1NC

1NC
The role of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question: is topical action is
better than the status quo or competitive option?

USFG should means the debate is solely about a policy established by

governmental means
Jon M. Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts California Polytechnic U., et
al., The Debaters Guide, Third Edition, p. 4
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions

from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions . 1. An agent doing the acting The United States in The United

States should adopt a policy of free trade. Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2.
The verb shouldthe first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example,
should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means . 4. A
specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs,

discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about
whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an
audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Violation---the affirmative skirts the resolutional question and doesnt defend a

policy to reduce private sector GHGs

Well outline three impacts ---

First is Testing---A clear, well-defined resolution is critical to allow the NEG to

refute the AFF in an in-depth fashion---this process of negation produces iterative
testing and improvement where we learn to improve our arguments based on our
opponents arguments. This process does NOT proscribe particular styles or forms
of argument, but does require a common point of disagreement around which
arguments can be organized
Poscher, 16director at the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the
University of Freiburg (Ralf, Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal
Disagreement, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas
(eds.), Hart Publishing, forthcoming)
Hegels dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation . It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness
that they have the power to negate. The spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This [] is
the magical power that converts it into being.102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the labour of
the negative 103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of
disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our
reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits . We must go through
the labor of the negative to have trust in our deliberative processes.104
This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be
deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization
effect. When a group of likeminded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme
views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such
groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices . In these
scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases .107 A
second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement , which can even be
manipulatively used in the sense of a presumptuous We108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of
deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative
process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our
discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms . Each of
the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received by looking the
negative in the face and tarrying with it .
These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of
reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning , as might be the case in
deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and
improve our position . We have to do the labor of the negative for ourselves . Even if
we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody elses beliefs , attitudes
and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own
personal beliefs , attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs,
attitudes and dispositions is at least in important issues an aspect of personal integrity to borrow one of Dworkins favorite
expressions for a less aspirational idea.
In hard cases we must in some way lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we
believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion,
the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the
background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to
discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions
or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way
of corroborating a view , because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to
find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement . It
might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked
some counterargument to our case.
It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and
argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand
and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard
cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice
in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond
persuading him: to test ones own convictions , to engage our opponent in inferential
commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or
express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that there must be a hope
of coming to terms with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and
not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena.
f) The Advantage Over NonArgumentative Alternatives
It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically
hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of
coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture
of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason,
the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature . The rational does not lie in
the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right
answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at
hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments .
Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of
settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor like swiftness of decision
making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and
discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has
to come by some nonargumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the
Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law though the king
allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to nonviolent non
argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon,
who in his late days decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping
a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the
end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the
outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on
questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered?
One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held
apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some
participants in the debate. A second reason is that the
objectives listed above could not be achieved by a
nonargumentative procedure . Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help
us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize
the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity
account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself even if it is not
the only right one required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement .113
Combining legal argumentation with the nonargumentative decision making procedure of
counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the
labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or
inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position
must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that
somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines . It thus protects
against incoherent checkerboard treatments 114 of hard cases. It is the combination of
reasoned disagreement and the nonrational decisionmaking mechanism of
counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases : a decision and one of multiple possible
coherent constructions of the law. Pure nonrational procedures like flipping a coin would only provide for
the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures which are not geared towards a decision
procedure would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the
face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about
winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged . That the decision depends on
counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational
argumentation . No plain nonargumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a
coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of
arguments . It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational
scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above.
2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS
The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the
question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal
disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague onerightanswer theories in
particular. However, it must still come
up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree
about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes .
In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic
negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like cruel and unusual punishment in a deathpenalty case.116
Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking
past each other , since they are engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the same
term . The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the term serves as a semantic anchor for a
disagreement on the substantive issues connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The cruel
and unusual punishmentclause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only
provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper
than a discussion whether the term bank should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for
semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of
the term bank, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements.
A promising route to capture this aspect of legal disagreements might be offered by recent semantic approaches that try to accommodate the externalist challenges of realist semantics,117 which inspire oneright
answer theorists like Moore or David Brink. Neo descriptivist and twovalued semantics provide for the theoretical or interpretive element of realist semantics without having to commit to the ontological
positions of traditional externalism. In a sense they offer externalist semantics with no ontological strings attached.
The less controversial aspect of the externalist picture of meaning developed in neo descriptivist and twovalued semantics can be found in the deferential structure that our meaningproviding intentions often
encompass.118 In the case of natural kinds, speakers defer to the expertise of chemists when they employ natural kind terms like gold or water. If a speaker orders someone to buy $ 10,000 worth of gold as a safe
investment, he might not know the exact atomic structure of the chemical element 79. In cases of doubt, though, he would insist that he meant to buy only stuff that chemical experts or the markets for that
matter qualify as gold. The deferential element in the speakers intentions provides for the specific externalist element of the semantics.
In the case of the law, the meaningproviding intentions connected to the provisions of the law can be understood to defer in a
similar manner to the best overall theory or interpretation of the legal materials. Against the background of such a semantic
framework the conceptual unity of a linguistic practice is not ratified by the existence of a single best answer, but by the unity of the
interpretive effort that extends to legal materials and legal practices that have sufficient overlap119 be it only in a historical
perspective120. The fulcrum of disagreement that Dworkin sees in the existence of a single right answer121 does not
lie in its existence, but in the communality of the effort if only on the basis of an
overlapping common ground of legal materials , accepted practices , experiences
and dispositions . As two athletes are engaged in the same contest when they follow the
same rules , share the same concept of winning and losing and act in the same context,
but follow very different styles of e.g. wrestling, boxing, swimming etc. They are in the same contest,
even if there is no single best style in which to wrestle, box or swim. Each, however, is engaged in
developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the
best argument to convince a bench of judges.122 Within such a semantic framework even people
with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still share a concept ,
in that they are engaged in the same process of theorizing over roughly the same legal
materials and practices . Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant
disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are talking about the same
concept . An agonistic account of legal disagreement can build on such a semantic framework, which can explain
in what sense lawyers, judges and scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are not talking past
each other . They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same legal
materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead
them to divergent conclusions in hard cases. Despite the divergent conclusions, semantic unity is provided by
the largely overlapping legal materials that form the basis for their disagreement. Such
a semantic collapses only when we lack a sufficient overlap in the materials. To use an example
of Michael Moores: If we wanted to debate whether a certain work of art was just, we share neither paradigms nor a tradition of
applying the concept of justice to art such as to engage in an intelligible controversy.

Second is Clash---Debates about scholarship in a vacuum breed reactionary fact

based arguments---their role of the ballot allows the AFF to cement their prep
advantage into an undefeatable position since it lets them win as long as they used
their infinite time to find quality evidence supporting an ideological orientation.
The real controversy isnt the problem, its the solution, which is why
disadvantages based on their praxis are incredibly important. Clash controls the
key internal link to advocacy and education

Third is Fairness---it outweighs and needs to come first because its an intrinsic
good---not defending the clear actor and mechanism creates a massive side bias
that makes deploying other strategies against them inordinately AFF tilted. They
have the ability to radically recontextualize link arguments, emphasize different
proscriptive claims of the 1AC while using traditional competition standards like
perms to make being NEG impossible---kills predictability and structurally
incentivizes AFF conditionality---its a prerequisite to education

Debates over the intricacies of governmental climate policy are key to dismantle
violent structures---state pessimism is unfounded and turns the AFF
Newell & Paterson 11 Peter Newell is currently a Professor in Centre for Global Political
Economy, International Development at the University of Sussex. The author also holds the post
of Director of Research and Knowledge Exchange in The School of Global Studies at the
University of Sussex. The author holds Research expertise in Climate change, Energy, and
Finance. In 2008 the author was awarded an ESRC Climate Change Leadership Fellow to work
on The Governance of Clean Development. At the time of this writing, the author held the posts
of James Martin Fellow at the Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Principal Fellow
in the Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, University of Warwick. Keele
University. Matthew Paterson is Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Keele University.
From the Chapter: Climate Capitalism - From the Book: After Cancun - E. Altvater, A.
Brunnengraber (Eds.) Modified for language thats potentially objectionable. #CutWithKirby.
Look if you are going to steal this card- and you should at least dont delete the part of the
citation that gives a shout-out to Kirby. Available via the Spring Link Database - DOI
10.1007/978-3-531-94018-2_2,
So how are we to make sense of the ways in which capitalism has attempted to render climate change non-threatening and treatable within its existing structures and modes of
operation? A critique of the carbon economy that has resulted from climate policy's neo-liberal heritage is readily available. Such a
argues that climate policy has been hijacked, and environmentalism co-opted, into a set of approaches that
critique in effect

serve capital's drive for constant accumulation well, but which do little to reduce emissions. Empirically, such critiques

focus on the climate fraud and carbon colonialism' which carbon markets exhibit (Bachram 2004; Lohmann 2006). Theoretically, it arises out of a
critique of commodification which derives from Marx (Lohmann 2010, Castree 2003; Pru-dham 2009) and Polanyi (Lohmann 2006; Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Patcrson
2010), arguing in effect that the privatised form of the commodity is in direct contradiction with the structural requirements of climate change as a global public good. We have

many sympathies with such a critique of carbon markets. However we want to take issue in three ways. First is that
empirically, we are not convinced that the evidence is that water tight that carbon markets cannot, if well-designed and

regulated ( a big if, admittedly), play a co-ordinating role in shaping the global economy towards de-carbonisation. Their potential to provide system-wide incentives for

investors, producers and consumers, combined with the fixed cap s that at least emissions trading requires, seems to us unwise to dismiss out of hand. The widespread

assumption in critiques of marketisation that because it involves commodifica-tion , it cannot work in terms of

emissions reductions, is to ignore the contradictions internal to any project within capitalism. But contradictions in the Marxist sense go both ways in this
situation; just as for example it explains the inability of capital to realise its objectives fully, it also explains the unintended consequences and complex politics, in this case that

we
the rise of finance has produced system-wide co-ordination possibilities through financial markets that might be used to achieve environmental goals. Second is that

need to think politically about climate policy , which means in capitalist conditions that the
construction of a coalition of forces that can overcome the objections of interests threatened by
climate policy is crucial in imagining a political process that might decarbonise the
economy . Carbon markets arguably have proved extremely useful in this regard. Clearly, for any political-economy approach, the relationship between the state and
capital is central to an enquiry into the ways in which the carbon economy has come into being and evolved and the extent to which states can use markets to address market
failures or in the case of climate change what Nicolas Stern described as ,the world's greatest market failure* (Stern 2007). Given the nature of relationship between the state
and capital in conditions of capitalism, the mutual dependencies that exist and the structural power of capital in relation to the state (Gill and Law 1988; Holloway and Picciotto
1978), responses to climate change have to be negotiated with powerful sectors of the economy. Instances where industry have mobilised on a
widespread scale to veto policy developments they oppose , often on grounds of carbon leakage accompanied with threats to re-locate, have been highly
successful. The use of the Byrd-Hagel resolution in the US to veto its participation in the Kyoto Protocol and the aggressive and intensive campaign by large energy users against

the proposed EU carbon tax in 1992 provide clear examples of this (Newell and Paterson 1998). They suggest the dangers of failing
to engage powerful actors and fractions of capital willing to depart from
oppositional positions. But of course the interests of capital in relation to climate change are not monolithic. They have to be
expressed in terms which demonstrate a contribution to the interests of capital in general. Early on in the process, it was relatively straightforward for energy producers to argue
that their business served the interests of capital in general because of the close relationship between energy use (largely based on fossil fuel use) and economic growth (Newell
and Paterson 1998). But that situation has become significantly more complex since the mid 1990s, with the emergence of various parts of large transnational business (from the
energy sector, to insurance, to financiers, to some parts of manufacturing) seeing increasing benefits in emissions reductions, especially if organised through an overarching

thinking about the state -capital relation with regard to

policy framework organised around emission trading. In this context,

climate change does not leave us with a singular account of how that politics will
play out. Third is that the process of resistance to carbon markets should be thought of as internal
to politics
the , not as an add-on extra (Paterson 2009; 2010). Beyond the strategic attempts to create new
alliances with powerful elements within neo-liberalism, such as Greenpeace's attempts to court the insurance industry (Paterson 2001) or
the attempts to use investor power to push firms to disclose their emissions described above, a broader set of critics of carbon markets, who are sceptical of capitalism's ability to
reconcile its growth requirements with efforts to reduce GHG emissions, have sought to expose the scams and injustices associated with
carbon markets. Rather than
apart from the system stand (operate) ,

the effect
nevertheless, is to create better of their campaigns and exposes, functioning markets where

advocates with a stake in and those their success are forced to deal with these critiques and demonstrate that they do not
diminish their ability to deliver emissions reductions in a profitable way. That is, actually existing carbon markets reflect in a number of ways concerns about climate fraud and
carbon colonialism. The virtual exclusion of forests from the CDM to date is one example, the emergence of certification systems in the voluntary markets noted above another.
This is in part the answer to the ,a big if in the first point above, since it follows that continued critique of and social movement activism against carbon markets is crucial (if
ironically so) in maximising the potential of such markets in relation to emissions reductions and global
justice .
 1NC
The Aff paves the road for Trumpism
Claudio 16 Lisandro Claudio, Assistant Professor At the Department of Political Science at
the Ateneo de Manila University, Intellectuals Have Ushered the World Into a Dangerous Age
of Political Nihilism, Quartz, 7-1, http://qz.com/721914/intellectuals-have-ushered-the-world-
into-a-dangerous-age-of-political-nihilism/
On the surface, it would seem that intellectuals have nothing to do with the rise of global
illiberalism. The movements powering Brexit, Donald Trump and Third-World strongmen like
Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte all gleefully reject books, history and higher education in
favor of railing against common enemies like outsiders and globalization. And youll find few
Trump supporters among the largely left-wing American professoriate.
Yet intellectuals are accountable for the rise of these movementsalbeit indirectly.
Professors have offered stringent criticisms of neoliberal society. But they have failed to offer the
public viable alternatives . In this way, they have promoted a political nihilism that has
set the stage for new movements that reject liberal democratic principles of tolerance and
institutional reform.
Intellectuals have a long history of critiquing liberalism , which relies on a philosophy of
individual rights and (relatively) free markets. Beginning in the 19th century, according to
historian Francois Furet, left-wing thinkers began to arrive at a consensus that modern liberal
democracy was threatening society with dissolution because it atomized individuals, made them
indifferent to public interest, weakened authority, and encouraged class hatred.
For most of the 20th century, anti-liberal intellectuals were able to come up with alternatives.
Jean-Paul Sartre famously defended the Soviet Union even when it became clear that Joseph
Stalin was a mass murderer. French, American, Indian, and Filipino university radicals were
hopelessly enamored of Mao Zedongs Cultural Revolution in the 1970s.
The collapse of Communism changed all this. Some leftist intellectuals began to find hope in
small revolutionary guerrillas in the Third World, like Mexicos Subcomandante Marcos. Others
fell back on pure critique.
Academics are now mostly gadflies who rarely offer strategies for political change . Those
who do forward alternatives propose ones so vague or divorced from reality that they
might as well be proposing nothing . (The Duke University professor of romance studies
Michael Hardt, for example, thinks the evils of modern globalization are so pernicious that only
worldwide love is the answer.)
Such thinking promotes political hopelessness . It rejects gradual change as cosmetic ,
while patronizing those who think otherwise. This nihilism easily spreads from the
classroom and academic journals to op-ed pages to Zuccotti Park, and eventually to the public at
large.
For academic nihilists, the shorthand for the worlds evils is neoliberalism. The term is
used to refer to a free market ideology that forced globalization on people by reducing the power
of governments. The more the term is used, however, the more it becomes a vague
designation for all global drudgery.
Democratic politics in the age of neoliberalism, according to Harvard anthropologists Jean and
John Comaroff, is something of a pyramid scheme: the more it is indulged, the more it is
required. They argue that our belief that we can use laws and constitutional processes to defend
our rights is a form of fetishism that is ultimately chimerical.
For the University of Chicago literary theorist Lauren Berlant, the democratic pursuit of
happiness amid neoliberalism is nothing but cruel optimism. The materialist things that
people desire are actually an obstacle to your flourishing, she writes.
According to this logic, we are trapped by our own ideologies. It is this logic that allows left-wing
thinkers to implicitly side with British nativists in their condemnation of the EU. The radical
website Counterpunch, for example, describes the EU as a neoliberal prison. It also views
liberals seeking to reform the EU as coopted by the right wing and its goalsfrom the
subversion of progressive economic ideals to neoliberalism, to the enthusiastic embrace of
neoconservative doctrine.
Across the Atlantic, Trump supporters are singing a similar tune . Speaking to a black,
gay, college-educated Trump supporter, Samantha Bee was told: Weve had these disasters in
neoconservatism and neoliberalism and I think that he [Trump] is an alternative to both those
paths.
The academic nihilists and the Trumpists are in agreement about a key issue: The system is
fundamentally broken, and liberals who believe in working patiently toward change are weak.
For the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos, indifference is the the hallmark
of political liberalism. Since liberals balance different interests and rights, Santos writes, they
have no permanent friends or foes. He proposes that the world needs to revive the friend/foe
dichotomy. And in a profane way, it has: modern political movements pit Americans against
Muslims, Britain against Europe, a dictatorial government against criminals.
Unfortunately, academic anti-liberalism is not confined to the West. The Cornell political
scientist Benedict Anderson once described liberal democracy in the Philippines as a Cacique
Democracy, dominated by feudal landlords and capitalist families. In this system, meaningful
reform is difficult, since the countrys political system is like a well-run casino, where tables
are rigged in favor of oligarch bosses. Having a nihilist streak myself, I once echoed Anderson
when I chastised Filipino nationalists for projecting hope onto spaces within an elite
democracy. Like Anderson, I offered no alternative.
The alternative arrived recently in the guise of the Duterte, the new president of the Philippines.
Like Anderson and me, Duterte complained about the impossibility of real change in a
democracy dominated by elites and oligarchs. But unlike us, he proposed a way out: a strong
political leader who was willing to kill to save the country from criminals and corrupt politicians.
The spread of global illiberalism is unlikely to end soon. As this crisis unfolds, we will need
intellectuals who use their intellects for more than simple negationprofessors like the late New
York University historian Tony Judt, who argued that European-style social democracy could
save global democracy. Failing that, we need academics who acknowledge that liberal
democracy, though slow and imperfect, enables a bare minimum of tolerance in a world beset by
xenophobia and hatred. For although academics have the luxury of imagining a
completely different world , the rest of us have to figure out what to do with the one
we have.

Trump risks short-term extinction. The immediate political task is to identify anti-
democratic red lines and stop him from crossing them---this demands a wide-
ranging front that sets aside internal differences and focuses on proximate threats
to create the conditions for all other progressivism.
Mounk 11-9 Yascha Mounk, Lecturer on Government at Harvard University, Carnegie Fellow
at New America, What We Do Now: How to Preserve the Ideals of Liberal Democracy in the
Face of a Trump Presidency, Slate,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/11/how_to_preserve_the_ide
als_of_liberal_democracy_in_the_face_of_a_trump_presidency.html
[language modified]
The unspeakable has happened: Donald J. Trump has been elected president of the United
States. The commander in chief, the most powerful man on earth, the supposed leader of the
free world is now a man who holds liberal democracy in contempt.
Its difficult to say what the next years will bring. For all his venom, Trump is no ideologue. He
has not worked out a plan for how to subvert American democracy or destroy liberal
institutions, if only because he has not much of a plan at all. So there is an outside chance that
he will prove to be a surprisingly conventionalor simply a historically ineffectivepresident.
But that seems unlikely. In my recent work, I have shown that citizens have increasingly turned
against liberal democracy, especially in the United States. The traditional checks and balances
that are supposed to safeguard our rights are at best imperfect bulwarks against a president
determined to amass power. In many countries around the world, the consequences are already
visible: Illiberal democracy, a system in which the people rule but the rights of unpopular
minorities are routinely violated, is on the march.
And if one thing is clear about Trump, it is that his instincts are deeply authoritarian . The
political scientist Juan Linz listed the warning signs long ago. As described by the Harvard
political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, they include a refusal to unambiguously
disavow violence, a readiness to curtail rivals civil liberties, and the denial of the legitimacy of
an elected government. Trump, they write, passes this anti-democratic litmus test with
flying colors:
He has encouraged violence among supporters (offering to pay their legal fees), pledged to jail
Hillary Clinton and take legal action against unfriendly media, and suggested that he might not
accept the election results. Such acts are unprecedented among major American candidates, but
they are precisely the kind of behavior that Linz and other scholars have identified as preceding
democratic breakdown in interwar Europe.
Of course, for all we know, Trump may never attack the freedom of the press. He may never
order his underlings to commit illegal acts. He may never decide to disobey a ruling by the
Supreme Court. He may never manufacture a foreign war to assure himself of re-election. And
he may never falsify election results or lock up his political opponents, when all of that wont
suffice.
But all these horrors are now real possibilities. If we are to have any chance of stopping
them, we must start to learn the art of resisting a would-be dictator .
That art is difficult to master . It cannot be imported wholesale from other countries or
contexts. Even if we learn to excel at itand we will have to learn on the fly, with no safety net to
catch our fallwe might well fail. But there are ordinary times, when the stakes of politics are
real yet limited, and then there are extraordinary times, when the most basic questions
about the future are up for grabs. A vast majority of Americans have only ever lived in
ordinary times. Now, with terrifying suddenness, the survival of the American republicand
of liberal democracy around the world is in danger. So we need to understand that the
stakes are higher than they have ever been in our lifetimes. Doing the right thing over the
course of the next four years will demand more sacrifice and greater courage than we could have
imagined a few short months ago. Here are some initial thoughtsstill far too broad and
inchoate, but a startfor what we can do to preserve liberalism in the face of such peril.
We accept Trumps victory . However much he scares us, we recognize his election as part of
the democratic process to which we are committed. But we also know that there are many things
an elected president does not have the authority to do, and we must be vigilant about
enforcing that red line . As soon as Trump does something unconstitutional or morally
abhorrent, we will come out into the streets in full forceand then we must not let up until he
retreats.
The press has a key role to play in fighting for the survival of free speech. It must remain
committed to the truth. But it is because of that commitment that all false equivalence must
cease. It is not possible to be neutral between a would-be tyrant and the democratic opposition.
Anybody who applies the bipartisan norms of political reporting that may have been appropriate
in 1979 to 2016 is falling into the trap that produced our current predicament.
To resist a would-be tyrant, you need to work with strange bedfellows . For the next
four years, we must build the broadest possible coalition against Trump. This coalition will
have plenty of internal disagreements : It will include Barack Obama and Mitt Romney but
also Jill Stein and Glenn Beck. Thats OK . Our joint goal is to work toward a future in
which these differences can come back to the fore .
We must condemn the individuals who are complicit in any form of authoritarian overreach in
the strongest terms. One of the great virtues of liberalism is that political rivals can continue to
be civil to each other. But when some people seek to destroy the most basic rights of their fellow
citizens, civility toward them is misplaced. If you are supporting an aspiring dictator, you need
to feel the social consequences.
On the other hand, if you decide to stand on the right side of history, no matter how late in
the game, we welcome you with open arms. Your sins will be forgiven, at least until the
danger is banished . If coming out against Trump gets you fired, we will crowdsource for you.
And if you are spending all of your time and energy organizing against Trump, our couches and
kitchens will have your name on them; we will not let you go hungry while you are fighting for us
all.
 1NC

Government should substantially increase funding for fusion energy generation in

the United States.

That brings it online quickly

Burnett 12 (Burke, Executive Secretary Pacific Science Association, Executive Director
Indo-Pacific Conservation Alliance, and MA in International Relations Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies, CBS News Segment On Potentially Game-Changing Fusion
Research, EnterSpace, 4-1, http://enterspace.typepad.com/blog/2012/04/fusion-research-at-
nif.html)
In terms of physics , there is no barrier to fusion as a successful source of energy - the
Given the massive benefits to
problem is that it isn't easy to achieve ignition, sustained fusion reaction, and breakeven.
society and the economy that
would result from successful commercialization of fusion, we
should be spending tens of billions more annually on fusion research. We really
haven't put much effort (i.e. funding) into fusion given what a genuine game-changer that
technology would be. There's the standard joke that "fusion is thirty years away, and always will
be" - which strikes me as unhelpfully cynical when the problem is driven by the fact that
we just haven't made fusion a national (or international) priority. Funding for fusion has
been anemic since the late 1950s.
According to the Focus Fusion Society, a New Jersey-based non-profit that seeks to advance aneutronic fusion research, Since 1953,
when the fusion program started, the total spent on fusion energy in the US, both Magnetic and Inertial is $22.4 Billion dollars.
Adjusting for inflation, total fusion spending is $29.1 Billion. Thats for 57 years of fusion funding. Thats an average of $393 Million
a year - adjusted to $510 million per year in the US. This includes NIF as well as Tokamaks and alternatives. Does that seem like a
lot to you?
I can't confirm those FFS numbers are correct (anyone who can provide better/official figures is encouraged to leave a comment),
but the larger point is that fusion research is seriously under-funded, and always has been relative to its value to
society. Moreover, U.S. spending is set to decline in Obama's proposed FY 2013 budget. There are
lots of politics involved here that I'm not following - or really qualified to comment on, to be honest - such as the relative
value of spending on MIT's work versus shifting funding over to ITER. My point is that we should be
increasing U.S. federal spending for fusion across the board , which would render
these zero-sum budget games moot.

Solves warming
Dominy 9 (John, Professor University of Nittingham, Internally Quoted (Along with Others)
for Channel 4 News Research, Ten Ideas to Save the Planet: The Nuclear Option, Channel 4
News, 11-30, http://www.channel4.com/news/ten-ideas-to-save-the-planet-the-nuclear-option)
What idea policy or technology holds the greatest promise for tackling climate change? That was the
question Channel 4 News posed to the scientific community over the past few weeks. Thanks to the extensive contacts of the Science
Media Centre at the Royal Institution Channel 4 News was able to email hundreds of scientists across various fields of expertise to
sound-out their opinions. The one nuclear word that kept on coming up was "fusion". One in ten of the
scientists who contacted us hailed nuclear as the salvation - and in particular the development of fusion technology. Is fusion the
future? Fusion is a nuclear reaction that makes stars, such as the sun, burn. The reaction takes place when a superheated gas called a
plasma reaches a stage called ignition. Hydrogen atoms then start to fuse with each other releasing large amounts of energy. This
type of nuclear reaction is widely sought after as it creates less radioactive waste than more traditional methods, such as fission. The
energy produced also lasts longer and can be created in less time. "The essential technology has to be nuclear
fusion," said Professor John Dominy from the University of Nottingham. "Based on cost benefit and green
element that comes out "conventional" sustainable technologies will not begin to save the
planet ." Prof Steve Cowley director of Culham Centre for Fusion Energy agreed. "Without a doubt developing
commercial fusion power would allow us to halt and reverse climate change . It will happen
one day - clearly the sooner the better ," he said. Prof Michael Wilson from the University Warwick went as
far as saying that nuclear fusion is the only option in tackling climate change. "Everything else
is currently a technological myth, a desperate hope, or a downright con trick (especially wind
turbines)", he said. Nick Walton from the University of Portsmouth suggested using nuclear fusion as a basis
for developing CO2-free energy. "Increase nuclear fission power whilst running down coal oil and gas power to take us
up to the start of a clean, safe, fusion-powered world. Meanwhile utilising carbon capture and storage," he proposed.

