In re: Gutierrez

FACTS:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on

October 5, 1945. However he was convicted of the crime murder of Filemon Samaco,
former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced
to the penalty of death.
After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by
the President on August 19, 1958.
the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified
complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.
Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant
regarding his previous conviction but pleading the conditional pardon in defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of
the rule on disbarment

HELD:

NO.

The rule that pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the
disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted applies only where the pardon is
absolute, but not where, as in this case, the pardon granted is conditional and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of the penalty. In such a case, the attorney must be judged upon the fact of
his conviction for the crime he has committed.

The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals. In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment status, it means an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man
and man
Orence vs. CA

FACTS (BACKGROUND) MAIN CASE:

Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of

land with an area of 2,000 square meters. The land with improvements, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-54556 (383917), is situated at No. 52 Gilmore Street,
New Manila, Quezon City.
In June 1988, private respondent obtained a four million peso (P4,000,000.00) loan
from the China Banking Corporation. To guarantee payment of the loan, private
respondent mortgaged the Gilmore property and all its improvements to said bank. Due to
irregular payment of amortization, interests and penalties on the loan accumulated
through the years.
On April 13, 1992, private respondent, through its president, Antonio B. Gonzales, signed
and executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the Gilmore
property and its improvements, in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano and Felicidad L.
Oronce.

FACTS RELATED TO ETHICS

private respondent filed an urgent motion to cite petitioner Rosita L.

Flaminiano and her husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, in contempt of
court. The motion was founded on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales who
resided at the contested property, deriving his right to do so from private
respondent corporation that is owned by his family. Gonzales alleged that on September
20, 1997, petitioner Flaminiano and her husband entered the property through craftiness
and intimidation. At around 5:30 p.m. on that day, two (2) men knocked at the gate. When
the houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened the gate for pedestrians tentatively, the two men
told him that they would like to visit Gonzales' mother who was ailing.
Once inside, the two men identified themselves as policemen and opened the gate for
twenty (20) men, two (2) trucks and an L-300 van to enter. When Gonzales went outside
the house, he saw thirty (30) to forty (40) men and two (2) trucks entering the driveway.
The person he asked regarding the presence of those people inside the property turned out
to be the brother of petitioner Flaminiano. That person said, "Kami ang may-ari dito,
Matagal na kaming nagtitiis, kayo ang dapat sa labas." After Gonzales had told him that
the property was still under litigation before this Court, the man said, "Walang Supreme
Court Supreme Court." When Gonzales asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside
the premises, to order the people to leave, she said, "Papapasukin namin ito dahil sa amin
ito. Maglalagay ako ng tao diyan sa loob, sa harap, sa likod. Wala ng pakiusap." When a
power generator was brought inside the property and Gonzales pleaded that it be taken
out because the noise it would create would disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonzales,
 petitioner Flaminiano said, "Walang awa-awa sa akin." Atty. Flaminiano butted in and,
referring to Gonzales' mother, said, "Ialis mo na, matanda na pala."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts of the husband/counsel committed contumacious acts

HELD:

YES.

Be that as it may, what is disturbing to the Court is the conduct of her husband, Eduardo
Flaminiano, a lawyer whose actuations as an officer of the court should be beyond reproach. His
contumacious acts of entering the Gilmore property without the consent of its occupants and in
contravention of the existing writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals and
making utterances showing disrespect for the law and this Court, are certainly unbecoming of a
member of the Philippine Bar. To be sure, he asserted in his comment on the motion for contempt
that petitioners "peacefully" took over the property. Nonetheless, such "peaceful" take-over
cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force.
Notably, he did not comment on nor categorically deny that he committed the contumacious acts
alleged by private respondent. Through his acts, Atty. Flaminiano has flouted his duties as a
member of the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited
from counseling or abetting "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system."

Her counsel and husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, is ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00
for committing contumacious acts unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more severely.

De Ysasi vs. NLRC

FACTS:

REGALADO, J:

Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The elder Ysasi owns
a hacienda in Negros Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as the farm
administrator.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities
and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding,
fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda
 and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For
this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife
and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two
separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his
recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In
June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April,
1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner
made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his
salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as
well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984

ISSUE:

WON atty. Apolonio sumbingco violated Rule 1.04 of CPR

HELD:

we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames
which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a
peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed
with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that
either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against
the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded
to petitioner.

The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical
duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their
clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly,
to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.
Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but
to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon
less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in
the conduct of litigation. 56

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite
their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to
initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients