Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Jeff Caldwell
26 March 2010
1. Introduction
In this paper I will argue that the Narrative Criterion of Personal Identity can allow
for human enhancement without failing to adhere to the constraints of coherency, reality
and articulation. This approach will also be able to address challenges to authenticity.
What seems to be the accepted view of narrative identity requires that individuals live
within the bounds of a narrow sense of what one’s narrative could contain. Instead I
propose that enhancement will allow for those whose narrative is not fully harmonious
with reality to bring their narrative in line with what they know to be their truly authentic
selves. The interpretation of narrative identity as it stands is too strict. If we allow others
to ascribe individual requirements to our narrative, or to limit what our narrative can be
because of laws against enhancement, our narrative, and hence our identity, is no
longer limited by ourselves but by others. Enhancement as well can allow for the
prevention and improvement of a possible incoherent identity. First I will address how
enhancement and Narrative Identity, as laid out by Schectman, can strengthen the
positions of each other. This paper will then address the challenges to enhancement of
2. Enhancement Defined
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function that do not respond to genuine medical needs” (DeGrazia 2005 263).
DeGrazia’s definition stumbles on the word ‘genuine’. It seems an arbitrary term that
part of the world may be considered enhancement in a region with a lower standard of
health care.
For the purposes of this paper I propose a more intuitive approach to what
enhancement is:
person beyond what would be the limits of their natural physical and
twenty-twenty vision. Gene therapy that aims to prevent or cure some genetic defect
that falls outside of the norm is not enhancement. Enhancements that slow or reverse
We must accept as DeGrazia does that “the original intuition is correct: major
changes in capacities or other traits can affect narrative identity” (DeGrazia 230). This
does not mean that those changes are not compatible with the idea of NI. It is my
1
I use the word unimpeded to mean those born without any type of birth defect, or genetic
predisposition to diseases. Temporal consideration is of the fact that we all age and in so
doing are capacities diminish.
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position that NI and Enhancement can strengthen the case for each other. To
understand how this is possible it will be useful to examine the main sections of NI.
(The Council) does not believe so; They state that “the decision to take anabolic
steroids to enhance athletic performance can be said to be, in one sense of the term, a
rational choice, it is a choice to alter oneself by submitting oneself to means that are
unintelligible to one’s own self understanding” (Council 147). On the contrary CR can
demand enhancement. Consider the example of an aging baseball player who sees
himself as someone who always hits 40 homeruns in a season. When his abilities start
to fail him, due to age, enhancement has the potential to realign his abilities with his
experience or characteristic coheres with the rest of a person’s narrative, the greater the
degree to which it is attributable to him” (Schechtman 98). Clearly then for someone
such as an aging athlete the amount of enhancement needed will increase with age,
until the point that his narrative ceases to be coherent, and further enhancement would
be unacceptable.
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This means that the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does,
Exposed drug users like Alex Rodriguez are asked questions such as, “Why did
you do it?”, “What made you believe it was ok?” and “Why did you feel you had to?” If
their answers seem genuine, fans tend to forgive. But more importantly, they accept the
narrative and envelope those actions into who they believe that person to be. The
viewer changes their assumptions about whom the person is, the player does not
their lives to guide the unfolding of experience” (Schechtman 116). These assumptions
are what can allow for enhancement. For many, the abilities that they are enhancing
are considered required, deserved even, within the scope of what they posit their
An argument could be made that the articulation constraint could licence any
form of enhancement. As long as one can explain why they want Enhancement A they
can have it. This though is not the case. Schechtman states: “When a person is unable
to explicate part of her narrative, some set of her actions and experiences are
incomprehensible to her and, hence, not properly under her control” (Schechtman 118).
An individual asking that a plastic surgeon make them look like Mikhail Gorbachev
reality” (Schechtman 118). A narrative out of touch with reality cannot be accepted. This
120). Many people make errors about past as well as future events, without losing their
identities. A professional athlete who uses enhancement for an ever so slight gain
cannot be compared to someone who has no athletic abilities or potential who attempts
NI is strong enough to incorporate events that occur beyond one’s lifespan, while
flexible enough to withstand events or abilities that extend beyond the narrowness of
the technological limits into which we were born. Does this lead to a future where our
narratives are only restrained by what is possible? I suggest that this is the way it is
now. An event that is impossible cannot become part of your narrative. But as soon as it
contradictory.
4. Authenticity
health technologies as enhancement. There may be some merit to this claim and should
realistic narrative could be considered as authentic, “then the possibility arises to live an
2
Schechtman expands on the Reality Constraint with two sub sections dealing with Errors of
Fact and Errors of interpretation.
3
The idea that NI admits of degrees helps this argument.
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inauthentic life. (Elliott Tyranny of Happiness 182)” Much of the traction for the
argument against enhancement via authenticity stems from a belief that “such change is
Elliot does raise a valid point with regard to the acceptance and normalization of
pharmapsychological treatments. “In this way happiness is not just your right; it’s your
duty. This kind of thinking amounts to a kind of tyranny of happiness, which I think is
something that the NI can defend, in that it does demand an autonomous narrative.
