Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT during any period of disability thereby occasioned
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify
the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity)
embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying
his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of
P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to
April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming
from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S.
Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699 1 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or
sickness incurred in performance of duty. When a
person in the service of the national government of a
province, city, municipality or municipal district is so
injured in the performance of duty as thereby to
receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the
proper Head of Department may direct that absence
shall be on full pay, though not more than six
months, and in such case he may in his discretion
also authorize the payment of the medical
attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence
and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in
the case contemplated shall be charged first against
vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly
with the performance of some act in the line of duty,
the Department head may in his discretion authorize
the payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement
dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of Justice, along with the
comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of
the NBI, "recommending favorable action thereof". Finding
petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the Committee on
Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably
recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a
4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990, returned petitioner's
claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the
Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September
1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy
of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary
of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating
that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to
repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code,
including the particular Section 699 of the latter".
1
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement
transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2,
1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman
Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992,
however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699
of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987,
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-
enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented,
however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees'
Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director
Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of
1987.
Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of
Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim under a 9th
Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that
petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so
desires".
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987
repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was
brought for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as
amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of
Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim
is filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, as
suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred from filing a
claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or
not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated
to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of
the new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the
intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA
2
questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary
of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that
employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered
by the Employees' Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such
that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on
account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the
Government.
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not
by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The
lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a
repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the
particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be
repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause,
that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is
repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the
ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature
to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the
scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is
found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this
repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed. 5 Rather, it is an example of a general
repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition
that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old
laws. 6 This latter situation falls under the category of an implied
repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute
of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. 7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent
in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention
to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a
general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,
and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. 9
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 10
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the
two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is,
that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. 11
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does
not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old
Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are
not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations,
claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the
two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an
irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because
the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by
petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of
1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the fact that
3
Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987
meant that the same section had been repealed. It further
maintained that to allow the particular provisions not restated in
the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself.
The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the
1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will
be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which
incorporate in a unified document the major
structural, functional and procedural principles and
rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code
the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause
an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely
be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary
is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 13
We come now to the second category of repeal the enactment of
a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole subject
matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was
intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect
system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed
to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter
of the former statute. 14 When both intent and scope clearly
evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the
prior act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed
repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal
under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature
that the later act be the substitute to the prior act. 16
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice,
what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of
government that pertain to administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because of the many changes that
transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this
opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as
the body which had been entrusted with the implementation of this
particular provision has already rendered its decision. The COA
relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case
of Sison vs.Pangramuyen 17 that in the absence of palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to substitute
its own judgment for that of the administrative agency entrusted
with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not
hold water. This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative
decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the
decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been
held that Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice
are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia. 19
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals
of statutes by implication are not favored. 20The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 21
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows:
"Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate
any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy
between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless
the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or
unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure
renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand
and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the
later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject
section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees'
4
Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second
sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees'
Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor
Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the
payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery
of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the
system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT
the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to
petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and Melo, JJ.,
concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988
PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO & ANTONIO
C. VASCO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES &
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION,respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Third Division * dated
February 29, 1984 in AC-G.R. No. CV No. 61705 entitled Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc., plaintiff-appellee vs. Primitivo Leveriza Parungao,
Antonio C. Vasco and Civil Aeronautics Administration, defendants-
appellants; Primitive Leveriza, Fe Leveriza Parungao and Antonio C.
Leveriza, cross-defendant, affirming in toto the decision of the trial
court dated April 6, 1976.
As found by the trial court and adopted by the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the facts of this case are as follows:
Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic
issues in the instant case. These three contracts are
as follows:
First Contract. For purposes of easy reference and
brevity, this contract shall be referred to hereinafter
as Contract A. This is a "CONTRACT OF LEASE",
executed between the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by Defendant CIVIL
AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, as lessor, and
ROSARIO C. LEVERIZA, as lessee, on April 2, 1965,
over a certain parcel of land at the MIA area,
consisting of approximately 4,502 square meters, at
a monthly rental of P450.20, for a period of 25 years,
(Exhibit "A", Exhibit "I-Leverizas", Exhibit "I-CAA").
Second Contracts. For purposes of easy references
and brevity, this contract shall be referred to
hereinafter as Contract B. This is a "LEASE
AGREEMENT", executed between ROSARIO C.
LEVERIZA, as lessor, and Plaintiff MOBIL OIL
PHILIPPINES, INC., as lessee on May 21, 1965, over
3,000 square meters of that SAME Parcel of land
subject of Contract A above mentioned, at a monthly
rental of P1,500.00, for a period of 25 years (Exhibit
'B', Exhibit 4-Leverizas' ).
5
Third Contract. For purposes of easy reference and
brevity, this contract shall be referred to hereinafter
as Contract C. This is a "LEASE AGREEMENT",
executed between Defendant CIVIL AERONAUTICS
ADMINISTRATION, as lessor, and plaintiff MOBIL OIL
PHILIPPINES, INC., as lessee, on June 1, 1968 over
that SAME parcel of land (Lot A, on plan being a
portion of Parcel, Psu 2031), containing an area of
3,000 square meters more or less, at a monthly
rental of P.25 per square meter for the second 200
square meters, and P.20 per square meter for the
rest, for a period of 29 (sic) years. (Exhibit "C").
There is no dispute among the parties that the
subject matter of the three contracts of lease above
mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is
the same parcel of land, with the noted difference
that while in Contract A, the area leased is 4,502
square meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the
area has been reduced to 3,000 square meters. To
summarize:
Contract A a lease contract of April
2, 1965 between the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by Defendant
Civil Aeronautics Administration and
Rosario C. Leveriza over a parcel of
land containing an area of 4,502
square meters, for 25 years.
Contract B a lease contract (in effect
a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between
defendant Rosario C. Leveriza and
plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. over
the same parcel of land, but reduced
to 3,000 square meters for 25 years;
and
Contract C a lease contract of June
1, 1968 between defendant Civil
 Aeronautics Administration and
plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over
the same parcel of land, but reduced
to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years.
It is important to note, for a clear understanding of
the issues involved, that it appears that defendant
Civil Aeronautics Administration as LESSOR, leased
the same parcel of land, for durations of time that
overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Defendant
Rosario C. Leveriza, and that plaintiff Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc., as LESSEE, leased the same parcel
of land from two lessors, to wit: (1) defendant Rosario
C. Leveriza and (2) defendant Civil Aeronautics
Administration, Inc., for durations of time that also
overlapped.
For purposes of brevity defendant Civil Aeronautics
Administration shall be referred to hereinafter as
defendant CAA.
Rosario C. Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the
lessor in Contract B, is now deceased. This is the
reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are
sued, namely: Defendants Primitive Leveriza, her
second husband, (now also deceased), Fe Leveriza
Parungao, her daughter by her second husband, and
Antonio C. Vasco, her son by her first husband. For
purposes of brevity, these defendants shall be
referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza.
Plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., shall be referred to
hereinafter simply as the Plaintiff. (pp. 95-99, Record
on Appeal).
Plaintiff in this case seeks the rescission or
cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the
ground that Contract A from which Contract B is
derived and depends has already been cancelled by
the defendant Civil Aeronautics Administration and
6
maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is
the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the
parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is
concerned. On the other hand, defendants Leverizas'
claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA
has never been legally cancelled and still valid and
subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff and
defendant CAA which should be declared void.
Defendant CAA asserts that Exhibit "A" is still valid
and subsisting because its cancellation by Guillermo
Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul
Contract A because of the violation committed by
defendant Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to
plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent
of defendant CAA. Defendant CAA further asserts
that Contract C not having been approved by the
Director of Public Works and Communications is not
valid. ...
xxx xxx xxx
After trial, the lower court render judgment on April 6, 1976 the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after having thus considered the
evidence of all the parties, testimonial and
documentary, and their memoranda and reply-
memoranda, this Court hereby renders judgment:
1. Declaring Contract A as having been
validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and
has therefore ceased to have any
effect as of that date;
2. Declaring that Contract B has
likewise ceased to have any effect as
of June 28, 1966 because of the
cancellation of Contract A;
 3. Declaring that Contract C was
validly entered into on June 1, 1968,
and that it is still valid and subsisting;
4. Ordering defendant CAA to refund to
defendants Leverizas the amount of
P32,189.30 with 6% per annum until
fully paid;
5. Ordering defendants Leverizas to
refund to plaintiff the amount of
P48,000.00 with 6% interest per
annum until fully paid;
6. Dismissing defendants Leverizas'
four counterclaims against plaintiff;
7. Dismissing defendants Leverizas'
cross-claim against defendant CAA;
8. Dismissing defendant CAA's
counterclaim against plaintiff;
9. Dismissing defendant CAA's
counterclaim against defendant
Leverizas.
No pronouncements as to costs.
On June 2, 1976, defendant Leveriza filed a motion for new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, lack of jurisdiction of the
court over the case and lack of evidentiary support of the decision
which was denied in the order of November 12,1976 (Rollo, p. 17).
On July 27, 1976, the CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
averring that because the lot lease was properly registered in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the President of
the Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could
execute the lease contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised
Administrative Code; that the Airport General Manager has no
7
authority to cancel Contract A, the contract entered into between
the CAA and Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA and
Mobil was void for not having been approved by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. Said motion was however
denied on November 12, 1976 (Rollo, p. 18).
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court, being in full accord
with the trial court, rendered a decision on February 29, 1984, the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
decision of the lower court dated April 6, 1976, the
same is hereby affirmed in toto.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CIVIL
AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION (CAA) HAD THE
STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO LEASE, EVEN WITHOUT
APPROVAL OF THE THEN SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, REAL PROPERTY
BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
II
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CIVIL
AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION HAD STATUTORY
AUTHORITY, WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE THEN
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS, TO CANCEL A LEASE CONTRACT
OVER REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, WHICH CONTRACT WAS APPROVED,
AS REQUIRED BY LAW, BY THE SECRETARY.
 III
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN
IT RULED THAT THE CONTRACT OF SUBLEASE
(CONTRACT B) ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
PETITIONERS' PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST AND
RESPONDENT MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC. WAS
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION.
The petition is devoid of merit.
There is no dispute that Contract "A" at the time of its execution
was a valid contract. The issue therefore is whether or not said
contract is still subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the
ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil
Philippines without the consent of CAA and the execution of
another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil Philippines
(Contract "C").
Petitioners contend that Contract "A" is still subsisting because
Contract "B" is a valid sublease and does not constitute a ground
for the cancellation of Contract "A", while Contract "C", a
subsequent lease agreement between CAA and Mobil Oil Philippines
is null and void, for lack of approval by the Department Secretary.
Petitioners anchor their position on Sections 567 and 568 of the
Revised Administrative Code which require among others, that
subject contracts should be executed by the President of the
Philippines or by an officer duly designated by him, unless authority
to execute the same is by law vested in some other officer (Petition,
Rollo, pp. 15-16).
At the other extreme, respondent Mobil Oil Philippines asserts that
Contract "A" was validly cancelled on June 28, 1966 and so was
Contract "B" which was derived therefrom. Accordingly, it maintains
that Contract "C" is the only valid contract insofar as the parcel of
land in question is concerned and that approval of the Department
Head is not necessary under Section 32 (par. 24) of the Republic
Act 776 which expressly vested authority to enter into such
contracts in the Administrator of CAA (Comment; Rollo, p. 83).
8
On its part, respondent Civil Aeronautics Administration took the
middle ground with its view that Contract "A" is still subsisting as
its cancellation is ineffective without the approval of the
Department Head but said contract is not enforceable because of
petitioners' violation of its terms and conditions by entering into
Contract "B" of sublease without the consent of CAA. The CAA
further asserts that Contract "C" not having been approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is not valid (Rollo,
p. 43). However, in its comment filed with the Supreme Court, the
CAA made a complete turnabout adopting the interpretation and
ruling made by the trial court which was affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals), that the CAA
Administrator has the power to execute the deed or contract of
lease involving real properties under its administration belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines without the approval of the
Department Head as clearly provided in Section 32, paragraph (24)
of Republic Act 776.
The issue narrows down to whether or not there is a valid ground
for the cancellation of Contract "A."
Contract "A" was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the
Leverizas as the lessee specifically "for the purpose of operating
and managing a gasoline station by the latter, to serve vehicles
going in and out of the airport."
As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the
leased premises, the provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract
reads in full:
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her
rights to the leased premises but in such eventuality,
the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be
secured. In any event, such transfer of rights shall
have to respect the terms and conditions of this
agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-
mentioned terms and conditions of the contract. Said paragraph
reads:
 8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part
to comply with the terms and conditions herein
agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this
contract by the Party of the First Part without need of
judicial demand.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a
contract of sublease (Contract "B") with Mobil Oil Philippines
without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of the
contract was made in a letter dated June 28, 1966 of Guillermo P.
Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario
Leveriza, as follows:
(Letterhead)
June 28, 1966
Mrs. Rosario Leveriza
Manila International Airport
Madam:
It has been found out by the
undersigned that you have sublet the
property of the CAA leased to you and
by virtue of this, your lease contract is
hereby cancelled because of the
violation of the stipulations of the
contract. I would like to inform you that
even without having sublet the said
property the said contract would have
been cancelled as per attached
communication
GUILLERMO P. JURADO
Airport General Manager
Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such
cancellation, claiming that the Airport General Manager had no
legal authority to make the cancellation. They maintain that it is
9
only the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, acting for
the President, or by delegation of power, the Director of Civil
Aeronautics Administration who could validly cancel the contract.
They do admit, however, and it is evident from the records that the
Airport General Manager signed "For the Director." Under the
circumstances, there is no question that such act enjoys the
presumption of regularity, not to mention the unassailable fact that
such act was subsequently affirmed or ratified by the Director of
the CAA himself (Record on Appeal, pp. 108-110).
Petitioners argue that cancelling or setting aside a contract
approved by the Secretary is, in effect, repealing an act of the
Secretary which is beyond the authority of the Administrator.
Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which
such revocation or cancellation may be made, have already been
specifically provided for in Contract "A" which has already been
approved by the Department Head, It is evident that in the
implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of said
Department Head is no longer necessary if not redundant.
It is further contended that even granting that such cancellation
was effective, a subsequent billing by the Accounting Department
of the CAA has in effect waived or nullified the rescission of
Contract "A."
It will be recalled that the questioned cancellation of Contract "A"
was among others, mainly based on the violation of its terms and
conditions, specifically, the sublease of the property by the lessee
without the consent of the lessor.
The billing of the petitioners by the Accounting Department of the
CAA if indeed it transpired, after the cancellation of Contract "A" is
obviously an error. However, this Court has already ruled that the
mistakes of government personnel should not affect public interest.
In San Mauricio Mining Company v. Ancheta (105 SCRA 391, 422), it
has been held that as a matter of law rooted in the protection of
public interest, and also as a general policy to protect the
government and the people, errors of government personnel in the
performance of their duties should never deprive the people of the
right to rectify such error and recover what might be lost or be
bartered away in any actuation, deal or transaction concerned. In
the case at bar, the lower court in its decision which has been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, ordered the CAA to refund to the
petitioners the amount of rentals which was not due from them with
6% interest per annum until fully paid.
Petitioners further assail the interpretation of Contract "A", claiming
that Contract "B" was a mere sublease to respondent Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc. and requires no prior consent of CAA to perfect the
same. Citing Article 1650 of the Civil Code, they assert that the
prohibition to sublease must be expressed and cannot be merely
implied or inferred (Rollo, p. 151).
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners in asserting
the non- necessity for a prior consent interprets the first sentence
of paragraph 7 of Contract "A" to refer to an assignment of lease
under Article 1649 of the Civil Code and not to a mere sublease. A
careful scrutiny of said paragraph of Contract "A" clearly shows that
it speaks of transfer of rights of Rosario Leveriza to the leased
premises and not to assignment of the lease (Rollo, pp. 48-49).
Petitioners likewise argued that it was contemplated by the parties
to Contract "A" that Mobil Oil Philippines would be the owner of the
gasoline station it would construct on the leased premises during
the period of the lease, hence, it is understood that it must be
given a right to use and occupy the lot in question in the form of a
sub-lease (Rollo, p. 152).
In Contract "A", it was categorically stated that it is the lessee
(petitioner) who will manage and operate the gasoline station. The
fact that Mobil Oil was mentioned in that contract was clearly not
intended to give approval to a sublease between petitioners and
said company but rather to insure that in the arrangements to be
made between them, it must be understood that after the
expiration of the lease contract, whatever improvements have been
constructed in the leased premises shall be relinquished to CAA.
Thus, this Court held that "the primary and elementary rule of
construction of documents is that when the words or language
thereof is clear and plain or readily understandable by any ordinary
10
reader thereof, there is absolutely no room for interpretation or
construction anymore." (San Mauricio Mining Company v.
Ancheta, supra).
Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of CAA cannot
execute without approval of the Department Secretary, a valid
contract of lease over real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, citing Sections 567 and 568 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which provide as follows:
SEC. 567. Authority of the President of the
Philippines to execute contracts relative to real
property. When the Republic of the Philippines is
party to a deed conveying the title to real property or
is party to any lease or other contract relating to real
property belonging to said government, said deed or
contract shall be executed on behalf of said
government by the President of the Philippines or by
an officer duly designated by him, unless authority to
execute the same is by law expressly vested in some
other officer. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 568. Authority of national officials to make
contract. Written contracts not within the purview
of the preceding section shall, in the absence of
special provision, be executed, with the approval of
the proper Department Head, by the Chief of the
Bureau or Office having control of the appropriation
against which the contract would create a charge; or
if there is no such chief, by the proper Department
Head himself or the President of the Philippines as
the case may require.
On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA
Administrator has the authority to lease real property belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines under its administration even
without the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, which authority is expressly vested in it by law,
more particularly Section 32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which reads:
 Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator.
Subject to the general control and supervision of
the Department Head, the Administrator shall have,
among others, the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control,
maintain and develop the Manila International Airport
and all government aerodromes except those
controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including such power and duties as: ... (b)
to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind
with any person, firm, or public or private corporation
or entity; (c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any
personal or real property; right of ways, and
easements which may be proper or necessary:
Provided, that no real property thus acquired and any
other real property of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration shall be sold without the approval of
the President of the Philippines. ...
There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative
Code is a general law while Republic Act 776 is a
special law nor in the fact that the real property
subject of the lease in Contract "C" is real property
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract of
lease must be executed: (1) by the President of the Philippines, or
(2) by an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an officer
expressly vested by law. It is readily apparent that in the case at
bar, the Civil Aeronautics Administration has the authority to enter
into Contracts of Lease for the government under the third
category. Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration has the power to execute the deed or
contract involving leases of real properties belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, not because it is an entity duly
designated by the President but because the said authority to
execute the same is, by law expressly vested in it.
11
Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the
Administrator (Director) of the Civil Aeronautics Administration by
reason of its creation and existence, administers properties
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and it is on these
properties that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and
discharge his duty to enter into, make and execute contract of any
kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity
and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real
property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or
necessary. The exception, however, is the sale of properties
acquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which
must have the approval of the President of the Philippines. The
Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of such
proviso in the other transactions contemplated in paragraph (24)
and is convinced as we are, that the Director of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration does not need the prior approval of the
President or the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in
the execution of Contract "C."
In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of
statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give
way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo v. De los Angeles, 96
SCRA 139),. that specific statute prevails over a general statute (De
Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of
equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefor specially should prevail (Wil Wilhensen, Inc. v. Baluyot, 83
SCRA 38)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan, J took no part.
12
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES
and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank
(LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees
(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the
Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the
Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on
promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their
respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S.
Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's
Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed
to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary
Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position
Paper had been filed by LDB.
On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary
Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:
13
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank
has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of
Agreement on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set
aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her
from enforcing the same.
In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute
to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of
evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have
bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final
and binding.
Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on
which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute
are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and
are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through
arbitration by a third party. 1The essence of arbitration remains
since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a
disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the
parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally
appointed by the government.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute
by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in
their collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final
and binding resolution. 2Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to
be complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an
award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done
by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are
presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of
settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have
chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide
their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by
said arbitrator's decision.
In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) are required to include therein provisions for a
machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel
policies. 3 For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and
designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or
include a procedure for their selection, preferably from those
accredited by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for
exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel
of arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of the
CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies. Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon
agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor
disputes.
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor
Code has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code
the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30)
calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement,
those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;
14
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of
this Code, including questions involving the legality
of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social
Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other
claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household
service, involving an amount exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether
accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
xxx xxx xxx
It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a
voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited
compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the
appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for that matter. 4 The state of our present law relating to
voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by
the parties," 5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
such decisions, awards, or orders." 6 Hence, while there is an
express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter,
Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the
decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the Supreme Court
itself on a petition for certiorari, 7 in effect equating the voluntary
arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the
Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled
premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled
that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of
parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as
judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et
al. v. Romero, et al., 9 this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator
by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity."
Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether
acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-
judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since
his decisions are not appealable to the latter. 10
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902,
provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards
of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of
the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
xxx xxx xxx
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of
voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-
judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel
are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial
instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very
situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary
arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral
tribunal operating under the Construction Industry Arbitration
15
Commission, 11 that the broader term "instrumentalities" was
purposely included in the above-quoted provision.
An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or
agency. 12 Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or
"instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of them
is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain
government act or function is performed. 13 The word
"instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an
authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function. 14 An individual person, like an
administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling
of an estate, 15 in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a
bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, 16 and a trustee
in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the
state. 17
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant
to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions
therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the
contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec.
9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided
for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to
said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as
contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees
Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code,
Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the
appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the
foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic
Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel
of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals,
in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies,
boards and commissions enumerated therein.
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original
purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the
appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities 18 not
expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by
either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to
the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the
adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded
from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.

In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of

Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration
is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the
contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial
Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or
is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have
jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one
(1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having
jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must
grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or
corrected. 19

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary

arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a
petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of
Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth
remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper
disposition.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the

Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

16
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 dated 9 August 1973 in order,
generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines. The objectives of the ISA are spelled out in the
following terms:
Sec. 2. Objectives The Authority shall have the
following objectives:
(a) to strengthen the iron and steel industry of the
Philippines and to expand the domestic and export
markets for the products of the industry;
(b) to promote the consolidation, integration and
rationalization of the industry in order to increase
industry capability and viability to service the
domestic market and to compete in international
markets;
(c) to rationalize the marketing and distribution of
steel products in order to achieve a balance between
17
demand and supply of iron and steel products for the
country and to ensure that industry prices and profits
are at levels that provide a fair balance between the
interests of investors, consumers suppliers, and the
public at large;
(d) to promote full utilization of the existing capacity
of the industry, to discourage investment in excess
capacity, and in coordination, with appropriate
government agencies to encourage capital
investment in priority areas of the industry;
(e) to assist the industry in securing adequate and
low-cost supplies of raw materials and to reduce the
excessive dependence of the country on imports of
iron and steel.
The list of powers and functions of the ISA included the
following:
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The authority shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic
iron and steel facilities for subsequent resale and/or
lease to the companies involved if it is shown that
such use of the State's power is necessary to
implement the construction of capacity which is
needed for the attainment of the objectives of the
Authority;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of five (5)
years counting from 9 August 1973. 1 When ISA's original term
expired on 10 October 1978, its term was extended for another ten
(10) years by Executive Order No. 555 dated 31 August 1979.
The National Steel Corporation ("NSC") then a wholly owned
subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself
an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on
an expansion program embracing, among other things, the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The
construction of such a steel mill was considered a priority and
major industrial project of the Government. Pursuant to the
expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued
by the President of the Philippines on 16 November 1982
withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land
(totalling about 30.25 hectares in area) located in Iligan City, and
reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter
Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational
chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by private
respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"), Letter of
Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, also dated 16 November 1982, was
issued directing the NSC to "negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for
and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's
present occupancy rights on the subject land." LOI No. 1277 also
directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach
an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI
No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent
domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings
in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating
to the subject public land as well as the plant itself and related
facilities and to cede the same to the NSC. 2
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.
Accordingly, on 18 August 1983, petitioner ISA commenced
eminent domain proceedings against private respondent MCFC in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, of Iligan City, praying that it
(ISA) be places in possession of the property involved upon
depositing in court the amount of P1,760,789.69 representing ten
percent (10%) of the declared market values of that property. The
Philippine National Bank, as mortgagee of the plant facilities and
18
improvements involved in the expropriation proceedings, was also
impleaded as party-defendant.
On 17 September 1983, a writ of possession was issued by the trial
court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and
control of the land occupied by MCFC's fertilizer plant installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however,
the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August
1988. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid
judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a
juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this motion.
In an Order dated 9 November 1988, the trial court granted MCFC's
motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The dismissal was
anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that "only
natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil case." 3 The trial court also referred to non-
compliance by petitioner ISA with the requirements of Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 4
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration of the trial court's Order,
contending that despite the expiration of its term, its juridical
existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be
completed. In the alternative, petitioner ISA urged that the Republic
of the Philippines, being the real party-in-interest, should be
allowed to be substituted for petitioner ISA. In this connection, ISA
referred to a letter from the Office of the President dated 28
September 1988 which especially directed the Solicitor General to
continue the expropriation case.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating,
among other things that:
The property to be expropriated is not for public use
or benefit [__] but for the use and benefit [__] of NSC,
a government controlled private corporation engaged
in private business and for profit, specially now that
the government, according to newspaper reports, is
offering for sale to the public its [shares of stock] in
 the National Steel Corporation in line with the
pronounced policy of the present administration to
disengage the government from its private business
ventures. 5 (Brackets supplied)
Petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 8 October 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of
dismissal of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner
ISA, "a government regulatory agency exercising sovereign
functions," did not have the same rights as an ordinary corporation
and that the ISA, unlike corporations organized under the
Corporation Code, was not entitled to a period for winding up its
affairs after expiration of its legally mandated term, with the result
that upon expiration of its term on 11 August 1987, ISA was
"abolished and [had] no more legal authority to perform
governmental functions." The Court of Appeals went on to say that
the action for expropriation could not prosper because the basis for
the proceedings, the ISA's exercise of its delegated authority to
expropriate, had become ineffective as a result of the delegate's
dissolution, and could not be continued in the name of Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General:
It is our considered opinion that under the law, the
complaint cannot prosper, and therefore, has to be
dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a new
complaint for expropriation if the Congress sees it
fit." (Emphases supplied)
At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it
was premature for the trial court to have ruled that the
expropriation suit was not for a public purpose, considering
that the parties had not yet rested their respective cases.
In this Petition for Review, the Solicitor General argues that since
ISA initiated and prosecuted the action for expropriation in its
capacity as agent of the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic,
as principal of ISA, is entitled to be substituted and to be made a
party-plaintiff after the agent ISA's term had expired.
19
Private respondent MCFC, upon the other hand, argues that the
failure of Congress to enact a law further extending the term of ISA
after 11 August 1988 evinced a "clear legislative intent to
terminate the juridical existence of ISA," and that the authorization
issued by the Office of the President to the Solicitor General for
continued prosecution of the expropriation suit could not prevail
over such negative intent. It is also contended that the exercise of
the eminent domain by ISA or the Republic is improper, since that
power would be exercised "not on behalf of the National
Government but for the benefit of NSC."
The principal issue which we must address in this case is whether
or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted
for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term. As will be made clear
below, this is really the only issue which we must resolve at this
time.
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties
to a civil action:
Sec. 1. Who May Be Parties. Only natural or
juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action.
Under the above quoted provision, it will be seen that those
who can be parties to a civil action may be broadly
categorized into two (2) groups:
(a) those who are recognized as persons under the
law whether natural, i.e., biological persons, on the
one hand, or juridical person such as corporations, on
the other hand; and
(b) entities authorized by law to institute actions.
Examination of the statute which created petitioner ISA shows that
ISA falls under category (b) above. P.D. No. 272, as already noted,
contains express authorization to ISA to commence expropriation
proceedings like those here involved:
 Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Authority shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic
iron and steel facilities for subsequent resale and/or
lease to the companies involved if it is shown that
such use of the State's power is necessary to
implement the construction of capacity which is
needed for the attainment of the objectives of the
Authority;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
It should also be noted that the enabling statute of ISA
expressly authorized it to enter into certain kinds of
contracts "for and in behalf of the Government" in the
following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) to negotiate, and when necessary, to enter into
contracts for and in behalf of the government, for the
bulk purchase of materials, supplies or services for
any sectors in the industry, and to maintain
inventories of such materials in order to insure a
continuous and adequate supply thereof and thereby
reduce operating costs of such sector;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes
normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no
provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that
20
of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be
a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast
in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical
personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. Among
such incorporated agencies or instrumentalities are: National Power
Corporation; 6 Philippine Ports Authority; 7 National Housing
8 9
Authority; Philippine National Oil Company; Philippine National
Railways; 10 Public Estates Authority; 11 Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration, 12 and so forth. It is worth noting that the term
"Authority" has been used to designate both incorporated and non-
incorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or
delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of
powers and attributes which are compendiously described as "legal
personality." The relevant definitions are found in the
Administrative Code of 1987:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific
words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a
particular statute, require a different meaning:
(1) Government of the Republic of the
Philippines refers to the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save
as the contrary appears from the context, the various
arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government.
xxx xxx xxx
 (4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the
various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a
local government or a distinct unit therein.
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphases supplied)
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the
powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of
that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of
the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law
specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution
or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some
other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic
of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is
an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be
looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and,
by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation
Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency
or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions,
assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed
once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having
been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other
entity or agency of the Republic.
21
The procedural implications of the relationship between an agent or
delegate of the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic itself
are, at least in part, spelled out in the Rules of Court. The general
rule is, of course, that an action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party in interest. (Rule 3, Section 2)
Petitioner ISA was, at the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, a real party in interest, having been explicitly
authorized by its enabling statute to institute expropriation
proceedings. The Rules of Court at the same time expressly
recognize the role of representative parties:
Sec. 3. Representative Parties. A trustee of an
expressed trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by statute may
sue or be sued without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is presented or defended; but the
court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order
such beneficiary to be made a party. . . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in
its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No.
272. The present expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and
for the benefit of the Republic as the principal of ISA. Paragraph 7
of the complaint stated:
7. The Government, thru the plaintiff ISA, urgently
needs the subject parcels of land for the construction
and installation of iron and steel manufacturing
facilities that are indispensable to the integration of
the iron and steel making industry which is vital to
the promotion of public interest and welfare.
(Emphasis supplied)
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic
of the Philippines and not the National Steel Corporation,
even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the
properties involved should the condemnation suit be
eventually successful.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of
ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's
statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings.
It is also relevant to note that the non-joinder of the Republic which
occurred upon the expiration of ISA's statutory term, was not a
ground for dismissal of such proceedings since a party may be
dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any
party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just. 13 In the instant case, the Republic has
precisely moved to take over the proceedings as party-plaintiff.
In E.B. Marcha Transport Company, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 14 the Court recognized that the Republic may initiate or
participate in actions involving its agents. There the Republic of the
Philippines was held to be a proper party to sue for recovery of
possession of property although the "real" or registered owner of
the property was the Philippine Ports Authority, a government
agency vested with a separate juridical personality. The Court said:
It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the
rentals, the Republic of the Philippines acted as
principal of the Philippine Ports Authority, directly
exercising the commission it had earlier conferred on
the latter as its agent. . . . 15 (Emphasis supplied)
In E.B. Marcha, the Court also stressed that to require the
Republic to commence all over again another proceeding, as
the trial court and Court of Appeals had required, was to
generate unwarranted delay and create needless repetition
of proceedings:
More importantly, as we see it, dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines is not the proper party would result in
needless delay in the settlement of this matter and
also in derogation of the policy against multiplicity of
22
suits. Such a decision would require the Philippine
Ports Authority to refile the very same complaint
already proved by the Republic of the Philippines and
bring back as it were to square one. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)
As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals declined to permit the
substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for the ISA upon the
ground that the action for expropriation could not prosper because
the basis for the proceedings, the ISA's exercise of its delegated
authority to expropriate, had become legally ineffective by reason
of the expiration of the statutory term of the agent or
delegated i.e., ISA. Since, as we have held above, the powers and
functions of ISA have reverted to the Republic of the Philippines
upon the termination of the statutory term of ISA, the question
should be addressed whether fresh legislative authority is
necessary before the Republic of the Philippines may continue the
expropriation proceedings initiated by its own delegate or agent.
While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily
in the legislative department of the government, we believe and so
hold that no new legislative act is necessary should the Republic
decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to
prosecute the expropriation proceedings. For the legislative
authority, a long time ago, enacted a continuing or standing
delegation of authority to the President of the Philippines to
exercise, or cause the exercise of, the power of eminent domain on
behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The
1917 Revised Administrative Code, which was in effect at the time
of the commencement of the present expropriation proceedings
before the Iligan Regional Trial Court, provided that:
Sec. 64. Particular powers and duties of the President
of the Philippines. In addition to his general
