Sidnell, Philip, Warhorse: Cavalry in Ancient Warfare (London: Continuum Books, 2006)

In Warhorse, Philip Sidnell argues that ancient armies used heavy cavalry and shock tactics to a
greater extent than previously thought, and he takes his readers on a trip through the classical world
and across numerous battles to prove his point. The result is an appealing narrative of ancient cavalry
warfare held together by an unconvincing thesis.
Sidnell begins with cavalry warfare emerging in competition to tactically vulnerable chariots.
He attributes the Scythians with the early development of cavalry warfare but the Assyrians soon took
over the mantle. Constricted by lack of evidence, however, Sidnell turns to the Greeks to ratchet up his
argument. The traditional view of Greek cavalry, Sidnell contends, was that they were only good for
scouting and reconnaissance. He claims that is false and that the Greeks utilized heavy cavalry using
shock tactics. Sidnells argument does not reach firm ground, though, until he introduces Alexander of
Macedon. Through a detailed examination of Alexanders major battles, Sidnell highlights the
undeniable shock component of the Macedonian cavalry and Alexanders brilliant deployment of
them. Alexanders successors, however, could not sustain Alexanders tactics for various reasons.
The Romans came, saw, and conquered Alexanders successors and just about everyone else
that crossed them. Most historians argue that the Romans had little need for cavalry but Sidnell
disagrees. He sees the Roman cavalry as a great asset that by the 3rd century BC could match anyone,
except Hannibal of Carthage. In the Empire, Sidnell asserts that Roman cavalry played a significant
role in Trajans and Hadrians campaigns. Hadrian is also credited for forming the first truly Roman
cataphracts. By the time the Western Empire fell, Rome had turned its reliance on infantry on its head
and emphasized its cavalry arm. The Byzantines would subsequently use cataphracts as their dominant
arm.
After all that, Sidnell wonders why mounted shock combat is attributed to the mediaeval world.
The answer, he argues, lies in modern historians slavishly adopting the theory of the stirrup being
necessary for an effective heavy cavalry charge. It was useful for climbing onto horses, he declares, but
there was no necessary connection between the stirrup and the tactics first seen under the Normans 400
years later. Sidnell concludes with a consideration of Hastings that echoed a form of warfare already
1500 years old.
Sidnells narrative is engaging and readable, and his battle reconstructions are easy to follow.
He also clearly knows horses and horsemanship. His decision to not involve himself in the modern
historical debate, however, particularly the recent lively discussion on Greek cavalry, does not help his
thesis. Robert Gaebel, for example, has already questioned the stirrup thesis without arguing for a
complete overhaul of ancient warfare, and Sidnell does not attempt to come to grips with Gaebels
argument that asymmetry is the key to understanding Alexander and Hannibals extraordinary use of
cavalry. By all means, then, read and enjoy Warhorse but be aware that Sidnells argument is a
contentious one.