Civil Code

Contracts; concept of contracts. A contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into
consideration its essential elements, and not what the contracting parties call it. The
real nature of a contract may be determined from the express terms of the written
agreement and from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the contracting
parties. However, in the construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention
of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued. The denomination or title given by
the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of its contents. ACE Foods,
Inc. v. Micro Pacific Technologies Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 200602, December 11, 2013.

Contracts; contract of loan; interest stipulated; reduced for being iniquitous and
unconscionable. Parties to a loan contract have wide latitude to stipulate on any
interest rate in view of the Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982 which suspended
the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1, 1983. It is, however, worth
stressing that interest rates whenever unconscionable may still be declared illegal.
There is nothing in the circular which grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise
interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets.In Menchavez v. Bermudez, the interest rate of 5% per
month, which when summed up would reach 60% per annum, is null and void for
being excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant, contrary to morals, and
the law. Florpina Benvidez v. Nestor Salvador, G.R. No. 173331, December 11, 2013.

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Damages; award of costs; when entitled. Costs shall be allowed to the prevailing
party as a matter of course unless otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The costs
Ramirez may recover are those stated in Section 10, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court.
For instance, Ramirez may recover the lawful fees he paid in docketing his action for
annulment of sale before the trial court. The court adds thereto the amount of P3,530
or the amount of docket and lawful fees paid by Ramirez for filing this petition before
this Court. 35(35) The court deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages;
hence, the restriction under Section 7, Rule 142 of the Rules of Courtwould have
prevented Ramirez to recover any cost of suit. But the court certifies, in accordance
with said Section 7, that Ramirezs action for annulment of sale involved a substantial
and important right such that he is entitled to an award of costs of suit. Needless to
stress, the purpose of paragraph N of the real estate mortgage is to apprise the
mortgagor, Ramirez, of any action that the mortgagee-bank might take on the subject
properties, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard his rights. Jose T.
Ramirez v. The Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 198800, December 11, 2013.

Damages; exemplary damages; when entitled. No exemplary damages can be
awarded since there is no basis for the award of moral damages and there is no award
of temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.Exemplary damages are imposed
by way of example for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. Jose T. Ramirez v. The Manila Banking Corporation, G.R.
No. 198800, December 11, 2013.

Damages; moral damages; when entitled. Nothing supports the trial courts award of
moral damages. There was no testimony of any physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury suffered by Ramirez. The award of moral damages
must be anchored on a clear showing that Ramirez actually experienced mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings or similar injury.
Ramirezs testimony is also wanting as to the moral damages he suffered. Jose T.
Ramirez v. The Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 198800, December 11, 2013.

Foreclosure; extrajudicial foreclosure; notice of extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
not necessary unless stipulated by the parties. In Carlos Lim, et al. v. Development
Bank of the Philippines, the court held that unless the parties stipulate, personal
notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary
because Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in
three public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general
circulation. In this case, the parties stipulated in paragraph N of the real estate
mortgage that all correspondence relative to the mortgage including notifications of
extrajudicial actions shall be sent to mortgagor Ramirez at his given address.
Respondent had no choice but to comply with this contractual provision it has entered
into with Ramirez. The contract is the law between them. Hence, the court cannot
agree with the bank that paragraph N of the real estate mortgage does not impose an
additional obligation upon it to provide personal notice of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale to the mortgagor Ramirez. Jose T. Ramirez v. The Manila Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 198800, December 11, 2013.

Foreclosure of mortgage; proceeds; obligations covered. The petitioner contends that
there was no excess or surplus that needs to be returned to the respondent because her
other outstanding obligations and those of her attorney-in-fact were paid out of the
proceeds.

The relevant provision, Section 4 of Rule 68 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
mandates that:

Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale. The amount realized from the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale,
be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance
or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior
encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there
be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them,
then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.

Thus, in the absence of any evidence showing that the mortgage also covers the other
obligations of the mortgagor, the proceeds from the sale should not be applied to
them. Philippine Bank of Communication v. Mary Ann O. Yeung, G.R. No. 179691,
December 4, 2013.

Laches; concept of. Well settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proven
positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this
stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature.
Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits, wherein both
parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.
Modesto Sanchez v. Andrew Sanchez, G.R. No. 187661, December 4, 2013.

Mortgage; redemption period; reckoning of the period of redemption by the
mortgagor or his successor-in-interest starts from the registration of the sale in the
Register of Deeds. The reckoning of the period of redemption by the mortgagor or his
successor-in-interest starts from the registration of the sale in the Register of Deeds.
Although Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, specifies that the period of
redemption starts from and after the date of the sale, jurisprudence has since settled
that such period is more appropriately reckoned from the date of registration.United
Coconut Planters Bank v. Christopher Lumbo and Milagros Lumbo, G.R. No.
162757, December 11, 2013.

Obligations; force majeure; concept of force majeure. Anent petitioners reliance on
force majeure, suffice it to state that Peakstars breach of its obligations to Metro
Concast arising from the MoA cannot be classified as a fortuitous event under
jurisprudential formulation.

Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable.
It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated,
as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The
mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.

To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of
the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to
foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free
from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. Metro Concast Steel
Corp., Spouses Jose S. Dychiao and Tiu Oh Yan, et al. v. Allied Bank Corporation,
G.R. No. 177921, December 4, 2013.

Obligations; modes of extinguishment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code states that
obligations are extinguished either by payment or performance, the loss of the thing
due, the condonation or remission of the debt, the confusion or merger of the rights of
creditor and debtor, compensation or novation. Metro Concast Steel Corp., Spouses
Jose S. Dychiao and Tiu Oh Yan, et al. v. Allied Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 177921,
December 4, 2013.

Obligations; novation; extinctive novation distinguished from modificatory
novation.To be sure, novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or
modificatory. It is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a
new obligation that takes the place of the former; it is merely modificatory when the
old obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible with the amendatory
agreement. In either case, however, novation is never presumed, and the animus
novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement of the parties,
or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken. ACE Foods, Inc. v.
Micro Pacific Technologies Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 200602, December 11, 2013.

Property; action for reconveyance; prescriptive period; exception. The Court likewise
takes note that Paraguyas complaint is likewise in the nature of an action for
reconveyance because it also prayed for the trial court to order Sps. Crucillo to
surrender ownership and possession of the properties in question to [Paraguya],
vacating them altogether . . . . Despite this, Paraguyas complaint remains
dismissible on the same ground because the prescriptive period for actions for
reconveyance is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of issuance of the certificate of
title, except when the owner is in possession of the property, in which case the action
for reconveyance becomes imprescriptible. Laura F. Paraguya v. Sps. Alma Escurel-
Crucillo and Emeterio Crucillo and the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon, G.R. No.
200265, December 2, 2013.

Property; possessor in good faith; reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses.
Dionisio was well aware that this temporary arrangement may be terminated at any
time. Respondents cannot now refuse to vacate the property or eventually demand
reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses under Articles 448 and 546 of the
New Civil Code, because the provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e.,
one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Persons who
occupy land by virtue of tolerance of the owners are not possessors in good faith.
Heirs of Cipriano Trazona, et al. v. Heirs of Dionisio Caada, et al., G.R. No.
175874, December 11, 2013.

Property; Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of ownership after six (6)
months from the effectivity of PD 892. Based on Section 1 of PD 892, entitled
Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of
Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings, Spanish titles can no
longer be used as evidence of ownership after six (6) months from the effectivity of
the law, or starting August 16, 1976. Laura F. Paraguya v. Sps. Alma Escurel-
Crucillo and Emeterio Crucillo and the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon, G.R. No.
200265, December 2, 2013.

Property; waiver of interest; when absolute and unconditional.Lucila did not say, to
put everything in proper order, I promise to waive my right to the property, which is
a future undertaking, one that is demandable only when everything is put in proper
order. But she instead said, to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive etc.
The phrase hereby waive means that Lucila was, by executing the affidavit, already
waiving her right to the property, irreversibly divesting herself of her existing right to
the same. After he and his co-owner Emelinda accepted the donation, Isabelo became
the owner of half of the subject property having the right to demand its
partition.Isabelo C. Dela Cruz v. Lucila C. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 192383, December 4,
2013.

Quasi-contract; unjust enrichment; concept of; elements.In light of the foregoing, it is
unfair to deny petitioner a refund of all his contributions to the car plan. Under
Article 22 of the Civil Code, [e]very person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Antonio Locsin II v. Mekeni Food Corporation, G.R. No. 192105, December 9, 2013.

Quasi-contract; concept of quasi-contract. Article 2142 of the same Code likewise
clarifies that there are certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts which give rise to
the juridical relation of quasi-contract, to the end that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another. In the absence of specific terms and
conditions governing the car plan arrangement between the petitioner and Mekeni, a
quasi-contractual relation was created between them. Antonio Locsin II v. Mekeni
Food Corporation, G.R. No. 192105, December 9, 2013.

Quasi-delict; elements. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that [w]hoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict. Under this provision, the
elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts
the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the damages. These elements show that the source of
obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual duties that
civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from non-contractual
relations of certain members of society to others. Dra. Leila A. Dela Llana v. Rebecca
Biong, doing business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading, G.R. No.
182356, December 4, 2013.

Quasi-delict; quantum of proof; preponderance of evidence. Based on these
requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three
elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebeccas liability as Joels employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joels reckless driving and her
whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption that
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of Joel arise.Once negligence, the damages and the proximate
causation are established, this Court can then proceed with the application and the
interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, an action
predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer
who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.The
rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual
obligations. Dra. Leila A. Dela Llana v. Rebecca Biong, doing business under the
name and style of Pongkay Trading, G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013.

Sales; car plan benefit; contributions as installment payments distinguished from
rental payments. From the evidence on record, it is seen that the Mekeni car plan
offered to petitioner was subject to no other term or condition than that Mekeni shall
cover one-half of its value, and petitioner shall in turn pay the other half through
deductions from his monthly salary. Mekeni has not shown, by documentary evidence
or otherwise, that there are other terms and conditions governing its car plan
agreement with petitioner. There is no evidence to suggest that if petitioner failed to
completely cover one-half of the cost of the vehicle, then all the deductions from his
salary going to the cost of the vehicle will be treated as rentals for his use thereof
while working with Mekeni, and shall not be refunded. Indeed, there is no such
stipulation or arrangement between them. Thus, the CAs reliance on Elisco Tool is
without basis, and its conclusions arrived at in the questioned decision are manifestly
mistaken. To repeat what was said in Elisco Tool, [P]etitioner does not deny that
private respondent Rolando Lantan acquired the vehicle in question under a car plan
for executives of the Elizalde group of companies. Under a typical car plan, the
company advances the purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee
through monthly deductions from his salary. The company retains ownership of the
motor vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for. However, retention of registration
of the car in the companys name is only a form of a lien on the vehicle in the event
that the employee would abscond before he has fully paid for it. There are also
stipulations in car plan agreements to the effect that should the employment of the
employee concerned be terminated before all installments are fully paid, the vehicle
will be taken by the employer and all installments paid shall be considered rentals per
agreement.

It was made clear in this pronouncement that installments made on the car plan may
be treated as rentals only when there is an express stipulation in the car plan
agreement to such effect. It was therefore patent error for the appellate court to
assume that, even in the absence of express stipulation, petitioners payments.
Antonio Locsin II v. Mekeni Food Corporation, G.R. No. 192105, December 9, 2013.

Sales; contract of sale; elements; distinguished from contract to sell. Corollary
thereto, a contract of sale is classified as a consensual contract, which means that the
sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular form is required for its validity. Upon
perfection of the contract, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, i.e., the
vendee may compel transfer of ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor
may require the vendee to pay the thing sold.

In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective
seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery
thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to the
prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, i.e., the full payment
of the purchase price. A contract to sell may not even be considered as a conditional
contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of
the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional
contract of sale, the first element of consent is present, although it is conditioned
upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur. ACE Foods,
Inc. v. Micro Pacific Technologies Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 200602, December 11, 2013.

Sales; contract to sell; concept of.Verily, in a contract to sell, the prospective seller
binds himself to sell the property subject of the agreement exclusively to the
prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon which is the full
payment of the purchase price but reserving to himself the ownership of the subject
property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer.The full payment of the
purchase price in a contract to sell is a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of
which prevents the prospective sellers obligation to convey title from becoming
effective, as in this case. Optimum Development Bank v. Spouses Benigno v.
Jovellanos and Lourdes R. Jovellanos, G.R. No. 189145, December 4, 2013.

Sales; contract to sell; real property in installments; covered by Realty Installment
Buyer Protection Act. Further, it is significant to note that given that the Contract to
Sell in this case is one which has for its object real property to be sold on an
installment basis, the said contract is especially governed by and thus, must be
examined under the provisions of RA 6552, or the Realty Installment Buyer
Protection Act, which provides for the rights of the buyer in case of his default in the
payment of succeeding installments. Optimum Development Bank v. Spouses Benigno
v. Jovellanos and Lourdes R. Jovellanos, G.R. No. 189145, December 4, 2013.

SPECIAL LAWS

Property Registration Decree; alienable lands of public domain; proof of; to prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, or in this case, for homestead patent. The
applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

As the court pronounced in Republic of the Phils. v. Tri-Plus Corporation, to prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable. Republic of the Philippines-Bureau of Forest Development v. Vicente
Roxas, et al./Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Vicente Roxas, et al., G.R. Nos.
157988/160640, December 11, 2013.

Property Registration Decree; estoppel; the principle of estoppel does not operate
against the Government for the act of its agents. Neither can respondent Roxas
successfully invoke the doctrine of estoppel against petitioner Republic. While it is
true that respondent Roxas was granted Homestead Patent No. 111598 and OCT No.
P-5885 only after undergoing appropriate administrative proceedings, the
Government is not now estopped from questioning the validity of said homestead
patent and certificate of title. It is, after all, hornbook law that the principle of
estoppel does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents. And while
there may be circumstances when equitable estoppel was applied against public
authorities, i.e., when the Government did not undertake any act to contest the title
for an unreasonable length of time and the lot was already alienated to innocent
buyers for value, such are not present in this case. More importantly, we cannot use
the equitable principle of estoppel to defeat the law. Republic of the Philippines-
Bureau of Forest Development v. Vicente Roxas, et al./Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v.
Vicente Roxas, et al., G.R. Nos. 157988/160640, December 11, 2013.

Property Registration Decree; homestead patent; once registered, the certificate of
title issued by virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued
under said registration laws; provided that the land covered by said certificate is a
disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.It is true that
once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered
pursuant to Act 496, otherwise known as The Land Registration Act, or Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree, the
certificate of title issued by virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens
title issued under said registration laws.We expounded in Ybaez v. Intermediate
Appellate Courtthat:

The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one (1)
year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it
becomes incontrovertible. The settled rule is that a decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of actual
fraud within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct
and not by a collateral proceeding. The validity of the certificate of title in this regard
can be threshed out only in an action expressly filed for the purpose.

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative
proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as
a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land
covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the
Public Land Law. Republic of the Philippines-Bureau of Forest Development v.
Vicente Roxas, et al./Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Vicente Roxas, et al., G.R. Nos.
157988/160640, December 11, 2013.

Property Registration Decree; reversion; nature of; grounds. We do not find evidence
indicating that respondent Roxas committed fraud when he applied for homestead
patent over the subject property. It does not appear that he knowingly and
intentionally misrepresented in his application that the subject property was alienable
and disposable agricultural land. Nonetheless, we recognized in Republic of the Phils.
v. Mangotarathat there are instances when we granted reversion for reasons other
than fraud:

Reversionis an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to
the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the
action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between
the grantor and the grantee. In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic
(Yujuico case), reversion was defined as an action which seeks to restore public land
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the
mass of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed the
resort by the Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for
reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the conditions
imposed by law; and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent
covering inalienable forest land or portion of a river, even when such grant was made
through mere oversight. In Republic v. Guerrero, the Court gave a more general
statement that the remedy of reversion can be availed of only in cases of fraudulent
or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title. Republic of the
Philippines-Bureau of Forest Development v. Vicente Roxas, et al./Provident Tree
Farms, Inc. v. Vicente Roxas, et al., G.R. Nos. 157988/160640, December 11, 2013.

Property Registration Decree; Torrens certificate of title is not conclusive proof of
ownership. It is an established rule that a Torrens certificate of title is not conclusive
proof of ownership. Verily, a party may seek its annulment on the basis of fraud or
misrepresentation. However, such action must be seasonably filed, else the same
would be barred. Laura F. Paraguya v. Sps. Alma Escurel-Crucillo and Emeterio
Crucillo and the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon, G.R. No. 200265, December 2,
2013.

Property Registration Decree; Torrens certificate of title is not conclusive proof of
ownership becomes incontrovertible and indefeasible after one (1) year from the date
of its entry. In this relation, Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the period to contest
a decree of registration shall be one (1) year from the date of its entry and that, after
the lapse of the said period, the Torrens certificate of title issued thereon becomes
incontrovertible and indefeasible, viz.:

Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree
of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or
other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review
of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the
entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained
by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent
purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed
to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such
decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages
against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) Laura F. Paraguya v. Sps. Alma Escurel-Crucillo and
Emeterio Crucillo and the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon, G.R. No. 200265,
December 2, 2013