ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNER VS.
SEC DAR
FACTS
This is the case wherein, The association of the Small Landowners
of the Philippines invokes the right of retention granted by PD 27 to
owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7hectares as long as
they are cultivation on intend to cultivate the same.
Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are
occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural
land primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed
from his holding until such time as the respective rights of the
tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been determined,
they petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR
Sec to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention.
Enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the time. The
invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the
entire program.
ISSUE
WON the assailed statures are valid exercises of Police Power
WON the content and manner of just compensation provided for the
CARP is violative of the Constitution
WON the CARP and EO 228 contravene as well accepted principle
of eminent domain by divesting the land owner of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation
RULING
Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have laid down by
the Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the
lawful subject. However, objections is raised to the manner fixing the
just compensation, which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives.
However, there no arbitrariness in the provision as the determination
of just compensation by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by
all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the right to
review with finality the said determination.
No. Although the traditional medium of payment of just
compensation is money and no other, what is being dealth with here
is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent domain. This
is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not more
millions of pesos. The initially intended amount of P50B may not be
enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the time. The
invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the
entire program.
No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries
were deemed full owners of the land they acquired under PP 27,
after a full payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its
part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land
to the government on the receipt by the landowners of the
corresponding payment of the deposit of DAR of the compensation
in cash of LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner
NPC VS. AGUIRRE
FACTS
This is the case wherein, the
Court of Appeals Decision
affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Danao
City, which granted the complaint
for expropriation filed by herein
petitioner National Power
Corporation (NPC) against herein
respondents "PetronaDilao et al.".
To implement its Leyte-Cebu
Interconnection Project, the NPC
filed on before the Regional Trial
Court of Danao City a complaint
for expropriation of parcels of land
situated at Baring and Cantumog,
Carmen, Cebu against Dilao and
siblings, and Enriquez.
The complaint covers 7,281
square meters of land co-owned
Petrona O. Dilao (Dilao) and
siblings, and 7,879 square meters
of land owned by Estefania
Enriquez (Enriquez). A day after
the complaint was filed or on
March 20, 1996, NPC filed an
urgent ex parte motion for the
issuance of writ of possession of
the lands. Dilao filed her Answer
with Counterclaim on April 19,
1996. Enriquez did not. On May 9,
1996, Branch 25 of the RTC
Danao, issued an Order granting
ISSUE RULING
WON the just There are two stages in every act of expropriation.
compensation The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
for right-of-way context of the facts involved in the suit.
easement The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be
being TAKEN. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
expropriated is evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to
proper. be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence
or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom. (Underscoring
supplied).
Thus, in Municipality of Bian, this Court held that in actions for eminent domain, since no less than two appeals are allowed by law, the period for
appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty days counted from notice thereof and not the ordinary period of fifteen days prescribed for actions in general.
[33]
As such, the complaint falls under the classification of other cases of multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require in above-quoted
Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in which a record on appeal is required to be filed and served.
Respecting NPCs claim that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other defendant, Enriquez, there being no evidence that summons was
served on her and, therefore, no appeal with respect to the case against her arose, the trial courts Order [34] of May 9, 1996 belies said claim:
In the letter-appeal by defendant Estefania V. Enriquez addressed to the Court, defendant did manifest no opposition to the right of plaintiff to the
use of her land but only wich (sic) that payment be based on the actual market value of the property sought to be expropriated. In comment to said letter-
appeal, plaintiff stressed that the amount deposited was purely to secure a writ of possession as provided under PD 42. It agreed with defendant that the fair
market value or actual market value shall be the basis for the just compensation of the property.
That the defendant Enriquez did not file an answer to the complaint did not foreclose the possibility of an appeal arising therefrom. For Section 3 of Rule 67
provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of
appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in
the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his
answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state
the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not
NPCs motion for the issuance of
writ of possession. It then
appointed a Board of
Commissioners to determine just
compensation.
later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously
appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of
the award. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In other words, once the compensation for Enriquez property is placed in issue at the trial, she could, following the third paragraph of the immediately-
quoted Section 3 of Rule 67, participate therein and if she is not in conformity with the trial courts determination of the compensation, she can appeal
therefrom.
Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation case, NPC should have filed a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of
the trial courts decision. The trial courts dismissal of its appeal, which was affirmed by the appellate court, was thus in order.
En passant, glossing over NPCs failure to file record on appeal, its appeal would still not prosper on substantive grounds.
NPC anchored its appeal[35] on the alleged overvalued appraisal by the commissioners of the compensation to be awarded to Dilao et al., the
commissioners having allegedly lost sight of the already mentioned 10% limit provided under Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395.
NPC VS. PUREFOODS
FACTS
This is the case wherein, Napocor sought to acquire an
easement of right-of-way over certain parcels of land situated in
four towns of the province of Bulacan for the construction and
maintenance of its 500 KV Transmission Line project in Northern
Luzon. It filed a special civic action for eminent domain before
the trial court against the registered owners or claimants of
parcel of lands affected. The complaint alleged the public
purpose of the Northwestern Luzon Project, as well as the
urgency and necessity of acquiring easements of right-of-way
over the said parcels of land.
Only PFI, SDC, Moldex and the heirs of Trinidad filed their
respective answers raising the issue of just compensation of their
property to be expropriated. A report submitted to the RTC
recommending that the compensation due from NAPOCOR be
based on the fair market value of P 600/sq m for properties
belonging to Moldex and P 400/sq m for properties belonging to
the rest of the respondents.
RTC rendered a Decision based on the report, ordering payment
of just compensation by Napocor to name respondents with legal
interest of 6%/annum until finality of the Decision and at
12%/annum from its finality until full payment. CA affirmed RTC
decision in all respects except for the period during which the
interest of 12% per annum would accrue.
NAPOCOR assailed the CA's reliance on the commissioners
report in fixing just compensation based on the full market value
of the affected properties. NAPOCOR contends that only an
easement of right-of-way for the construction of the transmission
line project is being claimed, thus, only an easement fee
equivalent to 10% of the fair market value of the properties
should be paid to the affected property owners (Section 3A, R.A.
ISSUE RULING
WON only the easement No. The question of just compensation for an easement of right-of-way over a parcel of land that will be
fee of 10% of the market traversed by NAPOCORs transmission lines has already been answered in the case of NAPOCOR vs. Manubay
value of the Agro-Industrial Development Corporation. In the said case, it was held that because of the nature of the
expropriated properties easement, which will deprive normal use of their land for an indefinite period, just compensation must be
should be paid for the based on the full market value of the affected properties. Also in the case of NAPOCOR vs Aguirre-
affected owners. Paderanga, the court noted that the passage of NAPOCORs transmission lines over the affected property
causes not only actual damage but also restriction on the agricultural and economic activity normally
undertaken on the entire property. While in the said case NAPOCOR was seeking to acquire only an easement
of the right-of-way, the court nonetheless rules that the just compensation in the amount of only 10% of the market
value of the property was not enough to indemnify the incursion of the affected property.
The Court explained therein that expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with
corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on
property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of
the terms expropriation. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just
compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitles is the market value and market
value is the sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but
not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and receive therefor. The aforementioned rule,
however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such case the owner is not
restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion taken,
he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same
time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits.
While section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state
that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of
right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
Thus, the decision of the RTC and CA with regard to the value of just compensation of P 400/sq.m. of the
properties of the respondents except for Moldex which is P600/sq.m. is affirmed.
6395, as amended and the implementing regulation of R.A. No.
8974).
NPC VS. CO
FACTS
The Petitioner in this case was established by R.A. No.
6395 to undertake the development of hydroelectric
generation of power and the production of electricity from
nuclear through eminent domain.
As a result, petitioner filed a complain with the RTC for the
acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots
with a total area of 575 square meters belonging to
respondent, in connection with the construction of its
transmission lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line
Project (Lahar Project).
At the pre-trial conference, respondent conceded the
necessity of expropriation. Thus, the sole issue for litigation
revolved around the determination of just compensation.
The RTC appointed three (3) commissioners to determine
the fair market value of the property. The rendered its Partial
Decision, wherein it declared the validity of the expropriation
and ordered petitioner to pay the sum of P1,179,000.00,
with interest at 6% per annum the date of actual taking, until
full payment.
Not satisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The CA rendered its Decision holding petitioner
liable to pay the full fair market value at the time of actual
taking, with interest at 6% per annum.
ISSUE RULING
WON just just YES. Petitioner expropriated respondents property for its Lahar Project, a project for public use. [20] In Republic v.
compensation Gingoyon (Gingoyon), we observed that R.A. No. 8974 covers expropriation proceedings intended
will be for national government infrastructure projects.[21] The Implementing Rules and Regulations[22] of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly include
governed by power generation, transmission and distribution projects among the national government projects covered by the law. There is no
RA 8974. doubt that the installation of transmission lines is important to the continued growth of the country. Electricity moves our economy, it
is a national concern. R.A. No. 8974 should govern the expropriation of respondent's property since the Lahar Project is a national
government project.
The right of a property owner to receive just compensation prior to the actual taking of the property by the State is a
WON value of proprietary right which Congress can legislate on. R.A. No. 8974 being applicable in this case, the government agency involved
the property must comply with the guidelines set forth in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 8974.
should be
reckoned as As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by
of the filing of transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10
the complaint. percent of the market value.[26] However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct
transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. [27]
YES. The second aspect of the compensation issue relates to the reckoning date for the determination of just compensation.
Petitioner contends that the computation should be made as of 27 June 2001, the date when it filed the expropriation complaint, as
provided in Rule 67. We agree. Rule 67 clearly provides that the value of just compensation shall be determined as of the date of
the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. [30]In B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, we
held that:
It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes
entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint. (emphasis supplied)

OSG VS. AYALA LAND
FACTS
This is the case where Respondents herein are operators of shopping
malls in various locations in Metro Manila that have parking facilities
(inside the main buildings, in separate buildings and/or in adjacent lots
solely provided for parking use). The respondents are also the one
which maintains the parking spaces and in turn, they collect parking
fees subject to their imposed parking rates.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and
Human Rights conducted a joint investigation to inquire on the legality
of the parking fees and to find out the basis and reasonableness of the
parking rates. More importantly, to determine the legality of the policy of
the shopping malls denying liability in cases of theft, robbery or
carnapping by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the parking
tickets.
After the public hearings, the Senate Committees jointly concluded that
the collection parking fee is contrary to the NationalBuilding Code and
that the reasonable interpretation of the code is that the parking spaces
are for free; thus, the Committee recommended that the Office of
the Solicitor General should institute the necessary action to enjoin the
collection of parking fees as well as to enforce the penal sanctions of
the National Building Code.
Typically, the time of taking is contemporaneous with the time the petition is filed. The general rule is what is provided for by Rule
67. There are exceptions grave injustice to the property owner, the taking did not have color of legal authority, the taking of the
property was not initially for expropriation and the owner will be given undue increment advantages because of the expropriation.
However, none of these exceptions are present in the instant case.
Moreover, respondents reliance on the ruling in City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, is misplaced since the applicable law
therein was the Local Government Code which explicitly provides that the value of just compensation shall be computed at the time
of taking.
Based on the foregoing, the reckoning date for the determination of the amount of just compensation is 27 June 2001,
the date when petitioner filed its expropriation complaint.
ISSUE RULING
WON the property right NO. The Building Code, which is the enabling law and the Implementing Rules and Regulations do
of the respondents can not impose that parking spaces shall be provided by the mall owners free of charge. Absent such
be taken so as to directive[,] Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-la and SM [Prime] are under no obligation to provide
provide free parking them for free. Article 1158 of the Civil Code is clear:
spaces for the general
public welfare. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special
laws are demandable and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to
WON the impairment of what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book
a property is merely
regulated or amounts to To compel Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM [Prime] to provide parking spaces for free
a compensable can be considered as an unlawful TAKING of property right without just compensation.
TAKING Parking spaces in shopping malls are privately owned and for their use, the mall operators collect fees. The
legal relationship could be either lease or deposit. In either case[,] the mall owners have the right to collect
money which translates into income. Should parking spaces be made free, this right of mall owners shall be
gone. This, without just compensation. Further, loss of effective control over their property will ensue which is
frowned upon by law.
the power of eminent domain results in the TAKING or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to
impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled
rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to TAKING. It is usually in cases
where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of
a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable TAKING. A regulation that deprives any person

Two civil cases arise and by being of the same subject matter, the RTC
Makati issued an order to consolidate the cases. The court ruled that
the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces that are
free of charge, compelling them to do so would bean unlawful TAKING
of property right without just compensation. The petitioners sought for
relief by filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals but
the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the joint decision by
the RTC. Hence, this present petition with a single assignment of error
that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the lower court.
NPC VS. SANGKAY
FACTS
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows: Pursuant to its
legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the
Charter of the National Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus
River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate
electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of
several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from
the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.
The respondents Macabangkit as the owners of land sued NPC in the
RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the
alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged
that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels
of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation
of the Hydroelectric Project traversed their land;
The NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to
compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which
a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause
of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed
due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason
of the profitable use of his property constitutes a TAKING and entitles him to compensation, unless the
invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a
police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes amounts
to a TAKING of private property, and the owner may recover therefor. [37]
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with
respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said
facilities, is already tantamount to a TAKING or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring
that respondents devote a portion of the latters properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating
that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the
property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties
as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the
expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.
Therefore, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the
mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the
same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents
property without payment of just compensation.
ISSUE RULING
WON NPCs YES. Here, like in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the
construction of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their
tunnel constituted consent or at least informing them beforehand of the construction. NPCs construction adversely affected the
taking of the land, owners rights and interests because the subterranean intervention by NPC prevented them from introducing any
and entitled owners developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage.
to just
compensation. The decisions of the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the
owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public
use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action
may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.
Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of
the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its
value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether
the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.
As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land. In that regard, the RTC pegged just
compensation at P500.00/square meter based on its finding on what the prevailing market value of the property
was at the time of the filing of the complaint, and the CA upheld the RTC.
The RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing
of the complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No.
of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action 6395. The CA did not dwell on the reckoning time, possibly because NPC did not assign that as an error on the
arising from such easement prescribed in five years. part of the RTC.

