky simply because he never had a
set of responsibility. I think that he finished his education but he never had a stable job because
he completely relied on the support of his mother.

Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something specific?

A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the part of the mother merely because
respondent happened to be the only son. I said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship
[sic] developed between the son and the mother simply because the mother always pampered
completely, pampered to the point that respondent failed to develop his own sense of assertion or
responsibility particularly during that stage and there is also presence of the simple lying act
particularly his responsibility in terms of handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly manifested
by the fact that respondent refused to build a home together with the petitioner when in fact they
are legally married. Thirdly, respondent never felt or completely ignored the feelings of the
petitioner; he never felt guilty hurting the petitioner because on the part of the petitioner, knowing
that respondent indulge with another woman it is very, very traumatic on her part yet respondent
never had the guts to feel guilty or to atone said act he committed in their relationship, and clinically
this falls under antisocial personality. [37]

In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayags answer was very vague and inconclusive, thus:

xxxx

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO

Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?

DR. NEDY TAYAG

A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up to this very moment, no scientific
could be upheld to alleviate their kind of personality disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other
 person suffering from any kind of disorder particularly narcissistic personality will never admit that
they are suffering from this kind of disorder, and then again curability will always be a
question. [sic][38]

This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic

personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these traits. She mentioned the buzz

words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage namely, gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage,

psychological incapacity relating to marriage and in her own limited way, related these to the medical condition she generally

described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondents exact condition except in a very general

way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the

respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and

incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondents

awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the

petitioners case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related

to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor

jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined

by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.[39] If a psychological disorder can be proven

by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.[40] No such independent

evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondents early life and associations,

and about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to

be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to

support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of

the respondents life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities,

such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six months

of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage,

for example, why the respondents family opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the

death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not

because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital developments

that do not amount to psychological incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses likewise never appeared to have been factored
in. Not a few married couples have likewise permanently separated simply because they have fallen out of love, or have outgrown

the attraction that drew them together in their younger years.

Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to the trial courts for the

introduction of additional evidence; the petitioners evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to support the conclusion that

the petitioners marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the ground of the respondents psychological incapacity.

The Court commiserates with the petitioners marital predicament. The respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his

marital obligations, particularly the obligation to live with ones spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological defect from

the mere fact that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we ruled inMolina, it is not enough to prove that a

spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable

of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the

marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and

responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.[41]

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of

Appeals dated June 25, 2004 andJanuary 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.

SO ORDERED.

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA vs. EDWARD RUMBAUA

GR 166738, August 14, 2009

FACTS: Rowena Padilla and Edward Rumbaua were married. However, they never lived together in one habitat because their marriage
was a secret to Edward's family. Rowena filed for nullity of their marriage due to psychological incapacity. She alleged that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
the respondent reneged on his promise to be true with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to
her; he blamed her for his mothers death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in
Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman.
The RTC nullified the marriage in its decision. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals due to
prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of required certifications from the Solicitor General. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court due to prematurity thus denied the nullification of the parties' marriage. Rowena, then filed a
petition to the Supreme Court praying for the Court of Appeal's decision be set aside and RTC's decision be reinstated.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the psychologist was able to prove that the respondent is indeed psychologically incapacitated according
to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

RULING: No. The testimony of Dr. Tayag, together with her report, suffers from very basic flaws.

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondents exact condition except in a very general way. In
short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can
be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why
it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondents awareness of and his capability
to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioners case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to
her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor
jurisprudence requires, of course,that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence,
however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondents early life and associations, and
about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005]

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July
12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After
respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer
denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.[1]

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia
Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1
million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00;

3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;

4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiffs
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying
to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum
from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies;

5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly,
subject to modification as the necessity arises;

6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and

7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate court, respondent
filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly supportpendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition
thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument.[3]

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000.[4] Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.[5]

On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in
toto the trial courts decision.[6] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision,
petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the son.[7] Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question
these two Resolutions.

On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari[8] and the Petition for Certiorari[9] were ordered consolidated by this Court.[10]
 In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and
jurisprudence, thus:

1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF
P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;

2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;

3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS
RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL,
AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND
THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE
TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND

4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT
ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS,
HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.[11]

In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED
SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR HEARING.[12]

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY
PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.[13]

IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED
THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY
ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL.[14]

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO
SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.[15]

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:

On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties particularly
the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love
instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-
appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was
unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to
make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendantappellee and their son;
that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their
separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless
nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.

Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts,
damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the
Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not
follow that no such award for damages may be made.

Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million
pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed
for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.[16]

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:

ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219[17] of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages may
be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully
cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages,
therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based
were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.

On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due
to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:

. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. . . .[18]

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said
courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding
moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of
entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his
or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.

For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one
must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely
deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner.
Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.

Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil
Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[19]

With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:

Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of
litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)[20]

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of attorneys fees and costs of
litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.[21]

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both
are grounded on petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to
comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since
the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without
basis.

Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park
and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:

The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of
declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage
carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993,
226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.

The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are
conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the following:

1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;

3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits
from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .

Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the parties conjugal properties
and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who
worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package
from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount
of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations other
than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such
share as provided in this Code. In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had
there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous
cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of
the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July
12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of
any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband,
for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which
it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has chosen
to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will
not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.

Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just,
lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being
part of their conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said
defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of
the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies. [22]

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:

On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-half of his separation/retirement
benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters share in the conjugal partnership.

On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties. In
the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no
steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received
from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued
from plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the
trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee,
the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial
court.[23]

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case
may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared voidab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.

In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,[24] this Court expounded on the consequences of a void marriage on
the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law
now expressly provides that

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of
the other, during the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common
children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation
or declaration of nullity of the marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither
imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with
authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation
and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51
and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43,
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any
continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to
have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on
the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-
ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it
may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. [25]

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to
have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property
of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of
co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn
twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005[26] and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.

With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that
the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which
are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner
from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of
Companies issustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and
November 13, 1996 which increased the supportpendente lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and
ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Spouses Buenaventura vs. CA
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Wednesday, March 07, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant parents Leonardo

Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children. The petitioners contend that there was no actual

valid consideration and that assuming that there was considerationin the sums reflected the properties are more than three-fold times

more valuable than the small sums appearing therein. The RTC ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the case. RTCs ruling

was affirmed by CA. Hence the appeal.

Issue:Whether or not there was a valid consideration in the deeds of sale

Held: If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or

even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject

to reformation.

Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud,

mistake or undue influence.

Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate a

defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract.

Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even

affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale. All

the respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave.