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EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

THE PRESIDENT
I.] Qualifications, election, term and oath
President
1.
Qualifications
V-President
Natural-born citizen
2. Registered voter,
3. Able to read and write,
4. at least 40 years old on the day of the election
5. 10-year residency immediately preceding the election
Election
direct vote of the people
* notMonday
2nd eligible
of May
forunless
reelection
otherwise provided
* A person who succeeded & served as President for more than 4 years, cannot run
as Pres. (refers to one one succeeded in permanent caapcity)
* cannot serve more than 2 successive terms
* Voluntary renunciation, for any length of time, is not considered an interrupt
*ion6 years
Term in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected
* begin at noon of June 30 following the day of the election
* end at noon of June 30, 6 years thereafter
Canvassing of Votes
Congress = Board of Canvassers
* Returns
SC = Presidential
transmitted
Electoral
to theTribunal
Congress, directed to the Senate President
* Open Certificates of Canvass w/in 30 days after election day before both House
s
* Congress shall canvass the votes after determning authenticity and due executi
on
* If there s a tie, winner is determined by majority vote of both Houses, voting s
eparately
* Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relati
ng to the election, returns, and qualifications

r Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be consi
dered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the fall term for
which he was elected.
r Art. VII, Sec. 5: the oath or affirmation needed before they enter the office
of President, VicePresident, or the Acting President
* By tradition, oath is taken before the Chief Justice of SC
r Residency here means the domicile
Santiago v. Ramos [P.E.T. Case No. 001. February 13, 1996.]
F: While Defensor-Santiago s protest against Ramos was pending, she ran for Senato
r and won.
H: she is deemed to have abandoned her protest
Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that duri
ng her campaign, she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the
outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for t
he Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation.
In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate t
hat if elected, she would assume the office of Senator, discharge its functions
and serve her constituency as such for the term. for which she was elected.
Tecson v. Comelec (3/3/2004)
F: Fernando Poe s qualifications to run for Pres. is questioned. Does PET has juri
sdiction over cases questioning the qualifications of Presidential candidates?
H: no; but SC took cognizance of the case to review COMELEC s decision
The Rules of the PET categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "Presi
dent" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for Presi
dent or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being a
n action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exer
cises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplat
e a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would hav
e received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an elec
tion protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to
conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, para
graph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought befo
re it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
II.] Privilege and Salary
r President shall have an official residence.
r Salaries of President and Vice President
o determined by law (annual salary of P300T for Pres., & 240T for VP)
o cannnot be decreased during their tenure (REASON: independence of executive)
o Increase only takes effect after the expiration of the term of the incumbent d
uring which such increase was approved

III.] Prohibitions
Members
Pres & V-Pres
of Congress
Executive
shall not
Family
receive during their tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source (public or private)
Shall not hold any other office or employment
EXCEPTION:
1. Vice President as member of the Cabinet
2. Secretary of Justice as member of Judicial and Bar Council
3. Ex officio positions
Cannot hold forbidden or incompatible offices
EXCEPTION: ex-officio capacity
Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession
Can practice their profession BUT lawyers are prohibited from making personal ap
pearance in courts and other tribunals
Shall not participate in any business (must divest their particitipation in busi
Notify the House of possible conflict of interest that may arise from the filing
ness)
of a proposed bill of which they are authors
Shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, o
r special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or ins
trumentality thereof, including GOCC s or their subsidiaries
Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office
Q: Malaysian PM gave Pres a car. Is this legal?
ANS: If the donation or gift was given to the office, it is legal. The c
ar will remain in the office, even after the term ends.
If donation was given to the person on his personal capacity, then it is
illegal.
REASON for ex-officio:
r add l appointment not needed & no additional renumeration; (includes honorarium)
r add l tasks are deemed included by their primary functions
Members of Executive Family = President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabine
t, and their deputies or assistants
r 1st Gentleman not a member, thus, he is not required to divest his participati
on in private business
President s spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil
degree of the President shall not be appointed as:
1. Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or
2. the Office of the Ombudsman, or
3. as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
4. chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including GOCC s and their subsidiarie
s
Q: May Pres appoint her daughter as a foreign service officer?
ANS: not covered by 2nd par of Sec 13, Art VI but covered by nepotism.
CLU v. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
F: Pres Aquino allowed members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assist
ant Secretaries to hold other government positions in addition to their primary
functions and to receive the corresponding compensation therefore.
H: The qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Sec
. 13, Art. VIII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Sec
. 7, Art. IXB of the 1987 Constitution
The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohib
ition on the President and his official family insofar as holding other offices
or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed t
o hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when suc
h is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of t
he Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authoriz
ed by the Constitution itself. In other words, Art. IX13 is meant to lay down' th
e general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and em
plovees, while Sec. 13, Art. VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to
the President, the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and a
ssistants.
[COMPARE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST OTHER OFFICIALS.]
Members of a Constitutional Commission cannot:
1. hold any other office of employment
2. engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or contr
ol of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his offi
ce
3. be financially interested, directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in
any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including GOCC s or their subsidiaries
Elective official cannot be appointed or designated to any public office or posi
tion
GR: Appointive official cannot hold any other office or employment in the Govern
ment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCC s or th
eir subsidiaries.
EXCEPTION: if allowed
1. by law or
2. by the primary functions of his position
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts shall not be designated to any
agency performing
1. quasijudicial or
2. administrative functions.
IV.] Succession
Estrada v. Desierto (146710-15; 3/2/2001)
F: Estrada argues that he is only unable to discharge the function of his office
temporarily and under the Anti-Graft Law, he could not resign
H: Estrada impliedly resigned, using the TOTALITY TEST; not covered by Anti-Graf
t Law since there is no pending adm. proceeding
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question
and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation
is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can b
e written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation i
s clear, it must be given legal effect. (his resignation is implied from press s
tatements, negotiations for peaceful and orderly transfer of power)
There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or ret
irement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative cases agai
nst him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is t
o prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public offic
ial as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or ad
ministrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graf
t Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no p
erson can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his co
nstitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wa
nts to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a
public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecutio
n, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal o
r administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or reti
rement to avoid prosecution.
When petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the Ombusdman refrained from co
nducting the preliminary investigation on cases filed against him since as the s
itting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said c
ases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to ac
t on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitio
ner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffe
r from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting P
resident.
Even assuming arguendo that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative p
roceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned beca
use the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted a
gainst the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors wa
lked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appe
arance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect,
no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
Estrada v. Desierto (146710-15; 4/3/2001)
F: Estrada argued that since his resignation is void being involuntary
H: duress did not exist
In determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the eleme
nt of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under dur
ess brought on by government action. The three-part test for such duress has be
en stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side involuntaril
y accepted the other s terms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no other alterna
tive; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the
opposite side. The view has also been expressed that a resignation may be foun
d involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employ
er s conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free c
hoice in the matter. Factors to be considered, under this test, are: (1) whethe
r the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employ
ee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the empl
oyee was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she w
as permitted to select the effective date of resignation. In applying this tota
lity of the circumstances test, the assessment whether real alternatives were of
fered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employee s purely
subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to
be resignation for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation is
irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpl
easant alternatives for example, resignation or facing disciplinary charges does
not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress or coercion, a
nd was therefore involuntary.
Petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation. He p
roposed to the holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the Congress a writ
ten declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was forced to res
ign because immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, a
alis na ba ako? which implies that he still had a choice of whether or not to lea
ve.
To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is dif
ficult to believe that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of the
petitioner s resignation. The Malacaang ground was then fully protected by the Pr
esidential Security Guard armed with tanks and high-powered weapons. The then C
hief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers were in Malacaan
g to assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the Palace. Ind
eed, no harm, not even a scratch, was suffered by the petitioner, the members of
his family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours.

ANNOTATION: Succession of Macapagal-Arroyo (353 S 587)


r Estrada did not actually write a formal letter of resignation
r BUT using the events that transpired including entries in the diary of Exec Se
c Edgardo Angara, SC held that in the state of mind of Estrada, he had indeed re
signed
r Judical review can be used as a political weapon.
r When the Supreme Court declares a law unconstitutional, or strikes down as ill
egal an action taken by the executive department, it affects power relationships
not only in the government but also in the whole society. In short, judicial re
view can be a weapon of political action and reaction, and the Supreme Court can
become an active participant in the struggle for political power."
r SC used the power of judicial review as a political weapon in legitimizing the
assumption of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as Pres

Rules on Succession:
Vacancy
Rules
Situation
Death
Pres-elect
Vice President-elect
oratpermanent
the beginning
fails todisability
qualify
shallofact
become
term:
ofasPres-elect
Pres until the President-elect shall have qual
Pres President-elect
ified
Vice shall not have been shallchosen
act as Pres until a Pres shall have been chosen and q
NoSenate
*ualified
Pres andPresident,
Vice Presorchosen
in casenorofshall
disability,
have qualified
Speaker of the House of Rep shall
act as Pres until a Pres or Vice Pres shall have been chosen and qualified
* Inability of both officials above = Congress, by law, shall provide the manner
in selecting the Acting Pres
Both Pres
Vacancy
Vice
Death, died
permanent
during
or become
shall the
become
disability,
term
permanently
the Pres
removal
disabled
from office, or resignation of the Pres & V
*iceSenate
Pres President, or in case of disability, Speaker of the House of Rep shall
act as Pres until a Pres or Vice Pres shall have been chosen and qualified
* Inability of both officials = Congress, by law, shall provide who shall serve
as Pres until a Pres or Vice Pres shall be elected & qualified (bec. of ugency o
f the matter)
Temporary
Pres
Vice submits
Pres Disability
shall
written
be thedeclaration
Acting Prestountil
SenatePres
Prestransmits
& Speakertoofthem
theaHouse
written declar
ation to of
Majority theCabinet
contraryMembers submit written declaration to Senate Pres & Speaker
*ofVice
the Pres
Houseshall be the Acting Pres until Pres transmits to them a written decl
aration to the contrary
* Pres will reassume his powers & duties
* If w/in 5 days, majority members of the Cabinet file a written declaration of
Pres s disability, Congress shall decide the issue
* Vice Pres shall be Pres if 2/3 vote of both Houses, voting separately holds th
at Pres cannot discharge his functions
Vice
Temporary
*No
Vacancy
Pres
provision
President
shall
disability
nominate
Only: (During
among members
the term)
of Congress
* shall assume office upon confirmation of majority vote of both Houses, voting
separately
NOTE:
r In any case, Vice Pres and Pres cannot stay in office under hold-over capacity
.
r In no case shall Senate Pres or Speaker of the House become Pres they will onl
y act as the Pres
Grounds:during
Vacancy at the the
beginning
term of the term
1. death
2. permanent
Grounds: (adddisability
the following)
3. removal by impeachment
4. voluntary
Congress
Successor isacts
shall
supposed
resignation
provide
as President
toasprovide
tountil
whothe
shall
a President
manner
act as
of has
selection
Pres been "chosen"
of ActingandPres
"qualified"
since vacancy need not be filled up by election (a tie can be decided by majorit
y vote of acts
Successor Congress)
as President until a President has been "elected" and qualified
since vacancy
Vacancy
Covers only
may permanent
bemust
temporary
be vacancy;
filled
or permanent
upabydifferent
electionset of rules applies, in case of the
temporary inability of the Pres
Procedure if both offices of Pres & Vice Pres are vacant:
1. 10:00 am of the 3rd day after the vacancy, Congress shall convene without nee
d of a call
2. Within 7 days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a Presiden
t and a Vice President
3. Special election will be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 from
the time of such call.
4. The convening of Congress and the special election cannot be suspended or pos
tponed.
5. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months be
fore the date of the next presidential election.
BORJA v. COMELEC (September 3, 1998)
F:Vice Mayor Capco, Jr. succeeded Mayor Borja upon his death. Is this term inclu
ded in determining whether Capco has exceeded 3-term limit in running for Mayor?
H: Such succession into office is not counted as 1 term for purposes of the comp
utation of the three-term limitation
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limita
tion refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It m
ade no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected.
There is a difference between the succession into office by operation of law
of the vice-mayor and the vice-president. The vice-president is elected to assu
me the presidency in case the President becomes unable to perform his duties. If
the vice-president assumes presidency for more than four years, that is conside
red as one term as president.
NOTE:
Members of the lower house also serve for 3 consecutive terms. After that, th
ere is a prohibition. The elected member of House of Rep should have to be elect
ed and also served, although the phrase voluntary renunciation will be taken into
consideration. Meaning, if you have voluntarily renounced in the meantime the re
mainder of the years for the term, that will still be considered as 1 full term.
For example, Guingona, he took and assumed the Vice President, he is sti
ll considered to have served the full term as Senator up to year 2004. So if thi
s is his 3rd term, he is not eligible to run for another 6-year term.
V.] Removal: By Impeachment (Art.XI,Sec.2, Art. XI, Sec. 3)
Estrada v. Desierto: discussion of J. Belosillo on permanent incapacity:
Any kind of incapacity that will prevent the incumbent from exercising his du
ty may be considered as permanent incapacity.
VI.] Powers and Functions of the President
A.] Executive Power: the power to enforce and administer laws
Art. VII, Sec. 1: The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Ph
ilippines. (unlike legislative which is shares by both Houses and the people thr
ough initiative and referendum)
Marcos vs. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)
F:Pres Aquino refused to allow Marcos to return here for fear that it might crea
te domestic violence
H:The President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from re
turning to the Philippines.
The Pres has residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It
is founded on the duty of the Pres as steward of the people.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to
be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solel
y of constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to tr
avel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contempl
ated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as
a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of th
e President which, are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residin
g in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760 (1989)
F: Pres Marcos alreay died, but Pres Aquino, still barred the return of his rem
ains in the name of "tranquility of the State and order of society".
H: Pres Aquino can deny the return
Contrary to petitioner's view, the President, upon whorn executive power is v
ested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executiv
e power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Cons
titution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enum
erated under the Constitution.

President s Residual Power:


Even if the power is not granted in the Constitution, as long as it is part o
f the executive power, it can be exercised by the Pres, unless it is limited by
the Constitution.
The Constitution is not a grant of rights, but other limitations of auth
ority.
Sec. 18 of Art. VII = inherently, the President can exercise emergency p
owers, can exercise the Commander-in-Chief powers she can declare martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This provision is a limit t
o that authority, rather than grant it.
OPLE vs. TORRES (G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.]
F: Ople opposed the implementation of the national ID system
H: the implementation of national ID through an administrative order is void
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced
by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the execut
ive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to ass
ume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or in
terfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control,
the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrativ
e power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge hi
s duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enfo
rcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the Preside
nt to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules a
nd regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates
to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be i
n harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the la
w and carrying out the legislative policy.
B] Control of Executive Departments
Art. VII, Sec. 17: The President shall have control of an the executive departme
nts, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
power to
Power of alter,
Controlmodify, nullify or set aside what the subordinate officer had do
Supervision
ne in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
Power
for that
of the
of the
superior
latterofficer to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed b
y inferiors
effect is only with respect to the acts:
Pres may set aside the judgment or action taken by the subordinate BUT this is n
ot the source of his disciplinary power (his disciplinary power came from his po
wer to appoint)
effects may be both with the acts and the actor:
If the subordinate officer did not perform the functions of his office, the pers
on mayofbesupervision
Power control
investigated
necessarily
does
andnot
disciplined
includes
include power of control
supervision
Malayan Integrated vs. CA (04 September 1992)
F: reclamation contract with Malayan was disapproved by Exec Sec., signing by aut
hority of the Pres. Malayan argued that disapproval was not valid since it was no
t signed by the Pres herself
H: action by the Exec Sec is presumed to be valid and to have been regularly per
formed in behalf of the President
As head of the Executive Office, the Executive Secretary is an ALTER EGO of t
he President. One of his myriad functions is to exercise primary authority to si
gn papers "by authority of the President", attest executive orders and other pre
sidential issuances unless attestation is specifically delegated to other offici
als by him or by the President; assist the President in the administration of sp
ecial projects; and perform such other functions as the President may direct. Hi
s personality is in reality "but the projection of that of the President", his a
cts performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless dis
approved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chi
ef Executive.

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter-Ego Principle:


The different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. The
Secretaries are the alter egos of the President. Their acts are presumptively ac
ts of the "President, until countermanded or reprobated by him".
EXCEPTION:
1. when the Constitution or law required the Chief Executive to act in person; o
r
2. the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290 (14 February 1992)
F: RA 6975 placed PNP and NAPOLCOM under the control of DILG Sec
H: The NAPOLCOM may be controlled by the President through the Secretary of the
DILG.
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY states that as the President cann
ot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person
, he will have to delegate some of them to his cabinet members.
In short, the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over t
he members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureau
s and other officers under their respective jurisdictions in the executive depar
tment.
This pictures how control is performed or done in the executive departme
nt. While the entire executive department is under the control of the President,
the President does not personally control the lowest ranked employee of the dep
artment. This is spread all throughout the different cabinet members, the cabine
t members and the under-secretaries, then the department heads, down to the lowe
st ranked employee in the respective offices. That is how control is distributed
.
But it does not exempt the President from exercising direct control over
that. Even if control is spread out, it does not prevent the President from exe
rcising direct control.
BLAQUERA v. ALCALA 295 SCRA 366 (1998)
F: Pres Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benef
its in the maximum amount of P1,000. When the President knew that there were una
uthorized releases, even without the problem brought to him or appealed to his o
ffice, he issued AO 268 clarifying the terms of the grant. Petitioner s argue that
it was a premature exercise of control, because the law grants the subordinate
officer to initially determine the grant of the benefits.
H: AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control ov
er the executive departments.
The President can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, al
ter or nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate in the executive depa
rtments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise this power motu proprio
without need of any appeal from any party.
When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefit
s, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits witho
ut prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the pres
cribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over execu
tive departments.
The provisions in the Administrative Code respecting administrative appe
al only involve the exercise of quasi-judicial function. If it is non-quasi judi
cial, it is subject to the control powers of the President even if it is not bro
ught to him. He may still exercise power over the subordinate.
The essence of control power is that he may delegate the exercise but it
does not mean that he cannot exercise his authority over the same acts of the s
ubordinate officer.
DOTC SECRETARY vs. MABALOT [G.R. No. 138200. February 27, 2002.]
F: DOTC Sec transferred the powers of Regional Office of LTFRB to DOTC-CAR
H: the transfer was valid: DOTC Sec. was the President's alter ego
A public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit, ei
ther (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted
by Congress), or (3) by authority of law.
Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has been se
ttled by decisions of the Court upholding the validity of reorganization statute
s authorizing the President to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive
department. Thus, at various times. Congress has vested power in the President
to reorganize executive agencies and redistribute functions, and particular tran
sfers under such statutes have been held to be within the authority of the Presi
dent By definition, control is "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nu
llify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It
includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo
such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB vs. ZAMORA [G.R. Nos. 142801-802. July 10, 2001.]
F: Economic Intelligence and Investigation Board created by Pres. Aquino was abo
lished by Pres. Estrada. Employees questioned the abolition
H: Pres. has the power to abolish EIIB: reorganization was valid bec. it was don
e in good faith
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is
lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the powe
r to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by
the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the off
ice was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legi
slature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the President's power of control may justif
y him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may gr
ant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

C] General Supervision of Local Governments and Autonomous Regions (Art X, Sec 4


& 16)
Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271 (05 August 1991)
F: Ganzon was suspended by DILG Sec. He questioned DILG s authority saying that su
pervisory powers excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, wh
ich allegedly embraces disciplinary authority
H: local gov t officials can be penalized under the supervisory functions of the E
xecutive
"Investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesse
r power than "altering".
Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the lat
ter may by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action
against local officials.
SUPERVISION and INVESTIGATION are not inconsistent terms; INVESTIGATION does
not signify CONTROL which the President does not have.
JOSON vs. TORRES 290 SCRA 279 (1998)
F: Gov Joson barged into SP session hall when SP did not approve a P150M loan fr
om PNB. Pres asked DILG Sec to investigate
H: The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.
As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the C
onstitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials.
A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Spec
ial Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority
. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The Presid
ent remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to invest
igate, not the power to discipline.
The power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on th
e alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency..
Pimentel v. Aguirre (336 S 201)
F: Sec 1 provides that total expenditures of all gov t agencies, GOCC s, & LGU s shoul
d be reduced by 25%. Sec 4 of AO 372 ordered that 10% of the LGU s IRA be withheld
pending assessment of Dev. Budget Coordination Committee. Pimentel contends tha
t AO 372 violated power of supervision.
H: AO 372 Sec 4 is not valid; but Sec 1 is valid since it is merely advisory
By Constitutional fiat, LGU s are subject to the President's supervision only,
not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legi
timate powers. By the ,same token, the President may not withhold or alter any a
uthority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. The Chief Executiv
e wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or t
heir officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law a
nd by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act
within the scope of their authority.
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shar
es of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than th
e constitution. Sec 4 however, orders withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA pending
assessment and evaluation by the Dev. Budget Coordinating Committee. Although t
emporary in nature, this is still equivalent to a holdback.
Bito-on v. Fernandez (350 S 732)
F: Guidelines of the Liga provides that post proclamation decision of Board of E
lection Supervisors (BES) should be appealed to National Liga Board (NLB). DILG
Sec, exercising is power of supervision, issued MC 97-193 which provides that BE
S decision should be appealed to regular courts.
H: MC 97-193 is not valid; the Liga is primarily governed by LGC, its own consti
tution and by-laws
Authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES
with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the G
UIDELINES promulgated by the NLB and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the
decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the NLB. The amendment of the
GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exerc
ise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Al
though the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other iss
uances, the Admin Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by
local government units of such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe o
r check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary o
ver local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government
unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory
enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfer
e with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the
local government

ANNOTATION: Supervision and Control (350 S 742)


A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shar
es of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than th
e constitution. Sec 4 however, orders withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA pending
assessment and evaluation by the Dev. Budget Coordinating Committee. Although t
emporary in nature, this is still equivalent to a holdback.

D.] Power of Appointment


Nature of the appointing authority:
The power of the President to appoint is characterized as discretionary and e
xecutive.
This means that the element of choice is there. It is not prohibited tha
t Congress will provide for the qualifications. But Congress cannot limit the ap
pointing authority of the President in such a way that there could be no choice.

Groups of officers whom the President shall appoint: (Sec 16, Art VII)
1. Requires CA confirmation:
a. heads of the executive departments,
b. ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
c. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
d. Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions (Sec 1(2), Art IX-B,C,
D)
e. Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (Art VIII, Sec 8(2))
f. Sectoral Representatives (Art VIII, Sec 7; RA 7941)
2. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise pro
vided for law;
a. a law creates an office but fails to provide for the filling up of the positi
on
b. if the law providing for the manner of filling up the position is declared un
constitutional
3. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
4. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone
Procedure for first group:
1. Nomination by the Pres
2. Confirmation by the CA
3. Issuance of the commission (written evidence of appointment)
4. Acceptance by the appointee
r For all other appointees made by the President, there is no need of confirmati
on and therefore a regular appointment is immediately issued

(1) With Consent of Commission on Appointments


Calderon vs. Carale 208 SCRA 254 (23 April 1992)
F: Pres. Aquino appointed the chairman and commissioners of the NLRC without CA
confirmation even though the Labor Code requires such.
H: Article 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires the confirmation by the
CA of appointments of the chairman and members of the NLRC is unconstitutional
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the CA of the appointment
s of respondents chairman and members of NLRC, it is unconstitutional because:
a. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII by adding th
ereto appointments requiring confirmation by the CA;
b. it amends, by legislation, the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII by imposi
ng the confirmation by the CA on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only
to the President.
Flores vs. Drilon 223 SCRA 568 (22 June 1993)
F: Sec 13(d) of RA 7227, "BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1992," states
that the Mayor of Olongapo City shall be appointed as the Chairman and Chief Exe
cutive Officer of the Subic Authority during its 1st year of operations. Petitio
ners argue that this infringes Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, since
it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President, who appoi
nted the Mayor to the subject posts.
H: Sec. 13 (d) of RA 7227 is unconstitutiona
Appointment is "the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office."
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power nece
ssarily exercises a discretion. Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to a
ppoint an officer, Congress cannot at the same time limit the choice of the Pres
ident to only one candidate. Once the power to appointment is conferred on the P
resident, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint.
Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress
may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indi
rectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifi
cations proscribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose, and co
nstitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
Tarrosa vs. Singson 232 SCRA 553 (1994)
F:Tarrosa as taxpayer questiones Singson s appointment as BSP Governor since it wa
s not confirmed by the CA although RA 7653, which establishes the BSP, requires
it
H: Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the CA and require c
onfirmation of appointments of other government officials not expressly mentione
d in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Art. VII of the Constitution.
MANALO v. SISTOSA
F: President promoted 15 police officers by appointing them to positions in the
Phil. Nat'l. Police with the rank of Chief Supt. to Director. Petitioner argues
that this requires CA confirmation since these ranks are equal to that of colone
l or naval captain (military) which require CA confirmation
H: Only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confi
rmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of the respondent of
ficers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the C.O.A
..
Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government offici
als not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and th
e ranks in the military are not similar to those in the PNP.
MATIBAG vs. BENIPAYO [G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002.]
F: Matibag was reassigned by Benipayo. Pending this case, Matibag questioned Ben
ipayo's appointment as COMELEC chair; 3 ad interim appointments were already ext
ended to Benipayo but until now, his confirmation was by-passed by the Commissio
n on Appointments
H: ad interim appointments do not impair the independence of the COMELEC
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee h
as qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Com
mission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution
itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effe
ctive until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjo
urnment of Congress.
Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment si
gned by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in th
e meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment
that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in th
e text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippi
ne jurisprudence.
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the C
onstitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by
the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress
without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provid
ed by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can b
e withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or a
cting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. Th
is is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from
making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMEL
EC. Thus, in Brillantes vs. Yorac, this Court struck down as unconstitutional th
e designation by then President Corazon Aquino of Associate Commissioner Haydee
Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC.

Sectoral Representatives:
QuintosDeles vs. CA 177 SCRA 259 (1992)
F: Deles and 3 other Sectoral Representatives were appointed by the President wi
thout CA confirmation. Because of opposition of some Congressmen, the 4 could no
t take their oaths and assume office. Deles argued that CA confirmation not need
ed
H: Appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require the consent
of the CA in accordance with the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII.
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in Paragraph 2, Sec. 5,
Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President, by express provision of
Sec. 7, Art. XIII, it is indubitable that the sectoral representatives to the Ho
use are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President
in this Constitution", referred to in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII w
hose appointments are subject to confirmation by the CA.
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitut
ion which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such
as appointments of members of the SC and judges of the lower courts (Sec. 9, Art
. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption
from confirmation had been extended to appointments by sectoral. representatives
in the Constitution.
(2) Upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar Council
(2.1) Members of the Supreme Court and all other courts (Art. VIII, Sec.
9)
(2.2) Ombudsman and Deputies (Art. XI, Sec. 9)
(3) Appointment of Vice President as member of the Cabinet (Art. VII, Sec. 3)
(4) Appointment solely by the President (Art. VII, Sec. 16)
(4.1) Those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
(4.2) Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
BERMUDEZ v. TORRES (August 4, 1999)
F: 2 candidates are vying for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac.
Bermudez, was a recommended by Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., while
Quiaoit was not. Pres appointed Quiaoit but Bermudez contend that such is void s
ince Revised Administrative Code of 1987 requires the Justice Sec s recommendation
H: power to appoint is discretionary; Since Pres has power of control, he can al
ter the decision of a subordinate
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has
the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deci
ding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualif
ications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power. Indeed,
it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to ap
point. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral pa
rt thereof.
The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary of the Revised Administrat
ive Code should be interpreted, as it is normally understood, to be a mere advis
e, exhortation or indorsement which is eesentially persuasive in character and n
ot binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation h
ere is nothing really more than advisory in nature.
(5) Limitations on the Appointing Power of the President
(Art. VII, Sec. 13)
President s spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th ci
vil degree of the President shall not be appointed as:
1. Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or
2. the Office of the Ombudsman, or
3. as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
4. chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including GOCC s and their subsidiarie
s
r Since there are no distinctions, we will assume that both spouse and relatives
by consanguinity covers legitimate and illegitimate relations
(Art. VII, Sec. 15: midnight appointments)
Two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the en
d of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, exce
pt
a. temporary appointments
b. to executive positions
c. when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger pu
blic safety.
IN RE: VALENZUELA
F: Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta were appointed by the President as RTC Judg
es within the period of the ban considering that Sec 4(1) & Sec 9 of Art VIII stat
es that
a. Section 4(1) = vacancy in SC must be filed w/in 90 days from the occurrence o
f the vacancy
b. Sec 9 = vacancy in lower courts must be filed w/in 90 days from the submissio
n of the list of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council
H: the need to appoint the members of the judiciary should yield to the prohibit
ion under section 15 since courts also decide election protest case
During the period of the ban- "two months immediately before the next preside
ntial election and up to the end of his term"- the president is neither required
to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so.
The exception allows only the making temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger pu
blic safety.
(6) Interim or Recess Appointments (Art. VI, Sec. 19)
Art. VII, Sec. 16(2): The President shall have the power to make appointments du
ring the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appoi
ntments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointme
nts or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Kinds of Appointments:
1. Permanent or Temporary Appointment
a. Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the requisite
eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security
of tenure
b. Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocab
le at will and without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation
2. Regular or Ad interim Appointment (CA confirmation needed)
a. A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in sessi
on, takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and
once approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee.
b. An ad interim appointment is one made by the president while Congress is not
in session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by t
he Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress. In the l
atter case, the ad interim appointment is deemed "by-passed" through inaction an
d deemed disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.
r A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to confirmation by t
he Commission on Appointments. Such confirmation, if given erroneously, will not
make the incumbent a permanent appointee
r An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
r Ad interim appointment may be made during:
o Voluntary Recess = either of the house is not actually convening or functionin
g (Holy Week, Christmas)
o Compulsory Recess = period between closing and opening
r upon next adjournment of Congress = refers to the same Congress the yearly adjou
rnment and opening
r Congress
o Open = 4th Monday of July
o Close = 1 year thereafter or at least 30 days before the opening of the next r
egular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays
ConcepcionBautista vs. Salonga (13 April 1989)
F: Bautista was extended a permanent appointment as Chairman of the CHR. CA insi
sted that such appointment needs its confirmation but Bautista argued otherwise.
CA then disapproved her "ad interim appointment" in view of her refusal to subm
it to the jurisdiction of the CA.
H: Bautista is the duly appointed Chairman of the CHR
The appointment of the Chairman and members of the CHR is not specifically pr
ovided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairman and members of the Ci
vil Service Commission, COMELEC and Commission on Audit, whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of CA.
When the President converted petitioner's designation as Acting Chairman on D
ec. 7, 1988, significantIv she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter)
that, by virtue of such apppointment, she could qualify and enter upon the perf
ormance of the duties of the office. All that remained for Bautista to do was to
reject or accept the appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by ta
king her oath of office. Bautista's appointment therefore on Dec. 17, 1988 as Ch
airman of the CHR was completed on the part of the President.
Appointments that are for the President solely to make, without the participa
tion of the CA cannot be "ad interim" appointments. Ad interim appointments, by
their very nature under the Constitution, extend only to appointments where the
review of the CA is needed.
(7) Temporary Designations
Administrative Code of 1987, Bk. 111, Section 17: The President may designate an
officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perf
orm the function of all office in the executive branch, appointment to which is
vested in him by law, when:
a. The officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties
by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or;
b. There exists a vacancy.
In no case, shall a temporary designation exceed on (1) year.
r Designation means the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a pe
rson already in the public service
(8) Limitations on the appointing power of the Acting President
Art. VII, Sec. 14: Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain eff
ective, unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assu
mption or reassumption of office.
r Art VII Sec 15 (midnight appointment) and Sec 16 (CA confirmation, ad interim
appointment) are applicable

E.] Executive Clemencies


Art. VII, Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
It shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for v
iolation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the Presid
ent without the favorable recommendation by the Commission (on Elections.)
Limitations on the exercise:
a. Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment
b. Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment
c. Grant of amnesty must be concurred by majority of all the Members of the Cong
ress.
d. Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without Comelec s favo
rable recommendation
e. Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as it would violate sepa
ration of powers) or civil contempt (as State is without interest in the same)
f. cannot absolve the convict of civil liability
g. cannot restore offices forfeited
r tax amnesty must be concurred by congress
1. Reprieve = temporary relief from or postponement of execution of criminal pen
alty or sentence or a stay of execution
2. Commutation = reduction of sentence
3. Pardon = permanent cancellation of sentence (fact of conviction still exists
)
a. absolute pardon = extended w/o any strings attached; the pardonee has no opti
on at all and must accept it whether he likes it or not. In this sense, an abso
lute pardon is similar to commutation, w/c is also not subject to acceptance by
the offender.
b. conditional pardon = the convict is required to comply w/ certain requirement
s; offender has the right to reject the same since he may feel that the conditio
n imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted
c. plenary pardon = extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, in
cluding accessory disabilities
d. partial pardon does not
4. Amnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by government g
enerally to a class of persons who have been guilty usually of political offense
s (treason, sedition, rebellion), and who are subject to trial but have not yet
been convicted, and often conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty wi
thin a prescribed time.
5. Probation is a disposition under which a defendant after conviction and sente
nce is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervisio
n of a probation officer.
6. Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Boa
rd after serving the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence penalty, without
granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be suspe
nded.
Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 378 (1991)
F: Ganzon and Paredes were tried before the Military Commission No. 34 for doubl
e murder. Paredes was acquitted while Ganzon was sentenced to life imprisonment
but was later released and placed under house arrest. Now, Justice Sec wants to
try them anew before the civil courts. Paredes invoked his previous acquittal wh
ile Ganzon argued that he had been extended an absolute pardon by Pres Marcos
H: Ganzon and Paredes can no longer be tried anew; the pardon was valid
The court does not believe that the commutation of sentence need be in a spec
ific form. It is sufficient that Ganzon was released voluntarily in 1978 with no
terms or conditions except that he should remain under house arrest which at th
at time, Marcos did not "take to heart" because Ganzon had been enjoying unrestr
ained freedom since his release.
Under the 1973 Constitution, as is under the present Charter, the "pardoning
power" of the President (that is, to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardon,
remit fines and forfeitures) is FINAL and UNAPPEALABLE. So is commutation of sen
tence, in which the Chief Executive reduces a sentence. It extinguishes criminal
liability partially and has the effect of changing the penalty to a lesser one.
The Court cannot consider Ganzons house arrest as a commutation of his senten
ce because in no way is arrest a penalty, but rather a mere means of taking a pe
rson into custody in order that he may be made to answer for the commission of a
n offense.
The grant of executive clemency is essentially discretionary, and so it
cannot be subjected to a mandamus suit or questioned as being improper. But unde
r the concept of judicial review, if there is a grave abuse of discretion, it ca
n still be questioned.
People vs Salle, Jr. 250 SCRA 581 (1995)
F: Conditional pardon was granted while Mengote s appeal was pending. SolGen argue
d that the conditional pardon is unenforceable because the judgment of convictio
n is not yet final. FLAG submits that the conditional pardon extended to Mengote
is valid because he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance o
f the conditional pardon
H: Considering that appellant Ricky Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw h
is appeal up to this date the conditional pardon extended to him should not have
been enforced.
The present Constitution provides that except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, comm
utations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by fina
l judgment.
Before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the
withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to
finality.
The Court categorically declared to be "in clear violation of the law" the "p
ractice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals.
"
IN RE: TORRES 251 SCRA 709 (1995)
F: Torres was convicted of estafa. Before he finished serving his sentence, he w
as granted conditional pardon. He violated his pardon since he was convited of s
edition. Torres was then arrested and served his remaining sentence. Pres used S
ection 64 (i) of the RAC
H: Torres arrest was valid; choice between RAC and RPC is solely vested on the Pr
es
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department
has two options:
(i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Co
de = court hearing not needed; arrest was based on executive decision of the Par
ole Board that pardon was violated
(ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code = court
hearing is needed
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign pow
er or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the form
er will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply w
ith the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexp
ired portion of the sentence or an additional one. Under Section 64 (I) of the R
evised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arre
st and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to c
omply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of
sentence.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was
the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the cor
ollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal
of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the sam
e. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pa
rdon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judi
cial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the Pr
esident to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a co
nditional pardon. There is likewise no a basis for the courts to effectuate the
reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise o
f powers undisputedly solely and absolutely loaded in his office.
PEOPLE vs. CASIDO [G.R- No. 116512. March 7,1997.]
F: Pardon was extended while the case was on appeal; subsequently the appellants
was also granted amnesty. SC earlier ruled that pardon was void thus Casido was
not released although amnesty was granted
H: Casido must be released bec. of valid amnesty
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no n
otice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the con
currence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial n
otice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to cl
asses of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, general
ly before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes aft
er conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequen
ces of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgi
ves the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the
rights to hold-public office, or the-right of suffrage unless such rights be ex
pressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the cul
prit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (
Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offen
se with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before th
e law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having been extended d
uring the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, the
refore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Co
nstitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused appellants William Casid
o and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid
. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Re
solution No. 12 adopted on 2 June 1994
PEOPLE vs. PATR1ARCA, JR (G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000.]
F: Patriarca was on trial for murder. While the case was pending, he was granted
amnesty but still RTC found him guilty
H: Patriarca is acquitted
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal li
ability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the pe
nalty and all its effects.
(1) Pardon distinguished from probation
Limited
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Granted
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ies,restoration
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People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 (1937)
F: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impai
red by the Probation Act in question?
H: Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man.
He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire pu
nishment which the law inflicts under the Probation Act, the probationer's case
is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Sec. 4 of the
Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probatione
r finally discharged from the supervision only after the period of probation sha
ll have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report,
and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the condi
tions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remai
ns in legal custody subject to the control of the probation officer and of the c
ourt; and, he may be rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the conditions of prob
ations and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence or
iginally imposed upon him.
The probation described in the Act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty
and may be far from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by
the judge in a proper case in substitution of imprisonment and fine prescribed b
y the criminal laws. For this reason, its application is as purely as judicial a
ct as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to the offense.
The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law, which
binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is th
us no conflict with the pardoning power and no possible unconstitutionality of t
he Probation Act for this case.
(2) Pardon distinguished from parole
he isconvict
Parole
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Granted
the notonly
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at the
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Chief
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time
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manalthough
has
andserved
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Parole
heofhis
the
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released
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term
from
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service
of the
Lawl
aw, he must submit to periodic examination by the Board of Parole
Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons 68 Phil. 154 (1939)
F:Gov General granted parole to Tesoro. The Administrative Code gave the Pres po
wer to grant paroles but the Constitution then did not only power to grant pardon
H: parole is part of the pardoning power of the President
The power to pardon given to the President by the Constitution, "upon such co
nditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to imp
ose, includes the power to grant and revoke as a denial thereof to the President,
the effect would be to discharge unconditionally paroles, who before the adopti
on of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive.
That such effect was never intended by the ConCon is obviously beyond question.

NOTE:
Sec 19, Art VII does not mention of probation or parole. Correct interpr
etation is If ever the President has the power to grant parole, it is because th
e law grants him that power, and not because parole is part of pardon.
Parole is based on the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Probation is under the Pro
bation Law.
Torres vs. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272 (1987)
F: Torres was convicted of estafa. Before he finished serving his sentence, he w
as granted conditional pardon. He violated his pardon since he was convited of s
edition. Torres was then arrested and served his remaining sentence. Pres used S
ection 64 (i) of the RAC
H: Torres can be arrested even though there was no judicial determination that h
e violated his pardon
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a co
nditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scr
utiny.
Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process i
n his trial and conviction for the offense for w/c he was conditionally pardoned
, sec. 64 (i), RAC, is not afflicted with a constitutional vice

(3) Pardon distinguished from amnesty


looksbe
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Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez 82 Phil. 642 (21 January 1949)
F: Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. While the appeal was pendi
ng, Jimenez filed for amnesty but such were denied since neither have admitted h
aving committed the offense, so they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
H: person need not admit having committed the crime to avail of amnesty; It is s
ufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or accused, shows that the
offense committed comes within the terms of said amnesty proclamation.
There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the comm
ission of a criminal act before a court or Amnesty Commission may investigate an
d extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guil
ty or that he has not committed the act with which he is charged, does not neces
sarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the evid
ence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary. The plea of not h
aving committed the offense made by an accused simply means that he can not be c
onvicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty thereof, and, even if t
he evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of
the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy, and not for purely political motives.
(4) Effect of Pardon
If it is absolute, then that person is restored to all his rights. But a
s we have said, the principle there is that the fact of conviction is not oblite
rated. That person will still have that conviction although he is exempted from
punishment. (Monsanto v. Factoran)
Cristobal vs. Labrador (07 December 1940)
F: Santos was found guilty of estafa but he continued to be a registered elector
so he was as the municipal president. Since Election Code disqualifies persons
found guilty of any crime against property, Santos was granted absolute pardon.
It restored his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to th
e right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money
or property responsibility."
H: An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all di
sabilities resulting from the conviction. While the pardon extended to responden
t is conditioned in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property
responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full c
ivil and political rights."
Pelobello vs. Palatino (20 June 1941)
F: Palatino, the mayorelect was convicted more than 25 years ago but was granted
conditional pardon. He was granted absolute pardon after the election but befor
e the date fixed by law for assuming office.
H: We adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to th
e limitations imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restric
ted or controlled by the legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only bl
ots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conv
iction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolu
te pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
Thus the better view is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of
the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be a
t liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completely the
party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of cr
iminal conviction.
Under the circumstances of the case, it is evident that the purpose in granti
ng him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to
the popular will

Lacuna vs. Abes (24 August 1968)


F: Abes was previously convicted of counterfeiting treasury warrants. He was gra
nted conditional pardon. 7 years after his maximum sentence would have been serv
ed, he ran for mayor and won. During the case questioning his qualification, the
President granted him an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored him "fu
ll civil and political rights."
H: pardon granted after election but before the date of assumption of office --
has removed his disqualification
The pardon's effect should not be necessarily limited as it would lead to the
impairment of the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the constituti
on. "We adopt the broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limita
tions imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power not only blots out the cr
ime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that w
hen granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes
all that is left of the consequences of conviction.xxx We are of the opinion tha
t the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction
is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who,
after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the r
igidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties co
ncerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction (Fe
lobello v. Palatino).
Mosanto vs. Factoran, Jr. (09 February 1989)
F: then Asst. Treasurer Mosanto was convicted of estafa through falsification of
public documents. President granted her absolute pardon which she accepted. Mos
anto now requests that she be restored to her former post since the same was sti
ll vacant. Ministry of Finance had her reinstated without the necessity of a new
appointment (starting the date of pardon) but she must pay P4,892.50 which the
Sandiganbavan had required to be indemnified in favor of the government. Mosanto
argues that pardon has wiped out the crime thus her service in the government h
as never been interrupted and she should not be required to pay P4,892.50.
H: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualificatio
n from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her for
mer post as asst. treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure re
quired for a new appointment.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of g
uilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he neve
r committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence
of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does
not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It
does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulnes
s.
The 1981 amendments to the 1973 constitution had deleted the earlier rule tha
t clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency
could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon w
as granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mention
ing that under the 1987 constitution, the former limitation of final conviction
was restored.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for
the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It d
oes not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what ha
s been suffered. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be e
ntitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
(5) Sanctions for violations of conditional pardon
Torres vs. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272 (1987)
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who i
s alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Dept. has
2 options: (i) to proceed against him under Sec. 64(i), RAC; or (ii) to proceed
against him under Art. 159, RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccion
al minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by
the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, t
he President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under the RAC.
That choice is an exercise of the executive prerogative and not subject to ju
dicial scrutiny.

(6) Does pardoning power apply to administrative cases?


"Conviction" may be used in either a criminal case or in an administrative case
Llamas vs. Orbos 202 SCRA 844 (15 October 1991)
F: Gov Campo was suspended for 90 days by DILG for violating Local Gov t Code. Bef
ore the period expired, he was pardoned
H: if the president can grant reprieves, commutation, and pardons, and remit fin
es and forfeitures in criminal case, with much more reason can she grant executi
ve clemency in administrative cases which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.
If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remi
t fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant e
xecutive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than c
riminal offenses. However, the power of the President to grant executive clemenc
y in administrative cases refers only to administrative cases in the Executive b
ranch and not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the govt
Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different Executive dep
artments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the a
cts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her. In this case, th
e President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all exe
cutive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate. It
is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant "executive cleme
ncy" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an e
rring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would suppor
t the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted
.
(7) Who may avail of amnesty?
PEOPLE vs. PATR1ARCA, JR [G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000.]
F: Patriarca was on trial for murder. While the case was pending, he was granted
amnesty but still RTC found him guilty
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or othe
r high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amne
sty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself, it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the per
son released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committ
ed no offense.
Vera vs. People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963)
Amnesty cannot be invoked, where the accused actually denies the commission of t
he offense charged
Petitioners contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Procl. No. 8,
it is not necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citi
ng Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez to the effect that "in order to entitle a person t
o the benefits of Amnesty Procl., it is not necessary that he should, as a condi
tion precedent, admit having committed the criminal act or offense w/ w/c he is
charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence
, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed com
es w/in the terms of said Amnesty Procl
H: But said cases have been superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent ca
ses of Peo. vs. Llanita (86 P 219) wherein we held that It is rank inconsistency
for appellant to justify an act or seek forgiveness for an act, according to hi
m, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and whe
n an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use
for amnesty. Where an amnesty procl. imposes certain conditions, as in this ca
se, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions.
The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidanc
e, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims
liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would brin
g the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation
NOTE: person serving sentence claim he is covered by general amnesty = do not fi
le writ of habeas corpus but instead, submit his case to proper amnesty board
F.] Powers of the CommanderinChief
Art. VII, See. 18: Commander-in-Chief Clause
Powers of Pres as the CommanderinChief of all armed forces of the Philippines:
1. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, in
vasion or rebellion.
2. he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
3. he may place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law
r this is subject to Judicial Review by the Courts under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2)

Requisites for #2 & #3:


1. There must be an invasion or rebellion,
2. public safety requires it
Call out the AFP to prevent lawless violence
This is merely a police measure meant to quell disorder. As such, the Constit
ution does not regulate its exercise radically.
This is discretionary on the part of the Pres thus not subject to judicial re
view.
IBP v. Zamora (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000)
The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifia
ble and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfyin
g the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible t
o the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to
judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also pr
ove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficul
t to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidenc
e upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the arm
ed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligenc
e network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confi
dential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to
call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situation
s to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. . . .
PANFILO LACSON vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ [G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001.]
F: They questioned Pres.Arroyo's declaration of "state of rebellion"
H: declaration was valid
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he Pr
esident shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines a
nd whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent o
r suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion ..."
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual bas
is of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this ti
me since Proclamation No. 38 have been lifted.
Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
A "writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court commanding a detaining o
fficer to inform the court (i) if he has the person in custody, and (ii) what hi
s basis in detaining that person.
The "privilege of the writ" is that portion of the writ requiring the detaini
ng officer to show cause why he should not be tested.
Note that it is the privilege that is suspended, not the writ itself, so the
Court can still issue the writ in spite of the suspension of the privilege.
Effect:
1. The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons "judicial
ly charged" for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with inv
asion (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5).
a. Persons suspected of the above crimes can be arrested and detained without a
warrant of arrest
b. They can be arrested even if it is not a valid warrantless arrest under Rules o
f Court
2. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested
or detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days, or otherwise he shall be
released. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 6)
a. If not charged, public officer becomes liable under Art. 125 for "delay in th
e delivery of detained persons"
b. Detainee or someone in his behalf may file a petition for habeas corpus
3. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ o
f habeas corpus is suspended. (Art. III, Sec. 13)
Proclaim Martial Law:
The President can:
1. Legislate
2. Order the arrest of people who obstruct the war effort.
The ff cannot be done (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 4)
1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution.
2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the legislative assemblies.
3. Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over civilians, where
civil courts are unable to function (open court doctrine)
4. Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (suspension
must be express)
"Open Court" Doctrine
Civilians cannot be tried by military courts if the civil courts are open and
functioning. But if the civil courts are not functioning, then civilians can b
e tried by the military courts.
Martial laws usually contemplates a case where the courts are already closed
and the civil institutions have already crumbled, that is a "theater of war." I
f the courts are still open, the President can just suspend the privilege and ac
hieve the same effect.
Role of Congress:
1. Upon President s proclamation, suspension of the privilege or martial law is ef
fective for 60 days unless sooner revoked by Congress
2. Upon proclamation, Congress shall convene at once. If it is not in session, i
t shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24 ho
urs following the proclamation or suspension.
3. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the suspension of the privilege, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress (meetin
g in joint session)
4. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority may
5. revoke such proclamation or suspension; or
6. extend such proclamation or suspension
Revocation:
President cannot set aside (or veto) the revocation as he normally would do i
n the case of bills.
If Congress does not do anything, the measure will expire anyway in 60 days
Extension:
Only upon the initiative of the President. The period need not be 60 days; i
t could be more, as Congress would determine, based on the persistence of the em
ergency.
Role of Supreme Court:
SC may review, in an appropriate proceeding filled by any citizen, the suffic
iency of the factual basis of (a) the proclamation of martial law or the suspens
ion of the privilege of the writ, or (b) the extension thereof. It must promulg
ate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18 par
. 3)
REASON: Judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has b
een a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on t
he part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1,
par. 2)
Lansang vs. Garcia 42 SCRA 448 (1971)
F: Pres Marcos through Proclamation No. 889 suspended the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
H: The SC has the authority (under the 1973 Constitution) to inquire into the ex
istence of a factual basis for the issuance of a presidential proclamation suspe
nding the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of determining
the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
The SC, in considering the fact that the President based his decision on (a)
the Senate report on the condition in Central Luzon and (b) a closed door briefi
ng by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the Presiden
t did not act arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts,
but one cannot say that it is without basis
It has to be remembered that the Supreme Court is not a trial court. It
is not for the Supreme Court to determine behind the certification or report mad
e by the executive that these are what is happening. The sufficient factual basi
s there would only require that there are factual basis (e.g. bombings, ambushes
etc). There would have to be some form of disruptions. But whether they are sta
ged or real is beyond the courts to determine. Intelligence reports can be the b
asis for this.
With this test and the new provisions in the 1987 Constitution, the case of G
arcia-Padilla v Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983), is, at last, overruled, and m
ay it be so always. In that case, the SC held that the President's proclamation
of martial law is beyond judicial review, and that the citizen can only trust t
hat the President acts in good faith.
There are 4 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted:
1) Lifting by the President himself
2) Revocation by Congress
3) Nullification by the Supreme Court
4) Operation of law after 60 days
G.] Emegrency Powers
Art. VI, Sec. 23(2):
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to exercise powers necessary and p
roper to carry out a declared national policy
1. In times of war or other national emergency
2. for a limited period and
3. subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe
4. Power ceases
a. Upon being withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
b. if there s no resolution, upon the next (voluntary) adjournment of Congress
When the President acts under the Commander-in-Chief clause, he acts under a
constitutional grant of military power, which may include the law-making power.
But when the President acts under the emergency power, he acts under a Congress
ional delegation of law-making power.
H.] Contracting and Guaranteeing Foreign Loans
Art. VII, Sec. 20:
Requisites for President to contract or guarantee foreign loans:
1. prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and
2. limitations under the law and the regulation of the monetary authority (Art.
XII, Sec. 21)
This is based on RA 4860 or the Foreign Loan Act. What used to be a statutory gr
ant of power is now a constitutional grant which Congress cannot take away, but
only regulate
I.] Power over Foreign Loans
(1) Treaty Making
Art. VII, Sec. 21: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effec
tive unless concurred in by at least twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Bayan v. Zamora (138587; 10/10/2000)
F: the Visiting Forces Agreement was treated as an executive agreement by the US
but it was treated as a treaty by the Senate
H: it is of no moment that US treated VFA as exec. agreement
The phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party acc
epts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting
state, the USA in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phr
ase.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only
as an executive agreement because under international law, an executive agreemen
t is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elemen
ts of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken eq
ually as a treaty.
Treaty distinguished from executive agreements
an international
Executive
Treaty
Must
becomebebinding
ratified
Agreements
through
by at executive
agreement
leastinvolving
2/3 action
votepolitical
ofwithout
the Senate
issues
need oforachanges
vote byofthenational
Senate pol
icyinternational
an and those involving
agreement
international
embodying adjustments
arrangementsofofdetail
a permanent
carryingcharacter
out well-est
ablished national policies and traditions, and those involving arrangements of a
Examples:
more or less
agreement
agreements
temporary
onrelating
tax,
nature
extradition,
to postal conventions,
alliance tariff rates, copyright, mo
st-favored nation clause
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961)
F: onion and garlic shipped by Eastern were seized since it did not comply with
CB circulars 44 and 45. This was based on EO No. 328, an executive agreement exte
nding the effectivity of our Trade and Financial Agreements with Japan. CTA over
ruled CIR saying the Executive Agreement is of dubious validity since the Senate
had not concurred
H: The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus patent. The concu
rrence of said House of Congress is required in the making of "treaties" (Sectio
n 10 [7], Article VII, Constitution), which are, however, distinct and different
from "executive agreements", which may be validly entered into without such con
currence.
USAFFE Veterans Association vs. Treasure 105 Phil. 1030 (1959)
F: foreseeing the war in the Pacific, Pres Roosevelt appropriated money to Phil
Army Forces (PAF). After the war, $35M remained so Pres Quirino proposed that th
is be considered as a loan, and repaid in 10 annual installments. The deal was c
oncluded and the RomuloSnyder Agreement. War veterans argued that then Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, Romulo was not authorized to sign the agreement
H: agreement is valid
From the point of view of international law, there is no difference between t
reaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon States concerned a
s long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. The d
istinction between so called executive agreements and treaties is purely a const
itutional one and has no international legal significance.
Executive Agreements may fall into 2 classes:
(1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting relations and independent
of or without legislative authorization, which may be termed as presidential ag
reements, and
(2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress, which have been de
signated as CongressionalExecutive Agreements.
The RomuloSnyder Agreement may fall under any of these 2 classes, for precise
ly on September 18, 1946, Philippine Congress specifically authorized the Presid
ent to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness with the US Government.
Even granting, arguendo, that there was no legislative authorization, it is m
aintained that the RomuloSnyder Agreement was legally and validly entered into to
conform to the second category which usually includes money agreements relating
to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may be said that this met
hod of settling such claims has come to be the usual way of dealing with matters
of this kind.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. John Gotamco & Sons, Inc. 148 SCRA 36 (1987
)
F: WHO constructed a bldg and informed its bidders that they are free from taxes
based on the HOST Agreement entered into between the Republic and WHO. CIR stil
l demanded 3% contractor's tax from WHO s contractor Gotamco
H: HOST Agreement is valid
While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate under the Constituti
on, less formal types of International Agreements may be entered into by the Chi
ef Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body.
The Host Agreement comes within the latter category; it is valid and binding in
ternational agreement even without the concurrence of the Philippine Senate. The
privileges and immunities granted to the WHO under the Host Agreement have been
recognized by this Court as legally binding on Philippine Authorities.
(2) Deportation of undesirable aliens
Lecture:
The age-old item here is on the validity of the issuance of the warrant
i.e. the warrant of arrest and subsequently his deportation.
We have made a distinction, that if the warrant for the arrest is issued
for purposes of determining first whether the alien is undesirable to stay in t
he country, then that warrant should be issued by the judge. But if there is alr
eady a prior determination that the alien s stay in the country is undesirable to
national security, interest or public interest, then the warrant may be issued b
y the authority of the President by the immigration department, not for the purp
ose of determining his undesirability, but for his immediate deportation.
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board 9 SCRA 27 (1963)
F: Petitioners (charged of hoarding dollars) contest the power of the Pres. to d
eport aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Bd. of the anc
illary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legi
slature. It is claimed that for the power to deport aliens be exercised, there
must be a legislation authorizing the same
H: alies may be deported (1) by order of the Pres., after due investigation, pu
rsuant to Sec. 69 of RAC, and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon reco
mmendation of the Bd. of Commissioners, under Sec. 37 of CA 613
President's power of investigation may be delegated to the Deportation Board.
-- The President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from
a reading of Sec. 69 of the RAC w/c provides for "a prior investigation, conduc
ted by said Executive or his authorized agent
Power to arrest aliens.-- Sec. 69 of the RAC does not provide for the exerci
se of the power to arrest. The contention xxx that the arrest of a foreigner is
necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when ther
e is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, th
e Pres. obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certa
inly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrest
ed. (there must be determination by the Board that the alien is undesirable befo
re the Board can issue warrant of arrest; OTHERWISE the court must issue the war
rant)
Power to order arrest of alien may not be delegated to Deportation Board by P
resident.-- Conceding w/o deciding that the Pres. can personally order the arre
st of alien, yet such power cannot be delegated by him to the Deportation Board.
The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exe
rcise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under spec
ific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted.
xxx And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be dele
gated, official functions requiring the exercised of discretion and judgement ma
y not be so delegated.
Go Tek vs. Deportation Board 79 SCRA 17 (09 September 1977)
F: Petitioner was arrested for possession of fake dollars and prosecuted under A
rt. 168 RPC. At the same time, deportation proceedings were brought against him
. He filed a petition for prohibition against the Deportation Board, contending
that he could only be deported on grounds enumerated in Sec. 37 (3) of the Immi
gration Law (of w/c possession of fake dollars is not) and only after conviction
.
H: Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek
The President's power to deport aliens derives from Sec. 69 of the Rev. Adm.
Code w/c does not specify the grounds for deportation of aliens but only provide
s that it be ordered after due investigation. The intention is to give the Chie
f Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the cou
ntry is so undesirable as to affect or inure the security, welfare, or interest
of the State. The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existe
nce of facts w/c warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigat
ion
Nowhere in the Constitution can you find a provision limiting the authority o
f the President to deport undesirable aliens. The reason for this is not to limi
t such authority.
The only test there is public interest requirement: national security, m
atters of the interests of the state, in general, public interest. Meaning, if
the continued stay of the alien is prejudicial to the interest of the public, th
en the Pres may order the deportation of the alien even if there is no law viola
ted. Even an acquittal by the Supreme Court for such any ground cannot constitut
e res judicata for the president to issue an order for the deportation of the al
ien.
J.] Power over Legislation
(a) Message to Congrgss
Art. VII, Sec. 23: The President shall address the Congress at the opening of it
s regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time. (State of the
Nation Address)
(b) Preparation and Submission of the Budget
Art. V111, Sec. 22: The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty day
s from the opening of every regualr session, as the basis of the general appropr
iations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including recei
pts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
(c) Veto Power (Art. VI, Sec. 27)
(d) Emergency Powers (Art. VI, Sec. 23 (2))
(e) Fixing of Tariff Rates
Art. VI, Sec. 28(2): The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restricttions as i
t may impose, tariff rates import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development pro
gram of the Government.
Garcia vs. Executive Secretary 211 SCRA 219 (1992)
F: President issued EO 475 & 478 imposing tax on petroleum products. Petitioner
argues that only Congress can issue revenuegenerating measures. He further argued
that EO No.'s 475 and 478 contravene Sec. 401 of the Tariff & Customs Code whic
h authorized the President to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to imp
ose additional duties ONLY when necessary to protect local industries or product
s but NOT for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the government.
H: EO No.'s 475 and 478 are valid
Under Sec. 24, Art. VI, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bi
lls, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the legislative
rather than the Executive department. There is an explicit constitutional permis
sion to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and res
trictions as Congress may impose" to fix "within specific limits tariff rates an
d other duties or imposts" (Sec. 28, Par. 2, Art. VI).
The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the President is a
uthorized to act under the TCC ONLY to protect local industries and products for
the sake of the national economy, general welfare and/or national security.
K.] Immunity From Suits
During his term:
Pres is immune from suit, regardless of whether the act complained of is
an official act or not.
Pres cannot be sued even if the acts were committed before his term.
EXCEPTION: Impeachment
r President s immunity from suit does not extend to his alter egos
r for other impeachable officers, they can be sued during their term provided th
e suit will not remove them from office
After his term:
Pres is only immune from suits arising from his official acts.
Carillo vs. Marcos GR No. 56461,06 April 1981 (Resolution)
The President as such cannot be sued, enjoying as he does immunity from
suit, but the validity of his acts can be tested by an action against the other
executive officials or such independent constitutional agencies as the Commissio
n on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
In Re: Satumino Bermudez 145 SCRA 160 (1986), supra.
F: Lawyers wants to clarify whether 1987 Constitution refers to Marcos and Tolen
tino OR Aquino and Laurel in talking about extension of term of Pres and VPres f
or the purpose of synchronization of election
H: Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this act
ion, it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit
against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Aquino, and it is equ
ally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being bro
ught to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
Soliven vs. Makasiar. 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
F: Pres Aquino filed a libel case against Beltran who argued that the reasons wh
ich necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability
to file suit. He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the Pr
esident's filing of her affidavitcomplaint, she may subsequently have to be a wit
ness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's privilege of immu
nity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing her
self to possible contempt of court or perjury.
H: The presidential immunity from suit may be invoked only by the holder of the
office, and not by any person in the President's behalf.
The rationale for the grant of the President of the privilege of immunity fro
m suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholder's time, al
so demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue
of the office and may be invoked by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President's behalf. Thus, as accused in a criminal case in which t
he President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving a privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed protection afford
ed by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice whether t
o exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. I
t is a decision which cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Gloria v. CA (338 S 5)
F: Icasiano was appointed by Pres Aquino as Schools Div Superintended in Marikin
a. He was reassigned by DECS Sec Gloria to Quezon. Icasiano sued Gloria who argu
es that the case is prohibited since Icasiano is attacking what is deemed an act
of the Pres thus covered by Doctrine of Presidential Immunity
H: The contention is untenable FOR THE simple reason that the petition is direct
ed against the petitioners and not against the President.
The questioned acts are those of the petitioners and not of the President. Fu
rthermore, Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where ther
e is grave abuse of discretion or that the President has acted without or in exc
ess of jurisdiction.
Estrada v. Desierto (146710-15; 3/2/2001)
I: Estrada claims executive immunity from the Ombudsman s investigations
H: Estrada does not enjoy immunity anymore
It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability f
or unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public offici
als are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting a
s such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope
of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It declared as a state p
olicy that (t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." It orda
ined that (p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficien
cy, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. It set the rule that (
t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public offi
cials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not b
e barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. It maintained the Sandiganbayan as
an anti-graft court. It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with
enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or age
ncy, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or ineff
icient. The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. These constit
utional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner s claim that a non-sitt
ing president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his i
ncumbency.
Estrada v. Desierto (146710-15; 4/3/2001)
I: Estrada argues that his immunity lasts until his term expires
H: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office
as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall su
cceed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent ac
tually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within
or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent onl
y with his tenure and not his term.
VICE PRESIDENT
Functions
1. Right to Succession: he is really elected to become the next President (Art.
VII, Sec. 8 & 11)
2. Membership in Cabinet
Art. VII, Sec. 3(2): The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the C
abinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT


I.] The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court is the only constitutionally created court. It cannot
be abolished by mere legislation. All the other courts which are of statutory c
reation may be abolished provided that the security of tenure is not undermined
A.] Composition (Art. VIII, Sec. 4)
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief justice and fourteen Associate
justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five,
or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occur
rence thereof.
Cases heard by SC en banc (decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Mem
bers who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and v
oted thereon)
1. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or execu
tive agreement, or law,
2. the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, pro
clamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations
Cases or matters heard by a division
1. shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Member
s who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and vote
d thereon, and
2. in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
3. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc
Doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed only by the court sitting en ban
c
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the
Resolution of November 18, 1993:
The following are considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamat
ion, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commiss
ion, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit:
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of
any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding PI 0,000.
00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in divi
sion may be modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) membe
rs thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majo
rity of the actual membership of the court en banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership m
ay deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
Note
1. The Court en banc is not an appellate court of the Court in division.
2. The division may refer a matter to the Court en banc en consulta.
MFR in a division:
r the division by at least 3 justices must agree that the matter must be referre
d to the court en banc.
r And the Court en banc by a majority accepts the matter referred.
r If the Court en banc refuses to accept the referral from the division, its ref
usal is final and not appealable.
r No motions for reconsideration allowed.
If there are 3 justices in a division who would refer the matter, the Supreme
Court en banc may still refuse the referral.

Fortich v. Corona [131457; 8/19/1999]


The Supreme Court interpreted Art VIII, Sec 4(3) by drawing a distinction bet
ween "cases" on the one hand, and "matters" on the other hand. such that cases a
re "decided", while matters are "resolved" On the basis of this distinction, onl
y cases are referred to the Supreme Court en banc for decision whenever the requir
ed number of votes is not obtained.
FIRESTONE vs. CA[G.R. No. 127022. June 28, 2000.|
F: case involves vast tract of land; petitioners asked the court the resolved th
eir MFR en banc
H: MFR will be resolved en banc; case scheduled for oral arguments
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc ent
ertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying t
hat the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective and fair justice.
The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en
banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has
taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the wel
l-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membersh
ip that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action
and decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the mem
bers of this highest Court of the land are always imbued with the noblest of int
entions in interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudenc
e, rules and Resolutions of the Court to the end that public interest be duly sa
feguarded and rule of law be observed.
B.] Appointment and Qualifications
For the Supreme Court Justices (Art. VIII, Sec. 7(l))
1. Natural Born Citizens
2. 40 yrs of age
3. 15 years experience as a judge or in the practice of law
4. Proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.
For lower collegiate courts
1. Natural Born
2. Member of the Bar
3. Proven competence, integrity, probity and independence
4. All the other qualifications shall be provided for by law.
For Lower Courts
1. No need to be natural born, only Filipino citizenship is required
2. Member of the Bar
3. Proven competence, integrity, probity and independence
4. Other qualifications are to be provided for by law.
Procedure for appointment:
Sec. 8(5): The Council (Judicial and Bar) shall have the principal function of r
ecommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions an
d duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Sec. 9(1): The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by th
eJjudicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirma
tion.
For the Supreme Court, the vacancy shall be filled up within 90 days fro
m the vacancy. For the lower collegiate courts/lower courts they shall be filled
up within the period of 90 days from the submission of the list of nominees to
the Pres.
Judges cannot be appointed in temporary capacity.

C.] Salary
Art. VIII, Sec. 10: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate justice
s of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. Dur
ing their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Constitutionally it has been fixed at P240,000 annual for the Chief Justice,
P204,000 for the associate justices. But they have increased due to the autonomy
of the judiciary. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 17).
It cannot be decreased but can be increased to take effect immediately.
Perfecto vs. Meer, (27 February 1950)
F: SC Justice Perfecto argued that his salary is not subject to income tax since
it would reduce his salary in violation of the Constitution
H: The imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereo
f, and violates the Constitution.
The imposition of such income tax upon the salaries of judges may imperil the
independence of the judicial department. The danger may be demonstrated. Suppos
e there is power to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary incurs the displ
easure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income tax law i
s amended so as to levy a 30% tax on an salaries of government officials on the
level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the judges by 30%, but the
y may not grumble because the tax is general on an receiving the same amount of
earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative branches in equal measure
.
Endencia. & Jugo vs. David (31 August 1953)
F:Because of Perfecto case, congress passed Sec. 13 of RA 590 which provides tha
t the constitutional provision against the diminution of salaries of members of
the judiciary should not be interpreted to mean an exemption from income tax
H: Sec 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional
The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the pow
er to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with reg
ard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not withi
n the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what
a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially af
ter the courts have in actual cases ascertained its meaning by interpretation an
d applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court dete
rmination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of the Cons
titution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interp
retation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That w
ould be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the funda
mental principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those
governing the separation of powers.
Nitafan vs. CIR (23 July 1987)
F: Under 1973 Const., there was a provision saying that no one will be exempt fr
om income taxes. But this provision was not included in 1987 Constitution. Now,
RTC judges argue that income tax on their salaries constitutes a decrease or dim
inution, invoking Meer.
H: salaries of Justices and judges are properly subject to a general income tax
law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by
justices and judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against d
ecrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on Art. VIII, Sec. 10
negate petitioner's contention. As originally drafted, this provision included
the following sentence: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be diminished nor subjected to income tax". But on objection principally of
Commissioners Rigos and Bernas, the word "diminished" was changed to "decreased"
and the prohibition against the taxation of the salaries of judges was deleted
to "give substance to equality among the 3 branches of the government". They agr
eed to discard the doctrine of the Perfecto and Endencia cases even as they agre
ed to have a provision similar to Sec. 6, Art. XV of the 1973 Constitution inclu
ded in the General Provisions but somehow overlooked to do so when they finally
approved the draft of the Constitution.
D.] Security of Tenure
Art. VIII, Sec. 11: The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower cour
ts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy ye
ars or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or ord
er their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Art. VII, Sec. 2(2): No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when i
t undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
De la LIana vs. Alba 112 SCRA 294 (12 March 1982)
F: Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) states that justices and judges
of inferior courts from the CA to MTCC, except Sandiganbayan and the CTA, would
be considered separated unless appointed. Upon the completion of the reorganiza
tion by the President, the courts affected "shall be deemed automatically abolis
hed and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." Petitioner argues th
at this contravened the security of tenure of judges under Art. X, Sec. 7 of the
Constitution.
H: BP129 is not unconstitutional; the abolition was valid since it was in good f
aith and based on reasonable grounds
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of the inferi
or courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no disti
nction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it
is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
For the members of the Supreme Court, we have to contend however with th
eir security of tenure and their immunity from prosecution. Members of the Supre
me Court can only be removed through impeachment. Unless they are impeached the
y are immune from prosecution during their tenure.
Q: If a Supreme Court justice rents your house, and does not pay, can yo
u file a case for unlawful detainer or ejectment against the Supreme Court justi
ce for not paying the rent? Is there a distinction between criminal cases and c
ivil cases from such prosecution?
Ans: As compared to the President where there seems to be, during his t
erm, a complete and holistic exemption from prosecution, with respect to the mem
bers of the Supreme Court, only case which may effectively remove them will be c
overed by the immunity.
E.] Removal
Art. VIII, Sec. 11: The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case a
nd voted thereon.
Art. XI, Sec. 2: SC justices are removable only by impeachment
IN RE: RAUL M. GONZALES , I60 SCRA 771 (15 April 1988)
F: a complaint for disbarment was filed against SC Justice Fernan
H: a disbarment case against a Supreme Court Justice will not prosper
There is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before su
ch liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must
first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under S
ections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the
Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to
answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for an
y wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in appropriate proceeding
s.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence a
nd separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is
important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court wou
ld be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number
of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court
.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer shou
ld forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of th
is Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachm
ent proceedings.
F.] Fiscal Autonomy
Art. VIII, Sec. 3: The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations
for the judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropr
iated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regu
larly released.
No need to request from the DBM.
G.] Jurisdiction
Judicial Power
Annotation: SC is not a Trier of Facts (358 S 829)
The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the apellation
given to such question by a party raising the same but whether the appellate co
urt can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence,
in which case it is a question of law, otherwise it is a question of fact.
Apropos this case being annotated, the Highest Tribunal is of the opinion and
so holds that petitioner is raising a factual issue, that is, whether petitione
r was illegally dismissed from his employment by the private respondents. Time a
nd again, it is held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is confined to a
review of questions of law. Exception is where the findings of fact are unsuppo
rted by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abus
e of discretion. Further, said the Final Arbiter of the Land, well-settled is th
e rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Estrada v. Desierto (146710-15; 3/2/2001)
I: Estrada states that this is a political question since it assails the legitim
acy of the Arroyo Gov t
H: The case at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues
for resolution require the proper interpretation of Sec1 of Art II and Sec 8 of
Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII in th
e 1987 Constitution. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presi
dential immunity from suit.
Tatad v. Sec of Dept of Energy [G.R. No. 124360. November 5, 1997.]
F: this questions the constitutionality of the Oil Deregulation Law
H: law is not unconstitutional
Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual cont
roversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but als
o the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrum
entality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have t
he inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates th
e Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declar
e such act as unconstitutional and void.
Our statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that petiti
oners are assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constituti
on and not because the law lacks wisdom. The principle of separation of power ma
ndates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should be resolved in o
ur courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in th
e halls of Congress. Every now and then, a law may be denounced in court both as
bereft of wisdom and constitutionally infirmed. Such denunciation will not deny
this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of the said law
while prudentially refusing to pass on its wisdom.
Taada v. Angara [G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997.]
F: questions the constitutionality of the WTO agreement
H: agreement does not contravene constitution
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it c
ontravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controve
rsy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infr
inged the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of th
e judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather th
an political. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretat
ion of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a lega
l issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
Cong. GARCIA vs. CORONA [G.R. No. 132451. December 17,1999.]
F: RA 8180, an oil deregulation law, was declared as unconstitutional by the SC.
So, Congress passed RA 8479, another deregulation law but this time the offendi
ng provisions were not included
H: the law is not unconstitutional
Reduced to its basic arguments, it can be seen that the challenge in this pet
ition is not against the legality of deregulation. Petitioner does not expressly
challenge deregulation. The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdo
m of the date when full deregulation should be effective.
In this regard, what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial determin
ation. Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great variety of relevant con
ditions, political, social and economic. They are not within the appropriate ran
ge of evidence in a court of justice. It would be an extravagant extension of ju
dicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis for the determination.
Bayan v. Executive |G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000.]
F: questioned the constitutionality of the VFA
H: VFA is constitutional
In cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing requir
ements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the p
arty claiming the right of judicial review.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question bas
ed on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments o
f the government a becoming respect for each others' acts, this Court neverthel
ess resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
(1) Art. VIII, Sec. 1
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower cou
rts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
1. to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and
2. to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amount
ing to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentali
ty of the Government.
Example, there is actually a presidential decree which prohibits the iss
uance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction against g
overnment contracts. Would that particular law prevent the judiciary from exerci
sing judicial authority and in the interim issue a TRO or preliminary injunction
?
While ordinarily, it should be understood as a general prohibition, but
if there is a grave abuse of discretion that law cannot prevent the courts from
exercising judicial authority. It is constitutionally granted.
All laws for that matter, cannot provide for the prohibition of the exer
cise of the constitutional authority. Of course, there must be a showing of grav
e abuse of discretion.
(2) Art. VIII, Sec. 5:
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other publi
c ministers and consuls and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the la
w or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
in
a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty internatio
nal or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instr
uction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c) All cases in which the jurisdiction. of any lower court is in issue.
d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or high
er.
e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations, as public inter
est may require. Such temporary assignments shall not exceed six months without
the, consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and. enforcement of constitutiona
l rights, pleading, practice, and. procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivilege
d. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speed
y disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and s
hall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapprove
d by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the
Civil Service Law.
Original Jurisdiction: (Art VIII, Sec 5(1))
This is shared with other courts RTC, CA. Thus it is actually Original C
oncurrent Jurisdiction
SC has Original Exclusive Jurisdiction over:
1. review of sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (Art VII, Sec 18);
and
2. SC en banc as PET (Art VII, Sec 7)
Appellate Jurisdiction:
While all criminal cases for the conviction decision imposed of reclusio
n perpetua or higher is appealable directly to the Supreme Court, for the Rules
of Court it is only the death sentence imposed which is automatically appealed.
In People v. Salle (under executive clemency), the judgment of convictio
n does not become final if there is an appeal, unless the appeal is waived in wr
iting.
For death penalty conviction, there can be no waiver in writing because
there is the direct and automatic appeal to the Supreme Court. So what the accus
ed will have to do, if he will have to ask for clemency is to wait for the Supre
me Court decision of the automatic review.
If the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the accused must appeal. A
lthough the appeal is with the Supreme Court, he must still file a notice of app
eal. The appeal is not automatic.
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP v. CA (258 S 186)
F: the church leased its properties to the Reyeses. The Reyes would like to buy
the property but it wants to correct the encroachment problem first
H: since the case involves question of fact, it cannot be resolved by the SC
Petitioner is correct in saying that decisions of the RTC may be directly revi
ewed by the SC on petition for review only if pure questions of law are raised (
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2)). But a careful analysis of the issues raised by respondent
in its appeal to respondent court reveals that they are not purely questions of
law. When respondent questioned the conclusion of the trial court that there wa
s no meeting of the minds between lessor and lessee regarding the sale of the le
ased property, a factual issue was raised. The issue of w/n there was a preferre
d contract of sale necessitates an inquiry into the facts and evidence on record
, and the question regarding the propriety of granting judgment on the pleadings
on the same rental arrears demands a scrutiny of the facts of the case.
People v. Flores [G.R. No. 106581. March 3, 1997.]
F: Flores and Macalintal were found guilty of murder and was sentenced to reclus
ion perpetua. After the prosecution, defense filed a demurrer to evidece with le
ave of court and waived his right to present evidence. From RTC, the appealed di
rectly to SC. They argue that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt be
yond reasonable doubt.
H: case is remanded to trial court; the waiver seem to be involuntary
This Court having been constitutionally mandated to directly review cases whe
re the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, has the power to review the enti
re case to correct any error, even if unassigned. The adjudication of: cases inv
olving the transcendental matter of life and liberty of a person, requires our u
tmost consideration. Thus, though there was not even the slightest protestation
by counsel regarding the issue of accused-appellants' waiver, we shall consider
the same in the interest of justice.
The lower court, in view of the severity of the imposable penalty, ought to h
ave inquired into the voluntariness and full knowledge of the consequences of ac
cused-appellants' waiver. Though the Rules require no such inquiry to be underta
ken by the court for the validity of such waiver or any judgment made as result
of the waiver, prudence, however requires the Court to ascertain the same to avo
id any grave miscarriage of justice. Although accused-appellants' waiver amazed
the lower court, nevertheless, the record is devoid of any facts which would ind
icate that the lower court took steps to assure itself of accused-appellants' vo
luntariness and full knowledge of the consequences of their waiver.
Echegaray v. Sec of Justice [G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999.]
F: This is a MFR on the TRO earlier issued by the SC to postpone Echegaray s execu
tion because Congress might reconsider the death penalty law. Secretary argued t
hat SC has no jurisdiction to issue the TRO since Echegaray s case has become fina
l, thus beyond its jurisdiction
H: SC has jurisdiction; TRO did not change the decision
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Consti
tution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lo
wer courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the most important part of
a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decision
s where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairnes
s. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have
been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and
orders to make them conformable to law and justice. For this purpose, Section 6
of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or j
udicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to car
ry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure
to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed
out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears
repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own
Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of superveni
ng events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular m
isimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the li
fe of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there
is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the Uni
ted States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to s
uspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over ar
guments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. F
or the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can prote
ct the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our governm
ent.
(3) Art VIII, Sec 18, par.3
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citiz
en, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or t
he suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must pr
omulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing
(4) Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests r
elating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- P
resident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Lopez vs. Roxas (28 July 1966)
F:questioned the constitutionality of creating PET through RA 1793 saying it is
illegal for Justices of the SC to sit as members of the PET since the decisions
thereof are appealable to the SC on questions of law and hence it is a court inf
erior to the SC; Congress cannot, by legislation, appoint in effect the members
of the PET and Constitution did not authorize the creation of PET
H: PET was valid since no new court was created but SC justices were only given
additional duties thus no appointment was made; PET is part of judicial power
The determination and adjudication of an election contest is a judicial power
, and pursuant to the Constitution, "the judicial power shall be vested in the S
C and in such inferior courts as may be established by law", and "Congress shall
have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the vario
us courts" subject to limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
Since the power to be judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of any public officer is essentially JUDICIAL, the purpose of th
e Constitution in providing that the Senate and the House shall each have an ele
ctoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to electi
on, returns, etc. of their respective members, was to EXCLUDE the power to decid
e such contest from the operation of the general grant of judicial powers to the
SC and such inferior courts as may be established by law. Hence, instead of ind
icating that Congress may not enact RA 1793, that said provision of the Constitu
tion establishing the Electoral Tribunals for Members of Congress only proves th
e exact opposite.
The power of Congress to declare who among the candidates for President and/o
r Vice President, has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely differen
t in nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the PET by
RA 1793. The duty of Congress in the first is ministerial and executive in char
acter; that of the Tribunal is the judicial power to determine whether or not su
ch duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with,
or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and if
not, to recount the ballots cast, and, incidentallv thereto, pass upon the vali
dity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the
affirmative, in whose favor.
SANTIAGO v. RAMOS (253S 559)
What happened here was that there was deemed to be an abandonment or wai
ver of a right of the protestant to the public office contested because she soug
ht election to and run and won in another political office. Aside from the fact
that she failed to comply with the rules for additional payment.
(5) Art. IXA, Sec. 7:
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case o
r matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorand
um required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless o
therwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the agg
rieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
H.] Cogressional Power Over Jurisdiction of Supreme Court
Art. VIII, Sec. 2(1): The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, an
d apportion the jurisdiction of the various court but may not deprive the Suprem
e Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
Art. VI, Sec. 30: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction o
f the Supreme Court as nrovided in this Constitution without its advice and conc
urrence.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC v. CA [G.R. No. 110571. October 7, 1994.]
The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, Sec. 30 that "No law shall be passe
d increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence." This provision is intended to
give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appella
te jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its a
ppellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine i
ts essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspect
s. Now, Art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct ap
peals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, incre
ases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without the
advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, wit
h the result that it can never be deemed to have amended BP Blg. 129, Sec. 9. Co
nsequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it
from the BOI must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, to
be exercised by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No.
1-91. Indeed, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must
be directly appealed to this Court. As already noted in the main decision in thi
s case, the purpose of Sec. 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide uniform appeals to
the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial a
gencies, with the exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those
rendered by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettab
le that in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 the advice and c
oncurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the Constitution, had not been o
btained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final orders of the BOI
directly to the Supreme Court.
Fabian vs. DESIERTO |G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998.1
F: Fabian appealed to the SC the Ombudsman decision invoking Sec 27 of RA 6770.
Nobody questioned the constitutionality of this provisions
H: the provision is unconstitutional bec. no law can be passed increasing the ap
pellate jurisdiction of the SC without it consent
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions whic
h are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of cert
ain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdi
ction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a
statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstituti
onal, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determin
e whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire
into the constitutionality of the statute.
I.] Administrative Powers (Non- judicial powers of the Supreme Court)
(1) Supervision of Lower Courts
Art. VIII, Sec. 6: The Supreme Court shall have the administrative supervision o
ver all courts and the personnel thereof.
Maceda vs. Vasquez (22 April 1993)
F: Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office filed before the Office of the Ombudsm
an a complaint against RTC Judge Maceda saying he falsified his Certificate of S
ervice. Maceda argues that he cannot be investigated by the Ombudsman because th
e offense charged against him arose from a judge's performance of his official d
uties, which is under the control and supervision of the SC.
H: Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
In the absence of any administrative action taken against a judge by the SC w
ith regard to his certificates of service, the investigation. being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the SC's power of administrative supervision over
all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of pow
ers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the SC admini
strative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Jus
tice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By
virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges' and court p
ersonnels' compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action a
gainst them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power without running afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificate
of service to the SC for determination of whether said certificates reflected t
he true status of his pending case load, as the SC has the necessary records to
make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel the SC, as one of the thr
ee branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to t
estify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavitc
omplaint.
If a judge or other court personnel has committed criminal acts, not ste
mming from the exercise of administrative functions, then they can be investigat
ed directly by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Dolalas v. Omb-Min (265 S 819)
F: Villarente charged Judge Dolalas and his clerk of court before the Omb-Min of
unnecessary delay in the administration of justice
The complaint against petitioner judge before the Office of the Ombudsman is
basically administrative in nature. The Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdict
ion to initiate an investigation into the alleged "undue delay in the dispositio
n of the case" as said charge relates to a judge's performance of his official d
uties over which the Supreme Court has administrative control and supervision, a
s mandated under Section 6, Art VIII of the 1987 Constitution. It must be borne
in mind that the resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying the
disposition of the said criminal case involves the determination of whether, in
resolving the alarms and scandals case, petitioner-judge acted in accordance wit
h the guidelines provided in the Rules of Court and in the Administrative Circul
ars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is
clearly an administrative matter.
De Vera vs. PELAYO [G.R. No. 137354. July 6, 2000.1
F: DeVera filed a criminal charge against Judge Pelayo and insisted that the Omb
udsman has jurisdiction over the case. Ombudsman instead referred the case to th
e SC
H: SC has jurisdiction
Before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 a
nd 205 (knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be entertained, the
re must first be "a final and authoritative judicial declaration" that the decis
ion or order "in question is indeed "unjust." The pronouncement may result from
either:
1. action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity
of the judgment; or
2. administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely fo
r promulgating an unjust judgment or order
Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the di
sposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial function.