After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Heirs of Macabangkit).
The RTC found that NPC had concealed the construction of the tunnel
in 1979 from the Heirs of Macabangkit, and had since continuously
denied its existence; that NPC had acted in bad faith by taking
possession of the subterranean portion of their land to construct the
tunnel without their knowledge and prior consent;
Earlier, on August 18, 1999, the Heirs of Macabangkit filed an urgent
motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. The RTC granted the
motion and issued a writ of execution, prompting NPC to assail the writ
by petition for certiorari in the CA. the CA issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC from implementing its
decision. The Heirs of Macabangkit elevated the ruling of the CA but
the Court upheld the CA decision.
We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC
provided in its decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when
NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the
gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPCs entering without the intention of formally expropriating
the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPCs entry denied
elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation
proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its
deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary
fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these
inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.

On October 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PARC

FACTS
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed.
It is a program aimed at redistributing public
and private agricultural lands to farmers and
farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands
covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a
mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse
straddling several municipalities of Tarlac.
Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the
Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development
Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or
controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in
1980, the Martial Law administration filed an
expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender
the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be
distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC
ISSUE RULING
Is the Yes, the Operative Fact Doctrine is available in this case.
operative
fact The Court cannot close its eyes to certain "operative facts" that had occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes that, in
doctrine declaring a law or executive action null and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting unfairness
available must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly
in this incurred in the meantime. The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may have
case? consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The oft-cited De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank discussed the effect to be given to a legislative or executive act subsequently declared invalid:
x x x It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to
be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties
may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what
has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that
prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
rendered judgment ordering TADECO to
surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the
governments case against TADECO. The CA
dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to
the condition that TADECO shall obtain the
approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to
the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure
its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows
either land transfer or stock transfer as two
alternative modes in distributing land ownership
to the FWBs. Since the stock
distribution scheme is the preferred option of
TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation,
the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to
facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and
revision of terms of the Stock Distribution
Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by
TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary
Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of
TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-
2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have
extended those benefits to the farmworkers.
Such claim was subsequently contested by two
groups representing the interests of the farmers
the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA.
In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions
before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of
terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They
claimed that they havent actually received
those benefits in full, that HLI violated the
terms, and that their lives havent really
improved contrary to the promise and rationale
government organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it
can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice
then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is
an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." x x x
Given the above perspective and considering that more than two decades had passed since the PARCs approval of the HLIs SDP, in conjunction
with numerous activities performed in good faith by HLI, and the reliance by the FWBs on the legality and validity of the PARC-approved SDP,
perforce, certain rights of the parties, more particularly the FWBs, have to be respected pursuant to the application in a general way of the operative
fact doctrine.
AS REGARDS TO THE SCTEX IN RELATION TO EMINENT DOMAIN....
As regards the 80.51-hectare land transferred to the government for use as part of the SCTEX, this should also be excluded from the compulsory
agrarian reform coverage considering THAT THE TRANSFER WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOVERNMENTS EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN and none of the parties actually questioned the transfer.
On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of
RA 6657, providing:
SEC. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may
authorize the reclassification, or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid its obligation.
About eminent domain on infrastructure projects in relation to hacienda luisita project...
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8974
November 7, 2000, AN ACT TO FACILITATE THE ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY, SITE OR LOCATION FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. - Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way or location for any
national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation proceedings
before the proper court under the following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property
the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the

of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to
attend to the issues and to review the terms of
the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting
the report and the recommendations of the Task
Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the
PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-
2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita
through compulsory acquisition scheme.
Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of
TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands
covered by the SDP to the mandated land
acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These
acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule
65.
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof;
(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of sixty (60)
days from the date of the expropriation case, to come up with a zonal valuation for said area; and
(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area
concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of
the property and start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the
proper official concerned.
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agencys proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be
paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court becomes final and executory,
the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court.
xxxx xxxx
Section 6. Guidelines for Negotiated Sale. - Should the implementing agency and the owner of the property agree on a negotiated sale for the
acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project, the standards prescribed under Section 5 hereof shall
be used to determine the fair market value of the property, subject to review and approval by the head of the agency or department concerned.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks

for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode
of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer
in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For
FARM, this modality of distribution is an
anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent
with the basic concept of agrarian reform
ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

FERNANDO VS. SCHOLITICA

FACTS ISSUE RULING
WON the honorable Yes, the eminent domain is applicable in this case. The Court agrees with the latter position.
Respondent SSCs property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter
court of appeals The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free
fence. Marikina City enacted an ordinance "Regulating the
erred in ruling that for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina."
the aforementioned be available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent
which provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a five-
ordinance is an domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
meter allowance between the front monument line and the building
exercise of the city The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property will continue to remain with
line of an establishment.
of the power of the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title nor the total destruction of value is essential to
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to demolish, replace, and move back the fence. As a
response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The
RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.
RP VS. CA
FACTS
This is the case of Private respondent Rosario Rodriguez Reyes
which is the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated on Claro M.
Recto and Osmea Streets, Cagayan de Oro City.
The respondent received a letter from petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, requesting permission to enter into a portion of private
respondents lot for the construction of the Osmea Street extension
road. The petitioner took possession of private respondents
property without initiating expropriation proceedings. Consequently,
private respondent sent letters to the DPWH stating her objection to
eminent domain. taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to
determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. 32 The
Court is of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of
3,762.36 square meters of the respondents private property for public use without just compensation, in
contravention to the Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness," it is obvious that
providing for a parking area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment
of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve
or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. 33 The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and
oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
ISSUE RULING
Whether or not No, the CA did not err in rendering its decision in favor of the respondent.
the Court of Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon
Appeals erred observance of due process of law and payment ofjust compensation. 20 The Constitution provides that, "[p]rivate property
in ordering the shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." 21
remand of the Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. 22 Among the factors to be
case to the trial considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
court, to order properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax
the declarations thereon.23 The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. 24 To be just, the compensation must be
reconvening of fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. 25
the taking of her property.
Hence, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cagayan de Oro City a complaint claiming just compensation and
damages against petitioner. The court appointed three
commissioners5 to determine the subject propertys fair market
value. As a result, the market value of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS
(P4,000.00) per square meter as the highest price obtaining and
prevailing in 1990, the time of the taking of the property subject of
the above entitled case, and fairly reasonable also to impose an
additional value equivalent to 5% of the market value as fixed for
severance fee.
Private respondent filed with the RTC an "Urgent Motion to Deposit
The Amount of P2,121,600 in Court," alleging that petitioners
counsel previously manifested in open court that the amount
of P2,121,600 was ready for release should the amount be
acceptable to private respondent, and praying that said amount
ofP2,121,600 be deposited by petitioner with the trial court. 8 The
RTC granted the motion in an Order dated 16 June 1994. 9 However,
it was only on 21 October 1994 that petitioner deposited with the
RTC Clerk of Court a Landbank check amounting to P2,121,600 as
just compensation.
The undersigned Commissioners would however like to bring to the
attention of the Honorable Court that in the subdivision plan
prepared by the City Engineers Office, the whole of plaintiffs
property was subdivided into three (3) lots. In effect, what has been
taken over and used by the defendant is not only 663 square meters
but 746 square meters, more or less.
On the other hand, the remaining portion left to the plaintiff, will not
actually be 297 square meters. If we deduct the setback area from
Osmea Extension Street, the usable/buildable area left to the
plaintiff would only be a little over 50 square meters. This portion
would not command a good price if sold. Neither is it ideal for
purposes of any building construction because aside from its being a
very small strip of land, the shape is triangular.
On 15 June 1995, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision, in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the former as
having the right to retain 590 square meters of the property covered,
and ordering the latter to return 293 square meters of the 746
square meters taken.
the Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and
commissioners appropriated by the government.26 However, if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation
or appointment proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
of new The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking
commissioners of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. 27
to determine The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of
the Rule 67 partly states that "[u]pon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
consequential competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
damages for property sought to be taken." However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals 28 that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing
the remaining of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the
297- square expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed
meter lot. in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. 2
Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
x x x The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the
property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or
person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages
assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.
An award of consequential damages for property not taken is not tantamount to unjust enrichment of the property
owner.1awphi1 There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."38 Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him." The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two conditions: (1) that
a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at anothers expense or
damage.39 There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit. 40
As stated, consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner
suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. Thus, there is a valid basis for the grant of consequential damages to
the property owner, and no unjust enrichment can result therefrom.
However, we agree with the appellate court that the trial courts decision is not clear as to its basis for ascertaining just
compensation. The trial court mentioned in its decision the valuations in the reports of the City Appraisal Committee and
of the commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67. But whether the trial court considered these valuations in arriving at
the just compensation, or the court made its own independent valuation based on the records, was obscure in the
decision. The trial court simply gave the total amount of just compensation due to the property owner without laying down
its basis. Thus, there is no way to determine whether the adjudged just compensation is based on competent evidence.
For this reason alone, a remand of the case to the trial court for proper determination of just compensation is in order. In
National Power Corporation v. Bongbong,33 we held that although the determination of just compensation lies within the
trial courts discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. The decision of the trial court must be based on all
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,
affirming with modifications the decision of the RTC. The Court of
Appeals found that the commissioners recommendations on just
compensation were not supported by valid documents.
established rules, correct legal principles, and competent evidence. 34 The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on
speculations and surmises.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals Decision dated 15 November 2002 and
Resolution dated 17 September 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50358.

RP VS. BPI
FACTS ISSUE RULING
This is the case wherein, the DPWH filed with the RTC, a case for expropriation against WON the Yes, there should be just compensation for the building for consequential damages.
portions of the properties of BPI and of Bayani Villanueva (Villanueva for the construction of award of No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential
the Zapote-Alabang Fly-Over. additional just damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner
Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the propriety of the expropriation; hence, the trial court compensation suffers from impairment or decrease in value.51 The rules on expropriation clearly provide a legal
constituted a Board of Commissioners and determined P40,000.00 per square meter as the for BPIs basis for the award of consequential damages. Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
fair market value as just compensation. building in the provides: The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken
Meanwhile, BPI filed a Motion for Partial New Trial12 to determine the just compensation of its amount fixed and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the
building, which was not included in the. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration on the therefor is owner from the public use or public purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise
ground that the proceeding fixing the just compensation of the building is null and void for not unfounded and by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the
complying with the mandatory procedure set forth in Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of without legal property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential
Court.
After due hearing, the trial court granted petitioners motion for reconsideration. From this
order, BPI filed a motion for reconsideration, on the ground that there was substantial
compliance with the Rules. The trial court denied BPIs motion for reconsideration.
On 19 September 2000, the trial court appointed Atty. Edgar Allan C. Morante, the branch
clerk of court, as the chairman of the Board of Commissioners, and gave petitioner and BPI
ten days to submit their respective nominees and their oaths of office. On 28 September
2000, BPI nominated Roland Savellano (Savellano), and submitted his oath of office.
Instead of submitting its nominee, petitioner filed on 13 October 2000a Manifestation and
Motion27 objecting to the propriety of paying just compensation for BPIs building and praying
that BPIs claim for additional just compensation be denied. Petitioner claimed that the
building was never taken by the government.
The trial court issued the Order, adopting the recommendation of Gervacio ofP1,905,600.00,
thus:
The Court approves the Recommendation dated October 22, 2001of ONE MILLION NINE
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND SIXHUNDRED PESOS (P1,905,600.00) by Commissioner
ROMULO C.GERVACIO as the just compensation of the building of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) Zapote affected by the construction of the Zapote-Alabang Fly-over, it appearing
that such amount is the existing market value of the property pursuant to the Declaration by
BPI as the market value of the building affected by the project as contained in Tax Declaration
D-006-02044.
On 14 September 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of
the trial court.
basis. damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.
In B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals,52 we held that:
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first as certain the market value of the
property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the
consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential benefits
exceed the consequential damages, these items should bed is regarded altogether as the basic
value of the property should be paid in every case.
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for
public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation. 44 The
States power of eminent domain is limited by the constitutional mandate that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 45
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. 46
The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is
entitled to is the market value.47 Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but
not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price
to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. The general rule, however, is modified where
only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to
compensation for the portion actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the consequential
damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property.

SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO

FACTS
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a
complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately
twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of
petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area
of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land
sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00)
per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial
assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the
valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of
the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the
Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the
subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
ISSUE RULING
WON, The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property /ties to be
expropriation taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of
proceedings were fraud, bad faith , or gross abuse of discretion which petitioners herein failed to demonstrate.
violated.
The court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size of the site of the project.
The right to the use ,enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands
of the common good.
Article II , Sec 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
The Court holds that Socialized Housing defined in PD #1224 as amended, constitutes public use for purposes
of expropriation. However, as previously held y this court, the provisions of such decrees on just compensation
are unconstitutional, and in the instant case, the Court finds that the orders issued pursuant to the corollary
1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property
for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had
been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of
law, however it was denied. Thus , this petition.
MANOSCA VS. CA
FACTS
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos St. Calzada, Taguig, Metro
Manila with a area of 492 sq. mtrs. When the parcel was ascertained by the National
Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the Founder of
Iglesia ni Cristo. NHI passed Resolution # 1 Series of 1987 pursuant to Sec 4 of PD
260, declaring the land to be a historical landmark.
It was also approved by the Minister of Education , Culture and Sports and affirmed
by the secretary of Justice explaining that the birth site of the founder of INC , the
late Felix Y. Manalo, had made contributions to the Philippine history and culture. It
was then declared as a national landmark.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of INC, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Sec 29 [2] Article VI of
provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process.
Wherefore, the orders of the lower court issuing the writ of possession on the asis of the market value appearing
therein are annulled for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
Let this case e remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the compensation the
petitioners are entitled to be paid.
ISSUE RULING
WON, the public use of Yes it is valid.
eminent domain is extant in The purpose of setting up the marker is essentially to recognize th e distinctive recognition
the attempted expropriation of the Late Felix Y. Manalo to the culture of the Philippines rather than to commemorate his
by the Republic of a 492 sq founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
mtrs parcel of land declared
as a National Historic Eminent domain is generally so described as the highest and most exact idea of property
Landmark is valid. remaining in the government that may e acquired for some public purpose through a method
in the nature of a forced purchase by the state.
It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the State for public purpose to
meet a public exigency.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the
public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowed.
the 1987 Constitution.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES VS. CA

FACTS ISSUE RULING
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang PAnlalawigan of the Province WON, THE The local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
of Cam Sur passed Resolution 129, authorizing the Provincial Governor ESTABLISHMENT expressly authorized by the legislature. In delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may
to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the Provincial Capitol OF THE PILOT retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments.
site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional DEVELOPMENT While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
agricultural crops and a housing project for the provl government CENTER AND
employees. THE HOUSING The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular
PROJECT ARE undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.
Pursuant to said resolution, Governor Luis R. Villafuerte filed two DEEMED FOR
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and PUBLIC USE. Sec 9 of the Local Govt Code does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure the approval
Efren San Joaquin. Forthwith, the Province of Cam Sur filed a motion of the DAR for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can
for the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
appear at the hearing of the motion. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural

The Sa Joaquins instead moved to dismiss the complaints on the
ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. But the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of
Cam Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the
Clerk of Court the amount of 5,714.00 Php. Then and again, the San
Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, but were denied.
The Province of Cam Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the
expropriation proceedings under Secs 4 & 7 of the Local Govt Code and
that the expropriations are for public purpose.
lands by the LGUs to the control of the DAR.
Under the new concept of public use means public advantage , convenience or benefit which
tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort
complex for tourist of a housing project.
Wherefore, the petition is granted, thus, the decision of the CA is set aside in so far as it[a]. nullifies
the trial Courts order allowing the Prov. Of Cam Sur to take possession of the property of the San
Joaquins,[ . b.] orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings ; and,[ c]. requires
theProv of CamSur to obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or re-classify the property of the San
Joaquins from agricultural to on-agricultural use.

In a comment, theSolGen stated that under Sec 9 of the Local Govt

Code, there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President
of the exercise of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent
domain. However, the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the
approval of the Dept of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the
lands of the petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court and ordered
therein to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the
Province of CamSur shall have submitted the requisite approval of DAR
to convert the classification of the property from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.

Hence , this petition.

REYES VS. NHA

FACTS ISSUE RULING
In 1977, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate WON, the judgment of The SC held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of
complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands of the cadastral expropriation was eminent domain provision contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public
survey of Dasmarinas, Cavite, belonging to the petitioners. The forfeited in the light of use. It is now a settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The
stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the the failure of the term public use has been held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public
Dasmarinas Resettlement Project , to accommodate the squatters Respondent NHA to use convenience.
who were relocated from Metro Manila area the expropriated
property for the intended The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties
The trial court ordered the expropriation of these lots and the purpose
payment of just compensation.
For the alleged failure of the Respondent NHA to comply with the
above order, Petitioners filed a complaint for forfeiture of rights
before the RTC of Quezon City r 79. They alleged that NHA had not
relocated squatters from Metro Manila area on the expropriated
lands in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation and
had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court.
Respondent NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial
amount to herein petitioners and that the expropriation judgment
could not e executed in view of several issues raised by NHA.
The trial court dismissed the complaint finding that the failure of the
respondent NHA to pay just compensation and of petitioners to pay
the capital gains tax are both unjustified and unreasonable.
MANAPAT VS. CA
FACTS ISSUE
The three-decade saga of the parties herein has for its . THE COURT OF
subject parcels of land forming part of what was APPEALS ERRED IN
originally known as the Grace Park Subdivision in HOLDING THAT THE
Caloocan City and formerly owned by the Roman ISSUANCE MADE IN
upon payment of just compensation. Article III Sec 9 states that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as
in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable.
As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is
the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the
transfer , through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is modified as follows:
1. Ordering Respondent NHA to pay petitioners the amount of 1,218, 57.35 Php with legal interest
thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the expropriated properties in 1997 until the
amount due shall have been fully paid;
2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax , and;
3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to Respondent NHA the owners duplicate certificates of title of the
expropriated properties upon full payment of just compensation.
RULING
Held 1:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7279 to the
subject expropriation cases instituted back in 1977 by petitioner-appellant NHA.[37]
1. Republic Act 7279 passed in 1992 should operate prospectively and, therefore, should not be given retroactive effect.
Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) and/or the THE EXERCISE Republic Act 7279 is a substantive and penal law with a penalty clause which cannot apply retroactively especially to pending
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). Sometime in the OF LEGISLATIVE actions.[39]
1960s, RCAM allowed a number of individuals to POWER, 2. Republic Act No. 7279 and PD 1072 are not in parimateria.[40]
occupy the Grace P ark property on condition that they SPECIFYING THE The retroactive application of Article VI, Section 10 of RA 7279 will affect vested rights of petitioner-appellant NHA arising from
would vacate the premises should the former push LOTS TO BE its exercise of the power of eminent domain.[41]
through with the plan to construct a school in the area. EXPROPRIATED Held 2:
The plan, however, did not materialize, thus, the AND THE PURPOSE 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the impractical consequences resulting from a selective
occupants offered to purchase the portions they FO expropriation of lots.[42]
occupied. Later, as they could not afford RCAMs R WHICH THEY ARE In G.R. No. 116176, petitioner Lim, a non-member of the tenant association who bought from RCAM/PRC four lots of the
proposed price, the occupants, organizing themselves INTENDED, subdivided Grace Park Subdivision,[43] argues as follows:
as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. REMOVES FROM (1) Respondent NHA may not, as it would herein, legally re-group several smaller lots into which a much bigger lot had
Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the Government THE JUDICIARY THE previously been subdivided, and consider and treat them as one again for the purpose of subdividing it once more into still
for the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision DETERMINATION OF smaller lots for distribution to its supposed or intended beneficiaries; (2) There really was no genuine necessity for the
into home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to THE N expropriation of the lots in question to satisfy the purpose thereof as alleged in the complaint therefor; (3) Respondent Court did
them at a low price.[5] Acting on the associations ECESSITY OF THE not sustain the clear finding of the trial court that no evidence sufficient to prove its claim that the expropriation of said lots and
petition, the Government, in 1963, through the Land TAKING, THERE subdividing them again into much smaller lots for resale to their present occupants would provide the latter with more healthful,
Tenure Administration (LTA), later succeeded by the BEING NO decent and peaceful surroundings and thus improve the quality of their lives was ever presented by respondent NHA.[46]
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), SHOWING OF Stripped of non-essentials, the petitions raise only one fundamental issue, and that is, whether the NHA may validly
negotiated for the acquisition of the property from ABUSE OF expropriate the parcels of land subject of these cases.
RCAM/PRC. But because of the high asking price of DISCRETION.[33]
RCAM and the budgetary constraints of the The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State.
Government, the latters effort to purchase and/or to 2. SUPERVENING Also called the power of expropriation, it is described as the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the
expropriate the property was discontinued. RCAM EVENT RENDERS government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a compulsory sale to
then decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision of IMPROPER THE the State. By virtue of its sovereign character, the exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause, and
the property and the sale of the individual subdivided DISPOSITION BY is clearly superior to the final and executory judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case; Section 9, Article III of
lots to the public.[6] Petitioners Manapat and Lim and THE COURT OF the Constitution merely imposes a limit on the governments exercise of the power and provides a measure of
respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos, APPEALS F protection to the individuals right to property.
Oracion and Mercado in these consolidated cases OR AN ORDER OF Eminent Domain; Non-impairment Clause; The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State;
were among those who purchased individual CONDEMNATION By virtue of its sovereign character, the exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause, and is clearly superior to
subdivided lots of Grace Park directly from RCAM DECLARING THAT the final and executory judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case; Section 9, Article III of the Constitution merely
and/or PRC.[7] NHA HAS A LAWFUL imposes a limit on the governments exercise of the power and provides a measure of protection tothe individuals right to
A significant turn of events however happened in 1977 RIGHT TO TAKE THE property.
when the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued LO Over the years and in a plethora of cases, this Court has recognized the following requisites for thevalid exercise of the power of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1072,[8] appropriating T OF FERMIN eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be private property; (2) there must begenuine necessity to take the private
P1.2M out of the Presidents Special Operations MANAPAT FOR property; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there must be payment of justcompensation; and (5) the taking must comply
Funds to cover the additional amount needed for the SUPPOSED PUBLIC with due process of law. As a rule, genuine necessity for the exercise of eminent domain is a justiciable question but when power
expropriation of Grace Park. The National Housing USE AND FOR is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political question.
Authority (NHA), PHHCs successor, then filed several REMAND OF HIS One final matter: the propriety of the application by the CA of R.A. No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided CASE TO THE TR Housing Act of 1992. The Court is not unaware of the condition now imposed by R.A. No. 7279[71] that, for purposes of urban
lots for the purpose of developing Grace Park under
the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing
it into small lots for distribution and resale at a low cost
to the residents of the area.
IAL COURT FOR development and housing under the Act, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners
DETERMINATION OF shall be exempted.[72] Small property owners are owners of residential lands with an area not exceeding 300 sq m in highly
JUST urbanized cities and 800 sq m in other urban areas and who do not own any other real property.[73] Invoking this limitation
COMPENSATION.[34] under the said law, the appellate court in the questioned rulings exempted from expropriation the lots owned by Loberanes,
Quimque, Mercado, Vega and Santos, and partially exempted the lot of Oracion. The CAs ruling on this point is incorrect. R.A.
No. 7279 was enacted in 1992, almost two decades after the expropriation cases against the property owners herein were
instituted with the RTC in 1977. Nova constitutiofuturisformamimponeredebet, non praeteritis. A new statute should affect the
future, not the past. The law looks forward, not backward.[74] Article 4 of the Civil Code even explicitly declares, (l)aws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.[75] In these consolidated cases, the Court finds that the language of
R.A. No. 7279 does not suggest that the Legislature has intended its provisions to have any retroactive application. On the
contrary, Section 49 of the said law indicates that it shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.[76] The laws prospective application being clearly stated, the Court cannot agree with the disposition of
the appellate court that the subject lots not exceeding 300 sq m are exempt from expropriation.WHEREFORE, PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the May 27, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 and the June 28, 1994
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159 are AFFIRMED; and the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions in
CA-G.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
CITY OF MAYNILA VS. TE
FACTS
The Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved Ordinance No. 7951 an expropriation measure by
the city council authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of real
property where low-cost housing units could be built and then awarded to bona fide residents
therein. In the aggregate, the covered property measures 1,425 square meters, and includes the 475-
square-meter lot owned by respondent Melba Tan Te.
The records bear that respondent had acquired the property from the heirs of Emerlinda Dimayuga
Reyes back then it was being occupied by a number of families whose leasehold rights had long
expired even prior to said sale. The respondent had sought before the Metropolitan Trial Court the
ejectment of these occupants from the premises. The favorable ruling in that case evaded execution;
hence, the court, despite opposition of the City of Manila, issued a Writ of Demolition at respondents
instance. It appears that in the interim between the issuance of the writ of execution and the order of
demolition, the City of Manila had instituted an expropriation case affecting the same
property. Respondent had moved for the dismissal of that first expropriation case. The trial court found
merit in the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
The petitioner[ filed this second Complaint[ for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court. This time,
it attached a copy of Ordinance No. 7951 and alleged that pursuant thereto, it had previously offered
to purchase the subject property from respondent but respondent allegedly failed to retrieve it despite
repeated notices, thereby compelling petitioner to institute the present expropriation proceedings.
Respondent submitted a Motion to Dismiss and raised the following grounds: that Ordinance
No. 7951 was an invalid expropriation measure because it violated the rule against taking private
property without just compensation; that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Sections
9and 10of R.A. No. 7279; and that she qualified as a small property owner and, hence, exempt from
the operation of R.A. No. 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned.
The trial court dismissing the complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals which, finding no merit therein, dismissed the same. Petitioner sought reconsideration, but it
was denied.
In this Petition, petitioner posits that the trial courts dismissal of its complaint was premature,
and it faults the Court of Appeals for having failed to note that by such dismissal it has been denied an
opportunity to show previous compliance with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279
as well as to establish that respondent actually owns other realty apart from the subject property.
ISSUE RULING
WON that Prefatorily, the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed
socialized and/or sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in
housing falls the expanded definition of public use or purpose in the context of the States exercise of
within the the power of eminent domain. Said the Court in Sumulong v. Guerrero,[32] citing the
confines of earlier case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes:[33]
public use.?
The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept
influenced by changing conditions.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time
where it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public
to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation
is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. x
x x The constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
divided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in
the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at
present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
The term public use has acquired a more comprehensive coverage.
To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by
the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public
benefit or advantage. x x x
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation
which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public
concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands
that obviate the need to take private property for public
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have
never been a laissez-faire state. And the necessities which impel the
exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce
 Respondent, for her part, points out that Ordinance No. 7951 is an invalid expropriation
measure as it does not even contain an appropriation of funds in its implementation.
Petitioner claims that by virtue of the vesture of eminent domain powers in it by its charter, it
is thereby not bound by the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
FACTS
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed.
Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation.
Respondent Judge Dulay then appointed commissioners to determine the just compensation. It
was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per
square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of
just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus
enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Under Proclamation No. 1811, four parcel of land owned and registered in the name of private
individuals were included for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). The EPZA offered to purchase the land from the
private owners in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 22 of PD464.
Failure to agreed regarding the sale, EPZA filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
expropriate the land pursuant to PD No. 66(empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation
proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to
Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone)The
judge authorized PEZA to to take immediate possession of the premises.
As per decision of the judge, EPZA should pay the private owners a just compensation for the
properties and order certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the
just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. Three commissioners submitted
their consolidated report at P15 per sqm as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation
public land or limited government resources.
Specifically, urban renewal or development and the construction of low-cost
housing are recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded
concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution.
ISSUE RULING
WON the exclusive YES. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible
and mandatory mode encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in
of determining just which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation
compensation in PD in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining
1533 is just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what
unconstitutional. amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of
just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
2. whether or not The court still have the power and authority to determine just compensation,
Presidential Decrees independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint
Numbered 76, 464, commissioners for such purpose. The trial court correctly stated the valuation in the
794 and 1533 have decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
repealed and compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount
superseded Sections should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
Revised Rules of function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
Court, such that in determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights
determining the just that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
compensation of statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shag
property in an prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking
expropriation case, the into the" just-ness" of the decreed compensation. Elimination of the court's discretion,
only basis should be under PD No. 1533, to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of
its market value as Court, is unconstitutional and void
declared by the owner
 or as determined by
the assessor,
whichever is lower
KNECHT VS CA
FACTS
This is the case wherein, petitioners Cristina de Knecht and Rene Knecht seek to annul and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals. This involves a parcel of land owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son,
Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts constructed eight (8) houses of strong materials, leased out the seven and
occupied one of them as their residence.
The Republic of the Philippines initiated Civil Case for expropriation against the Knechts' property. The
government sought to utilize the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the
extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. On petition of the Knechts, however, this Court, held that the
choice of area for the extension of EDSA was arbitrary. We annulled the writ of possession and enjoined the trial
court from taking further action.
In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property
from 1980 to 1982.[11] As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction on
May 27, 1982 for the sum of P63,000.00, the amount of the deficiency taxes. [12] The highest bidders were respondent
Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor Sangalang.
Petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the date of sale. In August 1983, Anastacio
Babiera filed with respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, a petition for registration of his name as
co-owner pro-indiviso of the subject land. , the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to register Babiera's name
and the Knechts to surrender to the Register of Deeds the owner's duplicate of the title.
Alejandro Sangalang filed LRC Case before the Regional Trial Court, Sangalang also sought to register his
name as co-owner pro-indiviso of the subject property. The trial court granted the petition and ordered the Register of
ISSUE RULING
WON In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that the Knechts had no right to
petitioners are intervene in Civil Case No. 7327 for lack of any legal right or interest in
entitled to just the property subject of expropriation. The appellate court declared that
compensation Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation proceeding under Rule 67
. of the Revised Rules of Court but merely a case for the fixing of just
compensation.[44] The Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after
they failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public auction. Whatever
right remained on the property vanished after Civil Case No. 2961-P, the
reconveyance case, was dismissed by the trial court. Since the petitions
questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the Court of
Appeals and this Court, the order of dismissal became final and res
judicata on the issue of ownership of the land.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
that Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation case. It was precisely in
the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain under B.P. Blg. 340
that expropriation proceedings were instituted against the owners of the
lots sought to be expropriated. B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the
procedure for expropriation. The law merely described the specific
properties expropriated and declared that just compensation was to be
determined by the court. It designated the then Ministry of Public Works
and Highways as the administrator in the "prosecution of the project."
Whether or Thus, in the absence of a procedure in the law for expropriation, reference
not Knechts must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in Rule 67 of the
are the lawful
 owners of the
Deeds, land at Revised Rules of Court.
subject.
Pursuant to said orders, the Register of Deeds cancelled the names of Sangalang and Babiera. The Knechts,
who were in possession of the property, allegedly learned of the auction sale only by the time they received the
orders of the land registration courts. Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment
Corporation

Meanwhile, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate
certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension, The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated
under B.P. Blg. 340.

The Knechts filed Civil before the Regional Trial Court, They prayed for reconveyance, annulment of the tax
sale and the titles of the Babieras and Sangalangs. The Knechts based their action on lack of the required notices to
the tax sale.

In the same case, Salem filed a petition for appointment of a receiver. The court granted the petition, appointed
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company as receiver. The Knechts questioned this appointment on a petition the Court
of Appeals The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition which this Court

NPC V. CA JUST COMPENSATION

FACTS
At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered the
towns near the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to
residents and their properties.
Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent
opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the
residents within the vicinity of the dam.
Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept
the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done
gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its
employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It
further contended that there was no direct causal relationship
between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that
the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what
ISSUE RULING
(1) Whether the (1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, a
petitioner can be held corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation
liable even though the as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual
coming of the typhoon is relation between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article
a fortuitous event 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done."
Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should
not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the
violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief.
When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention
happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the
damnumabsqueinjuria. acts of God. In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not escape
liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

MCIAA vs Rodriguez
FACTS ISSUE RULING
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), a GOCC WON the just It is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat, that the just compensation for the property is to be
operating the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Complex, compensation should be established ". . . (W)hen plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the
implemented expansion programs for its runway in the 70s. So it fixed, as of the time of value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the
bought and occupied some of the properties surrounding the area actual taking of possession latter should be the basis for the determination of the value, when the taking of the property involved coincides
through expropriation. In 1996, respondent lot owner proposed to by the expropriating entity with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule 69,
sell to MIAA at P2,350.00 per square meter one of the lots already or, as the Ansaldos Section 3, directing that compensation 'be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint' would never
occupied by the expanded runway. No deal was made. maintain, only after be operative.
conveyance of title to the
So respondent Rodriguez bought the bigger lot, a portion of which expropriator pursuant to The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that
was occupied by the runway, as well as all the rights to claim expropriation proceedings ". . . (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
reasonable rents and damages for the occupation, from its owner duly instituted since it is enchanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have
then, Buck Estate, Inc., for P4 million. only at such a time that the depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the

Rodriguez demanded from the MIAA full payment for the property
and back rentals for 27 years, amounting to P468.8 million. Failing
to reach an agreement with MIAA, Rodriguez filed a case for
accionreinvindicatoria with damages. Finding that the MIAA had
illegally taken possession of the property, the trial court ruled
respondents favor. The Court of Appeals modified the trial courts
decision, holding that Rodriguez is entitled to back rentals only from
the time he became the registered owner of the property in 1996.
constitutional requirements time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
of due process aside from compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his
those of just loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only
compensation may be way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., 'just not only to the individual whose property is taken,'
fully met. 'but to the public, which is to pay for it.'"
Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was
actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the way, still has to be done.
It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn
interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case law

Undeniably, the MIAAs illegal occupation for more than twenty (20) years has resulted in pecuniary loss to
Rodriguez and his predecessors-in-interest. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the
form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of
the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment by the MIAA.30 This is based on the principle
that interest "runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good
position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking."

The proper valuation for the property the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the
commission constituted by the trial court to make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price
thereof on a per hectare basis. The subject lot was occupied as a runway of the MIAA starting in 1972. Thus,
the value of the lot in 1972 should serve as the basis for the award of compensation to the owner.

REP VS. LIM

FACTS ISSUE RULING
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation of the Banilad Friar Land Estate in the name WON the NO. One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is
of Gervasia and EulaliaDenzon for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army.Thereafter, the CFI Republic that no person shall be deprived of his private property without
rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. has due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential
retained element of due process is that there must be just
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed. Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, ownership compensation whenever private property is taken for public
filed a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it denied knowledge of the matter. For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the of Lot 932 use.[7] Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution
Denzons successors-in-interest, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic despite its mandates: Private property shall not be taken for public use
and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. failure to without just compensation.
pay
On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have respondent The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it
retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in s failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest
the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale predecesso the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of
in favor of the Republic. In view of the differences in money value from 1940 up to the present, the court adjusted the market value rs-in- time and the manner with which it evaded payment
at P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full interest the demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory
payment. just attitude. The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings
compensa (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount tion. half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner,
in controversy, directly to this Court and rendered its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly,
still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be
viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is
Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that Valdehueza and Panerio are not entitled to recover possession of the accompanied by bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from
lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value, ratiocinating as follows:Appellants would contend that: (1) Valdehueza is the fact that respondents predecessors-in-
possession of Lots 932 and 939 should be restored to them as owners of the same; (2) the Republic should be ordered to pay interest were given a run around by the Republics officials and
rentals for the use of said lots, plus attorneys fees; and (3) the court a quo in the present suit had no power to fix the value of the agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of
lots and order the execution of the deed of sale after payment. the two lots, the National Airports Corporation denied
knowledge of the claim of respondents predecessors-in-
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondentas security for their loans. For interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil
their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name. Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National
Defense to expedite the payment, failed in granting relief to
Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of the them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of
Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, the Armed Forces expressed willingness to pay the appraised
DoroteoMantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners. On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Vicente Lim value of the lots, nothing happened.
declaring the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, Obviously,
defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying what was due to the landowners. The expropriation proceedings had The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay
already become final in the late 1940s and yet, up to now, or more than fifty (50) years after, the Republic had not yet paid the is contrary to the rules of fair play, as just compensation
compensation fixed by the court while continuously reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the prejudice of the embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to
landowner. be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the
land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
The CA UPHELD AND AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. payment, compensation cannot be considered just. In
Petitioners, through the OSG, filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Republic has remained the jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
owner of Lot 932. property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been
In our Resolutionwe denied the petition outright on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error. held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time,
Petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration but we denied the same with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004. the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.[8]

