G.R. No.
78590 June 20, 1988 On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC BRANCH 58,
MAKATI, METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOSE B. FLORA and
HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN, respondents..
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
May a probate court act on and/or grant motions for the appointment of
a special administrator, for the issuance of a writ of possession of
alleged properties of the deceased person, and for assistance to
preserve the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate even before the court has caused notice to be served upon all
interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court?
On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings .No. M-1436.
The petition alleges that: (1) on March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in
Makati, Metro Manila; (2) at the time of his death, the decedent was a
resident of Makati, Metro Manila; (3) decedent left personal and real
properties as part of his estate, listed in Annexes "A," "B," "C" and "D;" (4) the
properties were acquired after the marriage of the petitioner to the decedent
and therefore are included in their conjugal partnership; (5) the estate of -the
decedent has a probable net value which may be provisionally assessed at
P4,000,000.00 more or less; (6) the possible creditors of the estate, who
have accounts payable. and existing claims against the firm C. SANTOS
Construction are listed in Annex "E;" (7) the compulsory heirs of the decedent
are the as the surviving spouse and their two (2) minor children namely:
Charmane Rose de Guzman 11 years and Peter Brian de Guzman, 9 years
old; (8) after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the decedent
left a last will and testament, none has been found and according to the best
knowledge information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died
intestate; and (9) the petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of the
decedent, is most qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of
administration.
over five (5) vehicles registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman,
alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at
present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein
petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir,
the private respondent must have the possession of said vehicles in order to
preserve the assets of her late husband. On the same day, the lower court
issued an order setting for hearing the motion on May 27, 1987 directing the
deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the expense of the
private respondent.
The scheduled May 27, 1987 hearing was postponed on motion of
petitioner's counsel, Atty. Ricardo Fojas. The petitioner was also given three
(3) days from May 27, 1987 to give his comment on the motion for a writ of
possession. The hearing was reset to June 5, 1987 at 3:00 p.m.
On May 29, 1987, the petitioner's counsel filed a notice of appearance and
an "Urgent Motion For Extension of Time to File an Opposition and for
Resetting of the Hearing."
The motion was granted and the petitioner was given five (5) days from
receipt of the order within which to file his opposition to the motion for a writ
of possession. The hearing was reset to June 15, 1987 at 2:00 in the
afternoon.
In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte
Motion to Appoint Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of
Manolito de Guzman."
In an order dated May 28,1987, the aforesaid motion was set for hearing on
June 5, 1987. In this same order, the lower court directed that all parties in
the case be notified. However, no notice of the order was given to the
petitioner.
LOWER COURT
In an order dated June 5, 1987, the lower court granted the private
respondent's motion to be appointed as special administratrix, to wit:
Finding the motion for appointment of special administratrix,
on the ground alleged therein to be well-founded, and finding
 further that it is to be the best interest of the Estate of
Manolito de Guzman that petitioner-movant Elaine G. de
Guzman, be appointed as Special Administratrix in this case,
said motion is granted.
WHEREFORE, Elaine G. de Guzman, petitioner-movant, is
hereby appointed as Special Administratrix of the Estate of
the deceased Manolito de Guzman, pending appointment of
a regular administrator. The bond for the said special
administratrix is hereby fixed in the amount of P200,000.00.
(Rollo, p. 40)
On June 8, 1987, the lower court issued another order, to wit:
Acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Assistance" filed by
Petitioner-Special Administratrix Elaine de Guzman for
appointment of Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B.
Flora together with some military men and/or policemen to
assist her in preserving the estate of Manolito de Guzman,
the motion is granted and the Deputy Sheriffs Honorio
Santos and Jose B. Flora are hereby appointed for that
purpose, provided that the subject matter of the motion for
writ of possession pending before this Court shall not be
affected. (Rollo, p. 41)
Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the above order. The
petitioner resisted when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos
tried to take the subject vehicles on the ground that they were his personal
properties. According to the petitioner, this resulted in a "near shoot-out
between members of the Makati Police, who were to maintain peace and
order, and the CAPCOM soldiers who were ostensibly aiding respondent
sheriffs and Elaine G. de Guzman" and that "the timely arrival of Mayor
Jejomar Binay of Makati defused the very volatile situation which resulted in
an agreement between the parties that the bulldozer, sought to be taken, be
temporarily placed in the custody of Mayor Binay, while the parties seek
clarification of the order from respondent Judge Zosimo Angeles the next
day, June 9, 1981 at 10:30 a.m."
In the conference held before the respondent court attended by the counsels
for both parties, the June 8, 1987 order was clarified to the effect that the
order "must be merely to take and preserve assets admittedly belonging to
the estate, but not properties, the ownership of which is claimed by third
persons."
The petitioner then filed a manifestation listing properties which he claimed to
be his own.
PETITIONER FILED A PETITION TO NULLIFY THE COURTS ORDER
Thereafter, the instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's orders
dated June 5, 1987 and June 8, 1987.
In a resolution dated June 10, 1987, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondent court from enforcing the two questioned orders. In
another resolution dated October 28, 1987, we gave due course to the
petition.
CONTENTION OF PETITIONER
The petitioner contends that the June 5, 1987 order is a patent nullity, the
respondent court not having acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special
administratrix because the petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito
de Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive
weeks, as mandated by the Rules of Court. The petitioner also stresses that
the appointment of a special administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion
for having been made without giving petitioner and other parties an
opportunity to oppose said appointment.
Anent the June 8, 1987 order, the petitioner alleges that the immediate grant
of the motion praying for the court's assistance in the preservation of the
estate of the deceased, "without notice to the petitioner Pedro de Guzman,
and its immediate implementation on the very same day by respondent
Elaine G. de Guzman with the assistance of respondents deputy sheriffs, at
no other place but at the home of the petitioner Pedro de Guzman, are
eloquent proofs that all the antecedent events were intended solely to
deprive petitioner de Guzman of his property without due process of law." He
also prays that the respondent Judge be disqualified from further continuing
the case.
ISSUE
As stated earlier, the pivotal issue in the instant petition hinges on whether or
not a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the
estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said
deceased person even before the probate court causes notice to be served
upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PROCEEDINGS
As early as March 18, 1937, in the case of Santos v. Castillo (64 Phil. 211)
we ruled that before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the
probate of a will and the administration of the properties left by a deceased
person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased and other
indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor
named in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the
settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent since the petition
had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person,
the possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the
deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
OVER PROCEEDINGS VIS OVER THE PERSON
We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the probate court
over the proceedings for the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction
over the persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of
the deceased person but the determination of the properties comprising that
estate must follow established rules.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a
petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing
the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the
known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other
persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the
manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice
through publication of the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of
this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction
so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world. (Manalo v.
Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court Volume
3,1980 Edition) Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the
Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the
estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is
essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived
of his right to property without due process of law. (Eusebio v. Valmores, 96
Phil. 163).
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes
court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and
subject to annulment. (See Eusebio v. Valmores, supra)
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it
acted on the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special
administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the
deceased person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance
to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
The "explanation" which we required of the respondent Judge for his
apparent haste in issuing the questioned orders, states:
xxx xxx xxx
10. In issuing the subject Orders, undersigned acted in the
honest conviction that it would be to the best interest of the
estate without unduly prejudicing any interested party or third
person. Any delay in issuing the said Orders might have
prejudiced the estate for the properties may be lost, wasted
or dissipated in the meantime. (Rollo, p. 86)
xxx xxx xxx
This explanation while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently explain the
disregard of the Rule. If indeed, the respondent court had the welfare of both
the estate and the person who have interest in the estate, then it could have
caused notice to be given immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of
Court. All interested persons including herein petitioner who is the biggest
creditor of the estate listed in the Petition (P850,240.80) could have
participated in the proceedings especially so, because the respondent
immediately filed a motion to have herself appointed as administratrix. A
special administrator has been defined as the "representative of decedent
appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an
executor or general administrator is appointed." (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer
R. Co. 1965 ed., at 106 cited in Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189). The
petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the preservation of
the estate as the private respondent who happens to be the widow of
deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated
by the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what emergency
would have ensued if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at
least until the most interested parties were given notice of the proposed
action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is
apparent from the records.
As argued by the petitioner:
The position of special administrator, by the very nature of
the powers granted thereby, is one of trust and confidence. It
is a fiduciary position and, therefore, requires a
comprehensive determination of the suitability of the
applicant to such position. Hence, under Philippine
jurisprudence, it has been settled that the same fundamental
and legal principles governing the choice of a regular
administrator should be taken in choosing the special
administrator (Francisco, Vol. VB, page 46 citing the cases
of Ozaeta v. Pecson, Ibid. and Roxas v. Pecson, Ibid.)
In order to fully and correctly ascertain the suitability of the
applicant to the trust, a hearing is obviously necessary
wherein the applicant can prove his qualifications and at the
same time affording oppositors, given notice of such hearing
and application, the opportunity to oppose or contest such
application.
The requirement of a hearing and the
notification to all the known heirs and other
interested parties as to the date thereof is
essential to the validity of the proceeding for
the appointment of an administrator "in order
that no person may be deprived of his right
or property without due process of law"
(Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163).
Moreover, a hearing is necessary in order to
fully determine the suitability of the applicant
to the trust, by giving him the opportunity to
prove his qualifications and affording
oppositors, if any, to contest the said
application. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26
SCRA 770; emphasis supplied).
Since the position of special administrator is a very sensitive
one which requires trust and confidence, it is essential that
the suitability of the applicant be ascertained in a hearing
with due notice to all oppositors who may object precisely to
the applicant's suitability to the trust. (Rollo, pp. 103-104)
If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate
justify a court's immediately taking some kind of temporary action even
without the required notice, no such emergency is shown in this case. The
need for the proper notice even for the appointment of a special administrator
is apparent from the circumstances of this case.
The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the preservation of
the estate was limited to properties not claimed by third parties. If certain
properties are already in the possession of the applicant for special
administratrix and are not claimed by other persons, we see no need to hurry
up and take special action to preserve those properties. As it is, the sheriffs
took advantage of the questioned order to seize by force, properties found in
the residence of the petitioner which he vehemently claims are owned by him
and not by the estate of the deceased person.
The petitioner also asks that the respondent Judge be disqualified from
continuing with the proceedings of the case on the ground that he is partial to
the private respondent.
In view of the fact that the respondent Judge in his "Explanation" requests
that he be inhibited from further active on the case, this issue has now
become academic. We accept Judge Angeles" voluntary inhibition in line with
our ruling in Pimentel v. Salanga (21 SCRA 160). As we stated in Query of
Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan on the conflicting views of Regional Trial CourtJudges Manalo and
Elisaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954 M Administrative Matter No. 87-9-
3918-RTC, October 26, 1987:
xxx xxx xxx
 ... A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he
might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he
reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at
the back of his mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That
passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of
serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his
counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the
frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great
care and caution before making up his mind to act or
withdraw from a suit Where that party or counsel is involved.
He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could
be heard by another judge and where no appreciable
prejudice would be occasioned to others involved thereon.
On the result of his decisions to sit or not sit may depend to
a great extent that all-important confidence in the impartiality
of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or
fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of
the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.

Considering the foregoing, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised
in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 of Makati are hereby set aside. The case
is ordered remanded to the lower court for the hearing of the petition with
previous notice to all interested parties as required by law. In view of the
voluntary inhibition of the respondent Judge, the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati is directed to re-raffle the case to another branch
of the court. The Temporary Restraining Order dated June 10, 1987 is made
permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992
NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL,
ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL,
RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL,
DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO
GABRIEL, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19797 promulgated on August 23,
1991, 1 respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
by herein petitioners assailing the orders of the lower court in Special
Proceeding No. 88-44589 thereof which effectively sustained the
appointment of private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as administrator of
the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.
Petitioners' present appeal by certiorari would have this Court set aside that
decision of respondent court, hence the need to examine the chronology of
antecedent facts, as found by respondent court and detailed hereunder,
pertinent to and which culminated in their recourse now before us.
On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August
6, 1987, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XI, a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that
he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and
is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.
Private respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next
of kin and heirs of the decedent. 2
On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order 3 setting the hearing of the
petition on June 29, 1988, on which date all persons interested may show
cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The court further
directed the publication of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general
circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No opposition
having been filed despite such publication of the notice of hearing, private
respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the
probate court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988, appointing private
respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the late Domingo
Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00. 4
Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate
of the decedent was published in the "Metropolitan News." As a
consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private respondent, filed a "Motion to
File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that
the decision in a civil case between her and the deceased remained
unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate. 5
On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed for approval by the probate
court an "Inventory and Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by
the decedent at P18,960,000.00, which incident was set for hearing on
January 16, 1989. 6
On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and
Maribel, all surnamed Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for
the recall of the letters of administration issued to private respondent and the
issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate
daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein
petitioners. 7 After some exchanges and on order of the court, petitioners
filed an "Opposition to the Petition and Motion," dated May 20, 1989, alleging
that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for
administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should
be preferred over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting
and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the
claims of his mother and (4) most of the properties of the decedent have
already been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to petitioners and
should not be included in the value of the estate sought to be administered
by private respondent. 8
On September 21, 1989, the probate court issued an order denying the
opposition of petitioners on the ground that they had not shown any
circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1) no
evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a
legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that
the person who was appointed administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or
unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable under
these circumstances. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
was likewise denied in an order dated December 22, 1989. 10
From said orders, herein petitioners filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, on the following grounds:
 1. The orders of September 21, 1989 and December 22,
1989 are null and void, being contrary to the facts, law and
jurisprudence on the matter;
2. Respondent judge, in rendering the aforesaid orders,
gravely acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction, hence said orders are null and
void ab initio; and
3. Private respondent is morally incompetent and unsuitable
to perform the duties of an administrator as he would give
prior preference to the claims of his mother against the
estate itself. 11
As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing
that petition for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of an
administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which
may not be interfered with unless abused; that the fact that there was no
personal notice served on petitioners is not a denial of due process as such
service is not a jurisdictional requisite and petitioners were heard on their
opposition; and that the alleged violation of the order of preference, if any, is
an error of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, correctible by appeal
and not by the special civil action of certiorari. 12
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver that
under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who
is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator.
Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving spouse of
the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over
private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by
claimant. Aida Valencia. Secondly, they claim that assuming that the widow is
incompetent, the next of kin must be appointed. As between a legitimate and
an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel,
as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent who is
an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it is contended that the non-observance or
violation per se of the order of preference already constitutes a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not commit
a grave abuse of discretion in not following the order of preference because
the same is not absolute and the choice of who to appoint rests in the sound
discretion of the court. He calls attention to the fact that petitioners Nilda
Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never applied for appointment despite the
lapse of more than nine (9) months from the death of Domingo Gabriel,
hence it was not possible for the probate court to have considered them for
appointment. Besides, it is not denied that several properties of the deceased
have already been relinquished to herein petitioners, hence they would have
no interest in applying for letters of administration. Lastly, private respondent
submits that it has not been shown that he is incompetent nor is he
disqualified from being appointed or serving as administrator.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve,
it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select. (Emphases ours.)
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that
sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave
abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which
Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit
of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the
other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly. 13
This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in
establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her
husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an
interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. 14 Under the law, the
widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership.
For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. 15 On this
ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased
Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the
administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater
interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less. 16
Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no
longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters
of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as
required under the rules.
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the
surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said
persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after
the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure
is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of
her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the
widow from the administration. 17
In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify
Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's
estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be
disregarded for valid cause 18 despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise
waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely
provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more
of the principal creditors."
