REPUBLIC vs.

LIM
GR no. 161656, June 29, 2005

FACTS: In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the
purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of
Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on
May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just
compensation. The Denzons appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was
made on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two
lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed
willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-in-interest,
Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic
and AFP officers in possession of the property.

On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the
annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939
upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".

On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the
owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10,
adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to
execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.

They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered
owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they
are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security
for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was
issued in his name.

On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On
2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all
the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision
dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ...This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the
concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just"...

Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot
932.

ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May
14, 1940.

HELD: One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property
without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. 7 Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution
mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the
foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots
932 and 939.
 The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play. In
jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has
been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab
initio.

As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondents predecessors-in-
interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private
property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take
them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from the taking of private property by the
government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.

There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator
only upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it
has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of
just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator.

SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise.
The second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic v.
Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus,
here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
expropriation process incomplete.

Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of
the expropriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner
to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation
within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property
from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,
we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but
also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just."

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL

 vs.

THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA

G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines which pursuant to the Local Govt Code,
constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, Metro Manila chapter, and
metropolitan political subdivision chapters. On March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-
laws. Pursuant to its Constitution, it also adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Thereafter, it came out with its
calendar of activities and guidelines for the implementation of its election code. The synchronized elections for highly-
urbanized city chapters was also set on Oct. 21, 2002.

On June 28, 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance providing among other things, for the election
of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days
after the barangay elections.

Upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to Mayor Atienza for his approval, the Liga sent him a letter
requesting that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon or even assumed the functions of the Liga
through legislation. However, Atienza stillapproved and signed the ordinance, and issued an executive order for its
implementation.

This prompted the Liga to file a petition for certiorari with the SC. Respondents defend the validity of the assailed
ordinance and executive order and prays for the dismissal of the petition on the ff grounds: 1) certiorari under Rule 65 is
unavailing; 2) two actions were pending before the RTC Manila questioning the ordinance and executive order; 3)
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; 4) act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli; and 5) the city council does not fall
within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

ISSUE:

WON the City Council of Manila and Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when they enacted and approved the
ordinance purposely to govern the elections of the Manila Chapter of the Liga, and which provides a different manner of
electing its officers, despite the fact that the law mandates such elections to be governed by the Liga Constitution and By-
laws

HELD:
The SC ruled that the action, in its essence, seeks to declare the unconstitutionality/illegality of the ordinance. Thus it
partakes of an action for declaratory relief of which the SC has only appellate and not original jurisdiction.

Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken, as according to parties seeking any of
the writs, an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which the application therefore will be directed. There
is after all a hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for issuance of extraordinary writs against the first level (inferior) courts should be
filed with RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the SCs original jurisdiction to issue the
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and
attention, which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prvent further overcrowding of
the Courts docket.

Forum Shopping; Exists if elements of Litits Pendentia are present. Forum shopping exists where the elements of
litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia
to exist, the following requisites must be present: 1) identity of the parties, or at least such parties as are representing the
same interest in both actions; 2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; 3) identity with respect to the @ preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

Requisites for filing of a Writ of Certiorari. For the Writ of Certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: 1) it
must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and 3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Agan v PIATCO G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003

7/6/2010

0 Comments

Facts: In August 1989, the DOTC engaged the services of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic
development up to the year 2010.

On March 27, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed the proposal of Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp.
(unsolicited proposal dated Oct. 5, 1994) to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). A revised
proposal, however, was forwarded by the DOTC to NEDA on December 13, 1995. On January 5, 1996, the NEDA
Investment Coordinating Council (NEDA ICC) Technical Board favorably endorsed the project to the ICC Cabinet
Committee which approved the same, subject to certain conditions, on January 19, 1996. On February 13, 1996, the
NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III Project.

On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was held where certain clarifications were made. Upon the
request of prospective bidder People's Air Cargo & Warehousing Co., Inc (Paircargo), the PBAC warranted that based on
Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law, only the proposed Annual Guaranteed
Payment submitted by the challengers would be revealed to AEDC, and that the challengers' technical and financial
proposals would remain confidential. The PBAC also clarified that the list of revenue sources contained in Annex 4.2a of
the Bid Documents was merely indicative and that other revenue sources may be included by the proponent, subject to
approval by DOTC/MIAA. Furthermore, the PBAC clarified that only those fees and charges denominated as Public Utility
Fees would be subject to regulation, and those charges which would be actually deemed Public Utility Fees could still be
revised, depending on the outcome of PBAC's query on the matter with the Department of Justice.

On September 26, 1996, AEDC informed the PBAC in writing of its reservations as regards the Paircargo Consortium,
which include:
a. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAIRCARGO;
b. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAGS;
c. The prohibition imposed by RA 337, as amended (the General Banking Act) on the amount that Security Bank
could legally invest in the project;
d. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor of the PAIRCARGO Joint Venture, for prequalification purposes; and
e. The appointment of Lufthansa as the facility operator, in view of the Philippine requirement in the operation of a
public utility.

The PBAC gave its reply on October 2, 1996, informing AEDC that it had considered the issues raised by the latter,
and that based on the documents submitted by Paircargo and the established prequalification criteria, the PBAC had
found that the challenger, Paircargo, had prequalified to undertake the project. The Secretary of the DOTC approved the
finding of the PBAC.

On October 16, 1996, the PBAC opened the third envelope submitted by AEDC and the Paircargo Consortium
containing their respective financial proposals. Both proponents offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at
least $350 million at no cost to the government and to pay the government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first five
years of operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues
for the last ten years of operation, in accordance with the Bid Documents.