LBP vs AMS Farming

FACTS ISSUE RULING
The National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO) was the owner of a piece of agricultural land with an
area of 73.7 hectares. NAFCO leased a 51-hectare portion of said land to AMS for a period of 15 years. When
Apeco Motors Corporation (APECO) acquired ownership of the land, the said lease agreement was registered
and annotated on its certificate of title. Sometime during the effectivity of the lease, ownership of the afore-
mentioned agricultural land was transferred to Totco Credit Corporation (TOTCO). On 15 June 1988, Republic
Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect.
On 8 August 1991, four years before the expiration of the existing Lease Agreement, TOTCO and AMS executed
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wherein they agreed to increase the area leased to 61.65 hectares, and
renew the lease for another 25 years. AMS developed a banana plantation thereon, cultivating and planting on
the leased property Cavendish banana for export, and introducing the necessary improvements and
infrastructures.
DAR Case No. 52-99
On 9 September 1996, TOTCO submitted to the DAR a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) of its agricultural land,
including the area leased to AMS. LBP, the DAR issued a notice of valuation and acquisition offering the amount
of P1,806,754.83 as just compensation for the property. When TOTCO rejected the proffered amount. The
DARAB, upheld the valuation of just compensation made by the LBP. Still unsatisfied with the amount of just
compensation TOTCO filed with the RTC, a Complaint against the DAR and LBP for the determination of just
compensation.
The RTC appointed a panel of Commissioners to conduct a fair valuation of the property. In its Report, the panel
found acceptable the valuation presented by TOTCO of P328,026.85 per hectare. The RTC rendered its
Decision, adopting the amount of just compensation recommended by the panel of Commissioners. Since the
valuation of the just compensation awarded by the RTC to TOTCO included the standing crops and
improvements introduced by AMS on the leased property, AMS President filed an Affidavit in (sic) Third Party
Claim before the RTC asserting that AMS was the owner of the standing crops and all the improvements
inherent in the operation of a banana plantation on the land owned by TOTCO. The RTC granted the Motion
filed by TOTCO for the immediate execution of its judgment. The counsel for AMS wrote LBP a letter calling its
attention to the Third Party Claim of AMS on the award of just compensation to TOTCO. AMS requested that
TOTCO be paid just compensation for the land only, and that the balance of the award be remitted by check to
AMS. LBP, however, did not act on the request of AMS.
This Court painstakingly considers the Third Party Claimant of his right to file an Affidavit of Third Party Claim.
TOTCO filed with the RTC its Complaint for just compensation that the agricultural land it was leasing was
already the subject of a pending VOS made by TOTCO, but apparently still unaware of the pendency of AMS
wrote LBP a letter submitting its own VOS of the banana crops planted on the 61.65 hectares of land owned by
TOTCO.
The RTC promulgated its Decision awarding just compensation to TOTCO for its land, as well as the standing
crops and improvements found thereon. AMS did not receive a copy of the said Decision since it was not a party
in DAR Case No. 52-99. AMS was merely furnished a copy thereof by the LBP Land Valuation Office in Davao
City, when one of its employees followed up on the status of its VOS on 3 May 2000.
WON the NO. AMS has no interest in the just compensation paid by LBP to TOTCO
AMS Farms pursuant to the judgment in DAR Case No. 52-99.
is entitled for
When AMS entered into a lease agreement of the agricultural land with TOTCO,
Just
it had no right to expect that, upon the termination of the lease, it would be
compensati compensated for the crops it planted and improvements it built on the leased
on. land; or that, if at all, it can recover more than half the value thereof from
TOTCO. Hence, the Court cannot allow AMS to seek full compensation for the
same crops and improvements from the LBP just because its lease was
terminated by the sale of the leased property to the Republic under the CARP.
That the leased land was placed under the CARP did not change the status of
AMS as a lessee and gave it the right to more compensation upon the
termination of the lease, as compared to the lessee of any other kind of
property. It was never the intention of the CARL to create a privileged class of
lessees.
The said courts proceeded from the mistaken presumption that AMS had a right
to just compensation under the CARL for the standing crops and
improvements it introduced as a lessee on the agricultural land of TOTCO. The
RTC should have dismissed the Petition of AMS in Special Agrarian Case No.
61-2000 for lack of cause of action; it was clearly not an agrarian matter.
Furthermore, there is no question that the landowner is entitled to just
compensation for its private agricultural land taken pursuant to the CARP for
distribution to qualified beneficiaries. The Court could not find a provision therein
on the right of a lessee of a private agricultural land to just compensation for
the crops it planted and improvements it built thereon, which could be
recognized separately and distinctly from the right of the landowner to just
compensation for his land. The standing crops and improvements are valued
simply because they are appurtenant to the land, and must necessarily be
included in the final determination of the just compensation for the land to be
paid to the landowner. Standing crops and improvements, if they do not come
with the land, are totally inconsequential for CARP purposes.
Since AMS was not a landowner, but a mere lessee of the agricultural land
owned by TOTCO, it had no right under the CARL to demand from LBP just
compensation for its standing crops and improvements. Thus, it cannot lay
claim to the portion of the just compensation, pertaining to the improvements
on the leased property, awarded by the RTC to TOTCO in DAR Case No. 52-99.
And consequently, the Affidavit of Third Party Claim filed by AMS President
Soriano in DAR Case No. 52-99 over the just compensation awarded to
TOTCO is without merit.
This prompted AMS President Soriano to file with the RTC, an Affidavit in (sic) Third Party Claim. The RTC
appointed a panel of Commissioners to determine the value of just compensation for the standing crops and
improvements claimed by AMS. The panel determined the total actual market value of all existing improvements
introduced by AMS on the land owned by TOTCO to be P48,952,473.28,

The RTC promulgated its Decision on 11 March 2003, ruling in favor of AMS. In essence, the RTC found that
the standing crops and improvements were indeed owned by AMS. LBP subsequently appealed the judgment of
the RTC to the Court of Appeals, The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the appeal of LBP and
declared AMS as the owner of the standing crops and improvements it introduced on the leased property.

NAPOCOR VS. CA
FACTS ISSUE RULING
In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took
possession of a 21,995 square meter land which is a portion
of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-116159 situated
in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-378-A, under the mistaken belief that it
forms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for
hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of
the President of the Philippines dated December 3, 1974.
NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then
possessed and administered by Marawi City so that in
exchange for the citys waiver and quitclaim of any right over the
property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a financial assistance of
P40.00 per square meter.
In 1979, when NAPOCOR started building its Agus I HE
(Hydroelectric Plant) Project, Mangondato demanded
compensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to
compensate insisting that the property is public land and that it
had already paid financial assistance to Marawi City in
exchange for the rights over the property.
Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered
private property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
378-A in his name, and that he is not privy to any agreement
between NAPOCOR and Marawi City and that any payment
made to said city cannot be considered as payment to him.
More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that
the property belongs to Mangondato.
At the outset, in March, 1990, NAPOCORs regional legal
counsel, pursuant to Executive Order No. 329 dated July 11,
1988 requested Marawi Citys City Appraisal Committee to
appraise the market value of the property in
Saduc, Marawi City affected by the infrastructure projects of
NAPOCOR without specifying any particular land-owner.
In March, 1992, the parties executed a Deed of Sale Of A
Registered Property where NAPOCOR acceded to
Mangondatos request of provisional payment of P100.00 per
square meter excluding interest and without prejudice to
Mangondatos pursuance of claims for just compensation and
Whether or not The general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint
the respondent
court was justified The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the
in deviating from date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings
the well-settled
doctrine that just In the old case of Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo,the Court ruled that x x x the owners of the land have no right to recover
compensation is damages for this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the public improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to
the equivalent of Pasay) for which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the time when
the value of the it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public
property taken for improvements.
public use
reckoned from the In subsequently cases,the Court, following the above doctrine, invariably held that the time of taking is the critical date in determining lawful or
time of taking just compensation. Justifying this stance, Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for the Court in Municipality of La Carlota
vs. The Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, x x x the owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to according
to the value of the property so devoted to public use as of the date of the taking. From that time, he had been deprived thereof. He had no
choice but to submit. He is not, however, to be despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law guarantees just compensation. It
would be an injustice to him certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the value of what was lost. There could be on the other hand,
injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the collection, the increment in price would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has
been committed is intended precisely to avoid either contingency fraught with unfairness.
Simply stated, the exception finds application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the
government devotes the property expropriated -as for instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare as was the case in Caro de Araullo. In the
instant case, however, it is difficult to conceive of how there could have been an extra-ordinary increase in the value of the owners land arising
from the expropriation, as indeed the records do not show any evidence that the valuation of P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to increments
directly caused by petitioners use of the land. Since the petitioner is claiming an exception to Rule 67, Section 4,it has the burden of proving its
claim that its occupancy and use - not ordinary inflation and increase in land values - was the direct cause of the increase in valuation from 1978
to 1992.
This Court has defined the elements of taking as the main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain, in the following words:
A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
In this case, the petitioners entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority, for it
believed the property was public land covered by Proclamation No. 1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of ownership sometime
in 1979, the petitioner flatly refused the claim for compensation, nakedly insisted that the property was public land and wrongly justified its
possession by alleging it had already paid financial assistance to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. Only in 1990, after
more than a decade of beneficial use, did the petitioner recognize private respondents ownership and negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the
property. A Deed of Sale with provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the correct price was then executed.
Clearly, this is not the intent nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale. Obviously, the
interest. Mangondato was paid P1,015,412.00 in addition to the petitioner neglected and/or refused to exercise the power of eminent domain.
P1,184,088.00 earlier paid to him by NAPOCOR which
payments total P2,199,500.00 for the 12,995 square meter land Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to expropriate, did petitioner manifest its
intention to exercise the power of eminent domain.
PNOC VS MAGLASANG
FACTS
On October 25, 1994- the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) filed a complaint for
eminent domain against respondent Oscar S. Maglasang, the registered owner of a 63,333-
square meter parcel of land identified as Lot No. 11900 and covered by TCT No. T-4097.
November 10, 1994- the PNOC filed another expropriation complaint, this time against
respondent Leolino A. Maglasang, owner of the 98,206-square meter parcel of land identified
as Lot No. 11907; properties are located in Lim-ao, Municipality of Kananga, Leyte and to be
used by the PNOC in the construction and operation of the 125MW Upper Mahiao Geothermal
Power Plant Project.The RTC issued writs of possession over Lot No. 11907 and Lot No.
11900 on December 5, 1994 and December 13, 1994, respectively, after PNOC posted the
required provisional deposit.
March 21, 1997, upon finality of the orders of condemnation in both expropriation cases, the
trial court appointed three commissioners to ascertain and make a recommendation on the just
compensation for the condemned lots. However, commissioners' had varying land valuations,
confronted by this the trial court made its own determination of the just compensation taking
into account the range of prices recommended in the Commissioners' Report and documentary
evidence presented by the parties. Setting the reckoning period for the computation of the just
compensation at the time of the filing of the complaints, the trial court pegged the value of the
two lots at P 300.00 per square meter. However, in the same decision, the trial court further
increased said initial valuation to P 700.00 per square meter to compensate for what it termed
as inflation factor and adjustment factor:
just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land.'
The Court thus believes an inflation factor is to be applied in the computation considering the
time that elapsed since late 1994 up to the present. Also an adjustment factor commonly
adopted by appraisers is included in the computations.
On January 23, 2002, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision 8 which modified the
decision of the trial court insofar as it reduced the just compensation for the subject lots
from P 700.00 to P 300.00
ISSUE
A. CONTRARY TO
THE RULING OF THE
HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE
INITIAL VALUATION
OF THE TRIAL
COURT OF P 300.00
PER SQUARE
METER IS NOT WELL
SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON
RECORD AS
REPRESENTING THE
FAIR MARKET VALUE
OF THE
EXPROPRIATED
PARCELS OF LAND.
RULING
In expropriation proceedings, the value of the land and its character at the time it was
taken by the government are the criteria for determining just compensation. 9 This is so
because, there are instances when the expropriating agency takes over the property
prior to the expropriation suit, in which situation just compensation shall be determined
as of the time of taking.10 The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara,11 is
that
(W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the
value thereof may be enchanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by
the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may
have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is
filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his
property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be
truly just; i.e., 'just not only to the individual whose property is taken,' 'but to the public,
which is to pay for it.
In fixing the just compensation reckoned from 1994, the trial court took the
Commissioners' Report into consideration:
II. Time of the Taking.
In both cases the time of the taking may be reckoned in 1994. For Lot 11900, on
October 24, 1994, the date of the filing of the complaint although the plaintiff took
possession of the property in 1991 due to a lease contract executed between plaintiff
and defendant yet the intention to expropriate was manifested only upon the filing of the
complaint (NPC vs. CA and Macapanton Magondata, 254 SCRA 577).
For Lot 11907, the time of the taking shall be reckoned on November 10, 1994 where
the institution of the case precedes entry of the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the filing of the complaint.15
Accordingly, we quote with approval the trial court's ruling on this point:
Contrary to plaintiff's position, the lease in 1992 should not be construed as taking in
the constitutional sense. What constitutes taking' is when the property is directly
appropriated' and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful
power
NPC VS CO_just compensation
FACTS
Petitioner was established by R.A. No. 6395 to undertake the
development of hydroelectric generation of power and the
production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources,
as well as the transmission of electric power on a nationwide
basis.5 Its charter grants to petitioner, among others, the power to
exercise the right to eminent domain
27 June 2001, petitioner filed a complaint7 for the acquisition of an
easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots at Barangay
Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga with a total area of 575 square
meters belonging to respondent for its Lahar Project, a project for
public use
Complaint was filed at the RTC on June 27, 2001. On 25 March
2002, petitioner obtained a writ of possession and on 15 April 2002 it
took possession of the property.
Petitioner established its claim on RA 6395, allowing it to exercise
the right to eminent domain.
As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended,
substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by
transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just
compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10
percent of the market value.26also it provides that only an easement
fee equivalent to 10% of the market value shall be paid to affected
property owners. Based on this amendatory provision, petitioner is
willing to pay an easement fee of 10% for the easement of right-of-
way it acquired for the installation of power transmission lines.
However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes
private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the
full market value upon proper determination by the courts. 27 RTC
ordered the compensation of the full market value of the land valued
at P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum beginning 15 April
2002, the date of actual taking, until full payment. RA 8974 sets forth
the payment of lands full market value as distinguished to RA 6395
which entitles the land owner to only 10% of market value.
Petitioner argues that compensation should only be an easement
fee and not the total value and that computation of compensation
ISSUE
Whether or not compensation will be governed by provisions on RA
6395 or RA 8974? Who will determine?
Whether or not value of the property should be reckoned as of the
filing of the complaint or actual taking of the land?
RULING
1. Court held that with regard to compensation, provisions on
RA 8974 should govern. Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 8974 explicitly include power generation, transmission
and distribution projects among the national government
projects covered by the law. R.A. No. 8974 should govern
the expropriation of respondent's property since the Lahar
Project is a national government project.
The Court also held that the function for determining just
compensation remains judicial in character. It held that the courts
have the power to determine cases relative to the violations on the
guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights.
2. As to the amount to be given to respondent as
compensation, the court agreed with petitioner that
compensation should be computed as of the filing of
complaint (2001) win compliance with Rule 67. It provides
that the value of just compensation shall "be determined
as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of
the complaint, whichever came first."30 In B.H.
Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, we held that:
It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time
of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint
(Rule 67).
LBP Vs. CHICO
FACTS
The property subject of this controversy is the 8.3027 [4]-
hectare portion (subject property) of three (3) parcels of
irrigated rice land particularly denominated as Lot Nos. 1, 2
and 3, located at Sitio Sta. Cruz, Sto. Tomas Feria,
Quezon, Nueva Ecija, containing a total area of 12.2209
hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. N-18893[5] (entire property) in the name of respondent
Hernando T. Chico (respondent).
Ameded petition contend that subject property was taken
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the title
thereto transferred to farmer-beneficiaries (FBs) Amador
Gamboa, Regino Ambrocio and Romualdo Francisco,
[7]
with the issuance of Emancipation Patents (EPs) in their
favor on December 27, 1994, without prior notice to
respondent and without payment of just compensation.
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) opined that it
did not have any legal obligation to finance the said
transfer because the folder claim of respondent was not
duly endorsed for processing and payment and forwarded
to the LBP by the DAR. LBP supposed that the transfer
may have been made through the Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLT) scheme wherein the landowner and the FBs agreed
on the amount of just compensation and on the manner of
payment, or the FBs may have already completed paying
their amortizations in accordance with DAR's valuation. In
any of these instances, DAR was no longer obligated to
endorse the claim folder to LBP and, in turn, LBP was
under no obligation to finance said transfer
The SAC's Ruling
On May 17, 2004, the SAC ruled that the price
of P10,000.00 per hectare as just compensation for the
ISSUE
HE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE SAC
WHICH ORDERED THE PETITIONER
TO PAY THE RESPONDENTS THE
AMOUNT OF P1,482,340.00 AS JUST
COMPENSATION FOR SUBJECT
PROPERTY IN THE ABSENCE OF A
LAND TRANSFER CLAIM COMING
FROM DAR WHICH IS NECESSARY
FOR THE PETITIONER TO PROCESS
AND PAY THE JUST COMPENSATION
CLAIM.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY JUST
COMPENSATION SANS ANY LAND
TRANSFER CLAIM, THE COURT OF
APPEALS, IN USING FACTORS
PRESCRIBED IN SEC. 17 OF R.A. NO.
6657, GRAVELY ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE JUST
COMPENSATION IN THE AMOUNT
OF P1,482,340.00 WHICH TOTALLY
DISREGARDED THE VALUATION
FORMULA PROVIDED FOR UNDER
P.D. 27, E.O. 228 AND THE
LANDOWNER-TENANT PRODUCTION
AGREEMENT (LTPA) DATED APRIL 19,
1987.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
RULING
Just compensation in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which provides for the parameters
in the determination of just compensation, reads as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land
shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
There is no question that, in this case, the subject property was expropriated. In
fact, EPs have already been issued to the FBs, and respondent has been deprived
of the use and the fruits of the subject property. [35] Yet, respondent remains unpaid.
LBP disavows any liability to respondent, relying on the LTPA which, according to
LBP, proves that respondent entered into a VLT scheme with the FBs. In the same
breath, LBP insists that on the basis of the LTPA, the amount of just compensation
must be pegged at P10,000.00 per hectare. Lastly, the LBP surmises that the LTPA
is the reason why no claim folder or LTC was forwarded by the DAR to LBP. By and
large, LBP invites us to look closely into the LTPA.
Respondent denied having signed the LTPA.Based on the foregoing, we find no cogent reason
to deviate from the common finding of both the SAC and the CA giving no probative value to
the LTPA. Necessarily, the amount of P10,000.00 per hectare as just compensation for the
subject property must be discarded.
In the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice and equity, [40] we rule in favor of respondent
despite the absence of claim folders pro hac vice. If respondent is deprived of the just
compensation due him mainly because of the absence of claim folders which were not
prepared by the DAR even after it had already taken the subject property and issued the EPs in
favor of the FBs, we would be abetting the perpetration of a grave injustice on the respondent.
As to the legal basis of just compensation, we hold that the applicable law is R.A. No. 6657.
However, when just compensation is determined under R.A. No. 6657, no incremental,
subject property, as contained in the LTPA, could not be ERRED IN AWARDING SIX PERCENT compounded interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall be assessed.
sustained in the absence of concrete proof that respondent (6%) INTEREST PER ANNUM FROM
and the FBs voluntarily agreed thereto; otherwise, THE TIME OF TAKING UNTIL FULL Likewise, the twelve percent (12%) interest imposed by the SAC has no legal basis. In Land
respondent would not have filed the petition for just PAYMENT [OF] JUST COMPENSATION Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[55] this Court held that the interest of 12% per annum on the
compensation before the SAC. Moreover, the SAC noted
FOR THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.[29 just compensation is due the landowner in case of delay in payment, which will, in effect, make
that it would have been unrealistic and illogical for
respondent to agree that the subject property, which was a the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. On the other hand, interest in
prime lot, should be priced at only P10,000.00 per hectare, the form of damages cannot be imposed where there is prompt and valid payment of just
which the CA also affirmed. compensation. Interest on just compensation is assessed only in case of delay in the payment
thereof, a fact which must be adequately proved. In this case, it is noteworthy that the LBP, all
the while, believed in good faith in the validity of the LTPA.
LBP VS. HEIRS OF LISTANA
FACTS ISSUE RULING
WON Court As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the P5,644,773.02
Severino Listana (Listana) owned a 246.0561-hectare parcel of land in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, Listana voluntarily sold of Appeals bond shall answer for the damages Listana may sustain if the
the property to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform, under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. erred in not courts finally uphold the P10,956,963.25 just compensation
allowing the set by the DARAB
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon set the amount at P10,956,963.25 and ordered withdrawal
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Listana the same. of the In Republic v. Caguioa, the Court held that, "The purpose of
P5,644,773. the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or
On 18 June 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued a writ of execution ordering Land Bank Manager and 02 cash damage by reason of the injunction in case the court finally
Agrarian Operations Center Head Alex A. Lorayes (Lorayes) to pay Listana P10,956,963.25. Lorayes refused. Thus, on 2 bond decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is
September 1999, Listana filed with the PARAD a motion for contempt against Lorayes. usually conditioned accordingly.

On 6 September 1999, LBP filed with the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 5, Branch 52, Sorsogon City, acting as special It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent
agrarian court (SAC), a petition for judicial determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP challenged the domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with
amount set by the DARAB and prayed that the amount be fixed at P5,871,689.03. the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot
be lodged with administrative agencies and may not be
In its 25 October 2000 Order, the SAC dismissed LBPs petition for judicial determination of the amount of just compensation for usurped by any other branch or official of the government
the property. LBP appealed the 25 October 2000 Order.
In the present case, LBP filed with the SAC a petition for
In its 27 November 2000 Resolution, the PARAD ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution, ordering LBP to pay Listana determination of the amount of just compensation on 6
P10,956,963.25. On 3 January 2001, the PARAD issued a warrant of arrest against Lorayes. September 1999. The PARAD issued the alias writ of
execution and warrant of arrest on 27 November 2000 and 3
January 2001, respectively. The writ of execution and warrant
LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining PARAD
of arrest were invalid because the 14 October 1998 Decision
from implementing the warrant of arrest against Lorayes.
of the DARAB setting the amount at P10,956,963.25 was
merely preliminary and not executor
In its 29 January 2001 Order, the RTC enjoined the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final determination of
the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP posted a P5,644,773.02 cash bond.
In any event, the Court has reinstated the 29 January 2001
 Order of the RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing
Listana filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 April 2001 Order, the RTC denied the motion. Listana filed with the the warrant of arrest pending final determination of the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In its 11 December 2001 Decision, the Court of amount of just compensation for the property. Land Bank of
Appeals set aside the 29 January and 2 April 2001 Orders of the RTC. the Philippines v. Listana, Sr. has long become final and
executory and can no longer be disturbed. Consequently,
LBP filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. LBP cannot withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash bond which is a
Listana, Sr., the Court set aside the 11 December 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the 29 January and 2 April condition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
2001 Orders of the RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final determination of the amount of
just compensation for the property. The Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 30
January 2008 Decision and 6 May 2008 Resolution of the
The Court declared void all proceedings that stemmed from Listanas motion for contempt Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92701

On 26 May 2004, LBP filed with the RTC a motion 9 to withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash bond which was denied by both RTC and
CA

LBP vs ESCANDOR_just compensation

FACTS ISSUE RULING

Respondents Glenn and Gerome Y. Escandor are the registered owners of four WON Section It is settled that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. [16] The DARs land valuation is
parcels of agricultural while respondents Emilio Escandor and Violeta Yap are 17 of R.A. No. only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested
the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land. 6657 will show party. In the exercise of their functions, the courts still have the final say on what the amount of just
that the current compensation will be.[17]
market value of
the properties
Although the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the aforesaid lands under expropriated are
(CARL) of 1988 to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation for lands taken under
compulsory acquisition of (CARP). Petitioner (LBP) through its Land Valuation among the
the CARP, such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. [18] The CARL vests in the RTCs, sitting
Office conducted a field investigation and came up with its valuations in the factors to be
as SACs, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.
aggregate amount of P927,895.97 for the properties of Glenn and Gerome Y. considered in [19]
This means that the RTCs do not exercise mere appellate jurisdiction over just compensation disputes.
Escandor, and P849,611.01 for the properties of Emilio Escandor and Violeta determining the [20]
Yap. amount of just
compensation
We have held that the jurisdiction of the RTCs is not any less original and exclusive because the question is
first passed upon by the DAR. The proceedings before the RTC are not a continuation of the administrative
Since respondents rejected the LBPs valuation, the DAR instituted summary determination. Indeed, although the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable,
administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation still a resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of
respondents titles were cancelled and emancipation patents were issued to administrative action.[21]
farmer-beneficiaries. After due proceedings, the DAR sustained the valuation
made by petitioner. Since the subject lands were placed under land reform after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, it is said law
 which governs the valuation of lands for the purpose of awarding just compensation.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA arguing that the SAC gravely
erred in fixing the just compensation in clear violation of the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657. The CA held that Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 does not limit the sole
basis in computing just compensation to the income method nor does it foreclose the
use of market value approach. The factors enumerated therein merely serve as a
guideline for the court which is not precluded from considering all, some or only one
of those factors in computing just compensation.
In recognition of the DARs rule-making power to carry out the object of R.A. No. 6657, the Court
ruled in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal[22] that the applicable formula in fixing just compensation
was DAR AO No. 06, series of 1992, as amended by DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994, which was then the
governing regulation applicable to compulsory acquisition of lands. In the said case, the trial court based its
valuation upon a different formula and did not conduct any hearing for the reception of evidence. Thus, the
Court remanded the case to the SAC for trial on the merits.

While the LBP and the DAR may determine just compensation, such determination In view of the foregoing rulings, we hold that both the SAC and the CA errd in not strictly observing the
is merely preliminary and administrative, not binding or conclusive upon the guidelines provided in Section 17 of RA No. 6657 and adopting DAR administrative orders implementing the
agrarian court. The CA also declared that adopting the mathematical same, specifically AO No. 5, series of 1998 which took effect on May 11, 1998 and thus already in force at the
computation fixed by the Administrative Order would violate the landowners right time of the filing of the complaints.And contrary to the stance of the CA, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
to due process. Lim[28] that Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO No. 6, series of 1992, are mandatory and not mere
guides that the RTC may disregard.[29] We have stressed that the special agrarian court cannot ignore, without
violating the agrarian law, the formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just compensation. This Court
The CA further ruled that the computation of just compensation should be made thus rejected the valuation fixed by the RTC because it failed to follow the DAR formula.[30]
at the time of the taking, which in this case should be in 1997 when the DAR
took the lands and cancelled respondents titles thereto. Hence, there is a need
to recompute the amount of just compensation using as basis the value of the
lands in 1997 and reflecting the formula in arriving at the valuation. Lastly,
though not mentioned in the SAC decision nor raised in the petition, the CA
stated that the final compensation must include interest to temper the prejudice
caused to the landowner on account of the delay in his payment.

NPC VS. SALUDRES

FACTS
Sometime in the 1970s, NAPOCOR constructed high-tension
transmission lines to implement the Davao-Manat 138 KV
Transmission Line Project. These transmission lines traversed a
12,060-square meter portion of a parcel of agricultural land owned
by Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and Whether or not petitioner is liable for only ten
Mindaluz Pereyras.
In 1981, NAPOCOR commenced expropriation proceedings
ISSUE
Whether or not NAPOCOR has previously
compensated the spouses for establishing
high-tension transmission lines over their
property;
percent of the fair market value of the
property as it is only authorized to acquire
RULING
NAPOCOR failed to prove that it had adequately compensated respondents for the
establishment of high tension transmission lines over their property
While it is true that respondent spouses TCT No. T-109865 was indeed indirectly
sourced from TCT No. T-15343, the CA correctly ruled that NAPOCOR failed to prove
that the lands involved in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras and in the instant
Petition are identical. One cannot infer that the subject lands in both cases are the
covering TCT No. T-15343 in National Power Corporation v.
Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and
Mindaluz Pereyras. These proceedings culminated in a final
Decision ordering it to pay the amount of P 300,000 as just
compensation for the affected property.
On 19 August 1999, respondents filed the instant Complaint against
NAPOCOR and demanded the payment of just compensation. They
alleged that it had entered and occupied their property by erecting
high-tension transmission lines therein and failed to reasonably
compensate them for the intrusion.
RTC rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs, and against the
defendant-National Power Corporation, ordering the latter to pay the
plaintiffs the Just Compensation P4,920,750 + 12% interest per
annum which they claimed for the use, occupation and utilization of
their land from which it benefited and profited since January 1982
CA affirmed RTC decision but lowered the interest to 6%
NPC VS. ILETO
FACTS
On October 7, 1997, the National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a Whether or not CA erred in affirming the validity Yes, the compromise agreement is valid, it is a settled doctrine that a compromise
complaint, which was subsequently amended, seeking to
expropriate certain parcels of land in Bulacan, in connection with its
Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line project. Specifically, the NPC Whether or not the CA erred when it held that
sought to expropriate the following properties of herein respondents
easements of right-of-way over agricultural
lands
Whether the trial court properly awarded the
amount of P 4,920,750 as just compensation,
based on the Approved Schedule of Market
Values for Real Property in Tagum City for the
Year 2000.
ISSUE
of the compromise agreement between the
NPC and the heirs of Sofia Mangahas;
the NPC had to pay just compensation to the
landowners instead of a mere aerial
same, based on the fact that one of the source titles of TCT No. T-109865 happens to
be TCT No. T-38660, and that TCT No. T-38660 itself was derived from T-15343.
Furthermore, the evidence supports respondent spouses contention that the lands
involved in both cases are different. National Power Corporation v. Pereyras involved
Lot 481-B, Psd-11012718, which was a portion of Lot 481, Cad. 276 of Barrio
Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum, Davao.24 On the other hand, the instant Petition
involves Lot 15, Pcs-11-000704, Amd., which is a portion of Lots 481-D, Psd-11-
012718; 480-B, Psd-51550; H-148559 and 463-A-2 (LRC), Psd-150796, in Barrio
Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum, Davao. Clearly, these lots refer to different parcels of
land
The SC have ruled that "when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission
lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts.
in this case, while respondent spouses could still utilize the area beneath NAPOCORs
transmission lines provided that the plants to be introduced underneath would not
exceed three meters, danger is posed to the lives and limbs of respondents farm
workers, such that the property is no longer suitable for agricultural production.
Considering the nature and effect of the Davao-Manat 138 KV transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NAPOCOR perpetually deprives respondents of the ordinary use
of their land
The Trial court did not err in awarding just compensation based on approved schedule of
market values for Real Property for year 2000
The reckoning value of just compensation is that prevailing at the time of the filing of
the inverse condemnation proceedings
RULING
agreement, once approved by final order of the court, has the force of res judicata
between the parties and cannot be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery.
SC reiterated that compromises are favored and encouraged by the courts, and parties
are bound to abide by them in good faith. Since compromise agreements have the
On October 22, 1997, the NPC deposited with the Land Bank of the
Philippines the amount of P204,566.60, representing the initial
provisional value of the properties sought to be expropriated.
Consequently, the NPC received actual possession of these
properties on December 16, 1997
To determine the issue of just compensation, the RTC constituted a
team of commissioners,5 composed of the following: Atty. Luis
Manuel Bugayong, representing the NPC; Barangay Captain Manuel
Villacorta, representing the defendants; and Branch Clerk of Court
Ariston Tayag, acting as the Chairperson
On September 23, 1998, the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas and the NPC
filed with the RTC a jointly executed compromise agreement where
they agreed that NPC would acquire 13,855 square meters valued
at P250.00 per square meter
On August 20, 1999, the RTC approved the report submitted by
Commissioner Tayag and Commissioner Villacorta, recommending
that the just compensation for all the affected lands be pegged at
P250.00 per square meter
After the RTC denied NPCs motion for reconsideration, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the NPC, filed an appeal
with the CA, assailing the approval of the compromise agreement
between the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas and the NPC, as well as the
propriety of paying just compensation instead of merely the 10%
easement fee prescribed in Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395, as
amended
The CA affirmed the validity of the compromise agreement between
the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas and the NPC. The CA also upheld the
P250.00 valuation fixed in the compromise agreement but
distinguished Sps. Ileto, Rosemarie Fukosumi or Danilo Herrera,
and Francisca Mateo Eugenio, based on the schedule of fair market
values attached to NPC Board Resolution No. 97-246
SY VS. LGU
FACTS
easement fee for the subject properties; and
Whether or not the CA erred in using the
schedule of fair market values attached to NPC
board resolution no. 97-246 to determine the
just compensation of the other subject
properties.
The NPC, relying on the above-quoted provision, argues that the CA erred when it
The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to
ISSUE
force of law between the parties, no party may discard them unilaterally. This is
especially true under the present circumstances, where the NPC has already enjoyed
the benefits of the assailed compromise agreement, having been in possession of the
subject land since 1998.
ordered the payment of just compensation for the properties in question, given that
most of the properties were subject only to an aerial easement of right of way, with the
NPC requiring the use of the area above the subject lands for its transmission lines.
We have already established in a number of cases23 the flaw behind the NPCs
argument. At the heart of this argument is the mistaken assumption that what are
involved are mere liens on the property in the form of aerial easements. While it may
be true that the transmission lines merely pass over the affected properties, the
easement imposes the additional limitation that the landowners are prohibited from
constructing any improvements or planting any trees that exceed three (3) meters
within the aerial right of way area. This prohibition clearly interferes with the
landowners right to possess and enjoy their properties.
the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of
the government
SC finds that the trial court arbitrarily fixed the amount of just compensation due the
landowners at P250.00 per square meter. Thus, the Court has no alternative but to
remand the case to the court of origin for the proper determination of just
compensation
RULING
 Whether or not the CA
On November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint for correctly upheld the The Court holds that the correct rate of legal interest to be applied is twelve
expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered under amount of just percent (12%) and not six percent (6%) per annum
the name of Sy (subject property), which was intended to be used as a site for a multi-purpose barangay compensation as
hall, day-care center, playground and community activity center for the benefit of the residents of determined by the RTC The Court cannot sustain the amount of P5,500.00/sq. m. as just
Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City. The requisite ordinance to undertake the aforesaid as well as its grant of compensation which was set by the RTC and upheld by the CA. The said
expropriation namely, Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, was enacted on April 12, 1994. six percent (6%) legal valuation was actually arrived at after considering:
interest; and awarded
On March 18, 1997, pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as the exemplary damages (a) the September 4, 1996 recommendation of the City Appraisal
"Local Government Code of 1991," the City deposited the amount of P241,090.00 with the Office of the and attorneys fees. Committee;
Clerk of Court, representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based on its tax
declaration. (b) several sworn statements made by Sy himself; and

During the preliminary conference on November 8, 2006, Sy did not question the Citys right to
expropriate the subject property. Thus, only the amount of just compensation remained at issue.
On July 6, 2006, the RTC appointed Edgardo Ostaco (Commissioner Ostaco), Engr. Victor Salinas
(Commissioner Salinas) and Atty. Carlo Alcantara (Commissioner Alcantara) as commissioners to
determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid by the City for the subject property.
Subsequently, Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara, in a Report dated February 11, 2008,
recommended the payment of P5,500.00 per sq. m., to be computed from the date of the filing of the
expropriation complaint, or on November 7, 1996. On the other hand, Commissioner Salinas filed a
separate Report dated March 7, 2008, recommending the higher amount of P13,500.00 per sq. m. as
just compensation.
On August 22, 2008, the RTC, citing the principle that just compensation must be fair not only to the
owner but to the expropriator as well, adopted that the just compensation for the subject property should
be set at P5,500.00 per sq. meter. No award of damages and back rentals in favor of Sy, but awarded
six percent (6%) legal interest, computed from November 7, 1996 until full payment of just compensation
CA affirmed the RTCs ruling but modified the same, ordering the City to pay Sy the amount of
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorneys fees equivalent to one percent (1%) of the total
amount due.
(c) Sys own tax declaration for 1996.
It is well-settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as
of the time of the taking. However, the above-stated documents do not
reflect the value of the subject property at the time of its taking in 1986 but
rather, its valuation in 1996. Consequently, the case must be remanded to
the RTC in order to properly determine the amount of just
compensation during such time the subject property was actually
taken.
The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 20, 2012 Decision and July
16, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91964 are
SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper determination of the
amount of just compensation in accordance with this Decision.
Local Government of Quezon City is ordered to PAY exemplary damages in
the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney's fees equivalent to one percent
(1%) of the amount due, after final determination of the amount of just
compensation.
LBP VS. CASTRO
FACTS
Respondent Bienvenido Castro (Castro) is the owner of an unregistered property identified as Lot No.
2636, Cad. 537-D, with an area of 9.3390 hectares located at Barangay Mahayag, San Miguel, Surigao
Del Sur, under Tax Declaration No. B-16-12-237.
On 20 June 1994, Castro voluntarily offered to sell the property to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Castros offered
price isP60,000.00 per hectare or a total of P560,340.00 for the entire 9.3390 hectare lot.
The DAR, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council
conducted an ocular inspection, classifying the lot as riceland and suitable for agriculture. Thereafter, the
DAR, through the LBP, assessed the property at P15,441.25 per hectare or a total price of P144,205.90.
Castro rejected it. Consequently, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), in DARAB Case No. LVC-XIII-
232, conducted a summary administrative proceeding to fix just compensation for the subject property. At
the preliminary conference, Castro alleged that LBPs valuation did not constitute fair and just
compensation.
On 9 March 2000, the DARAB issued an Order directing LBP to conduct another inspection and to
reassess Castros property. LBP complied, but still reached the same valuation at P144,205.90.
The Trial Court notes that the Tax Declarations in the name of Castro and the other landowners had been
cancelled and new tax declarations in the name of the Republic of the Philippines issued, with x x x LBP
as Administrators of the Lots. x x x, and Lot No. 2636, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00567 since the
year 2001, had a market value, determined as of that year, of P223,509.00. It is a matter of judicial notice
that the market value of lands increases every year, that is why, periodically, normally every after (sic)
three (3) years, the Municipal Assessor makes new assessments of real properties and revises and
cancels existing tax declarations and issues revised tax declarations. Accordingly, the Court holds that the
respective valuations recommended by the Court Commissioners for subject Lots are fair, reasonable and
just under the circumstances.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Castro and the landowners and against DAR and LBP,
determining and fixing the just compensations. LBP is ordered to pay Castro and the other landowners,
within fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, the aforesaid amounts, the mode of payments of
which shall be in accordance with the provisions of Section 18, Chapter VI of R.A. 6657. 13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals completely agreed with the SAC that LBP was already estopped from
raising the defense that Castro has accepted the assessed amount of 144,205.90 for the subject
property. On LBPs argument that the SAC gravely erred in fixing just compensation contrary to the
factors set forth in Section 17 of RA No. 6657 as translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative
Order No. 5, Series of 1998, the appellate court again did not side with LBP, ruling that the "x x x formula
set in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998 is not a strictly-calibrated standard which obliges
the Court to apply in disregard of its judicial discretion x x x; it does not and cannot strictly bind the courts
which may proceed to make its own computation based on the extended list in Section 17 of Republic Act
ISSUE RULING
WHETHER OR
NOT TO USE Yes, the prescribed factor must be used.
THE FACTORS
PRESCRIBED IN The complementary pronouncements that the formula is already a translation of
SECTION 17 OF the land valuation factors, such that the SAC is not at liberty to disregard the
R.A. NO. 6657, formula, had since been thereafter honored and followed. We are reminded,
AS however, of decisions that state a principle as vital as that which enjoins the SAC
IMPLEMENTED from disregarding the DAR formula: The determination of just compensation is a
BY DAR A.O. NO. judicial function which cannot be unduly restricted, and of which the SAC cannot
5, SERIES OF be deprived. In LBP v. Heirs of Maximo Puyat,30 we said:
1998, WHICH Land Bank maintains that, assuming arguendo that RA 6657 is the applicable law,
ARE the trial and appellate courts wantonly disregard the basic valuation formula in
MANDATORY IN DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998, which implements Section 17 of RA 6657. It insists
NATURE, IN that courts are not at liberty to dispense of these formulations at will. Land Bank
DETERMINING thus asks that the case be remanded to the trial court for a proper determination
THE JUST of the just compensation in accordance with DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998.
COMPENSATION The fundamental doctrine that private property cannot be taken for public use
FOR SUBJECT without just compensation requires that the owner shall receive the market value
PROPERTY. of his property at the time of the taking, unaffected by any subsequent change in
the condition of the property.35
Our holding in the old case of Provincial Government of Rizal v. Caro de
Araullo,36 citing American precedents, remains instructive.
The principle of these decisions, which requires compensation for property taken
for public use to be estimated with special reference to its value at the time of the
appropriation or taking, is manifestly just to all concerned. By no other rule, in
cases of condemnations for uses of great public interest and local benefit, could
the valuation of property in the assessment of damages be so successfully
guarded against the influence of enhanced values resulting specially from the
enterprise.
x x x but in the case at bar the plaintiff appropriated the property with the consent
of the landowners, and without the filing of any expropriation proceedings, in the
expectation that the parties would be able to reach an agreement out of court as
to the value of the property taken, and the condemnation proceedings were not
filed until it was found much later that no such agreement could be reached as to
part of the property. Under those circumstances the value of the property should
be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the
No. 6657." proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
The principle of valuation at the time of taking is the specifically applicable
valuation of land acquired by the government under RA No. 6657. In Land Bank v.
Livioco,37 cited in Goduco, we said:
Since Liviocos property was acquired under RA 6657 and will be valued under
RA 6657, the question regarding the time of taking should follow the general rule
in expropriation cases where the "time of taking" is the time when the State took
possession of the same and deprived the landowner of the use and enjoyment of
his property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the
trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition of respondent for
judicial determination of just compensation is ordered DISMISSED.

