Organized Crime Series

Organized Crime in Mexico
March 11, 2008 | 2337 GMT
Summary
Organized crime in Mexico centers on drug trafficking into the United States and the
control of the most lucrative trade routes. As long as the drug trade thrives, organized
crime in Mexico will continue.
Analysis
Related Link
 Mexican Drug Cartels: The Net Assessment
MEMBERS-ONLY PODCAST
Related Special Topic Page
 Tracking Mexico’s Drug Cartels
Organized crime in Mexico is centered on the transit of illegal drugs into the United
States. In essence, Mexican organized crime groups are supply chain entities, competing
for suppliers in Central and South America, rapid and low-friction transit routes in
Mexico and across borders and consumers in the United States. Competition among the
major Mexican cartels is about geography — access to and control of the most lucrative
trade paths. This competition leads to wars between cartels, which can spill over into the
civilian population. The cartels generally try to avoid confrontations with law
enforcement and the military in Mexico and instead seek to mitigate their security risks
through bribery, extortion, threats and incentives. The trafficking of illegal drugs through
Mexico generates billions of dollars a year, and the Mexican cartels launder this money
through construction and real estate companies, small businesses and restaurants and
hotels and money exchanges. In many ways the cartels are personality-dependent —
controlled by family groups and subject to rapid disintegration or disruption when the
leadership is killed or imprisoned. However, leadership vacuums are filled quickly as the
cartels continue working to take over lucrative drug routes.
History
Organized crime in Mexico has a long history. Outlaw gangs with limited power in
northern Mexico existed as far back as the nineteenth century. Through the 1960s, the
main organized criminal element along the U.S.-Mexico border involved small
smuggling operations. These groups had limited reach and resources.
As the popularity of cocaine grew in the United States in the 1970s, criminal
organizations began to gain much more power and influence on a national level. This rise
in power accelerated in the 1980s as the United States government moved to shut down
the Caribbean smuggling corridor, primarily run by Colombian drug traffickers, which
had served as the primary route of drugs into the United States through the 1970s. In
response to this move, drug traffickers began using Mexico as a transshipment point for
U.S.-bound cocaine, as the country represented the path of least resistance to the
movement of contraband. It was during this time that Mexican cartels evolved into the
powerful organizations they are today.
Changes in the cartels’ standing and composition can be described most accurately as a
system of shifting and adjusting alliances inside Mexico, though outside factors such as
the death or arrest of a leader have also played a role in shaping the fate of individual
groups.
(click image to enlarge)

Geography
Organized crime exists in nearly every corner of Mexico. Small local street gangs
involved in a variety of crimes, including robbery, theft, extortion and kidnapping, can be
found in every city. However, it is the country’s drug cartels — extended criminal
organizations with a monopoly on the drug trade — that hold the real power, and these
criminal organizations tend to be concentrated in specific geographic locations. Several
cartels have also begun to establish logistics and criminal networks in the United States in
order to facilitate the movement of contraband into and out of Mexico. Mexican cartels
have not yet established a significant presence in Central or South America — the former
being of only minimal value to the drug supply chain, the latter (i.e., Colombia) already
under the sway of South American organized crime — relying instead on criminal groups
in those areas to transport drugs to be moved through Mexico.
Mexico’s location between the world’s largest producer and the world’s largest consumer
of cocaine makes it a natural transshipment point for narcotics. Mexico’s location became
even more important for drug traffickers due to the U.S. government’s increased efforts
to shut down air and maritime routes in the Caribbean smuggling corridor.
Within Mexico, the areas under cartel control generally correspond to routes used to ship
drugs from South America to the United States and shipment channels for precursor
chemicals and pirated goods from China. Whether or not a region is of strategic
importance to the movement of drugs is the primary factor determining the likelihood
that it will come under the control of a major cartel. Areas of cartel concentration are the
area along the U.S. border; coastal port cities on the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico and
Caribbean Sea; and cities and towns located on federal highways between these points.
Mexico’s large cartels are not as concentrated in the remainder of the country, including
Mexico City and much of the country’s central and southern interior.
While some South American drugs come into Mexico on land at the Guatemalan border,
most are shipped via air or boat along two main routes. The first route enters the Yucatan
Peninsula by either remote airstrips or the port of Cancun and then goes across the border
into Texas by land, air or sea along the Gulf of Mexico. The second route enters the
country via port cities in Guerrero and Michoacan states and then goes either inland or
along the Pacific coast toward the U.S. border.
Historically, the largest and most powerful drug cartels in Mexico have been based in
northern Mexico, but most importantly, they have all established control over entry points
into the United States (which is to say the cartels have established predominance and
have bribed police, immigration/customs officials and government officials in towns at
these entry points). These groups have based their operations out of large to medium-
sized Mexican cities located along the U.S. border: the Arellano Felix Organization in
Tijuana, the Juarez cartel in Ciudad Juarez, the Gulf cartel in Reynosa. The one exception
has been the Sinaloa federation, which is based out of Sinaloa state, approximately 500
miles south of the Arizona border. Drug cartels that have developed in southwestern
Mexico have never achieved the same amount of power as their northern counterparts,
which control the final step in the supply chain of drugs moving north.
One way to describe the territorial control of these groups is to divide Mexico into cartel
“states.” With its capital city in Reynosa, the Gulf cartel’s territory includes Tamaulipas
state, the eastern portion of Nuevo Leon state and much of Veracruz state. It controls two
main port cities — Veracruz and Tampico — and shares a land border with the United
States. The Sinaloa federation’s capital city is Culiacan, while its territory includes
Sinaloa and Sonora states and eastern Jalisco state. It also shares a land border with the
United States and controls the port cities of Mazatlan, Manzanillo and Puerto Vallarta.
Both states also have relationships with other cartel states that are important for their
supply chain, including the Guerrero-Michoacan “state” and the Yucatan region.
Political Structure
One or two cartels with the most power tend to control Mexican organized crime at any
given time. Currently the Gulf cartel and the Sinaloa federation control the bulk of the
drug trade, though this has not always been the case. The Juarez cartel and the Arellano
Felix Organization have each occupied the top spot in the past. Both of these
organizations lost power after their leaders were captured or killed in fighting with each
other or the government, and other groups moved in to take over territory. Occasionally a
top-ranking cartel will reach out to its rival to form a truce or an alliance. These
agreements are generally motivated by business concerns and are usually short-lived. The
Mexican drug trade simply involves too much money and too many volatile personalities
for such agreements to be honored for very long.
There is a better track record for mergers and partnerships between small and medium-
sized criminal organizations as a way to expand territory. The mergers with the greatest
success involve combining organizations with distinct geographic areas of responsibility
(such agreements were important in the Sinaloa federation’s formation and rise to power).
On a smaller scale, large cartels often establish partnerships with local gangs to assist in
the cartel’s mission. These gangs are tasked with a range of duties, including kidnapping,
drug distribution, security, intimidation and assassinations.
Drug cartels in Mexico have a hierarchical leadership structure, with some of the largest
cartels controlled by members of a family. The leadership structure in most Mexican
organized crime groups shows sophistication and efficiency. Many criminal activities are
compartmentalized, with particular groups focusing on specific duties. Top cartel
management is based primarily on geography. High-ranking and mid-level members
known as gatekeepers take responsibility for cartel activities in a specific city or state.
There appears to be little oversight as to how gatekeepers choose to manage their
territories, as long as they succeed with the overall business plan. The top-down approach
makes the cartels vulnerable, however, as the death or arrest of a key leader can collapse
the entire chain of relationships.
Mexican cartels interact differently with their suppliers and their distributors. One person
or a handful of individuals in the cartel with the appropriate contacts handle South
American suppliers; the same appears to be true for coordinating ephedra shipments from
China. On the other hand, distribution networks involve a relatively larger number of
people, though a small number of Mexican organized crime members hand off the
shipments to distribution teams in the United States, which have a better understanding of
the lay of the land north of the border.
The movement of drugs over long distances requires not only a great deal of coordination,
but also official complicity. An important part of cartel management, then, involves
bribes and intimidation of police officers, military personnel and government officials. In
fact, many cartel members are former police officers or army deserters.
Economics
Drug trafficking is the most profitable organized criminal business in Mexico. It is

estimated that up to $25-$30 billion worth of illegal drugs comes through Mexico into the
United States each year. A wide range of illegal substances enter the United States from
Mexico, though the primary ones are cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamines
(meth). Most cocaine and heroin shipments originate in other countries and pass through
Mexico on the way to the United States, meaning that the proceeds must be shared
between Mexican traffickers and foreign producers. Marijuana and meth, however, are
produced in large quantities inside Mexico, which means that Mexican cartels receive a
higher portion of the sales profits. Marijuana crops are cultivated in rural areas
throughout western Mexico, while meth is mass produced in large production laboratories,
whose operation has been facilitated by bulk shipments from China of ephedra, a
precursor chemical in the production of the drug.
Other organized criminal activities are widespread but do not generate nearly as much
money as drug trafficking. These activities include kidnapping, extortion, human
trafficking, and weapons trafficking. In general, the major drug cartels do not rely on
these activities as a major source of income, but rather use them in a limited way in order
to supplement drug profits or as a way to support the overall organization. Smaller
organized crime groups often rely on these activities as primary income sources, but their
income pales in comparison to that of the large drug trafficking organizations. The
Arellano Felix Organization, for example, has begun to diversify its criminal activities
and rely more heavily on kidnapping for ransom in order to fund itself. After it lost
access to Colombian cocaine sources, the cartel continued to move marijuana and meth,
but also expanded its activities outside of the drug trade.
Drug cartels go to great lengths to conceal the movement of drug money. As drug money
makes its way back to the source of supply it passes through a network of money
laundering operations which often use front companies on both sides of the border to
cover for the transfer of large sums of money. Popular front businesses include real estate
companies, hotels, currency exchange houses, automotive sales companies, restaurants
and other small businesses. In some cases drug traffickers have kept large amounts of
money in bank accounts in the United States or Caribbean or European countries.
Security
The largest criminal organizations in Mexico employ between 500 and 1,000 well-armed
security “enforcers,” who work exclusively for the cartel that hired them. Enforcers are
generally well-disciplined fighters with law enforcement or military backgrounds. Many
elite enforcer units are capable of deploying to anywhere within Mexico within 24 hours.
Cartels also hire on contract small local gangs to perform specific tasks in a particular
area of responsibility. These gangs may carry out tasks of lesser importance, while the
enforcers will be tasked with higher priority assignments. Among the most notorious
groups of enforcers are the Gulf cartel’s Zetas, and the Sinaloa federation’s Gente Nueva
and Los Pelones.
Cartel enforcers perform several duties, including protective security of high-ranking
members, escorting valuable shipments of contraband and carrying out assassinations of
rivals or government officials. They are armed primarily with small arms, including
handguns, assault rifles, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and lightweight anti-tank
rockets. The majority of weapons for enforcers are smuggled into Mexico from the
United States. It is believed that properly outfitting a single enforcer costs between $500
and $1,000 annually.
Some enforcers are loyal to an individual cartel leader, but most are loyal to their
operational commanders. As long as the enforcers are paid well, they will continue
working for their cartel; however, there have been cases (though rare) of entire enforcer
groups switching sides in the middle of a cartel war if the other side offers more money.
Currently, the Gulf cartel and the Sinaloa federation are engaged in a war to conquer
territory and weaken each other. The two cartels are fairly equally matched, and the
fighting has taken place both in disputed areas and in territories firmly under cartel
control. There is little that is unique about this situation, as conflict is the nature of the
drug business in Mexico.
At the same time, the cartels are battling a crackdown by government security forces.
This government operation is unique; never before has the Mexican government
deployed so many military and federal law enforcement forces on a counternarcotics
mission for such an extended period of time. The operation has so far had both positive
and negative results, including a decreased flow of cocaine into the United States and a
record number of killings.
Cartels generally engage in warfare by conducting targeted assassinations, both of rivals

and of security forces. Most targeted killings are preceded by surveillance of the target
and often involve a kidnapping before execution so that the enforcers have a chance to
interrogate the victim. Occasionally a group of cartel enforcers ambush police or army
patrols or buildings. Most attacks on buildings have a specific purpose, such as to free a
cartel member that has been detained.
Social Aspects/Culture
Mexican organized crime enjoys no small degree of prestige within certain portions of
the population. Local music groups occasionally compose songs — popular on a local
level in rural areas of northern Mexico — singing the praises of one drug cartel over
another. Beyond this, organized crime invokes a combination of fear and respect in the
community, making it difficult for law enforcement to locate witnesses willing to
cooperate in investigations.
In general, criminal organizations in Mexico are not known for providing large-scale
humanitarian services or making it a priority to win over the local population. Some
cartel leaders have occasionally attempted to buy loyalty from local residents by
providing money for a child’s education or basic necessities, for example. Family
connections are an important aspect of Mexican organized crime. Relatives of cartel
members are often used to launder drug money, and cartel leaders have been known to
provide financial support to the families of members who were captured or killed while
performing services for the cartel.
Prison life is another important aspect of cartel culture. Many lasting criminal
relationships are formed in prison, and having done prison time in the United States is
also an important rite of passage for many organized criminal elements in Mexico.
Dependence on the Drug Trade
There are two important conditions for Mexican organized crime to survive in its current
form. The first is the survival of the drug trade — specifically a high demand for illegal
drugs in the United States. The second is Mexico’s use as a transshipment point for U.S.-
bound drugs. There is currently no indication that either of these conditions will change
anytime soon, though this second one is likely to change before the first one.
Any change in the supply route of drugs toward the United States will have a profound
impact on the future of Mexican organized crime. If, for example, the Caribbean
smuggling corridor should reopen, Mexican drug cartels would no longer be competing
just for control of territory within Mexico; they would be competing against drug
traffickers operating alternative routes. Consequently, Mexican cartels will no longer
have a corner on the drug market, and will end up losing a great deal of the power that
they currently hold.
Even in this scenario, organized crime in Mexico will by no means disappear. Other
profitable criminal activities such as kidnapping and human trafficking will be around for
the foreseeable future. Regardless of how developed these criminal enterprises might
become, however, they would not come close to providing the money and power
Mexico’s drug cartels currently enjoy.
Organized Crime in Russia
April 16, 2008 | 1847 GMT
Summary
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian organized crime flourished. Russian
industry fell into the hands of corrupt oligarchs who worked with organized criminals to
secure their hold on nearly every aspect of the Russian state. President Vladimir Putin has
worked to reassert central control over a stronger Russian state, but he realizes that
eradicating organized crime is impossible.
Analysis
During the 1990s, organized crime expanded into all sectors of the Russian economy,
government and society, sustaining Russia at first but eventually threatening the
sovereignty of the state. Russian President Vladimir Putin — eager to consolidate power
and resources under his own control — has reined in some aspects of Russian organized
crime and has weakened the influence of the oligarchs. However, considering Russia’s
historical dependence on organized crime and its recent proliferation throughout the
world, organized crime will remain a fixture in Russian society for some time to come.
A Brief History of the Russian Mafia
Russia’s history, like that of many other nations with such stature, is largely cyclical.
Russia’s historical cycle runs roughly as follows: Catastrophe strikes the centralized state
and the social order is shattered; a “white rider” comes along to pick up the pieces and
restore power to the state, only to come up short and yield to a “dark rider” willing to do
whatever is necessary regardless of moral implications; and an era of decline follows
until the next catastrophe strikes and the cycle begins anew.
Related Links
 Russian Organized Crime

 The Risks of Operating in Russia
 Organized Crime in Mexico
Related Topics
 Terrorism/Security
 Russia
Related Special Topic Pages
 Putin’s Consolidation of Power

 The Russian Resurgence
As the power of the centralized state changes during the cycle, other actors — whether
internal or external — prey upon Russia when it is weak and cooperate with Russia when
it is strong. Organized crime is just as beholden to Russia’s historical cycle, with its
power inversely related to the power of the state. When the Russian state is in a crisis,
organized crime spreads and becomes the functioning arbiter of state affairs. Once power
is restored to the state, organized crime never fully disappears but recedes into the
background, usually cooperating to some degree with the state, until another catastrophe
hits and allows it to expand again.
The modern era of organized crime in Russia began with the 1917 revolution. Czar
Nicholas II was overthrown, creating a period of instability during which organized crime
picked up. During the revolution, food and other basic goods were scarce, and organized
crime sought to provide them — for a price. When Vladimir Lenin (the white rider of that
era) took over, he asserted the central government’s power and attempted to subdue
organized crime, though he was largely unsuccessful. His successor, Joseph Stalin,
cracked down even harder, sending criminals to the infamous Soviet gulags. Organized
crime continued to survive under Stalin, but only the best-connected criminal bosses
enjoyed protection from Stalin. Upon Stalin’s death, 8 million prisoners were released
from the gulags, and the vory v zakone (“thieves in law”) — as organized crime was
known in prison — were released upon Soviet society. By the time Leonid Brezhnev was
in office and overseeing an economically feeble Soviet Union, organized crime had
infiltrated the highest ranks of the Communist Party. The vory were allowed to buy goods
outside of the Soviet Union and operate smuggling routes in return for supplying the
Communist Party with foreign luxury items, which were given as rewards for good
behavior within the party.
By the 1990s, Russia found itself again in a crisis of state authority that nurtured the
expansion of organized crime. After the Soviet system collapsed, organized crime
exploded, filling every state and nonstate void. Since laws concerning property and asset
control were not enforced following the collapse, those who took advantage of the
situation acted with impunity. Organized criminals’ internal and external connections
from their days of operating under the Soviets ensured they gobbled up the oil, gas,
mineral and telecommunications industries; their smuggling routes (later to become
supply chains) let them exploit these assets for financial gain. The organized crime bosses
and their colluding political contacts from the Soviet era helped to create the enormously
powerful oligarchs of Russia’s chaotic post-Soviet era. Some oligarchs were former
politicians, some were former criminals and some were well-connected businessmen
operating in the gray area. The oligarchs worked with organized crime, either because
they had to in order to conduct business or because crime was their business strategy.
Following the collapse, basic government functions — such as social security, the
pension system, some electrical grids, dispute settlement and the distribution and
protection of property — either disappeared or were hopelessly inefficient. Government
workers were woefully underpaid or even cut from the payrolls. Thousands of ex-KGB
officers left the state and joined the organized crime network. This increased the amount
of security that Russian organized crime could provide and also gave it access to state
assets controlled by the KGB. Without a functioning state police to ensure the well-being
of Russia’s citizens and their property, the oligarchs were left to their own devices but —
along with their organized criminal associates — profited from the void the Soviet Union
left behind. In 1994, then-President Boris Yeltsin called Russia “the biggest mafia state in
the world,” referring to “the superpower of crime that is devouring the state from top to
bottom.”
Enter the white rider again. By the time Putin came to power in 1999, the organized
crime world and the oligarchs were seriously threatening the Russian state. First,
organized crime was arguably the most stable Russian institution. Where the state was
ineffective in settling disputes, enforcing laws and providing security, organized crime
was imposing its own version of justice. Second, state assets such as energy, minerals,
telecommunications and transport networks were under the control of the oligarchs. Since
1999, Putin has made it a point to adjust the balance between organized crime and the
state. To do this, he has asserted control over the state to reduce corruption and break up
the oligarchs’ hold over state assets; and now he is looking to increase the power of state
security forces and reduce the power of organized crime. Organized crime is far too
entrenched in Russia ever to go away completely, and Putin knows this. However, Putin
— who will still be powerful as prime minister when his successor Dmitri Medvedev is
sworn in as president — will continue his campaign to strengthen the state and weaken its
competition.
Smuggling Routes and International Connections
Russia’s unique geographical position is both a boon and a curse for those operating
within the country. Russia is at the intersection of Asia, Europe and the Middle East,
giving it access to some major markets and producers. The country’s sheer size and
position mean that any agent operating within Russia, be it organized crime, railroads or
the Federal Security Service, can access a number of strategic areas while staying
relatively close to “home base.” On the other hand, its expansiveness also means that
Russia is paranoid about its vulnerability on many fronts.
The Russian mafia has been able to take advantage of Russia’s position in the Eurasian
heartland much as the Soviet Union did in the 20th century. The Russian mob
(concentrated in Moscow) is able to work with suppliers and clients in East Asia and the
opium-rich Golden Crescent through the former Soviet states in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. It can smuggle goods to and from the Middle East and send commodities to and
from the European and American markets through ports on the Baltic and White seas.
However, its sheer size, location and harsh conditions make Russia difficult to navigate.
Any entity that seeks to control this land mass must be very well organized and have a
wealth of resources to coordinate on all fronts. Russian organized crime’s resurgence
speaks volumes to the effectiveness of its network and its access to resources.
Russian organized criminal groups oversee a network that colludes with criminal entities
all over the world. The list of their contacts is a virtual index of worldwide organized
crime and includes:
 Triads, criminal societies in China running many counterfeit operations;

 Yakuza, Japanese criminal groups involved in extortion and smuggling;
 Korean criminal groups active in rural Korea, dealing in drugs, extortion and
illegal fishing;
 Turkish drug traffickers serving as a gateway for drugs traveling between Asia
and Europe;
 La Cosa Nostra (“Our Thing”), the Sicilian mafia;
 N’dranghetta, an Italian crime outfit based primarily out of Calabria;
 Camorra, an Italian criminal organization operating out of Naples and the
Campania province;
and
 Colombian drug cartels, individual drug trafficking groups that usually focus on
cocaine.
Crime and Business: From Black Market to ‘Free Market’
Russian organized crime has interests in virtually every market and sector. Many factors
contribute to organized crime’s expansiveness in Russia, but the way in which it
developed is what makes it a ubiquitous economic force in the country. The Soviet
system stifled competition and allowed the politically connected criminals to thrive; the
post-Soviet system opened up endless possibilities for free-market-thinking criminals in
Russia. Since they already had dozens of years of experience supplying the Soviet elite
with illegal goods and operating illegal private businesses, and since the smuggling
routes and suppliers were already in place, the criminals were several steps ahead of the
Soviets by the time Mikhail Gorbachev announced perestroika.
During the food shortages under Brezhnev, the criminal underworld that had been
released from prison upon Stalin’s death began to operate private businesses. These
businesses were, of course, illegal under the Soviet system, but organized crime networks
enjoyed the protection of the Communist Party elite. A relationship based on goods,
favors and money already sealed a partnership between the criminals and the politicians.
When small food shops started opening up, the Kremlin largely looked away because the
criminals were pacifying the public by supplying food, and because crossing the mob
would hurt the Communist Party’s ability to access the goods and favors the criminals
provided. Gorbachev tried to clean up the corruption that flourished during the Brezhnev
and Nikita Khrushchev eras. Perestroika was supposed to give law-abiding citizens the
ability to participate in commerce, but by then the criminals had a firm grasp on the
private sector (which, before perestroika, was the black market). When other shops
opened up, thugs intimidated and harassed business owners until they either moved or
shut down. Perestroika did not create a freer market; it simply legalized the black market.
As the Soviet system collapsed, organized crime expanded and helped to oversee the rise
of the oligarchs. Yeltsin’s “shock therapy” market liberalization presented bigger and
more profitable avenues to organized crime bosses already well-connected to the
government. Financial criminals involved in scams, money laundering and fraud became
rich during “shock therapy.” During this period, boundaries between government, private
business (represented by the oligarchs) and organized crime did not properly exist. That
is why, once the dust of the 1990s privatization bonanza settled, assessing blame and
accountability was (and remains) so difficult. Members of the government and civil
services and organized crime bosses used their power and wealth to secure Russia’s
lucrative assets — thus forming the Russian oligarchy that controlled the fledgling
private sector.
Oil, gas, minerals, telecommunications, weapons systems (thanks to the KGB) and many
other state-owned assets were sold off to oligarchs who had special relationships with the
government and who were linked to organized crime. The oil industry, Russia’s most
promising money maker, was corrupted by oligarchs who cheated investors (including
the Russian government, Western countries, the International Monetary Fund and many
more) by selling oil at below-market prices to holding companies that they owned, which
then turned around and sold the oil abroad at market prices. Such deals enriched private
businessmen at the expense of the Russian government, tipping the balance of power
away from the state. With the Russian state all but bankrupt, organized crime bosses and
networks aligned themselves with the new holders of Russian power: the oligarchs.
Organized crime continued to grow, thanks to the activities of the oligarchs operating in a
legal gray area. Overall, organized crime began focusing more on financial crimes, which
were more profitable and less damning than violent crimes. The United States and Europe
were very attractive markets. Organized criminals set up front companies and formed
partnerships with foreign banks to defraud investors and launder their earnings. They
exploited existing Russian communities in such places as New York, Miami, the Baltic
States and Ukraine as both agents and victims of their activities.
The marriage of business and organized crime is illustrated in the case of Semyon
Mogilevich. Mogilevich was a major actor in Ukrainian oil and natural gas and was
considered a kingpin in the Russian mob. Though he was a silent partner in
RosUkrEnergo, he used this company as a front to sell oil and natural gas to certain
political factions in Ukraine. His activities reached into the United States, where he
defrauded investors out of $150 million through a scam that included a magnet producer
as a front company and reached up to executives at the Bank of New York. In 2004, the
director of Ukraine’s secret police accused him of conducting backroom deals with
Russia’s state-owned natural gas company, Gazprom. In January 2008, Mogilevich was
arrested in Moscow after meeting with the owner of a cosmetics company. Mogilevich is
an example of the new breed of Russian organized criminal who moved away from
violence and mixed crime with business to create a highly profitable form of white-collar
crime that ran across industries and borders. Mogilevich also exemplifies how prolific
Russian organized crime can be.
By expanding, Russian organized crime increased its profile along with its profits.
Affected countries’ law enforcement — including the FBI — turned their attention to
Russian crime bosses in an effort to stymie the proliferation of financial crimes.
Russian organized crime is not only prolific, it is pervasive. While its kingpins are very
active in the most lucrative business sectors, thousands of neighborhood gangs run the
daily protection racket. Foreign businesses operating in major mob-run cities such as
Moscow or St. Petersburg count on handing 10 percent of their monthly profits to the
local crime syndicate simply for operating in that area. Some businesses will pay up to 30
percent for additional “services,” such as physical protection of their property and even
suppression of competitors in the area. Cooperating with an organized crime entity to do
business is illegal, but without cooperation, there is no business; choosing not to pay the
mob can lead to very draconian punishments. In 2000, an estimated 80 percent of
businesses in Russia paid protection fees to the Russian mob. This type of parallel state
regulatory system scares many foreign businesses away and has hurt foreign investment
in Russia, giving Putin a major incentive to go after organized crime.
The Structure of the Mob
The term “Russian organized crime” is a loose one. It comes from the fact that the
primary node of the criminal network’s modern incarnation is the Moscow mob. The
Moscow mob is a highly politically connected umbrella organization that oversees a
network of criminal groups bound together by at least one of the following factors:
ethnicity, family ties and geography. These disparate groups receive support from the
Moscow mob in the forms of political cover, money and organizational oversight. It is
not like traditional Italian mafia groups that have a clear, delineated hierarchy; rather, it is
a network of influential kingpins, semi-autonomous bosses and gangs willing to contract
their services. Organized criminals often lose or gain power depending on political
conditions in Moscow, making it difficult to identify a “head” of Russian organized crime.
At the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Interior Ministry estimated that there were
100,000 criminals working for 5,000 to 8,000 Russian organized crime gangs operating
throughout the world.
First, there are the groups bound by ethnicity. Not all criminals involved in Russian
organized crime are Russian. But just about all of these criminals come from areas that
were under Soviet rule, including Chechnya, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ingushetia, Ukraine
and Dagestan. Many gangs from the Baltic countries, Poland and the former Yugoslavia
are often considered part of Russian organized crime. It is important to note that these
groups are ethnically bound and not geographically bound. They operate not only in their
areas of origin, but also throughout Russia, the former Soviet Union and — as in the case
of Chechen drug traffickers in Argentina — the world. They deal in everything from
drugs to physical protection to weapons.
Then there are the groups bound by kinship. One such outfit, the Tambov group, run by
two brothers, was a highly powerful and profitable player in St. Petersburg until Russian
special police broke it up. At its peak, the Tambov group controlled up to 80 percent of
the traffic in the ports of St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Kaliningrad. The
Tambov group was responsible for contract killings and extortion and essentially
controlled the fuel, lumber, tobacco and alcohol exports. All the while, various members
of the group (some related, some not) held seats in the Duma to protect the family
business.
Examples of groups bound by geography are the gangs that control the various suburbs of
Moscow. Groups such as the Dolgoprudnenskaya, Podolsk and Solntsevskaya gangs run
protection rackets and traffic drugs, weapons and humans in their respective Moscow
neighborhoods. Other gangs rule entire cities, such as the Uralmash boys who ruled over
the southern city of Yekaterinburg, 900 miles southeast of Moscow. This group
essentially took over the Ural Machine Factory (from which it got its name) and from
there expanded into telecommunications, utilities and copper processing. The Uralmash
boys took over a great deal of the Yekaterinburg economy and eventually went into
politics.
Those involved in Russian organized crime are usually very highly educated. In the early
1990s, the state was unable to retain the brightest in the country because it simply did not
have the money. However, organized crime outfits did have the money to employ these
highly skilled professionals. Many organized criminals hold master’s degrees or
doctorates and are very rational thinkers. They do not choose crime because they are
necessarily bloodthirsty or power hungry; in Russia during the 1990s, crime was simply
the most lucrative business.
KGB Connections
After the Soviet Union collapsed and government agencies splintered, many talented,
well-connected government professionals left to start new careers. Many of those were
KGB agents — the experts who made up the Soviet security intelligence apparatus
domestically and abroad. Up to 40 percent of KGB agents found jobs in the criminal
sector that paid very well and used their unique skills. By bringing in a significant piece
of the KGB, Russian organized crime gained access to security and military hardware,
including arsenals of personal weapons, vehicles and even a few rogue submarines, as
well as KGB contacts around the world. These items were either used by organized crime
and the oligarchs to protect themselves and their newly gained assets or sold off to
bidders around the world with the cash and desire to own a piece of Soviet military
hardware.
One man who found a way to profit from the KGB’s close ties to Russian organized
crime was Viktor Bout, the recently arrested arms smuggler. Bout entered the weapons
trade after his air force unit was disbanded when the Soviet Union fell. During the 1990s,
Bout supplied guns, ammunition and even helicopters to rebel groups in Africa, Latin
America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. His background in the Russian military
service and the KGB gave him a network and the ability to get materiel anywhere in the
world — advantages that supposedly earned him the business of Kremlin politicians and
even interest from the CIA when it was fighting the Taliban. He was known to supply
anything to anyone for the right price and, given the lack of security in Russia, it is
conceivable that he could have procured nuclear materials (though there have been no
confirmed reports that he did sell nuclear material). Bout’s is an extraordinary example,
but thousands of other ex-KGB officers were active in the weapons trade on smaller
scales and in more specific geographic areas.
Meanwhile, the oligarchs’ control over the Russian state went deeper as ex-KGB agents
got involved. During the Soviet era, organized crime was protected from above by
patrons within the Communist Party. In the lawless state of Russia after the Soviet Union,
dependable protection from politicians was no longer available, so the organized
criminals and oligarchs had to protect themselves. The most efficient and effective form
of security came from organized crime, thanks in large part to the involvement of former
KGB agents. Security itself became a commodity that organized crime could provide to
those who could afford it. And, eventually, nobody could afford not to have mob-
provided security. The mob used its monopoly on security as extortion. This led to the
existing situation in which businesses pay the mob for protection.
Putin’s Crackdown on the Mafia
The Russian organized crime network derives much of its protection and success from
political patrons in the Duma. Organized crime in Russia strengthened with Soviet
political cooperation, and, with the exception of some turbulent years during the 1990s, it
has remained a group effort. However, while the politicians were firmly in control during
the Soviet era, the balance has shifted so that organized crime has far more power than it
did 20 or 30 years ago. Putin is wary of organized crime’s threat to the sovereignty of the
state and has been working to rebalance the relationship between the state and the
organized crime network.
He has sought to counter the rise of organized crime by seizing assets and addressing
police corruption. He cut into the demand for illicit protection services by reclaiming
public safety as a responsibility of the state. In 2002, public prosecutors in Russia earned
a 160 percent pay raise as an incentive to remain loyal to their government employers. To
encourage legitimate business, Putin somewhat clarified the murky world of business and
finance regulation; those wanting to open a business in Russia have shorter waiting times
and fewer hoops to jump through now than in 2000. Fewer restrictions mean more soon-
to-be business owners are willing to pursue their interests in accordance with Russian law.
Putin has also reined in regional and local political officials as part of his crackdown on
organized crime and political corruption. It appears that his next target will be Moscow
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov is known to be an integral leader in the Moscow mob,
mostly in political corruption activities. Putin is pressuring Luzhkov to go, which would
radically shake up the structure of Russian organized crime and weaken it vis-a-vis the
state.
Although Putin will give up his position as president May 7, he handpicked Dmitri
Medvedev as his successor and will still hold quite a bit of power as prime minister. This
means that the current drive to increase the state’s power and weaken the oligarchs and
organized criminals will continue for at least the next four years.
From Putin’s point of view, the problem with organized crime is that it has corrupted key
assets such as oil, gas, minerals and telecommunications that used to be completely
controlled by the Soviet state. This is not to say that the Soviet state was not corrupt, but
it at least offered uniformity. The oligarchs, criminals and corrupt politicians who
oversaw this transfer of assets have varying styles of business that can differ wildly. The
state has, in turn, been discredited by foreign governments and companies that are
unwilling to invest in or cooperate with Russia due to the lack of transparency and
uneven regulatory standards that are the result of rampant organized crime.
Without investment from foreign companies, regardless of energy windfalls, Russia faces
a bleak future. Putin is seeking to restore domestic and foreign trust in Russia’s
institutions and economy and reassert control over traditional responsibilities of the state
such as security, tax collection and control over the borders. By reasserting control over
the state and strengthening it, Putin can regain control over the state’s assets and correct
the imbalance that has favored organized crime recently.
The Mob’s Vulnerabilities
As powerful and pervasive as organized crime is in Russia today, it faces challenges that
stem from its rapid growth. Russian organized criminals’ international activities have
caught the attention of authorities in Italy, Switzerland, the United States and South
Korea. They also have captured headlines and risen in stature among the general public.
Increased scrutiny and cooperation from foreign police agencies — including Interpol —
have helped Russian authorities to track activities and shut down operations in Russia, the
United States and elsewhere.
All of these advancements in recent years have led criminals to reconsider their business
models. The cost of doing illegal business is rising and — considering the money to be
made in the booming Russian energy and real estate markets — many criminals are
investing their illicit funds into legitimate businesses. A more legitimate, regulated
Russian economy has meant that on one hand, violent organized crime is declining
(though crime overall is not), but on the other hand, corruption and financial crimes are
still serious problems.
Organized crime in Russia will not go away any time soon. As in other countries, as long
as there are laws and regulations, there will be networks operating to get around them. As
long as the balance between organized crime and the state favors the state, Putin will be
content to live with a manageable level of crime (by Russian standards) that can be
controlled and monitored by the police so that the executive branch can focus its energy
on strengthening the state instead of wrestling over control of it.
Organized Crime in Italy
May 2, 2008 | 2303 GMT
Summary
Italian organized crime enjoys a global reputation thanks to countless movies depicting
its activities. Its story began not in Hollywood, however, but on the island of Sicily. By
the late 20th century, Italian organized crime had moved to the mainland. Today,
organized crime is largely regional, dominated by powerful families and alliances that
control everything from drug and weapons trafficking to local protection rackets and the
cement industry. Regardless of the ongoing competition between families and alliances
that sometime breaks out into so-called Mafia Wars, the groups will not disappear
anytime soon — though as long as they are forced to focus on regional control, their hand
will remain weak.
Analysis
Related Links
 Organized Crime in Russia

Related Topic
 Italy
Editor’s Note: This piece is part of an ongoing series on organized crime worldwide.
Italy is as famous for organized crime as it is for its cuisine. The main organized criminal
groups in Italy are dominated by powerful families and alliances associated with specific
regions. Despite the unending competition between families and alliances that hampers
their reach, the phenomenon of organized crime in Italy will persist.
Organized Crime Emerges
The phenomenon of organized crime in Italy began on the island of Sicily. This
strategically placed island in the Mediterranean Sea has been ruled by dozens of different
invading armies for millennia. The island’s position makes it an excellent naval and
trading station. Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Normans and Spaniards (among many others)
have all ruled the island, fighting for control of its well-protected harbors and ignoring
the plight of its citizens.
During Sicily’s existence under foreign rule, a system of local protection and security
emerged, giving rise to a caste of middlemen who operated farms and controlled
agricultural output on behalf of absent, foreign land owners. Without supervision, these
middlemen became the law enforcers in Sicily, favoring their own style of business and
justice over that of the state and the land owners. They were not shy about using violence
to impose their will and shotguns were the weapon of choice. Eventually, landowners
became irrelevant and retained little actual control over their Sicilian farms. The ruling
power of the day would occasionally crack down on the feudalistic system these
middlemen had imposed. But as always, Sicily’s main importance to foreign occupiers
was as a naval hub in the Mediterranean, not as an agricultural producer. After years of
disinterested, foreign rule, Sicilians built up distrust for state authority, preferring to do
things their own way — which often included violence and illicit economic activity that
evolved into Sicilian organized crime.
Hence the rise of organized crime, an institution largely left alone until the 1920s when
Fascist Dictator Benito Mussolini attempted with some success to eradicate it on the
island. By the 1940s, many Sicilian organized criminals had either fled or were dead.
Others escaped to the United States, where they built criminal empires along the East
Coast and in Chicago. The end of World War II brought renewed opportunities for
organized crime in Sicily.
In the face of global war, the threat of organized crime lost significance. In fact, the
Allied forces were aided by underground organized crime members when they landed in
Sicily in 1943. After the invasion, the Allies placed Sicilian organized criminals in
positions of power. By the end of the war, organized criminals were the only substantial
social force without ties to communists or fascists. As a result, they reasserted their social
dominance over Sicily. Trade in weapons and drugs and extortion subsequently
flourished.
As the Italian government formed ties with the Soviet Union, and Italian-U.S. relations
froze, organized criminals used their positions in Sicily to influence the national
government by supporting Christian Democrats — the pro-Western party that countered
communism in Italy. Despite the violence in Sicily, the threat of communism ensured the
survival and spread of Sicilian organized crime through its support for the Christian
Democrats.
What was once a loosely grouped cultural phenomenon evolved into a cohesive faction
known as La Cosa Nostra (LCN) once political support and a solid drug trade was
established in Sicily. But internal struggles for power between rival families in 1962
resulted in what has been called the First Mafia War, a violent six-month clash sparked
when a prominent LCN boss was killed by the Corleone family over a heroin shipment
dispute. The war ended when a bomb ordered by the Corleone family targeting a rival
boss missed its target and killed seven police officers instead, prompting the national
government to intervene and arrest more than 1,000 LCN members. The crackdown
proved half-hearted, however, and eventually the LCN was restored under new leadership
again dominated by the Corleone family until the Second Mafia war in 1981.
The second conflict proved more violent, producing 200 confirmed dead and countless
disappearances (LCN commonly used barrels of acid to dispose of bodies). Ultimately,
the Corleone family emerged victorious and strengthened their hold on the lucrative
cocaine and heroin trades. Again, violence brought a government crackdown and the
biggest anti-mafia trial in Italian history. A prominent LCN member turned state’s
witness, Tomasso Buscetta, provided valuable testimony on the group. His cooperation,
along with years of bank transactions, wiretaps and forensics, helped convict 360
members in the famous “Maxi Trials” of 1987. Meanwhile, the fall of European
communism weakened LCN’s political connections with the Christian Democrats.
In 1989, the Italian Communist Party disbanded, and the Christian Democrats followed
suit. Shortly thereafter, in 1992, LCN assassinated two top state prosecutors closely
involved in the Maxi Trials in an attempt to end the government’s campaign against their
organization. But the killings led to more trials and the arrest of LCN’s most violent boss,
Toto Riina. The damages LCN sustained in the early 1990s cut deeply into its operations.
Criminality in Italy, however, continued. After the prosperous years of the 1960s and
1970s, internal wars over control of Sicilian organized crime created opportunities for
other southern Italian organized crime groups like the Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, the Sacra
Corona Unita and La Stidda to expand. Another family-based operation with a similar
background to the Sicilians known as the Camorra, — centered in Campania, the region
surrounding Naples — filled the vacuum left by LCN. By 2004, the Camorra dominated
the cocaine and heroin trade in Europe. But success brought competition, and a three-
month war between rival members of the group ensued during the winter of 2004 and
early 2005 over territories and distribution networks. The battle left hundreds dead.
Eventually, the police intervened and many top bosses and influential members of
Camorra were either killed or arrested.
Currently, the top Italian criminal organizations are the less known and more secretive
‘Ndrangheta from Calabria and La Stidda from Sicily.
In a rare example of a dispute conducted openly and outside Italy, in August 2007, the
‘Ndrangheta killed six Italians in the German city of Duisburg as part of an inter-family
feud. Later that year, police arrested a mayor and several of his deputies in a Calabrian
town for collaborating with the organization.
Meanwhile, La Stidda has also faced arrests. Their identity was revealed to the public
only in the 1980s. It is believed they consist of LCN members that left during that time.
For now the group operates in south and east Sicily — LCN operated in the north and
west, primarily around Palermo. La Stidda has only begun and it is unclear whether they
have entered the drug trade — a lucrative facet of Italian organized crime determining
who the real powerbrokers are. Like the ‘Ndrangheta, La Stidda is worth watching as it
faces a double threat; competing for territory with LCN (despite its drop in power, it still
controls large swaths of Sicily) and eluding a smarter, less corrupt police force. Whether
the ‘Ndrangheta and La Stidda can retain a low-profile and avoid the mistakes that
afflicted the LCN and Camorra remains to be seen.
Geography and Organized Crime
As indicated, the most important aspect of Sicilian geography is its location in the middle
of the Mediterranean Sea. The coastal areas in the south and east are flat and ideal for
cities and harbors, while northern Sicily is rugged and mountainous, providing insulation
for the island’s historically agricultural-based natives. The traditional centers of Italian
organized crime are located in the north of Sicily, in towns like Palermo, Corleone and
Nicosia. La Stidda, in comparison, has begun to set up shop in the south and east of the
island, focusing on Gela.
Finished products rarely have ended or begun in Sicily, but the island has served as a
transshipment point for raw materials from Africa and the Middle East on their way to
bigger markets. Organized crime families treat Sicily in the same manner: While more
money can be made on the island today thanks to government injections of capital, the
big markets lie elsewhere. Friendly port operators in Sicily (either on the organized crime
payroll or owned by them outright) handle cocaine and marijuana traffic from Latin
America, heroin traffic from Asia and arms traffic from Southeastern Europe and Russia.
Only a fraction of these goods stay in Sicily; the bulk go on to Spain, France, Germany,
the United States and (in the case of weapons) Africa and the Middle East.
Since LCN’s stumble in the 1990s, other groups have cut into the drug and weapons
market. The Camorra capitalizes on the strategic location of the port of Naples and
southern Italy to participate in Mediterranean trade. The Camorra’s rise has redirected
drug shipments to Campania from Sicily, transforming the Naples area into one of the
cheapest markets for cocaine and heroin in Europe. Drug users and pushers from all over
Europe make their way to Campania in search of bargains. The Camorra’s rise has
corresponded to China’s rise, and the group has also entered the market for Chinese-made
counterfeit goods. It uses the port of Naples to collect and distribute counterfeit sneakers,
handbags and accessories. Even many legal items from China that come through the port
of Naples are picked up by organized criminals, who avoid paying duties. The Camorra
thus has managed to turn Naples into an illegitimate free-trade zone for criminal activity.
Since the Camorra war of 2004-5 and the police crackdown in 2006, the ‘Ndrangheta in
Calabria has enjoyed increased power at the Camorra’s expense. According to Italian
officials, the ‘Ndrangheta now controls up to 80 percent of the cocaine traffic between
Colombia and Europe. They also enjoy control of one of the bigger, more strategic ports
of Europe, Gioia Tauro, located near the regional capital, Reggio Calabria.
Italian organized crime consists of regional actors with global contacts rather than a
nationwide conspiracy. Each group operates in a specific geographic area. Certainly,
bosses and clans will have contacts with banks in Milan and politicians in Rome, as well
as hideouts elsewhere in Europe or the world when there is a bounty on their head, but
the heart of business resides in their home region. This is where each group’s power base
lies, and due to inter-family rivalries, it is also where each group’s greatest threat resides.
Maintaining power as an Italian organized criminal requires vigilance not just over the
complex trafficking arrangements and the flow of money, but also over the threats back
home. “Mafia Wars” in the past have been fought between clans operating in the same
region as well as within the same group. Bosses hungry to expand rely on their bases
back at home to provide capital, trusted talent, and most important, to guarantee their
personal survival. If they ignore the home base, many families and bosses are waiting to
wrest control and start their own empire. It is the constant threat of regional competition
that has kept any one organized criminal entity in Italy from becoming an international or
even national power.
The Criminal Groups’ Structure
LCN, the Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta and La Stidda are all named based on geography. Each
organization refers to a grouping of families that operate in a specific region of Italy.
Crimes, whether economic, narcotic or violent, ultimately are delegated and performed
by a family — or clan — member. These families in turn are defined by their geographic
location, not by actual blood relations. Families often are defined by where its members
are from, not necessarily by shared parentage. For example, the Corleone family that
ruled LCN for so long came from Corleone, Sicily. Since the families are grouped by
geography, many relatives will be part of the same family. But ultimately, family ties do
not define the family, geography does.
Depending on how much power it wields and where it operates, within each family there
will be managers, lookouts, soldiers, hit men and any other employee deemed necessary
to the family’s business. The more powerful families employ more people; less powerful
families either are squeezed out or are incorporated into alliances. Alliances are
collections of families, with one family providing a foundation of power. Whereas there
may be hundreds of families operating within a region, there will be two or three major
alliances that will wield the power. When wars break out, they almost always occur
between alliances, with certain families fighting for specific interests.
Violence between families represents an attempt to resolve power struggles between

family alliances. Families use periods of fighting to settle old scores. Wars either will
reinforce an alliance’s control over a region (as happened with the Corleone family
during the first mafia war) or upset the power structure and allow new players to get
involved. Like wars fought between nations, family wars must take into account the
economic losses resulting from expending resources on violence. Invariably, violence
directed at other criminals will affect civilians and police officers. When violence
between families reaches this level, government crackdowns target the causes of the
violence: the competing bosses and their inner circle of associates.
The Culture of Organized Crime
The major organized criminal groups of Italy share similar practices, structure and culture.
Their similarities are the result of a common, Southern Italian culture that values family
and machismo. Organized crime before World War II was very different from modern
organized crime. Before the war, organized criminal groups were largely agrarian, and
had a strict code of silence and secrecy called omertà. More than a code of silence,
omertà emphasizes self-reliance and toughness. It rejects outside authority (in the form of
the state or any occupying power) and encourages members to solve problems on their
own — eliminating the need for burdensome mediation, and thus promoting more
efficient criminal organizations. Organized crime creates its own sort of justice system as
dictated by the necessities of business and power. Omertà is the foundation of this justice.
After the war, as organized crime came to operate in the more profitable urban areas, the
culture changed and emphasized money as a form of self-reliance instead of omertà.
Whereas before, cooperating with politicians, police or any other state actor represented a
death sentence for the offender and his family, after the war, such cooperation became
acceptable. LCN, for example, enjoyed a relationship with the Christian Democrats in
Rome until the 1990s. And in 1983, Tommaso Buscetta became the first major state
witness to reveal the secrets of organized crime in Italy, living after telling the tale until
cancer killed him in 2000. Buscetta was followed by many others who chose to talk in
return for the protection their criminal families no longer offered.
Cooperation with the government created new sources of wealth for criminal bosses not
content with staying on the farm. Construction contracts, grants and development projects
were an easy target for LCN in Sicily, and so as long as it was for business purposes,
cooperating and supporting certain politicians and bureaucrats became acceptable. The
flow of government money effectively silenced many of the more traditional organized
criminals, but also stirred up rivalries over who controlled what shares of the wealth.
The rise in the number of police informants was also a consequence of the struggles over
the group’s newfound wealth. Mafia wars did not occur with regularity until after World
War II. The violence in these wars drove some to question the respect of family held by
LCN. After a rival clan killed his entire family and network of contacts, Buscetta had
nothing more to gain from a life in organized crime. After being arrested in Brazil and
extradited to Italy, his only remaining source of power was the information he had on
LCN and the police. New security measures ensured the protection of state witnesses like
Buscetta, and prevented him from being killed before he could testify. With help from the
state, Buscetta broke the tradition of omertà, ushering in an era of increased police
activity and capability in the fight against organized crime.
The Economics of Organized Crime
Confesercenti, an Italian commerce association, estimates that organized crime has

become Italy’s biggest business with earnings estimated to be $128 billion (or about 7
percent of Italy’s gross domestic product) in 2007. This figure tops the earnings of ENI,
Italy’s state oil and natural gas company, and the earnings of the automobile company
Fiat. It is inaccurate to portray Italian organized crime as a company with a leader and a
vertical managerial chain like ENI or Fiat, however. LCN, the Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta and
other regional criminal groups are more accurately portrayed as an industry. They have
carved out niches for themselves largely based on geography, and work their territory as
they see fit. A more accurate comparison would be between organized crime and Italy’s
energy or automobile sectors. Nevertheless, organized crime makes up a significant slice
of the Italian economy.
The economics of organized crime have seen significant changes since the end of World
War II. Traditionally, groups like the LCN and Camorra operated in rural areas and
measured their power in agricultural production and transportation. Gangs would form in
prisons as a form of protection and would continue to work together after their members
were released. In Sicily, mayors and entire towns would be under the control of organized
crime in a feudalistic system that saw very little economic growth. However, after World
War II and land reforms that broke up organized crime’s hold over agriculture, cities
became the new centers of organized crime, with the quest for money its primary
motivation.
In Sicily especially, the move to the cities was encouraged by the Italian government
through public works projects and grants to stimulate Sicily’s lackluster economy. As
LCN members were already embedded in the regional government, this money quickly
found its way into the pockets of influential organized crime families. This precipitated a
construction boom that continues today with state support, though in more recent times
EU money has filled the criminal group’s coffers. Under dubious circumstances, entire
blocks of Palermo (the capital of Sicily) were torn down to create demand for new
buildings. Organized crime families entered the construction business and won contracts
to build the housing for thousands of peasants trading the country for the city. It was
during this time that Italian organized criminals realized the power of concrete.
LCN and Camorra crime families are known to operate in the cement industry. The
industry is appealing for several reasons: It is profitable, allows high levels of local
economic involvement and is a good way to cover illegitimate business. Society relies
heavily on cement for construction of buildings, homes, roads and other forms of
infrastructure. The Italian government has focused on rejuvenating poorer, less developed
areas (usually those with the highest saturation of organized crime) by funding major
projects. Wherever there is construction, cement is needed. That axiom held true in the
building boom days after World War II and still holds true today.
In January of 2007 a story broke that Calcestruzzi, a subsidiary of cement maker

Italcementi, had ties to the mob. The subsidiary’s CEO and two other officials in Sicily
and Campania were arrested after Calcestruzzi suspended operations, suspecting
organized crime activity within its company. These are big businesses; Calcestruzzi
produces around 77 million tons of cement a year. Italcementi earned nearly $1 billion in
2007.
A second advantage to operating cement companies is that it gives the operating

company a finger on the economic pulse of a region. Modern organized criminals in Italy
are very much businessmen, and for them, information is power. By building the bakeries,
restaurants, apartments and government buildings, crime bosses build relationships with
influential people and can better leverage their own business interests. Cement companies
also are a kind of gatekeeper for what businesses go into an area. If the local crime family
owns all of the bakeries in a certain neighborhood, it can ensure that no more will be built
thanks to its control the access to building materials. The family often own or influences
all buildings in a given area and ensures nobody can get business done without their
permission.
Another advantage of doing business in cement is that it offers a window into conducting
other illegal and even more profitable business. The Camorra’s waste management
companies around Naples are known to take anything — no matter how toxic — and find
dumps for it throughout Campania. Many dangerous residuals from industrial areas in
northern Italy get worked into the cement that is used to construct buildings in the south.
Transporting cement is also a good cover for transporting weapons; similarly, waste
removal trucks are known to ferry drugs through neighborhoods. Organized criminals use
their seemingly unrelated spheres of influence in drugs, waste removal, cement and
weapons trafficking to reinforce and strengthen their activities. Modern family crime
syndicates are shrewd business operators who create profits at every turn.
While cement is an excellent front business for organized crime families all over
Southern Italy, the real money lies in drugs like cocaine, heroin, marijuana and hashish.
Control over the drug trade translates into financial and military superiority over other
organized crime groups. LCN became wildly successful when it started trafficking and
selling drugs to its American affiliates in the 1960s and 1970s. The resulting profits
helped the Corleone family rise to power in Italy’s criminal world. Their weakening in
the 1980s and 1990s left room for the Camorra to take over. The Camorra took advantage
of the new markets and suppliers that opened up in Central and Eastern Europe after the
fall of the Soviet Union. By then, Colombians had begun to compete for customers in the
American market, so Italian groups focused on the European and Balkan drug markets.
Currently, ‘Ndrangheta appears to control the drug trade in Italy. Their members have
fewer ties to the United States than the LCN and the Camorra. ‘Ndrangheta drugs are
being supplied by networks in Argentina and pedaled in Western Europe, Canada and
Australia.
Security and Organized Criminal Groups
As the organized crime financial empires grow, the economics of a family are more and
more connected to the security of that family. Modern mafia wars are inevitably fought
over economic resources. Families within a specific group fight over territory, control
over markets and shipment routes. Absolute control over these assets results in economic
gain for the family that wins and the loss of markets — if not extinction — for the
defeated family. Families very much approach business as a zero-sum game, with
economic superiority giving them more influence and resources with which to fight mafia
wars and defend their members.
A family that is powerful and rich has the ability to recruit. As it grows, families rely on
youth from poor areas who will serve as soldiers in future mafia wars. Young recruits
start out at the bottom, pushing drugs and running trafficking routes; eventually, they
work their way up to lookouts. These are dangerous jobs and pay very little. But in
Southern Italy, where unemployment can reach 20 percent among 18-24 years olds, it is
still an opportunity. As they prove that they can be depended upon, they are given a gun,
taught to fight by older members — finally becoming clan soldiers. One rite of passage
for such youths, sometimes occurring even at the age of 15, is when they are given a
bullet-proof vest and shot several times to prepare them for their first conflict. These low-
level soldiers are integral to organized criminal security, as they protect shipments of
goods, safe houses, and in times of war are assigned to intimidate and kill the opposition.
Assuming they survive and continue to advance, the next step up for these soldiers
involves entering a boss’ inner circle of protectors or joining a hit squad. Depending on
their talents and their connections, they may even be tapped to enter the business side of
the clan’s operations — a job that nevertheless requires fighting skills. For reasons of
security, boss bodyguards are only the most trusted of soldiers. They are often the only
ones who know where the most important member of a clan will be at any given time.
Their dedication must be perfect and lapses are punished by death.
Italian organized crime bosses are high-value targets, and are sought by the police as well
as rival families. During particularly tense times, bosses will leave the country and
operate business from Spain, France and the United States, or they will go into hiding in a
safe location in Italy, moving only when absolutely necessary. When bosses do move,
their level of security reflects their status. They will deploy deceptive measures such as
using several identical armored cars, which leave at the same time and then scatter, with
only the driver knowing which car the boss is in. Personal bodyguards are a must, while
an army of lookouts and scouts ensures that all activity in a family’s territory is
monitored.
Murder is an important part of any organized crime group, so every clan will have its
own hit squads. These teams of four to five men operate as a special forces team would
operate. During times of peace, they occasionally are called upon to carry out specific
attacks, such as the murder of a baker who refuses to pay protection money or member of
the family suspected of disloyalty. During tense times, hit squads are an invaluable asset.
Hit squads usually fire the first shots in mafia wars by directing their violence at a leader
of another clan who is blocking economic growth. During these wars, they seal
themselves away in special houses and only leave to carry out ordered attacks. During the
LCN wars of the 1960’s and 80’s, the Corleone family prided itself on the fact that every
high-level murder was ordered directly by the boss and carried out by the hit squad. The
successful organized crime families are powered by discipline and rewarded by the
money that results from their control.
Organized Criminal Groups’ Vulnerabilities
Organized crime groups in Italy face two major challenges to their future growth and
success. Family rivalries and the plurality of regional groups ensure that no one family or
group will come to dominate the organized crime world for any meaningful period of
time. On the international scale, they must compete with foreign groups over markets,
trade routes and suppliers. While organized crime in Italy is far from defeated, the glory
days of the 1960s and 1970s are unlikely to return.
Additionally, the violent crime that results from inter-family competition will inevitably
spill over, taking the lives of innocent civilians and public officials. Whenever these
outbreaks occur, the state will step in to manage the crisis. Crackdowns after the two
LCN mafia wars, the assassinations of two prominent prosecutors and the Camorra war
show that the state is willing to handle the situation when it gets out of control.
Currently, Italian organized crime works with other organized crime entities in China, the
Balkans, the United States and Russia, but they also compete against them. At the
moment, Italian groups are at a disadvantage. Operating a highly illicit organization in a
highly developed, first world country is not ideal. Despite Italian organized crime’s
regional control, cultural influence and its foreign networks, Italian police have showed
over the past 20 years (since the Maxi Trials) that they have the ability and desire to
crack down on illegal activities. Additionally, integration into the EU means more police
forces in neighboring countries will have increased access to information and the
authority to make arrests. This means that forays into the rest of Europe (like the
‘Ndrangheta shooting in Germany) that draw more attention to organized crime groups
will hurt their operations.
Despite these challenges, Italian organized crime will not disappear, however.
Organizations have been integrated into Italian culture over hundreds of years, and there
always will be a great deal of money to be made in extortion, drug smuggling and
weapons trafficking. But as long as a family is forced to focus on regional control instead
of national or international control, its hand will be weak.
Organized Crime in Cuba
May 16, 2008 | 1109 GMT
Summary
STRATFOR’s fourth in-depth look at organized crime focuses on Cuba. In atypical

fashion, organized crime in Cuba is run by the state and stems from a long tradition that
places Cuban military and intelligence apparatus into positions of control over the
island’s industry while both fostering and profiting from drug traffickers and smugglers.
Analysis
Related Links

 Organized Crime in Italy
Raul Castro’s recent liberalizations in Cuba have led many in the U.S. to breathe a sigh of
relief, comforted that the country may finally be moving away from the Fidel-led Cuba
that has persevered for a generation. In fact, Raul has already lifted bans on Cubans
including ones that prevented people from staying in resorts and owning cell phones or
computers. However, liberalization in Cuba may carry some nasty side effects — the
proliferation of domestic and transnational organized crime being one of them.
Unusually, organized crime in Cuba is run by the state. This is a result of the decision to
bolster the Cuban military and intelligence apparatus by granting its top generals control
over the lucrative tourism and hospitality industry. The island nation’s security and
intelligence apparatus, estimated at 20,000 strong, is part of Cuba’s Ministry of the
Interior. This means the Cuban security and intelligence community is also a major
business operator on the island, overseeing the country’s booming tourist industry, cigar
production and distribution of illicit goods.
The Government-Organized Crime Nexus
Control of the tourism industry gives the military and intelligence establishment control
over foreign involvement in Cuba, as well as the foreign currency visitors bring in. The
Cuban government badly needs the hard cash tourists bring in to subsidize Cuba’s
intelligence apparatus, among other government ministries and functions. The
intelligence apparatus in turn brokers the deals that allow drugs to pass through, over and
around Cuba in exchange for money and favors from traffickers for the Cuban state. The
drug money can then be laundered through Cuba’s complex currency exchange system
and the tourism industry.
Cuba acts as a kind of organized criminal state, a corrupt and cash-starved country whose
business is run not by investors, but well-connected senior-level government officials
seeking to supplement their meager state salaries.
This corruption extends to the highest levels of the Cuban state. Testimony from captured
drug traffickers and the Cuban military’s compliance with the drug trade tie Raul Castro,
head of the military during his brother Fidel’s rule, to Cuba’s drug-trafficking operations.
And, according to estimates by Forbes, Fidel Castro himself was worth $900 Million in
2006 in a country with a gross domestic product of around $50 billion.
Organized crime in Cuba began with the Italian-American mafia, which ran Havana’s
entertainment sector in the 1950s. At the time, under the rule of Cuban President
Fulgencio Batista, the country enjoyed strong ties with the United States in a region that
was susceptible to socialist, anti-Americanism.
Cuba was a playground, easily accessible to Americans and inexpensive. Havana had
cheap rum during prohibition and plenty of illicit drugs thanks to ties to the U.S. mafia.
Cuba’s nightlife appealed to middle-class Americans and the rich and famous alike.
Frank Sinatra could often be seen at one of Havana’s many upscale restaurants or bars
catering to foreigners who paid in dollars. Cuba also was a retreat from the U.S. legal
system, where gambling and prostitutes were plentiful. Much money was there to be
made, and organized criminals from New York and Chicago recognized Havana as a
market they needed to control. Meyer Lansky, a prominent member of the U.S. mafia,
oversaw mob activity in Cuba and Lansky operated through Batista. U.S.-born Italian
organized criminals like Santos Trafficante and Cubans looking to become rich like Jose
Miguel Battle also played major roles.
The money in Havana during the 1950s flowed from tourists; mostly Americans who
could escape for a weekend of partying and socializing. In contrast, native Cubans rarely
could afford the kind of lifestyle that their country offered rich foreigners.
From Revolution to Stagnation
Fidel Castro ended U.S. mafia activity in Cuba after he took over the government during
the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Trafficante was arrested, but soon returned to America
where he expanded his criminal empire into New Jersey. Other organized criminals either
fled Cuba or were arrested by Castro. Cuban casinos and cabarets were shuttered. Drug
trafficking and gambling ended. But Castro had ties to the drug trade that predated his
rise to power. While seeking refuge from Batista forces in the hills outside Havana, the
future dictator was sheltered by marijuana farmers. Castro promised the growers
protection for their hospitality.
Since the revolution, the state-controlled economy has lacked the foreign investment and
consumer markets that fuel financial success. Worsening the island’s economic situation,
Castro’s adoption of communism brought about a U.S. economic embargo that continues
today. With the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s biggest benefactor, the
country’s economy became particularly desperate for cash.
Besides an unhealthy economy, another major characteristic of the Cuban state is its
mantra of revolution and opposition to the United States. During the 1970s and 1980s, the
Cuban military and intelligence services supported communist movements in Angola,
Ethiopia and Colombia, the third of which proved most important to Cuba’s involvement
in organized crime.
Post-Castro Criminal Opportunities
Despite the government’s involvement in organized crime, the levels of this activity are
relatively low, and controlled. In the case of a power vacuum in Cuba, however,
organized crime would face few limits to expansion. Drug cartels from Mexico and
Colombia would most likely incorporate the island into their pre-existing network to gain
yet another gateway into the United States. The existing hospitality industry would
provide the perfect cover for laundering money gained from illicit activities like drug
trafficking.
And if the intelligence community could be bought, as it was in Russia, cartels would
virtually have their own drug-trafficking state. Not only could they use their signal
collection network to protect their drug shipments traveling throughout the Caribbean Sea,
they could branch out into trafficking counterfeit goods, humans (which already has a
huge market in the region) and weapons. There also would be opportunities for organized
crime with regard to legitimate state assets like sugar, zinc and the tourism industry. Such
legitimate assets offer tremendous potential for economic growth and corruption. At
present only a handful of top generals in the Ministry of the Interior control them.
The United States is starting to feel the first effects of decreased state power in Cuba.
STRATFOR sources report that high-end auto theft rings are operating in the U.S. and
that the cars are being smuggled to Latin American ports with the aide of Cuba. This
could either be a new fund-raising venture for the Cuban government, or more likely, it
could be a sign that organized criminals operating out of Cuba are targeting the United
States.
Car theft in the United States originating from Cuba would represent only the beginning
of the problem. If organized crime really begins to boom, and transnational groups based
out of Russia and China, or closer to home in countries like Mexico and Colombia, we
would expect to see more professionalism, violence and money in Cuban organized crime.
Like Russia in the 1990s, Cuba faces a situation in which state control over assets such as
sugar production, metals mining and (most importantly) tourism, could shift to oligarchic
control and criminal influence. Whereas in Russia the intelligence community only
played an ancillary role in the Russian economy’s crime-ridden economic conversion, in
Cuba the intelligence and security community makes up a far bigger proportion of the
population. Many generals already are placed in ownership positions over hotel chains
and consumer goods outlets. If the current regime were to completely lose their hold on
power, either by overthrow or by death, the struggle for economic assets would unleash a
free-for-all of domestic and transnational criminal activity.
The Military and Tourism
As mentioned, the Cuban military is well-integrated throughout the tourism industry, one
of the few sectors open to foreign investment. This presents an excellent platform from
which to conduct a wide variety of illicit activities due to the large volume of foreign
visitors who pass in and out of these resorts, providing Cuba with hard currency.
Raul Castro headed the transformation of Cuba’s military into what has become the
driving force of the Cuban economy. Raul founded Grupo de Administracion Empresarial
S.A. (Enterprise Management Group), or GAESA, which is the holding company for the
Cuban Defense Ministry. Raul appointed several of his close confidants and relatives to
positions within GAESA. These included Gen. Julio Casas Regueiro, who is the
Chairman of GAESA; and GAESA CEO Maj. Luis Alberto Rodriguez Lopez Callejas,
who is married to Deborah Castro Espin, Raul’s oldest daughter.
GAESA holds a wide array of companies ranging from the very profitable Gaviota
tourism company to Sasa, S.A., which controls the island’s gas station network. Gaviota,
which Gen. Luis Perez Rospide heads, controls and operates more than 30 hotels and
resorts. It is by far the most profitable company GAESA holds, and leads the nation in
foreign exchange earnings. Since the mid-1990s, Cuba has allowed foreign investment in
the tourism industry to help boost revenue. France-based Club Med can be found on the
Caribbean beaches, along with other foreign companies.
The ever-expanding Cuban tourism industry has allowed GAESA to expand to other
holdings. It controls the Military Counterintelligence Department VI and its support
companies, Empresa de Servicios La Marina, which is run by a counterintelligence
major; and Antex S.A., which provides engineering and technical support to all the
GAESA companies. Antex has served as a channel for introducing Cuban intelligence
operatives into foreign countries, given that it has offices in more than 10 countries.
This kind of economic development flies in the face of Cuban revolutionary dogma,
which preaches the equitable distribution of property and emphasizes the vows of poverty
taken by top government officials including Fidel Castro. The social uproar caused by the
expansion of the tourist industry eventually led Raul Castro to lift restrictions that until
April prevented Cubans from staying at tourist resorts on the island. While the law no
longer prevents them from enjoying resorts that for nearly 20 years were off-limits, their
poverty may still do so.
Tourism and the Currency System
Behind the tourism industry is Cuba’s peculiar currency system. Cuba has two official
forms of currency: the national peso and the convertible peso. Basic goods like food are
typically only sold in national pesos. In 2004, Fidel Castro outlawed the use of the dollar
and replaced it with the convertible peso (CUC). This currency officially exchanges at
about $1 per CUC. Only specialty stores, largely owned by the military, deal in
convertible pesos. Given tight government control over the currency, usually only
foreigners or Cubans with access to dollars are able to shop at these stores.
Splitting the currency accomplishes two things. First, the island can become more open to
visitors by supplying more consumer goods and imported foods without totally
undermining the restrictions on ordinary Cubans. Specialty stores that cater only to CUC-
paying customers are cropping up all over Cuba. One such store, TRD, has more than 400
outlets across Cuba. Since the military owns these CUC stores, it enjoys the profits while
the government also makes a profit off selling CUCs to tourists at an inflated price.
Second, selling CUCs to tourists means Cuba can accumulate hard cash in dollars, which
is needed to support the government and maintain the flow of imports.
The CUC was created solely for the purpose of getting dollars into the hands of the
Cuban government while keeping them away from the majority of Cuban citizens.
Essentially, it is play money. It is not accepted anywhere outside Cuba and it is not
considered a tradable currency. Since the stores that accept them are owned by the
military, the CUCs go straight back to the government. Swiss banks, along with
Panamanian and Mexican front businesses, are suspected of holding Cuban government
reserves gleaned off of the tourist industry. They might even hold Fidel Castro’s personal
wealth of $900 million. The U.S. government investigated Swiss investment bank UBS in
2005 for processing $3.9 billion in cash from Cuba.
Drug Trade Complicity and Show Trials
Before the days of Western tourists, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Cuba enjoyed
financial support from the Soviet Union, which allowed it to pursue interests without
thoughts of profit. Those first marijuana farmers Castro promised protection to in return
for taking care of him during his guerrilla march on Havana set a precedent followed in
the 1970s and 1980s. Colombian drug traffickers used Cuba’s airspace and waters with
the permission of Castro and other top Cuban officials. While money was also involved,
Cuban links to the M-19 guerilla movement in Colombia suggest that another reason for
allowing drug trafficking through Cuba was so that the Castro regime could extract
favors from wealthy, well-connected traffickers.
Once Cuban officials cleared traffickers to send drugs through Cuban waters or airspace,
the traffickers would be asked to purchase and deliver arms to the M-19, a group
sympathetic to Cuba’s socialist revolutionary mission in Colombia.
The list below details other links between the Cuban government and drugs:
 In 1982 a U.S. grand jury indicted four high-ranking Cuban officials for arranging
a drug smuggling operation through which drugs were brought into the U.S. in
exchange for smuggling weapons to the M-19 guerrilla movement in Colombia.
The officers indicted included Adm. Aldo Santamaria, chief of the Cuban navy
and a close Castro collaborate; Fernando Ravelo, Cuban ambassador to Colombia
and later to Nicaragua; Rene Rodriguez Cruz, president of the Cuban Institute of
Friendship with the People; and Gonzalo Bassols, a Cuban diplomat then assigned
to Colombia.
 On June 27,1984, Fidel Castro mediated between Panamanian leader Manuel
Noriega and an international drug cartel over the seizure of a cocaine laboratory
in Panama that Noriega had allowed to operate in exchange for a payment of $4
million. According to the indictment, Noriega traveled to Cuba for the mediation
at Castro’s request. Castro offered to help settle the disagreement between the
drug cartel and Noriega. Naturally, playing the role of mediator required good
relations with both parties.
 In 1989, Robert Vesco was indicted by a grand jury during the trial of drug
smuggler Carlos Lehder in Jacksonville, Fla., for arranging safe passage for drug
planes through Cuban airspace. According to the indictment, Vesco obtained
approval from Cuban authorities for this arrangement. Cuban air force Gen.
Rafael del Pino, who defected in 1987, reported that all the planes flying over
Cuba that veered off from the approved air corridors for commercial and private
aircraft had to be cleared with the office of Raul Castro at the Ministry of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces.
 On April 23, 1989, Reinaldo Ruiz and his son Ruben were convicted of drug
trafficking. Reinaldo was the cousin of Capt. Miguel Ruiz Poo of Cuba’s Ministry
of the Interior. Reinaldo and his son Ruben were allowed by Cuban authorities to
land their plane at the Varadero Beach airport for refueling after dropping their
drug cargoes off the Cuban coast near the Bahamas. Drug smuggling fast boats
would come from Florida to pick up the cargoes. Cuban coast guard radar
monitored U.S. coast guard cutters and helped the fast boats evade them.
All of the Cuban officials above who allegedly helped drug traffickers have been high-
ranking members of the military or Communist Party. By offering their influence and
Cuba’s geographic assets to traffickers (who primarily were Colombian) the officials
gained favors and powerful foreign contacts. At times, however, Cuba has cracked down
— or at least appeared to crack down — on drug dealers, probably to dispel rumors of
government involvement in the drug trade.
To this end, Cuba has held very public anti-narcotic trials. In 1989, Raul Castro ordered
the arrest of Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, one of the most highly respected and popular generals
in Cuba. In June 1989, a military court found the general guilty of corruption and
assisting drug traffickers. Ochoa was executed the following month. Raul Castro used
Ochoa’s arrest as an opportunity to trumpet his anti-narcotics efforts even as the
government continued its own trafficking operations.
Several possibilities explain Ochoa’s arrest and execution. The most plausible scenario is
that Ochoa — who as army chief was deeply involved in the drug trade with Raul Castro
— was trying to increase his take by establishing his own connections in Colombia. Thus,
Fidel Castro may have been telling the truth when he said Ochoa was aiding drug
traffickers, even though the real reason for eliminating Ochoa may have been unrelated.
Ochoa’s stature in Cuba and his military connections to the Soviet Union made him a
powerful force. The general fought in Angola and Somalia alongside Soviet forces and
was sympathetic to former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalization policies,
despite Castro’s condemnation of glasnost and perestroika. Furthermore, Raul Castro (at
that time head of the Cuban military) suspected Ochoa of having established his own ties
with Colombian kingpin Pablo Escobar.
Ochoa may have undermined Raul Castro’s control over Cuba’s role in trafficking
cocaine from Colombia, thus threatening a major financial source for the Cuban regime.
The general’s popularity combined with his control over a steady financial support at
Castro’s expense was too dangerous for the stability of the regime. Raul most likely had
him executed to remove this threat. The timing of this case was also peculiar in that it
came not quite a year after Noriega’s indictment for drug trafficking in 1988, something
that would have allowed Fidel Castro to point to the Ochoa case as proof that Cuba, too,
was fighting drugs.
More recent displays of Cuba’s anti-drug campaign have been publicized over the past
few years. In February 2005, the government incinerated 1,300 pounds of marijuana to
show the advances that Cuba’s Border Guard had made in intercepting a drug shipment
between Jamaica- and Bahamas-based smugglers. This gesture was largely symbolic,
however. The U.S. Coast Guard reported picking up 74,000 pounds of cocaine in the
Florida straights in 2004, twice the amount seized in 2003. That is not to say that all the
drugs came from Cuba, but it did not appear as if Cuba was helping. In March 2002,
Cuba announced that it had arrested Rafael Miguel Bustamante Bolanos, an alleged
Colombian drug trafficker wanted in the United States. Cuba used Bustamante Bolanos
as a bargaining chip to persuade the U.S. government into signing an anti-smuggling
agreement, but was rebuffed.
Both of these cases show Cuba is willing to arrest drug smugglers and seize drug assets,
but they do not prove that Cuba is out of the business of drug trafficking. In the grand
scheme of things, 1,300 pounds of marijuana is not that much. Marijuana is also not as
lucrative as cocaine. The seizure could simply mean those traffickers did not play by the
rules and were trying to use Cuba to transport their drugs without having an agreement
with Castro. The same can be said for Bustamante Bolanos. Certainly he was a drug
trafficker, but his arrest may have resulted from a disagreement or missed payment. By
making these periodic seizures and anti-drug statements, Cuba can claim to be in
compliance with international standards for drug enforcement while simultaneously
profiting from the drug trade.
Intelligence Capabilities and a Potential Threat
The Cuban intelligence apparatus is one of the best in the world. Trained by the KGB
during the Cold War and fueled by the paranoia of an imminent U.S. attack, foreign
intelligence is one of Cuba’s strongest assets. For a country as small and financially
strapped as Cuba, possessing such a world-class intelligence community is doubly
impressive. Its agents have experience supporting rebels in Angola and Ethiopia in the
1970s and the Colombian M-19 in the 1980s. Currently, the Cubans talk to many of
America’s main adversaries, including Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and Russia. The
Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI) is essentially in the business of selling
intelligence it collects on the United States to less technically capable or strategically
placed countries. DGI has trained Iran in radar construction and signal reading. Its
reputation and connections with the rest of the world make the DGI a very powerful force
within Cuba.
Because of the Cuban intelligence establishment’s involvement in assisting drug

traffickers, some background of its capabilities and activities is in order.
Cuba’s primary intelligence attribute is its proximity to the United States. Located a mere
90 miles off of the southern tip of Florida, Cuba can pick up signal intelligence, monitor
naval traffic entering and exiting the Gulf of Mexico and quickly transport deliverables to
the United States. Upon the collapse of Cuba’s benefactor, the Soviet Union, the United
States overcame the fear of a nuclear armed Cuba, but its proximity still poses a number
of indirect threats. As suggested by the Castro regime’s tolerance of drug smuggling
through the island, Cuba offers itself as a springboard into the United States. While it
may not always serve as a staging ground for drugs, it can offer a landing strip for drug
planes to refuel or it can offer Cuban waters as a safe haven for drug runners. Of course,
these are offered only if the government receives favors or cuts from the sales of
contraband.
Additionally, the well-outfitted radar installations along Cuba’s coast operated by the
intelligence agencies of the Interior Ministry can monitor U.S. Coast Guard patrols, thus
helping traffickers make the 90-mile hop across the Straits of Florida. If Cuban
intelligence operatives were to align themselves with organized criminals and drug
cartels, Cuba’s geography could be manipulated into a highly efficient drug trafficking
node for the entire Western Hemisphere.
The DGI is the component that makes organized crime in Cuba such a dangerous
potential threat. By assisting drug traffickers cross the Straits of Florida and monitoring
U.S. Coast Guard traffic, they are already using their resources and expertise in an
unconventional manner as far as intelligence agencies go. The DGI’s connections in
business domestically via the Cuban tourist industry and internationally would make it a
potent force for organized crime in the future.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the KGB turned to business and organized crime as
sources for income while the state was unable to pay it enough. During the 1990s, as the
Soviet Union was breaking apart, Miami became a node in the Russian criminal world
that saw the trafficking of drugs and sale of high powered weapons. Considering that the
Soviet Union was on the other side of the world, it is reasonable to believe that a Cuban
intelligence agency reconfigured to carry out private, illegal business could wreak much
more havoc. Given the nature of modern, transnational crime that is focused on amassing
huge amounts of money from the sale of drugs, weapons and people, the relatively
innocent times of the mafia in Havana during the 1950s would surely not return. Instead,
the United States could find itself facing a criminal semi-state to its south, one with very
effective smuggling abilities, a complex system of money laundering and an oligarchic
class of criminals and ex-government officials overseeing it all.
Ultimately, coining the illicit activities in Cuba “organized crime” is problematic given
that the main actors are the island nation’s ruling elite. Strictly speaking, this makes their
activities corruption. But the extent these activities have spread and the level to which the
state is dependent upon them makes it meaningful to label it organized crime.
That the activities of the military, intelligence apparatus and the highest officials in the
Cuban government are so blurred and that their financial sources are so unorthodox is an
omen of what could come after the current regime falls. The reliance on outside sources
for support — some of them highly dubious, like drug dealers — and funds means that if
a centralized Cuban government were not there to keep the situation more or less under
control, the individuals involved certainly would find the transition to outright crime an
easy one. The centralized state that holds it all together is already weak right now. As the
Castro government comes to an end, there is reason to believe the Cuban economy could
become ruled by transnational criminal activity and supported by the very components
that make Cuba a state.
Organized Crime in Japan
June 5, 2008 | 1600 GMT
Summary
STRATFOR’s fifth in-depth look at organized crime focuses on Japan. For nearly 400
years, criminal activity in Japan has been controlled by powerful Yakuza clans, largely
secret societies that thrive on intimidation while bucking societal norms.
Analysis
The Yakuza
Criminal activity in Japan has been controlled by the Yakuza clans for more than 400
years. First operating as gamblers and vendors on the black market, the Yakuza have
since branched out domestically and internationally. Their scope now expands into nearly
every possible industry — from arms dealing and prostitution to the financial and Internet
sectors.
 Global Organized Crime
Related Links

 Organized Crime in Cuba
For the most part, the Yakuza have managed to elude police, and their civilian casualty
rates are low when compared to other organized crime groups. But the primary threat
they pose lies in their ability to corrupt economic institutions and their reliance on
physical intimidation to negotiate deals. Not only is their influence seen on the streets of
Japan, but in some of the country’s most powerful boardrooms.
However, despite their influence the Yakuza face challenges going forward, namely how
to recruit in a country where the population is rapidly aging while battling competition
from foreign criminal groups like the Chinese Triads.
In the Beginning
The modern-day Yakuza, like other organized crime groups, trace their lineage into
Japanese history. Secret, criminal groups are a societal phenomenon deeply rooted in the
culture within which they operate. Pinpointing an exact origin date for these groups is
difficult, but significant transition periods can be identified when criminals gain and lose
influence or refocus their efforts due to changes in their surrounding societies and
economies. Yakuza are no exception. While their place in society surely has evolved over
centuries, the feudalistic period of 16th and 17th century Japan is when the term
“Yakuza” first started being used.
(click to view map)

The name Yakuza is derived from a popular card game and specifically is associated with
losers of that game. Of course, Yakuza members do not think of themselves as losers per
se, but they do embrace the status of outsider in a country with strict social norms and
hierarchies. While their members generally hail from lower classes and are uneducated,
Yakuza organizations give the would-be losers of Japanese society an avenue through
which to become powerful while operating parallel to the above-ground Japanese system.
The Tokugawa Period
Most modern day Yakuza clans trace their histories back to the Tekiya and Bakuto
groups of feudalist Japan. Tekiya groups were made up of traveling vendors and peddlers.
They set up stalls throughout Japan around temples, selling wares and buying, selling and
trading goods. Authorities recognized these groups as traders and authorized the
functions of Tekiya bosses. These bosses (Oyabun) looked after the traders (Kobun) by
ensuring their protection from thieves and lending the impromptu markets a sense of
legitimacy in the eyes of local authorities. This Oyabun/Kobun relationship is one
steeped in Confucian tradition and can be seen in other aspects of Japanese life like the
Sensei/Kohai relationship between teacher and student. Embedded into the
Oyabun/Kobun relationship are the values of obedience and protection which helped the
Tekiya groups thrive and spread throughout Japan.
As the Tekiya groups gained legitimacy and recognition, they also began to abuse the
protection provided by their bosses. Vendors earned a reputation for selling shoddy goods,
duping customers and being generally insincere. It was no longer the vendors that needed
protection, but the customers. As vendors brought in more money and as markets became
more organized, Tekiya groups bumped up against each other, leading to skirmishes over
who operated which marketplace. These clashes sometimes ended in bloodshed. The
more vendors and marketplaces a boss could control, the more money and power he
would gain. These bands of traveling merchants had essentially become financial bases
for their bosses’ territorial expansionist ambitions.
Meanwhile, another group called Bakuto were making money gambling. Given that those
who could afford to gamble were typically wealthy, Bakuto groups set up along roads
where wealthy families would travel en route to visit the emperor — an important
undertaking in those days. Rest stops were established along roadways and, eventually,
family-run Bakuto groups established gambling parlors along every important route. Like
the Tekiya vendor groups, Bakuto groups also enjoyed a degree of cooperation with the
state. Authors David Kaplan and Alec Dubro in their book, Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal
Underworld, give the example of gamblers who targeted laborers on public works
projects, won money from the state-paid construction workers and then funneled the
money back to state coffers after taking a cut. These kinds of partnerships with the state
set a precedent for later Yakuza activities.
Bakuto groups also handed down some traditions to modern-day Yakuza, including the
tradition of yubitsume (cutting off finger joints as a form of penance) and the practice of
receiving elaborate, full-body tattoos.
The Meiji Restoration
During the Meiji restoration period, which began in 1868, Japan went through a phase of
major industrialization and militarization. While the Tekiya and Bakuto still sold their
wares and hustled money, more profitable avenues arose for those looking to enter the
underground economy. As factories opened and the demand for raw materials rose,
Japan’s labor force and product reserves became strained. During this period, Bakuto
members also got involved in politics — providing muscle to campaigning politicians.
Ultranationalist groups like the Dark Ocean Society set up posts in China and Korea in a
subversive effort to undermine the governments there. Groups like these paved the way
for mineral extraction, foreign labor camps and the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1910
and China in 1931. They also got rich in the process. Prominent Japanese criminal figure
Yoshio Kodama, a behind-the-scenes power broker in post-war Japan, started to amass
great wealth leading up to the war from activities (including drug trafficking) in Korea
and China.
The militarization and industrialization taking place during the late 19th and early 20th
century was also a boon to domestic businessmen. In major cities, the demand for
construction laborers and dockworkers created a scenario in which gangs would collect
workers and broker them to employees, acting as a quasi-employment agency. Contacts
abroad in Korea and Manchuria ensured the steady flow of cheap labor that fueled the
industrialization boom. During this time, many of the modern gangs that currently rule
over port cities like Tokyo, Kobe and Fukuoka got their start by providing and organizing
labor.
The most important trend that emerged from the Meiji restoration period concerning
organized crime was the marriage between criminals and political parties. Throughout the
late 1800s, organized criminals (most of them with a background in Bakuto) led and
organized political rallies for their patron politicians. The largest Bakuto groups
controlled thousands of people through gambling networks and encouraged even more to
attend rallies through physical intimidation. They also used muscle to break up rallies
held by rival politicians. By the late 19th century, regional elections were being broken
up by right-wing groups who threatened violence against those who voted for the rival
progressive party. By then, criminal organizations had aligned with the right-leaning
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) — a relationship that continues today.
Post-War and Occupation
Yakuza in its modern form really came into being during the chaos of post-war Japan.
Universally, organized crime thrives in times of disorder under a weak state. Japan
following its defeat during World War II was ripe for such an evolution. Most major
cities and their infrastructure had been destroyed either by intensive fire bombing
campaigns or nuclear attack. The Japanese military and its resources (both material and
human) were strewn about East Asia. Food was either scarce or non-existent given that
supply chains had broken down. This combination of lacking basic needs, unaccounted-
for supplies and a strong demand for reconstruction created the perfect environment for
organized crime. Additionally, a communist threat from the east meant that the U.S.
occupying forces would, after the immediate threat of nationalism dissolved, support
right-wing groups over communist-linked left-wing parties.
Following its defeat, Japan faced severe food shortages. Daily government rations during
1946 and 1947 barely kept the population alive, much less provided support for a period
of reconstruction. Furthermore, people skipped work to search for food — further cutting
into productivity. Where the government failed to provide for its people, organized crime
stepped in, supplying food and eventually other useful items in black markets.
Immediately following the Japanese surrender in 1946, farmers could earn 30 times more
selling their rice to black markets than to the government. But food on the black market
was expensive. If people wanted to eat, they had to sell off valuables like jewelry,
heirlooms and other prized possessions. A flood of Japanese military goods, unaccounted
for after the surrender, also made their way into street-vendor booths and bartering deals.
Black market dealers became at the crux of the post-war Japanese economy.
In lean times, access to things like food and clothing could be highly profitable. By the
end of 1945, an estimated 17,000 black markets had emerged nationwide. But these
markets would not manage themselves. So, in a return to the days of the Tekiya vendors,
various Yakuza gangs stepped in and provided order for the chaotic marketplaces.
Because of the profits involved and the desperate circumstances, vendors were often the
victims of thefts and shakedowns. As Yakuza gangs solidified their hold over
neighborhoods and towns, they established their own territorial boundaries and financial
sources.
As the situation in Japan settled down after World War II, the Yakuza clans emerged as
an established fixture in the Japanese economy. Next, they integrated themselves into the
new political sphere. During the occupation, U.S. officials courted the ultranationalist
groups with the strongest potential to counter the communist threat. Like the Christian
Democrats’ alliance with La Cosa Nostra in Italy the Yakuza clans (many of which were
indistinguishable from the ultra-nationalist groups) allied themselves with the LDP in
Japan. As a result, the clans enjoyed the benefits of political connections including
superfluous public works projects handed over to Yakuza-dominated construction
companies in return for staunch support for the LDP. Yakuza clans organized anti-
communist rallies and sabotaged left-leaning organizations and politicians for their LDP
patrons. The connections were strong, especially during the era of political figure Yoshio
Kodama who, while himself not a member of Yakuza, had many connections to various
bosses who provided him with muscle in exchange for favors.
The Yakuza began to draw public ire in the 1970s, especially after a particularly
scandalous case in which Kodama received $12.6 million in bribes from U.S. firm
Lockheed Martin for enlisting the help of Yakuza bosses to secure a contract for the
company. The bribes tarnished Kodama’s reputation and brought the Yakuza out of the
shadows. Former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was also implicated in the Lockheed
Martin scandal and, according to Kaplan and Dubro’s Yakuza, secured his leadership
position through payoffs to LDP members from the Yakuza — another scandal that drew
much public criticism.
Political collusion between the Yakuza and LDP survived the 1970s scandals and the fall
of the Soviet Union, however. In 2000, photographs surfaced of former Prime Minister
Mori Yoshiro socializing with known Yakuza bosses. He also reportedly gave a speech at
a wedding attended by one of Tokyo’s leading clan families. In 2002, a mayor in western
Chiba prefect stepped down after admitting to borrowing more than $300,000 from a
local Yakuza group.
Inside the Yakuza World
The Yakuza exist as a parallel society within Japan. Many members have spent time in
jail, brought shame upon their law-abiding families, were raised in criminal families or
simply had no families to begin with. Instead of taking troubled youths and turning them
into respectable, upstanding members of society, Yakuza gangs take dejected youths and
build upon their outsider image. Yakuza members adorn their bodies with tattoos, dress
in 1950s-style American mobster clothing and drive large, American cars — a rarity in
Japan. They flaunt their status as members of the Yakuza and are therefore able to
intimidate others. They clearly send the signal that they are separate from polite, face-
saving Japanese culture from which they have already “fallen” from by committing some
kind of misdeed (like assault or murder). By advertising this separateness, they
demonstrate their willingness to commit further crimes.
This attitude stands in stark contrast to mainstream Japanese culture, which prefers
stability and the status quo over risk-taking. Japanese society as a whole offers little room
for second chances and youth who misstep early have little chance of re-entering
traditional society once they grow older. With some exceptions, many of these outsiders
face a choice between life as outcasts or opportunity for success in an organization that
values deviancy and rejects societal norms. Like many gang cultures, the Yakuza
embrace these so-called rejects.
Ironically, commitment and obedience are still highly valued by the Yakuza. However
while citizens in the mainstream are expected to obey the laws of the government,
Yakuza members obey the orders of their Oyabun or adoptive father.
While the command structure varies by clan, a very clear hierarchical relationship exists
between the Oyabun and his Kobun or adopted son. In a ritual called sakazuki, the two
take an oath of allegiance over a glass of sake. From that point forward, the new member
will drink sake during ceremonies with others from the same cup he was given when he
entered. While drinking sake is reserved for special ceremonies, most Yakuza prefer
drinking whiskey or beer.
As for obedience, the Yakuza have a long-standing and macabre tradition, called
yubitsume, of paying penance and showing loyalty to their clan leader. This act
essentially involves the offending member having their little finger completely severed at
one of its three joints. If a member makes a mistake, treats his boss dishonorably or
causes him embarrassment, this is the only certain way to gain forgiveness. The practice
dates back to when the weapon of choice was a katana or sword used by samurai that was
wielded by influential Bakuto. The little finger is very important to control a Katana. By
cutting off a joint, a member weakens his ability to protect himself and therefore he
becomes more indebted to his boss for protection. Today, this move is merely symbolic
given that members wield guns, not swords, but the process also brands Yakuza members.
A mangled little finger not only reveals someone’s membership in Yakuza, but
depending on the number of missing joints, their level of obedience. Disfigured fingers
arouse suspicion among mainstream employers and other Yakuza bosses and therefore
serve to bind a member closer to his boss.
Tattoos, often the resume of the underworld, are another tool used to mark a Yakuza
member. Tattooing is common among organized crime groups around the world. They
often communicate a member’s rank or accomplishments and serve to warn others. For
example, tattoos revealed from under a shirt cuff during a handshake or on a neck during
a bow send a clear message. When flashed to rival clan members or ordinary citizens,
these markings reveal a member’s authority and backing.
Tattoos today, however, fail to convey the same message they did during the Yakuza
heyday in the 1980s. In contemporary Japan, tattoos are expensive (full body work can
cost up to $10,000) and time-intensive (traditional bamboo-needle work can take up to
100 hours). Restrictions placed on juveniles as a result of the 1992 anti-Yakuza laws also
limits their proliferation.
Members of more cash-strapped clans might scale down the size of the tattoo or have it
done with a modern electric needle but as tattoos in general have become more popular in
society overall, the shock value has lessened. While they still warn employers and may
tell a story to other Yakuza bosses, tattoos are not as distinguishing a feature as
yubitsume.
Yakuza clothing also clearly marks members as outsiders from Japanese society. Their
fashion choices are reminiscent of those made by American mobsters in the 1950s.
Sporting slick black haircuts and large sunglasses, members wear shiny black suits with
lapel pins that reveal their specific clan affiliations.
Criminal Enterprises
Yakuza clans earned about $14.5 billion in 2004, according to official police figures.
Independent estimates, however, indicate that Yakuza clans earn anywhere from $45
billion to $70 billion annually, a figure that puts Yakuza activity at nearly 2 percent of
Japan’s gross domestic product. After decades of black-market activity, Yakuza clans
(like other organized crime groups around the world) are investing illicit earnings in
legitimate businesses either for laundering or investment purposes, or both. Yakuza
enterprises traditionally have focused on gambling, prostitution, protection and public
works projects. And while they still operate in these arenas, Yakuza clans have also
branched into the drug trade and financial criminal activity such as fraud and usury. Like
the post-World War II Japanese economy as a whole, the Yakuza have developed and
adapted to varying economic climates and grown incredibly wealthy in the process.
Like their Bakuto ancestors, modern Yakuza are heavily involved in gambling from
Sumo wrestling and baseball to boat racing. But pachinko, a game played on an upright
pinball/slot machine in dedicated parlors, remains Japan’s national gambling pastime and
the Yakuza’s most profitable gambling enterprise. Winners receive tokens, not money,
that they in turn sell at Yakuza-run kiosks for cash. This allows the Yakuza to circumvent
Japan’s gambling laws. Typically, pachinko parlors are located near Yakuza-run clubs
and bars that offer a perfect place for gamblers to spend their recently won earnings.
In Tokyo, Kabukicho is the red-light district where hostesses, dancers and entertainers
double as prostitutes. The Yakuza own many of the establishments in this area and others
throughout Japan. Prostitution is closely linked to pornography and human trafficking —
particularly of Eastern European women given that those with fair skin are in higher
demand (and therefore more profitable) than their Asian counterparts.
In one case, a Yakuza boss was arrested for operating charter flights to Uzbekistan that
kept a steady stream of women flowing into brothels and bars throughout Japan. The
Yakuza are also invested in the production and distribution of pornography, including
material featuring underage girls. Japan did not address this issue until 1992 when the
anti-Yakuza law outlawed producing and selling underage pornography. The law,
however, failed to outlaw the display of this material. Reports indicate that 500 stores in
2007 displayed underage pornography, primarily in the Yakuza-dominated red-light
districts.
Closely linked to pornography and prostitution ventures is the business of protection.

Because these ventures are lucrative, they encourage competition, sabotage and theft.
Since traditional protection by the police and the attention it brings is unwanted by these
questionable businesses, operators instead turn to Yakuza gangs. In fact, each November
a quasi-festival takes place in Tokyo’s red-light district in which Yakuza members collect
protection payments from their clients. Protection serves both parties’ interests since
business owners want to keep trouble-makers out and Yakuza gangs want to prevent rival
gangs from advancing on their territory.
A new economic era emerged for the Yakuza in the 1980s when Japan (and especially
Tokyo) underwent a huge real estate bubble. A strong stock market left investment banks
flush with cash. Seeking to invest their money in more tangible assets, banks began
buying and developing real estate. But after World War II, Japanese cities had already
undergone a momentous reconstruction that left them densely populated. Identifying
purchasable open land was difficult.
By 1987, banks and LDP politicians who sought to profit from the development frenzy
turned to local Yakuza gangs who used bribery, harassment and assault to convince
property owners to vacate their buildings to make way for new skyscrapers.
Harkening back to the days leading up to World War II when they organized political
rallies and foreign laborers, Yakuza gangs also provided workers for construction
projects — many of whom were often unskilled and unqualified for the job. The Yakuza
soon realized, however, that they could make more money financing development deals
than they could as land sharks and labor organizers.
By the late 1980s the real estate bubble had burst and banks were left holding bad loans
— many of which were connected to Yakuza bosses. As a result, executives at two of
Japan’s biggest companies, Sumitomo Bank and Fujifilm, were killed by Yakuza hit men
for attempting to call in bad loans. Before the real estate boom, the Yakuza were not
significantly involved in financial and white-collar activities, but as the Japanese
economy evolved, the Yakuza were forced to evolve also.
One tool that emerged during this time was sokaiya or the use of intimidation and
blackmail to disrupt shareholder meetings and hijack votes for the benefit of Yakuza
interests. Gangs representing bosses who held stocks would appear at meetings and
threaten to use force or disclose damaging information collected beforehand on other
shareholders or executives of the company in order to elicit certain results.
This leverage was used to manipulate votes, remove hostile board members and install
cooperative Yakuza partners — or sometimes simply blackmail the company and get paid
not to disrupt the meeting. Sokaiya complimented the Yakuza’s involvement in
investment fraud and insider trading. Members bullied and intimidated executives into
revealing sensitive information so they could then purchase or sell stock based on the
acquired insight. Ultimately, the Yakuza injected its thuggery into Japan’s stock
exchanges and board rooms. In fact, the Japanese Securities and Exchange Surveillance
Commission has tracked 50 different companies that have cooperated with the Yakuza
over the past seven years.
Yakuza are also involved in loan sharking and the Japanese version of lending high-
interest loans, which are called sarakin. These short-term, high-interest loans are
relatively simple to acquire and more anonymous than regular loans. As of 2007, there
were 10,000 companies involved in lending sarakin and behind many of those companies
a Yakuza connection exists. These loans, which can be as low as $100 but carry 29
percent interest rates, quickly add debt to the borrower’s name. One of the biggest sarakin
lenders is partially owned by Sumitomo bank.
The Yakuza also deal in amphetamines, which can be processed into Japanese speed
known as shabu. Drugs are an important part of every organized crime syndicate and the
Yakuza clans are no exception. They do differ from other groups in that Yakuza
primarily import drugs to the Japanese market. Unlike Italian and Russian organized
crime groups, they do not focus on transporting drugs. In fact, Yakuza stay fairly close to
home, importing amphetamines primarily from mainland China. Korea and Taiwan play
minor roles in the supply chain, but China was the source of nearly three-fourths of the
2981 pounds of amphetamines seized by the Japanese Customs Bureau between 1990 and
1999. (Taiwan was the only other significant supplier at just over 15 percent.)
Historically, North Korea has been a significant supplier of amphetamines and seizures in
the Sea of Japan are often reported.
Security, Structure, and the Police
A prime example of the open-yet-guarded nature of the Yakuza in society is the structure
of their headquarters. While these virtual fortresses are guarded 24 hours a day, their
locations are publicly available on the Internet. Until the 1992 anti-Yakuza law
prohibited it, clans could even advertise their headquarters and regional offices with a
plaque that flaunted their Yakuza activities.
Each gang has a headquarters, and Japan’s biggest clans have offices all over the country
from which they conduct local operations. One of the most contentious and closely
followed trends in the Yakuza world has been the movement into Tokyo of one particular
gang called the Yamaguchi-Gumi — the most powerful Yakuza clan. The Yamaguchi-
Gumi’s biggest impediment to success in Tokyo is an alliance by two rival gangs, the
Inagawa-Kai and the Sumiyoshi-Kai — a partnership commonly referred to as the Kanto
Hatsukai that wants to keep the dominant player off its turf. But even their alliance may
not be enough to keep out their rival. With an estimated membership of 45,000, the
Yamaguchi-Gumi far outnumbers the 16,000 members of the two smaller clans.
Although Yamaguchi-Gumi boss Shinobu Tsukasa expressed his intention to take over
Tokyo when he became leader in 2005, his campaign did not take off until February 2007
when two of his members gunned down a rival gang boss in broad daylight along one of
Tokyo’s busiest streets. The killing sparked a series of unsuccessful counterattacks that
targeted high level Yamaguchi-Gumi bosses. Overall there were six Yakuza killings in
Tokyo during the first half of 2007 and none in 2006 (the first year without incident since
the end of World War II).
Suspecting that Tsukasa would be aggressive in his bid for Tokyo, police prepared
themselves for an uptick in violence by increasing their forces by 10,000 in 2005 and
stepping up intelligence gathering efforts. They also started their own campaign to
prevent youths from joining Yakuza gangs by establishing prefectural centers to counsel
young people and monitor recruitment activity around the country.
The national police employed another tool: the anti-Yakuza laws established in 1992
(which have been amended several times since). In addition to prohibiting Yakuza from
forcing juveniles to get tattoos and from advertising their headquarters, the laws also
granted police the authority to close Yakuza offices for three months (six if a gang war
was in progress). Later amendments gave police the ability to seize assets purchased with
drug money and hold Yakuza bosses accountable for the crimes of their subordinates. For
the most part, however, the laws targeted recruitment and not operations. Police
designated groups as Yakuza clans (as opposed to, say, right-wing political groups) based
on the ratio of members with previous convictions. In fact, the 1992 law required Yakuza
clans to submit an annual roster of their members.
Rather than leading to the dismantling of the gangs, these laws have only prompted the
Yakuza to restructure. Larger bosses have delegated powers to regional gangs to avoid
culpability for their activities, yet front companies ensure that money still flows to the top.
National police estimate that approximately 800 companies, from food vendors to social
networking web sites, are used as fronts by the criminal enterprise. Yakuza clans have
also split membership between regular members and part-time members whose names are
not required on compulsory rosters. Essentially, the clans have outsourced their dirty
work, even allowing Korean and Chinese gangs to operate pachinko parlors and drug
markets.
Gun Trafficking
Essential to every organized crime group is firepower. The role of handguns in the
Yakuza organization is worth examining for several reasons, especially since guns are
illegal in Japan.
Essentially, criminals have a monopoly on the civilian arms market and 90 percent of
guns in Japan can be traced back to one of the various Yakuza clans, who in particular
use their international contacts to procure handguns primarily from the United States,
China and the Philippines. Some 32 percent of guns in Japan came from the United States
in the 1990s.
Not only will a Yakuza member of any importance own at least one gun, but the most
important bosses are protected by gun-toting bodyguards. A favorite among Yakuza
members is the .38 caliber Smith & Wesson, a gun that sells for $275 in the U.S. but even
with the right connections, cost $500 on the streets of Tokyo in 1997.
However, that price is considerably lower than in 1990, when the same gun cost about
$4,000. The drop in street price, along with a decrease in gun seizures over the past two
decades illustrates the success of the gun-running trade in Japan and the ability of the
Yakuza to conceal their operations from police.
International Ties and the Yakuza Connection
While the Yakuza have not been immune from outside competition, neither have they
shied away from propagating their activities throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The
ultranationalists who set off for foreign posts and established lines of supply for the
Japanese during World War II had links to the Yakuza. After Japan withdrew its forces
from those countries, these ties were exploited by the Yakuza. Organized crime groups
like the Triads in China, with their large operations in Hong Kong and Taiwan, have
provided drugs to the Yakuza.
During the 1970s, the Yakuza began to venture further from their homeland. Yakuza
targeted Japanese tourists from Hawaii to France, exploiting the trust of fellow Japanese
nationals and foreign law enforcement not yet familiar with the Japanese criminal
organizations. Yakuza would pressure and intimidate travelers into buying unnecessary
items and travel arrangements. During this decade, the Yakuza also catered to the niche
of sex-industry-centered tourism. Groups of men (both Japanese and foreign) were
shuttled around East Asia to countries like the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and the
city of Hong Kong on excursions where they hired prostitutes and frequented the brothels
of each country.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Yakuza became more financially savvy and began investing
in legitimate foreign businesses. They focused on developing markets in South America
and Eastern Europe, often infiltrating established Japanese communities and
complementing their investment business with protection rackets and scams. Japan’s
national police force is notorious for not assisting foreign investigations into Yakuza
dealings. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) commonly complains about the
Japanese police’s unwillingness to divulge information on the basis of privacy protection.
U.S. authorities charged with investigating investment fraud are unable to run
background checks on questionable Japanese businessmen and the companies that
Yakuza members often operate. Desperate for information on Yakuza members, the FBI
actually admitted four known Yakuza members into the U.S. between 2000 and 2004 to
receive transplants in return for intelligence on Yakuza activities and its members in
Japan.
Today, the Yakuza are known to be operating in various places around the world,
anywhere Japanese tourists and businessmen travel. Human-smuggling gangs at the top
of the supply chain have connections to Yakuza who hire Chinese criminals to do their
dirty work, allowing them to skirt the 1992 anti-Yakuza laws. In Latin America, the
Yakuza target Japanese businesses for protection and bribes. The Yakuza are involved in
drugs in Australia, guns in the Philippines and prostitution in Thailand. In Russia they
engage in smuggling, financial crimes and other endeavors.
The Future of Yakuza
Currently, several forces are applying pressure on the Yakuza. The 1992 anti-Yakuza law
and following amendments restricting their activity and empowering police forces has
forced the organization to restructure while cutting into its recruiting ability. In addition,
an aging society has shrunk the pool of potential recruits. In general, an overall shift in
Japanese society allowing for less-rigid standards among employees has created fewer
possible recruits for Yakuza activities.
This labor shortage has contributed to cooperation between Yakuza and foreign gangs
from China and Korea, and low-level criminals are in high demand. But foreign groups
are unlikely to stay content with their bottom-feeder position for long. While Yakuza
clans still dominate the Japanese criminal world, their supremacy is not guaranteed. In
fact, rivalries not only between Japanese clans but between local and foreign crime
groups could get very ugly.
For more, please see Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld by David Kaplan and Alec
Dubro, which provides an extensive and detailed look at the history and workings of the
Yakuza.
Organized Crime in South Africa

July 17, 2008 | 1033 GMT
Summary
STRATFOR’s sixth in-depth look at organized crime focuses on South Africa. The
abysmal social conditions created by apartheid made organized crime appealing to some
segments of the local population, while organized criminals from other countries are
attracted to South Africa’s comparative stability and reliable infrastructure.
Analysis
Few countries have seen such a positive turnaround in the past two decades as South
Africa. Emerging from a broadly condemned policy of apartheid and decades of
economic stagnation in the early 1990s, the nation of 45 million people at the southern tip
of Africa has become a hub of business activity in the continent and an attractive
destination for tourists and businessmen from the rest of the world. Gross domestic
product growth has steamed along at around 5 percent since 2000, and South Africa is
fostering relations with other developing countries in anticipation of increased investment
in Africa during the 21st century. On top of all this, South Africa will host the World Cup
in 2010, marking its move from pariah status to the world spotlight in just under 20 years.
But the same characteristics that attract foreign investors — world-class infrastructure,
economic stability and good climate — also attract criminals. Organized crime is very
visible in South Africa, from the drug trade to stolen cars to poached snails. Both
indigenous and foreign criminal syndicates darken the positive image that South Africa
has fostered for the 21st century. The legacy of apartheid, the political instability it
created in the 1990s and geography have shaped the criminal world in South Africa into
what it is today.
History
Organized crime in South Africa can be traced back to the gangs that operated in the
prisons there starting in the late 19th century. Just as in prison systems around the world,
survival in South African prisons at the time (and today, to a lesser extent) required
membership in a gang for protection and sustenance. Prison wardens were at best
indifferent to the health and well-being of criminals and at worst, physically beat them or
denied them their basic needs. The organization of prison gangs ensured security against
aggressive guards and facilitated the flow of necessities like food and water to counter the
indifferent guards.
Related Links

 Organized Crime in Cuba
 Organized Crime in Japan
But organized crime in South Africa did not really pick up until the era of apartheid.
After South Africa became a sovereign state in 1938, the ruling white class (by far the
minority in a predominantly black country) quickly enshrined a system of strict
segregation that had already loosely been in place. The system was designed to
disenfranchise blacks and protect the power of the whites — especially the Afrikaner
population, whose political party, the National Party (NP), held a firm grip on power until
1994.
By the late 1940s, blacks had been systematically removed from urban areas in Cape
Town, Johannesburg and any other city where whites lived and placed into peri-urban
areas known as townships. The general motivation for these moves was fear of unrest.
Blacks formed a majority in the country and whites feared that their power could easily
be undermined by sheer force should blacks become unhappy with the political
arrangement. The townships were created in order to control (or at least attempt to)
activities within the black community. But the black population generally was not moved
far; townships were always located just on the edge of towns so they could be closely
monitored and drawn on as a source of cheap labor.
The notion of “separate but equal” failed just as miserably in South Africa as it did in the
United States. While blacks in the townships were supposedly seen as equal under the
law, their situation was noticeably worse than that of neighboring whites. From the
education system to medical care to the organization of labor, blacks were consistently
and purposefully suppressed and treated as inferior.
As the situation in the townships got worse, people did start to organize to protest the
apartheid policies. The banning of political parties, including the African National
Congress (ANC), made all forms of anti-government political organizations illegal, so
any meetings and coordination had to be done in secrecy. Secret labor unions began to
form; groups that wanted to talk about the political situation would meet up secretly at
shebeens — the townships’ versions of speakeasies. These activities themselves are not
considered organized crime, but the fact that even the most benign of civic actions were
forced underground gave an air of conspiracy to almost any activities in the townships.
The ANC, formed in the early 20th century, was forced to go underground during this
period. A militant wing of the ANC — referred to as the MK, short for Umkhonto we
Sizwe, or “Spear of the Nation” — formed in the early 1960s. It was moderately
successful in attacking government interests but mostly only led to crackdowns in the
townships.
Overseeing the day-to-day security of the townships was the South African Police
Service (SAPS). Infamous for its brutality, the SAPS paralleled the prison guards of the
19th century: at best negligent, at worst extremely violent. The police were not stationed
in the townships to provide order and security to the inhabitants; they were there to root
out and crack down on any kind of activities that could be seen as political subversion.
As for internal stability, the police were ambivalent toward violence among blacks. If
they had any opinion on it at all, they probably condoned the violence, since keeping the
opposition divided is a good way to control the population.
The spread of communism in sub-Saharan Africa and uprisings in the townships during
the 1970s and 1980s threatened the regime and led to some of the most violent police
crackdowns under apartheid. Blacks in South Africa had positive views of the liberation
movements in Angola and Mozambique aided by the Soviet Union and its proxies.
Blacks largely saw those movements as victories over white rule in southern Africa — a
view that was worrisome to the South African government. But the involvement of the
Soviet Union introduced the threat of communism into South Africa’s security equation.
After the Portuguese left southern Africa in 1976, and with Rhodesia facing serious
difficulties fighting Zimbabwean liberation movements, the South African regime
became nervous of being surrounded not only by black uprisings in neighboring countries,
but also by communism. That many blacks sympathized with the revolutions (not
necessarily because of communism, but more because it marked the end of white rule
there) made the South African elite even more nervous.
Subsequent uprisings in the townships were met with harsh crackdowns. Mass casualties
were inflicted by the police during protests outside of Johannesburg and Cape Town,
further riling the population in the townships. By the late 1980s, facing economic
troubles and soaring security costs, the NP began negotiations with the ANC and other
political parties marking the beginning of the transition out of apartheid. By 1992 (not
coincidentally, around the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse), apartheid officially ended
and by the 1994 elections, the ANC formed a government, ending more than 50 years of
one-party, white-minority rule.
While the end of apartheid was a cause for celebration, there were dark sides to the event.
The gangs and conspiratorial networks that had formed during apartheid were now no
longer confined to the townships. Severe restrictions on the movements in and out of
townships were immediately revoked, releasing the populations of townships (and the
criminals among them) to move about the country and cities freely. A police force that
for so long concentrated on stamping out political subversion was not able to control
street crimes like drug dealing, thefts and stick-ups. The political wrangling over the
future of the state police weakened law enforcement further. The result was a crime wave
during the 1990s that is still visible today.
Structure
As outlined above, organized crime in South Africa really got its start in the prison
system in the 19th century. Gangs formed within prisons to provide protection and basic
needs for prisoners, and as prisoners were transferred across the country and served
sentences at various locations, the gangs spread. By the time apartheid had become
institutionalized in South Africa in the 1940s, the prison gangs were nationwide and were
referred to as the Numbers. The 26s and the 28s are the two most prevalent gang systems
in South African prisons. Membership in the gangs required a brutal initiation that often
included killing a guard or fellow prisoner. The gangs built their history around folklore
and a tradition of hierarchy. As members circulated between confinement and freedom,
knowledge of the gangs spread across the prisons and townships of South Africa.
Living in prison was difficult in South Africa and so prisoners required tight groups to
watch each other’s backs. But the need for such protection gangs did not arise in the
outside world until the 1970s and 1980s, when the situation in the townships became ever
more heated. It was during this time that some of the “super gangs” of today got their
start — groups like the Americans, a gang that got its name by identifying strongly with
American paraphernalia. Meanwhile federations of gangs like The Firm gained strength
and consolidated their resources.
Gangs may have gotten their start providing protection in the townships, but they quickly
used their strength to work their way into the drug market. The Americans, allied with
other local gangs like the Mongrels and Fancy Boys, and The Firm all got started in Cape
Town — the center of criminal activity in South Africa where over 130 gangs are
expected to be operating. In the late 1980s and 1990s, as more and more drug dealers and
street gang bosses started going to jail, the connection between the prison gang system
and the street gang system converged. The Americans and their allies aligned themselves
with the 26s and the federation of gangs under The Firm aligned themselves under the
28s. By aligning with the Numbers gangs, the street gangs were exposed to a national
network of criminals. Names and numbers mixed so that a franchise system was formed,
with street gangs all over the country lining them up with the 26s (headed by the
Americans) or the 28s (headed by The Firm).
Both major street-gangs-cum-drug-syndicates operated much like a corporation. The
Firm (founded by Colin Stanfield) and the Americans (founded by Jackie Lonte) built
themselves up during the 1980s and 90s, merging with, swallowing up or simply
stamping out the competitive local gangs. Their business plans called for them to be
wholesalers; they both knew that the real money and power in the drug business lay in
providing the drug dealers with product and forging partnerships with international drug
producers.
Stanfield grew his operation and organized its drug activities into sectors, creating a
system of what the Institute for Security Studies called “generals” to control areas like
Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town and any other market of significance. Local gangs
had already taken over many of these areas, but instead of battling resistance, Stanfield
essentially bought them out. He promised to provide the local gangs with a steady supply
of drugs in return for their allegiance (ISS). In this way, Stanfield could grow The Firm
quickly and pragmatically — invariably making enemies along the way, but getting his
way largely through pragmatism. As a testament to his popularity in the Cape Town
community, thousands of people from all over Cape Town attended his funeral in 2004;
the locals there saw him as more of a community leader and hero than a criminal.
While a neat separation into two gang alliances facing off over the control of drugs in
South Africa certainly plays well for the media, in reality it was not that simple. When
drug wars erupted, allied gangs were expected to cover each other according to their
Numbers alliance, but personal and economic interests often overcame national
allegiances. Territories and drug shipments were still fought over, and the ephemeral
nature of street gangs (very few gangs outlived their creator) made South African crime
groups much more complex than the 26s versus the 28s. Furthermore, Stanfield’s death
from cancer in 2004 contributed to the instability in South Africa’s 21st-century
organized crime environment. The SAPS estimates that there are 10-15 major crime
bosses in charge of the street gangs and drug syndicates of South Africa.
Another important element of South African organized crime is heist gangs. These hold-
up and theft gangs might be associated with one of the larger drug dealing syndicates, but
for the most part they too are ephemeral. The fierce competition among heist gangs has
led to a kind of heisting elite. The most successful (and thus richest) heist leaders display
their wealth conspicuously — wearing nice clothes, drinking expensive imported
whiskey and driving nice cars. According to the book Gentlemen or Villains, Thugs or
Heroes? by Jennifer Irish, an organized crime expert from the South African Institute of
International Affairs, heist gang leaders will advertise their success to show other
potential heist members that they are successful and worth building a team around.
Lifestyle is a resume in the organized crime world and the more successful one looks, the
more others want to work for him and be associated with him.
According to Irish, heist gangs usually consist of around 10 people and will work for
weeks or months conducting surveillance on their target — whether a bank, cash-in-
transit truck or a car dealership. They are made up of professionals who often have to
provide money up front to finance the operation; considering the cost of such operations,
members may have to put up several thousand dollars each, a barrier that can keep
unestablished operatives from joining in. Due to the high security that the heist teams
have to overcome, operations (especially those against cash-in-transit trucks) usually
involve excessive violence, according to Irish’s book. Expert drivers will run trucks off
the road, then someone trained in explosives will blast open the truck while others stand
back to provide cover fire. Guards are shot and often killed in an effort to get the money.
Ironically, more security features have meant more violence. Before major security
companies like Chubb and Brinks came to South Africa, cash transits were done in
regular cars, and personal vehicles typically did not have anti-theft systems. But cash
now travels in armored trucks, and anti-theft systems come standard with most cars. The
result is that criminals now use more violent measures to get their prize. Whereas before,
heist gangs could overwhelm a cash-in-transit car with handguns and the threat of
violence, they now use assault rifles and explosives, and many more bystanders are killed
as a result. In the case of private vehicles, security systems have led to an increase in
carjackings since the criminal now needs the occupant in order to get the car. Measures
meant to increase property security have actually decreased personal safety in South
Africa, according to Irish’s book.
Economically, carjacking, cash-in-transit heists and cargo theft do not compare to the
business of drugs. While the drug market puts South Africa on the global radar for heroin
and cocaine producers and sellers around the world, the direct effects of heists usually
stay closer to home. Stolen goods and money obtained from heists act primarily as
currency in the informal markets in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Botswana discussed above.
Heists are also relatively rare. While over 100,000 drug related crime deals took place on
the corners all over South Africa in 2007, according to the SAPS, there were 144 bank
robberies, 395 cash-in-transit heists and 14,201 carjackings in 2005. But heists are much
more visible, violent and perceived as random among the general population. While most
heists take place without shots being fired, there are plenty of stories of people being
dragged from their cars and shot on the sidewalk as the perpetrator (usually an amateur,
for professionals rarely have to use force) drives off to cash in.
Both the drug syndicates and the heist gangs are loosely organized and alliances (while
generalized by the media into the 26s and 28s) are very amorphous. The low-level, local
street gangs are very territorial and will not hesitate to kill people who violate their
territory, but mid- and upper-level leadership often coordinate and share resources when
needed. Heist gangs are even more nebulous.
Geography
Organized Crime in South Africa benefits from the country’s geography on three levels.
Globally, South Africa’s position between the Indian Ocean basin and the Western
Hemisphere makes it an excellent transshipment point for drugs, stolen and counterfeit
goods and other illicit contraband. Regionally, South Africa is a haven of (relative)
stability on the tip of the volatile continent. Its advanced financial, transportation and
communications infrastructure attract criminal enterprises from other countries in the
region. Finally, within South Africa, the legacy of apartheid shapes the geography of race
there. The high levels of inequality created a powder keg that went off after the fall of
apartheid.
Global Geography
South Africa sits rather conveniently at the nexus of the global drug trade. Heroin-
producing countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Thailand in Asia lie along the Indian
Ocean basin to the east of South Africa, while the cocaine producing countries of
Colombia, Peru and Bolivia in South America lie to the west. When these two regions
trade their wares, South Africa stands to benefit as a middle man. As evidence of South
Africa’s popularity among international criminals (and terrorist organizations, too), South
African passport forgery is a booming business. In 2004, British authorities uncovered a
passport forgery operation in London along with boxes of thousands of forged South
African passports.
Additionally, South Africa’s colonial past gives it connections to the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands, two very lucrative drug markets and gateways to the rest of the
wealthy countries of Western Europe. South Africa supplements shipments of foreign-
produced cocaine and heroin to Europe with its own domestically and regionally grown
marijuana. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC),
southern African countries accounts for 10 percent of global marijuana production. South
Africa provides the majority of marijuana to the United Kingdom and is responsible for a
large share of marijuana consumed in Europe. Worldwide, South Africa’s share of the
marijuana market is growing. The UNODC estimates that a gram of marijuana in South
Africa will fetch around $0.20 whereas the same amount will fetch $10-$15 in Western
Europe; thus there is financial pressure to export marijuana.
Of course, the Indian Ocean-South American-European trade triangle does not only
handle drugs. All kinds of contraband, from stolen cars to abalone (a mussel considered a
delicacy in China) follow these routes. Understaffed ports and lack of strict oversight
make South Africa even more attractive to transnational criminal groups operating out of
China, Russia, Italy, the United States and Colombia.
Regional Geography
Regionally, South Africa is an attractive base of operations for criminal groups in nearby
Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo and, farther away,
Nigeria. Even by world standards, South Africa is an advanced economy with reliable
financial and telecommunications services and a redundant transportation infrastructure.
Compared to the rest of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa has an
infrastructure and relative stability that makes the country an economic magnet. While
plenty of legitimate businessmen and traders flock to South Africa to run their operations,
criminal organizations are attracted there, too.
South Africa’s transportation and telecommunications infrastructures and financial

services outstrip neighboring countries’. Africa’s busiest seaport is in Durban, and
Johannesburg has the busiest airport on the continent. South Africa has redundant road,
telephone and high-speed Internet networks that, while not quite as reliable as North
America’s or Western Europe’s, far outstrip its neighbors. The biggest international
banks operate there, too, and while Barclays, Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan operate all
over Africa, the concentration of world class financial services in Johannesburg and Cape
Town is not seen anywhere else in southern Africa. Criminal syndicates operating in
places like Nigeria or Mozambique that are looking to expand see South Africa as an
essential market — both in carrying out their criminal activities and in spending their
wealth.
Besides the fact that South Africa has become a regional business and trade hub for sub-
Saharan Africa, migration to the country spiked after apartheid when the borders opened
up and trade increased as South Africa returned to the international community. There are
hundreds of thousands of Nigerians there illegally, and nearly three million Zimbabweans
have come to South Africa seeking a more stable home. Certainly not all of these people
are criminals, but often low-skilled, impoverished immigrants turn to crime early on and
then build upon it, with the successful ones making a career out of it.
South Africa’s success has created regional inequality, which has led to a boom in
organized crime.
Local Geography
Just as South Africa has had to deal with the unintended consequences of regional
inequality, it has also had to deal with the very intentionally created domestic inequalities.
The geography that was created during 50 years of apartheid has created very wealthy,
white neighborhoods next to squalid townships where blacks were forced to live.
The policy of apartheid created 10 “Bantustans” — territories declared independent states

and set aside by tribal identification by the apartheid South African government, aimed to
be a homeland and destination for surplus black labor — that were designated as black-
only areas similar to the U.S. system of Native American reservations. This rigorous
segregation was enshrined in the 1950 “Groups Areas Act” that essentially barred blacks
and whites from living in the same area. Leaving the Bantustans was tightly restricted by
the police, and blacks had to have the proper paperwork in order to leave the area; anyone
caught without the requisite “pass book” would end up in jail. Along with the Bantustans
were districts and townships. Two of the biggest and most commonly referred to districts
are the Cape Flats (the black-only area on the outskirts of Cape Town) and Soweto (short
for South Western townships), situated accordingly outside of Johannesburg.
Inside these zones, the living conditions were miserable. Whole families lived in shelters
constructed of mud and whatever materials they could salvage. Education, medical and
law enforcement services were well below standard, and blacks were disenfranchised
from the political system. In some Bantustans, residents technically even lost their South
African citizenship (a measure which was overturned by the ANC when it came into
power). In stark contrast, whites lived in comfortable suburbs, and their movements were
not restricted. In the townships, poverty fueled high crime rates and indifference from the
national police created a demand for security within the townships. Street gangs provided
security to youths and used their collective power to steal from others, creating a kind of
gangland rule of law within the townships.
Alcohol and Mandrax (a sedative drug, legal until 1977) were restricted or altogether
outlawed in the Bantustans. The consequences of this were similar to prohibition in the
United States; local bars known as shebeens sprouted up all over the townships, initially
peddling illegal alcohol. By the 1980s, the role of shebeens expanded and they became
much like speakeasies, where locals could come to socialize and get other illegal goods
like marijuana and credit. The evolution of shebeens into the business of credit solidified
their illicit nature. Once cash entered the mix, shebeen owners found it necessary to
employ street gangs in order to collect their debts and keep other shebeens from
encroaching on their territory. Thousands of shebeens existed throughout the townships
in South Africa and, although they existed illegally, police did not always intervene, as
they were more concerned with stamping out political opposition, not enforcing alcohol
restrictions.
The Bantustans created during apartheid in South Africa created a parallel society in the
country, and when apartheid ended, the social effects that came with reintegration
mirrored the economic reintegration that occurred in Germany after the fall of the Berlin
Wall or the shock that Russia went through after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The
magnitude was smaller in South Africa, but years of segregation had shaped the country’s
geography and demographics and all of that came crashing down when the ANC came to
power in 1994 and abolished the Bantustans. All of a sudden, impoverished and angry
blacks were free to go wherever they pleased.
International Activity
Certainly not all residents in the Bantustans were criminals, and the shebeens by no
means had a monopoly on organized crime. White South Africa had its fair share of
criminal activity as well. Organized criminals were relied upon to work around the
sanctions that were placed on South Africa because of their apartheid policies. La Cosa
Nostra boss Vito Palazzolo was offered sanctuary in South Africa after escaping from a
Swiss prison in 1986. He helped the South African government bust sanctions and in
return was allowed to conduct his criminal activities (largely money laundering) from
within the country. Also, members of the government and especially members of the state
police were involved in the illegal trades of precious stones from neighboring countries,
ivory, weapons and marijuana to support state coffers and supplement their own salaries.
By the end of apartheid, few aspects of South African society were not involved in some
kind of illicit activity.
While Palazzolo was running money-laundering operations for La Cosa Nostra in South
Africa during the 1980s, many other foreigners were taking advantage of the chaotic
environment in South Africa and still do to this day. Russians (who were undergoing
their own organized crime renaissance during the 1990s), Indians, Nigerians, Chinese,
Zimbabweans and many others were getting in on the action. South Africa was a kind of
organized crime free trade zone where criminals (as long as they shared their earnings
with the appropriate power brokers) could wheel and deal as they pleased.
Viktor Bout, the infamous weapons dealer, operated out of South Africa during the late
1980s and early 1990s (while his home, the Soviet Union, was breaking up). He operated
an airport along the Botswana border and put the entire staff on his payroll. Before he
was chased out of the country, he supplied weapons from the Soviet Union to arm
conflicts in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Sierra Leone. Once the criminal world in Moscow really got heated up in the mid-1990s,
Russian mobsters saw South Africa as an ideal place to launder their earnings. Russians
there bought up property and used car dealerships and traded in precious stones. In fact,
Bout often accepted precious stones as methods of payment for his arms deliveries,
seeing as how many of the countries he supplied were rich in them. It is likely that he
went on to sell these stones to fellow Russians in Johannesburg or Cape Town as a step in
their money laundering activities.
In the early 1990s, the Indian criminal boss Dawood Ibrahim was interested in South
Africa as a source of cheap labor. In Misha Glenny’s book McMafia, Ibrahim’s network
is said to have recruited men from South Africa and put them to work on the construction
sites in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and other oil-rich cities on the Arabian Peninsula. Going
the other direction was heroin harvested in Afghanistan and Pakistan and shipped out
from Karachi, where Ibrahim’s network had considerable power. This trade relationship
was not quite slavery (South Africans signed up to go and were paid — not well, but paid
nonetheless) but the hopeless situation for blacks in South Africa made this arrangement
particularly sinister.
Triads, the criminal groups that work out of China, have an interest in the South African
abalone supply (and poached products in general). Abalone has been over-harvested in
the waters near China, and Chinese suppliers have been forced to look further and further
abroad to find stocks of the delicacy. South Africa’s waters still have abalone (for now, at
least), and so Triad gangs are attracted to the market there. Neighboring countries also
provide poached products like ivory, shark fins and endangered hides to gangs tied to the
Triads operating in South Africa.
Nigerians make up a large proportion of criminals in South Africa. While there is

disagreement over exactly how they got involved, the relative stability of South Africa
was the underlying factor for their success there. Nigerians started trickling into South
Africa during the 1980s, but once the restrictive border was opened up after apartheid,
immigration from Nigeria boomed. There is even a district of Johannesburg named
“Little Lagos” after the capital of Nigeria. Naturally, not all came for criminal reasons,
but Nigerians are behind much of the crime in South Africa. They are blamed for
introducing the drug trade to South Africa; while small-time trade had always taken place
in South Africa, there is a correlation between Nigerians arriving in South Africa and the
increase in drug activity. They have not restricted themselves to drugs, though. Nigerians
are often behind car-theft rings, the weapons trade and, most famously, phishing scams.
Relying on South Africa’s more reputable business environment, Nigerian e-mail scams
often route the money through a bank in South Africa or, in more elaborate schemes,
involve meeting the target in South Africa.
Economy
Since the fall of apartheid and the incorporation of South Africa back into the
international system in the early 1990s, other avenues of prosperity besides crime have
opened up to the population. But many in the generation of blacks brought up in the
townships under apartheid and illegal migrants from neighboring poor countries still see
crime as the easiest way to earn money. Top criminals can pull down hundreds of
thousands of dollars a year in a country where the per capita gross domestic product is
around $5,400. South Africa’s top criminal boss — The Firm’s Stanfield — was a
millionaire many times over, with investments (both legal and illegal) all over the country.
The economy of organized crime in South Africa also requires investment into the
community. Criminals who have the support of a township or a whole city (like Stanfield
did in Cape Town) are in a much more powerful position than criminals who are simply
seen as drug dealers. People who turned out at Stanfield’s funeral in 2004 praised the
man for paying their utility bills and providing food and water when times were hard. By
paying attention to those who were largely neglected by the government, Stanfield
ensured that when the government came looking for him, it was not likely to get any help
from the people he assisted. Stanfield was eventually arrested on tax evasion charges but
was only in prison a short while before being diagnosed with cancer and released shortly
before his death.
Building up the kind of community support that Stanfield had took money. Granted, he
was only providing the most basic of services, but he did so for many people. In the end,
he earned more money selling drugs than he paid for people’s support, but buying
support most likely cost him a large percentage of his holdings.
Of course, Stanfield could not just deposit his net earnings at the nearest bank branch and
go about his business; laundering the money is the second job that every organized
criminal must take after becoming successful enough to draw attention from law
enforcement agencies. Virtually any business venture can be converted into a money
laundering operation, but the most attractive outlets are ones that do not attract too much
attention and have a high rate of cash turnover so as not to raise suspicion from
investigators. Businesses that fit these criteria are bars, restaurants, cash loan businesses
and cell phone shops. Before the end of apartheid, shebeens (ever the home of illicit
activity) acted as effective money laundering operations. But for those more successful,
discerning criminals who have more cash to launder than would be possible to run
through a bar or cell phone shop, there are more elaborate solutions: Car dealerships, real
estate investments, casinos or physically moving stacks of cash strapped to couriers’
bodies over borders and into foreign operations can place a barrier between the original
source of the money and the criminal pulling the strings.
This process becomes simpler the more contacts one has. With access to a complicit
attorney, criminals can put their money in a trust account and then withdraw it a week
later, successfully turning their cash into a check. Or criminals can use family or friends’
names to set up fake bank accounts and so spread out their earnings over a broad enough
base to not raise suspicion. Criminals can also use contacts within credit and debit card
facilities in Johannesburg to move cash electronically across borders into secure, offshore
accounts.
However, the most effective form of hiding illicit economic activity is to rely on the
informal economies that make up much of Africa’s economic activity. Like Bout’s
weapon/diamond/cash business arrangement, many criminals in South Africa simply
trade in illicit goods to get what they need. Stolen cars or other goods are turned in for
illicit drugs which in turn are traded for weapons which buy diamonds which are then
sold to indiscriminate jewelers from Tel Aviv, New York and London. By the time cash
is handed over for the diamond, the link to the stolen goods is virtually untraceable.
The Future
In February, the ruling ANC moved to disband a special anti-organized crime police
force known as the Scorpions. They had been chartered in 1999 as a tool to fight against
the country’s raging crime wave and proved successful in their mission. But high-level
investigations have led to allegations that the Scorpions have become more of a political
tool than crime fighting tool. Their mission will continue, but they will be weakened as a
result of being incorporated into the SAPS.
But this does not necessarily mean that organized crime will return to the way it was in
the 1990s. Many of the underlying factors for the crime wave then are not as potent now.
The police force has been integrated and, while still battling corruption, is moving away
from its oppressive legacy. Security technology and more private security firms are
working to prevent crimes so that the police can focus more on investigating and solving
crimes. Finally, the inequalities that apartheid created, while certainly not erased, are
being corrected. The shock of desegregation after apartheid will take at least a generation
to absorb.
On the other hand, geography — something South Africa can not change — will remain.
While the local level of apartheid geography discussed earlier does not play as serious a
role anymore, global and regional position certainly still do. South Africa’s position
between the heroin-producing Indian Ocean basin and cocaine-producing Andes will not
change. As South Africa grows richer, domestic demand for drugs will likely increase. As
long as there are drugs in South Africa, domestic and foreign gangs alike will be attracted
there.
Regionally, South Africa still lives in a bad neighborhood. The situation in Zimbabwe in
particular threatens to stimulate organized criminal activity. Political instability, racial
discrimination and a dismal economy all make up ingredients for a healthy informal
economy run by organized crime groups. South African organized crime groups are
positioned well to benefit from the situation, further strengthening their position in
southern Africa.
Where it can improve the situation, South Africa is certainly taking steps to stem
organized crime, but there are still too many factors that are largely out of South Africa’s
control that will enable organized crime there to flourish.
Organized Crime in China
August 19, 2008 | 1327 GMT
Summary
STRATFOR’s seventh in-depth look at organized crime focuses on China. Unlike in Italy,
Russia and Japan, Chinese organized criminal groups have not broken out on the national
stage, and instead are extremely localized. Hemmed in domestically, organized criminal
groups in China must go abroad to grow.
Analysis
Images of a shipping container full of filthy, sick (and sometimes dead) Chinese
immigrants flash across TV screens or newspapers fairly regularly. Probably the highest
profile groups behind this human smuggling are a subgroup of Chinese organized
criminal organizations known as “snakeheads.” But domestically, organized crime in
China is much more diverse. Just as in Italy, Russia and Japan, Chinese organized
criminals control territory, extort businessmen, traffic drugs and prostitutes and partake in
government corruption.
Unlike in Italy, Russia and Japan, however, Chinese organized criminal groups have not
been able to break out on the national stage. By opening up economically, Chinese
criminals have capitalized on increasing domestic wealth. But the Communist Party of
China (CPC), by keeping a firm grip on the political system, has prevented any single
group from rivaling the central government in any way. Beijing has shown its ability to
crush religious, political and militant movements, and has succeeded in preventing
organized crime from becoming a nationwide force.
Because of this, organized crime in China is extremely localized. Groups can control
criminal activity in townships by relying on corrupt local politicians. But as soon as the
groups begin to outgrow their localized area, the central government cracks down on
them with arrests and harsh penalties.
Hemmed in domestically, organized criminal groups in China are forced to go abroad to

grow. Their influence is increasing everywhere from the United States to South Africa to
the Philippines. These groups traffic drugs, smuggle human cargo and run criminal
activities in Chinatowns across the globe.
The History of Chinese Organized Crime
Chinese organized crime originated in localized secret societies of rural China. The
southeastern province of Fujian was — and is — one such hot spot. It is thought to have
been the birthplace of the Heaven and Earth Society — a secret group of Buddhist monks
who banded together in the mid-1700s to defend against an emperor who thought the
group was too powerful.
In Western countries, this group became known as the Triad — a name that reflects the
triangular symbol of the Heaven and Earth Society but is now a generic Western label for
Chinese organized crime. Today, there are many different varieties of Chinese organized
crime, including ethnic and regional groups, not just the Heaven and Earth secret
societies.
As with other organized criminal groups, there is a degree of legend behind the stories
explaining the group’s founding. Chinese secret societies in fact are more likely to have
formed gangs for protection, only going on the offensive once they grew stronger than
the forces against which they had banded together. They accordingly became involved in
theft and protection rackets, and imposed very expensive dues to join the gang. In his
book “The Dragon Syndicates,” Martin Booth calculates that dues may have equaled up
to one month’s salary, and that, in order to afford the payments, members were forced
constantly to recruit new members, as dues flowed up the chain of command. This
pyramid-like structure led to the gangs’ growth and ultimate involvement in shady
activities: Gangs were moneymaking ventures, and bosses would not have discriminated
against a member who acquired his dues through dubious means.
During the 1800s, these local gangs entered the opium trade and expanded into other
areas of China. Due to the physical size of China, the central government had (and still
has) trouble exerting its control over the entire country. Efforts by the central authorities
to stamp out criminal groups tended only to scatter the gangs –- ironically, helping spread
their influence well outside Fujian. By the early 20th century, the most successful
criminal organizations were operating in Shanghai.
In 1844, American, French, English and other colonial interests carved up Shanghai.
These countries staked out districts of the city from which they operated foreign trade and
investment. By the early 20th century, Shanghai was extremely wealthy, but was plagued
by dysfunctional law enforcement.
Each foreign-controlled sector (known as a “concession”) was responsible for

administering activity in its area, meaning that each concession was under the jurisdiction
of a different law enforcement agency. The Chinese had been forced to grant
extraterritoriality to the foreign concessions, and so had no law enforcement jurisdiction
in these areas. Criminals dealing in everything from gambling to prostitution to opium
knew about Shanghai’s fractured law enforcement, and exploited it. If the police in the
French concession were after a specific gang, the gang could quickly move to the
American concession to avoid arrest. Crossing the street was equivalent to crossing an
international border between two countries that did not coordinate law enforcement
activities very well — if at all.
One gang rose above all the others: the Green Gang. Initially led by Huang Jinrong (the
police chief of the French sector of Shanghai in its glory days), Du Yue-sheng ran the
operation. While Huang may have set the precedent of combining local officialdom and
crime, Du took it several steps further by becoming a socializing philanthropist who was
not shy of the limelight. Du and his gang provided a level of uniformity across Shanghai
that local officials could not. Whereas official administrators were bound to their own
jurisdictions, the Green Gang and Du operated all over the city. His universality in the
city was an important strength that made governments and businesses beholden to the
Green Gang.
In 1923, Du allied the Green Gang with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist movement to put
down communist forces in Shanghai. He also helped Chiang defend Shanghai against the
Japanese when they invaded in 1937. But, ultimately defeated by the communists, the
Green Gang scattered. Mao Zedong’s takeover in 1949 sealed the fate of a great majority
of organized criminals in China. Criminals fled Shanghai and China for Hong Kong and
Macau, while some followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan, where they re-established their
criminal enterprises. None of these successors reached the level of organization, wealth
or influence of the Green Gang attained during the early 20th century in Shanghai.
Economy
Organized crime in China virtually disappeared under Mao’s rule. Any rival to the central
state was unacceptable, and most experienced criminals had fled China and were now
operating on its periphery. The opium trade dried up, gambling was outlawed and
subversive groups were disbanded under the threat of death. China under Mao closed up,
and having been burned by foreign involvement in the past, removed itself from foreign
dependencies. By 1975, starvation and economic stagnation led to plummeting living
standards. The stability that Mao had intended to impose on China from the center via
various isolationist measures began to unravel and produce destabilizing forces. Poverty
and starvation now trumped foreign interference as the major threat to the government.
So, in 1975, Deng Xiaoping initiated a series of economic reforms that led to the opening
of China. The reforms devolved economic decisions to the local level, letting states and
townships take responsibility for their economic activities. The result was an economy
less regulated by the central government, but still very connected to politics on the local
level. Furthermore, special economic zones (SEZ), several of which opened up in Fujian
— the historic birthplace of Chinese organized crime — allowed individuals to set up
their own businesses.
Entrepreneurs and local politicians saw the opportunity to make money and quickly drove
a wedge through this crack in economic regulation and started enterprises in anything
they could get their hands on. The legal code was convoluted, contradictory and — as
long as politicians and party officials were making money off of the dubious enterprises
— largely went unenforced.
The economic liberalizations allowed enterprises to experiment with new business

models, and many of the enterprises pushed the envelope of legality. Some ambitious
businessmen partnered with companies from Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong, where
organized crime had a strong economic representation. For a few, the combination of
murky business operations in China along with criminal partnerships in Taiwan, Macau
and Hong Kong resulted in outright illegal operations. As entrepreneurs started dealing in
narcotics, human smuggling and extortion, cooperation with local authorities grew more
and more important. Entrepreneurs depended on local economic bureaucrats and law
enforcement officials for protection, and local officials in turn depended on the
entrepreneurs for money, business ties and their efficiency. As long as the new
enterprises did not flaunt their illegal activities, the authorities turned a blind eye.
Illegal Drugs
China’s experience with the British opium trade during the 19th century had led to a
zero-tolerance policy for drugs during Mao’s rule. But as openings in the economy
emerged under Deng, organized criminals were attracted to the profits that narcotics
brought in. Geographically, China straddles the drug-producing areas of the Golden
Triangle along with Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, and it is near the Golden Crescent —
the poppy-producing areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Overland drug routes from
China’s frontier in the west to the ports in the east became profitable under the guise of
legitimate trade. By the 21st century, Chinese criminal enterprises had begun branching
out from heroin to ephedrine. In 2005, the U.S. State Department estimated that the
Chinese narcotics industry was worth $24 billion.
The Golden Triangle produces up to 80 tons of heroin annually, most of which gets
smuggled over the border to China through the mountainous jungles of northern
Myanmar. Initially, in the 1980s and early 1990s, heroin traveled from Myanmar, through
China and on to foreign markets. This flow brought financial wealth to China without the
social side effects of drug abuse. It is believed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was
involved in transporting drugs during this time. But as the Chinese economy started to
heat up and incomes grew, drug consumption expanded.
By the late 1990s, domestic drug consumption became a destabilizing force that Beijing
had to address. It reformed the PLA by increasing its budget — thus removing the need
to moonlight in the drug trade — and stationing troops along the Myanmar border to slow
the drug trade into China. Crackdowns did slow down the heroin trade (though the
difficult terrain along China’s border with Myanmar ensures that smuggling will never be
stopped altogether), which in turn increased demand for methamphetamines.
As heroin became more expensive and more risky to handle (possession of 100 grams, or
about 3.5 ounces, can bring the death sentence), Chinese narcotic producers turned to
other drugs, such as methamphetamines. Ephedrine — a legal drug found in many over-
the-counter medications, including cough syrups used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine — proved attractive to Chinese criminals involved in narcotics. China
led the pack in reported methamphetamine seizures from 2000 to 2006, accounting for 39
percent of worldwide seizures in 2006, according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
2008 World Drug Report. Chinese businessmen with one foot in the legal
pharmaceuticals industry and another foot in the illicit narcotics trade can ship ephedrine
all over the world. In February, 2 tons of ephedrine from China were confiscated at
Mexico City’s international airport. Subsequent seizures in Guadalajara indicate that
Mexico is joining China in the ephedrine trade.
Human Smuggling
Fujian continued to set the pace in the 1980s and 1990s with human smuggling. Using
links to Taiwan and with the cooperation of local governments, an estimated 500,000
Fujianese were smuggled illegally from China to the rest of the world. Many of them
ended up in the United States, where immigration authorities estimate that up to 100,000
illegal Chinese immigrants are smuggled into the country each year. But the Fujianese are
not limited to the Chinatowns of New York and San Francisco; they have gone to Europe,
South America, the Middle East and anywhere else they can find work. In one instance,
58 illegal Fujianese immigrants suffocated in the back of a truck travelling from the
Netherlands to the British port of Dover in June 2000.
China’s snakeheads charge between $50,000 and $70,000 per person to be smuggled
abroad. This exorbitant fee by Chinese standards requires the pooled resources of an
entire family, if not an entire town. Snakeheads commonly smuggle individuals on credit,
letting them work off the smuggling fee once they have reached their new home. This
indebtedness often leads to indentured servitude for the illegal immigrant once he or she
arrives at the target country. Once in the hands of the snakeheads, illegal immigrants are
treated as a commodity, traded and sold for labor in underground economies from San
Francisco to Belgrade. Snakeheads use physical and psychological intimidation tactics to
detain immigrants. Immigrants are threatened with death after their harrowing trip across
the ocean in a shipping container, a journey that can last weeks. They are reminded that
because they are illegal, if they go to the authorities, they would be sent back to China.
Smuggled women may be forced into criminal prostitution rings in the country they end
up in; out of shame, they may not report what happened to them.
Smuggled individuals also are expected to send money back home. Families or villages
that contribute to the snakehead’s fees expect a return on that money. If their chosen
brother or neighbor goes to the authorities because of abuses by the handlers, then he or
she would likely be deported home to very disappointed family members and neighbors.
During the 1990s, human smuggling also helped local government officials. Townships
had to meet certain employment quotas. Sending hundreds of thousands of workers off to
foreign countries made it that much easier to find employment for everyone else. Plus,
the money sent back by these emigrants supported the local economy, creating a win-win
situation for local officials.
Legitimate Businesses, Illegitimate Tactics
Not all China’s organized criminals are involved in drugs or human smuggling. Many
criminal networks operate legitimate restaurants, factories and shops but use criminal
tactics to get ahead. Like more traditional organized criminal groups, they will use gangs
to intimidate rival businesses or garner political favors from local officials who offer an
umbrella of protection for the criminal groups.
More recently, as China’s central law enforcement agencies have begun to take organized
crime more seriously, “strike hard” campaigns have targeted organized criminal rings,
breaking up groups all over the country and arresting hundreds of people at a time.
Meanwhile, punishment for official corruption is harsh, with the death penalty frequently
used to punish local officials involved in graft or accepting bribes. As authorities crack
down on illicit drugs, physical intimidation and murder, it is likely that more and more
criminals will opt for less serious criminal activities — and even go into legitimate
businesses.
International Activities
Exports, not domestic consumption, traditionally have generated wealth in China.

Chinese organized crime, too, has sought to export itself to raise revenue while
maintaining a low profile at home. Direct international activity involving mainland-based
Chinese organized crime has tended to stay close to home. Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Macau have been busy locales for Chinese organized crime, and Myanmar, Thailand and
Central Asia have become key drug suppliers.
Staying close to home allows Chinese criminals the advantage of using the Special
Administrative Regions (SARs) of Hong Kong and Macau. These two SARs lie along the
coast of Guangdong province, and they officially are Chinese territory but have their own
autonomous law enforcement agencies. Communication between law enforcement
agencies has tended to be poor, something criminals have exploited to border-hop in
order to avoid capture, in a similar fashion to the Green Gang’s tactics of manipulating
the different concessions in early 20th century Shanghai. Police in Hong Kong and
Macau have more experience dealing with — and deeper exposure to — organized crime,
and they have established partnerships with mainland police agencies to provide training
in anti-organized crime policing.
Organized criminal groups in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are spin-offs from
traditional Chinese organized criminal groups, but they operate independently from —
and are more advanced than — their mainland counterparts. Offshore Chinese organized
criminal groups, for example, have far more transnational contacts due to their reliance
on foreign commerce. During the time span between 1949 (when Mao took over) and the
mid-1980s (when organized crime began to take advantage of economic liberalization), a
separation was created between mainland Chinese organized crime and offshore Chinese
organized crime. The two sides are now starting to link back together. But after such a
long period of time, the links are more similar to international partnerships than Chinese
unity.
In Chinatowns all over the world, Chinese immigrants who made their initial journey
through illegal networks get caught up in illegal activities and come to depend on crime
for a living. These immigrants certainly have ties to China and often act as outlets for
illicit goods from their homelands; however, their gangs and activities do not necessarily
operate under the direct control of groups from mainland China. There are an estimated
60 million people of Chinese descent living outside China, and their tendency to group
together in neighborhoods means there are virtual cities of Chinese people outside China.
These cities are prone to organized criminal activities, such as protection rackets and
extortion, just as much as mainland cities.
Finally, the western border with the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan is emerging as a drug-trafficking zone. Factions in these countries have long
controlled the flow of heroin from Afghanistan to Russia, but China’s share of the
exported heroin is growing. China’s northwestern province of Xinjiang borders these
three countries. As the target of infrastructural development plans to maintain China’s
frontier, more roads, rails and transfer stations are going into the province. But improved
Chinese infrastructure helps drug traffickers as much as it does law-abiding citizens. As
Xinjiang province’s infrastructure improves and more links to Central Asia are developed,
the routes between Xinjiang’s cities of Urumqi and Kashi to coastal cities such as
Guangzhou will be able to handle greater shipments of illegal drugs.
Structure
Unlike most organized criminal syndicates around the world, Chinese groups tend to
remain relatively small. While organized criminal groups have been successful at
infiltrating local governments and agencies, there is no evidence to suggest that any one
group has spread all across China. Groups tend to limit membership to between 50 and
200 people. Some government officials say there are more than 30 million members of
underground societies, with around 4,200 known groups operating in China. Thousands
more groups probably operate that have not captured official attention. Many organized
criminal activities may be as simple as collaborations between a few individuals who take
advantage of their connections to supplement their incomes. While there is certainly
cooperation between these types of groups, there is a serious limiting factor to the growth
of such organizations.
China’s central government is very protective of its position as centralizing force in the
country. Beijing does not tolerate subversive groups that spread nationwide and appear to
challenge the central government for control, such as the Tiananmen Square protesters, a
resurgent Uighur uprising in the mid 1990s, the Falun Gong standoff and the recent
Tibetan rising. Since organized crime by its nature is a force that challenges the writ of
the central government and puts economic gain above national security, it tends to get
noticed by the central government — but only when it grows large enough to pose a
considerable threat. As long as organized crime remains a localized force and groups stay
relatively small, such groups can remain below the government’s radar.
Because modern organized criminal groups must limit their growth, the vertical boss-to-
foot soldier structure that is more common in other criminal organizations tends to flatten
out in China. Chinese gangs are more accurately compared to a network of criminals who
rely on each other’s skills and connections, and the leader of any given group can shift
depending on personal connections or on the task at hand. One gang member may have
deep connections into local politics, another may have connections to local industry, and
another may be the gang leader and offer physical muscle for intimidating those who get
in the group’s way.
Politics, Security and Corruption
Organized crime in China largely takes place with the cooperation of local politicians.
The conditions in township governing councils encourage corruption, given that officials
are poorly paid, they are expected to meet quotas for economic growth and employment
and they largely control the information that gets passed from the local level to the
central government. This means local officials must get creative to fund local services
such as police and fire departments, and must ensure that economic growth continues
along at breakneck speed. All too often, politicians rely on shadow governments — the
local power brokers not necessarily tied to the CPC and most likely plugged into an
organized criminal network — to make ends meet.
Organized crime is attractive in China because it is so efficient. Criminal groups linked to

politicians can provide muscle to deter opponents and provide a measure of deniability
when an opposition group gets roughed up by an organized gang. When protests over
sensitive issues such as land reform and water pollution come up, local officials often
send organized criminal groups — instead of the local police or military — to shut down
the protests, thus allowing the state to escape from a potentially incriminating situation.
There are also cases in which organized criminal groups have purchased equipment, such
as cars and radios, for local police forces outright or paid their salaries. Presented in the
form of a gift, these donations serve as a tool for organized criminals to purchase the
cooperation of the police. Local officials go along with this because it means they have
more money for economic development projects.
At the highest level of political corruption is the practice known as “maiguan maiguan,”
or the selling of government posts to criminals or action by government officials to
protect criminals. Cash-strapped townships in particular might sell the position in charge
of economic development to the highest bidder — which in many cases will be a criminal
who can use the post to strengthen business operations and persecute rivals. This practice
is nothing new to Chinese organized crime — having been practiced in Shanghai in the
early 20th century when the city’s leaders were the police chief and director of the office
in charge of confiscating opium.
Because organized crime has such a grip on local politics in China and because local
politics control law enforcement and communication to higher-ups in the Chinese
bureaucracy, the central government has found it difficult to crack down on criminal
groups. Whistleblowers will periodically go to a high-ranking official with evidence that
a local politician is corrupt, but this a very dangerous action considering the kind of
people who can be effected by being implicated. Given the risks, whistleblowers are
likely to point out corrupt politicians not because of patriotic duty but because a reward,
along with protection, is promised to them — frequently by someone looking to eliminate
a rival.
Culture
China is a state based on an ethnic majority — the Han, who make up 92 percent of its
population — but there are many other ethnic minority groups in China, many of which
are involved in organized crime. China has 96 million citizens considered ethnic
minorities, and many of them have suffered real or perceived injustices at the hands of
the ruling Han majority. The Han constitute the elite in any province that has a strong
ethnic minority presence, where they are perceived as the representatives of the central
state. Minorities, on the other hand, are often less secure financially, are not afforded as
many opportunities — and so are more likely to enter organized crime. This is not to say
that Han Chinese are not involved in organized crime, just that the split between ethnic
majority and minority in China often is a catalyst for groups forming to defend their
interests in the face of a majority group.
Another factor in the culture key to understanding how organized crime works in China is
the principle of guanxi. Guanxi is a standard in Chinese culture that puts personal
relationships and commitments above everything else — including the law. In the West,
it is often viewed as corruption, but in China it is seen as pragmatic and logical. Business
in China is done largely with guanxi in mind; the concept takes into account personal
relationships and personal debts not necessarily in the interest of larger organizations.
Organized crime in China depends largely on the principle of guanxi. Criminal

organizations stay fluid, informal and hard to catch because the base of the group is not a
hierarchy but a web of personal relations that define loyalty. Members of a group or
network then go out and pursue their own endeavors, but they retain the ties to their
group. When an opportunity to make money presents itself, the group can decide how to
take advantage of it.
This is not to say that guanxi is an illegal or corrupt practice, it is simply a different way
of defining relationships. It is used by organized criminals for illegal purposes — as the
favors that organized criminals ask based on guanxi are illegal, such as drug smuggling,
paying protection money or having an official ignore specific illegal activities. When the
principle of guanxi is combined with the convoluted, sometime contradictory, nature of
China’s legal code, the world of organized crime in China can become very fuzzy.
Geography
Although organized crime is present all across China, it is most concentrated in the
southeast provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangxi and
Fujian. There are several reasons for this distribution. China’s southeast is separated
physically and culturally from the capital of Beijing, it is nearer to the traditional
organized crime hubs of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. These provinces also lie along
the drug routes that bring heroin from Southeast and Central Asia.
The provinces mentioned above are not as closely controlled by Beijing as China’s
northern provinces. Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian province, is nearly 1,000 miles from
Beijing; Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, is 1,300 miles from Beijing.
Meanwhile, the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi, rooted in the Cantonese south, are
economically imperative to Beijing, being major industrial centers. Guangdong in
particular has enjoyed a special level of autonomy from Beijing. Although it does not
flaunt its economic importance as much as Shanghai, Guangdong has a tendency to do
things its own way. This kind of regional exceptionalism limits central oversight from
Beijing and allows criminal organizations more room for influence.
Fujian is also a center of Chinese industry. But Beijing keeps the province on a much
shorter leash because of its ties to Taiwan (both geographically and culturally). It would
be devastating for China if Fujian were to grow too close to the contested island of
Taiwan. As Mao consolidated power in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek (who enjoyed the support
of the Green Gang in Shanghai) fled to Taiwan along with many members of the
underworld. During the second half of the 20th century, Taiwan (along with Hong Kong
and Macau) became the hubs for exiled Chinese criminals. But as criminal activity crept
back into mainland China, it was Taiwan-, Hong Kong- and Macau-based criminals that
led the charge. Geographically, the provinces that were closest and most vulnerable were
those in the southeast.
Finally, the provinces mentioned above lie along the drug route that brings heroin from
Central Asia, Myanmar and Thailand to the coastal population centers and the ports from
which heroin is smuggled to the United States. Although drugs are sold throughout China,
the major supply chains run through these provinces, making organized criminal
activities there more profitable and more likely to cause violence.
Conclusion
Chinese organized crime has benefited from the economic growth that has propelled
China over the past 20 years. Any movement that is unable to grow, however, will
ultimately die out and be replaced with something else. That the central government has
prevented Chinese organized crime from growing and expanding nationally means its
effects there are limited. Further putting a damper on organized crime’s potential for
growth, China earns money through exports, not domestic consumption — meaning
Chinese organized criminal groups have modest potential to make serious money in
China. Instead, criminals will have to look abroad for new markets and wealth. We have
already seen significant Chinese influence in Italian, Mexican, South African, U.S. and
Japanese criminal activities, and this influence is only likely to grow.
Meanwhile, at home, Chinese organized criminals will continue to exert influence over
local governments to ensure that their operations are secure. As long as these
relationships stay at the local level and do not spread to become nationwide syndicates,
China’s central government will focus on more pressing security concerns, such as
domestic terrorism and the state of the economy.

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