JUDGE CAOIBES, JR. vs. OMBUDSMAN [G.R. No. 132177. July 19, 2001.]
F: 2 justices fought at the Hall of Justice. Caoibes filed a case before the Omb
udsman and the SC.
H: SC has jurisdiction over the case thus the preliminary investigation of the O
mbudsman must be suspending pending the administrative investigation of the SC
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who we
re entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture.
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which
is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its per
sonnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself
and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,
involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases
against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Cou
rt for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.
This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based o
n the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with
the Court. For, aside from the fect that the Ombudsman would not know of this ma
tter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition
of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an
administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrativ
e liabilities but also other administrative concerns.
JUDGE FUENTES vs. OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO [G.R. No. 124295. October 23, 2001.)
F: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the
exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the sa
me acts before the Supreme Court
H: Ombudsman cannot investigate
The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative co
mplaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to inv
estigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Cou
rt, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the P
residing Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court cle
rk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court
personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrud
e into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary an
d the doctrine of separation of powers.
(2) Temporarily Assign Lower Judges to Other Stations in the Public Interest
Art. VIIL Sec. 5(3): Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stati
ons as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed s
ix months without the consent of the judge concerned.
The requirements are:
1. it is temporary capacity
2. public interest must require it
3. if the assignment shall exceed 6 months, the judge concerned must concur. Oth
erwise he should be returned back to his official station.
(3) Order A Change of Venue or Place of Trial to Avoid Miscarriage of Justice
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(4): Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a misca
rriage of justice.
(4) Discipline of Judges
Art. VIII, Sec. 11: The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower cour
ts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy (7
0) years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Su
preme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, o
r order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part. in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
People v. Gacott [G.R. No. 116049. July 13, 1995.]
F: Judge Gacott argues that only the Court en banc can discipline him, quoting t
he 2nd sentence of Art VIII, Sec 11. Gacott was reprimanded and fined with P10T
by 2nd Division for gross ignorance of the law. This was his MFR.
H: the 2nd division has jurisdiction to discipline Gacott
At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly
shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause
which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary pow
er to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Co
urt en banc. it was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary ca
ses should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an a
bsurdity, as will hereafter be explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein
and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other
hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority o
f the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the c
ase and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case mus
t be deliberated upon decided by the full Court itself.
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges
of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in
cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charg
es against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does no
t exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that
the administrative matter may be decided in division.
(5) Appointment of Officials and Employees of the Entire Judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(6): Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary ill a
ccordance with the Civil Service Law.
J.] Rule Making

Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5): The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: ... 5)
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rig
hts, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the pract
ice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide
a. a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
b. shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
c. shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain eff
ective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court
.
Art. XII, Sec. 14, Par. 2: The practice of all professions in the Philippines sh
all be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.
Art. VII, Sec. 18, Par. 3: The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proce
eding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclama
tion of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extens
ion therof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.
K.] No QuasiLudicial and Administrative Work of Judges
Art. VIII, Sec. 12: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts establi
shed by shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or adminis
trative functions.
In Re Ludge Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246 (1988)
F: Judge Manzano inquired whether his designation as a Member of the Ilocos Nort
e Provincial Committee on Justice violates the Constitution
H: such designation violates the Constitution
The Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS. A
dministrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgatio
n of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or
such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its ex
istence.
Under the Constitution, the members of the SC and other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administra
tive functions. (Sec. 12, Art. VIL Constitution, DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWER
S.)
NOTE: This declaration does not mean that RTC judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to the Province/City Committe
e on Justice. As incumbent RTC judges, they form part of the structure of govern
ment. Their integrity and performance in the ajudication of cases contribute to
the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an ord
erly society. Even as nonmembers of the Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RT
C judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudabl
e purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be REASONABLY
INCIDENTAL to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
Q: Can justices sit as honorary members of the Peace and Order Council?
ANS: If that body is not performing such tasks as quasi-judicial or quasi-leg
islative for that matter, just like a coordinating council, no policy determinat
ion, then it may be allowable. But as soon as they exercise quasi-judicial, or q
uasi-legislative powers, it is not allowable.
The reason for this is that judgments or orders of the members of the ju
diciary must be reviewable only by the higher appellate court. The judgment of
the members of the judiciary should not be reviewable by the members of the exec
utive department.
L.] Report on the judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 16: The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening
of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congre
ss an annual report on the operations and activities of the judiciary.
M.] Manner of Sitting and Votes Required
Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Just
ice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or its discretion, in d
ivisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within n
inety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, internationa
l or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court, en
banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation
of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and o
ther regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Mem
bers who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and v
oted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved w
ith the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the d
eliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, withou
t the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number i
s not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine o
r principle or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en
banc.
Rule 56, Sec. 7: Procedure if opinion is equally divided.  Where the court en b
anc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority opinion cannot be h
ad, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the act
ion shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court; in appealed cases,
the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental
matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
Rule 125, Sec. 3: Decision if opinion is equally divided.  When the court en ba
nc is equally divided in opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had, the ca
se shall be reheard, and if in rehearing no decision is reached, the judgment of c
onviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted.
The voting now follows the rule of shifting majority . It will be dependent on 2 t
hings:
1. Those who actually took part in the deliberations.
2. There is a quorum.
The important thing is that there must be a quorum. Out of that quorum,
a majority is necessary for purposes of performing official business.
With respect to the divisions, there are special rules. It still shifts
but in no case less than 3 votes. You also have to get the quorum first.
Who are considered in determining a quorum?
All the members are to be included. What if a member of the Court is in
the US, should his number be included? No.
But for those who actually took part, for the purpose of determining the
validity of the votes, those who abstained but present in the deliberations are
considered for determining the majority vote.
Those who inhibited or disqualified themselves are not included for the
purpose of determining the majority vote.
So those who actually took part, whether they voted or not, are consider
ed.
In civil cases, if the division does not reach a decision because they a
re equally divided, what should be done? (Fortich Case) If it is a case, then it
should be referred to the court en banc, but if it is an incidental matter, it
will not be referred to the Court en banc.
N.] Requirement as to Decisions
Art. VIII, Secs. 13: The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitt
ed to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation be
fore the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Cour
t. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued an
d a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties.
Any member who took no part, or dissented or abstained for a decision or resolu
tion must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by
all lower collegiate courts.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expres
sing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the cou
rt shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefo
r.
Consing vs. CA (29 August 1989)
F: Consing argues that the CA decision does not comply with the requirements of
Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution
H: absence of the certification does not invalidate the decision because of the
presumption of regularity
The certification requirement, however, is a new provision introduced by the
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of
the constitutional requirement that decisions of the SC and lower collegiate co
urts (CA, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals) are reached after consultation wi
th the members of the Court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is
assigned to a member thereof for decisionwriting. The decision is thus rendered b
y the Court as a body and not merely by a member thereof.
The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that th
e case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation before being
assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the Court since the reg
ular performance of official duty is presumed.
The lack of certification would only serve as evidence of failure to observe
the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsi
ble for the omission to account therefor. Such absence of certification would no
t have the effect of invalidating the decision.
Dadubo vs. CSC, 223 SCRA 747 (1993)
F: Dadubo contends that the decision of the CSC on the motion for reconsideratio
n filed by the DBP failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based
H: Petitioner's complaint that the CSC resolution failed to comply with the cons
titutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and law on whic
h a decision is based, is without merit. This provision applies only to courts o
f justice and not to administrative bodies like the CSC.
If it is a minute resolutions, like resolutions under the 2nd par, petitions
are outright denied, motions for reconsideration (MFR) are denied, it is not nec
essary that these are signed by justices.
Only in decisions on the merits of the case, will there be the requireme
nt of voting as well as certification indicated in the decision itself. But for
outright denials of petitions as well as denials of motions for reconsideration,
they need not sign.
Mangelen vs. CA 215 SCRA 230 (1992)
F:CA decision on MFR states xxx defendantsappellants have good and valid defenses
as amplified in their motion for reconsideration ... the motion for reconsiderat
ion .. is hereby granted. Let this case be remanded to the lower court xxx"
H: The CA resolution completely overturned its earlier decision. Such resolution
should state the factual and legal foundation relied upon. Aside from being req
uired by the Constitution, the court should be able to justify such sudden chang
e of course; it must be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its sole
mn conclusions and pronouncements. Its decision to remand the case back to the l
ower court leaves the latter in limbo because it is not the latter's challenged
decision which was reversed but rather the CA's own decision.
Should that resolution granting the MFR, should that comply the 2nd par
or the 1st par? The contention of the respondent was, since it is a MFR, only th
e legal basis should be stated.
But the Supreme Court ruled that if a decision is by reason of MFR recon
sidered and set aside, the court must restate the facts and the law why the MFR
was granted. The court has to explain why the earlier pronouncements are taken b
ack.
So if a MFR therefore is denied, no need to restate the facts because th
e decision stands. But if the MFR of the decision is granted, and the decision w
as reversed and set aside, then the court must restate a new set of facts, a new
set of legal basis as to why the reconsideration was granted. It is as if, ther
e is a new decision.
PEOPLE vs. M/SGT. REYNALDO LANDICHO (258 S 1)
In several cases, normally in criminal cases, like the case of Landicho,
where there is a question of why did the court took the findings of facts of on
e party and not mine, why did the court believe the evidence of one party and no
t mine? Well that is weight and sufficiency.
The appreciation of evidence does not mean that all evidence admitted ar
e to be taken with weight because as you all know, weight and sufficiency is dif
ferent from admissibility.
FRANCISCO vs. PERMSKUL (173 S 324)
F: RTC issued a memorandum decision affirming MTC decision
H: memorandum decision is allowed but it must make the party to have easy refere
nce to the decision
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact
and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which i
s to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to
the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference
to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being
adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. I
n other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lo
wer court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision
.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should
be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is
an additional condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resor
ted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or
easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications invol
ved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandu
m decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collecti
on cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the
time needed to dismiss it.
PILIPINAS KAO, INC. vs. CA [G.R. No. 105014. December 18, 2001]
For added measure, this Court cannot ignore the fact, so obvious upon the rec
ord, that respondent BOI did not render a decision in the manner prescribed by i
ts own rules and the law. We take cognizance of the flaw because it has a bearin
g on the timeliness of the petition, a key issue involved in this case, which ha
s to be resolved in order to arrive at a just decision on the merits of the case
. Moreover, the perceived shortcoming also offers the opportunity to remind BOI
and other quasi-judicial agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions of the pre
scription of the law and in the case of BOI, also its own rules, that their deci
sion in contested cases shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinct
ly the facts and the law on which these are based. Indeed, a judicious and well-
reasoned resolution of the questions peculiar in their fields of expertise, carr
ies a strong persuasive effect and will go a long way in easing the courts' burd
en.
PADUA vs. RANADA [G.R. No. 141949. October 14, 2002.]
F: Padua wants to stop toll free increases by saying that it was illegal and to
implement a CA decision which excluded some places from the PNCC franchise
H: petition is dismissed
Petitioner Padua's motion is a leap to a legal contest of different dimension
. As previously stated, G.R. No. 141949 is a petition for mandamus seeking to co
mpel respondent Judge Ranada to issue a writ of execution for the enforcement of
the Court of Appeal's Decision dated August 4, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13235. Th
e issue therein is whether the application for a writ of execution should be by
a mere motion or by an action for revival of judgment. Thus, for petitioner Padu
a to suddenly interject in the same petition the issue of whether Resolution No.
2001-89 is valid is to drag this Court to his web of legal convolution. Courts
cannot, as a case progresses, resolve the intrinsic merit of every issue that co
mes along its way, particularly those which bear no relevance to the resolution
of the case.
Certainly, petitioner Padua's recourse in challenging the validity of TRB Res
olution No. 2001-89 should have been to institute an action, separate and indepe
ndent from G.R. No. 141949.
O.] Mandatotory for Deciding Cases
Art. VII, Sec. 18(3); Art. XVIII, Sec. 12-14
Art. VIII, Sec. 15:
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution mus
t be decided or resolved within 24 months from date of submission for the Supre
me Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, 12 months for all lower col
legiate courts, and 3 months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be demed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this
effect signed by the Chief justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be iss
ued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served
upon the parties.
The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rende
red or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, wit
hout prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence t
hereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determi
nation, without further delay.
Cases filed after February 2, 1987
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution mu
st be decided within twenty-four months counted from the date of submission." [
Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)]
A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court
or by the court itself. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(2)]
Mandatory period in the Supreme Court: 24 months [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)]
Except: A proper case questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege which must be
decided 30 days from filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1.)
But what happens if the judge or court fails to meet the deadline anyway? Th
e Constitution provides:
Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding Judge shall forthwith be is
sued, and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and serve
d upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution
has been rendered or issued within said period. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (3)]
Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, wi
thout prejudice to such responsibility (administrative disciplinary action again
st the judge or justices) shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted t
hereto for determination without further delay. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(4)]
In other words, failure to decide the case [for reasons other than the i
nability to reach the necessary majority] has no consequence on the case. Thus,
a certification is required that the period has lapsed without any decision bein
g made, stating the reason for such inaction. Then the court must decide withou
t any further delay. The consequences are on the judge: (a) he could not draw o
ut his salary, since he would not be able to certify that he has resolved all ca
ses submitted to him in 90 days and (b) he is subject to administrative sanction
s.
Cases filed before February 2, 1987 but expire after this date
The provisions of Art. VIII, Sec, 15(3) - (4) shall apply to cases or ma
tters filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the applicable pe
riod lapses after such ratification. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 14)
In other words, it is as if these cases were filed after February 2, 198
7.
Cases that expired before February 2, 1987
The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitut
ion, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or mat
ters submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the SC as
soon as practicable. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 13.)
The Supreme Court shall, within 1 year from February 2, 1987 adopt a sys
tematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending
in the SC or lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A simi
lar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. (Art
. XVIII, Sec. 12.)
Q: He just assumed the office, he was appointed or promoted. And he asked the Su
preme Court, who should decide all these pending cases left by the former judge
and then he failed to perform that?
Supreme Court: You should and you failed, you re fined. Well, only justices of
the lower courts are to be considered with mandated periods in deciding cases.
Technically, all are supposed to be responsible for failing to discharge
the functions as required to render decisions within the mandated periods.
Mosquera v. Legaspi (335 S 326)
Sec 15, Art VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases filed before the
lower courts must be decided or resolved w/in 3 months from the date of submiss
ion. Non-observance of this mandate constitutes a ground for administrative sanc
tion against the defaulting judge. A judge's failure to resolve cases submitted
for decision w/in the reglementary period constitutes a serious violation of the
constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
Assuming the judge has his own reasons, even if true, they could only mitigat
e his liability but do not totally exculpate him from his responsibility unless
an extension has been sought and granted by the court for meritorious reasons, e
.g., when a difficult question of law is involved. A judge should at all times r
emain in full control of the proceedings in his sala and should follow the time
limit set for deciding cases. He should not be at the mercy of the whims of lawy
ers and parties for it is not their convenience w/c should be the primordial con
sideration but the administration of justice.
HEIRS OF CRISOSTOMO SUCALDITO vs. JUDGE MAGNO C. CRUZ [Adm. Matter. No. RTJ -99-
1456. July 27, 2000.]
F: it took judge 6 months to resolve motion for inhibition yet at this report to
the SC, he said he resolved all pending motions within 90 days
H: judge is guilty of delay and fined which will be deducted from his retirement
pay
For the speedy disposition of cases, a judge is called upon by law to resolve
cases and incidents pending before him within the prescribed period of time. Fai
lure to comply therewith constitutes gross inefficiency which is punishable admi
nistratively.
Under Section 15(1) 6 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Ru
le 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to dispose of their
cases promptly and decide them within the prescribed periods. The failure of a
judge to decide a case seasonably constitutes gross inefficiency.
Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law
is a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy dis
position of their cases. The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one
's pay check but an instrument by which courts can safeguard the constitutional
right of the people to a speedy disposition of their cases.
Prosecutor VISBAL vs. Judge RAMOS [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1306. March 20, 2001.]
F: prosecutor delegated his task to the private prosecutor yet he was still orde
red by the judge to appear. It took the judge months to rule on the Offer of Evi
dence submitted by the prosecution
H: judge is reprimanded since it should have been resolved within 90 days
Judges must resolve matters pending before them promptly and expeditiously wi
thin the prescribed period. If they fail to do so, they should ask the Supreme C
ourt for an extension, citing meritorious grounds therefore. Otherwise, they may
be charged with gross inefficiency and sanctioned administratively.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE CASTILLO [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1634. Octo
ber 25, 2001.]
F: OCA recommended adm. sanction against Castillo for rendering a decision beyon
d 90-day period. Subsequently, OCA found that the judge rendered the decision wi
thin the 90-day period thus OCA recommended the dismissal of the adm. case
H: adm. charge is dismissed
Article V1I1, Section 15(1) of the Constitution requires judges of lower cour
ts to decide cases or resolve matters within three months from the date of their
submission for resolution. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct s
imilarly enjoins judges to dispose of their business and decide cases within the
required period. Failure to do so promptly and expeditiously constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.
There is no gainsaying, however, that the ninety-day period applies only afte
r the case is submitted for decision, not from the start of the trial. A case or
matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, briefer memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the c
ourt itself
LICAROS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 145851. November 22, 2001.]
F: it took 10 years to resolve the criminal case against Licaros
H: Sandigan should have resolved the case within 90-day s from submission
It has been held that a breach of the right of the accused to the speedy disp
osition of a case may have consequential effects, but it is not enough that ther
e be some procrastination in the proceedings. In order to justify the dismissal
of a criminal case, it must be established that the proceedings have unquestiona
bly been marred by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
In the case before us, the failure of the Sandiganbayan to decide the case ev
en after the lapse of more than ten years after it was submitted for decision in
volves more than just a mere procrastination in the proceedings, From the explan
ation given by the Sandiganbayan, it appears that the case was kept in idle slum
ber, allegedly due to reorganizations in the divisions and the lack of logistics
and facilities for case records. Had it not been for the filing of this Petitio
n for Mandamus, petitioner would not have seen any development in his case, much
less the eventual disposition thereof. The case remains unresolved up to now, w
ith only respondent court's assurance that at this time "work is being done on t
he case for the preparation and finalization of the decision."
II.] Lower Courts
A.] Qualifications and Appointment
r Art, VIII Sec. 7(2): Congress shall prescribe qualification for lower court ju
stices
r Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5): principal function of JBC
r Art. VIII, Sec. 9: appointments made within 90 days from the submission of the
list.
B.] Salary (Art. VIII, Sec. 10): salary fixed by law; not decreased during their
continuance in office
C.] Congressional Power to Reorganize and Security of Tenure
Art. VIII, Sec. 11; Art. VIII Sec. 2(2)
De la Llana vs. Alba (12 March 1987)
F: constitutionality of BP 129
Now, nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an offic
e is within the competence of a legislative body if done in good faith. The test
is whether the abolition is in good faith. As that elements is present in the e
nactment of BP 129, the lack of merit of the
Petition becomes apparent. There is no reason to doubt that inferior courts a
re abolished by the new ones provided in the Act instead of existing ones merely
given new names.
D.] Removal
Art. VIII, Sec. 11: hold office until they reach the 70 years old or become inca
pacitated to discharge the duties of their office
The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actu
ally took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
E.] Jurisdiction (Art. VIII, Sec. 1)
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
F: 6 carabaos were confiscated after being transported in violation of EO 626-A;
RTC declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked au
thority to do so
H: Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may prov
ide, final judgments of lower courts" in cases involving the constitutionality o
f certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the
first instance. This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nontheless not
prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by
the highest tribunal.
F.] Requirement as to Preparation of Decisions (Art. VIII, Sec. 14)
G.] Mandatory Period for Deciding Cases (Art, VIII Sec. 12-15)
Lower collegiate courts: 12 months, unless reduced by the SC
Other lower courts: 3 months, unless reduced by the SC
III.] The Judicial and Bar Council
Art. VIII, Sec. 8: (1) A judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the su
pervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief justice as ex officio Chair
man, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex offici
o, Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retire
d Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President fo
r a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of th
e Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve
for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired justice for tw
o years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio, of the
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may b
e determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual
budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees
to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it.
Member
(term
Appointment,
*Ex-Officio doesofnotinitially
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since
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the position in the Council is good only while the person
is the occupant of the office
321RSCepresentative
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ecretary
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(4) of its proceedings
Functions:
1. Recommend appointees to the Judiciary [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)]
2. Recommend appointees to the Office of the Ombudsman and his 5 deputies. (Art.
XI, Sec. 9)
3. Such other functions and duties as the SC may assign [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)]
The reason for the creation of the JBC is to afford independence in the
judiciary. So that the appointees are not Presidential appointees technically, t
hey can only be appointed by the President if duly recommended by the JBC.
IV.] Automatic Release of Appropriations for the judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 3: The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for
the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriat
ed for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regular
ly released.
V.] Court Martial
Republic vs. Asuncion 231 SCRA 211 (1994)
F: PNP member Manio shot to death T/ Sgt. Satang. He was charged with homicide
H: The term "civil courts" and "regular courts" were used interchangeably or wer
e considered as synonymous by the Bicameral Conference Committee and then by the
Senate and House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term "regular courts" in
Sec. 46 of RA 6975 means civil courts. There could have been no other meaning in
tended since the primary purpose of the law is to remove from courtsmartial juris
diction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in the c
ourts within our judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which, as contradistingu
ished from courtsmartial, are the regular courts within the Philippine judicial s
ystem. Courtsmartial are not courts within the Philippine judicial system; they p
ertain to the executive department of the government and are simply instrumental
ities or the executive power. Otherwise stated, courtsmartial are not regular cou
rts.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS


No members of a Constitutional Commission shall during his "tenure" : (Art. IXA,
Sec. 2)
a. Hold any other office or employment. (This is similar to the prohibition agai
nst executive officers. It applies to both public and private offices and emplo
yment.)
b. Engage in the practice of any profession.
c. Engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way m
ay be affected by the functions of his office.
d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or i
n any franchise or privilege granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agenc
ies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries
So, Commissioner of the Comelec cannot be an active manager of a printing bus
iness or printing company because of the possibility that the company will bid f
or the printing of election materials or election paraphernalia. Other than that
, he can engage in supermarkets, sari-sari store, etc.
1CSCChair
Composition
COA
Comelec
12 Chair
Commissioners
16 Chair
Commissioners
2 Commissioners
Natural born citizens
Qualifications
At least 35 years old at the time of the appointment
Not candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding
the appointment (refers to national election)
Proven
Holders
CPA s with
capacity
of College
not less
forDegree
public
than 10administration
years of auditing experience, or lawyers who have bee
n engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years
Majority, including Chair, must be lawyers and engaged in practice of law for at
least 10 years
*Atw/noCAtime
Appointment
Consent
shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession
* Appointment to vacancy is only for the unexpired term of predecessor
* Cannot be appointed or designated in a temp. or acting capacity
7 years w/out reappointment
Term
Term of= 7those
Chair yearsinitially appointed
1st Commissioner = 5 years
32ndMembers
Commissioner
= 7 years
= 3 years
2 Members = 5 years
1 Member = 3 years
Chair = 7 years
1st Commissioner = 5 years
2nd Commissioner = 3 years
Art. V11, Sec. 13, Par. 2: The spouse and relatives by consanguinity, or affi
nity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure
be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or
offices, including governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidia
ries.
Common Provisions:
1. Appointment of Personnel (Art IX-A, Sec 4): The Constitutional Commissions sh
all appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law.
2. Salary (Art XVIII Sec 17; Art IX-A, Sec 3):
a. Constitution initially provided annual salary of P204T for the Chair and P180
T for the Commissioners
b. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and sh
all not be decreased during their tenure.
3. Impeachment (Art XI, Sec 2): can only be removed by impeachment
Civil Service Commission
I.] Composition and Qualification of Commissioners (Art. IXB, Sec. 1(1))
II.] Appointment and Term of Office of Commissioners; Rule against Reappointment
(Art IX-B, Sec 1(2))
III.] Appointment of Personnel of CSC (Art. IXA, Sec. 4)
IV.] Salary (Art. XVIII, Sec. 17; Art. IXA, Sec. 3)
V.] Disqualifications (Art. IXA, Sec. 2)
VI.] Impeachment (Art. XI, Sec. 2)
VII.] Scope of the Civil Service
Art. IXB, Section 2(1): The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including governmentowned or c
ontrolled corporations with original charters.
For definition of "governmentowned or controlled corporations with original chart
ers:
Art. XII, Sec. 16: The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Governmento
wned or controlled corporations may be created or establised by special charters
in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viabilit
y.
JUCO v. NLRC (277 S 528)
F: Juco was dismissed by NHC. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
NLRC w/c dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. NHC appealed until it reached SC
which states that NLRC has juris. In the meantime, Juco filed a case before CSC
. NHC moved that CSC has no juris
H: The NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction
because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters such as the NHC. Having been i
ncorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are gove
rned by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Rel
ations Commission.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel are owned by the GSIS, a GOCC. GSI
S has an original charter. But Manila Hotel is a corporation in the hotel indust
ry created and established under the corporation law. So even if it is controlle
d by, more than 50% owned by the government or a GOCC with original charter, it
is still not covered by the CSC.
The employees are not Civil Service employees if there is a labor disput
e involving rights of the employees they are covered under the Labor Code.
Commission on Elections
LOONG v. COMELEC (305 S 832)
I: WON, COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered a manual count of
the 1998 Sulu local elections.
H: Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the 1
987 Constitution states that "unless provided by this Constitution or by law, an
y decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the SC on certi
orari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof." We
have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of t
he COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi judicial powers
. Contrariwise, administrative orders of the COMELEC are not, as a general rule,
fit subjects of a petition for certiorari.
A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of RA 8436 on automa
ted election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Sec. 2(1), Art
IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations re
lative to the conduct of an election The issue is not only legal but one of first
impression and undoubtedly suffused with significance to the entire nation. It i
s adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondent and the in
tervenor to the position of governor of Sulu.
Which certiorari are we talking about?
This certiorari under Rule 65, it is a question of jurisdiction not of t
he error reviewable by appeal. It is not under Rule 45, it should be under Rule
65.
In the case of Gances, reiterated in the case of Loong, only decisions,
resolutions or final orders of the Comelec, exercising quasi-judicial function a
re to be reviewable, appealable by certiorari under Rule 65 in the Supreme Court
.
I.] Composition and Qualifications of Commissioners (Art. IXC, Sec. 1(1); Art. VI
I, Sec. 13(2))
Cayetano vs. Monsod (03 September 1991)
F: Monsod was nominated to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. W/N he has b
een engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years when Monsod is not invo
lved in litigation.
H: The practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires th
e application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To en
gage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics o
f the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kin
d of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal kn
owledge or skill
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of
law", particularly the modem concept of law practice, Atty. Monsod's past work e
xperiences as a lawyer economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyerlegislator of both the
rich and the poor  verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. These are added t
o the fact that Mr. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, has been a duespayi
ng member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972197
3 and has also been paying his professional license fees as a lawyer for more th
an 10 years.
II.] Appointment and Term of Office of Commissioners; Rule Against Reappointment
(Art. IXC, Sec. 1(2))
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista (07 December 1949)
F: Bautista was holding the Office of the Solicitor General when he was designat
ed by Pres Quirino as acting member of the COMELEC
H: the appointment to the Commission is permanent, they cannot be temporary or i
n an acting capacity. Only permanent appointees are secured in their offices.
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is an independent body or institution. By
the very nature of their functions, the members of the COMELEC must be independ
ent. They must be made to feel that they are secured in the tenure of their offi
ce and entitled to fixed emoluments during their incumbency, so as to make them
impartial in the performance of their functions their powers and duties. That i
ndependence and impartiality may be shaken by a designation of a person or offic
er to act temporarily in the COMELEC. It would be more in keeping with the inten
t, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a, permanent Co
mmission than to designate one to act temporarily.
Moreover, the permanent office of the respondent as Solicitor General is in t
he broad sense incompatible with the temporary one to which he has been designat
ed, because his duties and functions as Solicitor General require that all his t
ime be devoted to their efficient performance. Nothing short of that is required
and expected of him.
Brillantes vs. Yorac (18 December 1990)
F: Pres Aquino designated Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as acting Chairman
of the COMELEC
H: The President does not have the power to make the challenged designation; the
remaining members must decide who will be acting chair
Art. IXC of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "In no case shall a Member of
the Commission on Elections be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity."
Art. IXA, Section 1 of the Constitution, likewise expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nat
ure, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the d
ischarge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its o
wn proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise o
f its own discretion. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the r
egular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised
for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The choice
of the acting Chairman is an internal matter that should be resolved by the memb
ers themselves and that the intrusion of the President violates their independen
ce.
Nacionalista Party vs. Vera (07 December 1949)
F: De Vera was already a Commissioner when he was appointed as Chairman of the C
OMELEC. NP argued that such appointment was in fact a reappointment which is exp
ressly prohibited by the Constitution.
H: appointment is valid
Nevertheless, the Court gave its view on the 1935 Constitutional appointment
of COMELEC that " There shall be an independent Cortirrussion which shall be com
posed of a Chairman and the two other members to be appointed by the Fresident t
he consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term o
f 0 yearand may not be reappointed xxx".
It must be noticed from this provision that the prohibition against reappoint
ment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the Commissioners shall hol
d office for a term of 9 years. This imports that the Commissioners may not be r
eappointed only after they have held office for 9 years. Reappointment is not pr
ohibited when a commissioner has held office only for, say, 3 or 6 years, provid
ed his term will not exceed 9 years in all.
Republic vs. Hon. D. Imperial & Hon. R. Perez (31 March 1955)
F: Under 1935 Const., Comelec has 3 members w/ 9-year term:
SolsGen
SC version:
s version
termofshdexp.
start on 6/21/1941
Initially
Vito
Comelec
Chair
appointed
was(9organized
years)
to Comelec
under CA
on 657
7/12/1945
(died on 5/1947)
6/20/1950
7/12/1954 (When Vera was appointed as Chair, it was only for the unexpired porti
Enage
on
Vera hisMember
6/20/1947
7/12/1951Member
reappointment
(3(6years)
years)was thus invalid)
(replaced (this
6/20/1944
7/12/1948 Vito; was
diednot
on filled
8/1951)SO Vera s appointment on 7/12/1945 was for 9 years
Term
Perez
7/12/1951
expiring
Imperial
7/12/1954
began
(term
ononexpiration
(replaced
ends
6/20/1953)
6/21/1947
6/21/1950
onVera
11/24/1958)
of
and
asthe
Chair;
ends
term
onappointment
of
6/20/1956
6/20/1959
1st Chair
Perez s predecessor
ends 7/12/1960)
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensab
le to its workability: (1) That the terms of the first 3 Commissioners should st
art on a common date; and, (2) That any vacancy due to death, resignation or dis
ability before the expiration of a term should be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term.
Gaminde v. COA (347 S 655)
Quoted Republic v. Imperial. Their terms must start when the 1987 Consti
tution took effect.
III.] Appointment of Personnel (Art. IXA, Sec. 4)
IV.] Salary (Art. IXA, Sec. 3; Art. XVIII, Sec. 17)
V.] Disqualifications (Art. IXA, Sec. 2)
VI.] Impeachment (Art. XI, Sec. 2)
VII.] Appeal
Gances vs. CA (17 July 1996)
F: Comelec cancelled its appointment to Gances as Election Registrar of Gutalac,
Zamboanga del Norte since the position was not vacant. Gances then appealed bef
ore the RTC
H: RTC has juris; not SC
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before th
e COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELEC's resolution that triggered this
controversy. The "case" or "matter" referred to by the constitution must be some
thing within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i,e., must pertain to an election
dispute. the settled rule is that "decision. rulings, order" of the COMELEC that
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A are t
hose relate to the COMELEC's exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powe
rs involving "elective regional, provincial and city officials". In this case,
what is being assailed is the COMELEC's choice of an appointee to occupy the Gu
talac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an
agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Har
dly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. T
o rule otherwise surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions t
hat are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the pow
er to exercise original jurisdiction over "all cases not within the exclusive ju
risdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-j
udicial functions."
Commission on Audit
AGUINALDO v. SANDIGANBAYAN (28 November 1996)
F: the COA submitted a certification that there was no violation with respect to
the auditing procedure. And therefore Aguinaldo sought the dismissal of the cri
minal case filed against him
H: if there is no violation of the rules of the COA with respect to the public e
xpenses, it only means that the accountable officer has complied with the necess
ary requirements or procedure for spending public funds. But it does not proscri
be the prosecuting arm of the government or of the Office of the Sandiganbayan t
o find by any available evidence the criminal liability of the accountable offic
er
The COA is merely the source of the facts in these cases. Any determination m
ade by the COA outside of the narration of facts duly supported by evidence will
not by itself determine whether or not adequate cause exists to prosecute a cas
e. To demonstrate this point, the Supreme Court has ruled that ". . . a public o
fficer may be held guilty of malversation based on a 'preliminary' audit report
. . ."(De Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA 337, 348 (1982)) and that ". . .[t]he absen
ce of a post-audit is not . . . a fatal omission" nor is it a ". . .preliminary
requirement to the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prim
a facie guilt of the suspect has already been established." (Corpuz v. People, 1
94 SCRA 73, 79 (1990))
Nor is COA's final determination required for a malversation case to prosper,
much less will it decide one way or the other the propriety of the suspension o
f an accused in a malversation case filed, as sought herein.
COA's approval of petitioner's disbursements only relates to the administrati
ve aspect of the matter of his accountability but it does not foreclose the Ombu
dsman's authority to investigate and determine whether there is a crime to be pr
osecuted for which petitioner is answerable.
Therefore, as correctly stated by the Sandiganbayan in its order of Apri
l 12, 1996, while the COA may assist in gathering evidence to substantiate a cha
rge of malversation, any determination made by it will not be conclusive as to w
hether adequate cause exists to prosecute a case. This is so because the Ombudsm
an is given the power to investigate on its own an illegal act or omission of a
public official.
I.] Composition and Qualifications (Art. IXD, Sec. 1(1))
II.] Appointment and Term of Commissioners (Art. IXD, Sec. 1(2))
III.] Appointment of COA Personnel (Art. IXA, Sec. 4)
IV.] Salary (Art. IXA, Sec. 3; Art. XVIII, Sec. 17)
V.] Disqualifications (Art. IXA, Sec. 2)
VI.] Impeachment (Art. XI, Sec. 2)
VII.] Appeal
REYES v. CA [G.R. No. 125129. March 29, 1999.]
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders o
r rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on cert
iorari by the aggrieved party. 15 Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a judgment or final order of the Commission on Audit may be brought b
y an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65. However, the pet
ition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1
997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided
by the Commission of Audit to this Court was only by petition for certiorari und
er Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution. 16 The judgments and final ord
ers of the Commission on Audit are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or a
ppeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the Commission on Audit acted with
out or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certior
ari under Rule 65. 17 Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by ce
rtiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of C
ourt is not allowed from any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on Audi
t.
The 1997 Rules of Court has provided for under Rule 64, Sec. 2 as to mod
e of review of decisions of the COA. For other administrative agencies, it s under
Rule 68.
However, under Rule 64 Sec. 2, it still has provided that certiorari sha
ll be pursuant to Rule 65. So, it s an original action by filing a petition to que
stion the jurisdiction.
It has reiterated that except for the CSC, the decision under Rule 65, o
riginal action for certiorari for review.
THE AMENDING PROCESS

Art. XVII, Sec. 1: Any amendment to, or revision of, this constitution may be pr
oposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of threefourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Art. XVII, Sec. 2: Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly prop
osed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per cen
turn of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative distri
ct must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered votes ther
ein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years follo
wing the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five year
s thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this rig
ht.
Revision = rewriting or overhauling of the entire instrument
Amendment = change or alteration for the better, an amendment or change within t
he line of the original instrument which will bring about improvement
Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 November 1967)
F: The Senate and the House passed 3 resolutions to amend the Constitution. It w
as approved by votes, voting separately. It will be submitted to the people in t
he general elections. Petitioners argue that 1) Congress may adopt EITHER ONE of
2 alternatives  propose amendments or call a convention therefor  but may not avail
of both  that is to say, propose amendments AND call a convention  at the same ti
me; AND 2) The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution sh
all be submitted for ratification, must be a SPECIAL ELECTION, NOT a GENERAL ele
ction.
H: can be approved by the people in a general election
The first contention of petitioners is based upon the fact that' the 2 altern
atives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or". Such basis is,
however, a weak one. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean
"and", or viceversa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.
It is noteworthy that RBH Nos. 1 and 3 proposed amendments to the Constitutio
nal provision ON CONGRESS, to be submitted to the people for ratification on 14
Nov. 1967, whereas RBH No. 2 called for a convention in 1971, to consider propos
als for amendment to the Constitution, IN GENERAL. In other words, the subject m
atter of the latter resolution is different from the former resolutions. Althoug
h the 3 resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to
a vote separately, or one AFTER the other. In other words, they were NOT passed
at the same time.
There is nothing in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution to indicate that the
"election" therein referred to is a "special", not a general election. The circu
mstance that 3 previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the
people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed
it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
I.] Proposal (First Step)
A.] By Congress (XVII, Sec 1)
vote of all members of Congress, voting separately
B.] By Constitutional Convention (Art. XVII, Sec. 3)
May be called by Congress
1. by 2/3 vote of all its members
2. majority vote of all members of Congress with the people resolving whether to
call a Convention or not
a. people declare they want ConCon; then
b. people elect the members of ConCon
The Constitutional Convention or the constituent body is considered as n
ot a part of Congress. They derive their authority not from the Constitutional i
tself but from the people in their sovereign capacity. They just act as represen
tatives.
C.] By the People Through Initiative (Art. XVII, Sec. 2)
At least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legisla
tive district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered votes therein
This is still ineffective since RA6735 was incomplete for purposes of initiat
ive and referendum to amend the Constitution
Santiago vs. Comelec (March 19, 1997)
F: Atty. Delfin filed a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits
of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" before the COMELEC. The petition
was only signed by him. He wants the Comelec to get the 12% total votes needed
H: R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO T
HE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
The right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution th
rough the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Co
nstitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, whi
le the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exer
cise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementatio
n.
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover in
itiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. But is has not fully compli
ed with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right.
Firstly, the inclusion of the word "Constitution" in Sec. 2 of the Act w
as a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said sec
tion, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws an
d local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendmen
ts on the Constitution.
Secondly, unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act
does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitut
ion. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the pro
posed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as th
e case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the p
rovisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on
the Constitution.
Thirdly, while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Re
ferendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), n
o subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous sile
nce as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws.
II.] Ratification (Second Step)
A.] In Case of Amendments Proposed By Congress or Convention (Art XVII, Sec 4(1)
)
Ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite, not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days, after the approval of such amendment or revision
B.] In Case of Amendments Proposed Through Initiative (Art XVII, Sec 4(2))
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majori
ty of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Ele
ctions of the sufficiency of the petition
Shall not be based upon the approval but based on the certification of the Co
melec of the sufficiency of the petition;
C.] Plebiscite to be Called by Congress and Supervised by COMELEC, but the Initi
ative on Constitution will be called by COMELEC.
III.] Theories Regarding the Position of a Constitutional Convention in Our Syst
em of Government
Theory of Conventional Sovereignty.-- the constitutional convention is supreme
over the other departments of the govt bec. the powers it exercises are in the n
ature of sovereign powers
The Constitutional Convention is considered as an alter ego of the people -- the
source of the authority is the sovereign will. It could never be subject to jud
icial review.
Legislative Control Theory = considers the constitutional convention inferior to
the other departments of the govt since it is merely a creation of the legislat
ure.
Since the Constitution has provided for the modes of amendment, largely based on
the call of Congress if Congress will not call it, there can be no Constitution
al Convention. The Constitutional Convention can be subject to the control not o
nly by Congress but also by the courts, because it is considered to be restricti
ve by the creator, which is Congress.
Theory of Co-Equality= as long as it exists and confines itself w/in the sphere
of its jurisdiction, the constitutional convention must be considered independe
nt of and co-equal w/ the other departments of the govt
Tolentino vs. COMELEC (16 October 1971)
F:ConCon lowered the voting age to 18. They want this partial amendment to be subj
ect to a plebiscite first
H: there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to b
e proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "e
lection" or plebiscite; theory of co-equality is used here thus subject to judic
ial review
In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Consti
. may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but am
ple basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as
well as its relation to the other parts of the Consti. w/ w/c it has to form a h
armonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Conve
ntion has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, o
f proposals to amend the existing Consti., to present to the people any single p
roposal or a few of them cannot comply w/ this requirement. Under Sec. 1, Art.
XV of the Consti., a proposal to amend the Consti., should be submitted to the p
eople not separately from but together w/ all the other amendments to be propose
d by this present Convention
Limits to the power of a constitutional convention.-- As to matters not rela
ted to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned missions to pr
opose amendments to the Consti., the convention and its officers and members are
all subject to all the provisions of the existing Consti. Now we hold that eve
n as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Consti., it is subject to
the provisions of Sec. 1 of Art. XV. This must be so, bec. it is plain to us t
hat the framers of the Consti. took care that the process of amending the same s
hould not be undertaken w/ the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary le
gislation.
We follow this theory. Even if we follow the theory of co-equality and i
n a limited sense, the Constitutional Convention is subject to judicial review,
it must be emphasized that only in its procedural aspects.
The review powers of the court cannot go beyond that. They cannot go bey
ond the substantive parts because precisely, the power is to amend the Constitut
ion. If they think that the Pres shall only serve for 2 years or that there will
be no term limitations, as the case may be, or the members of the lower house s
hould not include actors or actresses, it could not be questioned as violative o
f equal protection.
IV.] Judicial Review of the Amending Process
Gonzales v. Comelec (21 S 774)
Nature of Power to Amend the Constitution.-- The power to amend the Consti.
or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legisla
tive powers to Congress. It is a part of the inherent powers of the people-- as
the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours-- to make, a
nd hence, to amend their own fundamental law. Congress may propose amendments t
o the Consti. merely bec. the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when ex
ercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the HReps. act, not a
s members of Congress but as competent elements of a constituent assembly. When
acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Consti.,
unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does
not emanate from the Consti.-- they are the very source of all powers of govt,
including the Constitution itself.
Tolentino v. Comelec (41 S 702)
True it is that once convened, this convention became endowed with extraordin
ary powers generally beyond the control of any department of the existing govern
ment, but the compass of such powers can be coextensive only with the purpose for
which the convention was called and as it is selfevident that the amendments it
may propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same ar
e duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of the conven
tion, its officers, and members are not immune from attack on constitutional gro
unds.
Rationale for the power of judicial review.-- In upholding the jurisdiction
of the Court over the case at bar, it is not bec. the Court is superior to the C
on Con or that the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply
bec. both the Con Con and the Court are subject to the Consti. and the rule of
law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per J. Laurel, it is w/in the p
ower, as it is the solemn duty of the Court under the existing Consti., to resol
ve the issues in w/c petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this
case
Javellana vs. Comelec (March 31, 1973)
F: Pres Marcos announced that the 1973 Constitution is already ratified by the C
itizen Assemblies.
By virtue of the majority of six votes w/ four dissenting votes, all the case
s were dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judi
cial obstacle to the New Constitution being considered in force and effect.
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1
Constitutional Law 1 (part 3)
emily zen chua

Carolyn