HEIRS PF TIMOTEO VS. MACTAN

FACTS ISSUE RULING
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case,
respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil
Code, When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the
parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received
x x x x In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to
the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return
xxxx

Hence, respondent MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and
920 to petitioners who shall hold the same subject to existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold right of
DPWH. In return, petitioners as if they were plaintiff-beneficiaries of a constructive trust must restore to
respondent MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and
920 in Civil Case No. R-1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with
consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947.Petitioners must likewise pay
respondent MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining the properties and the
monetary value of its services in managing them to the extent that petitioners will be benefited
thereby. The government however may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the
parcels of land, in the same way that petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they
received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime. As a matter of justice and
convenience, the law considers the fruits and interests as the equivalent of each other. [44]

Under Art. 1189 of the Civil Code, If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the
improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x, the creditor being the person who stands to
receive something as a result of the process of restitution. Consequently, petitioners as creditors do not
have to settle as part of the process of restitution the appreciation in value of Lots Nos. 916 and 920
which is the natural consequence of nature and time.
REP VS. MENDOZA
FACTS
This is the case wherein, Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) has been using 1,149 square meters
of land since 1957 for its school. But the property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in the
name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas). On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas
caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots. As a result of subdivision, the
Register of Deeds issued new in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in the
name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4.
Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property.
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa,
the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and
subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government and
PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the same. These improvements had also been tax-
declared.
The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to use the
property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the property
since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained registered in their name under the original
title. The Mendozas demanded PPS to vacate but the PPS declined to do so. As a result, Mendozas filed a
complaint against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction.
The MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republics immunity
from suit. The Mendozas appealed to the (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that the Republics consent was
not necessary since the action before the MTCC was not against it.
In light of the RTCs decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render judgment in
the case before it. The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the case had
passed to the RTC upon appeal. Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC, which then
dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to the
RTC in Civil Case 2001-0236.
The RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It held that the
Mendozas had the better right of possession since they were its registered owners. PPS, on the other
hand, could not produce any document to prove the transfer of ownership of the land in its favor. PPS
moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by
laches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas
relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot
ISSUE RULING
Whether or A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the
not the CA Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by
erred in name in the application for registration or its notice. Indeed, title to the land, once
holding that registered, is imprescriptible. No one may acquire it from the registered owner by
the Mendozas adverse, open, and notorious possession. Thus, to a registered owner under the
were entitled Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the registered property is equally
to evict the imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership.
Republic from Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas title over the
the subject property has not been disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision plan of
property that Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had been designated to
it had used the City Government, the Republic itself admits that no new title was issued to it or
for a public to any of its subdivisions for the portion that PPS had been occupying since 1957.
school. That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its
improvements in its name cannot defeat the Mendozas title. This Court has
allowed tax declarations to stand as proof of ownership only in the absence of a
certificate of title. Otherwise, they have little evidentiary weight as proof of
ownership.
The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property
that it had held as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on
record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the property to the City
Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the
property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought in 1962 to have the
bigger lot subdivided into four, the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149
square meters, for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may
be assumed that the Mendozasagreed to transfer ownership of the land to the
government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic, way back
but never got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it.
Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to possession pending the
Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation.
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of
his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the
institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as
the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis, the failure for a long time of the owner to
question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the
4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for taxation purposes.
In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Upholding the Torrens
system, it emphasized the indefeasibility of the Mendozas registered title and the imprescriptible nature of
their right to eject any person occupying the property. The CA held that, this being the case, the Republics
possession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely a tolerated one that could not ripen into
ownership.
The CA also rejected the Republics claim of ownership since it presented no documentary
evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of the government. Moreover, even assuming that
the Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in 1957 in the governments favor, the latter never took
steps to have the title to the property issued in its name or have its right as owner annotated on the
Mendozas title. The CA held that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim that the
Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its action.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken recourse to this Court via
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession.
The Mendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not
ejectment.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the
RTCs power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper
expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just compensation
based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of
possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when just
compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without
the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of
possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value
of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from
the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas right to
just compensation for it, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful
detainer dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper action for recovery of
such compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the
February 26, 2008 decision and the October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS the dismissal of respondents Primo and
Maria Mendozas action for eviction before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lipa
City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to their filing an action for payment of
just compensation against the Republic of the Philippines or, when appropriate,
against the City of Lipa.
FACTS
The expropriation suit was commenced by complaint of the Municipality of Bian,
Laguna filed in the RTC. The complaint named as defendants the owners of
eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Bian.
The land sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the new site of a
modern public market and the acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan. One of the defendants, Francisco filed a MOTION TO
DISMISS. Her motion was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67. Her "motion to
dismiss" was thus actually a pleading, taking the place of an answer in an
ordinary civil action; it was not an ordinary motion governed by Rule 15, or a
"motion to dismiss" within the contemplation of Rule 16. Respondent Judge issued
a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff Municipality.
Francisco filed a "Motion for Separate Trial. She alleged she had the special
defense of "a constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing approved
Locational Clearance from the H.S.R.C. The Court granted the motion. It directed
that a separate trial be held for Francisco regarding her special defenses.
Judge issued order dismissing the complaint "as against defendantFRANCISCO,"
and amending the Writ of Possessions as to "exclude therefrom and from its force
and effects said defendant .. and her property ..."
The Municipality filed a MR. Francisco filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Execution
and/or Finality of Order," contending that the Order had become "final and
executory for failure of the Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration and/or
appeal within the reglementary period," i.e "fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order .. appealed from.
ISSUE
WON the special civil action of
eminent domain under Rule 67 is a
case "wherein multiple appeals are
allowed, as regards which 'the
period of appeal shall be thirty [30]
days, instead of fifteen (15) days
RULING
The appeal period is 30 days, not 15 days.
In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two (2)
appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is
thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15)
days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of
BP129 to the effect that in "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109
of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period
of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.
The municipality's MR was therefore timely presented, well within the thirty-day period
laid down by law therefor; and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise
and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had become final and
executory.
It is claimed by the Municipality that the issuance of such a separate, final order or
judgment had given rise "ipso facto to a situation where multiple appeals became
available." The Municipality is right. In an action against several defendants, the court
may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them,
leaving the action to proceed against the others. " In lieu of the original record, a record
on appeal will perforce have to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court. More
than one appeal being permitted in this case, therefore, "the period of appeal shall be
thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required as provided by the Implementing
Rules in relation to Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Order issued by His Honor on July 24,1984 in Civil Case

The Municipality contended that "multiple appeals are allowed by law" in actions of
eminent domain, and hence the period of appeal is thirty (30), not fifteen (15)
days;the special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule 69.
Agan, Jr. vs PIATCO
FACTS
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the
development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the project and
submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for
competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as
amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo),
Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo
Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo
Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections as
regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted
PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees,
rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession
Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing
from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-
five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.
No. 8-1960 is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded to the Trial
Court for the reception of the evidence of the plaintiff Municipality of Bian as against
defendant Erlinda Francisco, and for subsequent proceedings and judgment in
accordance with the Rules of Court and the law. Costs against private respondent.
ISSUE RULING
Whether or not Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the
the State can Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and
temporarily obligate the government to pay reasonable cost for the use of the
Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.
take over a
business Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
affected with Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
public interest. requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national
emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take
over the operation of any business affected with public interest. The
duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long
the temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary
takeover by the government extends only to the operation of the business
and not to the ownership thereof. AS SUCH THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT
REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE THE PRIVATE ENTITY-OWNER OF THE
SAID BUSINESS AS THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP,
whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the
temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use
of the said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the
government is in exercise of its police power and not of its power of
eminent domain.

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had
existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-
flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling
and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they would lose their
job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for prohibition. Several employees of
MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not honor (PIATCO) contracts which
the Executive Branchs legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.
Agan, Jr. vs PIATCO
FACTS
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for
the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the
project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for
competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957,
as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc.
(Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively,
Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to
Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co.,
Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections as
regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government
granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to
collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997
Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years
commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation
wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the government to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. It is the welfare and
interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining
whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business. Clearly, the
State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power.
Police power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. Its
exercise therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise
be a source of obligation by the government in the absence of damage
due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay
reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant
to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.
ISSUE RULING
Whether or not Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the
the State can Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and obligate
temporarily the government to pay reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal
and/or Terminal Complex.
take over a
business Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
affected with Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
public interest. requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national
emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the
operation of any business affected with public interest. The duration of the
emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the temporary
takeover by the government would last. The temporary takeover by the
government extends only to the operation of the business and not to the
ownership thereof. AS SUCH THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO
COMPENSATE THE PRIVATE ENTITY-OWNER OF THE SAID BUSINESS
AS THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP, whether permanent or
temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot,
likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said business and its
properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its
police power and not of its power of eminent domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the
exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development
facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had
existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport services, such
as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo
handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they would lose
their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for prohibition. Several
employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not honor (PIATCO) contracts
which the Executive Branchs legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.
exigencies of the times necessitate the government to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. It is the welfare and interest of the public which is the
paramount consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over
a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is
exercising its police power. Police power is the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers. Its exercise therefore must not be unreasonably
hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the
absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the
government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the
property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the
Constitution.

PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO

FACTS
Fajardo was mayor in Baao,
Camrines Sur when the
municipal council passed
the ordinance that prohibits
the construction of a building
that blocks the view of the
town plaza. Moreover, it
redirects the grant of
permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency,
Fajardo applied for a permit
to build a building beside the
gasoline station near the
town plaza. His request was
repeatedly denied. He
continued with the
construction under the
rationale that he needed a
house to stay in because the
old one was destroyed by a
ISSUE RULING
Whether or not No, the subject ordinance is unconstitutional.
the ordinance is The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is
constitutional. expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance
thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined
and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71;
Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392)
The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested thereby in the respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the special
permission of the city is to be granted. Thus the city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to some and deny it others; to
refuse the application of one landowner or lessee and to grant that of another, when for all material purposes, the two applying for precisely the same
privileges under the same circumstances. The danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution,
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is
to be tested. Fundamental rights under our government do not depend for their existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread. Ordinances which thus
invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The
ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building "destroys the view of the public plaza or
occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was predicated
on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus
interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; HENCE,
IT OVERSTEPS THE BOUNDS OF POLICE POWER, AND AMOUNTS TO A TAKING OF APPELLANTS PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION. We
do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while
typhoon. property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs.
He was convicted and Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
ordered to pay a fine confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on
and demolish the building appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza
due to its obstructing view. from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited,
He appealed to the CA, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
which in turn forwarded the The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under section 2243, par. (c), of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This
petition due to the question section provides:
of the ordinances SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
constitutionality.
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the
creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building
permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the municipal council to require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first
establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there is
absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of
buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and
promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.
We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of
said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.

US VS. TURIBIO
FACTS ISSUE
Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of WON Act. No. 1147,
Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that regulating the registration,
the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao branding and slaughter of
without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality large cattle, is an undue
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act and unauthorized exercise
No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of police power.
of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for
agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1)
prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter
house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer.
Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no
RULING
Yes, the regulation is valid.
The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive
other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment
The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the purpose of the
slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling,
(2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the
compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the
enjoyment of their private property.
FACTS
law.
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private
property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction placed
upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a
reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the
population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public interest for
they are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the requesites of a valid exercise
of police power.
The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain.
The said law does not constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation
for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
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