supervisory authority, the President of the Philippines
shall have such other specific powers and duties as
are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law,
and also, in particular, the powers and duties set
forth in this Chapter.
 Among such special powers and duties shall be:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) To determine when it is necessary or
advantageous to exercise the right of eminent
domain in behalf of the Government of the
Philippines; and to direct the Secretary of Justice,
where such act is deemed advisable, to cause the
condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court
having proper jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 currently in force
has substantially reproduced the foregoing provision in the
following terms:
Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. The President
shall determine when it is necessary or
advantageous to exercise the power of eminent
domain in behalf of the National Government,
and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems
the action advisable, to institute expopriation
proceedings in the proper court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the President, exercising the power duly
delegated under both the 1917 and 1987 Revised
Administrative Codes in effect made a determination that it
was necessary and advantageous to exercise the power of
eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Republic
and accordingly directed the Solicitor General to proceed
with the suit. 17
It is argued by private respondent MCFC that, because Congress
after becoming once more the depository of primary legislative
power, had not enacted a statute extending the term of ISA, such
non-enactment must be deemed a manifestation of a legislative
design to discontinue or abort the present expropriation suit. We
find this argument much too speculative; it rests too much upon
simple silence on the part of Congress and casually disregards the
23
existence of Section 12 of the 1987 Administrative Code already
quoted above.
Other contentions are made by private respondent MCFC, such as,
that the constitutional requirement of "public use" or "public
purpose" is not present in the instant case, and that the
indispensable element of just compensation is also absent. We
agree with the Court of Appeals in this connection that these
contentions, which were adopted and set out by the Regional Trial
Court in its order of dismissal, are premature and are appropriately
addressed in the proceedings before the trial court. Those
proceedings have yet to produce a decision on the merits, since
trial was still on going at the time the Regional Trial Court
precipitously dismissed the expropriation proceedings. Moreover, as
a pragmatic matter, the Republic is, by such substitution as party-
plaintiff, accorded an opportunity to determine whether or not, or
to what extent, the proceedings should be continued in view of all
the subsequent developments in the iron and steel sector of the
country including, though not limited to, the partial privatization of
the NSC.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 8 October 1991 to the extent that it affirmed the
trial court's order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the
court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the Republic of the
Philippines for petitioner Iron and Steel Authority and for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106296. July 5, 1996]
ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.*
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is partially granted. The
questioned Orders and writs directing (1) reinstatement of
respondent Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of President of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, and (2) payment of
salaries and benefits which said respondent failed to receive during
his suspension insofar as such payment includes those accruing
after the abolition of the PCC and its transfer to the PUP, are hereby
set aside. Accordingly, further proceedings consistent with this
decision may be taken by the court a quo to determine the correct
amounts due and payable to said respondent by the said university.
The background of this case is as follows:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine
College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position
by the President of the Philippines on July 17, 1974.
During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two
administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of
government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials
belonging to the college, oppression and harassment, grave
misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The administrative cases,
which were filed with the Office of the President, were subsequently
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation.
24
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, 3 (e) and R.A. No. 992,
20-21 and R.A. No. 733, 14 were likewise filed against him with the
Office of Tanodbayan.
On June 14, 1976, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3
(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as
amended) were filed against him. The informations alleged that he
appropriated for himself a bahay kubo, which was intended for the
College, and construction materials worth P250,000.00, more or
less. Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the College as
his personal and family driver.[1]
On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended
from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, 13, as amended. In his place
Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge on
November 10, 1976, and then as Acting President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS
OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND
EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.
Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3,
1979, he was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as
President for a term of six (6) years.
On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered
judgment acquitting petitioner of the charges against him. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Isabelo T. Crisostomo,
not guilty of the violations charged in all these three cases and
hereby acquits him therefrom, with costs de oficio. The bail bonds
filed by said accused for his provisional liberty are hereby cancelled
and released.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and under which the accused has been suspended by this
Court in an Order dated October 22, 1976, said accused is hereby
ordered reinstated to the position of President of the Philippine
College of Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic University of
the Philippines, from which he has been suspended. By virtue of
said reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the salaries and other
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional liberty in
these cases are hereby cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.
The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman)
were likewise dismissed on August 8, 1991 on the ground that they
had become moot and academic. On the other hand, the
administrative cases were dismissed for failure of the complainants
to prosecute them.
On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court a motion for execution of the judgment, particularly the part
ordering his reinstatement to the position of president of the PUP
and the payment of his salaries and other benefits during the
period of suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was
issued by the trial court on March 6, 1992. On March 26, 1992,
however, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as
acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of the term of
office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr.
Mateo. Petitioner was one of the five nominees considered by the
President of the Philippines for the position.
On April 24, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, through respondent
Judge Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, issued another order, reiterating her
earlier order for the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of
PUP president. A writ of execution, ordering the sheriff to
implement the order of reinstatement, was issued.
25
In his return dated April 28, 1992, the sheriff stated that he had
executed the writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP,
although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted to
consult with the President of the Philippines first. This led to a
contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing was set on May 7,
1992. On May 5, 1992, petitioner also moved to cite Department of
Education, Culture and Sports Secretary Isidro Cario in contempt of
court. Petitioner assumed the office of president of the PUP.
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA G.R. No. 27931),
assailing the two orders and the writs of execution issued by the
trial court. It also asked for a temporary restraining order.
On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from
acting as president of the PUP pursuant to the reinstatement orders
of the trial court, and enjoining further proceedings in Criminal
Cases Nos. VI-2329-2331.
On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision,[2] the dispositive portion of which is set forth at
the beginning of this opinion. Said decision set aside the orders and
writ of reinstatement issued by the trial court. The payment of
salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing after the conversion of
the PCC to the PUP was disallowed.Recovery of salaries and
benefits was limited to those accruing from the time of petitioners
suspension until the conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The case was
remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amounts due
and payable to petitioner.
Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which
converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He
contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence,
it would have specified that the PCC was being abolished rather
than converted and that if the PUP was intended to be a new
institution, the law would have said it was being created. Petitioner
claims that the PUP is merely a continuation of the existence of the
PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former position as
president.
 In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be
explained, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the
promulgation of P.D. No. 1437 by the President of the Philippines on
June 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former
Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952,
R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of
Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took
place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name,
the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its
structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to
abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace
it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. He cites the
following examples:
E.O. No. 709:
1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Trade and Industry,
hereinafter referred to as the Ministry. The existing Ministry of Trade
established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 721 as amended,
and the existing Ministry established pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 488 as amended, are abolished together with their
services, bureaus and similar agencies, regional offices, and all
other entities under their supervision and control. . . .
E.O. No. 710:
1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Public Works and Highways,
hereinafter referred to as the Ministry. The existing Ministry of
Public Works established pursuant to Executive Order No. 546 as
amended, and the existing Ministry of Public Highways established
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 458 as amended, are abolished
together with their services, bureaus and similar agencies, regional
offices, and all other entities within their supervision and
control. . . .
26
R.A. No. 6975:
13. Creation and Composition. - A National Police Commission,
hereinafter referred to as the Commission, is hereby created for the
purpose of effectively discharging the functions prescribed in the
Constitution and provided in this Act. The Commission shall be a
collegial body within the Department. It shall be composed of a
Chairman and four (4) regular commissioners, one (1) of whom
shall be designated as Vice-Chairman by the President. The
Secretary of the Department shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the
Commission, while the Vice-Chairman shall act as the executive
officer of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. - Upon the effectivity of
this Act, the present National Police Commission, and the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to exist. The
Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the integrated
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be
a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The
Integrated National Police, which is the civilian component of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be
the national police force and in lieu thereof, a new police force shall
be established and constituted pursuant to this Act.
In contrast, P.D. No. 1341, provides:
1. The present Philippine College of Commerce is hereby converted
into a university to be known as the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, hereinafter referred to in this Decree as the University.
As already noted, R.A. No. 778 earlier provided:
1. The present Philippine School of Commerce, located in the City of
Manila, Philippines, is hereby granted full college status and
converted into the Philippine College of Commerce, which will offer
not only its present one-year and two-year vocational commercial
curricula, the latter leading to the titles of Associate in Business
Education and/or Associate in Commerce, but also four-year
courses leading to the degrees of Bachelor of Science in Business in
Education and Bachelor of Science in Commerce, and five-year
courses leading to the degrees of Master of Arts in Business
Education and Master of Arts in Commerce, respectively.
The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC
are not one and the same institution but two different entities and
that since petitioner Crisostomos term was coterminous with the
legal existence of the PCC, petitioners term expired upon the
abolition of the PCC. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of
Appeals took into account the following:
a) After respondent Crisostomos suspension, P.D. No. 1341 (entitled
CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING
ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS) was issued on April 1, 1978. This
decree explicitly provides that PUPs objectives and purposes cover
not only PCCs offering of programs in the field of commerce and
business administration but also programs in other polytechnic
areas and in other fields such as agriculture, arts and trades and
fisheries . . . (section 2). Being a university, PUP was conceived as a
bigger institution absorbing, merging and integrating the entire PCC
and other national schools as may be transferred to this new state
university.
b) The manner of selection and appointment of the university head
is substantially different from that provided by the PCC Charter. The
PUP President shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education
and Culture after consultation with the University Board of
Regents (section 4, P.D. 1341). The President of PCC, on the other
hand, was appointed by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Board of Trustees (Section 4, R.A. 778).
c) The composition of the new universitys Board of Regents is
likewise different from that of the PCC Board of Trustees (which
included the chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and
the chairman of the House Committee on Education, the President
of the PCC Alumni Association as well as the President of the
27
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines). Whereas, among others,
the NEDA Director-General, the Secretary of Industry and the
Secretary of Labor are members of the PUP Board of
Regents. (Section 6, P.D. 1341).
d) The decree moreover transferred to the new university all the
properties including equipment and facilities:
. . . owned by the Philippine College of Commerce and such other
National Schools as may be integrated . . . including
their obligations and appropriations . . . (Sec. 12; Italics supplied).[3]
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing
institution and to create a new one. New course offerings can be
added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal
existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and
organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new
one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking
authority will.
The Court of Appeals also cites the provision of P.D. No. 1341
as allegedly implying the abolition of the PCC and the creation of a
new one the PUP in its stead:
12. All parcels of land, buildings, equipment and facilities owned by
the Philippine College of Commerce and such other national schools
as may be integrated by virtue of this decree, including their
obligations and appropriations thereof, shall stand transferred to
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, provided, however,
that said national schools shall continue to receive their
corresponding shares from the special education fund of the
municipal/provincial/city government concerned as are now
enjoyed by them in accordance with existing laws and/or decrees.
The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment
owned by the PCC were being transferred to the PUP but only that
they stand transferred to it. Stand transferred simply means, for
example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood
as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution.
 But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president
of the PUP could not be ordered by the trial court because on June
10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing the term of
office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six (6)
years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing
the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of
incumbents who were not reappointed. P.D. No. 1437 provides:
6. The head of the university or college shall be known as the
President of the university or college. He shall be qualified for the
position and appointed for a term of six (6) years by the President
of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Education and Culture after consulting with the Board which may
be renewed for another term upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Education and Culture after consulting the Board. In
case of vacancy by reason of death, absence or resignation, the
Secretary of Education and Culture shall have the authority to
designate an officer in charge of the college or university pending
the appointment of the President.
Aquino to consider him for appointment to the same position after
it had become vacant in consequence of the retirement of Dr.
Prudente.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED by SETTING ASIDE the questioned orders of the Regional
Trial Court directing the reinstatement of the petitioner Isabelo T.
Crisostomo to the position of president of the Polytechnic University
of the Philippines and the payment to him of salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during his suspension in so far as such
payment would include salaries accruing after March 28, 1980
when petitioner Crisostomos term was terminated. Further
proceedings in accordance with this decision may be taken by the
trial court to determine the amount due and payable to petitioner
by the university up to March 28, 1980.
SO ORDERED.