Its real, anthropogenic and causes extinction

Flournoy 12 Citing Feng Hsu, PhD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center. Don
Flournoy is a PhD and MA from the University of Texas, Former Dean of the University College
@ Ohio University, Former Associate Dean @ State University of New York and Case Institute of
Technology, Project Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite,
Currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications @ Ohio
University (Don, "Solar Power Satellites," January, Springer Briefs in Space Development, Book,
p. 10-11
In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research
center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, The evidence of global warming is alarming,
noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu
2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a
global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to
global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues
who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and
that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity . No matter whether these
trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts
that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations
between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earths atmosphere with respect to the
historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of
the worlds scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic
global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we
continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earths biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010
) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing
nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. This, he
writes, is because the
risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the
extinction of human species , a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances (Hsu 2010 )
Case
 1NC Bronstein
Speculative poetics fails
Bronstein 11
Zelda Bronstein graduated from UC Berkeley with a B.A. in the Philosophy of Politics and Culture. After receiving an
M.A. in Political Science from SUNY Albany and a doctorate in the History of Consciousness program with a
specialization in American Studies at UC Santa Cruz, she taught American literature at UC Santa Barbara and also
taught at Merritt College. She is also a writer whose work has appeared in Dissent magazine, the Berkeley Daily
Planet, BeyondChron, 48 hills, the California Progress Report, Film Quarterly, Le Monde diplomatique, Open
Democracy, and The Nation. - Politics Fatal Therapeutic Turn Dissent Summer, 2011 modified for potentially
objectionable language. obtained via OmniFile Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson) database
In a Washington Post op-ed co-authored with Peter Dreier in August 2009, Ganz explained what he means by capacity. The piece called for
movement-building that would induce the president to make good on his campaign rhetoric and take on entrenched interests. To succeed, such
organizing must be rooted in the moral energy that can transform peoples anger, frustrations and hopes into focused public action, creating a sense of
urgency equal to the crises facing the country. The actions the authors recommended ranged from leafleting, holding vigils, and running newspaper
ads to acts of nonviolent civil disobedience. Ganzs criticism of MoveOn hit its target. The organization has been inviting members of its local councils
to weekend trainings called Camp MoveOn. At the session that I attended in Oakland last August, the trainers hailed Ganzs approach and showed a
video clip of a class he led. Half of the sixty-onepage Camp MoveOn Participant Guide was explicitly dedicated to his teachings. The camp curriculum,
with its emphasis on personal expression and self-realization, has a therapeutic cast. For Ganz, organizing is primarily about creating relationships
through public narrative, stories individuals tell about choices theyve made in the face of uncertainty. By telling and hearing stories about choice
points in their lives, he says, people construct their identities and move others to join them in action. The great advantage of such stories is that unlike
ideas, they engage both head and heart. Riffing on Rabbi Hillels famous adage If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am only for myself,
what am I? If not now, when? Ganz asks his students to share, in succession, stories of self; stories of us, which recount why our community is
called to act; and stories of now, which ask us to commit ourselves to a movement. At the Oakland Camp MoveOn, participants spent the entire first
day being led through just such a sequence. Throughout the day, the storytelling drills were interspersed with exhortations to trust in each other and
to get inspired, as well as capsule accounts of MoveOns history, organizationdescribed as leadership-rich and illustrated by a pattern of interlaced
snowflakesand mission: to bring real people back into the political process and rebuild this habit of organizing. The mission as stated was
admirable; the means intended to accomplish it, problematic. Personalized storytelling was supposed to foster solidarity. Through the story of self,
one trainer declared, you can create community. In fact, community grows out of trust, and trust out of shared action, not shared stories. A
compelling story can inspire people to get involved, but its only in the course of working together that you find out whether, and how, people walk their
talk. That knowledge leads to confidence (or not) in others and, if the requisite trust has been earned, to the loyalty that sustains solidarity. To speak of
community, however, is still to miss the mark, a mark that has politics written all over it. As Christopher Lasch observed, whereas the concept of
community evokes intimacy and togethernesspolitical life thrives on controversy. And political controversy centers on the deployment of power,
a source of contention among allies as well as opponents. One of the most challenging assignments facing leaders of a professedly democratic
organization is to reconcile the organizations democratic professions with its strategic need for unity in a manner that builds general confidence and
trust. We are led by our members, one of the MoveOn trainers told the assembled campers, explaining that every week the organization polls 1/52 of
its e-mail list on priority issues, seeking consensus in the results. To MoveOns left critics, Hayes reported, such consultation hardly constitutes
bottom-up leadership. The organization, these observers contend, is really run by its staff. Building the local councils is an avowed effort at
democratization. To judge from the proceedings at Oakland Camp MoveOn, that effort has a long way to go, and Ganzs precepts arent helping it to get
there. Tensions around accountability surfaced in the hour-long orientation conference call held the Tuesday evening before the weekend event. For
most of the call, campers voices were muted by the trainers. Occasionally, however, we were un-muted and invited to ask questions. Early on, a man
asked if there was going to be some discussion about the relationship between the councils and MoveOn central leadership. The San Francisco
council, he said, has had some issues aboutcontinuing to operate efficiently that had to do with its relationship to MoveOn Central. At the
training, would there be time to provide feedback up the chain? It was a crucial question about where power lay within the organization. I appreciate
that question, said the presiding trainer, who assured us that issues not on the agenda could be discussed over the weekend at camper-initiated
lunchtime groups. The next day participants were emailed notes from the call. In place of the San Franciscans query and the trainers reply was a
friendly reminder on what the content is for this weekends training[:]for us to really discuss our member leadership development model & current
campaign. The weekends tight agenda and the optional lunch discussion groups were mentioned again, but with a warning: In the rare instance
where a particular individual is being disruptive to the agenda at hand, those specific individuals may be asked to leave the training. At the Oakland
camp, no such disruption occurred. But more than once, attendees questioned the advisability of a MoveOn policy or practicefor example, the
unilateral online purging by MoveOns Washington staff of members who had not recently taken part in a MoveOn activity. Each time, the inquiry
was squelched by a trainer. The blame for this high-handedness lies at least partly with Marshall Ganz. To be sure, his leadership-rich model of
organization was jettisoned by the trainers at Oakland Camp MoveOn. Perhaps that was inevitable, given MoveOns centralized structure. That said, the
closest the Participant Guide came to offering advice on resisting leadershippoor facilitation was a four-line bulleted item under the heading
Setting Norms for Council Building that instructed participants to brainstorm how the group will discuss options and reach decisions as a team
to ensure vigorous input and debate and how it will self correct if the norm is broken. (Needless to say, no such discussion occurred at the Oakland
training.) Ganz is no stranger to issues of control and dissent. His book about the farm workers movement, Why David Sometimes Wins, details Cesar
Chavezs descent into autocracy and the resulting decline of the United Farm Workers. But at the trainings he advisesand I speak as a veteran of
Camp Obama as well as Camp MoveOnthefocus is on motivating involvement through the emotional pull of storytelling, not
inculcating the conceptual and practical tools of democratic mobilization. Ganzs emphasis on narrative is an
understandable response to the wonkery that has too often deadened left calls to action, and compelling moral rhetoric is an essential political tool. But

e
ffective radical politics , it needs to be premised on explicitly
if storytelling is to advance an accountable and

political grounds: the ends and means of power wielded on behalf of the common good. Instead, Ganzs method
gives priority to personal a
ffect and motivation. The upshot is a method of organizing
that not only leaves individuals helpless before peremptory authority but also neglects, when
it doesnt actually undermine, the creation of a solid agenda that lays out issues and commensurate policies, and the
design and implementation of a strategy that can realize that agenda. The last point was hammered home by Sean Wilentz in a
November 2010 New Republic essay that attacked Ganz for disdaining grubby politics and issues in favor of inspirational feeling and values.
Wilentzs criticism was borne out by the curriculum at Camp MoveOn. Ostensibly, participants were being educated in
recruitment. But it was hard to grasp how Ganzian stories would work as a recruiting tool, unless they were folded
into an explicitly political contextin this case, MoveOns current campaign from the start.
Instead, the campers, almost all strangers to each other, were first invited to expound on their successful encounters

with personal challenges of whatever sort. Unsurprisingly, my group found it easiest to come up with stories of self; stories of us
proved more elusive; stories of now were pretty much beyond usa performance that boded poorly for the future
of our local council. But the real cause for distress isnt Marshall Ganz. Its the adoption of his ideas by the leaders of MoveOn and the Sierra
Club, both high-profile organizations that enjoy substantial progressive support. Their embrace of a personalized politics
indicates the dismaying extent to which therapeutic values have permeated and distorted our political culture.
Treating people with respect is an indispensable component of democratic politics; basing political
engagement on personal affirmation is a recipe for impotence ( failure ). And political vigor
isnt the only casualty of the therapeutic mode: the irony of both organizing by storytelling and
online citizen participation is that for all their preoccupation with personal well-being, such tactics actually (hampers)
weaken individual character. Instead of disseminating an anemic form of activism, the Left should be fostering the strenuous
citizenship essential to democracy. We can do that only if we recognize what such citizenship entails: the morale to identify with a common
cause; the will to act; the wit to temper passion with astuteness; the courage to call power to account; and, in Max
Webers poignant phrase, the steadfastness of heart which can brave even the crumbling of all hopes.
 1NC University

Well straight turn their University K.

- No link *to us* Universitys not monolithic AND our deployments are not
politics as usual.

- Their K denies agency and locks-in the squo they seek to escape.
Tolson internally quoting Wellmon 15
This card is an excerpt from Chad Wellmons new book. Wellmon is a faculty fellow at the Institute for Advanced
Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia. Wellmons book is titled: Organizing Enlightenment: Information
Overload and the Invention of the Modern Research University - Jay Tolson is Editor of The Hedgehog Review, a
publication of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia. A journalist, editor, author,
and critic, Tolson covered religion, culture and ideas for U. S. News & World Report after working for more than
decade as the literary editor and editor of the Wilson Quarterly Article Title: Media Excess, Disruption, and the
Future of the University HEDGEHOG REVIEW: Critical Reflections on Contemporary Culture - March 11 th
ellipses in original modified for potentially objectionable language - Available at: http://iasc-
culture.org/THR/channels/THR/author/jtolson/

In his new book, Organizing Enlightenment: Information Overload and the Invention of the
Modern Research University, literary historian Chad Wellmon , a faculty fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in
Culture, argues against those who claim that the research university is an outmoded, bureaucratic

institution ripe for disruption. Recounting the emergence of the research university in another era of media excess, this one driven by print, he focuses on what has
always distinguished the research universityan ethics of knowledge. And this, he claims, is needed now more than ever. Here is an excerpt from the

afterword of his book: Misgivings about specialized science and disciplinarity have returned in recent jeremiads about the research university from within its
most elite ranks. Harvard professor Louis Menand writes that the structure of disciplinarity that has arisen with the modern research university is expensive; it is
philosophically weak; and it encourages intellectual predictability and social irrelevance. It deserves to be replaced. Similarly, CUNY professor Cathy Davidson has criticized the
research university as an archaic, hierarchical, silod apparatus of the nineteenth century. Our institutions of higher learning have managed to change far more slowly than the
modes of inventive, collaborative, participatory learning offered by the Internet and other online and digital technologies. Unlike some of the more general critiques of the
universitys disciplinary structure, however, Davidsons critique is more focused on what is actually at stake. Our universities are stuck, she writes, in an epistemological
model of the past. Our digital age entails not just new and better technologies but an entirely different notion of what constitutes true knowledge: how it is produced,
authorized, and disseminated. The disciplinary organization of knowledge is antiquated and dispensable. The very structures and forms of knowledge are changing, and, for
Davidson at least, the disciplinary research university is being left behind. In her more recent work on the future of education, Davidson embraces the potential of digital
technologies to undo the authority structure of the research university and spur collaborative forms of knowledge production. And yet, in what she describes as a field guide
and survival manual for the digital age, her Now You See It: How the Brain Science of Attention Will Change the Way We Live, Work, and Think, she relies on that same
authority structure she seems eager to escape. She bases her guide for the digitally perplexed on what she calls the science of attention. She grounds her argument in the
authority of modern, disciplinary-based science as she cites study after study, all of which are legitimated by the authority of the disciplinary order of the modern research

the research university ethic is. But it has endured not because it
university. Davidsons bad faith is a testament to just how enduring a system

was a rigid, hierarchical system, a Weberian iron cage, a Foucauldian panopticon , but rather because it has sustained
communities of people engaged in a common pursuit. Research universities have never overcome the fragmentation of knowledge or realized

anything like a universal knowledge. But what they have done is organize intellectual labor, traditions, and desires more effectively over the past
two hundred years than any other technology. To dismiss the research university as an antiquated bureaucratic apparatus defined by

constraint and enforceable standards is to overlook the ways in which its continuity and stability depended on the transformation of actual
people . At
this particular moment we need of technological and institutional change,

motivating ideals to orient our institutions and ourselves .

The idea of the research university is more than its bureaucratic structures. However haltingly, the research university embodies ideals and virtues
that scholars both inside and outside the university hold dear. This is where primarily structural accounts
of the research university as simply a bureaucratic system, seemingly lacking human agents who
endow it with meaning and life, can offer no compelling vision (approach)
for a future These cool, distant accounts of the research university, so redolent of Webers
research university.

(observe) nothing at stake, just the inexorable logic of another

description of any other modern, rational system, see

modern bureaucracy. They (ignore) overlook the persons and norms that have always been the core of the
research university. Anthony Grafton describes this attitude best: the loss of patience, or faith, or interest in specialized knowledge is
ultimately a capitulation to the absolute ness of the bureaucratic
system of the contemporary research university. Such an attitude belies a thoroughly structural account that omits the research universitys most basic feature: its

underlying ethic. These more radically functional accounts, however descriptively illuminating, can
never answer a basic question: why would anyone choose to devote herself (themselves) to
specialized knowledge and an institution such as the research university? The research university reproduces itself by forming people into its
culture. Its survival relies on the decisions of actual people, not simply on the abstract totalizing mechanisms of an

institution. Advocates of the contemporary research university need to recognize and embrace its most central feature: the fact that it embodies a set of norms,
practices, and virtues central to modern knowledge. Whatever its myriad failings and bureaucratic functions, the research university sustains

what scholars hold in common and commit themselves to an ethics of knowledge.

 1NC Hyperreality and Simulation
Critiques of hyperreality are violent---turns the AFF---its life-denying, trivializes
violent experiences, and hampers useful critique.
Wallace 4
Michele Faith Wallace is a feminist author. She self-identifies as an African-American female. She became famous in
1979 when, at age 27, she published Black Macho and The Myth of The Superwoman. Her writings on literature, art,
film, and popular culture have been widely published and have made her a "leader of a [new] generation of African-
American intellectuals." Dark Designs and Visual Culture page 444

Lets just suppose, for a moment, that our attraction to these images is neither evil nor detestable, and that we won't
burn in hell. There is this residual puritanism in some black feminist and black gay thought that seems to suggest that
anything at all pleasurable in the context of race, especially having to do with the visibility of race, must be relentlessly probed
and interrogated for reactionary implications. There is an unwillingness to allow any internal
differentiation in categories of racism. It seems odd to suggest that visual or narrative stereotype in
representations ought to be considered a sin precisely to the same degree, and in the same manner, as
a lynching of a black person or the burning of a black church. To do so is to trivialize the lynching or the church burning, and to make
a mockery of serious critique . I am one of those people Judith Butler refers to in the beginning of Bodies That Matter
who has a profound problem with the "linguistic idealism" of poststructuralism (27), especially when it
is put forth as the determining factor in political questions that might more properly choose to reference history,
reality, and experience. While I can accept the gravity of the post-structuralist critique of such essentialist categories, and even
find it occasionally useful as a scholar of black studies, women's studies, and gay studies to remind others that any convincing and seamless narration of
facts and events probably includes some fictional elements, nevertheless, this
does not mean that history, reality, and
experience don't exist or should be entirely discounted . Just because language can only approximate reality,
just because reality constantly eludes representation, that doesn't mean that we should stop
trying to find out what is really real.

Simulation thesis wrong on the environment

Tulloch 2K
John Tulloch is Professor of Journalism and Head of the School of Journalism at the University of Lincoln, United Kingdom. He is
Co-Director of the Centre for Media Policy, Regulation and Ethics (CEMPRE). From 1997-2003 Tulloch was Chair of the
Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Westminster. He has taught, designed and validated
journalism programmes in a number of international settings including India, Yemen, Oman, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
nine European countries. In 1984 he set up the first positive action journalism diploma in a U.K. university, backed by the CRE and
the BBC. In 1995-2003 and 2006-2007 he designed and managed the British Chevening programme for young Indian newspaper
journalists for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Tulloch has edited two books and authored numerous journal articles and
chapters on media subjects. Environmental Risks and the Media edited by Allan, Adam, and Carter. This card appears in Chapter
12 p.185
But their comments of the relation of the undecidable and the incalculable to the media and environmental risk
also indicate their significant difference. In Baudrillards postmodern world, environmental
risk and media signfication fuse. The nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island has no core reality
beyond televisions images of it, the television event having supremacyover the nuclear event which itself remains.in
some sense imaginary(Baudrillard 1984:18). In Becks risk society, the environmental hazards produced by
science and technology Chernobyl, Bhopal, the greenhouse effect, pollution, global warming are clearly not
simulacra; and far from TV becoming the world in an endless fragmentation and succession of images
(as Baudrillards vision), the media form one of many institutions of experts (together with science and the law)
which define and circulate politically salient discourses of risk.

(Note: Ulrich Beck internally quoted as an opponent of Baudrillards thesis is a professor of

sociology at Munich's Ludwig-Maximilian University and the London School of Economics)
 1NC Liberalism
Liberal humanism K is an empirical lie
Chandler 10
(David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of
Westminster Review of International Studies Vol. 36 (2011), Special Issue: Evaluating Global Orders, pp.137-155. Available at:
http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/journal_articles/RIS%20-%20Uncritical%20Critique%20of%20Lib%20Peace.pdf)
This article seeks to forward an alternative framework and to question the use of the liberal
peace rubric to describe and analyse post-conflict and international statebuilding interventions in the post-Cold War period. It will be argued that the
critique of liberal peace bears much less relation to policy practice than might be
assumed by the critical (radical and policy) discourses and, in fact, appears to inverse the
relationship between the critique of the liberal peace and the dominant policy assumptions.
The shared desire to critique liberal peace leads to a set of the

assumptions and one-sided representations that portray Western policy interventions as

too liberal: too fixated on Western models and too keen to allow democratic freedoms and market autonomy. It will be explained here that this view
of liberal interventions transforming post-conflict societies through immediate liberalisation and rapid democratization and marketization is a self-
serving and fictional policy narrative.5 This narrative fiction is then used, in the frameworks
of policy orientated critiques, as the basis upon which to reflect upon Western policy and to limit policy expectations (while
often extending regulatory controls) on the basis that the aspirations of external interveners were too ambitious, too

interventionist, and too liberal for the states and societies which were the subject of intervention. It is unfortunate that this policy narrative can
appear to be given support by more radical critiques of post-Cold War intervention, similarly framed through the critique of liberal
peace. For example, Oliver Richmond is not exceptional in re-reading the catastrophe of the invasion and occupation of Iraq in terms of an attempt to mimic the liberal state, which has done much to
discredit the universal claims of the transferability of the liberal peace in political terms.6 Michael Barnett argues that liberal values clearly guide peacebuilding activities and that their explicit goal is to create a
state defined by the rule of law, markets and democracy.7 Beate Jahn has argued that the tragedy of liberal diplomacy lies in the ideological drive of liberalism, in which intervention is intensified despite the

Foucaultian-inspired theorists, Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, similarly reinforce the claims that the key
counterproductive results.8

problematic of intervention is its liberal nature in their assertion that we are witnessing a liberal drive to
control and to regulate the post-colonial world on the behalf of neo-liberal or biopolitical power ,
seeking to globalize the domesticating power of civil society mechanisms in a war against all other modes of cultural forms.9
 1NC Impact D
Extinction not inevitable. particular actions can work but ONLY if we operate at
the level of the REAL
Parenti 11
(Christian, PhD in Sociology from the London School of Economics, visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics,
as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, taught at the New College of California and at St. Mary's College, Tropic of Chaos: Climate
Change and the New Geography of Violence, June 28, 2011)
There is one last imperative question. Several strands of green thinking maintain that capitalism is incapable
of arriving at a sustainable relationship with nature because, as an economic system, capitalism must grow
exponentially, while the earth is finite. You will find this argument in the literature of ecosocialism, deep ecology, and ecoanarchism.
The same argument is often cast by liberal greens in deeply ahistorical and antitheoretical terms that, while critical of the
economic system, often decline to name it. Back in the early 1970s, the Club of Romes book Limits to Growth fixated on the dangers
of growth" but largely avoided explaining why capitalism needs growth or how growth is linked to private
ownership, profits , and interfirm competition. Whether these literatures describe the problem as modern industrial society,"
the growth cult," or the profit system, they often have a similar takeaway: we need a totally different economic
system if we are to live in balance with nature. Some of the first to make such an argument were Marx and Engels. They
came to their ecology through examining the local problem of relations between town and countrywhich was
expressed simultaneously as urban pollution and rural soil depletion. In exploring this question they relied on the pioneering work
of soil chemist Justus von Liebig. And from this small- scale problem , they developed the idea of capitalisms
overall metabolic rift with nature. Here is how Marx explained the dilemma: Capitalist production collects the
population together in great centres, and causes the urban population to achieve an ever-growing preponderance. This has two
results. On the one hand it concentrates the historical motive force of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the metabolic interaction
between man and the earth, i.e. it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in the form of food
and clothing; hence it hinders the operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil .... All progress in
capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil. From that grew the Marxist
belief that capitalism, as a whole, is irreconcilably in contradiction with nature; that the economic system creates a rift in the balance
of exchanges, or metabolism, connecting human society and natural systems. As with soil robbing," so too with forests, fish stocks,
water supplies, genetic inheritance, biodiversity, and atmospheric CO2 concentrations. The natural systems are out of sync; their
elements are being rearranged and redistributed, ending up as garbage and pollution. As Mary Douglas, paraphrasing William
James, put it, Uncleanliness is matter out of place.At a large enough scale, that disruption of elements threatens environmental
catastrophe. It may be true: capitalism may be, ultimately, incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world.
However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can solve the climate crisis. Because of its
magnitude, the climate crisis can appear as if it is the combination of all environmental crisesoverexploitation of the seas,
deforestation, overexploitation of freshwater, soil erosion, species and habitat loss, chemical contamination, and genetic
contamination due to transgenic bioengineering. But halting greenhouse gas emissions is a much more specific
problem ; it is only one piece of the apocalyptic panorama. Though all these problems are connected, the most urgent and all
encompassing of them is anthropogenic climate change. The fact of the matter is time has run out on the climate missue. Either
capitalism solves the crisis or it destroys civilization. Capitalism begins to deal with the crisis now, or we face civilizational collapse
beginning this century. We cannot wait for a socialist, or communist, or anarchist, or deep- ecology,
neoprimitiverevolution; nor for a nostalgia-based localista conversion back to the mythical small-town economy of preindustrial
America as some advocate. In short, we cannot wait to transform everything including how we create energy .
Instead, we must begin immediately transforming the energy economy. Other necessary changes can
and will flow from that. Hopeless? No. If we put aside the question of capitalisms limits and deal only with
greenhouse gas emissions, the problem looks less daunting. While capitalism has not solved the environmental
crisismeaning the fundamental conflict between the infinite growth potential of the market and the finite parameters of the
planet it has, in the past, solved specific environmental crises . The sanitation movement of
the Progressive Era is an example. By the 1830s, industrial cities had become perfect incubators of epidemic disease,
particularly cholera and yellow fever. Like climate change today, these diseases hit the poor hardest, but they also sickened and
killed the wealthy. Class privilege offered some protection, but it was not a guarantee of safety. And so it was that middle-class do-
gooder goo-goos and mugwumps began a series of reforms that contained and eventually defeated the urban epidemics. First, the
filthy garbage-eating hogs were banned from city streets, then public sanitation programs of refuse collection began, sewers were
built, safe public water provided, housing codes were developed and enforced. And, eventually, the epidemics of
cholera stopped. So, too, were other infectious diseases, like pulmonary tuberculosis, typhus, and typhoid,
largely eliminated. Thus, at the scale of the urban, capitalist society solved an environmental crisis through
planning and public investment. Climate change is a problem on an entirely different order of magnitude, but past
solutions to smaller environmental crises offer lessons. Ultimately, solving the climate crisislike the nineteenth-
century victory over urban squalor and epidemic contagions will require a relegitimation of the states role in
the economy. We will need planning and downward redistribution of wealth. And, as I have sketched out above, there are
readily available ways to address the crisis immediately if we make the effort to force our political leaders to
act. We owe such an effort to people like Ekaru Loruman, who are already suffering and dying on the
front lines of the catastrophic convergence, and to the next generation, who will inherit the mess. And, we owe it to ourselves.

Neolibs not that powerful and their themes over-explain its effect on violence.
Geras 5
(Norman, Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester, "The Reductions of the Left," Dissent, 52:1, Winter, p. 57-
58)
THE SECOND PART of the answer- to which I now turnis a seeming lack of ability, of the imagination, to digest the meaning of
the great moral and political evils of the world and to look at them unflinchingly. This is a complementary failure. Elsewhere I have
argued that Marxism is as familiar as any other intellectual tradition with the realities of human violence and
oppression and the more negative traits and potentialities in the makeup of human beings. At the same time, because of its
Utopian aspiration-which I do not mean in any pejorative sensebecause of its progressive and meliorative impulse, there has
always been a tendency within this tradition to minimize, or sometimes just deny, the independent force of such negative
characteristics. They come to be treated, genericallv, as the product of class societies and, today, as
the product of capitalism.
The affinity between this overall intellectual tendency within Marxist and other
left thinking, and
the practical reductionism I have just describedin which America is identified as
the source of all worldly wrongsshould be transparent. The effect of the tendency, however,
is, to denature what one is looking at when one looks at the horrors of the world: a
massacre of in- nocents; a woman being beaten in a public place or hanged in a football stadium; a place in which a man can have his
ears surgically removed or his tongue cut out, or be broken and destroyed, to be followed by the next such vic-tim, and the next, in
a continuous sequence ol atrocity; or a place in which a parent can be forced to watch her child tortured and murdered in front of
her; or a place in which a husband can be forced to watch his wife repeat-edly raped; an "ethnic^leansing" or a genocide in
progress, in which entire communities are pulled up by the roots-arid people are shot or hacked or starved to death by the thousands
or the tens of thousands; mass graves opened to yield up their terrible story. The list, as anyone knows who keeps reading when the
overwhelming temptation is to look away, could be much extended. The items on it are moral and political realities in their own
right. They need to be registered and fully recognized as such. To collapse them too quickly into their
putative original causes, to' refer them immediately, or refer from them, to other
things that have preceded them is not to give them their due as the specific
phenomena they are, the horrors, tor those destroyed by them or enduring them, for those whose lives are torn and
wrecked and filled with grief by them, are in a double sense reduced by this quick and easy reference back to something else,
putatively their real cause or origin. Furthermore, not all the contributory causes of such grim events are of the type that the section
of the left under discussion here likes to invokethat is, causes arising else- where, either geographically (in the United States) or
societally (in the dynamics of capi- talism). Moral and political evils of this order and I make no apology for calling them
that can and generally do have causes that are more local in a spatial sense; and they are governed or
influenced by political, ideological, and moral specificities every bit as real as the
capitalist economy. Not everything is systemic , in the sense of being an effect of pressures or tendencies
of economic provenance, whether from the global economy or from some more particular region of it. There are
independent patterns of coercion and cruelty, both interpersonal and embedded
within political structures; forms of authoritarian imposition; types of invasive assault and
violence, at the micro-level and at the macro-level, involving large social forces.
2NC
T
 A2: Aff Offense
Environmental policy can include immanent critique---it doesnt commit to any
philosophical foundation
Meyer 11 John M. Meyer, Professor & Chair of the Department of Politics at Humbolt State
University, We have never been liberal: the environmentalist turn to liberalism and the
possibilities for social criticism, Environmental Politics Vol. 20 , Iss. 3,2011
Why, however, should we presume that citizens in western societies hold views that can be
consistently identified with the canon of liberal philosophy? Recognising this as a presumption
not a fact allows us to open up a space for criticism immanent to these societies
without requiring it to be immanent to something labelled the philosophy of liberalism. In this
case, environmental social criticism that engages with public concerns and values need not be
synonymous with an acceptance of the limits of liberalism. More importantly, a contest over
conceptions of the character and scope of liberal theory cannot serve as a surrogate for engaging
public concerns.
Opening up this space for more ambitious, yet immanent, criticism can enable us to think in
fresh ways about remedies for environmental problems. It allows us to escape from
or perhaps burrow in between an unproductive dichotomy between the transcendent and
totalising social criticism practiced by anti-liberals and the immanent, yet circumscribed and
often resigned, form practiced by those who have embraced liberalism. How to promote
change? Why is it so hard? Liberal environmental arguments seem to suggest that it is because
environmental concerns have not previously been couched in liberal terms. In this sense, they
hope that their criticisms resonate with popular views. Thus they hope to avoid being dismissed
as tilting at windmills or perceived as disdaining widely held values. By situating this form of
criticism entirely within the liberal tradition, however, they usurp our ability to identify popular
values that cannot readily be discovered in liberal philosophy, foreclosing a political space that
while offering no guarantees or easy answers can be a crucial location for constructive and
hopeful environmental criticism.
Surprisingly, Mark Sagoff one of the earliest to suggest a liberal-environmental
rapprochementcan provide assistance. 5 In a chapter of his book entitled Can
environmentalists be liberals?', Sagoff offers a different twist on the argument for liberal
neutrality. This requires him to reject the view that liberal theory can or should delineate a
comprehensive view' from which policy is derived. 6 If theory was comprehensive, the liberal
commitment to neutrality would severely restrain both the scope of state action and the
character of policy. Yet Sagoff argues that such an encompassing scope of liberalism would be
inherently anti-democratic because it obstructs the ability of the people to advance their good
through political action. He contrasts this with a much more modest conception of liberal
neutrality as only delineating the basic structure of the polity and protecting a minimal private
sphere for religious activity and intimate life. Sagoff (1988 Sagoff, M. 1988. The economy of the
earth: philosophy, law and the environment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. , p. 166)
concludes that there is nothing in this private sphere that poses a challenge for environmental
policy, I cannot think of any environmental statute that restricts personal choices or beliefs'
regarding friends, religion, or sexual relationships. 7 Rather than seeking the expansion of
liberalism to encompass environmental concerns, he describes a significantly more limited
scope of liberalism that does not measure environmentalist commitments or motivations for
political action on a liberal yardstick. In this sense, environmental action avoids the liberal/anti-
liberal dichotomy. This is consistent with Robyn Eckersley's (2004 Eckersley, R. 2004. The
green state: rethinking democracy and sovereignty, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. , p. 107)
characterisation of a democracy that is postliberal rather than antiliberal' .
Here, democracy is not only allowed but cultivated in civil society and policy-making, where
particular conceptions of the good necessarily come into play. As Sagoff describes it, this allows
for values that members of a community share as citizens to trump private-regarding
preferences they hold as consumers. To preclude these citizen values, in Sagoff's view, is to
commit a category mistake , by presuming that liberalism required the privileging of private
values over the public ones that individuals do, in fact, hold. The key liberal qualities to be
fostered in this context would be a sort of non-dogmatic liberality, open-mindedness, and
critical thinking that facilitates an open and vigorous policy debate rather than any
commitment to neutrality or other inflexible structural impediment to environmental
policymaking (Sagoff 1988 Sagoff, M. 1988. The economy of the earth: philosophy, law and the
environment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. , p. 167). In the course of defending
liberalism, then, Sagoff articulates its limited scope. It is not liberal philosophy that captures the
character of popular values, which are crucial to advancing environmental action.
To pursue this alternative project requires us to resituate our critical engagement from one
immanent to liberal philosophy to one immanent to the social practices we hope to
influence. Liberalism is too narrow a field for social criticism because popular attitudes
regularly spill across its boundaries. At the same time, it is too broad a field, because any
particular conception of liberal ideas will transcend those embedded within popular attitudes
and contemporary practices. Environmental challenges are prompted or exacerbated by
practices of land-use, work, play, consumption, and ownership. These practices are, to say the
least, complex. By engaging directly with this complexity, we can tease out and highlight those
aspects that hold environmental promise (cf. Trachtenberg 2010 Trachtenberg, Z. 2010.
Complex green citizenship and the necessity of judgment. Environmental Politics, 19 (3): 339
355. ). In this manner, we can honour the impulse to develop criticism that can resonate with
citizens, which I argue has led to the liberal turn, while also taking seriously the anti-liberal's
premise that environmental crisis demands that we reject conceptual complacency. To engage
theory with practice in this way promises to open up new democratic political space
and so a distinct research agenda for environmental political theory.
This political space can best be envisioned if we minimise the question of liberalism's character
to environmental social criticism. Then we can more effectively pursue a popular engagement of
environmental concerns with extant or nascent public values, since we will neither allow a
conception of liberalism to constrain this engagement, nor allow a rejection of
public values to alienate us from the broader constituency for social and environmental
action.
Case
 A2: Information is Dissuasive---2NC
Climate persuasion is not a matter of simple yes/no persuasion between the left
and right---theres significant nuance within the scope of what to do and how to
best educate and organize the public---theyre no different than climate defeatism
that abandons attempts to persuade people to take immediate action
Hoexter, 15 (Michael Hoexter, Ph.D. in Psychology, climate and energy policy analyst and
marketing consultant for energy efficiency and renewable energy, 7-16-2015, "Climate Defeatism
is as Much a Threat to Human Survival as Climate Denial Part 1", New Economic Perspectives,
http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2015/07/climate-defeatism-is-as-much-a-threat-to-
human-survival-as-climate-denial.html)
Voluntarism and Determinism
That humanity faces a momentous collective and individual choice , based in part on ethical
considerations, means that there is substantial room for voluntary action or the will to play a role in humanitys self-rescue.
Humanity is outfitted with a biology that enables people to imagine, create and consider options, exert
choice and thereby create new actions not largely determined by biological predisposition or a
predetermined evolutionary program. There are substantial areas of constraint via physics, chemistry, biology and
social and economic history but also some degrees of freedom to transform our social relationships and tool-making/tool-use and
thereby, indirectly, our and future generations biological being over the longer term, for both good and ill.
In the political realm, climate action is not just a matter of choosing between pre-existing sides,
as is the case in many political struggles. The side that will save humanity or at least salvage
some of its better parts, needs to be shaped by a massive public education and organizing
campaign as well as individual self-education given misinformation about the role of human
will, ethical intention and government in the neoliberal era. Then it is not just a matter of choosing
the current political side that says that it is concerned about climate action and/or ventures a few
lukewarm climate policies. Effective climate action means ensuring that ambitious policies are
actually implemented that have concrete effects on emissions and greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere and oceans. Political choice both in the voting booth and in grassroots and self-
described radical political contexts has often meant people have had to choose from
two pre-existing alternatives ; the climate challenge requires people to shape via force of
will the option that will save our species, in part via learning and far, far superior public
information about climate solutions. This means a good deal of work and effort of will by
individuals and groups of individuals .
The substantial ethical dimension to effective climate action then means that this is, of necessity, a voluntarist (will-
or choice-driven) movement rather than one that is wedded to a purely deterministic political-
social philosophy . Determinism and voluntarism play roles in the climate movement
discussion as it has developed so far. There are some activists who see their role as to simply educate the
public about climate change until such time as the public is upset enough about climate change to
demand action or institute actions on their own. This more deterministic view accepts as a
natural fact peoples self-assessment of their welfare and also a fundamental self-interested
focus of human beings. In a deterministic view, there is not a lot of room for either the moral ethical
persuasive efforts of leaders/activists or that of receivers of climate-related messages: they will act
when they are forced to act by circumstance and no sooner. Ultimately this is climate activists
allotting themselves a passive role and not embracing a role that makes history, a preference for passivity that I
find surprising.
If we look back at political history as well as current events, it
is those political sides that possess a voluntarist
attitude, an ability to engage in serious strategic thinking , and exertion of a political
will-to-power that almost invariably win political contests. The right-wing has had
enormous political success in winning both ideological and electoral contests with a policy
portfolio that actually undermines popular welfare and interests through clever and willful manipulation of
cultural attitudes and prejudices. The Rights success is due to a combination of financial backing from
wealthy financial interests, a sense of entitlement to win, and generally superior tactical and strategic
orientation than its opponents on the moderate Left. They have also shifted the terms of
the debate on economics, almost entirely into the right-wing neoliberal framework and therefore dominate the
discourse of what is possible to actually implement via government policy. Now most
nominally left parties are so initimidated by the Right and so lacking in their own independent perspective that they represent
simply a milder version of the political program of the Right.
There, however, can be extremes of hyper-voluntarism on both the Left and Right which defeat their own purposes by
act without a viable
blotting out important contours of political, social, economic, and now scientific reality to just
strategy and without effective communication with the public at large . In the climate movement,
some wish to express their individual conscience by simply throwing themselves at various
targets, like fossil fuel extraction projects and sites or trying to create utopian eco-communities.
These actions may temporarily feel good or assuage individual consciences to those who do or
fantasize about doing them but such acts cannot be relied upon to form the basis of a
considered strategy to transform society and human behavior for the better with regard to
climate.
To fully face the climate challenge requires a well-informed, can-do attitude on a mass scale,
an attitude that has been undermined by decades of diminished expectations, misinformation and also
depoliticization of the general population. In this context, it is also imperative to face and understand
strains of climate defeatism that might undermine efforts to rouse and inspire people to
propose and fight for policies that will address the problem in the most rapid manner
possible.

Especially on energy policies---they cede politics to technocrats

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of
Toronto, Science Education as a Call to Action, Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and
Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206
**note: SSI = socioscientific issues
The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways
of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in
responsible action, and assisting them in developing the skills , attitudes, and values that will
enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring about change , and
work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more
equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key
concepts and possession of the right attitudes. As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about
and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply,
our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save
the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a
local manifestation of a
particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts
in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE
RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002)
categorized the knowledge that is likely to promote sociopolitical action and encourage pro-
environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) scientific and technological knowledge that
informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic
issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge
about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the
likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the desirability of those outcomes.
Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to
all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion
earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have
positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. It is essential that they gain robust
knowledge of the social, legal, and political system(s) that prevail in the communities in which they live
and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and national
government and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and
with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the mechanisms by which
decisions are reached, intervention is not possible. Thus, the curriculum I propose
requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how
to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and
attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and
potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would
seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable
students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and
journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust,
and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth
category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the
kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their
ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional,
national, and global levelsa clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical
scientific and technological literacy on which sociopolitical action depends is the
application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can
control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect
technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not
entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of
discussion during the establishment of policy.
 A2: Fatal Strategy
Theyre not fatal, just absurd. That makes them feel funny and cool but does
nothing.
Wallace 97 David Foster Wallace, Genius, Best Author Ever, Professor of Creative Writing
and English at Pomona College, A Supposedly Fun Thing Ill Never Do Again, p. 66-68
So then how have irony, irreverence, and rebellion come to be not liberating but enfeebling in the culture today's avant-garde tries to
write about? One clue's to be found in the fact that irony is still around, bigger than ever after 30 long years as the dominant mode of
hip expression. It's not a rhetorical mode that wears well. As Hyde (whom I pretty obviously like) puts it, " Irony has only
emergency use. Carried over time, it is the voice of the trapped who have come to enjoy their cage:'32 This is because
irony, entertaining as it is, serves an almost exclusively negative function . It's critical and
destructive, a ground-clearing. Surely this is the way our postmodern fathers saw it. But irony's singularly
unuseful when it comes to constructing anything to replace the hypocrisies it debunks . This is why
Hyde seems right about persistent irony being tiresome. It is unmeaty. Even gifted ironists work best in sound
bites. I find gifted ironists sort of wickedly fun to listen to at parties, but I always walk away
feeling like I've had several radical surgical procedures. And as for actually driving cross-country
with a gifted ironist, or sitting through a 300-page novel full of nothing but trendy sardonic exhaustion, one ends up
feeling not only empty but somehow . . . oppressed. Think, for a moment, of Third World rebels and coups. Third
World rebels are great at exposing and overthrowing corrupt hypocritical regimes, but they seem
noticeably less great at the mundane, non-negative task of then establishing a superior
governing alternative . Victorious rebels, in fact, seem best at using their tough, cynical rebel-
skills to avoid being rebelled against themselves in other words, they just become better
tyrants. And make no mistake: irony tyrannizes us. The reason why our pervasive cultural irony is at
once so powerful and so unsatisfying is that an ironist is impossible to pin down . All U.S.
irony is based on an implicit "I don't really mean what I'm saying ." So what does irony as a cultural norm
mean to say? That it's impossible to mean what you say? That maybe it's too bad it's impossible, but wake up and smell the coffee
already? Most likely, I think, today's irony ends up saying: "How totally banal of you to ask what I really mean." Anyone with
the heretical gall to ask an ironist what [they] he actually stands for ends up looking like an
hysteric or a prig. And herein lies the oppressiveness of institutionalized irony, the too-
successful rebel: the ability to interdict the question without attending to its subject is , when
exercised, tyranny . It is the new junta, using the very tool that exposed its enemy to insulate
itself.
 A2: Hyperreality---Ext---Real is Real
Prefer specificity---there are narrow instances of media distortion, but its not a
broad description
King 98
Professor Anthony King - Sociology and Philosophy - University of Exeter Baudrillard's nihilism and the end of theory Teleos
112 (Summer 1998), pp.89-106 http://eric.exeter.ac.uk/exeter/bitstream/10036/71394/1/King%2520Baudrillard%2520Telos.pdf)
For Baudrillards later writings to be sustainable, two conditions have to be met. First,
Baudrillards terrorism his attempt to communicate hyperreality to the reader immediately, allowing the crystal its revenge
must be theoretically coherent and possible. Second, his description of hyperreality as a
unique transformation of culture, in which an external social reality is eclipsed in the vivid representations of the screen, must
be an accurate account of recent developments. The most sympathetic reading of Baudrillards later
writings is to read them as literature, as Turner and Mike Gane do.26 This is a legitimate strategy so long as what is produced is
literature. In other words, in demanding that he is no longer writing sociology, Baudrillard is committing himself to being judged by
the equally rigorous, though different standards, which are applied to creative prose. This is where he falls into difficulties, for his
later writing cannot really be said to be creative prose. They retain their academic form and still seek to provide a commentary on
hyperreality. They do not open up a fragmented world, but rather stand back from that world, offering detached criticisms and
generalizations about it. Baudrillard does not communicate the vertiginous flicking from one television channel to the other, but
comments on the meaning of these changing images. Like the academic he remains, Baudrillard makes claims about the general
features of this culture, rather than using narrative to communicate a message, as is typical in literature. Moreover, there is no divide
between Baudrillard and the narrative itself; there is no ironic use of character or detachment from the text. His writing is merely an
earnest but stripped form of academic writing, which moves from asserted claim to claim, rather than from sustained claim to claim
for the slow but rigorous building of an argument.27 Once his obscure lexicon is deciphered, and readers realize that by code and
matrix Baudrillard refers to the fact that hyperreal culture simply lives off itself, never
coupling with a reality beyond itself, then his sentences become assertive and static. The only point he
makes is that television culture is hyperreal Marked 09:31
signifiers now float free and the only way in which this sentence communicates that point is by positing these crude metaphors of
code and matrix. Stylistically, Baudrillards terrorism baldly states that contemporary culture is
like a hologram, a code, a matrix or clone, because it is wholly self-referential but
it does not actually communicate what it is like to experience this culture . Compare this
style of writing with J. G. Ballards Crash a novel providing a very successful (and deliberately obscene) description of postmodern
culture. It recognizes that cultures bodily indulgence, and knows that it does not liberate the individual but reduces the body to a
machine for pleasure, just as the car is a machine for speech. The car-crash and the sexact are the moments when the wholly
technical machineries of the car and the bodies are decomposed in an instant of pain that is transformed (for ironic effect) into one
of intense pleasure for the perverts who populate the book. In communicating this new, debased ethic of bodily pleasure, where the
delight in bodily mutilation parallels a correlating spiritual disfigurement, Ballard describes a questionnaire about car crashes which
Vaughan, the central figure in the book, has prepared and which lists every conceivable injury: Lastly came that group of injuries
which had clearly most preoccupied Vaughan genital wounds caused during automobile accidents. . . . the breasts of teenage girls
deformed by instrument binnacles, the partial mammoplasties of elderly housewives carried out by chromium louvres of windshield
assemblies, nipples sectioned by manufacturers dashboard medallions; injuries to male and female genitalia caused by steering
wheel shrouds, windshields during ejection, crushed door pillars, seat springs and handbrake units, cassette player instrument
toggles.28 The descriptions Ballard provides of both cars and bodies are wholly technical and anatomical, emphasizing that, in this
culture, both bodyworks are (obscenely) reduced to the same level. Against Ballards rich, selfdeveloping text, Baudrillards writing
is flat and strained. He simply breaks down his academic text into aphoristic gobblets and draws on a lexicon of dead, static
metaphors. In the end, Baudrillard falls between the two stools of demanding that
academic writing is inadequate to the analysis of hyperreality, but still writing
according to its conventions and thereby vitiating either the academic or the literary merit
of his later work. However, even if Baudrillard wanted his later writing to be read as literature and even if he had been
successful in producing text which could be judged as literature, the project of this later writing would still have been irretrievably
self-deluded. Even if his terrorism were a successful form of literature, it could never (as he claims) communicate hyperreality to the
reader directly, for all writing is necessarily mediated; all writing is an interpretation.29 Unavoidably, his terroristic
writing is an interpretation of hyperreal culture, which does not obviate the necessity of interpretation,
however directly it tries to communicate hyperreality.
1NR
CP
 Solvency---OV---2NC
Waste causes disparate violence
Newell 5
Peter Newell, Professor of International Relations (International Relations, Centre for Global Political Economy,
International Development) at the University of Sussex. Areas of research expertise include Energy and Finance. The
author has served as The Director of Research and Knowledge Exchange The University of Sussexs School of Global
Studies. From the article: Race, Class and the Global Politics of Environmental Inequality - Global Environmental
Politics - August 2005, Vol. 5, No. 3, Pages 70-94 Posted Online March 13, 2006. - 2005 Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Modified for potentially objectionable language -
https://www.amherst.edu/system/files/media/1304/race%252C%2520clas%252C%2520env%2520inequality.pdf

If not in intent, then in consequence, the new international

division of pollution feeds on entrenched patterns of
social inequality etched along racial, class and gender lines, as well as constructing new patterns of
environmental inequality in its wake. Despite the claims of the former World Bank Chief Economist Lawrence Summers that parts of
the world, notably Africa, are "under-polluted," it is misleading to understand the global allocation of environmental hazard in geographical terms. '1
The key issue raised by Summer's comment is the value of life and whose rights are privileged in discussions about societal allocations of risk and
benefit from industrial activity. Rather
like their counterparts in the (more industrialized nations) North, Third
World elites (from less-industrialized nations) tend not to live near toxic waste sites , nuclear
facilities or industrial belts producing hazardous chemicals. Social and racial hierarchies that exist within,
but extend beyond the state provide an analytically more satisfying point of departure for
understanding the politics of allocating the risks and benefits of environmental degradation. The
following sections of the paper develop these ideas through a focus firstly on race and secondly on class,
drawing connections between the two and other social structures such as gender.
 Warming NB
Consequentialism first
Chandler 14
(David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Westminster Beyond good and evil: Ethics in a world of complexity International Politics, Vol. 51,
No. 4 (2014), pp.441-457 Available at: http://www.davidchandler.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/International-
Politics-Evil-PUBLISHED-2.pdf)

Self-reflexive ethics redistribute responsibility and emphasize the indirect, unintended and relational networks of complex causation. Collective problems are reconceived
many radical and critical voices in the West are drawn to the problems
ontologically: as constitutive of communities and of political purpose. This is why

of 'side effects', of 'second-order' consequences - of a lack of knowledge of the emergent causality at play in the complex
interconnections of the global world. The more these interconnections are revealed, though the work of self-reflexivity and self-reflection, the

more ethical authority can be regained by governments and other agents of governance. We learn and learn again that we are
responsible for the world, not because of our conscious choices or because our actions lacked the right ethical
intent ion, but because the world's complexity is beyond our capacity to know and understand in advance. The unknowability of the outcomes
of our action does not remove our ethical responsibility for our actions, it, in fact , heightens our
responsibility for these second-order consequences or side effects. In a complex and interconnected world, few events or
problems evade appropriation within this framing, providing an opportunity for recasting responsibility in these ways. The new ethics of indirect

responsibility for market consequences can be seen (observed) clearly in the idea of environmental taxation, both state-enforced through
interventions in the market and as taken up by both firms and individuals. The idea that we should pay a carbon tax on air travel is a leading example of this, in terms of
governmental intervention, passing the burden of such problems on to 'unethical' consumers who are not reflexive enough to consider the impact of package holidays on the
environment. At a broader level, the personalized ethico-political understanding that individuals should be responsible for and measure their own 'carbon footprint' shifts the
emphasis from an understanding of broader inter-relations between modernity, the market and the environment to a much narrower understanding of personal indirect
responsibility, linking all aspects of everyday decision making to the problems of global warming (see, for example, Marres, 2012). The shared responsibility for the Breivik
murders is not different -ontologically - from the societally shared responsibility for global warming or other problematic appearances in the world. Through our
actions and inactions we collectively constitute the frameworks in which others act and make decisions -failing to raise our voice
against 'borderline racism' or extremism in a bar makes us indirectly responsible for acts of racism or extremism in the same way

that failing to save water or minimize air travel makes us indirectly responsible for the melting polar ice
caps.
 Solvency---Gov Key---2NC
The timeframe for halting emissions before warming becomes irreversible is
short---this demands quick action and abandonment of their abstract theory
Parenti 13 Christian Parenti, Professor, Sustainable Development, School for International
Training, Graduate Institute, A Radical Approach to the Climate Crisis, DISSENT, Summer
2013, www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-radical-approach-to-the-climate-crisis
Several strands of green thinking maintain that capitalism is incapable of a sustainable
relationship with non-human nature because, as an economic system, capitalism has a growth
imperative while the earth is finite. One finds versions of this argument in the literature of eco-
socialism, deep ecology, eco-anarchism, and even among many mainstream greens who, though
typically declining to actually name the economic system, are fixated on the dangers of growth.
All this may be true. Capitalism, a system in which privately owned firms must continuously
out-produce and out-sell their competitors, may be incapable of accommodating itself to the
limits of the natural world. However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can
solve the more immediate climate crisis. Because of its magnitude, the climate crisis can appear
as the sum total of all environmental problemsdeforestation, over-fishing, freshwater
depletion, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, chemical contamination. But halting greenhouse
gas emissions is a much more specific problem , the most pressing subset of the larger
apocalyptic panorama. And the very bad news is, time has run out. As I write this, news arrives
of an ice-free arctic summer by 2050. Scientists once assumed that would not happen for
hundreds of years. Dealing with climate change by first achieving radical social
transformation be it a socialist or anarchist or deep-ecological/neo-primitive revolution, or
a nostalgia-based localista conversion back to a mythical small-town capitalismwould be a
very long and drawn-out , maybe even multigenerational , struggle. It would be marked
by years of mass education and organizing of a scale and intensity not seen in most core
capitalist states since the 1960s or even the 1930s. Nor is there any guarantee that the new
system would not also degrade the soil, lay waste to the forests, despoil bodies of water, and find
itself still addicted to coal and oil. Look at the history of actually existing socialism before its
collapse in 1991. To put it mildly, the economy was not at peace with nature. Or consider the
vexing complexities facing the left social democracies of Latin America. Bolivia, and Ecuador,
states run by socialists who are beholden to very powerful, autonomous grassroots movements,
are still very dependent on petroleum revenue. A more radical approach to the crisis of climate
change begins not with a long-term vision of an alternate society but with an honest
engagement with the very compressed timeframe that current climate science implies. In
the age of climate change, these are the real parameters of politics.

Direct political advocacy for climate solutions is effective and shapes

government policy---this is the most direct method for change and mutually
exclusive with individualized local efforts
CAG 10Climate Change Communication Advisory Group. Dr Adam Corner School of Psychology, Cardiff University - Dr Tom
Crompton Change Strategist, WWF-UK - Scott Davidson Programme Manager, Global Action Plan - Richard Hawkins Senior
Researcher, Public Interest Research Centre - Professor Tim Kasser, Psychology department, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois,
USA. - Dr Renee Lertzman, Center for Sustainable Processes & Practices, Portland State University, US. - Peter Lipman, Policy
Director, Sustrans. - Dr Irene Lorenzoni, Centre for Environmental Risk, University of East Anglia. - George Marshall, Founding
Director, Climate Outreach , Information Network - Dr Ciaran Mundy, Director, Transition Bristol - Dr Saffron ONeil, Department
of Resource Management and Geography, University of Melbourne, Australia. - Professor Nick Pidgeon, Director, Understanding
Risk Research Group, School of Psychology, Cardiff University. - Dr Anna Rabinovich, School of Psychology, University of Exeter -
Rosemary Randall, Founder and director of Cambridge Carbon Footprint - Dr Lorraine Whitmarsh, School of Psychology, Cardiff
University & Visiting Fellow at the, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. (Communicating climate change to mass public
audience, http://pirc.info/downloads/communicating_climate_mass_audiences.pdf)
This paper
short advisory focus is
collates a set of recommendations about how best to shape mass public communications aimed at increasing concern about climate change and motivating commensurate behavioural changes. Its

not upon motivating small private-sphere behavioural changes on a piece-meal basis Rather, it .

marshals evidence about how best to motivate the systemic behavioural change ambitious and that is

necessary including, crucially greater public engagement with the policy process
,

Political leaders have drawn attention

(through, for example, lobbying decision-makers and elected representatives, or participating in demonstrations), as well as major lifestyle changes. themselves

to the imperative for more vocal public pressure to create the political space for
them to enact more ambitious policy interventions individuals making . 1 While this paper does not dismiss the value of

small private-sphere behavioural changes do not, (for example, adopting simple domestic energy efficiency measures) it is clear that such behaviours in themselves,

represent a proportional response to climate the challenge of change. As David MacKay, Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Department of Energy and Climate change writes:

Dont be distracted by the myth that every little helps. If everyone does a little, well

achieve only a little The task of communicators

(MacKay, 2008). campaigners and from government, business and non-governmental organisations

must be to motivate
therefore active demand for
both (i) widespread adoption of ambitious private-sphere behavioural changes; and (ii) widespread acceptance of and indeed

ambitious new policy interventions . Current public communication campaigns, as orchestrated by government, business and non-governmental organisations, are not achieving
these changes. This paper asks: how should such communications be designed if they are to have optimal impact in motivating these changes? The response to this question will require fundamental changes in the ways that many climate change communication
campaigns are currently devised and implemented. This advisory paper offers a list of principles that could be used to enhance the quality of communication around climate change communications. The authors are each engaged in continuously sifting the
evidence from a range of sub-disciplines within psychology, and reflecting on the implications of this for improving climate change communications. Some of the organisations that we represent have themselves at times adopted approaches which we have both
learnt from and critique in this paper so some of us have first hand experience of the need for on-going improvement in the strategies that we deploy. The changes we advocate will be challenging to enact and will require vision and leadership on the part of the
organisations adopting them. But without such vision and leadership, we do not believe that public communication campaigns on climate change will create the necessary behavioural changes indeed, there is a profound risk that many of todays campaigns will
actually prove counter-productive. Seven Principles 1. Move Beyond Social Marketing We believe that too little attention is paid to the understanding that psychologists bring to strategies for motivating change, whilst undue faith is often placed in the
application of marketing strategies to sell behavioural changes. Unfortunately, in the context of ambitious pro-environmental behaviour, such strategies seem unlikely to motivate systemic behavioural change. Social marketing is an effective way of achieving a
particular behavioural goal dozens of practical examples in the field of health behaviour attest to this. Social marketing is really more of a framework for designing behaviour change programmes than a behaviour change programme - it offers a method of
maximising the success of a specific behavioural goal. Darnton (2008) has described social marketing as explicitly transtheoretical, while Hastings (2007), in a recent overview of social marketing, claimed that there is no theory of social marketing. Rather, it is a
what works philosophy, based on previous experience of similar campaigns and programmes. Social marketing is flexible enough to be applied to a range of different social domains, and this is undoubtedly a fundamental part of its appeal. However, social
marketings 'what works' status also means that it is agnostic about the longer term, theoretical merits of different behaviour change strategies, or the cultural values that specific campaigns serve to strengthen. Social marketing dictates that the most effective
strategy should be chosen, where effective means most likely to achieve an immediate behavioural goal. This means that elements of a behaviour change strategy designed according to the principles of social marketing may conflict with other, broader goals. What
if the most effective way of promoting pro-environmental behaviour A was to pursue a strategy that was detrimental to the achievement of long term pro-environmental strategy Z? The principles of social marketing have no capacity to resolve this conflict they
are limited to maximising the success of the immediate behavioural programme. This is not a flaw of social marketing it was designed to provide tools to address specific behavioural problems on a piecemeal basis. But it is an important limitation, and one that has
significant implications if social marketing techniques are used to promote systemic behavioural change and public engagement on an issue like climate change. 2. Be honest and forthright about the probable impacts of climate change, and the scale of the
challenge we confront in avoiding these. But avoid deliberate attempts to provoke fear or guilt. There is no merit in dumbing down the scientific evidence that the impacts of climate change are likely to be severe, and that some of these impacts are now almost
certainly unavoidable. Accepting the impacts of climate change will be an important stage in motivating behavioural responses aimed at mitigating the problem. However, deliberate attempts to instil fear or guilt carry considerable risk. Studies on fear appeals
confirm the potential for fear to change attitudes or verbal expressions of concern, but often not actions or behaviour (Ruiter et al., 2001). The impact of fear appeals is context - and audience - specific; for example, for those who do not yet realise the potentially
scary aspects of climate change, people need to first experience themselves as vulnerable to the risks in some way in order to feel moved or affected (Das et al, 2003; Hoog et al, 2005). As people move towards contemplating action, fear appeals can help form a
behavioural intent, providing an impetus or spark to move from; however such appeals must be coupled with constructive information and support to reduce the sense of danger (Moser, 2007). The danger is that fear can also be disempowering producing feelings
of helplessness, remoteness and lack of control (ONeill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Fear is likely to trigger barriers to engagement, such as denial2 (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Weber, 2006; Moser and Dilling, 2007; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh,
2007). The location of fear in a message is also relevant; it works better when placed first for those who are inclined to follow the advice, but better second for those who aren't (Bier, 2001). Similarly, studies have shown that guilt can play a role in motivating people
to take action but can also function to stimulate defensive mechanisms against the perceived threat or challenge to ones sense of identity (as a good, moral person). In the latter case, behaviours may be left untouched (whether driving a SUV or taking a flight) as one
defends against any feelings of guilt or complicity through deployment of a range of justifications for the behaviour (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). Overall, there is a need for emotionally balanced representations of the issues at hand. This will involve
acknowledging the affective reality of the situation, e.g. We know this is scary and overwhelming, but many of us feel this way and we are doing something about it. 3. Be honest and forthright about the impacts of mitigating and adapting to climate change for
current lifestyles, and the loss - as well as the benefits - that these will entail. Narratives that focus exclusively on the up-side of climate solutions are likely to be unconvincing. While narratives about the future impacts of climate change may highlight the loss of
much that we currently hold to be dear, narratives about climate solutions frequently ignore the question of loss. If the two are not addressed concurrently, fear of loss may be split off and projected into the future, where it is all too easily denied. This can be
dangerous, because accepting loss is an important step towards working through the associated emotions, and emerging with the energy and creativity to respond positively to the new situation (Randall, 2009). However, there are plenty of benefits (besides the
financial ones) of a low-carbon lifestyle e.g., health, community/social interaction - including the intrinsic' goals mentioned below. It is important to be honest about both the losses and the benefits that may be associated with lifestyle change, and not to seek to
separate out one from the other. 3a. Avoid emphasis upon painless, easy steps. Be honest about the limitations of voluntary private-sphere behavioural change, and the need for ambitious new policy interventions that incentivise such changes, or that regulate for
them. People know that the scope they have, as individuals, to help meet the challenge of climate change is extremely limited. For many people, it is perfectly sensible to continue to adopt high-carbon lifestyle choices whilst simultaneously being supportive of
government interventions that would make these choices more difficult for everyone. The adoption of small-scale private sphere behavioural changes is sometimes assumed to lead people to adopt ever more difficult (and potentially significant) behavioural
changes. The empirical evidence for this foot-in-thedoor effect is highly equivocal. Some studies detect such an effect; others studies have found the reverse effect (whereby people tend to rest on their laurels having adopted a few simple behavioural changes -
Thogersen and Crompton, 2009). Where attention is drawn to simple and painless privatesphere behavioural changes, these should be urged in pursuit of a set of intrinsic goals (that is, as a response to peoples understanding about the contribution that such
behavioural change may make to benefiting their friends and family, their community, the wider world, or in contributing to their growth and development as individuals) rather than as a means to achieve social status or greater financial success. Adopting
behaviour in pursuit of intrinsic goals is more likely to lead to spillover into other sustainable behaviours (De Young, 2000; Thogersen and Crompton, 2009). People arent stupid: they know that if there are wholesale changes in the global climate underway, these
will not be reversed merely through checking their tyre pressures or switching their TV off standby. An emphasis upon simple and painless steps suppresses debate about those necessary responses that are less palatable that will cost people money, or that will
3b. Avoid over-
infringe on cherished freedoms (such as to fly). Recognising this will be a key step in accepting the reality of loss of aspects of our current lifestyles, and in beginning to work through the powerful emotions that this will engender (Randall, 2009).
emphasis on the economic opportunities that mitigating, and adapting to, climate change may provide. There will, undoubtedly, be economic benefits to be accrued through investment in new technologies, but there will also be instances where the economic
imperative and the climate change adaptation or mitigation imperative diverge, and periods of economic uncertainty for many people as some sectors contract. It seems inevitable that some interventions will have negative economic impacts (Stern, 2007). Undue
emphasis upon economic imperatives serves to reinforce the dominance, in society, of a set of extrinsic goals (focussed, for example, on financial benefit). A large body of empirical research demonstrates that these extrinsic goals are antagonistic to the emergence of
pro-social and proenvironmental concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009). 3c. Avoid emphasis upon the opportunities of green consumerism as a response to climate change. As mentioned above (3b), a large body of research points to the antagonism between
goals directed towards the acquisition of material objects and the emergence of pro-environmental and pro-social concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009). Campaigns to buy green may be effective in driving up sales of particular products, but in conveying the
impression that climate change can be addressed by buying the right things, they risk undermining more difficult and systemic changes. A recent study found that people in an experiment who purchased green products acted less altruistically on subsequent tasks
(Mazar & Zhong, 2010) suggesting that small ethical acts may act as a moral offset and licence undesirable behaviours in other domains. This does not mean that private-sphere behaviour changes will always lead to a reduction in subsequent pro-environmental
behaviour, but it does suggest that the reasons used to motivate these changes are critically important. Better is to emphasise that every little helps a little but that these changes are only the beginning of a process that must also incorporate more ambitious
private-sphere change and significant collective action at a political level. 4. Empathise with the emotional responses that will be engendered by a forthright presentation of the probable impacts of climate change. Belief in climate change and support for low-
carbon policies will remain fragile unless people are emotionally engaged. We should expect people to be sad or angry, to feel guilt or shame, to yearn for that which is lost or to search for more comforting answers (Randall, 2009). Providing support and empathy in
working through the painful emotions of 'grief' for a society that must undergo changes is a prerequisite for subsequent adaptation to new circumstances. Without such support and empathy, it is more likely that people will begin to deploy a range of maladaptive
coping strategies, such as denial of personal responsibility, blaming others, or becoming apathetic (Lertzman, 2008). An audience should not be admonished for deploying such strategies this would in itself be threatening, and could therefore harden resistance to
positive behaviour change (Miller and Rolnick, 2002). The key is not to dismiss people who exhibit maladaptive coping strategies, but to understand how they can be made more adaptive. People who feel socially supported will be more likely to adopt adaptive
emotional responses - so facilitating social support for proenvironmental behaviour is crucial. 5. Promote pro-environmental social norms and harness the power of social networks One way of bridging the gap between private-sphere behaviour changes and
collective action is the promotion of pro-environmental social norms. Pictures and videos of ordinary people (like me) engaging in significant proenvironmental actions are a simple and effective way of generating a sense of social normality around pro-
environmental behaviour (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and Griskevicius, 2007). There are different reasons that people adopt social norms, and encouraging people to adopt a positive norm simply to conform, to avoid a feeling of guilt, or for fear of not
fitting in is likely to produce a relatively shallow level of motivation for behaviour change. Where social norms can be combined with intrinsic motivations (e.g. a sense of social belonging), they are likely to be more effective and persistent. Too often,
environmental communications are directed to the individual as a single unit in the larger social system of consumption and political engagement. This can make the problems feel too overwhelming, and evoke unmanageable levels of anxiety. Through the enhanced
awareness of what other people are doing, a strong sense of collective purpose can be engendered. One factor that is likely to influence whether adaptive or maladaptive coping strategies are selected in response to fear about climate change is whether people feel
supported by a social network that is, whether a sense of sustainable citizenship is fostered. The efficacy of groupbased programmes at promoting pro-environmental behaviour change has been demonstrated on numerous occasions and participants in these
projects consistently point to a sense of mutual learning and support as a key reason for making and maintaining changes in behaviour (Nye and Burgess, 2008). There are few influences more powerful than an individuals social network. Networks are instrumental
not just in terms of providing social support, but also by creating specific content of social identity defining what it means to be us. If environmental norms are incorporated at this level (become defining for the group) they can result in significant behavioural
change (also reinforced through peer pressure). Of course, for the majority of people, this is unlikely to be a network that has climate change at its core. But social networks Trade Unions, Rugby Clubs, Mother & Toddler groups still perform a critical role in
spreading change through society. Encouraging and supporting pre-existing social networks to take ownership of climate change (rather than approach it as a problem for green groups) is a critical task. As well as representing a crucial bridge between individuals
and broader society, peer-to-peer learning circumnavigates many of the problems associated with more top down models of communication not least that government representatives are perceived as untrustworthy (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Peer-to-peer
learning is more easily achieved in group-based dialogue than in designing public information films: But public information films can nonetheless help to establish social norms around community-based responses to the challenges of climate change, through clear
visual portrayals of people engaging collectively in the pro-environmental behaviour. The discourse should be shifted increasingly from you to we and from I to us. This is starting to take place in emerging forms of community-based activism, such as the
Transition Movement and Cambridge Carbon Footprints Carbon Conversations model both of which recognize the power of groups to help support and maintain lifestyle and identity changes. A nationwide climate change engagement project using a group-based
behaviour change model with members of Trade Union networks is currently underway, led by the Climate Outreach and Information Network. These projects represent a method of climate change communication and engagement radically different to that typically
pursued by the government and may offer a set of approaches that can go beyond the limited reach of social marketing techniques. One potential risk with appeals based on social norms is that they often contain a hidden message. So, for example, a campaign
that focuses on the fact that too many people take internal flights actually contains two messages that taking internal flights is bad for the environment, and that lots of people are taking internal flights. This second message can give those who do not currently
engage in that behaviour a perverse incentive to do so, and campaigns to promote behaviour change should be very careful to avoid this. The key is to ensure that information about what is happening (termed descriptive norms), does not overshadow information
about what should be happening (termed injunctive norms). 6. Think about the language you use, but dont rely on language alone A number of recent publications have highlighted the results of focus group research and talk-back tests in order to get the
language right (Topos Partnership, 2009; Western Strategies & Lake Research Partners, 2009), culminating in a series of suggestions for framing climate-change communications. For example, these two studies led to the suggestions that communicators should use
the term global warming or our deteriorating atmosphere, respectively, rather than climate change. Other research has identified systematic differences in the way that people interpret the terms climate change and global warming, with global warming
perceived as more emotionally engaging than climate change (Whitmarsh, 2009). Whilst getting the language right is important, it can only play a small part in a communication strategy. More important than the language deployed (i.e. conceptual frames') are
what have been referred to by some cognitive linguists as 'deep frames'. Conceptual framing refers to catchy slogans and clever spin (which may or may not be honest). At a deeper level, framing refers to forging the connections between a debate or public policy and
a set of deeper values or principles. Conceptual framing (crafting particular messages focussing on particular issues) cannot work unless these messages resonate with a set of long-term deep frames. Policy proposals which may at the surface level seem similar
(perhaps they both set out to achieve a reduction in environmental pollution) may differ importantly in terms of their deep framing. For example, putting a financial value on an endangered species, and building an economic case for their conservation commodifies
them, and makes them equivalent (at the level of deep frames) to other assets of the same value (a hotel chain, perhaps). This is a very different frame to one that attempts to achieve the same conservation goals through the ascription of intrinsic value to such species
as something that should be protected in its own right. Embedding particular deep frames requires concerted effort (Lakoff, 2009), but is the beginning of a process that can build a broad, coherent cross-departmental response to climate change from

Private-sphere behavioural change is not

government. 7. Encourage public demonstrations of frustration at the limited pace of government action

enough, and may even at times become a diversion from the more important process of
bringing political pressure to bear on policy-makers . The importance of public
demonstrations of frustration at the lack of political progress on climate is both change and the barriers presented by vested interests

widely recognised including by government itself Climate change communications

. , including

should work to normalise public displays of frustration with the slow

government communication campaigns,

pace of political change. communications can play a role in fostering

Ockwell et al (2009) argued that

demand for - as well as acceptance of - policy change . Climate change communication could (and should) be used to encourage people to demonstrate
(for example through public demonstrations) about how they would like structural barriers to behavioural/societal change to be removed.
 Fusion Bad---1NR
Ks of science, management, and consumption dont apply to fusion. Prefer
particularity.
Lorimer 92 (Doug, Professor Emeritus Tri University and Member National Executive of
the Democratic Socialist Party, Should We Oppose Fusion Technology?, Green Left Weekly, 2-
19, http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/2210)
Undemocratic technology?
While he points out that with "more human and financial resources" the technical problems involved in fusion technology might be
overcome, Shannon argues that Marxists should oppose its development on sociopolitical grounds.
Fusion, he writes, is "an undemocratic technology, the domain of a scientific elite". By contrast,
"People can easily have control over renewable energy technology you only need know how to tell one end of a hammer from
another to be able to maintain a windmill, but mastering the theory and practice of fusion requires a lifetime of nuclear physics and
engineering".
But isn't the theory and practice of renewable energy technologies e.g., the generation of electricity using
photovoltaic cells also
the "domain of a scientific elite"? Even the technology of generating electricity
from modern windmills requires specialised scientific training in electrical engineering and aerodynamics.
The apparent assumption behind Shannon's argument is an idealist one that knowledge equals power
equals oppression. But the fact that fusion technology requires specialised knowledge does not
mean that those who have this knowledge exercise power over those who don't .
If someone knows how to do something that you don't, does that give them power over you? Not unless there is a material
advantage, a volved, one that is institutionalised and perpetuated by forms of private property. For example, Kerry Packer has power
over other people because he is the private owner of television stations, not because he has specialised knowledge of the theory and
practice of television technology (quantum physics and radio engineering), which he doesn't.
Shannon believes that those on the left who are attracted to nuclear fusion are caught up in the "orthodox,
19th century Marxist goal of the conquest of nature", a goal he argues present-day Marxist should reject:
"Rather than conquering nature, turning it into a super-factory powered by nuclear fusion, would it not be better to have a more
human-scale world where we use but don't abuse nature?"
Mastery of nature
Shannon seems to assume that when Marxists speak about humanity's "conquest", "domination" or "mastery" of nature, they believe
in "abusing" (destroying) rather than simply "using" it. But if I say a violinist has mastered her/his instrument,
this does not imply s/he has abused or destroyed it, but learned to control it to obtain what s/he wants.
Similarly, mastering, nature simply means that we have learned to control nature in order to meet humanity's material purpose. As
Frederick Engels noted in his 1876 essay "The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man":
"... we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature but that we, with
flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the
advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly."
In order to master nature, we have to obey its laws. Capitalism, however, does this only in a partial and limited way because it
subordinates technology to the immediate enrichment of a tiny minority and disregards the longer term effects of its productive
activities on nature. This is why Engels pointed out that mere knowledge was insufficient to regulate our productive activities so as
to avoid environmental destruction: "It requires a complete revolution in our hitherto existing mode of production, and
simultaneously a revolution in our whole contemporary social order".
This revolution involves the replacement of anarchistic production for private profit with the subordination of production, through
collective ownership and democratic control, to social needs, i.e., the "domination of technology by planning".
Abundance
Shannon poses the question: "Do we want, or need, an abundance of energy powering an abundance of
gadgets for an abundance of people, driven by nuclear fusion and a destructively exploitative attitude to
The question has been loaded by implying that anyone who supports the exploration of
nuclear fusion as a possible technological solution to the world's need for clean, sustainable
energy sources is guilty of a "destructively exploitative attitude to nature".
If we drop this unnecessary addition to the question, we can examine the real issue: does a classless society
require abundance of energy powering an abundance of "gadgets" for an abundance of people?
If the word "abundance" is taken in its literal meaning of "fully sufficient" and not as meaning an
unlimited amount, as it is sometimes abused, then the answer from a Marxist (and an ecological) viewpoint has to
be, yes . A fully sufficient amount of energy to power a fully sufficient amount of "gadgets" would be an
amount adequate to meet humanity's rational needs, including its need to preserve a livable
global environment .
The DSP's Socialism and Human Survival points out that there is an environmental limit to the production of energy on Earth,
determined by the amount of heat that can be safely dissipated into the atmosphere. Development of the practical large-scale
conversion of solar energy into electricity would eliminate this problem. While the development of practical deuterium
fusion would not eliminate the problem of thermal pollution, it would enable an increase in energy production
of between 300 and 700 times what we have now without adversely affecting the planet's heat
balance.
Maybe the development of renewable energy sources will make fusion technology unnecessary. But we shouldn't oppose
research into it because it may be difficult to achieve. And Marxists certainly shouldn't oppose it because it requires
scientific knowledge.
 Fusion = Lie---2NC
Fusions not too optimistic neg arg is dated.
Prosser 16
Marc Prosser Technology and Science journalist for Forbes. Prosser has previously worked for Financial Times, The
Times and The Engineer (Ingeniren). Prosser holds a degree in journalism from Roskilde University, as well as a
bachelors degree in Library and Information Science from the Royal Danish School of Library and Information
Science. Meet the Reactors Accelerating Us Toward Fusion Energy- Singularity Hub - Singularity Hub is an edited
and reviewed publication that chronicles technological progress by highlighting the breakthroughs, players, and
issues shaping the future as well as supporting a global community of people who want to change the world. Aug 12,
2016 - http://singularityhub.com/2016/08/12/meet-the-reactors-accelerating-us-toward-fusion-energy/
The old joke about fusion is that it is 30 years from becoming a reality and thats been the case
for the last 50 years or more. Its a joke that may quickly be reaching its sell-by date. And a good
thing too. The promise of fusion is near-unlimited energy that produces almost no waste.
Traditional nuclear reactors split atoms to create energy. These fission reactors run on processed uranium and
leave behind radioactive waste. Fusion, on the other hand, is the same process that keeps the sun shining. Fusion
reactors would run on abundant hydrogen isotopes and, in theory, create significantly more energy
than fission with comparatively little waste. Fusion might provide the perfect complement to renewable energy in the
future but building fusion reactors has proven a tough nut to crack. In early 2016, however, two major fusion
advances were announced. First, the German Wendelstein 7-X stellarator reactor reached plasma temperatures of 80
million degrees. Just a week later, the Chinese Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak reactor controlled plasma for 102
seconds. One major challenge for fusion energy is reaching high enough plasma temperatures. Another is maintaining stability of the
plasma, which is essential to most fusion reaction processes. The two projects show how scientists are closing in on
solutions that can help conquer these hurdles. At the same time, technical progress is speeding up in a multitude of different
fusion reactor approaches. And parts of the fusion industry itself are beginning to resemble the startup ecosystem known from the
information technology industry.
Case
 RC---1NR
Finishing geras.
The effect of the tendency, however, is, to denature what one is looking at when one looks at
the horrors of the world: a massacre of in- nocents; a woman being beaten in a public place or hanged in a football
stadium; a place in which a man can have his ears surgically removed or his tongue cut out, or be broken and destroyed, to be
followed by the next such vic-tim, and the next, in a continuous sequence ol atrocity; or a place in which a parent can be forced to
watch her child tortured and murdered in front of her; or a place in which a husband can be forced to watch his wife repeat-edly
raped; an "ethnic^leansing" or a genocide in progress, in which entire communities are pulled up by the roots-arid people are shot
or hacked or starved to death by the thousands or the tens of thousands; mass graves opened to yield up their terrible story. The list,
as anyone knows who keeps reading when the overwhelming temptation is to look away, could be much extended. The items on it
are moral and political realities in their own right. They need to be registered and fully recognized as such. To collapse
them too quickly into their putative original causes, to' refer them immediately, or
refer from them, to other things that have preceded them is not to give them their
due as the specific phenomena they are, the horrors, tor those destroyed by them or enduring them, for those
whose lives are torn and wrecked and filled with grief by them, are in a double sense reduced by this quick and easy reference back to
something else, putatively their real cause or origin. Furthermore, not all the contributory causes of such grim events are of the type
that the section of the left under discussion here likes to invokethat is, causes arising else- where, either geographically (in the
United States) or societally (in the dynamics of capi- talism). Moral and political evils of this order and I make no apology
for calling them that can and generally do have
causes that are more local in a spatial sense; and they are
governed or influenced by political, ideological, and moral specificities every bit as
real as the capitalist economy. Not everything is systemic , in the sense of being an effect of
pressures or tendencies of economic provenance, whether from the global economy or from some more particular region of it.
There are independent patterns of coercion and cruelty, both interpersonal and
embedded within political structures; forms of authoritarian imposition; types of invasive
assault and violence, at the micro-level and at the macro-level, involving large social forces.

Neolib is sustainable and self-correcting---AFF cant solve

Seabra 12 (Leo, has a background in Communication and Broadcasting and a broad experience
which includes activities in Marketing, Advertising, Sales and Public Relations, 2/27,
Capitalism can drive Sustainability and also innovation,
http://seabraaffairs.wordpress.com/2012/02/27/capitalism-can-drive-sustainability-and-also-
innovation/)
There are those who say that if the world does not change their habits, even the end of economic
growth, and assuming alternative ways of living, will be a catastrophe. Our lifestyles are unsustainable. Our
expectations of consumption are predatory.Either we change this, or will be chaos. Others say that the pursuit of
unbridled economic growth and the inclusion of more people in consumption is killing the
Earth. We have to create alternative because economic growth is pointing to the global collapse. What will happen when billions
of Chinese decide to adopt the lifestyle of Americans? Ill disagree if you dont mind They might be wrong.
Completely wrong .. Even very intelligent people wrongly interpret the implications of what they observe when they lose
the perspective of time. In the vast scale of time (today, decades, not centuries) it is the opposite of what
expected, because they start from a false assumption: the future is the extrapolation of this. But
not necessarily be. How do I know? Looking at history. What story? The history of innovation,
this thing generates increases in productivity, wealth, quality of life in an unimaginable level. It
is innovation that will defeat pessimism as it always did . It was innovation that made life today
is incomparably better than at any other time in human history. And will further improve.
Einstein, who was not a stupid person, believed that capitalism would generate crisis, instability, and
growing impoverishment. He said: The economic anarchy of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the true
source of evil. The only way to eliminate this evil, he thought, was to establish socialism, with the means of production are owned by
the company. A centrally controlled economy would adjust the production of goods and services the needs of people, and would
distribute the work that needed to be done among those in a position to do so. This would guarantee a livelihood to every man,
women and children. Each according to his possibilities. To each according to their needs. And guess what? What
happened was the opposite of what Einstein predicted. Who tried the model he suggested,
impoverished, screwed up. Peter Drucker says that almost of all thinking people of the late nineteenth
century thought that Marx was right: there would be increased exploitation of workers by employers. They would
become poorer, until one day, the thing would explode. Capitalist society was considered inherently
unsustainable. It is more or less the same chat today. Bullshit. Capitalism, with all
appropriate regulations, self-corrects. It is an adaptive system that learns and
changes by design. The design is just for the system to learn and change. There was
the opposite of what Einstein predicted, and held the opposite of what many predict, but the
logic that unlike only becomes evident over time. It wasnt obvious that the workers are those whom
would profit from the productivity gains that the management science has begun to generate by
organizing innovations like the railroad, the telegraph, the telephone .. to increase the scale of
production and cheapen things. The living conditions of workers today are infinitely better than
they were in 1900. They got richer, not poorer .. You do not need to work harder to produce more
(as everyone thought), you can work less and produce more through a mechanism that is only now becoming apparent, and that
brilliant people like Caetano Veloso still ignores. The output is pursuing growth through innovation, growth is
not giving up. More of the same will become unsustainable to the planet, but most of it is not
what will happen, will happen more different, than we do not know what is right. More
innovative. Experts, such as Lester Brown, insist on statements like this: if the Chinese also want to have three cars for every
four inhabitants, as in the U.S. today, there will be 1.1 billion cars there in 2030, and there is no way to build roads unless ends with
the whole area used for agriculture. You will need 98 million barrels of oil per day, but the world only produces about 90 million
today, and probably never produce much more. The mistake is to extrapolate todays solutions for the future. We can continue living
here for 20 years by exploiting the same resources that we explore today? Of course not. But the other question is: how can we
encourage the stream of innovations that will enable the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, Africans ..
to live so as prosperous as Americans live today? Hey, wake up what can not stop the engine of
innovation is that the free market engenders. This system is self correcting, that is its beauty. We
do not need to do nothing but ensure the conditions for it to work without distortion. The rest he
does himself. It regulates itself.
 Case D---2NC
Demonization of liberalism turns the AFF
Goodwin-Smith 8 (Dr Ian Goodwin-Smith is a lecturer in the School of Social Work & Social
Policy at the University of South Australia. He is a member of the Social Policy Research Group.
Ian teaches courses in social theory and policy. This is paper submitted as part of his thesis from
the University of Adelaide, submitting as a Doctor of Philosophy and a Discipline of Politics
The Amateur Writes Back: New Theoretical Directions for Progressive Left Politics and Social
Policy May
http://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/55041/1/02whole.pdf)
For Alcoff, and for any post-liberal or postcolonial logic, this is an untenable position which
misapprehends the nature of being: it is an ontological mistake. Further, it constitutes a paradoxical justification for a
certain type of speech speaking by omission or speaking in silence. The worst charge against this kind of retreat and
against this kind of appeal to authenticity is that it is an illusory smokescreen which has the effect of
shielding the (non-)interlocutor for criticism. As Alcoff says, there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in
which my words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experience of others, not is there a way to demarcate decisively a
boundary between my location and all others. Even a complete retreat from speech is of course not neutral since
it allows the continued dominance of current discourses and acts by omission to reinforce their
dominance. The declaration that I speak only for myself has the solve effect of allowing me to avoid responsibility and
accountability for my effects on others, it cannot literally erase those effects (Alcoff, 1995, p. 108). It is an astute observation that we
cannot erase our effects on others by appealing to liberal ontological formulations and busying ourselves with rhetorical and
There is no conjuring trick which allows this slight of
epistemological concerns about authenticity.
hand, or which hermetically seals the critic outside of a postcolonial nexus of humanity so as to
quarantine their choice from effects on the world, and to absolve them from the responsibilities of this
worldliness.