Ex-CIA Directors: Interrogations Saved Lives - WSJ 12/12/14 08:30

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OPINION

Ex-CIA Directors: Interrogations

Saved Lives
The Senate Intelligence investigators never spoke to usthe leaders of the agency whose
policies they are now assailing for partisan reasons.

Updated Dec. 10, 2014 1:04 a.m. ET

The Senate Intelligence Committee has released its majority report on Central Intelligence
Agency detention and interrogation in the wake of 9/11. The following response is from
former CIA Directors George J. Tenet, Porter J. Goss and Michael V. Hayden (a retired Air
Force general), and former CIA Deputy Directors John E. McLaughlin, Albert M. Calland
(a retired Navy vice admiral) and Stephen R. Kappes :

The Senate Intelligence Committees report on Central Intelligence Agency detention

and interrogation of terrorists, prepared only by the Democratic majority staff, is a
missed opportunity to deliver a serious and balanced study of an important public
policy question. The committee has given us instead a one-sided study marred by errors
of fact and interpretationessentially a poorly done and partisan attack on the agency
that has done the most to protect America after the 9/11 attacks.

Examining how the CIA handled these matters is an important subject of continuing
relevance to a nation still at war. In no way would we claim that we did everything
perfectly, especially in the emergency and often-chaotic circumstances we confronted
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. As in all wars, there were undoubtedly things in our
program that should not have happened. When we learned of them, we reported such
instances to the CIA inspector general or the Justice Department and sought to take

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corrective action.

The country and the CIA would have benefited from a more balanced study of these
programs and a corresponding set of recommendations. The committees report is not
that study. It offers not a single recommendation.

Our view on this is shared by the CIA and the Senate Intelligence Committees
Republican minority, both of which are releasing rebuttals to the majoritys report. Both
critiques are clear-eyed, fact-based assessments that challenge the majoritys
contentions in a nonpartisan way.

What is wrong with the committees report?

First, its claim that the CIAs interrogation program was ineffective in producing
intelligence that helped us disrupt, capture, or kill terrorists is just not accurate.
The program was invaluable in three critical ways:

It led to the capture of senior al Qaeda operatives, thereby removing them from the
battlefield.

It led to the disruption of terrorist plots and prevented mass casualty attacks, saving
American and Allied lives.

It added enormously to what we knew about al Qaeda as an organization and therefore

informed our approaches on how best to attack, thwart and degrade it.

A powerful example of the interrogation programs importance is the information

obtained from Abu Zubaydah, a senior al Qaeda operative, and from Khalid Sheikh
Muhammed, known as KSM, the 9/11 mastermind. We are convinced that both would not
have talked absent the interrogation program.

Information provided by Zubaydah through the interrogation program led to the

capture in 2002 of KSM associate and post-9/11 plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh. Information
from both Zubaydah and al-Shibh led us to KSM. KSM then led us to Riduan Isamuddin,
aka Hambali, East Asias chief al Qaeda ally and the perpetrator of the 2002 Bali
bombing in Indonesiain which more than 200 people perished.

The removal of these senior al Qaeda operatives saved thousands of lives because it
ended their plotting. KSM, alone, was working on multiple plots when he was captured.

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Heres an example of how the interrogation program actually worked to disrupt terrorist
plotting. Without revealing to KSM that Hambali had been captured, we asked him who
might take over in the event that Hambali was no longer around. KSM pointed to
Hambalis brother Rusman Gunawan. We then found Gunawan, and information from
him resulted in the takedown of a 17-member Southeast Asian cell that Gunawan had
recruited for a second wave, 9/11-style attack on the U.S. West Coast, in all likelihood
using aircraft again to attack buildings. Had that attack occurred, the nightmare of 9/11
would have been repeated.

Once they had become compliant due to the interrogation program, both Abu Zubaydah
and KSM turned out to be invaluable sources on the al Qaeda organization. We went
back to them multiple times to gain insight into the group. More than one quarter of the
nearly 1,700 footnotes in the highly regarded 9/11 Commission Report in 2004 and a
significant share of the intelligence in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on al
Qaeda came from detainees in the program, in particular Zubaydah and KSM.

