RULE 129 SECTIONS 1 & 2 JUDICIAL NOTICE

RULE 129

What Need Not Be Proved

SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)

Sec. 2 . Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants, vs. JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Manila, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a
premium on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered
essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after
midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly
learned in all the learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1

Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to know
the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the
administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal
principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to
end. 2

In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V.
Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:

1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed
as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned complainant
prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No.
960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;

2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports (August 11, 1992
issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10,
1992 by the President of the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange
restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank
Governor Jose Cuisia;

3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting of foreign
exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national circulation had the effect
of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the
Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all
the eleven cases aforementioned "for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over
which it has no more jurisdiction;"
 4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central Bank Circular or
Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his
Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of
the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and
in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary
Board resolution, and whether the same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had
pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations
previously issued on the matter;

5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice purportedly as a
matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President had announced the lifting of
foreign exchange restrictions as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous
and misplaced. For the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is officially
released by the Central Bank and its full text published as required by law to be effective shows his
precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental precept of due process which the People is also
entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which has not
yet come into force and the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been published and
ascertained to be the basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor
diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constituting Grave Misconduct;

6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the comment of the
prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending
cases before dismissing the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to due process;

7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be gleaned
from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of
trial dates set in the order of the court (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .)
dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30
o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby depriving the Government
of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and

8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even waiting for a motion
to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his dismissal Order suspect.

Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his comment, 4
contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular repealing
the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public announcement made by
the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total,
absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the basis of such
announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the President that the new
foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which was
corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after
respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised
by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility
for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to
respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which had become
of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending
actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed
involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused cannot be tried and convicted
under a law different from that under which she was charged; that assuming that respondent judge erred in
issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an
administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake committed by a judge should not necessarily be
imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show
ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were reversed or modified" because "even doctrines
initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower courts?"

He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as
he theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to
use a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged by
complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does
not affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB Circular
960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take
judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the
contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal
on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President
announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in the future,
because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign
exchange controls.

Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of Justice,
violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first
instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the newspapers the filing of
the present administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve
a simple and pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy
disposition of cases.

In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under Section 16
of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of
Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn
refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353,
pending cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is
alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity
to file a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases against accused Imelda R.
Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect,
respondent judge acted as if he were the advocate of the accused.

On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report and recommendation, 7
dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval
of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Pao.

The questioned order 8

of respondent judge reads as follows:

These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as
amended.

The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases; apparently the other
accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the Court did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.

His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992 that the government
has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also reported that Central Bank Governor Jose
Cuisia said that the Monetary Board arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
August 11, 1992 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to give full confidence
and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive Department, specially from the highest
official of that department; the Courts are charged with judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, without introduction of proof, the announcement published in at least the two
newspapers cited above which are reputable and of national circulation.

Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs.
Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225),
among others, it was held that the repeal of a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes the right
to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old law and if the law repealing the prior
penal law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the
repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the
aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and not only to the crimes punishable in the
Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which
the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law because violation thereof is
penalized with specific reference to the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes
 violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions
and since according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this Court motu
proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for not to do so opens this
Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction.

This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private respondent Marcos failed to
file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to the petition, private respondent was ordered,
but again failed despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary
injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting
aside the order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.

In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:

The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the
accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and solely on the basis of
newspaper reports announcing that the President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.

The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can become
effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided
(Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992, entitled
"Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in the August 27, 1992 issue of the
Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of the CB Corporate
Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .

Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353,
he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which the accused
Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the regulations on
non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a provision that with respect to
violations of former regulations that are the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall
be governed by the regulations existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his conclusion
that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing
of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution to
comment/oppose the same, his resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not
speculation.

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 10

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 13

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of
his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17
Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 18

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which
is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting
of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of
general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when
the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute
before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent,
cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken
cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of
dismissal was issued.

II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign
exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade
transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:

Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No.
1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall
remain in full force and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange
transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are
the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such
pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions
or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.

Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas
the eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists, Circular
No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the former is not covered by the saving clause in
the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant a
dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.

Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any regulation on
non-trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of
which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such
pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern." The terms of
the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused
in the eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of
Circular No. 960, and said cases had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect.
Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the
existence of Circular No. 1353.

Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the circulars
involved, he would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially
similar saving clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former provides:

Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028, including
amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as
well as all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent
with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly:
Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are
concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No.
960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which were
then pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No.
1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.

III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it
in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that a
judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be
free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should possess
proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he
should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his
impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that
he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's
wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21

Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should show
their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their
intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should be mindful
that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and
not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what
he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he
knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate
controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the law. 23
These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the task of dispensing justice and we see no
reason why they should not be duly considered in the present case.

The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the
reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation
lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond
comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in
the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect. It is inconceivable that
respondent should insist on an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an established and well-
entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his indefensible action. It
was not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of
yielding to first impressions. 24 He having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard
put to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.

IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to
be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for
abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation
of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of
law. 26

The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss
the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably
opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may
have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper
report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had
strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its
right to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the
effects and implications of the President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether
or not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution to
comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What
explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and should not be
believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended
cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give
the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not
be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct
of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the
very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the
eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious.

V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially
affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering
that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could have
spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of
the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not
set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we
reiterate what we have heretofore declared:

It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of
the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . .

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
due process is thereby violated.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30

It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or an
answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in
her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and
erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of influence
and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said dismissal order came to be, to
the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.

VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering
of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which
cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding or error of
the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner,
in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31

In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial
argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual,
or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no
explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and
cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts
from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic illustration and emphasis:

On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the Order dismissing the
eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of newspaper reports referred to in
paragraph 2 of the letter complaint without awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank
Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign exchange controls" was announced
by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe,
August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the words of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government yesterday LIFTED the LAST
remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations supplied)
not only the President made the announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia
 joined in the announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting
how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."

Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign exchange transactions,
there was no need to await the publication of the repealing circular of the Central Bank. The purpose
of requiring publication of laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to inform the latter as
to how they will conduct their affairs and how they will conform to the laws or the rules. In this
particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is no need to await publication. It would
have been different if the circular that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which
the accused was charged in the cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or modified
the provisions of said Circular No. 960.

The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I dismissed the cases
but it should be noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the President's
announcement of the lifting of controls was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense
(Inquirer). In other words, it has already been lifted; the announcement did not say that the
government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but instead says that the government
"has LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The
government yesterday lifted the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions". The
lifting of the last remaining exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.

The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all foreign exchange
regulations. The President has within his control directly or indirectly the Central Bank of the
Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the
policies of the Central Bank.

No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10, published the
following day, nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls do not apply to cases
already pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day after my Order, and the third day after report of
said order was published) and after the President said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's
issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules have nullified government cases
against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the widow of former President
Marcos "have become moot and academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free flow of
currency in and out of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules
still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman
Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by the
Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary Board
Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal cases pending in court and such a position shall
stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."

I will elaborate on two points:

1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in August 11, 1992,
newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on the
Presidential announcements, and there is basis to conclude that the President was at the very least
ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal advisers, because no one bothered to advise the President to
correct his announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President had made
another announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered moot and
academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist,
banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and
brief him on matters of immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange
controls, designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign investments). Instead of
rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's
announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the blame for the consequence of their failing to
me, who only acted on the basis of announcements of their Chief, which had become of public
knowledge.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed
with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is,
accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that
respondent judge would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof.
This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted thereto.

In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB
Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a
plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to violate the law and
benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on
the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent judge
therein was ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the
law. 33

Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross
ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an
accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating
judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34

Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and
quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying
unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference to
and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and
oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities. 35

Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of the
law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name
of the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other interested parties. 36

Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all the
accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of
malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering
an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T.
Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry
with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from
reemployment in the government service. 38

Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or order, or
continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision. SO
ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

DISSENTING OPINION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or
discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases
has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is
insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial
independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement,
might become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the
inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1

In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that -
 . . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits provided he acts in good faith,
that in the absence of malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be held administratively
responsible . . . for no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be nothing short of
harassment or would make his position unbearable. 2

A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or

administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He
cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision
rendered by him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous. 5 It is a general principle of the highest importance to proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon
consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary."
6
This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it to the instant case.

The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986 as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product
of the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and
placed sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct
and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 7 for dismissing motu proprio the
eleven (11) cases filed by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after President Fidel V. Ramos had
announced, which was published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions.

The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority on
various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a different light.

There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been reversed by the appellate court,
which reversal has now become final for failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has
been caused except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as
adverted to, the overturned order alone does not necessarily make respondent judge liable administratively,
much more civilly or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith. 8 Plainly said, fault in this regard may exist only when the error
appears to be deliberate or in bad faith. 9

Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that "there was no need to await
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the President in
several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without
qualification, and immediately effective," 10 and, second, for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal
cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11

But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some
interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well
understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will. 14

Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he insists
that there really is no need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows
that he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to await publication. Whether his belief is
erroneous or not is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not
inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of
the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an elementary principle
in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction
to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer
exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action should be
dismissed. 15

On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to respondent judge. Good faith
means that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is,
that what he gives as his motive was in truth his motive. 16 Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for
the criminal charges against accused have been eliminated and thus strikes down the information and
consequently dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or even administratively,
held liable.

Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses
protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from
being held accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts
or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. 17

Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the prosecution, even if the accused
invoked the defense of double jeopardy, since the remedy of certiorari is very much available. Precisely, as
has been pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailing when the
prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions
of lower court judges - which does not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if respondent judge
was indeed in bad faith, he should have given the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-
blown trial, acquitted the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been proper and the
accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this Court affirmed the conclusions
of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that "[w]hen a person seeks administrative sanction
against a judge simply because he has committed an error in deciding the case against such person, when
such error can be elevated to a higher court for review and correction, the action of such person can only be
suspect."

To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition before the appellate court, and
consequently invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy of the assailed order, 19 may be
indulging in needless speculation. And to imply that the influence of the accused who is a prominent public
figure brought about the dismissal order is simply not borne out by the records.

Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be considered as grossly erroneous to merit his
dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as it turned out when the reversal of his decision by
the appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as even the President of the Republic, with his
learned legal advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed by his administration against the
accused, was quoted as saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign exchange
deregulation policy of his administration. 20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos further said that "[t]he forex
deregulation applies to everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs. Marcos,
numbering about 11 out of 90 have become moot and academic because of the new regulations that have
come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her advantage." 21 Where the conclusions of the judge in his
decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22

It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 23 Ideally so.
But the cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes suspicion especially from the successful
appellant who feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.

It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to a particular
instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of
justice under such system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a
particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have
detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of law." 24 As it has been said, he must interpret the books, and not
unload his ideas.

But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and established jurisprudence, his own
personality, character, convictions, values, experiences and prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and
unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he is no more and no less human, his own beliefs,
perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws he is bound to apply, all having profound influence on his
eventual choice. Thus, Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States once wrote of judges:
"We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
except our own." 25 Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the Court of Appeals and
this Court, have continued to set new trails in jurisprudence without exactly conforming with what has been
settled. yet, whether reversed or merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from this Court; on the
contrary, they remain to be effective dispensers of everyday justice.

In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable doubt, that respondent judge issued the
assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.

Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, 26 said that "[i]mpeachment proceedings before
courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be
governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice
of this Court, reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge Ugbinar 27 where he said that "[t]his is to defer the
basic concept first announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings of this
character being in their nature highly penal, the charge must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
To paraphrase the opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence and gross ignorance of
the law by a preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an exacting
standard has been adhered to by this Court in subsequent decisions." 28

The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the burden is on the one challenging the same to
prove want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required, complainant-prosecutors in the instant
case failed to prove the absence of good faith on the part of the respondent judge. Consequently, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands.

I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge Dizon,
29
respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free, leaving the Commissioner of Customs without
any relief against the accused, the former likewise ordered the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus,
respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross ignorance of the law, but also of gross incompetence,
and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was consequently dismissed
from the service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier administrative case, respondent judge, after
his reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4) different cases of illegal
possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly demonstrated, as in this case, not
only once but four (4) times, that the judge is either grossly incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal
laws . . . . he becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office." 30 Unlike former Judge Dizon, this is the first time
respondent Judge Muro is being administratively charged.

In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found respondent guilty of "serious misconduct, gross ignorance
of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order of judgment" for granting bail to an accused who was
charged with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral intervention in brokering a compromise of the
criminal cases" against the accused, and thereafter for granting the motion to dismiss the rape case on the
basis of an Affidavit of Desistance allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor. Certainly, the
actuations of the respondent judge in the cited case are far worse than the complained indiscretions of
herein respondent Judge.

In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 he was charged with a litany of administrative cases,
six (6) in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance of the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While
not all the charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge was found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary
and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, (with) . . . a marked penchant for applying
unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, (and) exhibits
indifference to, and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically,
capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed, "[t]he different acts
of misconduct proven against respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and to continue
to discharge the functions and duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of the extreme sanction
of dismissal from the service." There is nothing in the records of the instant case which shows that
respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for applying pecant and unaccepted theories which
breed manifest and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent aggravated her ignorance of the law by her refusal to
abide by the Decision of the appellate court and later of this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open
defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not only found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also
of grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service.

Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court merely imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge
who entertained the petition for bail filed by the suspects prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding
unrefuted allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives of the congressman who "sponsored" the
appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other case, 35 this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on
respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after he improperly issued a warrant
of arrest and set the case for arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And, still in
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against respondent ruled that a judge cannot be
condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith or
that he knowingly rendered an unjust decision.

In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T.
Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his
dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the records that the respondent's assailed
decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment,
but not a deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of respondent judge from the
service is not proper. 37

Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail the independence of judges and
send the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office without fear of reprisal, merely for
expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain eventual justice only after
costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but these are necessary evils which must be
endured to some extent lest judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.

Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in handing down
his decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and independence. And, while this Court may slightly
bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must
also step forward and take the lead to defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and
disgrace not only the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As champion at other times
tormentor of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of
unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which serve no other
purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court must be circumspect and
deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent judgments handed down in good faith.

Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials which, experience shows, are no
longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with creditable
distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic evidence of bad faith and then shatter
his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, is the ultimate dream of every
sacrificing trial judge.

