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SECOND DIVISION

CRISTINA BARSOLO, GR. No. 187950

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
MENDOZA,
-versus- LEONEN, and
JARDELEZA, JJ.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,

Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------

DECISION

LEONEN,J.:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by Cristina

Barsolo, assailing the Decision2 dated November 19, 2008 and the
Resolution3 dated May 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
102469.

Cristina Barsolo's (Cristina) deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo

(Manuel), "was employed as a seaman by various companies from 1988 to

Rollo, pp. 11-27.

Id. at 98-108. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by
!
Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of the Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals, Manila.
Id. at 120-121. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of the Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals, Manila.
 Decision 2 G.R. No. 187950

2002." 4 From July 2, 2002 to December 6, 2002, Manuel served as a Riding

Gang/Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star with Vela International Marine
Ltd., (Vela). 5 Vela was his last employer before he died in 2006. 6

After his separation from employment with Vela, Manuel was

diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease,
and osteoarthritis. 7 He was examined and treated at the Philippine Heart
Center as an outpatient from April 2, 2003 to October 22, 2004. 8 When he
died on September 24, 2006, the autopsy report listed myocardial infarction
as his cause of death. 9

Believing that the cause of Manuel's death was work-related, Cristina

filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, with the Social Security System. 10 The Social Security System,
on June 27, 2007, denied her claim on the ground that there was no longer an
employer-employee relationship at the time of Manuel's death and that
"[h]is being a smoker increased his risk of contracting the illness." 11

Cristina appealed her case to the Employees' Compensation

Commission (Commission), which, in a Decision 12 dated December 17,
2007, denied the appeal for lack of merit. 13 According to the Commission:

Since Myocardial Infarction (Cardiovascular Disease) is listed as

an occupational disease under P.D. 626 as amended, [Cristina] is bound to
comply with all the conditions required [under Annex A of the Amended
Rules on Employee's Compensation] to warrant the grant of benefits

If the heart disease was known to have been present during

employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation
was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the
nature of his/her work.
The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of
sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the
clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal
relationship;
If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being
subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of
cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such
symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal /J
relationship. 14 ;(

4
Id. at 12.
Id. at 99.
6
Id. at 12.
7
Id. at 99-100.
Id.
9
Id. at 100.
IO Id.
11
Id. at 62.
12
Id. at 63-74.
13
Id. at 65.
14
Id. at 66.
 Decision 3 G.R. No. 187950

The Commission held that Cristina was unable to establish that her
15
husband's case fell under any of the above circumstances.

Moreover, since Manuel was a smoker, the Commission believed that

Manuel's "smoking habits precipitated the manifestation of his Myocardial
Infarction." 16 The Commission added that "the System correctly ruled that
the development of the Myocardial Infarction could not be categorically
attributed to the occupation of [Manuel] as Seaman because of the presence
of major causative factor which is not work-related." 17

Aggrieved, Cristina filed a Petition for Review 18 before the Court of

Appeals, which was denied for lack of merit on November 19, 2008. 19

The Court of Appeals ruled that while there was no doubt that

myocardial infarction was a compensable disease, 2 Cristina failed to prove a
causal relationship between Manuel's work and the illness that brought
about his death. 21 The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission that
Manuel's habit of smoking, which dates as far back as 1973, may have
contributed to the development of his heart ailment. 22

Cristina moved for reconsideration23 of the said Decision but her

Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution24 dated May 19,
2009. 25

Hence, this Petition was filed.

Petitioner Cristina argues that the Court of Appeals erred in finding

that "the illness which caused the death of [her] husband[,] had no relation
with his occupation." 26 She insists that Manuel's case falls under the third
condition27 under Annex ''A'1 of the Amended Rules on Employee
Compensation.

Petitioner contends that although Manuel did not exhibit symptoms

while he was employed with Vela, it was not unreasonable to assume that he

15
16
Id.
Id.
/
17
Id. at 66.
18
Id. at 29-45.
19
Id. at 98-108.
20
Id. at 102.
21
Id.atl03.
22
Id. at 105.
23
Id. at 109-115.
24
Id. at 109.
25
Id. at 120-121.
26
Id. at 15.
27
Id. at 17.
 Decision 4 G.R. No. 187950

was already suffering from the illness, which prompted him to visit the
Philippine Heart Center, four (4) months after his employment contract
ended. 28

29
Petitioner also presented a Medical Certificate dated October 22,
2004, wherein it was stated that when Manuel was initially seen during his
pre-employment examination, he claimed to have Hypertension even prior to
the examination, and was already on the maintenance drug Capoten. 30

Petitioner further avers that even if her husband had a history of

smoking, it cannot be denied that the cause of his death is a compensable
31
disease and that his work as a seaman aggravated his ailment.

The issue in this case boils down to the entitlement of Cristina to

compensation for the death of her husband Manuel.

The Petition has no merit.

The Amended Rules on Employee Compensation provide the

guidelines before a beneficiary can claim from the state insurance fund.
Rule III, Section l(b) states:

For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be

compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease
listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions.

The pertinent portions of Annex A of the Amended Rules on

Employee Compensation read:

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to

be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

(1) The employee's work must involve the risks described herein;

(2) The disease was contracted as a result of the employee's

exposure to the described risks;

(3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and

under such other factors necessary to contract it;

(4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.

"
29
Rollo, p. 17. J
Id. at 56. This Medical Certificate was not considered by the Court of Appeals as it was not attached
in the petition therein (roll a, p. I 04).
30
Id. at 56.
31
Id. at 22.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 187950

The following diseases are considered as occupational when

contracted under working conditions involving the risks described
herein:

18. CARDIO-VASCULAR DISEASES. ** Any of the following

conditions -
a. If the heart disease was known to have been present during
employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was
clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature
of his/her work.
b. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of
sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the
clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship.
c. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being
subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac
injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and
signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
(Emphasis supplied)

It is worthy to note that this Court has already ruled on the

compensability of Myocardial Infarction as an occupational disease.
Rafiises v. Employees Compensation Commission, 32 is instructive:

Section l(h), Rule III of the ECC Amended Rules on Employees

Compensation, now considers cardio-vascular disease as compensable
occupational disease. Included in Annex "A" is cardio-vascular
disease, which cover myocardial infarction. However, it may be
considered as compensable occupational disease only when substantial
evidence is adduced to prove any of the following conditions:

a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during

employment there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly
precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;

b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of

sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty-four (24) hours by
the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship.

c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting

himself to strain of work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury
during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs
persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. 33 (Emphasis
supplied.)

I'
32
Raflises v. Employees Compensation Commission, 504 Phil. 340 (2005) [Per J. Sandoval- Gutierrez,
Third Division].
33
Id. at 343.
 Decision 6 G.R. No. 187950

In Ranises, we held that for myocardial infarction to be considered a

compensable occupational disease, any of the three conditions must be
proven by substantial evidence. 34 Petitioner failed in this regard.

On petitioner's insistence that Manuel's case falls under the third

condition, this Court disagrees. For a claim under this condition to prosper,
there must be proof that: first, the person was asymptomatic before
beginning employment and second, he had displayed symptoms during the
performance of his duties. Such symptoms should have persisted long
enough to establish that his work caused his heart problem. However,
petitioner offered no proof that her husband suffered any of the symptoms
during his employment. All she managed to prove was that her husband
went to the Philippine Heart Center and was treated for Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease from April 2, 2003 to January 9, 2004, 35 four
months after his contract with Vela ended on December 6, 2002. 36

The Medical Certificate37 did not help petitioner's cause, as this only
shows that Manuel was already suffering from hypertension even before his
pre-employment examination, and that he did not contract it during his
employment with Vela. Having had a pre-existing cardio vascular disease
classifies him under the first condition. However, for a claim under the first
category to prosper, petitioner must show that there was an acute
exacerbation of the heart disease caused by the unusual strain of work.
Petitioner failed to adduce any proof that her husband experienced any
symptom of a heart ailment while employed with Vela, much less any sign
that his heart condition was aggravated by his job.

Since there was no showing that her husband showed any sign or
symptom of cardiac injury during the performance of his functions,
petitioner clearly failed to show that her husband's employment caused the
disease or that his working conditions aggravated his existing heart ailment.

Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Manuel died

on September 24, 2006, four years after he disembarked from MV Polaris
Star. 38 Other factors have already played a role in aggravating his illness.
Due to the considerable lapse of time, more convincing evidence must be
presented in order to attribute the cause of death to Manuel's work. In the
absence of such evidence and under the circumstances of this case, this
Court cannot assume that the illness that caused Manuel's death was
acquired during his employment with Vela.

34
I
Id. at 343-344.
35
Rollo, p. 54.
36
Id. at 99.
37
Id. at 56.
38
Id. at I 00.
 Decision 7 G.R. No. 187950

To emphasize, it is not refuted that myocardial infarction is a

compensable occupational illness. However, it becomes compensable only
when it falls under any of the three conditions, which should be proven by
substantial evidence.

Furthermore, Manuel was a smoker. The presence of a different

major causative factor, which could explain his illness and eventual death,
defeats petitioner's claim.

In any case, the Court in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v.

National Labor Relations Commission, 39 held that findings of facts of quasi-
judicial agencies are accorded great respect and, at times, even finality if
supported by substantial evidence. 40 These findings are especially
persuasive when, such as in this case, all three lower tribunals concur in their
findings. We find no reason to overturn their findings.

Petitioner's claim for death benefits was correctly denied by the Court
of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated November 19, 2008 and Resolution dated May 19, 2009 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 102469 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

~k Associate Justice
Chairperson

39
Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 359 Phil. 955 (1998)
[Per J. Romero, Third Division].
40
Id. at 964.
 .
Decision 8 G.R. No. 187950

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

OZJ~
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice