THE ARMY AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR
OF SOCIAL MOBILITY IN ROMAN EMPIRE
Undoubtedly, there were many factors of stability
of the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire deve-
loped gradually and already in the end of Roman
Republic comprised all the Mediterranean Sea and
all areas near by. The Mediterranean Sea served as
fastest route for transport of troops, goods or in-
formation. Nevertheless, the Romans built famous
land-routes, which served both for trade and/or
military operations. “The combination of impro-
ved transportation, military market, and the intro-
duction of Roman technology and organization sti-
mulated the rapid development of the local native
economies of most frontier districts. Native villa-
ges grew as a result of that development” (Drum-
mond, Nelsen 1994, 132). Besides, the Romans
managed to attract the local elites (by granting the
Roman citizenship). Certainly, very important was
the imperial propaganda, which underlined all the
Roman military successes (See recently: Żyromski
2006b, 317-322). But we have to be always aware
the situation that it was the Roman army, which
conquered and kept the Empire as a whole (especi-
ally during the early Roman Empire). “The Roman
army was conceived as a defensive force, a tool for
maintaining the stability of the frontiers” (Adams
1985, 5). Nevertheless, the Roman armed forces
served not only to maintain the Roman Empire and
to keep position of the emperor himself. In some
aspects the Roman army fulfilled also some impor-
tant functions for the conquered population. “Mili-
tary planners usually located their garrisons at vul-
nerable points where fiords, tributary rivers or old
trade routes offered the border tribes access to the
interior of the empire. Such sites were also attracti-
ve to traders and merchants, who moved along the
same routes for peaceful purposes” (Drummond,
Nelsen 1994, 146). The existence and further deve-
lopment of such the towns (or even state’s capitals)
as Cologne, Coblenz, Mainz, Vienna, Belgrade or
Budapest can prove the above-mentioned thesis.
“It was the presence of the army, placed after Au-
gustus with relative stability and increasingly at
the perimeter of the Empire, that gave the provin-
ces not only peace but in some measure the mar-
Tyragetia, s.n., vol. II [XVII], nr. 1, 2008, 287-292.
Marek Żyromski
ket that was their economic springboard, making
it possible for them to outstrip Italy” (Levick 1987,
205). Moreover, the military service played very
important role (if not decisive) in the process of
Romanization of former soldiers. Only “in the East
from Augustus to Caracalla at least 600th men re-
ceived Roman citizenship as the result of military
service” (Giliam 1986, 282).
The Romans took an enormous military effort al-
ready in Republican times. “In 225 B.C. perhaps
about 17% of the adult male citizens were in the
army, rising to more than 25% at the climax of the
war with Hannibal” (Campbell 2002, 23). Star-
ting with the reforms of Caius Marius, the Roman
army became filled by professional soldiers. “The
Roman Army of the Empire was a professional
force of legionaries, auxiliaries and fleet person-
nel who enlisted for extended periods and who re-
garded the army as a lifetime occupation” (Keppie
1984, 173). Both Roman army and fleet comprised
probably at about 300th men during the reign of
Augustus (Erdkamp 2002, 5). Y.le Bohec estima-
ted the same figure for the year 23 A.D. (fleet – at
about 40th mariners) (Bohec 1989, 36). In the 2nd
century A.D. all Roman military forces probably
needed at about 375th men, and during the reign
of Septimius Severus even at about 400th men (Er-
dkamp 2002, 5). In the opinion of B. Campbell,
the Roman armed forces already in the 2nd century
A.D. probably reached the 400th men (170-180th
legionaries and perhaps 220th auxiliaries, amongst
them fleet 30th) (Campbell 2002, 48). Nevertheless,
even then the Roman army formed only a tiny part
of the population – perhaps as little as less than
0,75% of state’s population (Campbell 1984, 270).
