Fundamentals of The Toyota Production System

GHINATO, P. Published as second. Sec.
Book Production & Competitiveness: Innovat

ions and Applications, Ed: Adiel T. Fernando de Almeida & M. C. Souza, Edit. UFP
E, Recife, 2000.
Fundamental Elements of the Toyota Production System
What is the Toyota Production System?
It is a management philosophy that seeks to optimize the organization to meet cu
stomer needs in the shortest time possible, in the highest quality and lowest co
st, while increasing security and morale of its employees, involving and integra
ting not only manufacturing, but all parts of the organization. The Toyota Produ
ction System (Toyota Production System - TPS) has been more recently referred to
as "Lean Production System." The production "lean" (the original English, "lean
") is actually a term coined in the late 80's by researchers IMVP (International
Motor Vehicle Program), a research program connected with MIT, to set a product
ion system more efficient, flexible, agile and innovative than mass production,
a system able to better address a changing market. In fact, lean manufacturing i
s a generic term for the Toyota Production System (TPS).
A Bit of History: Origins of the Toyota Production System
The TPS was originally developed for manufacturing. So for the perfect understan
ding of TPS, is, first and foremost, understand its origins in manufacturing, sp
ecifically in the automotive industry. The enthusiasm by the Toyoda family's aut
o industry began even earlier in the century after the first trip to the United
States Sakichi Toyoda in 1910. However, the birth of Toyota Motor Co. should be
even Kiichiro Toyoda, son of the founder Sakichi, which in 1929 was also on a te
chnical visit to the Ford factories in the United States. As a result of this en
thusiasm and belief that the automobile industry will soon become the flagship o
f the industry worldwide, Kiichiro Toyoda established the automobile department
at Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, a major manufacturer of textile equipment and ma
chinery belonging to the Toyoda family, to in 1937, founded the Toyota Motor Co.
Toyota entered the automobile industry, specializing in trucks for the military
, but with the firm intention to enter into large scale production of passenger
cars and commercial trucks. However, Japan's involvement in World War II postpon
ed the pretensions of the Toyota. With the end of World War II in 1945, Toyota h
as taken over its plans to become a major carmaker. However, any less pretentiou
s analysis indicated that the distance that separates the great American competi
tors was simply monstrous. People used to say, there is this time that the produ
ctivity of American workers was about ten times the productivity of manpower in
Japan. This finding
GHINATO, P. Published as second. Sec. Book Production & Competitiveness: Innovat
E, Recife, 2000.
served to "wake up" and motivate the Japanese to reach the U.S. industry, which
actually happened years later. The fact that U.S. productivity is so superior to
the Japanese drew attention to the only reasonable explanation: The productivit
y gap could only be explained by losses in the Japanese production system. From
there, what we saw was the structuring of a systematic process of identification
and elimination of losses. The success of the system of Fordist mass production
inspired several initiatives around the world. Toyota Motor Co. for several yea
rs attempted without success to reproduce the organization and results in the pr
oduction lines of Ford, until in 1956 the then chief engineer at Toyota, Taiichi
Ohno, he realized, on his first visit to factories Ford's mass production that
needed adjustments and improvements in order to be applied in a discrete market
demand and product variety, as was the case for the Japanese market. Ohno noted
that workers were under-used, the tasks were repetitive and it does not add valu
e, there was a strong division (design and implementation) of the work, the qual
ity was overlooked during the manufacturing process and there were large stockpi
les intermediaries. Toyota began to receive worldwide recognition from the oil s
hock of 1973, the year the soaring price of oil has profoundly affected the whol
e world economy. Amid thousands of companies that succumbed or were facing heavy
losses, Toyota Motor Co. emerged as one of the few companies to escape virtuall
y unscathed from the effects of the crisis.This "phenomenon" has aroused the cu
riosity of organizations worldwide: What is the secret of Toyota's!
Fundamental Principles of the Toyota Production System
Indeed, the essence of the Toyota Production System is the persecution and elimi
nation of any loss. That is what Toyota is known as the "principle of non-cost".
