Beruflich Dokumente
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CounterIntelligence
Sergio E. Sanchez
To cite this article: Sergio E. Sanchez (2015) Spider Web: Al-Qaeda's Link to the Intelligence
Agencies of the Major Powers, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,
28:3, 429-448, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2015.992753
SERGIO E. SANCHEZ
429
430 SERGIO E. SANCHEZ
have been required, along with the direct involvement of a large number
of operatives.6
Yet the organization has survived the assassination of its leader, Osama bin
Laden in 2011 and the killing of many of his lieutenants, and continues to
pose a threat to U.S. national security.7
A better understanding of the genesis of al-Qaedas intelligence and
counterintelligence capabilities will assist analysts and pundits to more
accurately assess al-Qaedas skills by helping overcome any nave attitudes
stemming from the organizations provincial origins, or any biases of
Orientalism, the subtle and persistent prejudice against the Orient in
general, but specifically the Middle East, as described by the late Columbia
University professor Edward W. Said.8
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This analysis highlights three clear instances where intelligence TTPs were
indirectly disseminated to al-Qaeda by the major powers. Unfortunately, the
shortage of quantitative information, as well as the limited qualitative data
from primary sources, due in large part to the sensitive nature of the topic,
makes an all-inclusive case study extremely difficult to compile.
new Iranian government was able to maintain a continuity of CIA and MI-6
TTPs originally entrusted to the Shahs security service.
The post-revolutionary Iranian intelligence establishment incorporating
SAVAMA and other security organs was reorganized, and made to rest on
twin pillars: the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran,
the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, and the Revolutionary
Guard.25
with explosives, intelligence, and security training through what Matthew Levitt
and Michael Jacobson have referred to as Shiite entities, which presumably
meant Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.36
Troubling still, however, is the fact that circa 1995 Russias Foreign
Intelligence Service (SVR), the successor to the KGB, provided the latest
methods of intelligence training to the Iranian MOIS, 37 training that
would be of immense value to Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.
Lastly, according to Eben Kaplan, U.S. and European intelligence reports
dated circa 11 September 2001 (9=11), noted that Hezbollah and al-Qaeda
were collaborating in money laundering, gun running, and various types of
training.38 While the current status of the relationship between al-Qaeda
and Hezbollah is unknown, given sectarian violence between Shia and
Sunni in Iraq and Syrianotice should be taken that a relationship existed
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they were in turn succeeded by their native clones, men who saw the army as
a unique institution, separate and apart from the rest of civil society and
authority.42 Thus, any intelligence training that British officers possessed
at the time of their transfer to the Pakistani military was more than likely
disseminated to their subordinates and successors. In other words,
Pakistans ISI has been infused with British Intelligence TTPs since its
inception.
In time, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and ISI developed a
working relationship, which began during the Nixon Administration, and
focused on the Khalistan movement in the Punjab 43 a campaign to
establish a separate and independent Sikh state of Khalistan in the Indian
state of Punjab.44 Perhaps the best-known relationship between the ISI and
the IC involved the CIA and the Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s.
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Later, in May 1996, bin Laden arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, along with
various Arabs who had left the country after the Soviets had withdrawn.52
And while Musharraf asserted in his 2006 memoir, In the Line of Fire, that
al-Qaeda and other radicals including Uzbeks, Bangladeshis, Chechens,
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Chinese Uygurs, and Muslims from south India, Europe, America, and even
Australia started to arrive in Afghanistan to help the Taliban cause,53
Mark J. Roberts has suggested that Pakistans motives for supporting bin
Laden were to solidify the Talibans control over the country, and then
establish training camps for Kashmiri militants.54 In fact, the ISI allegedly
asked Saudi Arabian Intelligence for prior permission to sponsor bin Laden
since the ISI received Saudi funds to operate madrassas in Pakistan, and did
not want to sour its relationship with the Kingdom.55 And while Musharraf
suggests that bin Laden was in Afghanistan merely to assist the Taliban,
Robertss assertion that the relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan
was more complex seems accurate. For example, the ISI requested
permission from the Saudi Kingdom to sponsor bin Laden, an important
point because by this time the Saudi government disapproved of Osama and
may have attempted to assassinate him.56 But bin Laden had the ability to
establish training camps and attract large numbers of radical followers who
could assist the ISI in waging a covert war against India in Kashmir, which
was exactly what the ISI wanted, and therefore justified its requesting
permission from the Saudis who might have been offended if not
consulted.57 In fact, according to Roberts:
Furthermore, Roberts notes that ISI personnel did not limit themselves to
funding al-Qaeda training camps, but also actively participated in training
leader of Egypt, Sadat began distancing his country from the Soviet Union
and aligning more with the West, which included mending ties with the
CIA, should therefore come as no surprise.84
While the mukhabarat was rekindling ties with American intelligence, the
Egyptian Brotherhood began to fragment, with some more radical members
splintering from the main organization into smaller cells.85 One group was
Munazzamat Al Jihad, also known variously as Tanzim al Jihad, Egyptian
Islamic Jihad (EIJ), or simply Jihad, an offshoot of al Tahrir al Islami
itself an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhoodwhich in 1981 was
responsible for Sadats assassination.86 Notably, Sadats assassin was an
Egyptian military officer,87 highlighting how the military, and presumably
other organs of state, were penetrated by radical elements. Indeed, a
leading member of EIJ was Abud al-Zumur, a retired lieutenant colonel
from the Egyptian Military Intelligence Department (MID),88 who by virtue of
his position was trained on the intelligence TTPs by both the CIA and the
KGB, and thus strategically positioned to share his knowledge with his
compatriots.
Another key personality in EIJ was Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri,89 who later
traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet invaders, and while
there met the Saudi Osama bin Laden. 90 The two formed a personal
relationship in the mid-1980s, with Zawahiri serving as bin Ladens
personal physician, and later a professional activist relationship which
lasted throughout the 1990s, subsequently merging al-Qaeda and EIJ in
2001 under the banner of al-Qaeda.91
Bin Ladens nascent organization benefited from al-Jihads expertise in the
1980s and 1990s. For example, an Egyptian special forces colonel, Saif al-
Adel, arguably possessed knowledge of intelligence and counterintelligence
TTPs, based on both his military rank and the nature of his function as
a special forces officer, assisted bin Ladens group in their fight against the
Soviets and later in their jihad against the U.S.92 In 2001, Saif al-Adel was
Lastly, U.S. intelligence is, as of this writing, training and equipping the
security services of Libya, 1 0 8 and training rebels in Syria. 1 0 9 The
disconcerting aspect about U.S. efforts is that the loyalties of those
involved cannot be guaranteed, and while the security interests of the U.S.
and those it trains may currently align, that alignment cannot be
guaranteed for the foreseeable future given the fluidity of events on the
ground in both Libya and Syria.
In sum, the U.S. and its allies perhaps unwisely continue to disseminate
intelligence TTPs to friendly, yet questionable, allies whose motivations to
work with the U.S. are dynamic and unstable. Americas allies today have
the potential to be its enemies tomorrow, or at minimum, passive-aggressive
states that sponsor, or facilitate, terrorism against the West. The U.S.
trained the security services of the PA, part of which are now under the
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Defense and State is less than that.110 This means that almost any important
decision made by one administration will have to be addressed by its
successor, a situation that highlights the need for long-term studies that
outline the pros and cons of sharing intelligence operations knowhow.
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1
Justin R. Harber, Unconventional Spies: The Counterintelligence Threat From
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2
Ibid., p. 223.
3
Robert Tracinski, Al-Qaedas Intelligence Service, RealClearPolitics.com, 2
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17
Ibid., pp. 162164.
18
Ibid., p. 161.
19
Ibid., pp. 175178.
20
Michael Getler, Khomeini Is Reported to Have a SAVAK of His Own;
Khomeini Reported to Have Own SAVAK-Style Agency, The Washington
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21
Reuters, Around the World; Iranian Says Secret Agency Isnt Like Savak
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22
Michael Getler, Khomeini Is Reported to Have a SAVAK of His Own.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations.
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26
Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
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27
Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization; Sean Anderson and Stephen
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28
Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization, p. 157.
29
Carl Anthony Wege, Iranian Intelligence Organizations.
30
Ibid.
31
Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbollah Organization.
32
Eben Kaplan, The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship, Council on Foreign
Relations, 14 August 2006, available at http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-
networks/al-qaeda-hezbollah-relationship/p11275.
33
Ibid.
34
Dina Temple-Raston, The Closer, in The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna
Six and Rough Justice in an Age of Terror (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), pp.
8194; Eben Kaplan, The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship; Ton Hays and
Sharon Theimer, Egyptian Agent Worked with Green Berets, Bin Laden,
Associated Press, 31 December 2001.
35
Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, The Iran-Al-Qaeda Conundrum,
Washingtoninstitute.org, 23 January 2009, available at http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-iran-al-qaeda-conundrum.
36
Ibid.
37
Bill Gertz, Russian Agents Teach Iranians How to Spy, The Washington
Times, 11 September 1995, available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/
409352119?accountid=10346.
38
Eben Kaplan, The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship.
39
U. S. Department of Defense, The Governments Guide to Assessing Prisoners,
The New York Times, 24 April 2011, p. 2, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2011/04/24/world/guantanamo-guide-to-assessing-prisoners.
html.
40
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem, The Journal of
International Security Affairs, January 2009, pp. 112, available at http://
www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/gartenstein-ross.php.
41
B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers,
2002); Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.
42
Ibid.
43
B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, p. 46.
44
Virginia Van Dyke, The Khalistan Movement in Punjab, India, and the
Post-Militancy Era: Structural Change and New Political Compulsions,
Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 6, November 2009, pp. 975997.
45
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.
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46
B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, p. 46.
47
Ibid.
48
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?, Joint Force Quarterly, 16 March 2010, pp. 18, available at
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA517856; Pervez Musharraf, In the
Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 208.
49
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?
50
Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 208.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid., p. 212.
53
Ibid.
54
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?
55
Ibid., p. 106.
56
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11
(New York: Knopf, 2006), pp. 161162.
57
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?; Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.
58
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State? p. 107.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11,
p. 303.
62
Mark J. Roberts, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State
Within a State?
63
Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 201.
64
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Fixing Our Pakistan Problem.
65
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009 (London: Routledge, 2010); Owen L. Sirrs,
Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and Prospects, Intelligence and
National Security, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2013, pp. 230251.
66
Benjamin B. Fischer, Okhrana: The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial
Police, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 19 March 2007,
available at http://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/
csi-publications/books-and-monographs/okhrana-the-paris-operations-of-the-
russian-imperial-police/5474-1.html.
67
Owen L. Sirrs, Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and Prospects.
68
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009.
69
Ibid., p. 16; Owen L. Sirrs, Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and
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Prospects.
70
Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: the CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the
Middle East, Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 5, November 2004, pp. 663701;
Owen L Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009.
71
Ibid., p. 29.
72
Ibid., p. 34.
73
Ibid., p. 24.
74
Ibid., p. 36.
75
Ibid.; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11.
76
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009, pp. 4243.
77
Ibid., p. 44.
78
Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in
the Middle East, p. 678.
79
Ibid., p. 680.
80
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009, 51.
81
Ibid., p. 65.
82
Ibid., Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert
Action in the Middle East.
83
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009, p. 117.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid., p. 142.
86
Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism,
pp. 456457.
87
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009; Douglas Little, Mission Impossible: The CIA and
the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East; Lawrence Wright, The Looming
Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11.
88
Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the
Mukhabarat, 19102009, p. 143.
89
Ibid., Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid., Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism.
92
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11, p. 129.
93
U. S. Department of Justice, United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden Et Al.
(New York, 18 October 2001).
94
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9=11, pp.
181182.
95
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