It is interesting that the cost of the Roman armed
forces rose even faster than the personnel of Ro-
man army and fleet. Expenses on the army were
estimated on ca. 350-380 millions HS during the
reign of Augustus (Campbell 1984, 163). Already
in the end of the first century (during the reign
of Domitian) this cost nearly doubled – ca. 600
millions HS (Campbell 1984, 164). In the middle
of 2nd century A.D. the cost of Roman armed for-
 II. Materiale şi cercetări
ces reached at about 650 – 700 millions HS (Erd-
kamp 2002, 7). According to R.Duncan – Jones in
A.D.215 the military expenses could be estimated
on 1130 – 1190 million HS, which formed at abo-
ut ¾ of state expenses (Duncan-Jones 1994, 45)
J.B. Campbell presented little lower figures : 800
millions during the reign of Caracalla – or at abo-
ut 50% states revenues (Campbell 1984, 164). In
his opinion in the middle of 2nd century the army
consumed merely at about 40% of state expenses
(Campbell 2002, 85). The fast grow in expenses
on army was due not only to the growing number
of soldiers but also to the rising pay rates. “The
basic rate of army pay was probably 6 times hi-
gher under Diocletian than at the end of 1st cen-
tury” (Duncan-Jones 1990, 106). Most probably
the Roman soldiers received part of their payment
in wheat. During the reign of Septimius Severus
the army consumed each year at about 125th tons
of wheat (Erdkamp 2002, 8). “The Roman army,
in any case, liked to keep at least one year’s supply
of grain at all times.” (Adams 1985, 246). And no-
thing strange that “a primary goal of the Roman
government in governing the Empire was to ma-
intain its fundamental basis, i.e. the army” (Erd-
kamp 2002, 7).
The high cost of Roman armed forces was connec-
ted not only with the growing number of soldiers
and their salaries. The great cost was created also
by salaries of officers and army commanders. The
senatorial provincial governors of praetorian sta-
tus (legati Augusti pro praetore provinciae), who
simultaneously acted as legionary commanders
(legati Augusti legionis), probably received 500th
HS/year (Duncan-Jones 1994, 38). The estimate
for legionary legate on 200th HS/y seems too little
(Konen 2000, 303). The provincial governors of
consular status received the huge sum of 1 mil-
lion HS, which corresponded to the material re-
quirement needed for enter the senatorial order!
And so „civilian salary-costs were another signifi-
cant part of the Empire’s budget” (Duncan-Jones
1994, 37) – for instance, the number of equestri-
an procurators increased from 136 in 192 A.D. to
174 in 211 A.D. The highest equestrian official, the
prefect of praetorian guard (praefectus praeto-
rio) received 1 million HS/y, the equestrian go-
vernor of Egypt (praefectus Aegypti) 500th HS/y
and praefecti vigilum or annonae received 400th
HS/y (Devijver 1996, 131-132). The material requi-
rement for advance into the equestrian order was
400th HS. The annual profit from this sum could
288
be estimated on 6%//y i.e. at about 24th HS yearly
(Devijver 1995, 119). At the same time the salaries
of equestrian officers were much higher: praefec-
tus cohortis 20th, praefectus alae (of 500 men)
60th, praefectus alae (of 1000 men) 80th HS.
“The starting salary of 20th HS corresponds to the
5% profit from the equestrian census” (Devijver
1995, 120). The lesser officers such as centurions
received probably 15-30th HS/y, but the salary of
first centurio (primus pilus) was 60th HS/y. It is
interesting that higher salaries received officers
stationed in the capital of Rome: tribunus cohor-
tis vigilum 80th HS/y, tribunus cohortis urbana-
ae 100th HS/y and tribunus cohortis praetoriae
even 120th HS/y (Devijver 1996, 131-132).
It is interesting that the path of promotion was lon-
ger and harder in case of equestrian officers than
in case of members of the senatorial order. In the
middle of the 2nd century A.D. the equestrian mi-
litary hierarchy was as follows:
– at about 300 praefecti. cohortis quingenariae/
tribuni. cohortis voluntariorum;
– ca. 190 tribuni angusticlavii legionis/tribuni
cohortis milliariae;
– ca. 90 praefecti alae quingenariae;
– ca. 10 praefecti alae milliariae (Devijver 1995,
183; Devijver 1987, 108).
Especially important is the low number of milliary
alae (10), in comparison to at about 90 quingenary
alae. “It is a commonplace that service in the ‘mili-
tia secunda’ might be either as ‘tribunus angusti-
clavius’ in a legion or as tribune in command of a
milliary cohort […] In the middle of the 2nd century
there were something like 270 quingenary cohorts,
between 40 and 50 milliary ones, and 141 posts for
‘tribuni angusticlavii’ in legions” (Birley 1988, 357).
