G.R. No.

209651 November 26, 2014

MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, and THE HEIRS

OF EDWARD T. MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA MELINDA
J. MARCELO REVILLA, and JOHN STEVEN J. MARCELO
vs.
JOSE T. MARCELO, JR

Facts:
On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his
four compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr.
Initially, petitioner Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed
a Petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. At
first, Helen, along with her brother, Jose, Jr. separately opposed MIMCOs petition;
the two prayed for their respective appointment as administrator. Edward opposed
Helens and Jose, Jr.s respective petitions for issuance of Letters of Administration in
their favor and Edward himself prayed for his appointment as regular administrator.
Ultimately, MIMCO, George and Edward banded together: (1) opposed Helens and
Jose, Jr.s petitions, and (2) prayed for Edwards appointment as regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate. In an Order dated 13 December 1991, the RTC
appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate. Jose Jr. filed
successive oppugnant motions which were all denied. On 16 February 2001 the RTC
approved the partition after Edward filed a project of partition of the estate after
having gained the conformity of all the compulsory heirs.
On 3 July 2009, Edward died and Jose Jr. immediately moved to revive the
intestate proceedings and for his appointment as administrator. Amidst opposition,
the RTC appointed Jose Jr. as regular administrator. Petitioners then filed an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and moved for the appointment instead of George as
administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate. Upon appeal, the CA held that:
1. The prior Order dated 13 December 1991 of the RTC appointing Edward as
regular administrator instead of Jose, Jr., which appointment was affirmed by this
Court in G.R. No. 123883, did not make a finding on Jose, Jr.s fitness and
suitableness to serve as regular administrator; and
2. On the whole, Jose, Jr. iscompetent and "not wanting in understanding and
integrity," to act as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate.

Issue:
Whether or not Jose Jr. was found by a final, immutable, and unalterable
judgment, to be unfit to act as administrator.

Ruling:
Yes. A close scrutiny of the records reveals that in all of Jose, Jr.s pleadings
opposing Edwards appointment as regular administrator, he simultaneously prayed
for his appointment as regular administrator of their fathers estate. In short, he
proffered his competence and qualification to be appointed as regular administrator
as a legal issue for resolution of the courts. Essentially, Jose, Jr. was weighed and
found wanting by the RTC, the appellate court, and this Court.
 This court looks with deep concern the manner by which Jose, Jr. treats the
corporate properties of the Marcelo Group of Companies. Evidence shows that
sometime October 21, 1998, Jose, Jr. took evidencing liabilities of the deceased and
other pertinent records and up to the present has not returned them.
Notably, the decision of the trial court appointing Edward as the
Administrator of the Estate of Jose, Sr., which decision had the imprimatur of a final
resolution by this Court, was not merely a comparison of the qualifications of
Edward and Jose, Jr., but a finding of the competence of Edward compared to the
unfitness of Jose, Jr.
Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general
disqualification of those who wish to serve as administrator:
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No
person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Plainly, the RTC in its Order dated 13 December 1991, found Edward
competent to serve as regular administrator, more competent than Jose, Jr.,
preferred despite equal status in the Order of Preference, manifesting none of the
disqualifications set by law.
Contrary to the recent rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals appointing
Jose, Jr. as administrator, there is a previous and categorical ruling on Jose, Jr.s
fitness to serve as such:
It is Jose T. Marcelos position that he is more competent, qualified and
suitable for the position of regular administrator. This, above all else is the main
thrust of this second motion for reconsideration. However, the court in the exercise
of its sound discretion after a consideration of the evidence adduced by both
parties, ruled otherwise and instead appointed Edward T. Marcelo as regular
administrator.
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 August 4, 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R. MARCOS

Facts:
On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, acting as a
probate court, issued an Order4 granting letters testamentary in solidum to
respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as
executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration6 in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order granted
letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos
filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that
petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.
On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance
stating that he already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the
January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that he took his oath as named executor of the will
on January 30, 1996.
On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration to BIR
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dated
September 9, 1994, appointing her as Special Administratrix of the Marcos Estate.
On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the
Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.
On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for partial
reconsideration filed by petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent Imelda Marcos.

Issue:
Whether or not the probate court gravely erred in failing to consider that
respondents Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos II should be disqualified to
act and serve as executors.

Ruling:
At the crux of the controversy is a determination of whether or not
respondents are incompetent to serve as executors of the will of Ferdinand Marcos.
Ozeata v. Pecson is instructive:
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It has
been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court
to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his application.
 In the case of In re Erlangers Estate, this the court said that After the
admission of a will to probate, the courts will not name a better executor for the
testator nor disqualify, by a judicial veto, the widow or friend or other person
selected in the will, except upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of
incompetency.
Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of
cases and, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least,
with questionable integrity. The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made
the following findings:
However, except for petitioner Republics allegation of want of integrity on the part
of Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named
executors in the last will and testament, so as to render them "incompetent" to
serve as executors, the Court sees at this time, no evidence on record, oral or
documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation.
Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is
disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the probate court in the matter of
removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of
discretion is shown. The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty and discretion
to determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor.
The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said
court.
The eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four
charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four
charges for violation of Section 50 (non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC).
It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569, the CA acquitted
respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and
sustained his conviction for all the four charges for violation of Section 45. It,
however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a
fine for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by
petitioner, said decision is still pending appeal.
The filing of a "fraudulent return with intent to evade tax" is a crime involving
moral turpitude as it entails willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of the
individual. The same, however, cannot be said for "failure to file a return" where the
mere omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this Court holds that even if the
conviction of respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving
moral turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON

Facts:
Eliseo Quiazon died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994,
Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon, represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Pias City. She claims
that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time
when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. She further impugned
the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for
having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one
Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached
to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by
Eliseo as her father. Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid,
Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of
the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. In a Decision
dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. It held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together
as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos
death in 1992.

Issue:
Whether or not Elise is a party in interest.

Ruling:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow,
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate
as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by
the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo,
the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as
a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts
of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate
as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party within the purview of the law.