This principle is based on the belief that the traditional equation Cost + Prof
it = Price must be replaced by Price - Cost = Profit According to traditional lo
gic, the price was imposed on the market as a result of a given manufacturing co
st plus a margin target profit. Thus, the supplier was allowed to transfer to th
e client the additional costs of any inefficiency of its production processes. W
ith increased competition and the emergence of a more demanding consumer, the pr
ice shall be determined by the market. So the only way to maintain or increase p
rofit is by reducing costs. At Toyota, reducing costs through the elimination of
losses involves a detailed analysis of the value chain, ie the sequence of proc
esses by which the material passes from the stage of raw material to be processe
d into finished product. The systematic process of
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identification and elimination of losses is still in the analysis of the transac
tions, focusing on the identification of the components of work that do not add
value. In the language of industrial engineering consecrated by Toyota, losses (
MUDA in Japanese) are completely unnecessary activities that generate cost, add
value and therefore should be immediately eliminated. Ohno, the great founder of
the Toyota Production System, has proposed that these losses in the production
system were classified into seven main groups, namely: • Loss of over-production
(quantity and anticipated) • Loss on hold; • Loss of transport ; • Lost in the
processing itself; • Loss on stock; • Loss of movement; • Loss on manufacture of
defective products.
Loss on Overproduction
All seven losses, the loss by over-production is the most damaging. She has the
ability to hide losses and the other is more difficult to be eliminated. There a
re two types of losses by overproduction: • Loss of produce too much (over-produ
ction by quantity) • Loss of produce in advance (overproduction in advance) Loss
on Overproduction by Amount: is the loss by producing beyond the scheduled or r
equired volume (remaining parts / products ). This type of loss is beyond questi
on when dealing with the overproduction in the Toyota Production System. It is a
kind of loss unacceptable under any circumstance and is completely overcome at
Toyota. Overproduction loss by Anticipation: the loss due to any production unde
rtaken prior to the time necessary ie, parts / products will be manufactured sto
red awaiting the opportunity to be consumed or processed by subsequent stages. T
his loss is the most persecuted in the Toyota Production System.
Expected loss
The waste with the wait time comes from a time interval in which no processing,
transport or inspection is performed. The lot is "parked" awaiting the green lig
ht to move forward in the production flow. We highlight three basic types of los
s expected: • Loss on standby in case
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• •
Loss of the expected Batch Operator Expects Loss by
Loss on standby in case: the whole lot is awaiting the completion of the operati
on being performed in the previous batch, until the machinery, devices and / or
operator is available to the beginning of the operation (processing, inspection
or transportation); Loss on Hold Plot: the wait is that each component part of a
batch is submitted until all parts of the batch have been processed to then pro
ceed to the next step or operation. This loss occurs, for example, when a batch
of 1000 pieces is being processed and the first part, after being processed, is
hoping the other 999 pieces pass through the machine to follow the flow with the
plot completely. This loss is imposed on each of the successive parts of the lo
t. Assuming that the processing time on machine M is 10 seconds, the first piece
had to wait for the whole lot for 2 hours and 47 minutes (999 pcs. X 10 / 2) un
necessarily.Expected loss for the Operator: idleness generated when the operato
r is forced to remain with the machine in order to monitor / track the processin
g from start to finish, or due to imbalance of operations.
Loss on Transportation
Transportation is an activity that adds no value, and as such can be viewed as a
loss that should be minimized. The optimization of transport is, ultimately, th
eir complete elimination. The elimination or reduction of transport should be se
en as a priority in the effort to reduce costs because, in general, the transpor
t occupies 45% of the total time of manufacture of an item. The most significant
improvements in terms of reducing transport losses are those applied to the tra
nsport process, obtained by changing the layout that obviate or eliminate the mo
vement of material. Only after exhausting the possibilities for improvements in
the process is, then, improvements in transport operations are introduced. This
applies to the use of conveyor belts, air conveyors, mechanical arms, hoists, cr
anes, etc..
Loss on Equity Processing
Are portions of the processing that could be eliminated without affecting the ba
sic functions and features of the product / service. Can still be classified as
losses in the actual processing situations where the process performance is belo
w the ideal condition. Examples: low cutting speed of a lathe by virtue of probl
ems of machine adjustment or maintenance, the number of images printed on a meta
l plate smaller than the maximum possible due to an inadequate use of project ma
terial.
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Loss on Stock
It is the loss in the form of stock of raw material, material processing and fin
ished product. A major barrier to combat stock losses is the "advantage" that st
ocks provide to ease the problems of synchronization between processes. In the W
est, the stocks are seen as a "necessary evil". The Toyota Production System use
s a strategy of gradual reduction of intermediate stocks as a way to identify ot
her problems in the system, hidden behind the stocks.
Loss on Drive
The losses relate to drive unnecessary movements made by operators in the execut
ion of an operation. This type of loss can be eliminated through improvements ba
sed on study time and motion. Typically, the "improvements as a result of the st
udy of movements can reduce operating times by 10 to 20%." The rationalization m
ovement in operations is also achieved through mechanization of operations, tran
sferring to the machine manual tasks performed by the operator. However, it warn
ed that improvements in operations through mechanization is recommended only aft
er they have exhausted all possibilities for improvements in the labor movement
and any changes in routine operations.
Loss on Production of Defective Products
The loss for the manufacture of defective products is the result of generation o
f products that present some of its characteristics of quality out of a specific
ation or standard established and for this reason do not meet the requirements o
f use. In the Toyota Production System, the elimination of losses of manufacturi
ng defective products depends on the systematic application of methods of contro
l at source, ie, along the root cause of the defect.
The pillars of the Toyota Production System: JIT and Jidoka
There is nothing new in saying that the "new" competitive conditions that had pl
agued the world market, especially after the oil crises of the '70s, they impose
d severe restrictions on gains arising from large-scale production. However, it
must be said that this was one of the fundamental causes for the Toyota Motor Co
. emerged as having a powerful and effective system for managing production, per
fectly attuned to the new rules. The urgency to reduce production costs has made
all efforts were concentrated on the identification and elimination of losses.
This became the basis on which system is structured around the management of Toy
ota Motor Co.
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It is undeniable that the JIT has the amazing ability to put into practice the p
rinciple of reducing costs through the complete elimination of losses. Perhaps,
by its impact on traditional management methods, it has created a very strong id
entity with their own TPS. However, the TPS should not be interpreted as essenti
ally the JIT, which certainly would limit their true scope and capability. JIT i
s nothing more than a management technique incorporated into the structure of th
e TPS which, beside the jidoka, occupies the position of a mainstay of the syste
m. There are different ways of representing the structure of the Toyota Producti
on System. Figure 1 shows the TPS with its two pillars - JIT and Jidoka - and ot
her key components of the system. According to this model, the goal of Toyota's
best attend to customer needs, providing products and services of the highest qu
ality, lowest cost and smallest possible lead time. All this while ensuring a wo
rk environment where safety and morale of employees constituting in key concern
of management.
Lower Cost
Smaller Lead Time
CUSTOMER
Just-in-Time
Takt Time Streaming Prod. Pull
Moral Security
Highest quality
Jidoka
Separation Human Machine Poka-Yoke
Heijunka Standardized Operations Kaizen
Stability
Figure 1 - Structure of the Toyota Production System
Just-In-Time
The English expression "Just-In-Time" was adopted by the Japanese, but you can n
ot specify from when it began to be used. We speak of the emergence of expressio
n in the marine industry being incorporated in the sequel, by industry manufactu
rers. Therefore, it would be a term known and widely used in industry publicatio
ns that brought fame before the JIT as a development of Toyota Motor Co. However
, Ohno says the JIT concept
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arose from the idea that Kiichiro Toyoda, in an industry like autos, the ideal w
ould be to have all the pieces along the assembly lines at the exact moment of i
ts use. Just-in-time means that each case must be provided with the right items
at the right time, the right quantity and at the right place. The goal of JIT is
to identify, locate and eliminate the losses, ensuring a continuous flow of pro
duction. The viability of JIT depends on three factors intrinsically related: co
ntinuous flow, takt time and pull production. The streaming is the answer to red
ucing the lead time of production. The implementation of a continuous flow in th
e chain of added value normally requires the reorganization and rearrangement of
the factory layout, converting the traditional functional layout (or layouts fo
r processes) - where the machinery and resources are grouped according to their
processes (eg group of cutters, grinders group, group of presses, etc..) - for m
anufacturing cells composed of various processes needed to manufacture a given p
roduct family. The conversion of traditional lines of manufacturing and assembly
in manufacturing cells is only a small step toward the implementation of lean p
roduction. What really leads to continuous flow is the ability to implement a fl
ow unit (one to one) of production, where, ultimately, inter-process inventories
are completely eliminated (see representation of Figure 2). This way we ensure
the elimination of losses from stock losses and obtain the expected reduction in
production lead time.
Traditional (functional type) - Workers are separated
The
raw material inventory
B
Inventory Inventory Inventory
C
finished product
Streaming: Eliminates the real "stagnation" of work in each case and between the
m, thus enabling the production 1 × 1
Material
The
B
C
Finished Products
2 - Production Flow Traditional versus Steady Flow Unit
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The implementation of a continuous flow of production necessitates a perfect bal
ance of operations along the cell manufacturing / assembly. Toyota's approach to
the balancing of operations differs diametrically from the traditional approach
. As shown in Figure 3, balancing traditional demand even cycle times for each e
mployee in order to make both workers receive similar workloads. The cycle time
is the total time required for a worker to perform all operations assigned to it
.
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1 Op # Op # 2 Time (s) Op Op # 1 # 2
3 - Balancing Traditional Operations At Toyota,the balancing of operations is f
undamentally linked to the concept of takt time. The takt time is the time neede
d to produce a component or a complete product, based on customer demand. In oth
er words, the takt time associates and dictates the pace of production at the pa
ce of sales. In the logic of "production pull" the customer, the supplier will o
nly produce when there is demand for your customer. The takt time is given by th
e following formula: Takt time = total time available Demand Customer Therefore,
in the example illustrated in Figure 4, the takt time = 50 / 2 is calculated as
follows: Demand = 576 pieces / day total available time = 8 hours (28,800 secon
ds) Takt time = 28800 / 2 ÷ 576 parts = 50 seconds / part
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60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Takt Time
Op # 1
Op # 2
After the sum of cycle times Kaizen
Time (s)
4 - Balancing Operations at Toyota Soon, as the logic is "to produce the pace of
demand," the cycle time of each operator should ideally be equal to the takt ti
me. So instead of having two operators with cycle times of 30 seconds as the bal
ancing figure 3, we allocate all the operations to a single operator (see column
"sum of cycle times" in Figure 4) to, immediately Then, as a result of a proces
s improvement (kaizen), reduce cycle time of this operator to be compatible with
the takt time of 50 seconds (column "After the Kaizen", Figure 4). The concept
of pull production is intertwined with the very definition of Just-In-Time, whic
h is producing only the right items, in the right quantity at the right time. In
the Toyota Production System, the pace of customer demand end to pass along the
entire value chain from the warehouse of finished products to the suppliers of
raw materials. Information should flow from the production process in process in
the opposite direction to the flow of materials, ie, process-customer-supplier
to the process. A production system working under the logic of pull production p
roduces only what is sold, avoiding over-production. Still, under this logic, th
e scheduling is simplified and self-regulating, eliminating the continual reasse
ssment of the needs of production and the interference of verbal instructions, f
eatures of thrust production. The pull production at Toyota's kanban is made pos
sible through a signaling system between client and supplier-supplier process te
lls exactly what, how and when to produce. The kanban system aims to monitor and
balance the production, eliminate waste, allowing the inventory replenishment b
ased on demand and form themselves into a simple method of
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visually inspect the processes. There are several types of kanban system, the sy
stem shown in Figure 5 is the two card kanban system, also known as kanban of ty
pe A.
The Kanban Production
The Withdrawal Kanban
Previous Case
B C D
A B C D
The
The Withdrawal Kanban
Subsequent process
5 - Kanban System: Pull Production Through the kanban system, the subsequent pro
cess (customer) goes to the super market (stock) of the previous process (suppli
er) in possession of kanban withdrawal that allows you to take stock of exactly
how much product necessary to meet their needs. The withdrawal kanban process th
en returns to tracking the subsequent batch of material removed. Upon removal of
material by the subsequent process, the previous process receives the signal to
begin production of this item through the production kanban that was attached t
o the lot removed.
Jidoka
In 1926, when the Toyoda family has concentrated its business in the textile are
a, Sakichi Toyoda invented a loom capable of automatically stop when the program
med amount of tissue was reached or when longitudinal and transverse wires of th
e mesh to be broken. Thus, he managed to dispense with the constant attention of
the operator during processing, enabling the simultaneous monitoring of various
looms. This innovation revolutionized the traditional and centuries-old textile
industry.
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In 1932, the newly-formed mechanical engineer Taiichi Ohno took to Toyoda Spinni
ng and Weaving,where he remained until being transferred to Toyota Motor Compan
y Ltd. in 1943. Having received a "carte blanche" by Kiichiro Toyoda, former pre
sident of the group, Ohno began to introduce changes in production lines factory
Koroma of Toyota Motor Company in 1947. Ohno knew there were two ways to increa
se efficiency in the manufacturing line: increasing the quantity produced or red
ucing the number of workers. In a quiet market as the Japanese domestic market f
or season, it was clear that increased efficiency could only be obtained from th
e decreasing number of workers. From there, Ohno tried to organize the layout of
parallel lines or in shape of "L", so that one worker could operate three or fo
ur machines during the manufacturing cycle, getting so increase the production e
fficiency of the two 3 times. The implementation of this new form of organizatio
n required the formulation of Ohno's question: "Because one person at Toyota Mot
or Company is able to operate only one machine while in a textile factory Toyoda
operator supervises 40-50 automatic looms?" The answer was that machines in the
Toyota were not prepared to stop automatically when the process is finished or
when something unusual happened. Sakichi Toyoda's invention, applied to machiner
y of Toyota Motor Company, originated the concept of Jidoka autonomation or, as
is also known. In fact, the word simply means jidoka automation. Ninben in jidok
a aru expresses the true meaning of the concept, ie the machine is endowed with
intelligence and human touch. Although the jidoka is often associated with autom
ation, it is not a concept restricted to machines. In TPS, Jidoka is extended fo
r use on production lines operated manually. In this case, the operator can stop
the production line when an abnormality is detected. Jidoka is to provide the o
perator or machine autonomy to stop processing when any abnormality is detected.
The central idea is to prevent the generation and propagation of defects and el
iminate any abnormality in the processing and production flow. When the machine
stops the process or the operator stops the production line, the problem immedia
tely becomes visible to the operator himself, his colleagues and to their superv
ision. This triggers an effort to identify the root cause and eliminate it, avoi
ding the recurrence of the problem and therefore reducing the stops of the line.
When Ohno began his experiments with jidoka, production lines stopped at any mo
ment, but as the problems were being identified, the number of errors began to d
ecline sharply. Today, the factories of Toyota, the yield of the lines approachi
ng 100%, ie the lines almost never stop.
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The separation between Man and Machine
The relationship between machine and man, characterized by the permanence of the
operator at the machine during the execution of the processing is not as easy t
o break, because it is a typical practice of traditional industry. However, the
improvement of devices capable of detecting abnormalities promoted the separatio
n between machine and man and contributed to the development of intelligent func
tions on the machines (automation with human functions). The separation between
machine and man is a fundamental requirement for the implementation of jidoka. I
n practice, the separation is occurring between the detection of the abnormality
and the solution of the problem. Detection is a function of the machine because
it is technically and economically feasible, while the solution or fix the prob
lem remains the responsibility of man. Thus, the transfer of manual activities a
nd mental functions (intelligence) from man to machine, allows the worker to ope
rate more than one machine simultaneously (see Figure 6).
Release
Drop
Release
Fix
Person Machine
WAITING
Person Machine 1 Machine 2
1 Person - 1 Machine
1 Person 2 machines
6 - Separation between Man and Machine In the Toyota Production System, whether
the machine performs the functions of attachment / removal of the part and the d
rive automatically. The important thing is that before this, she has the ability
to detect any abnormality and stop immediately.
Fix
Fix
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Poka-Yoke
The second component is the pillar jidoka poka-yoke device. The poka-yoke is a m
echanism for detection of abnormalities which, when connected to an operation, p
revents the execution of an unlawful activity. The poka-yoke is a way to block t
he main interference in the operation. The poka-yoke devices are the means by wh
ich the concept of Jidoka is put into practice. The application of poka-yoke dev
ices allows the separation between machine and man and the resulting exercise ji
doka. At Toyota, the poka-yoke devices are used to detect the root causes of def
ects, or errors in the operation. This idea will be implemented in 100% inspecti
on regime associated with inspection at source. The use of poka-yoke devices ass
ociated with the successive inspection or self-inspection is only justified in c
ases of technical or economic infeasibility for the application at the source.
Standardized Operations
The pillars of JIT and Jidoka sit on a base formed by heijunka (production level
ing), standardized operations and kaizen (continuous improvement). The first of
these elements - the standard operation - can be defined as an organized and eff
ective method of producing lossless. The standardization of operations seeking m
aximum productivity through the identification and standardization of work eleme
nts that add value and eliminate losses. The balance between the processes and t
he definition of the minimum stock in process are also the focus of the standard
ization of operations. The components of the standard operation are the takt tim
e, the routine standard of operations and the amount of inventory in the standar
d processing (see Figure 7).
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Leveled Production with Minimum M.O. and Inventory
Standardized Operations
Takt Time
Standard Routine Operations
Quantity Standard Inventory Processing
Figure 7 - Components of Standardized Operation Routine standard operations is a
set of operations performed by an operator in a particular sequence, allowing y
ou to repeat the cycle consistently over time. The determination of a standard r
outine operations prevents each operator perform random steps from the process,
reducing the fluctuations of their respective cycle times and allowing each rout
ine is performed within the Takt time, in order to meet demand. The standard amo
unt of inventory in process is the minimum amount of pieces in circulation neede
d to maintain constant flow and level of production. This level can vary with th
e different layouts of machinery and routine operations. If the routine operatio
ns follows the same order of the process flow, you need only one piece of proces
sing on each machine is not necessary to maintain any inventory between machines
. If the routine runs in the opposite direction to the processing sequence, it i
s necessary to maintain at least a part between operations. In determining the s
tandard amount of inventory in process, should be considered the points test and
verification of the product. Small quantities may be required at these points.
Another important issue is the influence of temperature. One must consider the a
mount required to bring the temperature rise caused by the previous operation is
compensated.
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Heijunka - Leveling Production
Heijunka is the creation of a level schedule by sequencing orders in a repetitiv
e pattern and smoothing of the daily variations of all applications to match the
demand in the long term. Put another way, is flushing heijunka the quantities a
nd types of products. The production scheduling through heijunka allows the comb
ination of different items to ensure a continuous flow of production, also level
ing the demand of production resources. The heijunka, how it is used at Toyota,
the production in small lots and minimize inventories. The following example ill
ustrates clearly the mechanics of heijunka. Table 1 shows the demands for five d
ifferent car models. The last column shows the takt times for each model, assumi
ng that the plant could afford to devote an assembly line for each model. Howeve
r, it is known that in practice the different models should be assembled into a
single assembly line. In this case,if all 480 units are assembled on this line,
the takt time should be 1 minute (480 minutes ÷ 480 units). How, then, to satis
fy different demands if the pace of the line is unique and constant? Table 1 - P
roduction of 5 Models
Model
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Total
Monthly Production (20 days)
4800 pcs. 2400 pcs. 1200 pcs. 600 pcs. 600 pcs. 9600 pcs.
