An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the
PEOPLE VS AMADO HERNANDEZ (99 PHIL 515)
1. What happened:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other
appellants were accused of conspiring, confederating and
cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31)
defendants charged in the criminal cases of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. They were accused of being members of
PKP Community Party of the Philippines, which was actively
engaged in an armed rebellion against the government of the
Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan
Laban sa mga Hapon), they committed the crime of rebellion
causing murder, pillage, looting plunder, etc., enumerated in
13 attacks on government forces or civilians by HUKS.
2. Crime Committed:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
3. Contention of the State:
The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that
the gravity of the crime committed required the denial of bail.
Moreover, the complex crime charged by the government
against Hernandez has been successfully imposed with other
arrested communist leaders and was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
4. Contention of the Accused:
PETITIONER: Juan Ponce Enrile
RESPONDENT: Jaime Salazar
judgment rendered by the CFI in Manila that rebellion cannot
be a complex crime with murder, arson or robbery.
5. Ruling:
The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere
ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means necessary for
the perpetration of the offense. Such common offense is
absorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the
acts specified in Article 135 constitutes, one single crime it
follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application of
Article 48 which requires therefore the commission of at least
two crimes.***
HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE
Rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as
killings, destruction of property, etc., committed on the
occasion and in furtherance thereof. The thinking is not
anymore correct more so that there is no legal basis for such
rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME.
SUMMARY: Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile
was arrested by law enforcement officers of the NBI on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC
Quezon Cit Branch 103. The warrant was based on an
information charging Senator Enrile with the crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the failed coup from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Enrile was detained overnight at NBI
headquarters without bail. He was brough to Camp Tomas
Karingal the next day.Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his
constituitional rights.
DOCTRINE: (1) Art. 48 of the RPC: In a complex crime,
wherein two or more crimes are actually committed, they
constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as a complex
crime. (2) Based on People v. Hernandez, rebellion cannot be
complexed with common crimes.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes
(delito compleio) arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the
second clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why
Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at
bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the
movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding
period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present,
but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present.
In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances,
the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to
him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity
with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the
movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a
crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically
correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information
does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In
the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as
applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and
necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion,
which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted
as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the
facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas
corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before
the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested
with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to
invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail,
claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by
the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have
been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the
Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in

People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against
petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only,
hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail
to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the
proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the
respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the
petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court
shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

BAYAN VS. ERMITA (Batas Pambansa 880 or The Public

Assembly Act of 1985)

I. FACTS
It is provided in the Constitution that it is a the basic right of
every Filipino individual to voice out or express himself,
whether for personal reasons or common good itself. However,
certain acts must be discontinued although it gives body to a
right, especially if it harms the good for the greater mass.
Batas Pambansa 880 is an example of a delimiting law that
provides boundaries on the free expression of persons.
Such in the case of three petitioner groups, first of Bayan,
secondly of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al and
third of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), all of whom are recognized
as taxpayers and official residents who allege themselves to
be staging a peaceful mass assembly when police forces
under the rule of BP 880 forcibly and violently dispersed them
much to their dismay, which incurred their members injuries
and arrest. These groups of concerned citizens are attesting
that such manner of dispersal of abiding by no permit, no
rally policy, and that delegation of powers in the local
government (specifically by the Mayor Lito Atienza) in the said
dispersal were unconstitutional, as well as the implementation
of BP 880 itself. They seek to stop such policies of ruthless
dispersals, as it violates their basic right to freedom of
expression, redress of grievances and most of all their right to
peaceably assemble.
II. ISSUE
Whether Batas Pambansa 880 is constitutional or not.
III. HELD
As it is to be observed in the BP itself, BP 880 has provisions
which defines the requisites of a peaceful assembly, maximum
tolerance of the police forces and permit to rally (see definition
of terms and Declaration of policy). On the matter regarding
the claim of illegality of power delegation without clear
standards, the mayor being the local government head
concerned, has the right to issue or not the permits. As stated
in Section 6 of BP 880: (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health. The preceding and succeeding sections provide
for the requisites of the peaceful assembly stated in the Article
4 of the Bill of rights. As to the matter regarding ruthless
dispersals, police assistance as observed in Section 10 to 11
of the same law is observed for the interest of those exercising
their right to assemble peacefully. BP 880 gives that no
assembly shall be dispersed, unless there is impending
violence which could lead to property destruction, harm to
others and the likes. As to the claim of the groups of the
unconstitutionality of BP 880, the law itself provides acts
which, if violated by the assembly regardless of permission,
are deemed to be a disruption of the common good, which is
the greatest and the object of supreme importance over the
right of the assembly. As stated in the U.S vs. Apurado case
which has similar concerns: "It is rather to be expected that
more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the
people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always
wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect,
as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over
their irresponsible followers. Also, as Primicias case contains:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it
is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered
civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to
the rights of the community or society.
If one is to read fully the contents or provisions of the BP 880,
it is not a law indicating total ban of assemblies; but rather it
exists to regulate the time, place, and manner of conducting
the assembly. B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not hold back or unduly confine
freedoms; it merely controls the use of public places as to the
time, place and manner of assemblies. Much of the population
have the notion that maximum tolerance is a sinister move, but
"maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to
issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard as
stated in Section 10.
Therefore:
As the court finally decides that the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary
steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation
of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country to avoid misunderstandings of
permit-related issues.
All in all, the petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects,
and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED.