The powers and duties of the President of the university or college,

in addition to those specifically provided for in this Decree shall be
those usually pertaining to the office of the president of a university
or college.

7. The incumbent president of a chartered state college or

university whose term may be terminated according to this Decree,
shall be entitled to full retirement benefits: provided that he has
served the government for at least twenty (20) years; and
provided, further that in case the number of years served is less
than 20 years, he shall be entitled to one month pay for every year
of service.

In this case, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo Jr., who had been acting
president of the university since April 3, 1979, was appointed
president of PUP for a term of six (6) years on March 28, 1980, with
the result that petitioners term was cut short. In accordance with 7
of the law, therefore, petitioner became entitled only to retirement
benefits or the payment of separation pay.Petitioner must have
recognized this fact, that is why in 1992 he asked then President
28
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 115844 August 15, 1997
CESAR G. VIOLA, Chairman, Brgy. 167, Zone 15, District II,
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary DILG, ALEX L. DAVID,
President/Secretary General, National Liga ng mga
Barangay, LEONARDO L. ANGAT, President, City of Manila,
Liga ng mga Barangay, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III,
1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the
General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers so far as
they provide for the election of first, second and third vice
presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay
and its chapters. The provisions in question read:
1. Local Liga Chapters. The Municipal, City,
Metropolitan and Provincial Chapters shall directly
elect the following officers and directors to constitute
their respective Board of Directors, namely:
1.1 President
1.2 Executive Vice-President
1.3 First Vice-President
29
1.4 Second Vice-President
1.5 Third Vice-President
1.6 Auditor
1.7 Five (5) Directors
2. National Liga. The National Liga shall directly
elect the following officers and directors to constitute
the National Liga Board of Directors namely:
2.1 President
2.2 Executive Vice-President
2.3 First Vice-President
2.4 Second Vice-President
2.5 Third Vice-President
2.6 Secretary General
2.7 Auditor
2.8 Five (5) Directors
Petitioner Cesar G. Viola brought this action as barangay chairman
of Brgy. 167, Zone 15, District II, Manila against then Secretary of
Interior and Local Government Rafael M. Alunan III, Alex L. David,
president/secretary general of the National Liga ng mga Barangay,
and Leonardo L. Angat, president of the City of Manila Liga ng mga
Barangay, to restrain them from carrying out the elections for the
questioned positions on July 3, 1994.
Petitioner's contention is that the positions in question are in excess
of those provided in the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160),
493 of which mentions as elective positions only those of
president, vice president, and five members of the board of
directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial,
metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels. Petitioner
argues that, in providing for the positions of first, second and third
vice presidents and auditor for each chapter, 1-2 of the
Implementing Rules expand the number of positions authorized in
493 of the Local Government Code in violation of the principle that
implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract from the
provisions of the law they are designed to implement.
Although the elections are now over, the issues raised in this case
are likely to arise again in future elections of officers of the Liga ng
mga Barangay. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of
the acts of those elected. For another, this comes within the rule
that courts will decide a question which is otherwise moot and
academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 1
We will therefore proceed to the merits of this case.
Petitioner's contention that the additional positions in question
have been created without authority of law is untenable. To begin
with, the creation of these positions was actually made in the
Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, which was
adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly on January 11,
1994. This Constitution and By-laws provide in pertinent parts:
ARTICLE VI
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
Sec. 1. Organization of Board of Directors of Local
Chapters. The chapters shall directly elect their
respective officers, namely, a president; executive
vice president; first, second, and third vice
presidents; auditor; and five (5) members to
constitute the Board of Directors of their respective
chapter. Thereafter, the Board shall appoint a
secretary, treasurer, and public relations officer from
among the five (5) members, with the rest serving as
Directors of Board. The Board may create such other
30
positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter. Pending elections of the
president of the municipal, city, provincial and
metropolitan chapters of the Liga, the incumbent
presidents of the ABCs of the municipality, city
province and Metropolitan Manila shall continue to
act as presidents of the corresponding Liga chapters,
subject to the provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Sec. 2. Organization of Board of Directors of the
National Liga. The National Liga shall be composed
of the presidents of the provincial Liga chapters,
highly urbanized and independent component city
chapters, and the metropolitan chapter who shall
directly elect their respective officers, namely, a
president, executive vice president; first, second, and
third vice president, auditor, secretary general; and
five (5) members to constitute the Board of Directors
of the National Liga. Thereafter, the Board shall
appoint a treasurer, secretary and public relations
officers from among the five (5) members with the
rest serving as directors of the Board. The Board may
create such other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the National Liga.
Pending election of Secretary-General, the incumbent
president of the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga
Barangay (PKB) shall act as the Secretary-General.
The incumbent members of the Board of the PKB,
headed by the Secretary-General who continue to be
presidents of the respective chapters of the Liga to
which they belong, shall constitute a committee to
exercise the powers and duties of the National Liga
and with the primordial responsibility of drafting a
Constitution and By-Laws needed for the organization
of the Liga as a whole pursuant to the provisions of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
The post of executive vice president is in reality that of the vice
president in 493 of the LGC, so that the only additional positions
created for each chapter in the Constitution and By-laws are those
of first, second and third vice presidents and auditor. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, the creation of the additional positions is
authorized by the LGC which provides as follows:
493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city,
provincial, Metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-
president, and five (5) members of the board of
directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and
treasurer and create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter.
A secretary-general shall be elected form among the
members of the national liga and shall be charged
with the overall operation of the liga on the national
level. The board shall coordinate the activities of the
chapters of the liga. (emphasis added)
This provision in fact requires and not merely authorizes the
board of directors to "create such other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter" and belies
petitioner's claim that said provision (493) limits the officers of a
chapter to the president, vice president, five members of the board
of directors, secretary, and treasurer. That Congress can delegate
the power to create positions such as these has been settled by our
decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes
authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish or
merge officers in the executive department. 2 The question is
whether, in making a delegation of this power to the board of
directors of each chapter of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, Congress
provided a sufficient standard so that, in the phrase of Justice
Cardozo, administrative discretion may be "canalized within proper
banks that keep it from overflowing." 3
Statutory provisions authorizing the President of the Philippines to
make reforms and changes in government owned or controlled
corporations for the purpose of promoting "simplicity, economy and
efficiency" 4 in their operations and empowering the Secretary of
Education to prescribe minimum standards of "adequate and
efficient instruction" 5 in private schools and colleges have been
31
found to be sufficient for the purpose of valid delegation. Judged by
these cases, we hold that 493 of the Local Government Code, in
directing the board of directors of the liga to "create such other
positions as may be deemed necessary for the management of the
chapter[s]," embodies a fairly intelligible standard. There is no
undue delegation of power by Congress.
Justice Davide contends in dissent, however, that "only the Board of
Directors and not any other body is vested with the power to
create other positions as may be necessary for the management of
the chapter" and that, in any case, there is no showing that the
Barangay National Assembly was authorized to draft the
Constitution and By-laws because he is unable to find any creating
it. The Barangay National Assembly is actually the Pambansang
Katipunan ng mga Barangay (PKB) referred to in Art. 210(f)(2)(3) of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, which Justice Davide's dissent cites. It will be helpful
to quote these provisions:
(2) A secretary-general shall be elected from among
the members of the national liga who shall be
responsible for the overall operation of the liga.
Pending election of a secretary-general under this
rule, the incumbent president of the pambansang
katipunan ng mga barangay shall act as the
secretary-general. The incumbent members of the
board of the pambansang katipunan ng mga
barangay, headed by the secretary-general, who
continue to be presidents of the respective chapters
of the liga to which they belong, shall constitute a
committee to exercise the powers and duties of the
national liga and draft or amend the constitution and
by-laws of the national liga to conform to the
provisions of this Rule.
(3) The board of directors shall coordinate the
activities of the various chapters of the liga.
(Emphasis added)
Pursuant to these provisions, pending the organization of the Liga
ng mga Barangay, the board of directors of the PKB was constituted
into a committee, headed by the PKB president, who acted as
secretary general, with a two-fold mandate: "[I] exercise the powers
and duties of the national liga and [2] draft or amend the
constitution and by-laws of the national liga to conform to the
provisions of this Rule." The board of directors of the PKB,
functioning in place of the board of directors of the National Liga ng
mga Barangay, exercised one of these powers of the National Liga
board, namely, to create additional positions which it deemed
necessary for the management of a chapter. There is therefore no
basis for the claim that because the power to create additional
positions in the Liga on its chapters is vested only in the board of
directors the exercise of this power by the Barangay National
Assembly is unauthorized and illegal and positions created are void.
The Barangay National Assembly was actually the Pambansang
Katipunan ng mga Barangay or PKB. Pending the organization of
the Liga ng mga Barangay, it served as the Liga.
But it is contended in the dissent that "Section 493 of the LGC . . .
vests the power to create additional positions in the Board of
Directors of the chapter." The implication seems to be that the
board of the directors at the national level did not have that power.
It is necessary to consider the organizational structure of the Liga
ng mga Barangay as provided in the LGC, as follows:
492. Representation, Chapters, National Liga.
Every barangay shall be represented in said liga by
the punong barangay, or in his absence or
incapacity, by a sangguniang member duly elected
for the purpose among its members, who shall attend
all meetings or deliberations called by the different
chapters of the liga.
The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city,
provincial and metropolitan political subdivision
levels.
The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be
composed of the barangay representatives of
32
municipal and city barangays, respectively. The duly
elected presidents of component municipal and city
chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the
metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly
elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities,
provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter
and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall
constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.
493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-
president, and five (5) members of the board of
directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and
treasurer and create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter.
A secretary-general shall be elected from among the
members of the national liga and shall be charged
with the overall operation of the liga on the national
level. The board shall coordinate the activities of the
chapters of the liga.
(Emphasis added)
While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional
positions to provide for the needs of the chapter, the board of
directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power to
create additional positions not only for its management but also for
that of all the chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and
metropolitan political subdivision levels. Otherwise the National
Liga would be no different from the local chapters. There would
then be only so many local chapters without a national one, when
what is contemplated in the above-quoted provisions of the LGC is
that there should be one Liga ng mga Barangay with local chapters
at all levels of local government units. The dissent, by denying to
the board of directors at the National Liga the power to create
additional positions in the local chapters, would reduce such board
to a board of a local chapter. The fact is that 493 grants the power
to create positions not only to the boards of the local chapters but
to the board of the Liga at the national level as well.
Indeed what was done in the Constitution and By-laws of their liga
was to create additional positions in each chapters, whether
national or local, without however precluding the boards of
directors of the chapters as well as that of the national liga from
creating other positions for their peculiar needs. The creation by
the board of the National Liga of the positions of first, second and
third vice presidents, auditors and public relations officers was
intended to provide uniform officers for the various chapters in line
with the mandate in Art. 210(g)(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 to the Barangay
National Assembly to "formulate uniform constitution and by-laws
applicable to the national liga and all local chapters." The various
chapters could have different minor officers depending on their
local needs, but they must have the same major elective officers,
meaning to say, the additional vice-presidents and auditors.
The dissent further argues that, following the rule
of ejusdem generis, what may be created as additional positions
can only be appointive ones because the positions of secretary and
treasurer are appointive positions. The rule might apply if what is
involved is the appointment of other officers. But what we are
dealing with in this case is the creation of additional positions.
Section 493 actually gives the board the power to "[1] appoint its
secretary and treasurer and [2] create such other positions as it
may deem necessary for the management of the chapter." The
additional positions to be created need not therefore be appointive
positions.
Nor is it correct to say that 493, in providing that additional
positions to be created must be those which are "deemed
necessary for the management of the chapter," contemplates only
appointive positions. Management positions are not necessarily
limited to appointive positions. Elective officers, such as the
president and vice-president, can be expected to be involved in the
general administration or management of the chapter. Hence, the
creation of other elective positions which may be deemed
necessary for the management of the chapter is within the purview
of 493.
33
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting;
In light of the disclosure in the revised ponencia that the creation of
the questioned additional positions of Executive Vice-President,
First, Second and Third Vice-Presidents, and Auditor, embodied in
Article III of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the
General Elections of Liga ng Mga Barangay Officers was made by
way of the Constitution and By Laws adopted by the First Barangay
National Assembly on 11 January 1994, the ultimate issue then to
be resolved is whether or not the Barangay Assembly is empowered
to create said additional positions.
Section 493 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC)
specifically provides as follows:
493. Organization. The liga at the municipality, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-
president, and five (5) members of the board of
directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and
treasurer and create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter.
A secretary-general shall be elected from among the
members of the national liga and shall be charged
with the overall operation of the liga on the national
level. The board shall coordinate the activities of the
chapters of the liga. (Emphasis supplied).
Article VI of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga
Barangay provides as follows:
ARTICLE VI
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
Sec. 1. Organization of Board of Directors of Local
Chapters. The chapter shall directly elect their
respective officers, namely a president; executive
vice president; first, second, and third vice-
presidents; auditor; and five (5) members to
constitute the Board of Directors of their respective
chapter. Thereafter, the Board shall appoint a
secretary, treasurer, and public relations officers
from among the five (5) members, with rest serving
as Directors of Board. The Board may create such
other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter. Pending elections of the
president of the municipality, city, provincial and
metropolitan chapters of the Liga, the incumbent
presidents of the ABCs of the municipality, city,
province and Metropolitan Manila shall continue to
act as presidents of the corresponding Liga chapters,
subject to the provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Sec. 2. Organization of Board of Directors of the
National Liga. The National Liga shall be composed
of the presidents of the provincial Liga chapters,
highly urbanized and independent component city
chapters, and the metropolitan chapter who shall
directly elect their respective officers, namely, a
president, executive vice president; first, second,
and third vice presidents, auditor, secretary
general; and five (5) members to constitute the
Board of Directors of the National Liga. Thereafter,
the Board shall appoint a treasurer, secretary and
public relations officers from among the five (5)
members with the rest serving as directors of the
Board. The Board may create such other positions as
34
it may deem necessary for the management of the
National Liga. Pending election of Secretary-General,
the incumbent president of the Pambansang
Katipunan ng mga Barangay (PKB) shall act as the
Secretary-General who continue to be presidents of
the respective chapters of the Liga to which they
belong, shall constitute a committee to exercise the
powers and duties of the National Liga and with the
primordial responsibility of drafting a Constitution
and By-Laws needed for the organization of the Liga
as a whole pursuant to the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991. (Emphasis supplied).
Sections 1 and 2 of Article III of the Revised Implementing Rules
and Guidelines for the General Elections of Liga ng Mga Barangay
Officers read as follows:
1. Local Liga Chapters. The Municipal City
Metropolitan and Provincial Chapters shall directly
elect the following officers and directors to constitute
their respective Board of Directors, namely:
1.1 President
1.2 Executive Vice-President
1.3 First Vice-President
1.4 Second Vice-President
1.5 Third Vice-President
1.6 Auditor
1.7 Five (5) Directors
2. National Liga. The National Liga shall directly
elect the following officers and directors to constitute
the National Liga Board of Directors namely:
 2.1 President metropolitan chapters of
the liga, the incumbent
2.2 Executive Vice-President presidents of the
association of barangay
2.3 First Vice-President councils in the
municipality, city,
2.4 Second Vice-President province, and
Metropolitan Manila shall
2.5 Third Vice-President continue to act as
presidents of the
2.6 Secretary General corresponding chapters
under this Rule.
2.7 Auditor (Emphasis supplied).

