1
Republic of the Philippines accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-
Appellee,
vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's
effects through Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy
and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to
privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle
against dangerous drugs is more apparent than real.
Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers
neglect to perform what could have been done to
uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who
traffic this scourge of society.
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of
the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless arrest.
The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator
through facts that were not based on their personal
knowledge. The information as to the accuseds
whereabouts was sent through a text message. The
driver. The bag that allegedly contained the
contraband was required to be opened under
intimidating circumstances and without the accused
having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a
reasonable search within the meaning of the
Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that
would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The
alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done
intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure
or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused
should be excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3
(2) of the Constitution. There being no possible
admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of
November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio
Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in
San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from
an unidentified civilian informer"2 that one Marvin
Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be
transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La
Union.4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept
the suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime
Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San
Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting
area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San

Fernando City.6 A passenger jeepney from Barangay
Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs checkpoint. 7 The
jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1
Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who
were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached
the two male passengers who were later identified as
Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa
Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack
while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. 10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the
contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1
Taracatac that they did not know since they were
transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange,
Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of
what looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered,
"nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti
nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is
what [is] contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac
arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to
the police station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still
carrying their respective bags"16inside the station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and
Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit)
requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their
bags.18 Inside Cogaeds sack was "four (4) rolled pieces
of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"19 and inside
Dayaos yellow bag was a brick of suspected
marijuana.20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for
laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan personally delivered the
2
suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector
Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found
that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana. 23 The
marijuana collected from Cogaeds blue bag had a
total weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from
Cogaeds sack weighed 4,246.1 grams. 25 The
marijuana collected from Dayaos bag weighed 5,092
grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from
Cogaeds and Dayaos bags.27
According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was
at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney to take
him"28to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy
pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and recognized
Dayao, his younger brothers friend.30 Upon arrival at
the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed
alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for
[Cogaeds] help in carrying his things, which included a
travelling bag and a sack."32 Cogaed agreed because
they were both going to the market.33 This was when
SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1
Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags,
Cogaed replied that he did not know. 34 SPO1 Taracatac
then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy
to their conversation.35Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac
arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the
police station.36 These facts were corroborated by an
eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across
the parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended. 37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac
hit [him] on the head."38 The bags were also opened,
but Cogaed never knew what was inside. 39

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was
marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic
Act No. 9165.40 The information against them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in
the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA
and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with
discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without
being authorized by law, have in their control, custody
and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug,
with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four
hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002").41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28
of San Fernando City, La Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao
pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed against
Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time
and was exempt from criminal liability under the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act
No. 9344.44Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a
decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court
found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
3
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y
Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation
of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life
imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one million pesos
(Php 1,000,000.00).46
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest
illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just
done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney
and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless
search should also be considered illegal. 48 However,
the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality
of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to
such irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when
SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to
open his bag."50
Cogaed appealed51 the trial courts decision.However,
the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed
the trial courts decision.52 The Court of Appeals found
that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless
searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1
Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag." 53 Hence,
this appeal was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his
appellants brief:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT
OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND
SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1)
whether there was a valid search and seizure of
marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the
evidence obtained through the search should be
admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence
to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a
discussion with respect to the requirements on the
chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary. 55
We find for the accused.
4
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined
by implication in our Constitution. It has many
dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection
through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with
care and diligence whether searches and seizures are
"reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted
with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this
provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the
existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable
cause must be established by the judge after asking
searching questions and answers.57 Probable cause at
this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged
to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the
searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a
particular description of the place and the things to be
searched.58

However, there are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless. 59 In the Rules of
Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed
even without a separate warrant. 60 This court has
taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made,
the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured."61 The known jurisprudential
instances of reasonable warrantless searches and
seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated
by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
5
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search
warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches
are often confused with searches incidental to lawful
arrests under the Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental
to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in
flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the
vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done
to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to
preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are
conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals65 was similar "to a stop and frisk situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to
obtain more information."66 This court stated that the
"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing
with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal
situation in the city streets where unarguably there is
no time to secure . . . a search warrant." 67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop
and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as
Terrysearches68) are necessary for law enforcement.
That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal
to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this

should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness"
present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based
on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced
police officers have personal experience dealing with
criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should
have the ability to discern based on facts that they
themselves observe whether an individual is acting
in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the
suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers
were initially informed about a place frequented by
people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the
police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and [who
was] walking in a swaying manner." 71 The suspicion
increased when the man avoided the police
officers.72 These observations led the police officers to
conclude that the man was high on drugs. 73 These
were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to
stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate." 74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man
who appeared drunk.76 This man was also "wearing a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit."77 Upon seeing
the police, the man fled.78 His flight added to the
suspicion.79After stopping him, the police officers found
an unlicensed "homemade firearm"80 in his
6
possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the
circumstances, the government agents could not
possibly have procured a search warrant first." 82 This
was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses
observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man
with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner,
based on their experience, is indicative of a person
who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian
in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a
passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover,
criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The
assessment of suspicion was not made by the police
officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who
signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac
himself:
COURT:
Q So you dont know what was the content while it was
still being carried by him in the passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.83
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:

COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the
accused, did you have reason to believe that the
accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor. 84
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would
not have been identified by the police officers
otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that
would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary
to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched.85 Anything less than this would
be an infringementupon ones basic right to security of
ones person and effects.
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law
enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to
determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of
Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop
and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this
court approximatedthe suspicious circumstances as
probable cause:
7
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag
there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.87 (Emphasis supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined
as "a reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged."88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement
further. It does not have to be probable cause,but it
cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine
reason"91 to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk"
exception:92
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable
cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about
him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin
reminds us that police officers must not rely on a
single suspicious circumstance. 95 There should be
"presence of more than oneseemingly innocent
activity, which, taken together, warranted a

reasonable inference of criminal activity." 96 The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious
circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search.98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this
case, and there was no approximation for the probable
cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was noteven the person mentioned by the
informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin
Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed.
Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying
that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance. This should
not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and
his belongings without a valid search warrant.
V identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be
shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance
with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the
search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As
stated in Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservationwhich
8
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with
a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer. 99 (Emphasis
supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to
outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence
also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People
v. Aruta.102 In that case, an informant told the police
that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs
from Baguio City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the
police officers prepared themselves. 104 The informant
pointed at a woman crossing the street105 and
apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she
allowed them to look inside her bag.107The bag
contained marijuana leaves.108
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure
conducted was illegal.109 There were no suspicious
circumstances that preceded Arutas arrest and the
subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the
informant that prompted the police to apprehend
her.111 The evidence obtained was not admissible
because of the illegal search. 112 Consequently, Aruta
was acquitted.113

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was
the jeepney driver, not the polices informant, who
informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People
v. Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau
ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming
Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs.115 The NBI
waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin
while he was disembarking from a boat.116 Like in the
case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudins bag and
found bundles of what turnedout to be marijuana
leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand
seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same
circumstances. In this case, the police had been
receiving information that the accused was distributing
drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City." 121 One
night, the police received information that thisdrug
dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel
so they conducted a stakeout.122 A car "arrived and
parked"123 at the hotel.124The informant told the police
that the man parked at the hotel was dealing
drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He was
carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately
apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and
drugs in his person and in the juice box he was
holding.128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual
or suspicious about Chuas situation when the police
apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no
validstop-and-frisk."129
9
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches
exist to allow the evidence to be admissible.The facts
of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for
searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a
lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest
or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, withouta
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a
warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present
whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his
apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not
committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in
People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante
delictoto be affected, "two elements must concur: (1)
the person to bearrested must execute anovert act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the
view of the arresting officer."130 Both elements were
missing when Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no
overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at
that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time;
hence, he could not have qualified for the last
allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds
constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. As
this court previously stated:
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
10
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaeds silence or
lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a
coercive environment brought about by the police
officers excessive intrusion into his private space. The
prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing
that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is
knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all
cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of
the police officer can be discerned again from the
testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked
them what are the contents of their bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, maam.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just
opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to
open the bags?
A None, maam.

Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and
asked them what were the contents ofthe bag, you
have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from
them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, maam.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any
hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that
they were surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with
SPO1 Taracatacs responses to Judge Florendos
questions:
COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your
Honor I observed that he was somewhat
frightened.1wphi1 He was a little apprehensive and
when he was already stepping down and he put down
the bag I asked him, "whats that," and he answered, "I
dont know because Marvin only asked me to carry." 134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her
constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police
officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a
police officer.1wphi1 The police officer must also
11
inform the person to be searched that any inaction on
his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of his or
her objections that the circumstances do not amount
to a reasonable search. The police officer must
communicate this clearly and in a language known to
the person who is about to waive his or her
constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given
to the police officer that the accused fully understands
his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a persons
constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional
provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. 136 This
rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be
excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 137 It
ensures that the fundamental rights to ones person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed
upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of
Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a
 12

pronouncement of the illegality of that search means

that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society.

In the fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers
should be equipped with the resources to be able to
perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in
any way, compromise our societys fundamental
values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we
will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations
of the society that we seek to protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless he is being heldfor some other
legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188611 June 16, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718,
which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in
Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen
Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an
Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165,
allegedly committed as follows:
13
"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in
the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit
or authority from the proper government agency or
office.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the
following were stipulated upon:
"1. Accused admits that she is the same person
identified in the information as Belen Mariacos;
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San
Gabriel, La Union;
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused,
accused had just alighted from a passenger
jeepney;
4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the
possession of the accused contained in two (2)
bags were submitted for examination to the
Crime Lab;
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005,
the alleged drug submitted for examination

gave positive result for the presence of
marijuana;
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the
accused contained (sic) and submitted for
examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a
counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and
8. The existence of the affidavits executed by
the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn
Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino."
During the trial, the prosecution established the
following evidence:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel
Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a
checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to
intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from
Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The
group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes
B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and
other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield
any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed
PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to
conduct surveillance operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay
Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of
the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him
that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the
14
poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and
one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a
backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc
then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself
on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he
found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking and
peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks
of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked
the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the
owner of the bag, but no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc
alighted together with the other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black
backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a
few moments later that the said bag and three (3)
other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already
being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under arrest,
but one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later
identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos,
and the bags to the police station. At the police
station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San
Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the
Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the
bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting
tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and
forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime
laboratory for examination. The laboratory
examination showed that the stuff found in the bags
all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
When it was accused-appellants turn to present
evidence, she testified that:
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning,
accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio, was
inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion.
While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for
passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her
neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had
been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-
appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when
she was told that she would only be carrying the bags.
When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed
accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio,
the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few
moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting
them. Without explanation, they were brought to the
police station. When they were at the police station,
Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police
station that accused-appellant discovered the true
contents of the bags which she was asked to carry. She
maintained that she was not the owner of the bags
and that she did not know what were contained in the
bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a
Counter-Affidavit.3
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision,
the dispositive portion of which states:
15
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen
Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences here (sic)
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered
confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of
the Court personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.4
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She
argued that the trial court erred in considering the
evidence of the prosecution despite its
inadmissibility.5 She claimed that her right against an
unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police
Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the
bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant
and with no permission from her. She averred that PO2
Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to verify
if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had
illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant
contended that there was no probable cause for her
arrest.6
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed
to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.7 She alleged
that the apprehending police officers violated
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of
1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of
1990, which prescribes the procedure in the custody of
seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments,
apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation directs

the apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately
after seizure or confiscation, to have the same
physically inventoried and photographed in the
presence of appellant or her representative, who shall
be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure
to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts
a serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly
confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the
prosecution failed to prove that the items allegedly
confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to
establish the chain of custody over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the
warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless
seizure of marijuana were valid and legal, 8 justified as
a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2
Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had committed the crime of delivering
dangerous drugs based on reliable information from
their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into
the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of
marijuana.9 The OSG also argued that appellant was
now estopped from questioning the illegality of her
arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of "not
guilty" upon arraignment and participated in the trial
and presented her evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside
appellants argument that the bricks of marijuana were
not photographed and inventoried in her presence or
that of her counsel immediately after confiscation,
positing that physical inventory may be done at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending team, whichever was practicable. 11
16
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed
appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in
toto.12 It held that the prosecution had successfully
proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a
number of bags which, when inspected by the police,
contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of "carrying
and conveying" the bag that contained the illegal
drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless
arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier
ascertained the contents of the bags when he was
aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on
board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified
destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed
only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged.
So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the bags,
PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a
warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section
2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At the
time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of
the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He
asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no
one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be
no violation of the right when no one was entitled
thereto at that time.

Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of
the situation. The local police has been trying to
intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more
than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was
tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence
Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to
verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the
contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving
vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle
has been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2
Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search
warrant in order to check the contents of the bags
which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney.
Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no
use because the motor vehicle had already left the
locality.13
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her
conviction.
Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of
the powers of the States agents to conduct searches
and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down
the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or
less, clear parameters in determining which are proper
and which are not.1avvphi1
Appellants main argument before the CA centered on
the inadmissibility of the evidence used against her.
17
She claims that her constitutional right against
unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the
apprehending officer.
Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it
was, then there would have been probable cause for
the warrantless arrest of appellant.
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution
provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances
when a warrantless search is valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section
13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the
elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent[;] and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated
by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.14
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their
respective decisions on the fact that the search was
18
conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of
the search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made
except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable
cause.15
In People v. Bagista,16 the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a
moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain
view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had
been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be
valid only as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or

evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have
recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a
judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer
effecting the arrest or seizure must have been
impelled to do so because of probable cause. The
essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be
lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the
articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against
the person arrested.18
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.19
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
19
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.20
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure
have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which
borders on the impossible in instances where moving
vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place
to another with impunity.21
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant
may readily be obtained when the search is made in a
store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But
it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search
is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in
other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
must be sought.22
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that
the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried
the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave.
PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act
fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to
procure a warrant before conducting the search under
the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this
case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a
warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the
vehicle before the same left for its destination.

It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the
night before appellants arrest, the police received
information that marijuana was to be transported from
Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint
around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of
October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent
from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed
him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a
passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion.
Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the
packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus,
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.23
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a
prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is
necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court
provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
20
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.24
Be that as it may, we have held that a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.25
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest
based on that search is also valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death

and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug,
including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any controlled
precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a
broker in such transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages
she was carrying did not belong to her but to a
neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him.
This contention, however, is of no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or
transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership
thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of
ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not
necessary.26
Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not
constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and
21
good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this
case.27 Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited
drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the
Dangerous Drugs Act.28
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are
regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the
affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to
crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala
prohibita condemn behavior directed not against
particular individuals, but against public order. 29
Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or
convey from one place to another."30 There is no
definitive moment when an accused "transports" a
prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the
purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of
transportation itself, there should be no question as to
the perpetration of the criminal act.31 The fact that
there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding
that the act of transporting was committed and it is
immaterial whether or not the place of destination is
reached.32
Moreover, appellants possession of the packages
containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable
presumption33 that she is the owner of the packages
and their contents.34 Appellant failed to rebut this
presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of
knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her
possession is insufficient.

Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence.
If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her and
her companion to carry some baggages, it is but
logical to first ask what the packages contained and
where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant
said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from
the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have
ran after him to give him the bags he had left with
them, and not to continue on their journey without
knowing where they were taking the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to
prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular, she
alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to
follow the procedure in the custody of seized
prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments,
apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua
non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very
corpus delicti of that crime.35
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the
procedure for custody and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
22
essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A.
No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately

after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending
appellant, he immediately brought her to the police
station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor
to witness the opening of the bags seized from
appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag
in front of appellant and the other police officers. The
black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded two bundles
of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting
tops.36 PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3
Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the
seized items were brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination.
23
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of
the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied
by counsel, and that no representative from the media
and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has
already previously held that non-compliance with
Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds
arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.37
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after
appellants arrest, she was immediately brought to the
police station where she stayed while waiting for the
Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages,
revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter
marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the
following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the
prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of
custody from the time of appellants arrest until the
prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime
laboratory.
While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state
explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance
with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that
appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized
are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain
unknown because appellant did not question the
custody and disposition of the items taken from her
during the trial.38 Even assuming that the police
officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should
have raised this issue before the trial court. She could
have moved for the quashal of the information at the
 24

first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed

to have waived any objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to

the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed
the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith
to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are
presumed to be performing their duties regularly,
absent any convincing proof to the contrary. 39

In sum, the prosecution successfully established

appellants guilt. Thus, her conviction must be
affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the

appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986
JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE
PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE
PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP
MARINDUQUE, respondents.
CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on
the ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can
do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the
fundamental law, we do annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free
society is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his
own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back
through the mists of history to the mighty English
kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly
subject had his own castle where he was monarch of
all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from
25
which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces
of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in
a few libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably,
continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of
authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few,
able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the
past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the
more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication
and cor- respondence shag be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or

when public safety and order require
otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was
the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted
by the military authorities. The articles seized from
him are sought to be used as evidence in his
prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks
that their admission be temporarily restrained (which
we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's
house was searched two days later but none of the
articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the
search found in the premises one Colt Magnum
revolver and eighteen live bullets which they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge
against the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by
probable cause to be determined by the judge or some
other authorized officer after examining the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No
less important, there must be a specific description of
the place to be searched and the things to be seized,
to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the
warrant. 5
26
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin
in Burgos v. Chief of Staf 6 as referring to "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the
probable cause must refer to only one specific
offense. 7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce" was a refinement
proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the1934
Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the
strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Although the condition did not
appear in the corresponding provision of the federa
Constitution of the United States which served as our
model it was then already embodied in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P.
Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights
of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was
thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the
Convention. 8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court
provided in what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant.
The municipal or city judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine
on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce and

take their depositions in writing, and
attach them to the record, in addition to
any affidavits presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken
by the respondent judge in accordance with the above
rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact,
depositions were taken of the complainant's two
witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by
them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the
complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge
declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P.
Quinosa personally filed his application
for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he
appeared before me in the company of
his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and
Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise
presented to me their respective
affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a
police investigator assigned to the PC-INP
command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As
the application was not yet subscribed
and sworn to, I proceeded to examine
Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof
to ascertain, among others, if he knew
and understood the same. Afterwards, he
subscribed and swore to the same before
me. 10
27
By his own account, an he did was question Captain
Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood
the same," and only because "the application was not
yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that
he would not have asked any questions at all if the
affidavit had already been completed when it was
submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own
searching questions. He limited himself to the contents
of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's
deposition in writing and attach them to the record,
together with the affidavit presented to him.
11
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions
in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he niay produce and attach
them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine
the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it wifl be found later
that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search
warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them

to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no
need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken
considering that he was applying for a search warrant
on the basis of the information provided by the
aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as
aforementioned had already been taken by the
undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the
issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to
him, as required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The
rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a
ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the
applicant's declarations are found to be false. His
application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify
the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore
necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own
personal information, to establish the apphcant's
claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take
the depositions only of the witnesses and not of the
applicant himself, there is still the question of the
sufficiency of their depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing
and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if
the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
28
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry
on the intent and justification of the application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses
Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to
be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in
the main a mere restatement of their allegations in
their affidavits, except that they were made in the
form of answers to the questions put to them by the
respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark
made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the
petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition
candidate in the forthcoming election (a
"Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's
own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as
to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to
possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received
the witnesses' statement that they saw eight men
deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2,
1984. 17 This was supposedly done overtly, and
Tohilida said he saw everything through an open
window of the house while he was near the gate. 18 He
could even positively say that six of the weapons
were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber
revolvers. 19
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the
respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so
certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far
he was from the window, or whether it was on the first
floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not
noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done

openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering
that these acts were against the law. These would
have been judicious questions but they were
injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the
witnesses were readily accepted and the search
warrant sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search
warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General
argues that whatever defect there was, was waived
when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search
and manifested his conformity in writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted
by the military authorities, who practically coerced the
petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty
against a possible challenge later to the validity of the
search they were conducting. Confronted with the
armed presence of the military and the presumptive
authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice
but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous
case, 21 the manifestation merely of our traditional
Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the
repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there
was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the
petitioner could not resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum
pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from the
petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have
been taken by the military authorities even without a
warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was
violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum
29
prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken
even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as
the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1)
there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such
a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by
the petitioner. In short, the military officers who
entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be
there and therefore had no right either to seize the
pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum
prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala
prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may
not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the
rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could
have just entered the premises and looked for the
guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without
bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact
that they did bother to do so indicates that they
themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant
for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was
suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a
search may be validly made without warrant and
articles may be taken validly as a result of that search.
For example, a warrantless search may be made
incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when the person
being arrested is frished for weapons he may
otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer.
 30

Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will
smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the the wrong be repressed. "
interior upon a showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels
and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as
operation of the rule because of their mobility and evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action
their relative ease in fleeing the state's against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending
jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to resolution of that case, however, the said articles must
be searched or waive objections to an illegal remain in custodia legis.
search. 26 And it has also been held that prohibited
articles may be taken without warrant if they are open Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before
to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of
them inadvertently. 27 the search warrant by the respondent judge in
accordance with the normal procedure. But as we said
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw
any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in
cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol view of the seriousness and urgency of the
and bullets for the fact is that these things were constitutional issues raised. 28
deliberately sought and were not in plain view when
they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the
and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby declared
that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining
illegally and therefore are protected by the order of August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.
exclusionary principle.
SO ORDERED.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was
later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While
conceding that there may be occasions when the
criminal might be allowed to go free because "the
constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion
observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless
"the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision
cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in
case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158467 October 16, 2009
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA
MARIMLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T.
VIOLA, RTC Judge, Branch 57, Angeles
City, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. It seeks to annul the
Order1 dated September 6, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, denying
petitioner spouses Joel and Marietta Marimlas Motion
to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence
Illegally Seized, and the Order 2 dated April 21, 2003
denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C.
Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed
two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of
Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners
31
house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad,
Angeles City3 and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St.,
Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga,4 both for
Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly
alleged that SI Lagascas request for the issuance of
the search warrants was founded on his personal
knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D.
Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of
surveillance operations and a test buy made at
petitioners house. The purpose of the application for
search warrants was to seize the following
articles/items:
Undetermined amount of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, popularly known as "SHABU,"
"MARIJUANA," weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters,
burner, rolling papers, and paraphernalia, all of which
articles/items are being used or intended to be used in
Violation of Republic Act 6425 as amended, and are
hidden or being kept in said house/premises. 5
Executive Judge Mario Guaria III (Judge Guaria III)
examined in writing and under oath SI Lagasca and
Fernandez, in the form of searching questions and
answers, and found that based on facts personally
known to SI Lagasca and Fernandez, petitioners had in
their possession and control, inside their house located
on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City, an
undetermined amount of methamphetamine
hydrochloride known as shabu and marijuana.
Pursuant these findings, Judge Guaria III issued a
search warrant docketed as Search Warrant No. 02-
2677, which commanded any peace officer "to make

immediate search, at any time of the day or night, not
beyond 10 days from date hereof, of the premises
above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take
possession of the properties subject of the offense and
bring to his court said properties to be dealt with as
the law directs."6
On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI
Anti-Organized Crime Division, namely, SI Lagasca,
Primitivo M. Najera, Jr., Jesusa D. Jamasali, Horten
Hernaez, and Ritche N. Oblanca, in coordination with
the Philippine National Police of Angeles City, searched
petitioners house on February 19, 2002 at around
5:00 in the morning.7They were able to seize cash in
the amount of P15,200.008 and the following items:
1. One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped
in a packing tape marked "RCL-1-2677," (net
weight - 915.7 grams);
2. One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape
wrapped in a newsprint marked "RCL-2-2677"
(net weight - 491.5 grams);
3. Dried flowering tops separately contained in
sixteen (16) transparent plastic bags, altogether
wrapped in a newsprint marked "RCL-3-2677"
(net weight - 127.9 grams); and
4. Dried flowering tops separately contained in
nine (9) plastic tea bags, altogether placed in a
yellow plastic bag marked "RCL-4-2677" (net
weight - 18.2736 grams).9
32
On February 20, 2002, an Information10 for Violation of
Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, was filed against petitioners before the
RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, presided by herein
respondent Judge Omar T. Viola.
On March 25, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally
Seized11 on the following grounds: (1) the application
for search warrant was filed outside the territorial
jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the
alleged crime was committed; (2) the court which
issued the questioned search warrant committed grave
abuse of discretion when it issued the same because
under the law it cannot issue a search warrant outside
its territorial jurisdiction; (3) the questioned search
warrant is void ab initio; and (4) the evidence illegally
seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is
therefore inadmissible in evidence.
In support of the above motion, petitioners filed a
Motion to Admit Documentary Evidence,12 asking the
court to admit the following documents: (1) application
for Search Warrant No. 02-2677; (2) authorization
letter dated February 12, 2002 with the signature of
NBI Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco (Director Wycoco);
(3) NBI ID No. 5370 of Agent Victor Emmanuel G.
Lansang with the Signature of Director Wycoco; and
(4) Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-5-03-SC (Re:
Proposed Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [Rules
110-127, Revised Rules of Court]). Petitioners claim
that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 02-2677 was
"defective considering the application was not
personally endorsed by [Dir.] Wycoco," and that the

latters signature in the authorization letter is different
from that as appearing in the identification card, and
therefore it is "not the true and genuine signature of
[Dir.] Wycoco."13
In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to
Quash,14 the Office of the City Prosecutor, Angeles City
claims that the questioned search warrant does not fall
within the coverage of Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, but under A.M.
No. 99-10-09-SC,15 which authorizes the Executive
Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila
and Quezon City to act on all applications for search
warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others,
filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may
be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
On August 14, 2009, SI Lagasca filed his Opposition
and/or Answer to the Motion to Quash Search Warrant
and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. 16 He avers
that Judge Guaria III issued Search Warrant No. 02-
2677 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 20-
9717 issued on February 12, 1997. He also claims that
it was NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation
Fermin Nasol who signed the authorization letter in
behalf of Director Wycoco, for him to apply for a
search warrant in the house/premises of petitioners on
RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and
Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac,
Pampanga for violation of R.A. No. 6425.1avvphi1
18
In an Order dated September 6, 2002, Judge Omar T.
Viola denied petitioners Motion to Quash Search
33
Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized for
lack of merit, ratiocinating as follows:
The public prosecutor was able to point out that the
search warrant issued by Judge Mario Guaria III, the
Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is in
order considering that AM 99-10-09-SC allows or
authorizes executive judges and vice executive judges
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and Quezon City to
issue warrants which may be served in places outside
their territorial jurisdiction in cases where the same
was filed and, among others, by the NBI.
The NBI also was able to explain that the authority to
apply search warrant was personally signed by Deputy
Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who is
authorized to sign and that he was delegated the
authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director
on documents of this like. Deputy Director Fermin
Nasol having that authority to sign for and in behalf of
the NBI Director, Reynaldo Wycoco, there is, therefore,
compliance with the law regarding the issuance of
authority to apply search warrant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the revelation, the Court has
no other recourse but to agree with the views of the
prosecution as well as the NBI. And this being so, the
Court finds not enough ground to quash the search
warrant issued against Spouses Joel and Marietta
Marilma.
The motion filed by them and their supplement, is
therefore denied, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.19
On September 23, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration20 on the ground that the denial of their
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress
Evidence Illegally Seized is not in accordance with the
law and existing jurisprudence. They claim that no
evidence was presented by Deputy Director Nasol that
he was authorized to sign for and in behalf of Director
Wycoco.
Said Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by
respondent court on the ground that the issues raised
therein were mere reiterations of petitioners
arguments that had already been considered and
passed upon in the Motion to Quash Search Warrant
and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. Respondent
court added:
To elaborate, this Court believes and is of the opinion
that the Deputy Director of the NBI possesses the
authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director
requesting for the issuance of a search warrant and
nothing in the Administrative Matter 99-10-09 prohibits
the delegation of such ministerial act to the Deputy
Director who is an alter ego of the NBI Director. It is
also quite clear that the NBI Director approved said
authorization for SI Ray Lagasca to apply for a search
warrant because said document was never recalled or
amended by the Office of the Bureau Director up to the
present.
The Court is also of the view that A.M. 99-10-09 is still
valid, binding and legal by virtue of the fact that not
34
even the Supreme Court (sic) did not make any
pronouncement withdrawing and or declaring the
same ineffective, hence, until such order is issued, this
Court must interpret and rule for its continued validity
and applicability.21
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners claim that the search warrant was issued in
violation of A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC and Section 2 of Rule
126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this petition is
whether or not the respondent court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders dated
September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, denying
petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to
Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized and their Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively.
At the onset, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
prays for the dismissal of this petition on the ground
that the filing of the said petition directly with this
Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The OSG argues that while this Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals (CA) over
petitions for certiorari, this petition should have been
filed with the CA. The OSG contends that the
petitioners have not shown any compelling reason to
justify the filing of the petition directly with this Court.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow
the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases,

the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by
the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance
of petitions filed directly before it.22 In this case, the
Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it
involves the application of the rules promulgated by
this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power
under the Constitution.23
At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No.
99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the
Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants,
which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically,
Section 2, Rule 126 thereof. We quote the pertinent
portions of the two issuances below:
Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC
Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application
for the Enforceability of Search Warrants
In the interest of an effective administration of justice
and pursuant to the powers vested in the Supreme
Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized
to act on all applications for search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and
illegal possession of firearms.
The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of
Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City filed by
the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the
35
Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with the
Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the
Heads of the said agencies, for the search of places to
be particularly described therein, and the seizure of
property of things as prescribed in the Rules of Court,
and to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which
may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of said courts.
The authorized judges shall keep a special docket book
listing the details of the applications and the result of
the searches and seizures made pursuant to the
warrants issued.
This Resolution is effective immediately and shall
continue until further orders from this Court and shall
be an exemption to the provisions of Circular No. 13
dated 1 October 1985 and Circular No. 19 dated 4
August 1987. x x x
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
Rule 126
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant
shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall
be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction
a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed,
the application shall only be made in the court where
the criminal action is pending.
From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-
09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon
City to act on all applications for search warrants
involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous
drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application
filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the
other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that the application for search
warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose
territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b)
for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.
Petitioners contend that the application for search
warrant was defective. They aver that the application
for search warrant filed by SI Lagasca was not
personally endorsed by the NBI Head, Director
Wycoco, but instead endorsed only by Deputy Director
Nasol and that while SI Lagasca declared that Deputy
36
Director Nasol was commissioned to sign the
authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, the
same was not duly substantiated. Petitioners conclude
that the absence of the signature of Director Wycoco
was a fatal defect that rendered the application on the
questioned search warrant void per se, and the issued
search warrant null and void "because the spring
cannot rise above its source." 24
We disagree. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits
the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from
delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the
application for search warrant to their assistant heads.
Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or
other subordinate in every bureau may perform such
duties as may be specified by their superior or head,
as long as it is not inconsistent with law. The said
provision reads:
Chapter 6 POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF
BUREAUS AND OFFICES
Sec. 31. Duties of Assistant Heads and Subordinates.
(1) Assistant heads and other subordinates in every
bureau or office shall perform such duties as may be
required by law or regulations, or as may be specified
by their superiors not otherwise inconsistent with law.
(2) The head of bureau or office may, in the
interest of economy, designate the assistant
head to act as chief of any division or unit within
the organization, in addition to his duties,
without additional compensation, and

(3) In the absence of special restriction
prescribed by law, nothing shall prevent a
subordinate officer or employee from being
assigned additional duties by proper authority,
when not inconsistent with the performance of
the duties imposed by law.
Director Wycocos act of delegating his task of
endorsing the application for search warrant to Deputy
Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted
provision of law unless it is shown to be inconsistent
with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasols
endorsement had the same force and effect as an
endorsement issued by Director Wycoco himself. The
finding of the RTC in the questioned Orders that
Deputy Director Nasol possessed the authority to sign
for and in behalf of Director Wycoco is unassailable.
Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search
Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No.
99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000,
was no longer in effect when the application for search
warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue
that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, should have been
applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of
the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside
the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in
violation of the law.
The petitioners contention lacks merit.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on
the enforceability of search warrants provided therein
37
shall continue until further orders from this Court. In
fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are
reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines
On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges
And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties,
which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the
issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases
by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an
exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:25
Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of
Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision
Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal
cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and
Quezon City. The Executive Judges and, whenever
they are on official leave of absence or are not
physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive
Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall
have authority to act on applications filed by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force
(ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended,
and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted
by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme
Court.
 38

The applications shall be personally endorsed by the

heads of such agencies and shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property
or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of
Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges
concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which
may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said courts.

The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall

keep a special docket book listing names of Judges to
whom the applications are assigned, the details of the
applications and the results of the searches and
seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.

This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule

126 of the Rules of Court. (italics ours)

In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of

discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for
denying petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant
and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. On the
contrary, Judge Guaria III had complied with the
procedural and substantive requirements for issuing
the questioned search warrant.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby

DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 6, 2002 and
April 21, 2003, both issued by respondent Judge Omar
T. Viola of the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 117412 December 8, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VALENTINO C.
ORTIZ, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
September 27, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 301291. The
decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly
the respondent courts Order of 25 January 1993 is
hereby SET ASIDE and the firearms and ammunition
irregularly and unreasonably seized pursuant to the
search warrant of 13 August 1992 are declared
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding, consequently to be disposed of by the
respondent court pursuant to applicable law.
"SO ORDERED."1
39
The facts of the present case, as adopted from the
findings of the Office of the Solicitor General, are as
follows:
On August 13, 1992, operatives of the Philippine
National Police- Special Investigation Service
Command (PNP-CISC) were conducting a surveillance
of suspected drug-pushing activities at the Regine
Condominium, Makati Avenue, Makati City. Among
their targeted suspects was private respondent
Valentino "Toto" Ortiz. Spotting the latter alighting
from his Cherokee jeep and noting that he had a
suspiciously bulging pants pocket,2 the police officers
immediately moved in and accosted him. Ortiz was
frisked and yielded an unlicensed .25 caliber "Raven"
automatic pistol SN-930291 with one magazine and
seven rounds of live .25 caliber ammunition. A search
of his vehicle resulted in the retrieval of a sealed
cellophane packet of methylamphetamine
hyrdrochloride or "shabu" from the glove
compartment. The police then took private respondent
into custody.
Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search
warrant against private respondent for violation of P. D.
18663 with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Paraaque, Branch 77. Supporting the application were
the depositions of two police officers asserting that
they had personal knowledge that private respondent
was keeping in his residence at 148-D Peru Street,
Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, the
following unlicensed firearms: "Baby armalite M-
16;4 Shotgun, 12 g; pistol cal. 9mm; pistol cal. 45 and
with corresponding ammunitions (sic)"5

On the same day, the MTC judge issued Search
Warrant No. 92-94 commanding the PNP officers "to
make an immediate search at any reasonable hour of
the day or night of the house/s, closed receptacles and
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take
possession"6 the personal property subject of the
offense described in the warrant.
Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC-Special
Investigation Group (SIG) team, accompanied by a
representative of the MTC judge and a barangay
security officer, went to private respondents residence
in Paraaque at about 7:30 P.M. of the same date to
search said premises. Private respondents wife and
their childs nanny were both present during the
search, but neither consented to be a witness to the
search. The search resulted in the seizure of the
following unlicensed firearms and ammunition:
"a. One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923
b. One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-
9015620
c. One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449
d. Six (6) live ammo. for shotgun.
e. One hundred eighteen (118) live ammo for
pistol cal. 9mm
f. Sixteen (16) live ammo. for M16 rifle
g. Thirty (30) live ammo. for pistol cal. 45
40
h. One (1) magazine for pistol cal. 9mm
i. One (1) magazine (short) for M16 rifle." 7
Private respondents wife signed a receipt for the
seized firearms and ammunition.
On August 17, 1992, a return of search warrant was
executed and filed by the police with the issuing court.
At the preliminary investigation, the investigating state
prosecutor ruled the warrantless search of private
respondents person and jeep in Makati invalid for
violating his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.8 However, the prosecutor found
the search conducted in Paraaque valid.
On August 25, 1992, private respondent was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, in Criminal
Case No.92-5475, with violating Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866. The information alleged:
"That on or about August 13, 1992 in the Municipality
of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession,
a. One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923
b. One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-
9015620
c. One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449

d. Six (6) live ammo. for shotgun.
e. One hundred eighteen (118) rds ammo for
pistol cal. 9mm
f. Sixteen (16) live ammos (sic). for M16 rifle
g. Thirty (30) live ammo for pistol cal. 45
without lawful authority therefore.
CONTRARY TO LAW."9
On September 25, 1992, private respondent moved for
reinvestigation alleging that the dismissal of the
charges against him arising from the illegal search and
seizure in Makati also applied to the search conducted
in his house in Paraaque. The trial court denied the
same. Private respondent moved for reconsideration
and deferral of arraignment, but said motions were
likewise denied.
On November 23, 1992, private respondent moved to
quash the search warrant on the following grounds: (1)
that he was not present when his house was searched
since he was then detained at Camp Crame; (2) that
the search warrant was not shown to his wife; and (3)
that the search was conducted in violation of the
witness-to-search rule. The trial court denied the
motion to quash for lack of merit.
On February 5, 1993, private respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. SP No. 30129, for certiorari
and prohibition of the order of the trial court denying
his motion to quash search warrant.
41
On September 27, 1994, the appellate court
promulgated its decision declaring as inadmissible in
evidence the firearms and ammunition seized pursuant
to Search Warrant No. 92-94.
Hence, the instant case anchored on the following
assignments of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT AT 7:30 P.M. WAS UNREASONABLE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE WARRANT ITSELF
AUTHORIZED SEARCH AT NIGHT.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SEARCH WARRANT VIOLATED SECTION 7 RULE
126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT NO RETURN WAS PREPARED
WHEN ANNEX "G" WAS PREPARED AND
SUBMITTED BY CHIEF INSP. JESUS A. VERSOZA,
GROUP COMMANDER OF SIG, CISC, CAMP
CRAME.
IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION INVOKED
A PRESUMPTION WITHOUT SHOWING BY
LEGALLY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE
SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPLEMENTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
Petitioners grounds for this petition may be reduced to
one issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in
holding that the firearms and ammunition seized from
private respondents house are inadmissible as
evidence for being the fruits of an illegal search.
The appellate court ruled the search wanting in due
process for having been done at an unreasonable time
of the evening causing "inconvenience" to the
occupants of private respondents house, especially as
there was no showing how long the nighttime search
lasted. The court a quo applied the doctrine in Asian
Surety & Insurance Co. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312
(1973), where we invalidated a nighttime search
conducted on the basis of a warrant which did not
specify the time during which the search was to be
made.
Before us, petitioner contends that Asian Surety is
inapplicable since the search warrant specified that
the search be made at a reasonable hour of day or
night.
The rule governing the time of service of search
warrants is Section 8 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
42
"Sec. 8. Time of making search. The warrant must
direct that it be served in the day time, unless the
affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or
in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time
of the day or night."
The general rule is that search warrants must be
served during the daytime. However, the rule allows
an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour
of the day or night, when the application asserts that
the property is on the person or place ordered to be
searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the
warrant relied on the positive assertion of the
applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and
ammunition were kept at private respondents
residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was
satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly
satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a search
warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in
fixing the time within which the warrant may be
served, subject to the statutory requirement 10 fixing
the maximum time for the execution of a warrant. 11 We
have examined the application for search
warrant,12 and the deposition of the witnesses
supporting said application,13and find that both
satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section
8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the
judge who issued the questioned warrant did not
abuse his discretion in allowing a search "at any
reasonable hour of the day or night." Absent such
abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where
so allowed, is not improper.14

As prescribed in Adm. Circular No. 13 of the Supreme
Court dated October 1, 1985:
"e. Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed
by the judge. The duplicate copy thereof must be
given to the person against whom the warrant is
issued and served. Both copies of the warrant must
indicate the date until when the warrant shall be valid
and must direct that it be served in the daytime. If the
judge is satisfied that the property is in the person or
in the place ordered to be searched, a direction may
be inserted in the warrants that it be served at any
time of the day or night;"
But was the time during which the search was effected
"reasonable?"
Petitioner submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time
for executing a search warrant in the metropolis. We
find no reason to declare the contrary. The exact
time of the execution of a warrant should be left to the
discretion of the law enforcement officers.15 And in
judging the conduct of said officers, judicial notice may
be taken not just of the realities of law enforcement,
but also the prevailing conditions in the place to be
searched. We take judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in a
suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at
which the residents are still up-and-about. To hold said
hour as an unreasonable time to serve a warrant would
not only hamper law enforcement, but could also lead
to absurd results, enabling criminals to conceal their
illegal activities by pursuing such activities only at
night.16
43
The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches
in the absence of specific judicial authorization is to
protect the public from the abrasiveness of official
intrusions.17 A nighttime search is a serious violation of
privacy.18 In the instant case, there is no showing that
the search which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an "abrupt
intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark" 19 or that
it caused private respondents family such prejudice as
to make the execution of the warrant a voidable act. In
finding that the duration of the search could have
caused "inconvenience" for private respondents
family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and
conjectures. Moreover, no exact time limit can be
placed on the duration of a search. 20
But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the
police officers who conducted the search
notwithstanding the absence of private respondent
and despite the refusal of the members of his
household to act as witnesses to the search?
The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of
Rule 126, which reads:
"Sec. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be
made in presence of two witnesses. No search of a
house, room, or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof
or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality."
Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the
aforementioned rule since the searchers were justified
 44

in availing of two witnesses of sufficient age and search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court
discretion, after respondents wife and maid refused. of Paraaque, dated August 13, 1992, shall be
The regularity of the search is best evidenced by the admissible as evidence in proceedings instituted by
"Certification of Orderly Search" and the receipt of the the State.
property seized signed by respondents wife.
SO ORDERED.
We find merit in the petitioners argument that private
respondents wife had no justifiable reason to refuse to
be a witness to the search and that her refusal to be a
witness cannot hamper the performance of official
duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the
premises or any member of his family, the witness-to-
search rule allows the search to be made "in the
presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality." There was no
irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff
of the Paraaque court and the barangay security
officer to act as witnesses to the search. To hold
otherwise would allow lawful searches to be frustrated
by the mere refusal of those required by law to be
witnesses.

In our view, the conduct of the nighttime search was

reasonable under the circumstances in this
case.1wphi1The unlicensed firearms and ammunition
taken from private respondents residence pursuant to
Search Warrant No. 92-94, are admissible in evidence
against private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

decision dated September 24, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 30129 is REVERSED and
NULLIFIED. The firearms and ammunition seized from
the residence of the Valentino C. Ortiz, pursuant to the

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI
SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano
Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay
and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search
warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under
45
which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of
the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We
Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the
return of the seized articles, and that respondents,
"particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential
Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP,
the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives,
assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or
successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus
seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents
were required to answer the petition. The plea for
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was
set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7,
1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General,
while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that
respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles
as evidence in the aforementioned case until final
resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation,
the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was
rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the
petition on the ground that petitioners had come to
this Court without having previously sought the
quashal of the search warrants before respondent
judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the
validity of the warrants before this Court, should have
filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that
issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in
view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public
interest generated by the search of the "We Forum"
offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely
publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of
this special circumstance justifies this Court to
exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the
words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the
case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is
always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to
suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require
it...".
46
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on
ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact
that while said search warrants were issued on
December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the
same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse
of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the
reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they
now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation]
with the fact that the Petition was filed on
June 16, 1983, more than half a year after
the petitioners' premises had been
raided.
The climate of the times has given
petitioners no other choice. If they had
waited this long to bring their case to
court, it was because they tried at first to
exhaust other remedies. The events of
the past eleven fill years had taught them
that everything in this country, from
release of public funds to release of
detained persons from custody, has

become a matter of executive
benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners,
upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a
letter to President Marcos, through
counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return
at least of the printing equipment and
vehicles. And after such a letter had been
sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the
Presidential Security Command, they
were further encouraged to hope that the
latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months,
petitioners finally decided to come to
Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be
flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to
punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On
the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption
that they had abandoned their right to the possession
of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of
laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal
Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do
47
not follow the logic of respondents. These documents
lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can
do whatever he pleases with them, within legal
bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence
does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or
invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this
petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by
petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged
failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as
mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court . 6 This objection, however, may properly be
considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted
by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b]
were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively.
Objection is interposed to the execution of Search
Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the
ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only
one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed
therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
This assertion is based on that portion of Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:

Which have been used, and are being
used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion
penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and
he is keeping and concealing the same at
19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical
error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for
and issued because the purpose and intent were to
search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd
and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place.
Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be
searched were specifically set forth in the application,
and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the
ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The
fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20-
82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
appeared in the opening paragraph of the said
warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that
respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant
No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant
describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held "that the executing
officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in
the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the
affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and
48
when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it
has also been said that the executing officer may look
to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an
ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search
warrants is the fact that although the warrants were
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b
belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani
Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were
seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates
the personal properties that may be seized under a
search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized.
A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of the following
personal property:
[a] Property subject of the
offense;
[b] Property stolen or
embezzled and other
proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
[c] Property used or intended
to be used as the means of
committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to
be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may
not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of
the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that
may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen
property must be owned by one other than the person
in whose possession it may be at the time of the
search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized, as
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the
warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that
real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are
considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co.
v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this
Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed
by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as
the agent of the owner.
49
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the
owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure
under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by
respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N.
Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C.
Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the
Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the
application for the search warrants on December 7,
1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the
abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause
upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing

the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. And when the search warrant applied for
is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or
its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner
"is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion
of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause,
said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance
of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of
probable cause is the statement contained in the joint
affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango,
50
"that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit
clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and
the articles and things above-described were used and
are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of,
illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6
Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than
personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of
First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency
established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that
they are in the nature of general warrants. The search
warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in
this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia,
paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment,
tape recorders, dictaphone and the like
used and/or connected in the printing of
the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and
all documents communication, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets,
leaflets, books, and other publication to
promote the objectives and piurposes of
the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-
Fire Movement and April 6 Movement;
and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the
distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive materials
and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored
yellow with Plate No. NKA
892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored
white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate
No. NBS 524;
51
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW,
colored white with Plate No.
PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up
truck with Plate No. NGV 427
with marking "Bagong
Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant
which authorized the search for "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning
the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by
the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like
manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" have been held too general, and that
portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles
sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to
mind a notable chapter in English history: the era of
disaccord between the Tudor Government and the
English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given
roving commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent
both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such

historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the
policy of our government to suppress any newspaper
or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-
conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger
to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the
business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of
the search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential
for the political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the
printing machines on the ground that they have been
sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration
of the property of any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities against the
government and its duly constituted authorities ... in
accordance with implementing rules and regulations as
may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense."
It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be
52
effected in view of the absence of any implementing
rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of
National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily
Express, it was reported that no less than President
Marcos himself denied the request of the military
authorities to sequester the property seized from
petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by
government prosecutors for sequestration
of the WE FORUM newspaper and its
printing presses, according to Information
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government
agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory
of the equipment and all materials in the
premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial
the newspaper and its equipment remain
at the disposal of the owners, subject to
the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not
been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of
then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter
dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P.
Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm
over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
 53

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos

turned down the recommendation of our
authorities to close the paper's printing
facilities and confiscate the equipment
and materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-

82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on
December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void
and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of
mandatory injunction for the return of the seized
articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129651 October 20, 2000
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON.
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for
the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing
Corporation, and pray for the return of the items
seized by virtue thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos
reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that
petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin
Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities
constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of
Unifish, executed an Affidavit1 stating:
1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH
PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to
as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at
54
Hernan Cortes Street, under the active
management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is
selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of
canned sardines without issuing receipt. This is
in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated
through the following scheme:
(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys
in bulk from the company;
(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot
of clout in the distribution of the canned
sardines processed by UNIFISH;
(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of
canned sardines that he orders and buys
from UNIFISH without any receipt of his
purchases;
(4) The moment he has the quantity he
wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho
delivers to the different supermarkets
such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;
(5) Payments made by these tax evading
establishments are made by checks
drawn payable to cash and delivered to
Uy Chin Ho; These payments are also not
receipted (sic);

(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for
the quantity of sardines he had withdrawn
from the corporation;
3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by
UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos direction is the
sale of imported oil locally to different
customers. This is a case of smuggling in the
sense that UNIFISH, being an export company
registered with the Board of Investments, is
enjoying certain exemptions in their importation
of oil as one of the raw materials in its
processing of canned tuna for export. These tax
exemptions are granted by the government on
the condition that the oil is to be used only in
the processing of tuna for export and that it is
not to be sold unprocessed as is to local
customers.
4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales
of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax
exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject
to the condition that these are to be used as
containers for its processed tuna for export.
These cans are never intended to be sold locally
to other food processing companies.
5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the
factory of the UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION
was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter
referred to as PREMIER) [,] which corporation
was being controlled by the same majority
stockholders as those now running and
controlling UNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was
also committing the same fraudulent acts as
55
what is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at
present.
6. The records containing entries of actual
volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH
AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the
corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes Street,
Mandaue City. The particular place or spot
where these records [official receipts, sales
invoices, delivery receipts, sales records or sales
books, stock cards, accounting records (such as
ledgers, journals, cash receipts books, and
check disbursements books)] are kept and may
be found is best described in the herein
attached sketch of the arrangement of the
offices furniture and fixture of the corporation
which is made an integral part hereof and
marked as Annex "A",
7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under
oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations
and he is reserving his right to claim for reward
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief
of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied
for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu. The application sought permission
to search the premises of Unifish.
After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos,
Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the disputed
search warrants. The first2 is docketed as "SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION
253" ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two
 56

pages. A verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned,
appears below: after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N. Labaria,
Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic) probable
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section
7th Judicial Region 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been
Branch 28 committed and there is good and sufficient reason to
Mandaue City believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing
Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in
his possession, care and control, the following:
THE PEOPLE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT NO.
PHILIPPINES, 93-10-79 1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts;
Plaintiff, FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
253 Register Books, Sales Books or Records;
- versus - Provisional & Official Receipts;

UY CHIN HO alias FRANK 2. Production Record Books/Inventory

UY, Lists [,] Stock Cards;
Unifish Packing
Corporation 3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
Hernan Cortes St., Cebu
City 4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales
Invoices;

x-------------------------x 5. Sales Records, Job Order;

(with sketch) 6. Corporate Financial Records; and

SEARCH WARRANT 7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: You are hereby commanded to make an immediate

search at any time of day or night of said premises and
G R E E T I N G S: its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take
possession of the articles above-mentioned and other
properties relative to such violation and bring said
 57

properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the

law directs. St., Mandaue City

WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.

x-------------------------/
(sgd.)
(with sketch)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge SEARCH WARRANT

The second warrant3 is similarly docketed as "SEARCH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253"
("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, G R E E T I N G S:
reproduced below, is almost identical in content to
Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned,
bold print. It consisted of only one page.
after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N. Labaria,
Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic] probable
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section
7th Judicial Region 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been
Branch 28 committed and there is good and sufficient reason to
Mandaue City believe that Uy Chin Ho aliasFrank Uy and Unifish
Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City
has in his possession, care and control, the following:
THE PEOPLE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT NO.
PHILIPPINES, 93-10-79 1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts;
Plaintiff, Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. Register Books, Sales Books or Records;
- versus - 253 Provisional & Official Receipts;

UY CHIN HO alias FRANK 2. Production Record Books/Inventory

UY, and Lists [,] Stock Cards;
Unifish Packing
Corporation 3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
Hernan Cortes

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales
Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate
search at any time of day or night of said premises and
its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take
possession of the articles above-mentioned and other
properties relative to such violation and bring said
properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the
law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant, 4 which was
docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-80 FOR:
VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263"
(hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except for the
docket number and the designation of the crime in the
body of the warrant ("Section 238 in relation to Sec.
263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and
possession of unregistered delivery receipts and/or
sales invoices"), Search Warrant B is a verbatim
reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
58
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR,
accompanied by members of the Philippine National
Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of
the Unifish Packing Corporation. They seized, among
other things, the records and documents of petitioner
corporation. A return of said search was duly made by
Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a
case before the Department of Justice. The records,
however, do not reveal the nature of this case.
On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash
the subject search warrants with Branch 28 of the
Cebu RTC.
The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to
quash as well as their subsequent motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed
to comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which
states:
a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in
seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof shall be
served on each of the respondents, and must be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the decision or
order complained of and true copies of the pleadings
and other pertinent documents and papers. (As
amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified
true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash, (2) the Motion

for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo
Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper
remedy to question the resolution denying the motion
to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to
the petitioners, assuming that the Department of
Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for
reinvestigation; the right to post bail; a Motion to
Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an
appeal, after judgment on the merits, or after the case
shall have been tried. This brings us to the case
of Lai vs. Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the
pronouncement, thus:
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be
allowed where petitioner has other remedies available.
-- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners
(referring to the petition for certiorari) from the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by
Judge Diez, the same should not have been granted.
Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law
against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These
remedies are as enumerated by respondent appellate
court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their
provisional release; 2. They can ask the Provincial
Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them.
If unsatisfied with the fiscal's resolution they can ask
for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA
5180 as amended by P.D. 911);
3. if their petition for review does not prosper, they can
file a motion to quash theinformation in the trial court.
(Rule 117, Rules of Court).
59
4. If the motion is denied, they can appeal the judgme
ntof the court after the case shall have been tried on t
he merits.
x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not
certiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in the case of
Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied,
the remedy is notcertiorari but to go to trial without pr
ejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in s
aid Motion. In the event that an adverse decision is
rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom
should be the next legal step.
xxx
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic]
that the Court issued the Search Warrants without
jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The
argument therefore that the Court committed an error
in not describing the persons or things to be searched;
that the Search Warrants did not describe with
particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence
of probable cause; and for having allegedly condoned
the discriminating manner in which the properties
were taken, to us, are merely errors in the Court's
finding, certainly not correctible by certiorari, but
instead thru an appeal.5
In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile,
petitioners filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA
certified true copies of the pleadings and documents
listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their
Motion for Reconsideration. An examination of the
CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first
submitted the same in their Reply, after respondents,
in their Comment, pointed out petitioners failure to
attach them to the Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the
petition on this ground although, to its credit, it did
touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that
the case could have been decided without these
pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA
deemed them essential to the resolution of the case, it
could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third,
in a similar case,6 we held that the submission of a
document together with the motion for reconsideration
constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule
46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a
certified true copy of "material portions of the record
as are referred to [in the petition], and other
documents relevant or pertinent thereto" along with
the petition. So should it be in this case, especially
considering that it involves an alleged violation of a
constitutionally guaranteed right. The rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to
help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be
defeated.7
The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners
cannot avail of certiorari to question the resolution
denying their motions to quash the subject search
warrants. We note that the case of "Lai vs.
60
Intermediate," cited by the appellate court as authority
for its ruling does not appear in "220 SCRA 149." The
excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as
observed by petitioners,8 appears to have been taken
from the case of Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap, however, is inapplicable
since that case involved a motion to quash
a complaint for qualified theft, not a motion to quash
a search warrant.
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,9 where
we held that the issuing judges disregard of the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant
constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which may be
remedied by certiorari:
Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is the general rule that certiorari is available
where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions
"has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law."
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein
above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge de Guzman
gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search
warrant. Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously
when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined by the
municipal or city judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized;

and that "no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense."
The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the
requirements laid down by the said rule renders the
warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has
been held that where the order complained of is a
patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus
may properly be entertained despite the existence of
the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de
Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy
remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of
the warrant. The seizure of her personal property had
resulted in the total paralization of the articles and
documents which had been improperly seized. Where
the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and
expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode
of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to
a party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above
pronouncement in Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC of
Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,10 which also involved a
special civil action for certiorari:11
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must
strictly comply with the constitutional requirement that
he must determine the existence of probable cause by
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers. His failure to
comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman,
G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the
capricious disregard by the judge in not complying
61
with the requirements before issuance of search
warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion".
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before
the CA that the issuing judge violated the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in
issuing the disputed search warrants, which, if true,
would have constituted grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners also alleged that the enforcers of the
warrants seized almost all the records and documents
of the corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of its
business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate
remedy that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the
right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in

connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline
form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable
cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by
the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe
the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.12
62
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the
downright nullification of the search warrants. 13 The
proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely
legal, "for there is not a description of process known
to the law, the execution of which is more distressing
to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such
intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect." The warrants will always be
construed strictly without, however, going the full
length of requiring technical accuracy. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of
the process when an officer undertakes to justify under
it.14
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in
the subject warrants that command their nullification.
They point out inconsistencies in the description of the
place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as
inconsistencies in the names of the persons against
whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That
two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2)
were issued for the same crime, for the same place, at
a single occasion is cited as another irregularity.
Petitioners also dispute the existence of probable
cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants.
Finally, they claim that the things to be seized were
not described with particularity. These defects,
according to petitioners, render the objects seized
inadmissible in evidence.15
Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be
searched
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant
A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy
as "Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City" while the body of

the same warrant states the address as "Hernan
Cortes St., Mandaue City." Parenthetically, Search
Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of
petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City."
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search
warrant, that there be a particular description of "the
place to be searched and the persons of things to be
seized."16 The rule is that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended17 and distinguish it from other places in
the community.18 Any designation or description known
to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers
unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement.19 Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan,20 where the
search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of
the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the
adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted
that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient
gravity to call for its invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly
named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor
was it established that the enforcing officers had any
difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner
corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore,
inconsistently identified the city where the premises to
be searched is not a defect that would spell the
warrants invalidation in this case.
Inconsistencies in the description of the persons
named in the two warrants
63
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the
names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1 and A-2.
Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against "Uy Chin
Ho alias Frank Uy." Search Warrant A-2, on the other
hand, was directed against "UY CHIN HO alias FRANK
UY, and Unifish Packing Corporation."
These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
In Miller v. Sigler,21 it was held that the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, from
which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is
historically derived, does not require the warrant to
name the person who occupies the described
premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the
search of specifically described premises only and not
for the search of a person, the failure to name the
owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and
search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and
where the name of the owner of the premises sought
to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search
warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description
of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so
that no discretion is left to the officer making the
search as to the place to be searched.22
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not
for search of the persons owning or occupying the
premises, but only a search of the premises occupied
by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or
in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or
occupants of the premises, because of inconsistencies
in stating their names.23
Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one
place

In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed
superseded by Search Warrant A-2.
Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were
actually issued by the trial court for the same crime
(violation of "SEC. 253" of the National Internal
Revenue Code). It appears, however, that Search
Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the
inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1,
as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a
party against whom the warrant was issued. Search
Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing
judge to be more precise in the names of the persons
against whom the warrant was issued and in the
description of the place to be searched. Indeed, it
would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single
occasion two warrants authorizing the search of a
single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the
apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to
supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be
deemed revoked by the former.
The alleged absence of probable cause
Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for
Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search
warrants.
Probable cause is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.24
64
In the determination of probable cause, the
Constitution and the Rules of Court require an
examination of the witnesses under oath. The
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit
but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.25 Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search
warrant, and conducting of examination in a general
manner, would not satisfy the requirements for
issuance of a valid search warrant.26
The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts
of their own personal knowledge. The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence
of probable cause.27 Search warrants are not issued on
loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere
suspicion or belief.28
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the
judge deposed two witnesses, namely, Nestor Labaria
of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old
employee of Unifish. Petitioners claim that the
testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree
with this contention, but only as to the testimony of
Labaria, who stated during the examination:
Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?
A. No.

Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish
Packing Corporation?
A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our
informer, Mr. Abos.
Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the
premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?
A. Because of that information we received that they
are using only delivery receipts instead of the legal
sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.
Q. From where did you get that information?
A. From our informer, the former employee of that
establishment.29
The above portion of the transcript shows that
Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of
petitioners was acquired not through his own
perception but was merely supplied by Abos.
Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on
hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of
the search warrants.30
The application for the warrants, however, is not based
solely on Labarias deposition but is supported by that
of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged
illegal practices was apparently obtained during his
employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos
detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uy and
Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described
the place where the documents supposedly evidencing
these schemes were located:
65
Q Do you know Frank Uy?
A Yes.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980
until August of 1993.
Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?
A Hernan Cortes St.
Q What is it being engaged of?
A It is engaged in canning of fish.
Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect
that it seems that in his business dealings that he is
actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion.
Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q How is it done?
A As an officer, he is an active member of the
corporation who is at the same time making his
authority as appointing himself as the distributor of
the company's products. He sells these products thru
supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the
whole Philippines. He makes it appear that it is the
company which is selling when actually it is him selling
the goods and he does not issue any invoices.

Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?
A Thru delivery receipts.
Q Is the delivery receipt official?
A No. It is unregistered.
Q For how long has this been going on?
A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started
producing the sardines.
Q When was the last time that you observed that that
is what he is doing?
A August, 1993, last month.
Q How did you happen to know about this last month?
A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and
the payments of that supermarket did not go directly
to the company. It went to him and he is the one who
paid the company for the goods that he sold.
Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain
supermarkets?
A White Gold and Gaisano.
Q How did you know this fact?
A As a manager of the company I have access to all
the records of that company for the last three years. I
was the Operating Chief.
66
Q Until now?
A No. I was separated already.
Q When?
A August, 1993.
Q How does he do this manipulation?
A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich
the company, Unifish will deliver to his customers,
then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn,
he pays to the company.
Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their
books of account or ledger or whatever?
A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret
transaction.1wphi1 It is not for the public, not for the
BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping the
transactions between the company and him. It is not
made to be shown to the BIR.
Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they
have made some deliveries to certain supermarkets?
A Yes.
Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers
that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares
everything.

Q Based on what?
A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to
declare.
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales
invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts, sales
records, etc. These documents are records that you
have stated, in your affidavit, which are only for the
consumption of the company?
A Yes, not for the BIR.
Q Where are they kept now?
A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the
sketch. This is the bird's eyeview (sic) of the whole
office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is
the one recording all the confidential transactions of
the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers
and notebooks.
Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?
A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the
office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new
personnel. Gina Tan collects all the records from this
girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl
delivers the receipts. The second girl prepares the bill
of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the
stocks.
67
This sketch here is the bodega where the records are
kept. The records from these people are stored in this
place which is marked as "C".
Q So what you want to impress on that now is that
only current records are kept by Gina because
according to you the whole records are already placed
in the bodega?
A Yes.
Q But how can you enter the bodega?
A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which
will lead to this part here. If you go straight there is a
bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit
right after opening the door.
Q The problem is that, when actually in August have
you seen the current records kept by Gina?
A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of
the records.
Q Where are they now?
A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to
the Court a bunch of records).
Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox
copies that you have given me, especially this one
which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that
these are for the months of January, February, March,
April and May. Are these transactions reflected in these

xerox copies which appear in the ledger being shown
to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it did not appear.
Q What about this one which says Columnar Book
Cash Receipt for the month of January, what does it
show?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from
the company and these are his customers.
Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books
which are the basis for the report to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it does not reflect.
Q What are these xerox copies of checks?
A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the
memos received by Unifish for payment of sardines.
This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin
Ho for collection.
Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company
imported soya oil. How is it done?
A The company imports soya oil to be used as a
component in the processing of canned tuna for
export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and
so it is tax free. As far as I know, they profit more to
dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this
soya oil are sold to another company.
Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?
68
A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil
supposedly to be used as a raw material but instead
they are selling it locally?
A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated
November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt was the
delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90
grams soya oil.
Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used
by Unifish but instead they are seeling (sic) it?
A Yes, at a profit.
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling
of cans. What do you mean by this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a
special price given to packaging materials. When you
export the product there is a 50% price difference.
Now, taking that advantage of that exemption, they
sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia
Farms.
Q Do you have proof to that effect?
A No, but we can get it there.
Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the
application for search warrant since according to you,
you have seen this manipulation reflected on the
books of account kept by Gina? Are you sure that
these documents are still there?

A Yes. I have received information.
COURT: Alright.31
Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish,
he had access to the company records, and even
showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus,
we reject the contention that this witness did not have
personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified.
The contents of the deposition clearly demonstrate
otherwise.
The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners
submission, the inquiries made by the judge were far
from leading or being a rehash of the witness
affidavit. We find such inquiries to be sufficiently
probing.
Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the
things seized
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of
the things to be seized in the subject warrants and
those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,32 Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc.
vs. Ruiz,33 and Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Herrera.34
In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized
were described as:
69
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements."
This Court found that the foregoing description failed
to conform to the requirements set forth by the
Constitution since:
x x x the warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things
to be seized be particularly described - as well as
tending to defeat its major object: the elimination
of general warrants.
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant
containing a similar description as those in Stonehill:
The documents, papers, and effects sought to be
seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in
this manner:
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers,
journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements
books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments
received; certificates of stocks and securities;
contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex
and coded messages; business communications;

accounting and business records; checks and check
stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and
records of foreign remittances, covering the years
1966 to 1970."
The description does not meet the requirement in Art.
III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized.
xxx
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil.
886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, to wit:
"x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders
No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the
things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant - to leave
the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be
made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the
correct interpretation of this constitutional provision
borne out by the American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and
effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.
70
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe
the things to be seized when the description therein is
as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow
(People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law -
by which the warrant officer may be guided in making
the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126,
Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant
does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the
articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to
an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily
have some evidence, other than those articles, to
prove the said offense; and the articles subject of
search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence. In this event, the
description contained in the herein disputed warrant
should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts,
persons, and other pertinent data regarding the
receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and
securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale,
messages and communications, checks, bank deposits
and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances,
among others, enumerated in the warrant.
In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the
description of the things to be seized, i.e., "Fire
Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including
subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers,
Book of Accounts including cash receipts and
disbursements and general ledger, etc." was held to
be "an omnibus description" and, therefore, invalid:

x x x Because of this all embracing description which
includes all conceivable records of petitioner
corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its
business, petitioner in several motions filed for early
resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of
TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their
business to the grave prejudice of not only the
company, its workers, agents, employees but also of
its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued
by it, including the government itself, and of the
general public. And correlating the same to the
charges for which the warrant was issued, We have
before Us the infamous general warrants of old.
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were
described in the following manner:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers,
Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books,
Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official
Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,]
Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
71
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants
fail to meet the test of particularity, especially since
witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of
the documents sought to be seized. The issuing judge
could have formed a more specific description of these
documents from said photocopies instead of merely
employing a generic description thereof. The use of a
generic term or a general description in a warrant is
acceptable only when a more specific description of
the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to
employ the specificity available will invalidate a
general description in a warrant.35 The use by the
issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of
accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash
register books, sales books or records, provisional &
official receipts," "production record books/inventory
lists, stock cards," "sales records, job order,"
"corporate financial records," and "bank
statements/cancelled checks" is therefore
unacceptable considering the circumstances of this
case.
As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts"
and "unregistered purchase & sales invoices,"
however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General
correctly argues that the serial markings of these
documents need not be specified as it is not possible
to do so precisely because they are
unregistered.36 Where, by the nature of the goods to
be seized, their description must be rather general, it
is not required that a technical description be given, as
this would mean that no warrant could issue. Taking
into consideration the nature of the articles so
described, it is clear that no other more adequate and
detailed description could have been given,
particularly because it is difficult to give a particular

description of the contents thereof. 37 Although it
appears that photocopies of these unregistered
documents were among those handed by Abos to the
issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the
latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice,
and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents
listed in the warrants does not render the entire
warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the
search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts
and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the
warrants remain valid. The search warrant is
severable, and those items not particularly described
may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.
In United States v. Cook,38 the United States Court of
Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the following
pronouncement:
x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court,
53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415 (1961).
In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure
of two particularly described books and myriad other
generally described items. On appeal, the California
Supreme Court held that only the books were
particularly described in the warrant and lawfully
seized. The court acknowledged that the warrant was
flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized,
the court chose to sever the defective portions of the
warrant and suppress only those items that were not
particularly described.
Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not
follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion
would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even
though proper if viewed separately, must be
72
condemned merely because the warrant was defective
with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of
the warrant are severable from the authorization
relating to the named books x x x. The search for and
seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not
rendered illegal by the defects concerning other
articles.
xxx
x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of California and the majority of state courts that
have considered this question and hold that in the
usual case the district judge should sever the infirm
portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional
muster. See United States v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445,
459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described
with the requisite particularity in the warrant should be
suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the
search is hardly consistent with the purposes
underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items
improperly described prohibits the Government from
profiting from its own wrong and removes the court
from considering illegally obtained evidence.
Moreover, suppression of only those items that were
not particularly described serves as an effective
deterrent to those in the Government who would be
tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary
description. As the leading commentator has
observed, "it would be harsh medicine indeed if a
warrant which was issued on probable cause and
which did particularly describe certain items were to
be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and
the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a
search for other items as well." 2 W. LaFave, Search

and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
4.6(f) (1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the
warrants ought to be returned to petitioners.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though
not listed in the warrants, were also taken by the
enforcing officers:
1. One (1) composition notebook containing
Chinese characters,
2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese
characters,
3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,
4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,
5. One (1) bound gate pass,
6. Surety Agreement.39
In addition, the searching party also seized items
belonging to the Premier Industrial and Development
Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with
petitioner Unifish.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically
mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly
described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In
order to comply with the constitutional provisions
regulating the issuance of search warrants, the
property to be seized under a warrant must be
73
particularly described therein and no other property
can be taken thereunder.40 In Tambasen vs. People,41 it
was held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in
the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search
warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
requires that a search warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized. "The evident purpose
and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to
be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant, to leave the officers
of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made and that
abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137
SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz,
37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil.
886 [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also
aimed at preventing violations of security in person
and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations
when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547
[1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the
search warrant, had been illegally seized from
petitioner. The fact that the members of the police
team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is
not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The
presumption juris tantum of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail
against the constitutionally protected right of an
individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994];
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although
 74

public welfare is the foundation of the power to search premises and belonging to petitioners, except the
and seize, such power must be exercised and the law unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
enforced without transgressing the constitutional purchase and sales invoices.
rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing
Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As SO ORDERED.
the Court aptly puts it in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198
SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals
cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors."

The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants

cannot be justified by the directive in the penultimate
paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of
other properties relative to such violation," which in no
way can be characterized as a particular description of
the things to be seized.

As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC,

we cannot order their return in the present
proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties.42

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of

Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14 May 1987,
affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17
July 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as said
Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search
Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales
invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the
articles subject of said warrants. The respondent
Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to return
to petitioners all items seized from the subject

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125754 December 22, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN and ROBERTO
DELOS REYES, accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga
and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11
September 1995 that a man and a woman were
repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta.
Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3
Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando
Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the
suspects and parked their car some three hundred
(300) meters away. They walked towards their quarry's
lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer.
When they reached the house they "peeped (inside)
through a small window and . . . saw one man and a
woman repacking suspected marijuana." 1 They
entered the house and introduced themselves as
police officers to the occupants and thereupon
75
confiscated the tea bags and some drug
paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turned
out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and
Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the
tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo
confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained
marijuana.
Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus
charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, of RA 6425
otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Both however denied on the witness stand ownership
over the confiscated tea bags and drug implements.
According to Roberto delos Reyes, he and his wife were
merely tenants in the house of Zenaida Bolasa and at
the time he was arrested he had just arrived from
work. Upon learning that Zenaida was repacking
marijuana inside their room, he immediately ordered
her to leave. Unfortunately however it was at that
precise moment that police authorities entered and
announced their presence. He and Zenaida were then
brought to the Valenzuela Police Station for
questioning and subsequently detained.
On the part of Zenaida Bolasa, she narrated that at
7:30 in the evening of 11 September 1995 she was on
her way to 9th Avenue, Caloocan City, where she was
working as a waitress. As she was about to leave the
house she met a certain "Rico" and conversed with
him for some time. She denied knowing PO3 Carizon
and the fact that the latter saw her repacking
marijuana inside her house.

The trial court upon finding the version of the
prosecution to be more plausible convicted both
accused Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes of
the crime charged and sentenced each of them not
only to reclusion perpetua but also to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. 2
Both accused appealed, although separately, each one
represented by a separate counsel.
Maintaining his innocence in this appeal, accused-
appellant Roberto delos Reyes insists he had just
arrived from work and had, in fact, just entered his
room when he was arrested. Assuming he was indeed
repacking marijuana when the police officers arrived,
he claims it would have been inconceivable for them to
know what he was doing inside his room considering
the height of his window. Significantly, the police
officers had to lean first on the window in order to
observe the activities inside the room.
76
Accused-appellant Zenaida Bolasa meanwhile asserts
that the search in her residence was likewise illegal as
her arrest preceding it was illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized from her could not be properly used
as evidence against her. She insists that the trial court
should not have given credence to the testimony of
PO3 Albert Carizon as the same was hearsay.
According to her and her co-accused delos Reyes, PO3
Carizon was not among the arresting officers. As such,
PO3 Carizon had no personal knowledge regarding the
conduct of the arrest and search thus making his
testimony hearsay. Since the prosecution did not
present the two (2) arresting officers the version of the
prosecution cannot stand on its own.
Bolasa likewise impugns the identity of the items
confiscated from her person vis-a-vis those which were
submitted for laboratory examination and charges that
the failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily establish
the chain of custody over the specimen is damaging to
its case.
We sustain the appeal. This case clearly illustrates how
constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests and
seizures can be violated by overzealous police officers
in the arrest of suspected drug offenders. Thus, after a
meticulous evaluation of the evidence at hand, this
Court finds itself with no other recourse but to strike
down the process adopted by the prosecution and
acquit accused-appellants for insufficiency of evidence
and reasonable doubt.
Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides

The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the
persons of its citizens as well as into their houses,
papers and effects. The constitutional provision
sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable
armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It
protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself
against unlawful arrests and other forms of
restraint, 3 and prevents him from being irreversibly
"cut off from that domestic security which renders the
lives of the most unhappy in some measure
agreeable." 4
For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket
prohibition against all searches and seizures as it
obviously operates only against searches and seizures
that are "unreasonable." 5 Thus, arrests and seizures in
the following instances are not deemed
"unreasonable" and are thus allowed even in the
absence of a warrant
77
1. Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The
elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain
view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly
regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;.
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances. 6

An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant:
(a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is about to commit an offense
in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been
committed and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and,
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another. 7 A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense. 8
The manner by which accused-appellants were
apprehended does not fall under any of the above-
enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal.
First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge
that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had
just committed, were committing, or were about to
commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor
did they have any reasonable ground to believe that
accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-
appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from
a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in
plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As
already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally
arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later
on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
78
discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped
first through the window before they saw and
ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside
the room. In like manner, the search cannot be
categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a
stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and
emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is
bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending
officers should have conducted first a surveillance
considering that the identities and address of the
suspected culprits were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause for arresting accused-
appellants, they should have secured a search warrant
prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest
being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was
likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during
the illegal search cannot be used against accused-
appellants; 9 hence, their acquittal must follow in
faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
WHEREFORE, the 12 July 1996 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court finding accused-appellants Zenaida Bolasa
y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes guilty of violating
Sec. 8, Art. II, of RA 6425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
for insufficiency of evidence and on reasonable doubt;
consequently, both are ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held
for another lawful cause.
 79

Their Jailers the Correctional Institution for Women,

Mandaluyong City, for Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan,
and the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
Roberto delos Reyes are DIRECTED to implement
this Decision immediately and to report to this Court
within five (5) days from receipt hereof their
compliance herewith WITHOUT DELAY.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias
"Joy," was charged on August 22, 1994 for violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which
alleges:
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at
Barangay Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias, Province
of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and
deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana
leaves, which are considered prohibited drugs, in
violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing
damage and prejudice to the public interest. [1]
The consequent arraignment conducted on
September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from
appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de
parte.[2] Trial was held on scheduled dates thereafter,
80
which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of
the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed
the extreme penalty of death on appellant. He was
further ordered to pay a fine in the amount
of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.[3]
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution
that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of
June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay
Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio
Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of
the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based
in Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two officers,
was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained
in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana
bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they
were aided by an informer in the arrest of
appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and
Clarin, had informed them the day before, or on June
19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom
said informer could recognize, would be arriving
somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from
Baguio City with an undetermined amount of
marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to
the arresting officers the appellant when the latter
alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated
day, hour, and place.[4]
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed
ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed during

the trial that while he indeed came all the way from
Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only
some pocket money and without any luggage. His sole
purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who
had earlier offered a prospective job at a garment
factory in said locality, after which he would return to
Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was
accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at
Barangay Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated
at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never
informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact
even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with
him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's
testimony about the job offer in the garment factory
where she reportedly worked as a supervisor,
[5]
although, as the trial court observed, she never
presented any document to prove her alleged
employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes
the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in
flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court,
after an objective and exhaustive review of the
evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the
factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable
the reliance of the lower court on the positive
testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill
motives can be attributed, and its rejection of
appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently
self-serving in nature.
81
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo
grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of
insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered
showing that he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of
dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers
"testified only on the alleged transporting of Marijuana
from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in
court the civilian informant is supposedly corrosive of
the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon
appellant's fundamental right to confront the
witnesses against him, that informant was a vital
personality in the operation who would have
contradicted the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of
the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by
them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here
involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as amended,
is as follows:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act
to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor,
or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the death
of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the
various modes of commission[6] being the sale,
administration, delivery, distribution, and
transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the
epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law. The text of
Section 4 expands and extends its punitive scope to
other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by
including these who shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions." Section 4 could thus be
violated by the commission of any of the acts specified
therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling,
administering, delivering, giving away, distributing,
dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a
violation of Section 4, the transgressive acts alleged
therein and attributed to appellant being that he
administered, delivered, and transported
marijuana. The governing rule with respect to an
offense which may be committed in any of the
different modes provided by law is that an indictment
would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been
committed in one, two or more modes specified
therein. This is so as allegations in the information of
82
the various ways of committing the offense should be
considered as a description of only one offense and the
information cannot be dismissed on the ground of
multifariousness.[7] In appellant's case, the prosecution
adduced evidence clearly establishing that he
transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By
that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs,
appellant had already run afoul of that particular
section of the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations
must fail.
The Court also disagrees with the contention of
appellant that the civilian informer should have been
produced in court considering that his testimony was
"vital" and his presence in court was essential in order
to give effect to or recognition of appellant's
constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed
by the State against him. These assertions are,
however, much too strained. Far from compromising
the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the
non-presentation of the informer in this instance was
justified and cannot be faulted as error.
For one, the testimony of said informer would have
been, at best, merely corroborative of the declarations
of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial
court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both
testified upon matters in which they had personally
taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer
could be dispensed with by the prosecution, [8] more so
where what he would have corroborated are the
narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of
duties regularity is the prevailing legal
presumption. Besides, informants are generally not

presented in court because of the need to hide their
identities and preserve their invaluable services to the
police.[9] Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to
present in court as its witnesses, and not for the
defense to dictate that course. [10] Finally, appellant
could very well have resorted to the coercive process
of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear
before the court below,[11] but which remedy was not
availed of by him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks
were confiscated in the course of an unlawful
warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention
of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the
preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities
had already been apprised by their so-called informer
of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City,
hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to
procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance
should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure
of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on
the following dawn.Once again, the Court is not
persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down
the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant, absent which such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision.[12] Evidence secured on the
occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure
is tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of
the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
83
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This
exclusionary rule is not,however, an absolute and rigid
proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches;[13] (2)
[14]
searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view; [15]
(4) consented searches;[16] (5)
searches incidental to a lawful arrest;[17] and (6) "stop
and frisk" measures[18] have been invariably
recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the
information relayed by the civilian informant to the law
enforcers was that there would be delivery of
marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming
from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20,
1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not
pressed for time, this would be beside the point for,
under these circumstances, the information relayed
was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the
obtention of the corresponding arrest or search
warrant. While there is an indication that the informant
knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he
knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should
know the exact name of the subject of the warrant
applied for, there is the additional problem that the
informant did not know to whom the drugs would be
delivered and at which particular part of the barangay
there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset
know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his
means of transportation, the container or contrivance
wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the
same were arriving together with, or were being
brought by someone separately from, the courier.

On such bare information, the police authorities
could not have properly applied for a warrant,
assuming that they could readily have access to a
judge or a court that was still open by the time they
could make preparations for applying therefor, and on
which there is no evidence presented by the
defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining
warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling
but all the coincident and ambient circumstances
should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact,
the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay
down a dragnet at the possible entry points to
Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day
notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning"
arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to
reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup,
unsure as they were of the time when and the place in
Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up,
and how he would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed
the informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1 Clarin
and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a
reliable source in past operations. Moreover,
experience shows that although information gathered
and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are
vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly and
completely packaged as one would expect from a
professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes
successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of
appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of
understanding assistance to our law enforcement
agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic
appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of
84
the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the
placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless
search conducted on appellant invalidates the
evidence obtained from him, still the search on his
belongings and the consequent confiscation of the
illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above
contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from
the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those
that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense.[19] On the other hand, the apprehending officer
must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting
an arrest which could beclassified as one in cadence
with the instances of permissible arrests set out in
Section 5(a).[20] These instances have been applied to
arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante
delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause,
while largely a relative term the determination of
which must be resolved according to the facts of each
case, is understood as having reference to such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as
to the commission of an offense, and that the objects

sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.[21]
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to
observe that the evidentiary measure for the propriety
of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for
effecting a warrantless arrest, has been reduced and
liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and
jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which
was of a higher degree or quantum, [22] and was even
used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause."
Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from which we
derived the term and its concept, probable cause is
understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for
belief in the existence of facts warranting the
proceedings complained of,[23] or an apparent state of
facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which
would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man
to believe that the accused person had committed the
crime.[24]
Felicitously, those problems and confusing
concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the
issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the
Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that
the quantum of evidence required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender
a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission
of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof.
[25]
It has the same meaning as the related phraseology
used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the
investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent
for trial," or where "a probable cause exists." [26] It
should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right
85
to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as
legally authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had
alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at
once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at
hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1
Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the
marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag
and carton box which appellant was carrying at the
time. The officers thus realized that he was their man
even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent
looking pair of luggage for personal
effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant,
introduced themselves as policemen, and requested
him to open and show them the contents of the
traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily
did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag
yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to
further search the box, they brought appellant and his
luggage to their headquarters for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a
person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box
should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the
commission of any crime since that is normal. But,
precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that
drugs being illegally transported are necessarily
hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus,
the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely
on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their
side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in
appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been
irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the

circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a
"wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing
the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the
search and seizure that, at the point prior to the
search, were already constitutive of probable cause,
and which by themselves could properly create in the
minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable
belief that appellant was in the act of violating the
law. The search yielded affirmance both of that
probable cause and the actuality that appellant was
then actually committing a crime by illegally
transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant
facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of
his belongings without the requisite warrant were both
justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the
search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when
the officers approached appellant and introduced
themselves as policemen, they asked him about the
contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they
contained personal effects, the officers asked him to
open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded,
presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that
the law had caught up with his criminal
activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have the same conducted upon
his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof.
86
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like other rights, be waived either
expressly or impliedly.[27] Thus, while it has been held
that the silence of the accused during a warrantless
search should not be taken to mean consent to the
search but as a demonstration of that person's regard
for the supremacy of the law,[28] the case of herein
appellant is evidently different for, here, he
spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition
by himself opening the bag without being forced or
intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be
construed as a clear waiver of his right.[29]
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of
the prosecution to "legally, properly and adequately
establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly
confiscated from (him) were the same marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist and presented in
court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in
court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since,
in fact they did not have to do so. It should be noted
that the prosecution presented in the court below and
formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of
marijuana together with the traveling bag and the
carton box in which the same were contained. The
articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence
and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the
marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination,
and which subsequently proved positive as such, were
the same drugs taken from appellant. The trial court,
therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence,
satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other
than those taken from appellant.

Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly
established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who
categorically related that when they had ascertained
that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant
appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him
where he had come from, and the latter readily
answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity
of the report of the informer. No other conclusion can
therefore be derived than that appellant had
transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from
Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation in court of
the subject matter of the crime, the marijuana bricks
which had tested positive as being indian hemp, the
guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs
in violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by
the police authorities, claiming that he was not allowed
to communicate with anybody, and that he was not
duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police
authorities here could possibly have violated the
provision of Republic Act No. 7438[30] which defines
certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or under
custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the
arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and
providing corresponding penalties for violations
thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities,
however, the proceedings in the lower court will not
necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never
admitted or confessed anything during his custodial
87
investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the
nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or
admission was elicited from him which would
otherwise have been inadmissible in
evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of
appellant was clearly established by other evidence
adduced by the prosecution, particularly the
testimonies of the arresting officers together with the
documentary and object evidence which were formally
offered and admitted in evidence in the court below.
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its
imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. As
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article
IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter
alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be
applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case
of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In
said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs
carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present
case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
consequently provides the rules to be observed in the
application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending
appellant's violation of the law, hence the second
paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in
which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is
the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the

pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never
intended by the legislature that where the quantity of
the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in
Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be
imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a
provision from which such a conclusion may be
gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has
already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not
amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, [31] the
rules wherein were observed although the cocaine
subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity
provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law
itself provides a specific penalty where the violation
thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the
second paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of
Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in
said section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.[32] While the minority or the death of the
victim will increase the liability of the offender, these
two facts do not constitute generic aggravating
88
circumstances, as the law simply provides for the
imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if
the offense is attended by either of such factual
features. In that situation, obviously the rules on the
graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In
herein appellant's case, there was neither a minor
victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence,
the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in Criminal
Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense
that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other
respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.