I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.

# Separate Opinions

BELLOSILLO, J.:

In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or
discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases
has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is
insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial
independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement,
might become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the
inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1

In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that -
 . . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits provided he acts in good
faith, that in the absence of malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be held
administratively responsible . . . for no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be nothing
short of harassment or would make his position unbearable. 2

A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or

administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He
cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision
rendered by him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous. 5 It is a general principle of the highest importance to proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon
consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary."
6
This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it to the instant case.

The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986 as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product
of the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and
placed sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct
and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 7 for dismissing motu proprio the
eleven (11) cases filed by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after President Fidel V. Ramos had
announced, which was published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions.

The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority on
various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a different light.

There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been reversed by the appellate court,
which reversal has now become final for failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has
been caused except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as
adverted to, the overturned order alone does not necessarily make respondent judge liable administratively,
much more civilly or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith. 8 Plainly said, fault in this regard may exist only when the error
appears to be deliberate or in bad faith. 9

Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that "there was no need to await
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the President in
several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without
qualification, and immediately effective," 10 and, second, for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal
cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11

But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some
interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well
understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will. 14

Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he insists
that there really is no need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows
that he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to await publication. Whether his belief is
erroneous or not is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not
inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of
the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an elementary principle
in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction
to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer
exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action should be
dismissed. 15

On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to respondent judge. Good faith
means that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is,
that what he gives as his motive was in truth his motive. 16 Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for
the criminal charges against accused have been eliminated and thus strikes down the information and
consequently dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or even administratively,
held liable.

Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses
protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from
being held accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts
or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. 17

the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in the negative

Facts:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent
Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the
Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos
in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The
respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers,
which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all
foreign exchange restrictions. The respondents decision was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby
divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such
fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his
part.
The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he purported
to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted
the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due
process to the prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the
government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial
notice on the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been
officially in force and effect of the law.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction
published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his
assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the
Presidents announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is absolute and without
qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a
judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15
days in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the Presidents statement was
published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353
thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal
knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice
of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be
disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not
amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by the law where the court
can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary
experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled
that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking
cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the
prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from
service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and
for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a
reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

[G.R. NO. 177809 : October 16, 2009]

SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners, v. ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 89300:1[1] (1) reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil
Case No. 04-0052;2[2] and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315. 3[3]

First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.

The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of
Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road,
Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.

On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners,
Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over
two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.

The contract of lease reads:

CONTRACT OF LEASE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:

ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B.
Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,

- and -

OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24
Anahan St. RGV Homes Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.

WITNESSETH

1
2
3
 1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G.
Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Paraaque Ctiy;

2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1 st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an
area of 56 square meters under the following terms and conditions, to wit:

a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND
(P60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees
to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly rental;

b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;

c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said
premises;

d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a written
permission from the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the Contract, the
lessee shall return the two cubicles in its original conditions at their expenses;

e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall
not keep any kinds of flammable or combustible materials.

f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate any
of the above conditions shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease. Provided,
further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the rentals for the
unused month or period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.

3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to
December ______, 2005.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December,
1999 at City of Manila, Philippines.

(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSORLESSEE

(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua

Republic of the Philippines)

C i t y o f M a n i l a )s.s.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:

Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at
Paraaque City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.

known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two (2)
pages duly signed by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is
their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.
 IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th
day of December, 1999 at the City of Manila, Philippines.

Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS

Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member4[4]

A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles,
Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail
to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies demand, she instituted the
aforesaid complaint.

In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2)
cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total
amount of P2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalies handwriting, read:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for
the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City.
ROFERLAND5[5] Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.

P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK

______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
Received by
3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99

____(sgd.)___
Received by:6[6]

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over
two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they
readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction

4
5
6
at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.

Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied
them without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of
lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were
surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against
them.

The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming
rights under them are hereby ordered to VACATE the property subject of this case located at
the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner
Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered
to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P720,000.00)
as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to December 2000 and thereafter to
PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P72,000.00) per month from
January 2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every
succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x,
until the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased premises subject of this lease.
Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00)
per [Rosalies] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
[Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 7
[7]

In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give
credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects,
incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of
Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the
specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for six (6) y[ea]rs only starting
from December 1999 or up to December 2005; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the
month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or
advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.

The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and
supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by
Spouses Latip in the amount of P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalies claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was
simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease
rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce
evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties for
a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be
ejected from the leased premises until expiration of the lease period.

The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC]
dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip]
and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former

(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

7
 (2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and
for attorneys fees; and
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8[8]

In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision
of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not
notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged
defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of
P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common
practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate
court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg.
that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalies
appeal, the CA disposed of the case:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed decision of RTC Paraaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED en toto. SO ORDERED.9[9]

Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.

The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased
cubicles.

As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip,
took judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money
to the lessor.

