Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Essai
René ten Bos
The bureaucratic mentality is the only constant in the universe (Doctor
McCoy, in: Star trek IV: The Journey Home)
Abstract
René ten Bos This paper relates Zygmunt Baumans admonitions of the bureaucratic mentality
Schouten & to business ethics. Although I am not in agreement with everything Bauman has
Nelissen, to say, I will argue that business ethicists, consultants and others who claim to be
Management able to do the moral thinking for others should take Baumans worries about the
Training and moral autonomy of people working in our organizations very seriously. As long as
Consultancy, business ethics does not enhance this moral autonomy but instead proffers a ratio-
Zaltbommel,
The Netherlands nalized and rule-governed ethics, it may very well undermine the moral nature of
people working in organizations.
Descriptors: ethics, moral rules, moral impulse, employee autonomy,
bureaucracies
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Introduction . ,
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organizational theorists but also for consultants, and, more particularly, for
business ethicists. One of my aims in this paper is to make clear why
Baumans insights are so disturbing.
Baumans ideas are most provocatively put forward in Modernity and the
Holocaust ( 1989), the central argument of which is that the Holocaust
should not be seen as an aberration of modem civilization, but rather as a
product of it. The Holocaust is essentially a non-nal phenomenon in the
sense that it is fully in keeping with everything we know about our civi-
lization, its guiding spirit, its priorities, its immanent vision of the world
(1989: 8). The uniqueness of the Holocaust has misled many sociologists
and philosophers into thinking that it was a perversion rather than a con-
sequence of civilization. Bauman points out, though, that it was normal
and civilized people and not inveterate sadists who paved the way for
997- Treblinka. These normal and civilized people were working for bureau-
cratic organizations: They could destroy a whole people by sitting at their
desks (Hilberg, cited in Bauman 1989: 24). Baumans point is not that
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998
bureaucracies necessarily lead to atrocity; the point is that they do not nec-
which undermines our moral nature. Bauman argues that organizations are
by the moral experts in the community to which one belongs. The horizon
of a particular action is thus not determined by how the actor herself thinks
about its effects, but by its being in comformity with the rules laid down
by those who occupy a higher rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The over-
all effect of this ideology has been that members of organizations become
alienated from their very own moral nature.
Of course, one may claim that not all organizations are conterminous with
the bureaucracies Bauman appears to have in mind. If we take a very opti-
mistic stance, we may even consider postmodem, postfordist, flexible
or even excellent organizational forms as happy exceptions to the rule,
which would imply that Baumans critique would not pertain to such forms
of organization. However, we should not be so optimistic. Many of the new
forms (e.g. the re-engineered company, the TQM organization) are still
highly technocratic and rigid, others (e.g. the sweatshop, the artisan com-
pany) simply represent a major step backwards to paternalism, subcon-
tracting or other pre-modern features that clearly undermine the individual
employees moral autonomy (Willmott 1993). In other words, it is still the
moral technology and not the moral quality (of autonomous individual
beings) that counts in most organizations, even though it must be granted
that some of them operate entirely under an anti-bureaucratic cloak.
In the next section I will discuss in more detail how - according to Bauman
-
Denial of
&dquo;
.~ -
Proximity ,
ity, the organization not only prevents itself from doing good, but also from
doing evil.
The organization is therefore naturally inclined to create a distance between
itself and those who have to bear the consequences of its actions. The lat-
ter group are systematically held beyond the reach of the actors moral
impulse ( ihid 1993: 125) but apparently also beyond the reach of what-
ever evil might be inflicted on them by the organization. An
ideological
component is unmistakable here: the victims of evil might always recur to
the law that allows the members of the organization to keep moral stress
at bay. As long as we act in conformity with the law, or with rules, we do
not have to worry. We may be legally responsible, but we are never monally
responsible. If somebody objects to our actions, he or she should recur to
the law and not appeal to our conscience.
In locating the effects of actions by the organization beyond the reach of
moral limit (ihid 1993: 125), members of organizations often point out
how complex the circumstances were, under which those actions took place.
Complexity provides the members of the organization with the perfect
excuse for not having acted morally. Whatever the organization does is so
complicated that the individual members of it are at best only part of the
action and, hence, not wholly responsible. Morality is sacrificed on the altar
of complexity.
The relegation of the moral impulse is, for example, often effectuated by
placing intermediary men between the organizations members and those
who bear the consequences of their actions. Whether or not this is done
deliberately does not matter; what does matter is that it is often very
difficult for the members of the organization to see how human misery
resulted from their actions. They only remotely sense that there might be
a link, and in the rare case that they are fully aware of it, it is at least
difficult to resist the temptation to deny any direct contribution to that mis-
ery. In other words, if members of the organization perfectly understand
the dire consequences of their actions, they often dodge responsibility by
pointing out that the situation is complex and that many intermediaries are
involved.
Shells recent problems in Nigeria are a perfect case in point. For the Dutch
television program NOVA, Shells president, Mr. Herkstr6ter, readily
admitted that he was deeply concerned about the executions of people who
were opposing Shells activities in Nigeria because of the damage inflicted
on their environment. He contended, however, that he did not feel any per-
sonal responsibility for the executions. The Nigerian government,
HerkstrOter pointed out, was solely responsible for the executions and not
Shell. Indeed, Shell had done everything to stop the executions: in this con-
text this means that the company apparently developed a strategy of inten-
sive secret diplomacy. His interlocutor argued that Shell, at least, could not
dodge responsibility for the ecological damage that had led to the protests.
However, again, Herkstr6ter insisted that Shell was not responsible for the
ecological damage, because Nigerian legislation prevented the company
from doing what was, from an environmental point of view, necessary.
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1002
(Note that the argument here is that if Shell would have had free play, they
would actually have protected the environment!)>
Herkstr6ters strategy was to render the link between the action (polluting
the environment) and the consequences (executions of people who protested
against the pollution) obscure, invoking not only the Nigerian government
and Nigerian legislation as intermediaries, but also competitors and employ-
ees. If Shell would have acted out of truly moral concern, they would have
left Nigeria, but this, Herkstr6ter argued, would have been problematic
since Nigerias oil-fields contribute to almost 10 per cent of Shells total
production. Besides, competitors (with less moral inhibitions than Shell)
would unscrupulously take advantage of the companys departure by tak-
ing over the plants built by the company. A serious moral impulse in bus,-
ness might very well amount to a suicidal impulse (Friedman 1970: 125)
and, clearly, no sensible person can expect a business manager to commit
suicide. Finally, there were jobs at stake. This argument points to yet
another strategy of obscuring the (im)moral impact of organizational action:
one should not only make clear that others are clearly more unscrupulous
than oneself, but also that the moral value of the action is at least ambiva-
lent.
Thus, whatever might have been the result of Shells activities in Nigeria
is not to be morally interpreted. If a person is incensed by what she/he
takes to be Shells behaviour and would point out that it is immoral to
invest heavily in such unstable countries as Nigeria, she/he is making a
classic category mistake. People involved in business action, whether highly
ranked within the organization or not, see their jobs as morally irrelevant
(Bauman 1993: 126), because they are led to believe that their impact on
the course of things is too minute to be of any real importance. Thus the
barbaric executions are not only the unintended or unanticipated by-
products of morally neutral acts (Bauman 1993: 126) such as investments
in Nigeria; they are also, either implicitly or explicitly, interpreted as
inevitable. Those poor people in Nigeria would, given the situation there,
have been executed anyhow. Shell can do nothing about it.
Not that people working for organizations like Shell are taught to behave
immorally. On the contrary, moral capacity of employees is, if I understand
Bauman rightly, turned inward and distracted from the overall aim and the
outcome of collective efforts. Thus, ... -
... the moral capacity of the actors has not been extinguished altogether; it can be
now channelled in a convenient direction turned towards other members of the action-
-
chain... the &dquo;intermediaries&dquo; in the actors proximity. It is for their weal and woe that
the actor, as a moral self, is now responsible. (Bauman 1993: 126)
Loyalty to the organization and the people who work there a value which -
has indeed strong roots in companies like Shell has become the hall- -
mark of morality. The moral impulse is not allowed to roam freely; instead,
it is canalized in the direction of those with whom the moral actor does
the job. The result is that individual moral scruple is rendered predictable
by not allowing it to come to the fore. For example, the chance that some-
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1003
body is indeed led by such scruple and is going to blow the whistle is min-
imized. Individual morality is replaced by group morality.
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Effacement of Face ~~
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The moral impulse is, as we have seen, prompted by the Face, that is, by
the Other who gazes at me and in the vulnerability of whom I sense a moral
command. An appropriate strategy for preventing the moral impulse to
come to the fore then consists in the effacement of Face. This process con-
sists in ...
castling the objects at the &dquo;receiving end&dquo; of action in a position at which they are
denied the capacity of moral subjects and thus disallowed from mounting a moral chal-
lenge against the intention and effects of the action. In other words, the objects of action
are evicted from the class of beings who may potentially confront the actor as &dquo;faces&dquo;.
(Bauman 1993: 127) .
icence, even of compassion, are effectually blocked; they have no place in this world.
(Michelman 1993: 36-37, my emphasis)
This passage is so telling because it claims that those who are on the receiv-
ing end of action, in casu the losing competitors, do not even themselves
expect to be treated as moral persons. This, of course, encourages the mem-
bers of the team to direct their moral worries to each other and not to those
who do not belong to the team. I would like to add that the incestuous
morality that is invoked in this way also influences the general publics
expectations of companies. Not only competitors but also the general pub-
lic do not, I believe, expect to be treated by (the members of) companies
as moral persons. As managerialism takes hold of our society at large, those
who are made morally undignified by business actions are jeered at, or, at
least, are considered strange or exotic, since they cherish unrealistic or ille-
gitimate expectations. Thus, in addition to what Bauman claims, I do not
only believe that organizations engage in a process of effacement, but also
that the receiving end of action is voluntarily, albeit perhaps uncon-
sciously, effacing itself. Organizations do not allow the members of soci-
ety to become a Face and, hence, to prompt a moral impulse; consequently,
the members of society answer by withdrawing their Face. _
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Reduction to Traits
Outside the mills, hung on the mill wall, were large black-painted sign boards, made
of well-vamished wood, written on in gold lettering, in a somewhat florid style. The
signs usually said something like Hands wanted and then, using boards that could be
slotted in at will, the categories of personnel required could be advertised for (often
with a gold-painted hand with forefinger outstretched symbolically indicating where the
boards could be clotted in). Hands that is what theyve always been, from the early
-
days of industrial capitalism to their last days ... (Clegg, cited with permission)
Other examples of the reduction to traits can be found in hospitals where
patients have long been treated as calculable bundles of nerves and mus-
cles and not as fully-fledged persons, or in governmental bureaucracies that
treat citizens as statistically processed &dquo;units of computations&dquo; (Bauman
1993: 127) which are abstracted from total persons. In a similar fashion,
one can say that, in the beat-up language of management gurus, the cus-
tomer as a person is reduced to a collection of needs and demands. It is
not the customer as a moral person to whom writers like Peters, Hamel and
Prahalad try to focus attention, but the customer as a needing and demand-
ing being. The customers needs and demands are interesting because they
offer a business opportunity, not because they offer a moral opportunity.
The companies that follow the prescripts of the just-mentioned gurus try,
in the words of one of them, to business the customer (Peters 1992: 215).
That is, they envision the customer as somebody whose actions and think-
ing are in total conformity with that of the business manager. I take it that
this is why customers are, increasingly, seen not as passive customers any-
more but as serious business partners or, whenever the mood seizes man-
Why is Korean steel so much cheaper [than American steel]? Before the recent worker
protests, Koreans were putting in the longest average work week in the world fifty
-
seven hours. In return they earned 10 per cent of a Western salary. Since the Korean
cost of living is quite high, the workers live in slum conditions ... that are reminiscent
of nineteenth-century England. (...1 Given the modem managers devotion to an inter-
national &dquo;standard&dquo; of competition, the effect of the marginal improvement in social
conditions brought about in Korea by persistent and violent street demonstrations has
been to weaken Koreas attractiveness as a capitalist producer. The citizen who listens
to the modem rhetoric of free markets and free men would assume that a bit more social
justice and democracy are good things. (...) From [the managers] point of view [.how-
they often overlook the simple fact that they take as a starting-point of
future action somebody elses ideas about the customer. This is, however.
exactly what a person who obeys a command does. In Baumans view there
is not much difference between the blue-collar worker who blindly obeys
his bosss command and the manager who acts on the experts advice.