Daily production (480 min.)
240 pcs. 120 pcs. 60 pcs. 30 pcs. 30 pcs. 480 pcs.
Takt Time
(Min.) 2 min. 4 min. 8 min. 16 min. 16 min. 1 min.
The answer is provided by heijunka, which defines a particular sequence of assem
bly (in this hypothetical case, AABACDAE) which, if repeated cyclically, is able
to meet the demand for each of the different models as if they were mounted on
exclusive lines, as represented Figure 8.
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Exclusive Lines
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Single Line
The
The
B
The
C
D
The
E
Figure 8 - Assembly Line Capped
Kaizen: Continuous Improvement
The third component of the basis on which sit the pillars of the TPS is kaizen.
Kaizen is the continuous and incremental improvement of an activity that focuses
on elimination of waste (muda) in order to add more value to the product / serv
ice with a minimum investment. The practice of kaizen depends on the continuous
monitoring of processes through the use of the Deming cycle (PDCA cycle). This p
rocess develops from the standardization of best solution and subsequent improve
ment of this standard, ensuring that small, incremental gains are incorporated i
nto the operational practices. Figure 9 shows the importance of the relationship
between standardization and kaizen. The steady improvement, which will launch t
he next level, can only be achieved from standard processes. The climb up the st
airs (kaizen process) can only be considered safe and continuous if all the step
s (standardization of operations), one after the other, are built on a solid and
consistent. The practice of kaizen without standardization corresponds to attem
pt to climb the ladder, putting up all the weight on a badly structured step, th
e risk of collapse and step he takes us down the staircase is imminent.
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4 5 4 0 3 5 3 0 2 5 2 0 1 5 1 0 5 0 CD AP AP AP CD CD
Ka Pa ROE = n + M lh ize themselves oriaEst ve ál M lh and orias pde = In the dm
a refute s ro st bae
Figure 9 - Kaizen and Standardization
Stability
The "stability" of the processes is the basis for all the Toyota Production Syst
em. Only processes that can, under control and stable can be standardized to ens
ure the production of defect-free items (resulting from pillar Jidoka), the amou
nt and timing (resulting from the JIT pillar). The stability of the processes is
a prerequisite for the implementation of TPS. Production planning and improveme
nt of one's actions can only be performed in a controlled and predictable enviro
nment. The identification process of change throughout the value chain should be
conducted in stable conditions, otherwise what is there is no solution of probl
ems in a systematic way but the practice of firefighting
Concluding Remarks
It took more than 50 years since the revolutionary engineer Taiichi Ohno began t
o implement his ideas on the factory floor at Toyota. Still, all the employees o
f Toyota understands that the TPS is still in process improvement since kaizen m
ust continue to be applied to improve the structure of the system. The Toyota Pr
oduction System is undeniably the benchmark for industry organizations worldwide
. However, the Toyota Production System should not and can not be simply "copied
" by other industries. The process of "downsizing" (make other
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companies as "lean" and Toyota) for other production systems must be driven from
a deep and perfect understanding of the concepts, principles and components of
the Toyota Production System as this is a process of adapting the original model
. It is also essential to note that the superior performance of Toyota Motor Co.
over its competitors as a result of the systematic and concocted of the element
s of TPS.The rapid response to market demand does not result from the use of ka
nban, nor the higher productivity of manpower result of using cells from "U". No
r is it because of the use of poka-yoke devices that the quality of Toyota is su
perior to its competitors. The results obtained by Toyota resulting from the app
lication of a management system focused on meeting customer needs through total
elimination of these losses in the chain of added value.
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