2.8 Five (5) Directors (2) A secretary-general

shall be elected from
To implement Section 493 of the Local Government Code, Article among the members of
211(f) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local the national liga who
Government Code of 1991 provides: shall be responsible for
the overall operation of
the liga. Pending
(f) Organizational Structure
election of a secretary-
general under this rule,
(1) The national liga and
the incumbent president
its local chapters shall
of the pambansang
directly elect their
katipunan ng mga
respective officers,
barangay shall act as
namely: a president,
the secretary-general.
vice president, and five
This incumbent
(5) members of the
members of the board of
board of directors. The
the pambansang
board shall appoint its
katipunan ng mga
secretary and treasurer
barangay, headed by the
and create such other
secretary-general, who
positions as it may
continue to be
deem necessary for the
presidents of the
management of the
respective chapters of
chapter. Pending
the liga to which they
election of presidents of
belong, shall constitute
the municipal, city,
a committee to exercise
provincial, and
35
 the powers and duties of metropolitan subdivision levels (Sec. 492). Under the Implementing
the national liga and Rules of the LGC (Art. 211[e][4]), the National Liga Ng Mga
draft or amend the Barangay is composed of the duly elected presidents of highly
constitution and by-laws urbanized city chapters, provincial chapters and metropolitan
of the national liga to chapters.
conform to the
provisions of this Rule. Pursuant to Article 211[f][2] of the Implementing Rules, the
members of the Board of the Pambansang Katipunan ng Mga
(3) The board of Barangay, headed by the Secretary-General, were constituted into
directors shall a committee to exercise the powers and duties of the national liga
coordinate the activities and draft or amend the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga. There
of the various chapters is at all no showing that this committee was the so-called First
of the liga. Barangay National Assembly which convened on 11 January 1994.

It may readily be observed that Section 493 of the LGC and Article Second, even assuming that the committee was the so-called First
211(f) of the Implementing Rules are clear that the officers of the Barangay National Assembly of 11 January 1994, said committee
national liga and its local chapters are: (1) the President, (2) Vice was not authorized to create, by virtue of the Constitution and By-
President and (3) five (5) members of the Board of Directors. In Laws it enacted additional positions for the national liga and the
turn, it is the Board of Directors which appoints the secretary and liga at the local levels. The aforementioned Article 211(g), limits the
treasurer and is empowered to "create such other positions as it power of this committee, as follows:
may deem necessary for the management of the chapter
concerned." It is, therefore, unequivocally clear that only the Board (g) Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga
of Directors and not any other body which is vested with the
power to create other positions as may be necessary for the (1) All other matters not
management of the chapter. provided under this Rule
affecting the internal
The ponencia maintains that since the questioned positions were organization of the liga
provided for in the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga shall be governed by its
Barangay adopted during its First Barangay National Assembly on constitution and by-laws,
11 January 1994, then such additional positions "were as much the unless inconsistent with
creations of the local chapters as of the national league. The the Constitution and
barangay themselves, through the constitution and by-laws of their applicable laws, rules
liga, created the additional positions without precluding the boards and regulations.
of directors of the chapters as well as that of the national liga from
creating other positions." (2) The committee
created in this Article
I beg to differ. In the first place, I am unable to find any provision of shall formulate uniform
the LGC creating or establishing the Barangay National Assembly. constitution and by-laws
What the LGC has created is the Liga ng Mga Barangay (Sec. 491) applicable to the
with local chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and national liga and all local
36
 chapters. The committee
shall convene the
national liga to ratify the
constitution and by-laws
within six (6) months
from issuance of these
Rules.
Note that the constitution and by-laws which the committee may
enact must not be inconsistent with . . . "applicable laws, rules and
regulations." Of course, one of the laws that come to mind is the
LGC of 1991 and the rules and regulations could nothing be than
the Rules Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It
goes without saying that the LGC and its Implementing Rules must
perforce be heeded. It bears repeating that as they stand, Section
493 of the LGC and Article 211 (f) of the Implementing Rules limit
the officers to the: President, Vice President and the board of
directors composed of five (5) members. The latter then appoints
a secretary and a treasurer and may create such other positions as
it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. Plainly,
neither the LGC nor the Implementing Rules authorizes any person
or entity, other than the Board of Directors, to create additional
positions.
Third, it would be a clear case of judicial legislation to declare that
since the additional positions were created in the Constitution and
By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, then they "were as much as
the creations of the local chapters as of the national league." This
runs afoul of Section 493 of the LGC which vests the power to
create additional positions only in the Board of Director of the
chapter.
The claim in the ponencia that the creation of additional positions
in the Constitution and By-Laws does not preclude the board of
directors of the chapter as well as that of the national liga from
creating other positions, is inconsistent with the earlier proposition
that such new positions, "were as much the creations of the local
chapters and the league" and the further justification proferred that
the creation of the national positions "was intended to provide
uniform officers for the various chapters and the national liga was
37
in line with the mandate of the assembly to "formulate uniform
constitution and by-laws applicable to the national liga and all local
chapters." If this were so, then the chapters are barred from
creating additional positions other than those created in the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay.
Finally, it may likewise be observed that Section 493 merely allows
the creation of other appointive positions "as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter." I lay stress on the
term "appointive," in light of the clause preceding the grant of the
power, which reads: "The board shall appoint its secretary and
treasurer. Following the rule of ejusdem generis in statutory
construction, the "other positions" which may be created must be
of the same category, viz., APPOINTIVE, as that of secretary and
treasurer. These other positions may then be that of an assistant
secretary, assistant treasurer, auditor, public relations officer, or
information officer, or even a sergeant-at-arms. Further, under
Section 493, the new positions which may be created are those
"deemed necessary for the management of the chapter," which
may only pertain to the day-to-day business and affairs of the liga
chapter, and not to policy formulation which may be exercised the
executive officers and Board of Directors. In short, the section does
not empower the local liga to create elective positions other than
that of President, Vice-President and Board of Directors.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to declare void, for lack of
legislative authority Sections 1 and 2 of Article III of the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the
Liga ng Mga Barangay Officers, and Sections 1 and 2 of Article VI of
the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, insofar
as they relate to the creation of the positions of executive vice
president, first, second and third vice-presidents, and auditor.
Romero, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting;
In light of the disclosure in the revised ponencia that the creation of
the questioned additional positions of Executive Vice-President,
First, Second and Third Vice-Presidents, and Auditor, embodied in
Article III of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the
General Elections of Liga ng Mga Barangay Officers was made by
way of the Constitution and By Laws adopted by the First Barangay
National Assembly on 11 January 1994, the ultimate issue then to
be resolved is whether or not the Barangay Assembly is empowered
to create said additional positions.
Section 493 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC)
specifically provides as follows:
493. Organization. The liga at the municipality, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-
president, and five (5) members of the board of
directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and
treasurer and create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter.
A secretary-general shall be elected from among the
members of the national liga and shall be charged
with the overall operation of the liga on the national
level. The board shall coordinate the activities of the
chapters of the liga. (Emphasis supplied).
Article VI of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga
Barangay provides as follows:
ARTICLE VI
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
Sec. 1. Organization of Board of Directors of Local
Chapters. The chapter shall directly elect their
respective officers, namely a president; executive
vice president; first, second, and third vice-
presidents; auditor; and five (5) members to
constitute the Board of Directors of their respective
chapter. Thereafter, the Board shall appoint a
secretary, treasurer, and public relations officers
38
from among the five (5) members, with rest serving
as Directors of Board. The Board may create such
other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter. Pending elections of the
president of the municipality, city, provincial and
metropolitan chapters of the Liga, the incumbent
presidents of the ABCs of the municipality, city,
province and Metropolitan Manila shall continue to
act as presidents of the corresponding Liga chapters,
subject to the provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Sec. 2. Organization of Board of Directors of the
National Liga. The National Liga shall be composed
of the presidents of the provincial Liga chapters,
highly urbanized and independent component city
chapters, and the metropolitan chapter who shall
directly elect their respective officers, namely, a
president, executive vice president; first, second,
and third vice presidents, auditor, secretary
general; and five (5) members to constitute the
Board of Directors of the National Liga. Thereafter,
the Board shall appoint a treasurer, secretary and
public relations officers from among the five (5)
members with the rest serving as directors of the
Board. The Board may create such other positions as
it may deem necessary for the management of the
National Liga. Pending election of Secretary-General,
the incumbent president of the Pambansang
Katipunan ng mga Barangay (PKB) shall act as the
Secretary-General who continue to be presidents of
the respective chapters of the Liga to which they
belong, shall constitute a committee to exercise the
powers and duties of the National Liga and with the
primordial responsibility of drafting a Constitution
and By-Laws needed for the organization of the Liga
as a whole pursuant to the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991. (Emphasis supplied).
Sections 1 and 2 of Article III of the Revised Implementing Rules 2.7 Auditor
and Guidelines for the General Elections of Liga ng Mga Barangay
Officers read as follows: 2.8 Five (5) Directors

1. Local Liga Chapters. The Municipal City To implement Section 493 of the Local Government Code, Article
Metropolitan and Provincial Chapters shall directly 211(f) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
elect the following officers and directors to constitute Government Code of 1991 provides:
their respective Board of Directors, namely:
(f) Organizational Structure
1.1 President
(1) The national liga and
1.2 Executive Vice-President its local chapters shall
directly elect their
1.3 First Vice-President respective officers,
namely: a president,
1.4 Second Vice-President vice president, and five
(5) members of the
1.5 Third Vice-President board of directors. The
board shall appoint its
1.6 Auditor secretary and treasurer
and create such other
1.7 Five (5) Directors positions as it may
deem necessary for the
2. National Liga. The National Liga shall directly management of the
elect the following officers and directors to constitute chapter. Pending
the National Liga Board of Directors namely: election of presidents of
the municipal, city,
2.1 President provincial, and
metropolitan chapters of
2.2 Executive Vice-President the liga, the incumbent
presidents of the
association of barangay
2.3 First Vice-President
councils in the
municipality, city,
2.4 Second Vice-President
province, and
Metropolitan Manila shall
2.5 Third Vice-President
continue to act as
presidents of the
2.6 Secretary General
corresponding chapters

39
under this Rule. of the various chapters
(Emphasis supplied). of the liga.

(2) A secretary-general It may readily be observed that Section 493 of the LGC and Article
shall be elected from 211(f) of the Implementing Rules are clear that the officers of the
among the members of national liga and its local chapters are: (1) the President, (2) Vice
the national liga who President and (3) five (5) members of the Board of Directors. In
shall be responsible for turn, it is the Board of Directors which appoints the secretary and
the overall operation of treasurer and is empowered to "create such other positions as it
the liga. Pending may deem necessary for the management of the chapter
election of a secretary- concerned." It is, therefore, unequivocally clear that only the Board
general under this rule, of Directors and not any other body which is vested with the
the incumbent president power to create other positions as may be necessary for the
of the pambansang management of the chapter.
katipunan ng mga
barangay shall act as The ponencia maintains that since the questioned positions were
the secretary-general. provided for in the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga
This incumbent Barangay adopted during its First Barangay National Assembly on
members of the board of 11 January 1994, then such additional positions "were as much the
the pambansang creations of the local chapters as of the national league. The
katipunan ng mga barangay themselves, through the constitution and by-laws of their
barangay, headed by the liga, created the additional positions without precluding the boards
secretary-general, who of directors of the chapters as well as that of the national liga from
continue to be creating other positions."
presidents of the
respective chapters of I beg to differ. In the first place, I am unable to find any provision of
the liga to which they the LGC creating or establishing the Barangay National Assembly.
belong, shall constitute What the LGC has created is the Liga ng Mga Barangay (Sec. 491)
a committee to exercise with local chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and
the powers and duties of metropolitan subdivision levels (Sec. 492). Under the Implementing
the national liga and Rules of the LGC (Art. 211[e][4]), the National Liga Ng Mga
draft or amend the Barangay is composed of the duly elected presidents of highly
constitution and by-laws urbanized city chapters, provincial chapters and metropolitan
of the national liga to chapters.
conform to the
provisions of this Rule. Pursuant to Article 211[f][2] of the Implementing Rules, the
members of the Board of the Pambansang Katipunan ng Mga
(3) The board of Barangay, headed by the Secretary-General, were constituted into
directors shall a committee to exercise the powers and duties of the national liga
coordinate the activities and draft or amend the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga. There
40
is at all no showing that this committee was the so-called First
Barangay National Assembly which convened on 11 January 1994.
Second, even assuming that the committee was the so-called First
Barangay National Assembly of 11 January 1994, said committee
was not authorized to create, by virtue of the Constitution and By-
Laws it enacted additional positions for the national liga and the
liga at the local levels. The aforementioned Article 211(g), limits the
power of this committee, as follows:
(g) Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga
(1) All other matters not
provided under this Rule
affecting the internal
organization of the liga
shall be governed by its
constitution and by-laws,
unless inconsistent with
the Constitution and
applicable laws, rules
and regulations.
(2) The committee
created in this Article
shall formulate uniform
constitution and by-laws
applicable to the
national liga and all local
chapters. The committee
shall convene the
national liga to ratify the
constitution and by-laws
within six (6) months
from issuance of these
Rules.
Note that the constitution and by-laws which the committee may
enact must not be inconsistent with . . . "applicable laws, rules and
regulations." Of course, one of the laws that come to mind is the
41
LGC of 1991 and the rules and regulations could nothing be than
the Rules Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It
goes without saying that the LGC and its Implementing Rules must
perforce be heeded. It bears repeating that as they stand, Section
493 of the LGC and Article 211 (f) of the Implementing Rules limit
the officers to the: President, Vice President and the board of
directors composed of five (5) members. The latter then appoints
a secretary and a treasurer and may create such other positions as
it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. Plainly,
neither the LGC nor the Implementing Rules authorizes any person
or entity, other than the Board of Directors, to create additional
positions.
Third, it would be a clear case of judicial legislation to declare that
since the additional positions were created in the Constitution and
By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, then they "were as much as
the creations of the local chapters as of the national league." This
runs afoul of Section 493 of the LGC which vests the power to
create additional positions only in the Board of Director of the
chapter.
The claim in the ponencia that the creation of additional positions
in the Constitution and By-Laws does not preclude the board of
directors of the chapter as well as that of the national liga from
creating other positions, is inconsistent with the earlier proposition
that such new positions, "were as much the creations of the local
chapters and the league" and the further justification proferred that
the creation of the national positions "was intended to provide
uniform officers for the various chapters and the national liga was
in line with the mandate of the assembly to "formulate uniform
constitution and by-laws applicable to the national liga and all local
chapters." If this were so, then the chapters are barred from
creating additional positions other than those created in the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay.
Finally, it may likewise be observed that Section 493 merely allows
the creation of other appointive positions "as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter." I lay stress on the
term "appointive," in light of the clause preceding the grant of the
power, which reads: "The board shall appoint its secretary and
treasurer. Following the rule of ejusdem generis in statutory
construction, the "other positions" which may be created must be
of the same category, viz., APPOINTIVE, as that of secretary and
treasurer. These other positions may then be that of an assistant
secretary, assistant treasurer, auditor, public relations officer, or
information officer, or even a sergeant-at-arms. Further, under
Section 493, the new positions which may be created are those
"deemed necessary for the management of the chapter," which
may only pertain to the day-to-day business and affairs of the liga
chapter, and not to policy formulation which may be exercised the
executive officers and Board of Directors. In short, the section does
not empower the local liga to create elective positions other than
that of President, Vice-President and Board of Directors.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to declare void, for lack of

legislative authority Sections 1 and 2 of Article III of the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the
Liga ng Mga Barangay Officers, and Sections 1 and 2 of Article VI of
the Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, insofar
as they relate to the creation of the positions of executive vice
president, first, second and third vice-presidents, and auditor.

Romero, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

42
 EN BANC reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, G.R. No. 192935 assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
Petitioner, conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual
- versus - controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
OF 2010,
Respondent. --- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]
x-----------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, G.R. No. 193036 The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. Present:
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J.,
distributed among the several departments. [2] The Constitution is
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA, and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, must defer.[3] Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no
BRION,
PERALTA, matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to
BERSAMIN, sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who
VILLARAMA, JR.,
run it.[4]
PEREZ,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. MENDOZA, and
OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF SERENO, JJ.
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT For consideration before the Court are two consolidated
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Promulgated: cases[5] both of which essentially assail the validity and
Respondents.
December 7, 2010 constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010,
entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for

MENDOZA, J.: prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his

capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order
When the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
43

Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution [6] as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office
and to appropriate funds therefor.[7]
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF
2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the
principle that a public office is a public trust and
mandates that public officers and employees, who
are servants of the people, must at all times be
accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable
acts of defiance of this principle and notorious
violation of this mandate;

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events
prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator
Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of
graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his
ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator
to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President
Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported
cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration.
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which
seriously affects the political, economic, and social
life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold
misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized
and underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached
very alarming levels, and undermined the peoples
trust and confidence in the Government and its
institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports
of large scale graft and corruption in the government
and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the
evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants;

WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July campaign for the Presidency in the last
elections kung walang corrupt, walang
30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if elected,
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read: WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration, and
44
which will recommend the prosecution of the
offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives
the President the continuing authority to reorganize
the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is
hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which
shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,
committed by public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to
ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served
without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman
and four (4) members who will act as an independent
collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of
reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration and thereafter submit its
finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of
such graft and corruption which it will investigate;
45
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence
related to or regarding the cases of large scale
corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to
this end require any agency, official or employee of
the Executive Branch, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, to produce documents,
books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain
information and documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of investigations
conducted by committees thereof relating to matters
or subjects being investigated by the Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain
information from the courts, including the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court
Administrator, information or documents in respect to
corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their
testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or
affirmations as the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to
utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that
the ends of justice be fully served, that such person
who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised
Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that
purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious
prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial
authorities, by means of a special or interim report
and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of
public officers and employees and their private sector
co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any,
when in the course of its investigation the
Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to
believe that they are liable for graft and corruption
under pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or
prosecutorial agency such as the Department of
Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such
assistance and cooperation as it may require in the
discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource
persons, professionals and other personnel
determined by it as necessary to carry out its
mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of
procedure it deems necessary to effectively and
efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive
Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its
investigations, proceedings and hearings, including
the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are
appropriate and necessary in connection with the
objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource
Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource
Persons. x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or
Give Testimony. Any government official or personnel
who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon
subpoena issued by the Commission or who,
appearing before the Commission refuses to take
oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be
subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any
private person who does the same may be dealt with
in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the
Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office
of the President shall provide the necessary funds for
the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its
powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties
46
and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and
expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The
Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before
December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the
Commission. x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If
and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as
defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of
a supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of
this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall
not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall
take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30 th day
of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian
law in a countrys past.[9] They are usually established by states
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2)
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time,
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies
and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an that finish their work with the submission of a report containing
independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially
Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. [10] Commissions
it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one. [8] members are usually empowered to conduct research, support
victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of
recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions
an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms.[11]
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and Thus, their main goals range from retribution to
make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a
such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds
criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions. of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other cathartic experience for victims.
countries which have been created as official, transitory and non-
judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context of

47

The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter
placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial retribution,
while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and
punishment of perpetrators. As one writer[12] puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It
translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino
in his inaugural speech: To those who talk about
reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to
simply forget about the wrongs that they have
committed in the past, we have this to say: There can
be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow
crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their
occurring over and over again.
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1,
the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to
enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the
arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are
essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them
in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of
powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to
create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10,
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority
of the President to structurally reorganize the Office
of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the Truth Commission.
48
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the
Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested
the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution
and the Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.
(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 violates the consistent and
general international practice of four decades
wherein States constitute truth commissions to
exclusively investigate human rights violations, which
customary practice forms part of the generally
accepted principles of international law which the
Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the
Declaration of Principles enshrined in the
Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an
exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility,
a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a
mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the
people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish
if corruption is eliminated without even addressing
the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions
were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment
because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an
eventual question on the constitutionality and
validity of an executive issuance or even a statute.[13]
In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the
legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive Agency on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by
order with the following arguments: President Ferdinand E. Marcos. [18]

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda,
Congress to create a public office because the the following are the principal issues to be resolved:
Presidents executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully 1. Whether or not the
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, petitioners have the legal standing to file their
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416[16] (as respective petitions and question Executive Order
amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970, [17] and
No. 1;
settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of 2. Whether or not Executive
Congress to appropriate funds because there is no Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress. powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or
supersede the functions of the Office of the and commissions;
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1
Justice (DOJ),because it is a fact-finding body and not
a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
DOJ;
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the
equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes. 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1
violates the equal protection clause; and

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity
of other executive orders and presidential issuances creating similar
bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential
Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B.
Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance
Efficiency (PCAPE)by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to
injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the

49
requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are
present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of
judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[19]
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the
petitioners has been put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-
legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their
personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the
petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the
commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its
creation or as a result of its proceedings. [20]
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal
standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No.
1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the
power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels
for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the
usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature
before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,[21]
To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
of since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the
institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.[22]
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer,
he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the
budget for its operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be
used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be
taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus,
50
the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will
not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the
Presidents power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown
that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order
No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that
may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and
to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the
Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-
seated rules on locus standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the
real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.Succinctly put, the
plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus
standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person. He could be
suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or
taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other
words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of
relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
51
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both
citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,
where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit
is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by
the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he
is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As
held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel
Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right,
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least
the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere
and see that a public offence be properly pursued
and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v.
Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the
unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied.
However, to prevent just about any person
from seeking judicial interference in any official policy
or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders
the activities of governmental agencies engaged in
public service, the United State Supreme Court laid
down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex
Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of an executive or legislative action, he
must show that he has sustained a direct injury
as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient
that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury
test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a
result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of
cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De
la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public
 Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v.
Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the
rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[25]
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,
[26]
the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the
requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper
even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right
of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, [27]
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question
constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only
an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental
importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-
existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the
Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. [30] Undoubtedly,
the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of
the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the
country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to
overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes
of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to
perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with
overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that
the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct
standing body of the Office of the President.[31]Thus, in order that the
President may create a public office he must be empowered by the
Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law.
ordinary According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed [32] since
the there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that
authorizes the President to create a truth commission. [33] He adds
that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the
President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot
serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering
the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize,
transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish.[34] Insofar as it vests in
the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the
President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is
inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in
the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity
thereof.[35]
52
 Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue
that the creation of a public office lies within the province of
Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They
maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize
under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not
permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth
commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative
structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the
restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President
Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. [36] Such continuing
authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by
issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits
of this delegated authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively
legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body
such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created
by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to
create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has
long been recognized.[37]According to the OSG, the Executive, just
like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent
authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the
performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the
exercise of its administrative functions. [38] This power, as the OSG
explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section
17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.[39]
53
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the
power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to
ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees
of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and
office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials. [40] The power of
the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his
power of control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but
extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his
power to discipline subordinates,[41] his power for rule making,
adjudication and licensing purposes [42] and in order to be informed
on matters which he is entitled to know.[43]
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,
[44]
where it was held that the President has the power to reorganize
the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with
his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control
necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the
President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a
closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the
government.[45]
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the
creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize
as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code?
 to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the
organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, President." For this purpose, he may transfer the
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions functions of other Departments or Agencies to the
Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323
from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization
"involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the redundancy of functions." It takes place when
there is an alteration of the existing structure
President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.Clearly, of government offices or units therein,
the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under
functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.
already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be [Emphasis Supplied]
effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by
question is in the negative.
the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition,
judgment of the former with that of the latter. [47] Clearly, the power
even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an
of control is entirely different from the power to create public
alteration of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part
offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter
of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment
finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his
of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
Hon. Executive Secretary,[46]

But of course, the list of legal basis The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power
authorizing the President to reorganize any from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office?
department or agency in the executive branch does
not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the
very source of the power that which constitutes an According to the OSG, the power to create a truth
express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject
54
under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. [48] The said law Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor
granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the General agrees with this view. Thus:
national government, including the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was
create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer enacted was
the last
appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This whereas clause
decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has of P.D. 1416
says it was
been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary. enacted to
[49] prepare the
transition from
presidential to
parliamentary.
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a Now, in a
justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is parliamentary
form of
already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a government,
delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the legislative
and executive
the administrative structure of the national government including powers are
fused, correct?
the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to
one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.
clause: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D.
1416 was
WHEREAS, the transition towards issued. Now
would you
the parliamentary form of government will
agree with me
necessitate flexibility in the organization of the that P.D. 1416
national government. should not be
considered
effective
anymore upon
the
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing
promulgation,
manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as adoption,
ratification of
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficioupon the the 1987
convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Constitution.

55
 SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D.
[No.] 1416, Your Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct
Honor. investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not
President to mean that he is bereft of such authority. [51] As explained in the
reorganize the
entire National landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]
Government is
deemed x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however,
repealed, at brought back the presidential system of government
least, upon the and restored the separation of legislative, executive
adoption of the and judicial powers by their actual distribution
1987 among three distinct branches of government with
Constitution, provision for checks and balances.
correct.
It would not be accurate, however, to state
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50] that "executive power" is the power to enforce the
laws, for the President is head of state as well as
head of government and whatever powers inhere in
such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster Constitution itself provides that the execution of the
on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also
grants the President other powers that do not involve
creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power
over the country's foreign relations.
the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
On these premises, we hold the view that
although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations
Section 17. The President shall have control of on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
all the executive departments, bureaus, and maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of
It has been advanced that whatever power
all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws
in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief

56
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the
laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Commission. There being no changes in the government structure,
Constitution. [53]
One of the recognized powers of the President the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the existent just because the direction of the political winds have
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious changed.
need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the
executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,[54] the
power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public
authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298,
office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only
creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative
an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case,
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further,
it was ruled:
there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad
hoc Investigating Committee cannot be operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of
control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation the President will be the very source of the funds for the
to ensure that all executive officials and employees commission.[55] Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact
regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the
same composition, or that the former used the
offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad
are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-
hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president represents the
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is
the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority
to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative
to directly assume the functions of the executive department.[57]

57

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to
primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-
judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot
adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said
that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law.[58] In simpler terms,
judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial
power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must
be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case
administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the
power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means
to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to
subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official
inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved
in the facts inquired into by application of the law to
the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is
essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to
search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;"
"to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation"
being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and
collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly
understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the
rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on
the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant
of
judicially in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To
settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on
judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence
or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment."[Italics included.
Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals
58

or modes of review as may be provided by law. [60] Even respondents
themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-
judicial power.[61]
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the
Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those
of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall
task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.
[62]
The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less
adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, [63] is
certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, when
in the course of its investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this
fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. [64]
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No.
6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,
[65]
it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the
Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared
with other similarly authorized government
agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The
power to conduct preliminary investigation on
charges against public employees and officials is
likewise concurrently shared with the Department of
59
Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government
Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent
jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the
local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against
local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of
R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated
above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or
the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is
categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and
guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard,
the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans
primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under
Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised
Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be
shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of
crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the
findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its
predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission
and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be
recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the
DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to
reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the
reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft
laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within
the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in
upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of
its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined
in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is
violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does
not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the
intent of singling out the previous administration as its sole object
makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility. [66] Thus, in order
to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover
reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations
previous to that of former President Arroyo.[67]
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the
reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts
committed not only during the administration of former President
Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies[68] were reported to have
been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the
classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall
under the recognized exceptions because first, there is no
substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for
investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons
who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the
selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive
Order No. 1 to end corruption.[69] In order to attain constitutional
1987 permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should
deal with graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo
administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force. [70]
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1
identifies the previous administration as the initial subject of the
investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine
60
itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the
said administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the commission
would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous
administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed
against the equal protection clause for the segregation of the
transactions of public officers during the previous administration as
possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on
substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the
Executive Order seeks to correct.[72] To distinguish the Arroyo
administration from past administrations, it recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view
of widespread reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the previous administration which have
eroded public confidence in public institutions. There
is, therefore, an urgent call for the determination of
the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft
and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases
against those involved, if warranted, and to deter
others from committing the evil, restore the peoples
faith and confidence in the Government and in their
public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding
administration as the object of fact-finding is
warranted by the reality that unlike with
administrations long gone, the current administration
will most likely bear the immediate consequence of
the policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous
administration as a separate class for investigation
lies in the reality that the evidence of possible
criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to
recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the
policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-
corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more
easily established in the regime that immediately
precede the current administration.
61
Fourth. Many administrations subject the
transactions of their predecessors to investigations to
provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national
life or even as a routine measure of due diligence
and good housekeeping by a nascent administration
like the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), created by the late President
Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to
pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her
predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and
his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by
former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative
Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent
citizens committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding Philippine Centennial
projects of his predecessor, former President Fidel V.
Ramos.[73] [Emphases supplied]
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded
is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws
is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It
has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a
more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.[74]
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. [75]
It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. [76] The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
[77]
In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[78]
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state
actions, not just those of the legislature. [79]
Its inhibitions cover all
the departments of the government including the political and
executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever
guise is taken. [80]
It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only;
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
[81]
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. [82]
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class.[83] The classification will be regarded
as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry,
in the sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will
suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as
long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others,
does not justify the non-application of the law to him. [84]
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated
in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union [85] and reiterated in a
long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is
not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore,
a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
and prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a
62
 statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity
of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice,
is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that
the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations
omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration[87] only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
63
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of
the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during theprevious administration, and
which will recommend the prosecution of the
offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is
hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which
shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,
committed by public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to
ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served
without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of
reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during
the previous administration and thereafter submit
its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a of previous administrations, given the bodys limited time and
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit
ad impossibilia).[91]
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between
the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the
distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of
Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a
the investigation to the previous administration only. The reports of
centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that
widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken
Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC,
as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier
to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not
administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread
exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure
have the authority to investigate all past
solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it,
administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. [88]
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v.
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. Hopkins,[92]
1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the
previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to
include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily
overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness. Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and
[89]
The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the administered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or end and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
corruption and the evil it breeds.[90] circumstances, material to their rights, the denial
of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing
evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad
administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the
Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already considered view that although its focus is restricted, the
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should
64
not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered. [93] Laws that do
not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is,
for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No.
1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions of the
Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of
substantial distinctions would only confirm the petitioners lament
that the subject executive order is only an adventure in partisan
hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian, [95]
it was written: A rather
limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or
assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin,
gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union
activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the
exercise of first amendment rights.
the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by
it in the same way as are the members of the class.[97]
The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is
not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause.
[98]
Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-
embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach. [99] It
has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal
protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply
because it happens to be incomplete. [100] In several instances, the
underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike
down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in
future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by
step process.[101] With regard to equal protection claims, a
legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial
scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise,
to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked. [102]

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no
requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was
persons who naturally belong to the class. [96] Such a classification
deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it
must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive
constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within
order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even
a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and
the investigative commissions created in the past. The equal
conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation
discrimination. [103]

and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the

65
 To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate
discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does not only
confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed
during the previous administration. [104]
The OSG points to Section
17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate.
If and when in the judgment of the President there is
a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as
defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of
a supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the
President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the
PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in
other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would
be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate
commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the
President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would
then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the
petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit
the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo
administration.[105]
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in
the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[106] that the PCGG Charter
(composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate
the equal protection clause. The decision, however, was devoid of
any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at,
the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause
of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is -
whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to
recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is
exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is
expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of
violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of
powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the
Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to
once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be
of the accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power
that includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
66
 Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said
power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty, act as void and unconstitutional.
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
It cannot be denied that most government actions are
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the
the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to
constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential
remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify the
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
means. No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose
regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds
of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is
of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two
simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot
co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court
still be allowed.[108] The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and
has been accused of asserting superiority over the other
simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its
departments.
enshrined principles.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would
The Constitution must ever remain supreme.
be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: And when the judiciary All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for
power debase its rectitude.[109]
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and
truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so
that instrument secures and guarantees to them.[107]
as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to

not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply the Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the

making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it

the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its

after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for

sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a
government of laws and not of men.[110]
67
 As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive
Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
Order No. 1.
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

68