DeGrazia echoes this sentiment: “I suggest that any self-creation project that is
autonomous and honest is ipso facto authentic. (DeGrazia 112)” Counter to Elliott’s
criticism is that enhancements in fact “can help users to become who they really are
(Elliott 2003 31). Enhancement can allow for the creation/correction of an elusive
missing identity. Not fulfilling your internal desires, or narrative, could also be
considered fraudulent. Consider the transgendered person who is forced to live their life
physically in a way that is not representative of whom they truly are. Enhancement does
not undermine authenticity; instead I suggest that living fraudulently does. Authenticity,
5. Posthumanism
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abandons it in favour of the term ‘Beyond Therapy’. The Council states that “one needs
to see the topic less in relation to medicine and its purposes, and more in relation to
human beings and their purposes” (Council 13). This distinction still points to an issue of
fission arguments against NI. “Despite the strong connection between persons and
human beings drawn by this requirement, however, the narrative self-constitution view
does not completely rule out the possibility that a person’s history could involve more
than one body. If someone did tell a story involving more than one body in such a way
that it indicated a grasp of the intimate connection that usually holds between persons
and human beings, the narrative self-constitution view could allow it as an identity-
constituting narrative”(Schechtman 132). This argument can cover the concerns of the
the following passage: “The runner on steroids or with genetically enhanced muscles is
still, of course, a human being who runs. But the doer of the deed is, arguably, less
obviously himself and less obviously human than his unaltered counterpart. He may be
faster, but he may also be on the way to becoming “more cheetah” than man, or more
like the horses we breed for the racetrack than a self willing, self-directing, human
agent” (Council 144). The Council believes that with enhancement inevitably come
changes in what fundamentally makes someone human. In this case, by changing our
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physical abilities we will change or destroy our humanity. This is a serious charge and
requires examination.
Allen Buchanan outlines the concerns of the Council: “The first is that
enhancement may alter or destroy human nature. The second is that if enhancement
alters or destroys human nature, this will undercut our ability to ascertain the good
because, for us, the good is determined by our nature” (Buchanan 1). This argument
hinges on the belief that we have characteristics that are in fact essential, rather than
contingent. To lose any of these characteristics would be to lose what makes us human.
The Council’s argument gets traction because it appeals to our fear of the sci-fi post
-human4.
intelligence, sleep requirements, aging, gender, being Homo Sapiens) that would seem
accept that appearance or ability could be cited in this list. Surely at best the maximum
degree of enhancement that narrative identity would allow would “not threaten
possible to derive substantive moral rules from reflection on human nature” (Buchanan
145). Any change then would be seen as a threat not just to our humanity but more
importantly to the moral rules that we live by. This implies that we could not, upon
4
Being turned into something not fully human, a zombie, a vampire, Darth Vader.
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something is morally good or bad. There is a deeper problem with the correlation that
the Council makes between being human and being moral. “Normative essentialist
claims confuse two quite different kinds of moral judgement: what is best for human
beings and judgements about what is compatible with human beings’ fundamental
moral status or dignity” (Buchanan 146). The contradiction of the Council’s stance is
which case the appeal to human nature is nothing more than the admonition not to try to
DeGrazia does, will simply be arbitrary and non-exhaustive at best. The argument does
not necessarily need to address specific characteristics. Instead the question should be
enhancement is acceptable.
6. Conclusion
The concerns raised by critics of enhancement are related to fears of loss of our
humanity, that we will lose our authenticity. Instead the concern should be the degree to
which our humanity, our identity, can absorb those enhancements. NI as I have
described it allows for enhancement and provides a test against those enhancements
Nietzsche’s suggestion to “become what you are” (GS 270) might more
realistically embody how we should reflect on the limits of enhancement and personal
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identity. As humans, we are unique in that we desire to become more than what we are.
strive and overcome the limitations our limited bodies place on our limitless
imaginations.
Works Cited
Buchanan, Allen. Human Nature and Enhancement. Bioethics Volume 23 Number 3
2009 pp.141-150
Bolt, L.L.E. True to Oneself? Broad and Narrow Ideas On Authenticity In The
Enhancement Debate, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, Issue 28, 2008
DeGrazia, David. Human Identity and Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005.
DeGrazia, David. Enhancement Technologies and Human Identity Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy,2005.
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Elliott, Carl. Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream. New
York: W.W. Norton, 2003.
Elliott C. The Tyranny of Happiness: The Ethics of Cosmetic Psychopharmacology.
Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications, ed. Erik Parens
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 177-188.
Guignon, Charles B. On Being Authentic. Thinking in action. London: Routledge, 2004.
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold Kaufmann. The Gay Science; With a
Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.
President's Council on Bioethics (U.S.), and Leon Kass.Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology
and the Pursuit of Happiness. Washington, D.C.: President's Council on
Bioethics, 2003.
Sandel The Case Against Perfection: What’s Wrong with Designer Children, Bionic
Atheletes, and Genetic Enginerring? in Human Enhancement by JuliaSavulescu,
Nick Bostrom
Schechtman, Marya. The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1996.
Schermer, M On The Argument That Enhancement is Cheating, Journal of Medical
Ethics Issue 24, 2008