The majority on the Senate Intelligence Committee further claims that the takedown of
bin Laden was not facilitated by information from the interrogation program. They are
wrong. There is no doubt that information provided by the totality of detainees in CIA
custody, those who were subjected to interrogation and those who were not, was
essential to bringing bin Laden to justice. The CIA never would have focused on the
individual who turned out to be bin Ladens personal courier without the detention and
interrogation program.

Specifically, information developed in the interrogation program piqued the CIAs

interest in the courier, placing him at the top of the list of leads to bin Laden. A detainee
subjected to interrogation provided the most specific information on the courier.
Additionally, KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libiboth subjected to interrogationlied about
the courier at a time when both were providing honest answers to a large number of
other critical questions. Since other detainees had already linked the courier to KSM
and Abu Faraj, their dissembling about him had great significance.

So the bottom line is this: The interrogation program formed an essential part of the
foundation from which the CIA and the U.S. military mounted the bin Laden operation.

The second significant problem with the Senate Intelligence Committees report is its
claim that the CIA routinely went beyond the interrogation techniques as authorized by
the Justice Department. That claim is wrong.

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President Obama s
attorney general, Eric
Holder , directed an
experienced
prosecutor, John
Durham, to
investigate the
interrogation
program in 2009. Mr.
Durham examined
whether any
unauthorized
techniques were used
by CIA interrogators,
Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, shown in an undated photo from the FBI. ASSOCIATED PRESS and if so, whether
such techniques
could constitute violations of U.S. criminal statutes. In a press release, the attorney
general said that Mr. Durham examined any possible CIA involvement with the
interrogation and detention of 101 detainees who were alleged to have been in U.S.
custody after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The investigation was concluded in
August 2012. It was professional and exhaustive and it determined that no prosecutable
offenses were committed.

Third, the reports argument that the CIA misled the Justice Department, the White
House, Congress, and the American people is also flat-out wrong. Much of the reports
reasoning for this claim rests on its argument that the interrogation program should not
have been called effective, an argument that does not stand up to the facts.

Fourth, the majority left out something critical to understanding the program: context.

The detention and interrogation program was formulated in the aftermath of the
murders of close to 3,000 people on 9/11. This was a time when:

We had evidence that al Qaeda was planning a second wave of attacks on the U.S.

We had certain knowledge that bin Laden had met with Pakistani nuclear scientists
and wanted nuclear weapons.

We had reports that nuclear weapons were being smuggled into New York City.

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We had hard evidence that al Qaeda was trying to manufacture anthrax.

It felt like the classic ticking time bomb scenarioevery single day.

In this atmosphere, time was of the essence and the CIA felt a deep responsibility to
ensure that an attack like 9/11 would never happen again. We designed the detention and
interrogation programs at a time when relationship building was not working with
brutal killers who did not hesitate to behead innocents. These detainees had received
highly effective counter-interrogation training while in al Qaeda training camps. And
yet it was clear they possessed information that could disrupt plots and save American
lives.

The Senate committees report says that the CIA at that point had little experience or
expertise in capture, detention or interrogation of terrorists. We agree. But we were
charged by the president with doing these things in emergency circumstancesat a time
when there was no respite from threat and no luxury of time to act. Our hope is that no
one ever has to face such circumstances again.

The Senate committees report ignores this context.

The committee also failed to make clear that the CIA was not acting alone in carrying
out the interrogation program. Throughout the process, there was extensive
consultation with the national security adviser, deputy national security adviser, White
House counsel, and the Justice Department.

The president approved the program. The attorney general deemed it legal.

The CIA went to the attorney general for legal rulings four timesand the agency
stopped the program twice to ensure that the Justice Department still saw it as
consistent with U.S. policy, law and our treaty obligations. The CIA sought guidance and
reaffirmation of the program from senior administration policy makers at least four
times.

We relied on their policy and legal judgments. We deceived no one.

The CIA reported any allegations of abuse to the Senate-confirmed inspector general
and the Justice Department. CIA senior leadership forwarded nearly 20 cases to the
Justice Department, and career Justice officials decided that only one of these cases
unrelated to the formal interrogation programmerited prosecution. That person
received a prison term.

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The CIA briefed Congress approximately 30 times. Initially, at presidential direction the
briefings were restricted to the so-called Gang of Eight of top congressional leadersa
limitation permitted under covert-action laws. The briefings were detailed and graphic
and drew reactions that ranged from approval to no objection. The briefings held
nothing back.

Congresss view in those days was very different from today. In a briefing to the Senate
Intelligence Committee after the capture of KSM in 2003, committee members made
clear that they wanted the CIA to be extremely aggressive in learning what KSM knew
about additional plots. One senator leaned forward and forcefully asked: Do you have
all the authorities you need to do what you need to do?

In September 2006, at the strong urging of the CIA, the administration decided to brief
full committee and staff directors on the interrogation program. As part of this, the CIA
sought to enter into a serious dialogue with the oversight committees, hoping to build a
consensus on a way forward acceptable to the committee majority and minority and to
the congressional and executive branches. The committees missed a chance to help
shape the programthey couldnt reach a consensus. The executive branch was left to
proceed alone, merely keeping the committees informed.

How did the committee report get these things so wrong? Astonishingly, the staff
avoided interviewing any of us who had been involved in establishing or running the
program, the first time a supposedly comprehensive Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence study has been carried out in this way.

The excuse given by majority senators is that CIA officers were under investigation by
the Justice Department and therefore could not be made available. This is nonsense.
The investigations referred to were completed in 2011 and 2012 and applied only to
certain officers. They never applied to six former CIA directors and deputy directors, all
of whom could have added firsthand truth to the study. Yet a press account indicates
that the committee staff did see fit to interview at least one attorney for a terrorist at
Guantanamo Bay.

We can only conclude that the committee members or staff did not want to risk having
to deal with data that did not fit their construct. Which is another reason why the study
is so flawed. What went on in preparing the report is clear: The staff picked up the signal
at the outset that this study was to have a certain outcome, especially with respect to the
question of whether the interrogation program produced intelligence that helped stop
terrorists. The staff members then cherry picked their way through six million pages

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of documents, ignoring some data and highlighting others, to construct their argument
against the programs effectiveness.

In the intelligence profession, that is called politicization.

As lamentable as the inaccuracies of the majority document areand the impact they
will have on the publics understanding of the programsome consequences are
alarming:

Many CIA officers will be concerned that being involved in legally approved sensitive
actions can open them to politically driven scrutiny and censure from a future
administration.

Foreign intelligence partners will have even less confidence that Washington, already
hemorrhaging with leaks, will be able to protect their cooperation from public scrutiny.
They will cooperate less with the United States.

Terrorists, having acquired now the largest haven (in the Middle East and North
Africa) and string of successes they have had in a decade, will have yet another valuable
recruitment tool.

All of this means more danger for the American people and for our allies.

Anyone who has led a U.S. intelligence agency supports strong congressional oversight.
It is essential as a check on leadership judgment in a profession that deals constantly
with uncertainty, crises and the potential for surprise. We have all experienced and
benefited from that in our careers, including at times when the judgment of overseers
was critical.

When oversight works well, it is balanced, constructively critical and discreetand

offers sound recommendations. The Senate Intelligence Committees report is
disrespectful of that standard.

Its fair to ask whether the interrogation program was the right policy, but the
committee never takes on this toughest of questions.

On that important issue it is important to know that the dilemma CIA officers struggled
with in the aftermath of 9/11 was one that would cause discomfort for those enamored of
todays easy simplicities: Faced with post-9/11 circumstances, CIA officers knew that
many would later question their decisionsas we now seebut they also believed that

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they would be morally culpable for the deaths of fellow citizens if they failed to gain
information that could stop the next attacks.

Between 1998 and 2001, the al Qaeda leadership in South Asia attacked two U.S.
embassies in East Africa, a U.S. warship in the port of Aden, Yemen, and the American
homelandthe most deadly single foreign attack on the U.S. in the countrys history. The
al Qaeda leadership has not managed another attack on the homeland in the 13 years
since, despite a strong desire to do so. The CIAs aggressive counterterrorism policies
and programs are responsible for that success.

Related documents are available at ciasavedlives.com.

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