Whatever their differences, there is one overriding similarity: both renounce
their own understanding with respect to a particular situation. Admittedly,
relying on somebody else reduces moral stress under the pretext that it is
not management (or the worker) itself, but a qualified expert (or the boss)
who has induced a particular line of action. Nevertheless, it is exactly this
heteronomization of organizational action which can be so catastrophic.
People who willy-nilly relinquish their autonomy and replace it by what
others think are, in Baumans view, nothing less than dangerolls.
Moral Impulse and Business Ethics
.
During the 1980s, a group of experts emerged who were primarily inter-
ested in the question of whether and how organizations could behave eth-
ically. Not that questions as to the morality of organizational action did not
occur earlier, but they only attracted the attention of philosophers and social
theorists, generally of a radical signature, who sought to subsume these
questions under more general ones, such as those that pertained to the very
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1007
wrong and that ends by defining right action in a specific situation cr.c
what best confor-ms to tlris set of mor-al rules (Green 1994: 66). NORM
oozes deontology in that it defines action as right if it might reasonably
be thou~lzt of as accepted by all members of society as a moral rule, that
is, as an abiding for-m of conduct known by everyone and open to eney~-
one in similar circumstances (ibid 1994: 88-89; 112). NORM
heavily
relies on the formulation of publicly accessible moral rules. The idea is to
enable the public in general and managements in particular to rationally
judge whether an organization or company has acted in a morally
respectable way. This approach is typical of the way in which many busi-
ness ethicists think they can help managements to find their way in the
moral maze. The ethical expert, as envisaged by Green, formulates ratio-
nal and publicly accepted rules which provide the manager with a source
to which she/he can appeal, whenever morality becomes an issue.
Business ethicists thus help managements to formulate ethical rules. These
rules are often transformed into codes of conduct, mission statements, basic
beliefs, and so on (Van Luijk 1993: 174). The reasons for the introduction
of ethical rules or codes vary enormously. Some companies have psycho-
logical reasons for doing this, for example, because they want to create a
new corporate identity or because they want to prevent employees from
was in agreement with the rules prescribed for that sort of action. Criteria of morality
The difference in tone with Green ( 1994) is striking. Bauman thinks that
deontological ethics amount to proceduralism that declares the moral con-
science of the actor totally out of court, whereas Green clearly believes
that these rules might guide this conscience in the moral maze. According
.&dquo;
to Bauman, deontology, with its emphasis on procedure rather than
.
effects and motives replaces the question of doing good with pure dis-
. cipline.
The theme of organizational discipline overriding individual moral con-
science is well known in organization studies. The allegation is that the
employees morality is typically subjected to organizational discipline or,
as Henry Fayol would have put it, to organizational harmony, which is
- embodied in rules, codes, missions, visions, or identities. New, and highly
original, is Baumans point that this discipline is founded in a profound
disbelief in the selfs moral capacitv and ultimately amounts to the denial
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indeed be worried. I entirely agree with Bauman that ethics should not
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invite employees to mere proceduralism. Yet I do not think, as Bauman
seems to believe, that ethical rules necessarily lead to proceduralism and
soporification of morality.
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Ethical Rules
What could possibly be wrong with such a rule? It does not only encour-
age or allow employees and managers to blow the whistle in case of malfea-
sance or negligence (which would be the case if the crucial must is
Greens rule is not one which would be explicitly articulated, let alone,
lived by, in many organizations, but this challenge would clearly not affect
the ethical expert. Although the articulation of Greens rule does not guar-
antee that people who have followed their moral impulse (such as bona
fide whistleblowers) will be decently treated, I cannot help thinking that,
for a particular whistleblower, it might offer some support. And what can
possibly be wrong with that?
This can only be wrong if you think that morality entails heroism. Most
people are simply not the sort of autonomous heroes Bauman has in mind.
People in organizations may very well be in need of some solid (het-
eronomous) backing, if necessary in the form of rules or legal protection.
I disagree with Bauman to the extent that he seems to think that rules nec-
essarily stifle morality. Many rules do, but some do not. Although it would
certainly go too far to claim that rules like the one proffered by Green actu-
ally prompt moral behaviour (Kohnstad and Willmott 1995), I simply do
not see why they should neutralize it and would like to argue that they
might be supportive for anybody who is facing a moral dilemma. The busi-
ness ethicist may, however, not be too happy with this: a moral dilemma
can never be solved by simply applying a rule. I .
