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ISSUE respect to person and to equal right to the poor and the rich.

respect to person and to equal right to the poor and the rich.' To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as
FACTS far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience." 18
1) On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. After
conducting an investigation of the shooting incident, the police identified petitioner Rolito Go as the prime The Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court's denial of petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and
suspect in the commission of the crime. Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila with the following pronouncement:
2) On July 8, 1991, petitioner, accompanied by two lawyers, presented himself before the San Juan Police Station.
He was arrested and booked for the shooting of Maguan. The police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide "On the question of the denial by the respondent court of petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. transfer venue outside of Metro Manila, suffice it to say that the respondent court was correct in denying
3) On July 11, 1991, an information for murder was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, petitioner's motion. For indeed, the authority to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage
Metro Manila, the victim Eldon Maguan having died on July 9, 1991. of justice is vested in the Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 4 of the Constitution. Neither the
4) On the same day, July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion praying for respondent court nor this Court has the authority to grant petitioner's motion for transfer of venue. The cases
petitioner's immediate release and for a preliminary investigation. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro cited by petitioner in support of this issue were all decided by the Supreme Court before the advent of the
interposed no objection to petitioner's being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00. 1973 Constitution where the provision on transfer of venue was first adopted, hence not applicable to the
5) The case was raffled to the sala of respondent judge, the Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on July 12, 1991, instant case." 19
approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release.
6) On July 16, 1991, respondent judge issued an Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision having been denied, 20 a petition under Rule 45
conduct a preliminary investigation. was filed before this Court on July 29, 1992 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. On September 9,
7) However, on July 17, 1991, respondent judge motu proprio issued an Order 2 which: (a) recalled the July 12, 1992, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent People of the Philippines, filed a
1991 Order granting bail; (b) directed petitioner to surrender within 48 hours from notice; (c) cancelled the Comment on the Petition.
July 16, 1991 Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; (d) On September 23, 1992, the Court, after considering the allegations contained, issues raised and the arguments
treated petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated July 11, 1991 as adduced in the Petition, as well as the Comment filed by the OSG, issued a Resolution denying the Petition on
a petition for bail. the ground that the respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its assailed decision.
8) On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the July 17, On October 12, 1992, the present Motion for Reconsideration 21 was filed in which petitioner reiterates his
1991 Order of respondent judge. On the same day, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to suspend all position that respondent judge should inhibit himself from the case.
the proceedings pending the resolution of the petition filed before the Supreme Court. 3 This motion was On December 16, 1992, petitioner filed a pleading captioned "Urgent Motion (for preliminary mandatory
denied by respondent judge. injunction)." In said Motion, petitioner questioned the Order of the trial court dated December 9, 1992 denying
9) On July 23, 1991, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the CAPCOM. Upon motion 5 by petitioner, the petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing (of the cancellation of bail proceedings) and to Present Last Witness. It
respondent judge issued an Order 6 directing "the accused's continued detention at the CAPCOM until such appears that after the presentation of eleven (11) witnesses by the prosecution and six (6) by the defense, the
time as the Court shall have properly determined the place where accused should be detained." trial court considered the question concerning the cancellation of petitioner's bail ripe for resolution.
10) On July 29, 1991, the National Bureau of Investigation wrote a letter 7 to the trial court requesting that custody Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen and Present Last Witness. 22 But the trial court issued an Order
of petitioner be transferred to the Bureau in view of an investigation for illegal possession of firearms 23 dated December 9, 1992 which, among other things, denied the Motion. In the Urgent Motion filed with
involving petitioner. this Court on December 16, 1992, petitioner prayed "for the issuance forthwith and ex parte of a writ of
11) On the same date, July 29, 1991, the trial court issued an Order 8 granting the NBI temporary custody of preliminary mandatory injunction directing respondent judge to allow petitioner to complete his defense
petitioner subject to the following conditions: (a) the petitioner is to be accorded his constitutional rights evidence by presenting his last witness on the bail issue . . ."
during the investigation; (b) the NBI investigation is to be conducted only during office hours and petitioner is On December 29, 1992, the Court passed a Resolution 25 issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO)
to be returned to the custody of the CAPCOM at the end of each day; and (c) the NBI should report to the trial restraining respondent judge from resolving the bail issue and directing him to allow petitioner to present his
court the status of the investigation. last witness. This Resolution was clarified and the TRO confirmed in another Resolution issued by the Court
12) On July 30, 1991, petitioner filed a motion 9 before the trial court praying that the Order dated July 29, 1991 be on January 11, 1993.
nullified and recalled On January 8, 1993, the OSG filed a Comment on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
13) The following day, July 31, 1991, the NBI filed a motion 10 praying that it be granted full custody of petitioner
pending the investigation of the case involving illegal possession of firearms. At the outset, it is noteworthy to observe that petitioner in this Motion for Reconsideration no longer raises the
14) An Order 11 was issued by the trial Court dated August 1, 1991 setting for hearing the issue concerning the question of change of venue. Moreover, the Motion for Reconsideration is predicated on what petitioner
proper venue of petitioner's detention. alleges are "the supervening events demonstrating partiality to the prosecution, on one hand, and hostility
15) After the hearing on petitioner's custody, the trial court issued an Order 12 dated August 2, 1991 ordering the against petitioner, on the other." 27 Perforce, this Resolution shall only consider the allegations and issues
CAPCOM to bring the person of petitioner to the court not later than August 5, 1991 so that a commitment raised in this Motion for Reconsideration and in the Comment thereon filed by the OSG.
order for his detention at the Rizal Provincial Jail could be issued. The Commitment Order 13 ordering the Petitioner's Motion for Recusation filed before the trial court is based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2 of the Rules of
Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail of Pasig to take custody of petitioner was issued on August 5, 1991. Court on disqualification of judges.
The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a
16) On August 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Recusation 14 praying that respondent judge inhibit himself speedy, impartial, and public trial." 28 (Emphasis supplied) This right is a derivation and elaboration of the
from hearing the case. The motion was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated September 4, 1991. more fundamental right to due process of law. 29 The rule on the disqualification of judges is a mechanism for
17) On August 22, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro enforcing the requirements of due process. "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in
Manila which was denied by respondent judge on September 17, 1991. the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair
18) Petitioner was arraigned on August 23, 1991. In view of his refusal to enter a plea, a plea of "Not Guilty" was and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the
entered for him by the trial court. 17 application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites." 30
19) In the meantime, this Court, by Resolution dated July 24, 1991, remanded to the Court of Appeals the petition The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," 31 although required primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is
filed by petitioner assailing the July 17, 1991 Order of the trial court. also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the
20) On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals. people's faith in the institutions they have erected when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that
21) On September 23, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the two petitions. "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" 32 is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the
However, upon petition by petitioner, this Court by an 8-6 vote in G.R. No. 101837 issued a decision reversing conduct of public business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the
the, CA decision and ordering (a) the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; and (b) the proper dispensation of justice.
release of petitioner without prejudice to any order that the trial court may issue, should the Provincial While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for the
Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. voluntary inhibition 33 of the judge under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, 34 the established rule is that mere suspicion
22) After conducting a preliminary investigation pursuant to this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101837, the that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. 35
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated February 27, 1992 finding probable cause to charge Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. 36 Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed
petitioner with the crime of murder. The Resolution was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor who filed with especially if weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without
the trial court a motion to cancel the bail of petitioner and a motion to set the criminal case for resumption of respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. 37
the trial on the merits. In the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court, petitioner, to prove his allegation of bias on the part
23) Petitioner attempted to have the Resolution of the Prosecutor reversed by appealing to the Department of of respondent judge, takes the latter to task for continuing with the trial during the pendency of this petition
Justice, and filing petitions with the Court of Appeals (CA, G.R. SP No. 27738) and finally to this Court (G.R. stating that:
No. 105424), but his efforts did not meet with success. "Even as the instant petition for the trial judge's recusation pends, the latter did not see fit to suspend the
24) On October 1, 1991, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before this hearings. Indeed the trial judge has been conducting marathon hearings which, in the context of his
Court seeking to annul: (1) the Order of the trial court dated September 4, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion for questioned fairness and impartiality, roars out as a railroad rush to make official a pre-determined verdict of
Recusation; and (2) the Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings guilt." 38
and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 101772, was remanded to the DECISION
Court of Appeals.
25) On March 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals (13th Division) rendered a decision dismissing the petition. As to the The Court draws the attention of petitioner and his counsels 39 to the procedure to be followed by the judge
denial of petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Court of Appeals held in part: before whom a motion for disqualification has been filed. Rule 137, sec. 2 provides:

"On the basis of the allegation of the petition, the Court is not inclined to strike down the denial of petitioner's "If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his
motion for recusation as a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge absent any clear competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official
showing of such grave abuse of his discretion. The allegation of petitioner in support of his motion for shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the
recusation are conclusions based on his own fears and are therefore speculations than anything else. question of his disqualification . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

In order to warrant a finding of 'prejudicial' publicity as urged by the petitioner, there must be allegation and In People v. Moreno, 40 we stated that if a judge denies the motion for disqualification and rules favorably on
proof that the judge has been unduly influenced, not simply that he might be, by the "barrage" of publicity his competency to try the case, it becomes a matter of official duty for him to proceed with the trial and
(Martelino vs. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106; emphasis supplied). While there is such allegation in the petition, the decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of being called upon to account for his
Court has however found no proof so far adduced sufficient to accept the petitioner's claim that the dereliction. Although this case was decided prior to the introduction of par. 2 of Rule 137, sec. 1, there is no
respondent judge has been unduly influenced by the alleged publicity. reason why the procedure laid down in Rule 137, sec. 2 and applied in People v. Moreno should not likewise
Additionally, We quote hereunder the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Aparicio vs. Andal, apply to a motion for inhibition filed pursuant to Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2. 41 In fact, in Genoblazo v. Court of
175 SCRA 569 where, citing the case of Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, it said: Appeals, 42 the Court applied the procedure prescribed in Rule 137, sec. 2 when the trial judge denied a
party's motion for inhibition under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, thus:
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not
licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approval to this ideal. It ill behooves this "Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the case by setting it for pre-trial since it is within
Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to her sound discretion, after her decision in favor of her own competency, to either proceed with the trial or
complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality refrain from acting on the case until determination of the issue of her disqualification by the appellate court
and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show [Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court; De la Paz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 76].
arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally 43
disqualified, will do in a case before him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made
before trial that a party 'will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing' is 'premature.' Prejudice is not to be Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, he shall
presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by this Court. The mere

Tambunting v CA
filing of a motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition before either the Court of Appeals or the It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a divided Court nullified
Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive the respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be conducted. But the
judge of authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such motion or petition, erroneous Order of respondent judge is not necessarily proof of partiality.
although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial. In People v. Lacson, 56 we held that erroneous rulings do not always constitute evidence of bias. 57 In Luciano
In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when v. Mariano, 58 we made the pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously ruled against
he proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation. the same litigant on two or more occasions does not create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the
- Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case part of the judge against that particular litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence in our courts . . ." *
during the pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that the judge is partial. Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as
- This Court has not, in connection with the petition, issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) in this case, militates against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias or partiality.
enjoining respondent judge from further hearing the case. We have earlier underscored the importance of the rule of disqualification of judges, not only in safeguarding
- The TRO which this Court issued on December 29, 1992 after the petition was denied and pending the rights of litigants to due process of law but also in earning for the judiciary the people's confidence, an
this Motion for Reconsideration ordered the judge to desist from resolving the question on the element so essential in the effective administration of justice.
cancellation of bail until the last witness of petitioner was heard. The rule should, therefore, not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant's personal designs or to defeat the ends of
- The TRO did not restrain the judge from hearing the case. On the contrary, the judge was ordered to justice. "While We are exacting on the conduct of judges confronted with motions for disqualification's, We
hear petitioner's last witness in the cancellation of bail proceedings. 44 Because it was his duty to cannot, however, tolerate acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge for their
continue trying the case and there was no order from this Court not to do so, respondent judge own purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment . . . [T]his Court does not approve the
committed no impropriety evincing partiality when he continued hearing the case during the tactic of some litigants of filing of baseless motion for disqualification of the judge as a means of delaying the
pendency of the petition before this Court. case and/or of forum-shopping for a more friendly judge." 60
Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, claims that since the issuance of the Court Resolution dated In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the light of his lawyers'
September 23, 1992 denying his Petition, there have been "supervening events demonstrating partiality to the many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial court, petitioner tried
prosecution on one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other hand." 45 Petitioner alleges: at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, 61 but to suspend the trial of the case itself.
The following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent judge all prayed either to suspend the
"Pursuing his unconstitutional bent first evinced when, without benefit of preliminary investigation, proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a particular issue:
petitioner's arraignment and trial, then arrest and detention for almost a year was peremptorily ordered
which this Court reversed and rebuked (G.R. no. 101837, promulgated 11 February 1992) the unchastened CAPTION OF PLEADING DATE OF FILING
trial judge let out yet with two palpably biased and hostile orders, infra, clearly and unmistakably
demonstrating an unconstitutional prejudgment of petitioner's culpability." 46 1. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion July 19, 1991
2. Motion to Hold in Abeyance August 2, 1991
The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by respondent judge on 3. Motion for Recusation August 8, 1991
August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility of an affidavit of Geronimo Gonzaga 4. Motion to Suspend Proceedings
offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge should not have admitted the
extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the witness stand to affirm the statements and Transfer Venue Outside
contained in the document presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was
trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution. Metro Manila August 22, 1991
5.Motion to Suspend Proceedings March 4, 1991
This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's objection to the 6.Second Motion to Inhibit March 2, 1992
admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. 7.Motion to Suspend Action on Formal Offer of Evidence and on Submission of Memorandum Dec. 21,
In Jandionco v. Pearanda, 47 it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a 1992
party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from 8.Motion to Reopen Hearing and Present Last Witness Dec. 1, 1992
hearing the case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." 48
If petitioner disagrees with the judge's ruling, he may still question the admissibility of the evidence when he Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing various orders of respondent judge
files an appeal, in case a judgment of conviction is rendered. in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart from the present petition which is
To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection raised by petitioner's counsel, was docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously filed two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos.
trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not only baseless because there was no evidence given to 101837 and 105424. In all three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining order to have the
support this conclusion, but also premature because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the proceedings before the trial court held in abeyance.
merits and weight of the particular piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility. The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated and the
Petitioner's conclusion that "the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement suggest a proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between the filing of the
sinister concert to simulate evidential strength" 49 is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist
overreaction. of four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have reached a total of one thousand five hundred
The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred during one of the and twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being conducted.
hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's bail. When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the proceedings in the murder case
On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the prosecution and two (2) for the suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the needless protraction of the case, the Motion for
defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further
allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling ploy to stall hearings.
were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and different from the hearing on the merits; In sum, after a careful examination of the records of the case, including the transcript of stenographic notes,
(2) the court need not receive exactly the same number of witnesses from both the prosecution and the and considering the applicable law, the pertinent rules and prevailing jurisprudence, we reiterate our holding
defense; and (3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to two (2) witnesses as borne out by the in the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992 that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
record of the case. 50 affirming the respondent judge's Order which denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation. This extended
Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an Resolution should put an end to petitioner's obvious attempts at deferring the trial of his principal case by
application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. dwelling on incidental matters. The motion for reconsideration must, perforce, be denied with finality.
- By 'summary hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the In the Comment on the petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Solicitor General prays that Attys. Raymundo
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, be disciplinarily dealt with by this Court for allegedly
determine the weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. using abusive and intemperate language against respondent judge which betrays disrespect to the trial court.
- In such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer
weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the malevolence" 62 respondent judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further stated:
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered is admitted.' . . . The course of "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to
the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such muzzle his right to be heard in his defense . . ." 63 The trial judge's actions were also branded as an "obviously
evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ."
examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to have: (1)
of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing." 51 "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced contempt for
Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for an application for bail but to cancel Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before he condemns, proceed
that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and procedure governing hearings on an application for upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of the facts." 65
bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial court may issue justice and judicial officers." 66 Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional Responsibility
in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the bail. 52 which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
- The grant of bail was made without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as in this and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of the Code further states:
case, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of guilt. "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the courts." The
53 next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
- In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with the same issue as in record or having materiality to the case."
an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to convince the court that the
accused is not entitled to bail. To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their duty
- Hence, the similarity of the nature and procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and the to advance the interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a license to malign our
cancellation of the same. courts of justice.
Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the bail proceedings temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our
before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the number of witnesses for petitioner. judicial system, so necessary for the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court has admonished and
- The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination as to whether or not the punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or
evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial discretion." 54 defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods,
- If the trial judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the bail issue, perhaps more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not
after giving both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
the bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request offensive." 67
and allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings. In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and authority of this Court to
In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we are of the opinion that the language used by
prosecution's motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already presented petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous.
was not motivated by bias or prejudice.
Finally, petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition that the respondent NOTES
judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 55 which in effect allowed petitioner's
arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary investigation.

Tambunting v CA

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