On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of
private respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's
suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the
sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said
judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly
in error. 19 Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the
execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal
without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific
causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the
removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it
in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or
omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of
the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to
warrant the removal of the administrator. 20 In the instant case, a mere
importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and
substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of
private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator
does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries
of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in
appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to
apply therefor within a given time. 21
On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason
why, for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one
administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally permissible and
sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the
next of
kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may
arise when there is only one administrator but which may easily be
remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an executor or
administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration
herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the
widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may
further be expected from private respondent for the same estate.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-
administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the
benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests
represented; 24 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; 25
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing
one to settle; 26 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; 27 and
(5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the office. 28

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and

advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by
petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo
Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to have
the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they will
respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the
estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons
will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the
direction and supervision of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED

by AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo
Gabriel as judicial administrator and ORDERING the appointment of
petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special Proceeding
No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

RULE 78 & RULE 82

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992
NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL,
ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO
GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL
and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL
E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO
DINDO GABRIEL
FACTS:
On May 12, 1988, nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August 6,
1987, private respondent filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch XI, a petition for
letters of administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the
decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of
administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. Private respondent
mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the
decedent.
On May 17, 1988, RTC issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on
June 29, 1988, on which date all persons interested may show cause, if any, why
the petition should not be granted. RTC further directed the publication of the
order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed despite such publication of
the notice of hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex
parte.
RTC
- Issued an order, dated July 8, 1988, appointing private respondent as administrator
of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00.
Later, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of the
decedent was published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, Aida
Valencia, mother of private respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of the
Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that the decision in a civil case
between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an
interest in said estate. 5
Private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and
Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent at
P18,960,000.00, which incident was set for hearing on January 16, 1989.
Petitioners, all surnamed Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for
the recall of the letters of administration issued to private respondent and the
issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate
daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein
petitioners.
Petitioners allege that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the
petition for administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter,
should be preferred over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a
conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the
claims of his mother and (4) most of the properties of the decedent have already
been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to petitioners and should not
be included in the value of the estate sought to be administered by private
respondent.
RTC
- Issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners on the ground that they had
not shown any circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1)
no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a legitimate
daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the person who was
appointed administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust
as to make his appointment inadvisable under these circumstances.
- The MR filed by petitioners was likewise denied.
- Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
CA
- Rendered judgment dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the
appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the RTC
which may not be interfered with unless abused.
- CA added that the fact that there was no personal notice served on petitioners is not
a denial of due process as such service is not a jurisdictional requisite and petitioners
were heard on their opposition; and that the alleged violation of the order of
preference, if any, is an error of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, correctible
by appeal and not by the special civil action of certiorari.
Petitioner contention
In the petition for review on certiorari with SC, petitioners primarily aver that
under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse
who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an
administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving
spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred
over private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by
claimant, Aida Valencia.
Secondly, they claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin
must be appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the
former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate
daughter, must be preferred over private respondent who is an illegitimate
son.
Thirdly, it is contended that the non-observance or violation per se of the order of
preference already constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Private respondent contention
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion in not following the order of preference
because petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never applied for
appointment despite the lapse of more than nine (9) months from the death of
Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible for the probate court to have
considered them for appointment. Besides, it is not denied that several properties
of the deceased have already been relinquished to herein petitioners, hence they
would have no interest in applying for letters of administration. Lastly, private
respondent submits that it has not been shown that he is incompetent nor is he
disqualified from being appointed or serving as administrator.
ISSUE: On Rule 78: WON the surviving spouse is the first in the order of preference
for appointment of an administrator YES
On Rule 82: WON the appointment of private respondent as administrator should be
nullified - NO
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select. (Emphases ours.)
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks
out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that
sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave
abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly
ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6
of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption
behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy
and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer
the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.
 This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in
establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband
upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a
partner in the conjugal partnership. 14 Under the law, the widow would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside
from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as
much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any
other next of kin. 15 On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel,
the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very
much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one
who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.
Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer
be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of
administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required
under the rules.
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the
surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said
persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after the
decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is
not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of
her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the
widow from the administration.
In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify
Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's
estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be
disregarded for valid cause 18 despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise
waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely
provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors."
ON SECTION 2, RULE 82:
On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private
respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of
judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising
the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless
the said court is clearly in error. 19 Administrators have such a right and corresponding
interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal
without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes
authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the
removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in
order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on
the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the
orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal
of the administrator. 20
In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the
deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not
adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to
state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and
dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also
exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are
entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. 21
On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why,
for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one
administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally permissible and
sanctioned in practice.
Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be
issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of
Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise when there is only one
administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-
administration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust
alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the
extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services
rendered to and which may further be expected from private respondent for the
same estate.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators
has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; 24 (2) where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate
of the deceased; 25 (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle; 26 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; 27 and (5) when a
person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office. 28
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and
advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by
petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo
Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to
 have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they will
respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate.

Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be

satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction and
supervision of the probate court.
Rule 76
G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988
PEDRO DE GUZMAN vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC
BRANCH 58, MAKATI, METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOSE B. FLORA
and HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman in the RTC of Makati.
The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. M-1436.
On March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in Makati, Metro Manila. At the
time of his death, he was a resident of Makati. Manolito left personal and real
properties as part of his estate. The properties were acquired after the marriage
of the petitioner to the decedent and therefore are included in their conjugal
partnership.
The estate of the decedent has a probable net value which may be provisionally
assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less. The possible creditors of the estate,
who have accounts payable and existing claims against the firm C. SANTOS
Construction are listed in in the Annex.
The compulsory heirs of the decedent are the surviving spouse and their two (2)
minor children namely: Charmane Rose de Guzman (11 years old) and Peter
Brian de Guzman (9 years old).
After diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the decedent left a last will
and testament, none has been found and according to the best knowledge
information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died intestate.
According to petitioner, as the surviving spouse of the decedent, she is most
qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of administration.
Private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) vehicles
registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal
properties of the de Guzman's but which are at present in the possession of the
private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman.
The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent must have
the possession of said vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late
husband.
RTC
- On the same day, it issued an order setting for hearing the motion directing the
deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the expense of the private
respondent.
- The scheduled hearing was postponed on motion of petitioner's counsel, Atty.
Ricardo Fojas.
- The petitioner was also given three (3) days to give his comment on the motion for a
writ of possession. The hearing was reset to June 5, 1987 at 3:00 p.m.
- On May 29, 1987, the petitioner's counsel filed a notice of appearance and an
"Urgent Motion For Extension of Time to File an Opposition and for Resetting of the
Hearing."
- The motion was granted. Petitioner was given five (5) days from receipt of the order
within which to file his opposition to the motion for a writ of possession. The hearing
was reset to June 15, 1987.
- In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion
to Appoint Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman."
- On the same date, said motion was set for hearing on June 5. RTC directed that all
parties in the case be notified. However, no notice of the order was given to the
petitioner.
- June 5, the lower court granted the private respondent's motion to be appointed as
special administratrix.
- June 8, lower court granted the urgent Ex-parte Motion for Assistance filed by
private respondent for appointment of Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B.
Flora together with some military men/policemen to assist her in preserving the estate
of Manolito de Guzman.
Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the above order. The
petitioner resisted when Flora and Santos tried to take the subject vehicles on
the ground that they were his personal properties. According to the petitioner, this
resulted in a "near shoot-out between members of the Makati Police and the
CAPCOM soldiers who were ostensibly aiding respondent sheriffs and Elaine G.
 de Guzman" and that "the timely arrival of Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati
defused the very volatile situation which resulted in an agreement between the
parties that the bulldozer, sought to be taken, be temporarily placed in the
custody of Mayor Binay, while the parties seek clarification of the order from
respondent Judge Zosimo Angeles the next day.
In the conference held before the respondent court attended by the counsels for
both parties, the June 8, 1987 order was clarified to the effect that the order
"must be merely to take and preserve assets admittedly belonging to the estate,
but not properties, the ownership of which is claimed by third persons."
Petitioner then filed a manifestation listing properties which he claimed to be his
own. Thereafter, the instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's orders
dated June 5, 1987 and June 8, 1987.
SC
- In a resolution, it issued a TRO enjoining the respondent court from enforcing the
two questioned orders.
- In another resolution dated October 28, 1987, we gave due course to the petition.
Petitioner contends that the June 5, 1987 order is a patent nullity, the
respondent court not having acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special
administratrix because the petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito de
Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks,
as mandated by the Rules of Court. The petitioner also stresses that the
appointment of a special administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion for
having been made without giving petitioner and other parties an
opportunity to oppose said appointment.
Anent the June 8, 1987 order, petitioner alleges that the immediate grant of the
motion praying for the court's assistance in the preservation of the estate of the
deceased, "without notice to the petitioner Pedro de Guzman, and
its immediate implementation on the very same day by respondent Elaine G. de
Guzman with the assistance of respondents deputy sheriffs, at no other place but
at the home of the petitioner Pedro de Guzman, are eloquent proofs that all
the antecedent events were intended solely to deprive petitioner de
Guzman of his property without due process of law." He also prays that the
respondent Judge be disqualified from further continuing the case.
ISSUE: WON a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person even
before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties
pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
HELD: NO
In the case of Santos v. Castillo, we ruled that before a court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of the
properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege the residence
of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances and that
the applicant is the executor named in the will or is the person who had
custody of the will to be probated.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of
an intestate estate by the private respondent since the petition had alleged all the
jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs and
creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de
Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the probate court
over the proceedings for the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction
over the persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the
deceased person but the determination of the properties comprising that estate
must follow established rules.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for
letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court
shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice
thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and
to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the
manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice
through publication of the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of
this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so
that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world.
 Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court
has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the estate of the
deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void
and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the
validity of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived of his right to
property without due process of law. (Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163).
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders
affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and subject to
annulment. (See Eusebio v. Valmores, supra)
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court was caused to be given by the probate court before
it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special
administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased
person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve
the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
have ensued if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at least until the
most interested parties were given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable
delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.
If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an
estate justify a court's immediately taking some kind of temporary action
even without the required notice, no such emergency is shown in this case.
The need for the proper notice even for the appointment of a special
administrator is apparent from the circumstances of this case.
The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the preservation of the
estate was limited to properties not claimed by third parties. If certain properties
are already in the possession of the applicant for special administratrix and are
not claimed by other persons, we see no need to hurry up and take special action
to preserve those properties. As it is, the sheriffs took advantage of the
questioned order to seize by force, properties found in the residence of the
petitioner which he vehemently claims are owned by him and not by the estate of
the deceased person.

The "explanation" which we required of the respondent Judge for his apparent Considering the foregoing, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised in
haste in issuing the questioned orders, states that he: acted in the honest the petition.
conviction that it would be to the best interest of the estate without unduly
prejudicing any interested party or third person. Any delay in issuing the said
Orders might have prejudiced the estate for the properties may be lost, wasted or
dissipated in the meantime. (Rollo, p. 86)

This explanation while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently explain the
disregard of the Rule. If indeed, the respondent court had the welfare of both
the estate and the person who have interest in the estate, then it could have
caused notice to be given immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of
Court.

All interested persons including herein petitioner who is the biggest creditor of the
estate listed in the Petition (P850,240.80) could have participated in the
proceedings especially so, because the respondent immediately filed a motion to
have herself appointed as administratrix. A special administrator has been
defined as the "representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to care
for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is
appointed.

"The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the preservation
of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be the widow of
deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by
the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would