It could be estimated that at about 2/3 officers from
militia prima could advanced to ‘secunda’ but from
‘secunda’ to ‘tertia’ just at about half. Starting with
the Flavian emperors, the pattern of promotion
from praefectus cohortis through tribunus legionis
to praefectus alae had been established. “The com-
mander of a cohors milliaria with the title of tribu-
nus was equated in seniority with the tribunate of
a legion (so that it could be hold as an alternative
to the tribunate); the command of an ala milliaria
was judged to be the most senior post at all, and
held after the prefecture of an ordinary ala. Centu-
rions ceased from the Flavian period to be offered
commands in the auxilia; thereafter all these senior
centurionate thought capable of higher command
 M. Żyromski, The army as an important factor of social mobility in Roman Empire
went to Rome to be tribunes in the cohorts of the
garrison there” (Keppie 1984, 184-185). However,
the possibilities of promotion within the equestrian
militia were not so great. “Only 3% of the officers
that started in the militia prima could ever hope
to act in the militia quarta” (Devijver 1986, 113).
Besides, the most of equestrian officers began their
official curriculum vitae in civil administration of
their native town and entered the military career
already in age of 35-45 (Devijver 1987, 121). Espe-
cially during the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D. „it was
mainly the municipal elite that provided equestrian
officers” (Devijver 1991, 190).
Certainly both high position of the army in Roman
social and political life and high salaries (especi-
ally for officers) created situation that the Roman
army could be analyzed as the factor of social
mobility. The question of social mobility can be
presented in many aspects – for instance we can
distinguish the horizontal social mobility (mainly
change of place of living – process of migration)
and vertical social mobility (the social advance or
social sinking). This vertical social mobility could
be analyzed in case of one or many (usually two
or three) generations (Żyromski 1986, 265-274;
Żyromski 2000, 101-112; Żyromski 2001, 87-94;
Żyromski 2005a, 258-261; Żyromski 2005b, 201-
208). In Brian Campbell’s opinion the importance
of Roman army as the factor of social mobility was
specially visible starting with the reign of Septimius
Severus. B. Campbell called the Roman army even
the “avenue of social mobility” (Campbell 2002,
118). In his opinion the processes of social mobi-
lity started even from the position of centurion.
“There was a gradual increase in the proportion
of men who rose from the position of centurion to
equestrian rank and were then promoted to hold
further posts in the civil administration [….] on
the available evidence, in the Severan period just
over 30% of equestrian procurators who had held
some military post in their previous career were
promoted centurions, while over 57% had held
traditional equestrian military posts” (Campbell
2002, 118). However, as analyzed Brian Dobson,
the promotion from the position of simple soldier
to the post in centurionate was not so easy. First
one had to be in life – “for ordinary soldiers death
during service has been estimated at 50%” (Dob-
son 1970, 102). And so, only the most successful
and long-living soldiers could expect the promoti-
on to the position of centurion. On the other hand
“the bulk of the legionary centurions were always
promoted legionaries” (Birley 1953, 105). Undo-
ubtedly, “social advance as far as the centurionate
was concerned was to be the reward of a lifetime
in the army” (Dobson 1970, 115). Probably all the
centurions were of the same rank and the only ad-
vance was within the first cohort (Campbell 1994,
46). However, when one obtained the post of cen-
turio, further promotion was not so hard – at abo-
ut 1/3 – ½ centurions became primus pilus (i.e.
the first centurio in the first cohort of the legion).
The primus pilus had “responsibility for the legi-
onary eagle. The primus pilus was appointed for
one year and usually gained equestrian rank im-
mediately afterwards” (Campbell 1994, 47). There
were many vacancies within the Roman legions.
“It has been estimated that 90 posts as legionary
centurion and 7 posts as centurion in Rome beca-
me available every year.” The most of men (ca. 70)
were promoted from the legion (ca. 10 from citi-
zens and rest from praetorians) (Campbell 1984,
102). “On average a man of reasonable literacy
and good conduct could reach the centurionate in
15-20 years” (Keppie 1984, 179). Certainly all the-
se promotions within the Roman legion needed
much time; so we know only three cases of advance
from the position of simply soldier to the equestri-
an order. “In all 3 cases the award is coupled with
military decorations” (Dobson 1970, 102). Nevert-
heless, the role of military decorations (dona mili-
taria) for the future career of Roman officers and
members of civil administration is worth of closer
examination (Żyromski 1996, 115-136). “The preci-
se part played by dona in the furthering of careers
is difficult to asses, but certainly they are common
in the careers of centurions who reached the pri-
mipilate” (Dobson 1993, 139).
During the emperors of Severan dynasty still
growing number of equestrian officials (prefects
and procurators) began their career in the Roman
army. “Many equestrian office-holders such as
procurators had begun their career with military
service of some kind” (Campbell 2002, 118). It was
Septimius Severus who “democratized the army,
enabling common soldiers to rise from the ranks
to equestrian status and beyond, and in addition
he opened up more military commands and gover-
nmental posts to the equites” (Southern 2001, 40).
Only members of the equestrian order could take
command over newly created three legions (legio
I.II.III Parthica). This process of growing impor-
tance of members of ordo equester was continued
in the 3rd century A.D. and its culmination was the
289
 II. Materiale şi cercetări
exclusion of senators from the military positions
during the reign of Gallienus. “From the mid-third
century there was certainly greater social mobility,
in that men of equestrian rank were now being ap-
pointed to more senior posts previously held by se-
nators, such as the command of a legion [….] Many
of these tough military officers came from the Da-
nubian provinces” (Campbell 2002, 121). Starting
with the end of the 1st century A.D. the growing
number of provincials was employed in the Roman
army and administration. This process reached
even the Roman senate, which was observed alrea-
dy fifty years ago by Mason Hammond (Hammond
1957, 74-81). Of course this process was even more
visible in case of the Roman armed forces. “The de-
mands of Imperial defense changed military ser-
vice, from an Italian point of view, from a patriotic
defense of hearth, home and family to the policing
of inhospitable frontiers far distant from Italy. Le-
gionaries as well as auxiliaries came to be drawn
from the province” (Keppie 1997, 101).
On the other hand, Pat Southern underlined the
role of Marcus Aurelius and his wars in the second
half of 2nd century (especially Marcomannic Wars)
for speed up the process of social mobility throu-
gh the army. As testify the examples of such gre-
at “military men” like P. Helvius Pertinax and M.
Valerius Maximianus – “Perhaps the most far-re-
aching development was Marcus employment of
military officers, no matter what their origin may
have been, whose valuable and visible expertise
best suited them to ordinary of special commands.
Equestrians, provincials or even sons of freedmen
could rise to high office via the army, and then to
even higher appointments through the equestrian
and senatorial posts to which Marcus promoted
them” (Southern 2001, 19). It is interesting that
both these great “military men” (and many others)
spent large part of their military career on Lower
Danube, where in the 2nd century A.D. stationed
the greatest provincial army in whole the Roman
Empire (Żyromski 1995; Żyromski 2004; Żyrom-
ski 2006a, 825-827). “In the middle of the 2nd c.
the whole Southern frontier of the Empire, from
Rabat to Aswan, had an army of 2 legions and ca.
33.000 auxiliaries, or a little over 45.000 men. At
the same time the Eastern frontier had 85.000,
Britain and Germanies 91.000 and the Danube
126.000” (Daniels 1990, 236). Almost half (46.7%)
of the whole Roman land armed forces (estimated
on 363.690 men) stationed c. 150 A.D. on Rhine or
Danube (East 21,4%, Britain 13,8%, Africa 11,9%)
(Kennedy 1990, 269, fig. 11/1.).
290
The high position of army in the Roman social
and political system was connected not only with
military criteria but with the social consciousness
of the Romans themselves. “The Romans conti-
nued to be impressed by military success and an
ability to master the qualities and attitudes of a
general” (Campbell 2002, 12). During the Ro-
man Republic it was the strong position and gre-
at ambitions of Roman generals, which was one
of the main reasons of long civil war in the final
phase of the Republic. In the political system of
the early Roman Empire, created by Augustus
just after winning the civil war, almost all mili-
tary glory had to be directly connected with the
emperor himself (for instance triumphal arches).
Moreover, in Rome there was not “real military
hierarchy or caste of generals” (Campbell 2002,
119). Both the legionary legates (legatus Augus-
ti legionis) and the provincial governors (legatus
Augusti pro praetore provinciae), as shows their
nomenclature, were considered as personal offici-
als of the emperor himself. Besides, in the case of
senatorial officials the military service and/or war
experience formed only part of their preparation
(mainly administrative, iuridical, economical) for
the successful service for the emperor and the Ro-
man state. It seems that the role of army as the
factor of social mobility was much more impor-
tant on the lower level of the Roman social struc-
ture. “The Roman army seems curiously modern
with its professionalism, structured bureaucracy
and detailed military organization […] There was
also an avenue of social mobility through promo-
tion in the army to the rank of centurion or abo-
ve” (Campbell 2002, 151). This was especially true
in the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D., when “a greater
reliance on the army, greater specialization in mi-
litary affairs and the frequent military campaigns
of this are promoted social mobility” (Campbell
2002, 116). The retired officers entered the civil
life on a much more privileged position than wi-
thout the former military service. “Army was a
broad avenue of social mobility into the civic bu-
reaucracy: retired chief centurions, primipilares,
took up in municipalities positions appropriate to
their equestrian status” (Lendon 1997, 266).
During the whole history of the ancient Roman
civilization (754/753 B.C. - A.D. 476) the highest
strata of the Roman society (mainly the ordo se-
natorius) never formed the caste system – like
in India (of course in case of varna and not of
jati). Mainly the demographical considerations,
but also the unwillingness to serve in distant and
 M. Żyromski, The army as an important factor of social mobility in Roman Empire

unhealthy regions (like Syria for example (Syme
1984, 1376-1392), created many vacancies within
the senatorial order. These vacancies had to be fil-
led by members of lower strata of Roman society
(mainly members of the ordo equester). Besides,
the still growing area of Roman Empire created
more and more posts in the imperial army and ad-
ministration to be filled. And so, the paths of pro-
motion started even below the equestrian order
– in the Roman army. Certainly, both the position
of the Roman army and high salaries (connected
with high social position of its officers within the
local communities), established the important
role of the Roman army as the factor of social mo-
bility. The high level of social mobility (especially
in the 3rd century A.D. onwards), as it seems, for-
ms part of the explanation of high stability of the
Roman imperial culture and civilization.

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Armata ca factor important în mobilitatea socială a Imperiului Roman

Rezumat
Statul roman – una din cele mai elocvente civilizaţii europene, s-a perpetuat în timp o perioadă destul de îndelungată
(754/753 a. Chr. – 476 p. Chr.). Cercetătorii scot în evidenţă o serie de factori şi cauze a decăderii Imperiului Roman. Însă,
este mai complicat de a stabili cauzele menţinerii atât de îndelungate a statului roman, a culturii şi civilizaţiei romane.
Printre acestea poate fi menţionat nivelul înalt al culturii romane, precum şi importanţa acordării dreptului de
cetăţenie elitei locale din provincii.
Armata, care cu ajutorul armelor a creat şi menţinut acest imperiu, de asemenea reprezintă un indiciu de bază.
Ea, însă, trebuie tratată şi ca un factor important al mobilităţii sociale. Imperiul Roman nu s-a străduit să creeze
niciodată un sistem de caste (ca în India antică) unde ascensiunea socială nu ar fi fost posibilă. Din anumite con-
siderente de ordin demografic au fost create condiţii pentru avansarea reprezentanţilor păturilor de jos spre elita
socială şi politică a Imperiului Roman. Aceasta a fost posibil, mai ales, pentru ofiţerii din armata romană, cum ar fi
cei din legiunile ce au staţionat în provinciile Dacia, Moesia şi Pannonia.

Армия как важный фактор социальной мобильности в Римской империи

Резюме
Римское государство – одно из величайших европейских цивилизаций, просуществовавших наиболее дли-
тельное время (754/753 гг. до н.э. – 476 н.э.). Можно привести немало факторов и причин упадка Римской
империи. Однако ещë труднее установить причины столь длительного существования древнего римского
государства, римской культуры и цивилизации. Среди таких факторов можно назвать высокую римскую
культуру и важность предоставления членам местной и провинциальной элиты римского гражданства. Ар-
мия, которая силой оружья создала и сохранила Римскую империю, является также основным факторам.
Однако римскую армию следует рассматривать и как важный фактор вертикальной социальной мобиль-
ности. Римская империя никогда не пыталась создать кастовую систему (как в древней Индии), в которой
был бы невозможен социальный рост. Соображения демографического характера создали необходимость
социальной мобильности и продвижения членов нижних социальных слоëв в социальную и политическую
элиту Римской империи. Это в особенности было возможно для офицеров, служивших в самых лучших
римских армиях – таких, как в провинциях Нижнего Подунавья (Дакия, Мезия и Паннония).

15.12.2007

Dr. Marek Żyromski, Poznań University, Szamarzewskiego 89a, 60567 Poznań, Poland, e-mail: zyromski@interia.pl

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