Finally, we may have found something here that unites the business ethi-
cist with Bauman: both tend to overlook the inherent complexity of rules
and peoples attitudes towards them. Rules play a singularly positive role
in the life of the business ethicist, because they speak to the ethicists
r-aison d tre. If managers abide by the rules, they will become moral. In
similar fashion, rules play a negative role in Baumans text and are
unvaryingly associated with unthinking and unsensitive (rule-abiding)
people, with bureaucratic bigotry or malice, in short, with the ugly face of
bureaucracy. The rest of my paper will focus on my (partial) disagreement
with Bauman.
The fact that bureaucracy, as has been pointed out by Du Gay (1994, 1996),
offers a full-blown moral alternative of its own, is not taken seriously
How do we, for example, get access to rules that are not explicit and that
play a role in the collective subconsciousness of organizational members?
How do we avoid the inclination to trust only particular subjectivities
(Clegg 1994: 160) within organizations? How can we erect a solid frame-
work for the analysis of (ethical) rules?
It is beyond the scope of this text to enter into these questions. It was my
intention to cast doubt on Baumans simplified description of rules.
Moreover, I would like to suggest that Bauman underestimates the discre-
tion people in organizations retain with respect to rules (Clegg 1994: 162).
I am perfectly willing to allow that ethical rules tend to undermine our
moral nature (with all its, from a managerial point of view at least, unpro-
ductive ontological insecurity, see: Willmott 1993); and I also think this
is a very serious point that should be considered by each self-respecting
business ethicist. However, even the most hard-nosed bureaucrats may
resist attempts to freeze the meaning of rules (Clegg 1994: 163) and per-
sist in trying to give their very own twist to it. I am in agreement with
Bauman insofar as he claims that it is this twist that really counts, but I
disagree with him insofar as he claims that following an ethical rule does
not count, or is even dangerous, since it incapacitates moral impulse.
Foucault (1982: 33), for example, understood perfectly well the moral rel-
evance of ethical rules. He makes a useful distinction between I agent
moral who does exactly what the ethical code prescribes and le siijet
mor-al who chooses a particular attitude with respect to this code. In this
sense human beings can never be in an agentic state, as Bauman (1989:
162) himself calls it, no matter how hard rule-governed practices and ethics
try to bring them there. Nobody does exactly what the rule prescribes, since
the description is always vague and ambiguous but in this vagueness -
and ambiguity lies the moral relevance of the rule. They leave room for
choice. We can only be moral subjects because we always choose how we
subject ourselves to a particular rule (le mode de I aSlljetissement). This
choice constitutes our very own morality. Admittedly, managements will
try to restrain this freedom of choice and influence peoples discretion with
respect to rules, because this enables them to control the organization. In
this sense, we may very well share Baumans rather agonistic (agon =
fight, struggle) view of organizations, but we need not share his pessimism
with respect to the outcome of this struggle. As managers in real-life orga-
nizations are very well aware, complete control by means of rule-giving is
not only impossible but, in some respects at least, also undesirable and dan-
gerous.
The bureaucrat is not necessarily the adiaphorized person Bauman (1989:
215) believes her/him to be, but embodies, as I have tried to point out, an
ethical position; bureaucracies are not necessarily the woeful and fiendish
enemies of human beings, but can be protecting people both inside and out-
side the organization; and, finally, the moral predicament of people work-
ing in organizations does not reside in rules, but in the way people relate
to them.
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*
Note Many thanks Stewart Clegg, Martin Parker, Amdt Sorge and Hugh Willmott for their
to
comments on an earlier draft of this paper and for providing me with stimulating agreements
and disagreements. I would also like to thank my colleagues at Schouten & Nelissen for
offering me a latitude whichI believe is rather exceptional in the world of business.
Stewart R.
Clegg, Kohnstad, Bjom, and Hugh Willmott
1990 Modern organizations: organization 1995 Business ethics: restrictive or
studies in the postmodern world. empowering? Journal of Business
London: Sage. Ethics 14: 445-464.