We disagree.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is
mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10[10] is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts.
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care

8
9
10
 must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on
the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be
assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying
that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it
will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
matters which are commonly known.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life,
or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable
of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they
may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 11[11]

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,12[12] which cited State Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life,
or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable
of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that
they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the
common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have
been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a
fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.

11
12
 From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which
the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA
took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area.
Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of
common knowledge or notoriously known.

We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no
evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill
money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint
declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie
as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters
that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the
usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary
evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged
practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What
need not be proved.

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill
money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded
that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.

Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what
remains in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both parties the contract of lease and the
receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.

We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first or if there was
a novation of the contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the
amount of P2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:

Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1 st and 2nd
floors of Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino
Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran, Paraaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The
lease agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing in December 1999 up to
December 2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms of
this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another agreement between
the parties executed and or entered into in or about the time of execution of the lease
contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is unclear. 13[13]

We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties as
set forth in the contract of lease which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as
he likewise did not sign the other two receipts for P500,000.00 and P70,000.00, respectively, which
contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in
Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husbands consent. The findings of the three lower
courts concur on this fact.

13
 The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again
buttressed by Spouses Latips admission that they occupied the property forthwith in December 1999,
bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday season.

On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to P2,570,000.00,
we hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of
judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly
submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment
of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.

In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation
of contracts, to wit:

Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those which the parties
intended to agree.

Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be
understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.

The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for P2,570,000.00 modified
or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was
payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this finding.
To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are again
reproduced:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for
the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]que City.
ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.

P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK

______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
Received by

3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99
___(sgd.) ____
 Received by:14[14]

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt of P2,570,000.00
referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalies receipt
of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt for P2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but
this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect.
Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the P2,000,000.00 is not
for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalies receipt
of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered
by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the
commencement of the lease.

Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased
premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with
the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering
advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable
to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of P2,570,000.00 already received by her as
advance rentals. No costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO REANZARES* also known as

ARMANDO RIANZARES, accused-appellant.* [G.R. No. 130656. June 29, 2000]

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This case is with us on automatic review of the 26 May 1997 Decision 15[1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan, Batangas, finding accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as "Armando Rianzares" guilty of
Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 53216[2] and sentencing him to the extreme penalty of death. He
was also ordered to pay the heirs of his victim Lilia Tactacan P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related
expenses, P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag, and to reimburse
Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from him.

The facts, except as to the identity of accused Armando Reanzares, are undisputed. Spouses Gregorio
Tactacan and Lilia Tactacan owned a sari-sari store in San Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. On 10 May 1994 at
around 8:10 in the evening, the Tactacan spouses closed their store and left for home in Barangay San
Roque, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on board their passenger-type jeepney. As Gregorio was maneuvering his jeep
backwards from where it was parked two (2) unidentified men suddenly climbed on board. His wife Lilia
immediately asked them where they were going and they answered that they were bound for the town
proper. When Lilia informed them that they were not going to pass through the town proper, the two (2) said
they would just get off at the nearest intersection. After negotiating some 500 meters, one of the hitchhikers
pointed a .38 caliber revolver at Gregorio while the other poked a balisong at Lilia's neck and ordered
Gregorio to stop the vehicle. Two (2) other persons, one of whom was later identified as accused Armando
Reanzares, were seen waiting for them at a distance. As soon as the vehicle stopped, the accused and his
companion approached the vehicle. Gregorio was then pulled from the driver's seat to the back of the

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*[
15
16
vehicle. They gagged and blindfolded him and tied his hands and feet. They also took his Seiko wristwatch
worth P2,500.00. The accused then drove the vehicle after being told by one of them, "Sige i-drive mo
na."17[3]

Gregorio did not know where they were headed for as he was blindfolded. After several minutes, he felt the
vehicle making a u-turn and stopped after ten (10) minutes. During the entire trip, his wife kept uttering,
"Maawa kayo sa amin, marami kaming anak, kunin nyo na lahat ng gusto ninyo." Immediately after the last
time she uttered these words a commotion ensued and Lilia was heard saying, "aray!" Gregorio heard her
but could not do anything. After three (3) minutes the commotion ceased. Then he heard someone tell him,
"Huwag kang kikilos diyan, ha," and left. Gregorio then untied his hands and feet, removed his gag and
blindfold and jumped out of the vehicle. The culprits were all gone, including his wife. He ran to San Roque
East shouting for help.18[4]

When Gregorio returned to the crime scene, the jeepney was still there. He went to the drivers seat. There he
saw his wife lying on the floor of the jeepney with blood splattered all over her body. Her bag containing
P1,200.00 was missing. He brought her immediately to the C. P. Reyes Hospital where she was pronounced
dead on arrival.19[5]

At the time of her death Lilia Tactacan was forty-eight (48) years old. According to Gregorio, he was deeply
depressed by her death; that he incurred funeral, burial and other related expenses, and that his wife was
earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher.20[6]

Dr. Lily D. Nunes, Medical Health Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, conducted a post-mortem examination on
the body of the victim. Her medical report disclosed that the victim sustained eight (8) stab wounds on the
chest and abdominal region of the body. She testified that a sharp pointed object like a long knife could have
caused those wounds which must have been inflicted by more than one (1) person, and that all those
wounds except the non-penetrating one caused the immediate death of the victim. 21[7]

Subsequently, two (2) Informations were filed against accused Armando Reanzares and three (3) John Does
in relation to the incident. The first was for violation of PD 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for allegedly conspiring, with intent to gain and armed with bladed weapons
and a .38 caliber revolver, to rob and carry away one (1) Seiko wristwatch owned by Gregorio Tactacan and
P1,000.00 cash of Lilia Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed her. The second was for violation of RA
6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, for taking away by means of violence and intimidation
of persons one (1) passenger-type jeepney with Plate No. DBP 235 owned and driven by Gregorio Tactacan
and valued at P110,000.00. Only the accused Armando Reanzares was arrested. The other three (3) have
remained unidentified and at large.

The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not have perpetrated the crimes imputed to
him with three (3) others as he was in Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, for the baptism of his
daughter Jessica when the incident happened.22[8] His father, Jose Reanzares, corroborated his story. Jose
claimed that the accused borrowed P500.00 from him for the latter's trip to Bicol although he could not say
that he actually saw the accused leave for his intended destination. 23[9] To bolster the alibi of the accused,
his brother Romeo Reanzares also took the witness stand and alleged that he saw the accused off on 9 May
1994, the day before the incident. Romeo maintained that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop that

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
day and even helped the latter carry his things to the bus. He however could not categorically state where
and when the accused alighted or that he in fact reached Bicol. 24[10]

On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecutions evidence credible and ruled that the alibi of the
accused could not prevail over his positive identification by complaining witness Gregorio Tactacan. The court
a quo declared him guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 and sentenced him to death. It
further ordered him to pay the heirs of Lilia Tactacan P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P172,000.00 for
funeral, burial and related expenses, and P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag. The accused was also
ordered to reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from him.25[11] But the
trial court exonerated the accused from the charge of carnapping under RA 6539 for insufficiency of
evidence.

The accused insists before us that his conviction for Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 is
erroneous as his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the testimony of private
complainant Gregorio Tactacan, who implicated him as one of the perpetrators of the crime, is incredible. He
maintains that Gregorio failed to identify him because when the latter was questioned he stated that he did
not know any of the culprits. He also claims that in the publication of Hotline by Tony Calvento in People's
Tonight, Gregorio even asked the readers to help him identify the malefactors.

The trial court observed that Gregorio Tactacan testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner, and was consistent on cross-examination. Indeed, Gregorio might not have immediately
revealed the name of accused Armando Reanzares to the police authorities when he was first investigated
but the delay was not an indication of a fabricated charge and should not undermine his credibility
considering that he satisfactorily explained his reasons therefor. According to him, he did not immediately
tell the police about the accused because he feared for the safety of his family as his neighbors told him that
they saw some people lurking around his house on the day of the incident. Moreover, he was advised not to
mention any names until after the burial of his wife. No ill motive could be attributed to him for implicating
the accused. If at all, the fact that his wife died by reason of the incident even lends credence to his
testimony since his natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter him from implicating
persons other than the real culprits, otherwise, those responsible for the perpetration of the crime would
escape prosecution.

To further undermine the credibility of Gregorio, the accused underscores Gregorio's refusal to be subjected
to a lie detector test. We cannot subscribe to this contention as the procedure of ascertaining the truth by
means of a lie detector test has never been accepted in our jurisdiction; thus, any findings based thereon
cannot be considered conclusive.

Finally, the accused chides Gregorio for supposedly suppressing a very material piece of evidence, i.e., the
latter failed to present as witnesses a certain Renato and his wife who allegedly saw the holduppers running
away from the crime scene. But this is only a disputable presumption under Sec. 3, par. (e), Rule 131, of the
Rules of Court on evidence, which does not apply in the present case as the evidence allegedly omitted is
equally accessible and available to the defense.

These attempts of the accused to discredit Gregorio obviously cannot hold ground. Neither can they bolster
his alibi. For alibi to be believed it must be shown that (a) the accused was in another place at the time of
the commission of the offense, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. 26[12]

In this case, the accused claims to have left for Bicol the day before the incident. To prove this, he presented
his father and brother but their testimonies did not meet the requisite quantum to establish his alibi. While
his father testified that the accused borrowed money from him for his fare to Bicol for the baptism of a
daughter, he could not say whether the accused actually went to Bicol. As regards the claim of Romeo,
brother of the accused, that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop on 9 May 1994 and even helped

24
25
26
him with his things, seeing the accused off is not the same as seeing him actually get off at his destination.
Given the circumstances of this case, it is possible for the accused to have alighted from the bus before
reaching Bicol, perpetrated the crime in the evening of 10 May 2000, proceeded to Bicol and arrived there on
12 May 2000 for his daughters baptism.

Thus the trial court was correct in disregarding the alibi of the accused not only because he was positively
identified by Gregorio Tactacan but also because it was not shown that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene on the date and time of the incident.

Indeed the accused is guilty. But that the accused was guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD
532 was erroneous. As held in a number of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several
accused were organized for the purpose of committing it indiscriminately. 27[13] There is no proof in the
instant case that the accused and his cohorts organized themselves to commit highway robbery. Neither is
there proof that they attempted to commit similar robberies to show the "indiscriminate" perpetration
thereof. On the other hand, what the prosecution established was only a single act of robbery against the
particular persons of the Tactacan spouses. Clearly, this single act of depredation is not what is contemplated
under PD 532 as its objective is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another thereby
disturbing the peace and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the
people.

Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 28[14] as the allegations in the Information
are enough to convict him therefor. In the interpretation of an information, what controls is the description of
the offense charged and not merely its designation. 29[15]

Article 294, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code as amended punishes the crime of robbery with homicide by
reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Art. 63, second par., subpar. 2, of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "[i]n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: x x x 2. [w]hen there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in the absence of any modifying circumstance.

As to the damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim, we sustain the award of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity for the wrongful death of Lilia Tactacan. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages is ordered. Also, damages for loss of earning capacity of Lilia Tactacan must be granted to her
heirs. The testimony of Gregorio Tactacan, the victims husband, on the earning capacity of his wife, together
with a copy of his wifes payroll, is enough to establish the basis for the award. The formula for determining
the life expectancy of Lilia Tactacan, applying the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, is as follows: 2/3
multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). 30[16] Since Lilia was 48 years of age at the time of her
death,31[17] then her life expectancy was 21.33 years.

At the time of her death, Lilia was earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher at the San Roque Elementary
School so that her annual income was P41,160.00. From this amount, 50% should be deducted as reasonable
and necessary living expenses to arrive at her net earnings. Thus, her net earning capacity was P438,971.40
computed as follows: Net earning capacity equals life expectancy times gross annual income less reasonable
and necessary living expenses

27
28
29
30
31
 Net earning = Life expectancy x Gross annual reasonable &
income - necessary living
capacity (x) expenses

x = 2 (80-48) x [P41,160.00 P20,580.00]

-
......3

= 21.33 x P20,580.00

= P438,971.40

However, the award of P1,000.00 representing the cash taken from Lilia Tactacan must be increased to
P1,200.00 as this was the amount established by the prosecution without objection from the defense. The
award of P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses must be reduced to P22,000.00 as this was
the only amount sufficiently substantiated. 32[18] There was no other competent evidence presented to
support the original award.

The amount of P2,500.00 as reimbursement for the Seiko wristwatch taken from Gregorio Tactacan must be
deleted in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence aside from the self-serving valuation
made by the prosecution. An ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can
only take judicial notice of the value of goods which is a matter of public knowledge or is capable of
unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry therefore does not fall under either category of which
the court can take judicial notice.33[19]

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as
"Armando Rianzares" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide under Art. 294 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, another P50,000.00 for moral damages, P1,200.00 for actual
damages, P438,971.40 for loss of earning capacity, and P22,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses.
Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant. G.R. Nos.
135695-96 October 12, 2000

QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal
Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape
and sentencing him to death twice.

On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutors
Office two separate complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-
6186, alleged:

That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN

32
33
TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:

That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN
TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges.

The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.

Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape charges
against him since he and his daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for going out
whenever he was not at home."3

Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.

On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -

a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;

b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:

(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and

(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in
relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral
shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape with one
qualifying aggravating circumstance; and

c) To pay the costs.

II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -

a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;

b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:

(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and

(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to
Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her
 and for the commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance;
and

(3) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.4

In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants version of what accused did to her.

The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that private
complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ of
76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy
Compound, Mandaue City.

xxx

That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was in the house together with her
father. But before she went to sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat while herself (sic) just lied
down at his head side which was not necessarily beside him. However, when she was already sleeping, she
noticed that her father who was already undressed was beside her and was embracing her. Then, he
undressed her which she resisted but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts
and after that, he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his
penis penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.

That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the time asking by
saying (sic) : Does it feel good? And at the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a woman
who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry with her when she contradicted his statement.

That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she felt intense pain
that she cried and told him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out when it
feels so good(?)

That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to heaven if she did
not get married, her father just stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.

That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her father was just
smoking and squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her
father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her, she placed a stool between them but he
just brushed it aside and laid down with her and was able to take her womanhood again by using a very
sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made her afraid.

That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers place and went to her neighbor by the
name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report the
matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the policemen, she went to the Southern Islands
Hospital where she was examined and after her medical examination, she was brought back by the police
and was investigated by them."5

Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which
found him twice guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply contending
that:6

THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF
THE SAME.

Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on September 5,
1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home tired
and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his
brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents
allegedly transpired, "he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do
such wrongdoings."7

The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the trial courts
decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to
conform to prevailing jurisprudence.

Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of the penalty of
death imposed in each of these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its review of the
records, including the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense. Conviction must rest on
nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.8 But here we find no room to disturb the trial courts judgment
concerning appellants guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.

Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty
ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private
complainant who testified on affirmative matters,9 such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an
inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim
of the appellant as the violator of her honor.10 Indeed, we find that private complainant was unequivocal in
charging appellant with ravishing her. The victims account of the rapes complained of was straightforward,
detailed, and consistent.11 Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her
father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court. 12

In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single most important issue. 13 The
determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale for this is
that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the
stand and, therefore, is in a better position to form an accurate impression and conclusion. 14 Absent any
showing that certain facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result
of the case, or that the trial courts finding are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of
origin must be respected and the judgment rendered affirmed. 15

Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is corroborated by medical findings that
lacerations were present in her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the private
complainant yielded the following results:

Genitalia: grossly female

Pubic Hairs: scanty

Labia Majora: coaptated

Labia Minora: -do-

Fourchette: U-shaped

Vestibule: pinkish

Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock position(s).

Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease

Vagina:

Walls: pinkish

Ruganities: prominent

Uterus: small
 Cervix: closed

Discharges: Mucoid, minimal

Smears:

Conclusions: sperm identification (-)

Gram staining of vaginal disc.16

Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants private parts meant
a history of sexual congress on her part.17 According to her, the lacerations may have been caused by the
entry of an erect male organ into complainants genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed out that
previous coitus may be inferred from complainants U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female
who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped. 18 While Dr. Acebes conceded under cross-
examination, that the existence of the datum "U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and absolutely
mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or
other things,"19 nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants
claim that she was raped by appellant.

Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had quarreled
with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution did not rebut his
testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with private complainant. He urges us to consider the
charges filed against him as the result of his frequent castigation of her delinquent behavior. 20

Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous
rape is of such a nature that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against human
experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of
dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. 21 More so, where her
charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.

Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed to him
considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is
impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the only
child who lived with him.22 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was thus "free to do as he
wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter." 23

Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76
in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that appellant
raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges
against her own father, as shown by the following testimony of the victim on cross-examination:

Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be sentenced to
death?

A : Yes.

Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?

A (Witness nodding.)

xxx

Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in case your father
would be found guilty, two death sentences will be imposed against him?

A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?

A: I want this to proceed.24

Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?

Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, 25 penalizes rape of a
minor daughter by her father as qualified rape 26 and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the prosecution
must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her
consent27 and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional elements that: (4) the
victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim. 28

In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victims father. 29 But the victims
age was not properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was thirteen
years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born
because her mother did not tell her. She further said that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother.
In her own words, the victim testified - 30

COURT TO WITNESS

Q: When were you born?

A: I do not know.

Q: You do not know your birthday?

A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.

COURT: Proceed.

FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request for judicial
notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.

ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof
because they already know them.31 Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or
discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial
notice of facts -

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts -

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.

Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always
nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can and has
been committed in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5)
meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with the
accuseds sister.32
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in
publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue. 33

On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of
professional and scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,34 the trial court took judicial notice
of the clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby boys as "premature"
since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.

As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be
facts which are ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were
received by a party.

With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can
take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which
requires that -

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission,
thereof acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters
such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of
the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon
showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for
the purpose.

Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that the rape
committed was statutory rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and so
was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was
presented because the victims birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate was duly
presented. Hence, we ruled that the mothers testimony coupled with the presentation of the baptismal
certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.

However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be convicted of simple
rape, and not statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim, who
was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape.1wphi1 The prosecution failed to present either the birth
or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was no showing that the said documents were lost or
destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay,
and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.

In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim, aside
from testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,35 we stressed that the
prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the
defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In
People v. Cula,36 we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the
victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
Since the record of the case was bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the victims duly
certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainants age, appellant could not be
convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v. Veloso,37 the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years
of age at the time of the rape. It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed
to prove the victims age other than through the testimony of her father and herself.

Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No.
7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without any dissent, that the
failure to sufficiently establish victims age by independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified
form. For, in the words of Melo, J., "independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and
essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances" for the
imposition of the death penalty set by the law.

In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed by the death
penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form under Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was
committed on November 7, 1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the same.

As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil indemnity.
However, the award of another P50,000.00 as "moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation
to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code" for each count is imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing
jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need for pleading or proof as to the basis
thereof.38 Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for
each count of rape.

The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a different
amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the alternative
circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230
of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 proper. Note that generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that
relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments
introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the
nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. 39 However, in
this case, the special qualifying circumstance of relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim,
taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes
committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers
with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. 40

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos.
DU-6186 and DU-6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2)
counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.