OCAMPO v. ABANDO

FACTS:

A mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry

Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang, Leyte. The
mass grave contained skeletal remains of 67 individuals
believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease"
(Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks
of suspected military informers.
P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff
Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the
8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated
letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor
Vivero).The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12
complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along
with several other unnamed members.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias
Piedad,Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano
Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They
narrated that they were former members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them, Operation VD was
ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo
(Ocampo),Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis
(Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then members
of the Central Committee.
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted,
hog-tied, tortured and executed by members of the
CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to Operation VD.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments,
Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among others,
petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their
witnesses.
In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of
an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54
named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners
herein
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad,
Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna
be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as
their testimonies were vital to the success of the prosecution.
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding
probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned accused
of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them with no recommended bail for their
temporary liberty.
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him
and 44 others was then pending before the RTC Makati,
Branch 150 (RTC Makati).Putting forward the political offense
doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such
as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of
rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in
connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.
ISSUE
Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be
dismissed under the political offense doctrine.
HELD:
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as "common" offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately
from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty." People v.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed

in the crime of rebellion.Thus, when a killing is committed in
furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder.
Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion
as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished
as rebellion alone.

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a

defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to
determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of
a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be
conclusively demonstrated.

REYES v. BAGATSING

Facts:
Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a
peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to
5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of
the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space
of public property, a short program would be held. The march
would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such
conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a
petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session
of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance
in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to
free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be
taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the
request was denied. Reference was made to persistent
intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations
where a large number of people is expected to attend.
Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to
be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area
where the safety of the participants themselves and the
general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard
and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that
there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a
permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is
violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred
(500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other
purposes. Hence the Court resolves.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right
to peaceably assemble violated.
Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable
assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free
speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as
to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is
freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the
applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of
Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time
immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there
was violation and even if it could be shown that such a
condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could
legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the
permit sought could still be challenged.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the
time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession
is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time
to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
Notice is given to applicants for the denial.
PEOPLE v. RECTO

FACTS:

RTC of Romblon found Julio Recto y Robea guilty of (1) two

counts of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with
frustrated homicide the complex crime of qualified direct
assault with murder and (3) homicide. accused, with intent to
kill, did by means of treachery attack, assault, and shoot with a
shotgun locally called pugakang one MELCHOR RECTO,
knowing that the latter is a duly appointed barangay chief
tanod of Romblon, while he was engaged in the performance
of his official duties, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds
in different parts of his body.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of direct assault.
HELD:
No. The trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified
direct assault with frustrated homicide
Direct assault may be committed in two ways: first, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ
force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;
and second, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties.
In the case at bar, the victim, Melchor Recto -- being then the
barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon --
was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However,
contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was not engaged
in the performance of his official duties at the time he was
shot. Neither was he attacked on the occasion of such
performance. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct
assault appellants liability amounted only to attempted, not
frustrated, homicide. The penalty that is lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for consummated homicide shall
be imposed upon appellant. After applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, it shall be taken from the medium period, since
there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances proven.
In Criminal Case No. 1971, the trial court was correct in ruling
that the attack on Percival Orbe then a barangay captain, a
person in authority.
In his other criminal case, Considering that Antonio Macalipay
was a kagawad who was in the actual performance of his
duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct
assault. appellant should be held liable for the complex crime
of qualified direct assault with homicide. The penalty to be
imposed on him should be for homicide, which is the more
serious crime, to be imposed in the maximum period.