As AEDC failed to match the proposal within the 30-day period, then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo, on
December 11, 1996, issued a notice to Paircargo Consortium regarding AEDC's failure to match the proposal. AEDC
subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the
prequalification of PIATCO.

On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO, through its President,
Henry T. Go, signed the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III" (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other
charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement
provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may be
renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession
period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.

During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, on November 29, 2002, in her
speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export Awards at Malacaang Palace, stated that she will not "honor (PIATCO)
contracts which the Executive Branch's legal offices have concluded (as) null and void."

Issue: Whether the petitioners and the petitioners-in-intervention have standing;

Whether this Court has jurisdiction; and
Whether the BOT and contracts therein are unconstitutional.

Held: YES.
Ratio: Messrs. Lopez et al. are employees of the MIAA. These petitioners (Messrs. Agan et al. and Messrs. Lopez et al.)
are confronted with the prospect of being laid off from their jobs and losing their means of livelihood when their employer-
companies are forced to shut down or otherwise retrench and cut back on manpower. Such development would result
from the imminent implementation of certain provisions in the contracts that tend toward the creation of a monopoly in
favor of Piatco, its subsidiaries and related companies.

Petitioners-in-intervention are service providers in the business of furnishing airport-related services to international
airlines and passengers in the NAIA and are therefore competitors of Piatco as far as that line of business is concerned.
On account of provisions in the Piatco contracts, petitioners-in-intervention have to enter into a written contract with
Piatco so as not to be shut out of NAIA Terminal III and barred from doing business there. Since there is no provision to
ensure or safeguard free and fair competition, they are literally at its mercy. They claim injury on account of their
deprivation of property (business) and of the liberty to contract, without due process of law.

By way of background, two monopolies were actually created by the Piatco contracts. The first and more obvious one
refers to the business of operating an international passenger terminal in Luzon, the business end of which involves
providing international airlines with parking space for their aircraft, and airline passengers with the use of departure and
arrival areas, check-in counters, information systems, conveyor systems, security equipment and paraphernalia,
immigrations and customs processing areas; and amenities such as comfort rooms, restaurants and shops.

In furtherance of the first monopoly, the Piatco Contracts stipulate that the NAIA Terminal III will be the only facility to
be operated as an international passenger terminal; that NAIA Terminals I and II will no longer be operated as such; and
that no one (including the government) will be allowed to compete with Piatco in the operation of an international
passenger terminal in the NAIA Complex. Given that, at this time, the government and Piatco are the only ones engaged
in the business of operating an international passenger terminal, I am not acutely concerned with this particular
monopolistic situation.

There was however another monopoly within the NAIA created by the subject contracts for Piatco in the business of
providing international airlines with the following: groundhandling, in-flight catering, cargo handling, and aircraft repair and
maintenance services. These are lines of business activity in which are engaged many service providers (including the
petitioners-in-intervention), who will be adversely affected upon full implementation of the Piatco Contracts, particularly
Sections 3.01(d) and (e) of both the ARCA and the CA.

Should government pay at all for reasonable expenses incurred in the construction of the Terminal? Indeed it should,
otherwise it will be unjustly enriching itself at the expense of Piatco and, in particular, its funders, contractors and
investors both local and foreign. After all, there is no question that the State needs and will make use of Terminal III, it
being part and parcel of the critical infrastructure and transportation-related programs of government.

The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The
said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary
jurisdiction. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court, procedural bars may be lowered to give
way for the speedy disposition of the instant cases.

In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium,
predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void.

Manchester Development Corp. VS Court of Appeals

149 SCRA 562 Remedial Law Civil Procedure Payment of Docket Fees Claimed Damages must be Stated in the
BODY and PRAYER of pleadings
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City Land Development
Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land
forfeited the formers tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to
P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of
same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of
Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court
ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester
complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not
stated in the PRAYER.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.

HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee
was not paid for the original complaint, its as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original
complaint duly filed which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended
complaint is void.

Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited. The Supreme Court
ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages and for specific
performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.

Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission
in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of
similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading
that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.

SUN INSURANCE VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation of fire insurance
policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorneys fees, litigation
costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it
can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The complaint
underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as
well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.

Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct or
sufficient docket fees?
YES.

It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for
permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee due not only
in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal
interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.

PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION et al. v. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS

460 SCRA 260 (2005), THIRD DIVISION

Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed credit facilities of respondent Banque Nationale De Paris (BNP). In
order to assure payment, co-petitioners Automotive Corporation, Asea One Corporation and Autocorp Group executed a
corporate guarantee.

Proton failed to comply with his obligation to BNP. Thereafter, BNP demanded the payment of Protons obligation to its co-
petitioners pursuant to corporate guarantee. But the same remained unheeded. BNP then filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Proton et al. The clerk of court assessed the docket fee. Proton et al. filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case because BNP did not properly pay the
docket fees. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the motion of Proton et al.
Hence this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court does not acquire jurisdiction when there is an improper payment of docket fees

HELD:

The Court rules that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. It also stated that
where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It
shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.

In the case at bar, BNP merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect.
Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the
prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)

(Question on Court of First Instance's* Jurisdiction)
Digested Case

FACTS:
Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant.
Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied,
appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI
Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA
set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE:
WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.

HELD:
YES, SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the
Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or
barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel
by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of
execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried
on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a
question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial
proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an
opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of
the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the
same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called,
and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he
allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was
deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.