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Heirs of Eduardo Simon v.

G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011

(Subject: Criminal Procedure- Independent Civil Action.)

FACTS: The City Prosecutor of Manila filed a criminal case in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila charging Eduardo Simon of violating BP22. Simon issued to Elvin Chan
a Landbank a check but failed to pay the respondent the value of the check within 5
days after receiving the notice.Three years later , Elvin Chan commenced in the MTC in
Pasay City a Civil Action for the collection of the principal amount of P 336,000.00. The
plaintiff countered the argument of Simon by pointing out he did not make any allegation
as to the exact amount of his claim in the criminal case, consitituting an implied right to
initiate civil action. The Plaintiff also cited Rule 111 Section 2, exception to file separate
civil action during the pendency of a criminal case under Art. 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of
the NCC. The case falls underArt. 33 of the NCC. Chan appealed to the RTC but the rtc
upheld MCTCs dismissal of Chans independent civil action. Chan appealed to the
CA .The CA reversed the decision of the RTC . The CA recognized that civil case cannot
anymore initiated following the filling of a criminal case, the following case falls under
the exception under Rule 111 sec. 2. Simon appealed to the Supreme Court for petition
for review.

ISSUE: Whether Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check was
an independent civil action.

HELD: No. there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing
check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states: Any provision of law or Rules of Court to
the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be
observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or
credit: The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
People v. Renato Dadulla y Capanas
G.R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011

(SUBJECT: Criminal procedure- Effect of failure to alleged the qualifying

circumstance of relationship in the crime of qualified rape)

FACTS: The accused was charged in the RTC with rape of AAA and attempted rape
through separate informations. The RTC found the accused guilty of rape imposed the
death penalty. On Appeal, the CA held that the correct penalty in Criminal Case No. 98-
2304-MK was reclusion perpetua because the accused was liable only for simple rape
by virtue of the information not alleging any qualifying circumstances; and that in
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK the accused was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness,
not attempted rape, because his act of opening the zipper and buttons of AAAs shorts,
touching her, and pulling her from under the bed constituted only acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE: Whether the failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the
information precluded a finding of qualified rape against the accused.

HELD: Yes. Section 8,Rule 110 of the Rules of Court has expressly required that
qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the information. Due
to such requirement being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application.
The term aggravating circumstance is strictly construed when the appreciation of the
modifying circumstance can lead to the imposition of the maximum penalty of death.
Consequently, the qualifying circumstance of relationship, even if established during
trial, could not affect the criminal penalty of the accused by virtue of its non-allegation in
the information. The accused could not be convicted of the graver offense of qualified
rape, although proven, because relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily
included in the information.
People v. Tuy
G.R. No. 179476, February 9, 2011

(Subject: Evidence- Alibi)

FACTS: Ruel Tuy was charged with murder in the Regional Trial Court for the killing of
Orlando .Accused with intent to kill and while armed with firearms and a bolo and with
conspiracy between Ramon Salcedo, Jr. and Raul Salcedo, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and harm one Orlando Barrameda thereby
inflicting mortal wounds on the different part of his body which caused his instantaneous
death, Attendant during the commission of the crime is treachery. The offended party
was at the time of the crime the incumbent barangay captain of the place where the
incident happened. Upon arraignment, Tuy pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder.
Severino, the son of the victim, declared that he had witnessed the Salcedos shooting
and Tuy hacking his father. The medico-legal evidence presented through Dr. Salvador
Betito, Jr. who had conducted the autopsy, established that the victim had sustained
five hack wounds and two gunshot wounds. Betito concluded that the cause of death
was rapid external and internal hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds and
hack wounds. Tuy denied his participation in the crime and claimed that he was
processing copra at the time of the killing in Sitio Olango, Brgy. Bani Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. His brother Ramil Tuy corroborated him. The RTC rendered its decision
convicting Tuy of murder, and archiving the case as against the Salcedos. The RTC
based its judgment on the eyewitness testimony of Severino and on the testimony of Dr.
Betito. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, rejecting Tuys defenses of denial and
alibi. It ruled that it was still physically possible for him to come from Brgy. Olango and
be at the seashore of Brgy. Bani, Tinambac, Camarines Sur where the killing happened.

ISSUE: Whether the failure of Tuy to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at
the crime scene negated his alibi

HELD: Yes. His absence from the scene of the murder was not firmly established
considering that he admitted that he could navigate the distance between Brgy. Olango
(where he was supposed to be) and Brgy. Bani (where the crime was committed) in an
hour by paddle boat and in less than that time by motorized banca. Also, eyewitness
Severino positively identified him as having hacked his father.The failure of Tuy to prove
the physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene negated his alibi.
People v. Joey Toriaga
G.R. No. 177145, February 9, 2011

(Subject: Evidence- Physical Evidence.)

FACTS: A Toriaga was a trusted employee of AAAs aunt in balut selling business. AAA
was a 13-year old lass. AAA was asked to watch over the house of CCC during that
night. Toriaga raped AAA and tried to kill her but AAA pretended to be dead. Toriaga left
AAA and AAA took the chance to shout for help. Immediately, her neightbors responded
quickly. A crime of rape was filed in the RTC. A separate information for frustrated
homicide was also filed. The RTC consolidated the two cases, and Toriaga pleaded not
guilty to both charges. The RTC convicted Toriaga. In the CA, Toriaga changed his
defense of denial and alibi for the first time to the affirmative defense of consensual
sexual intercourse with AAA, whom he insisted had undressed herself freely and did not
shout when the incident was taking place. The CA affirmed the conviction for rape.

ISSUE: Whether the defense of consensual rape is tenable.

HELD: No. the physical evidence spoke more vividly than the testimony of the victim,
whose multiple injuries confirmed the use of brutal force and violence in her rape. Also,
the multiple stab wounds she sustained negated the claim of consensual sexual
People v. Arelino Felan
G.R. No. 176631, February 2, 2011

(SUBJECT: Evidence- Credibility of Witness. Criminal Procedure- Trial judges

assessment of the credibility of a witness.)

FACTS: Avelino Felan, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his very own 14 years
old daughter, AAA .AAA filed a complaint for qualified rape. The information
subsequently filed in the Regional Trial Court. The RTC convicted the accused of
qualified rape and imposed the death penalty. The CA modified the criminal and civil
liabilities of the accused after finding him guilty of simple rape on account of AAAs
minority not being established beyond reasonable doubt. The accused contends that
the RTC and the CA erred in relying mainly on AAAs testimony, despite her not being a
credible witness and although her testimony was doubtful by reason of her having used
illegal drugs and having engaged in prostitution, aside from possessing a poor memory.
He insists that he could control his sexual urge.

ISSUE: (1)Whether AAA is a credible witness.

(2) Whether trial judges assessment of the credibility of AAA and of her
testimony should be given great weight.

HELD: (1) Yes. The attempt to discredit AAA on the ground of her being a user of illegal
drugs and of her having engaged in prostitution deserved no consideration. First of all,
AAAs use of illegal drugs and engaging in prostitution, even if true, did not destroy her
credibility as a witness or negate the rape. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the victims
moral character was immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of an accused for
rape, there being absolutely no nexus between it and the odious deed
committed. Moreover, even a prostitute or a woman of loose morals could fall victim of
rape, for she could still refuse a mans lustful advances.

(2) Yes. The court accord great weight to the trial judges assessment of the credibility of
AAA and of her testimony because the trial judge, having personally observed AAAs
conduct and demeanor as a witness, was thereby enabled to discern if she was telling
or inventing the truth. The trial judges evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is binding on
the Court, and it becomes the burden of the accused to project to us facts or
circumstances of weight that were overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted
which, when duly considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case
Auroa A. Sales v. Benjamin D. Adapon, et al.
G.R. No. 171420. October 5, 2016

(SUBJECT: Criminal Procedure- Clarificatory Questions during preliminary


FACTS: Ofelia C. Adapon is the spouse of petitioner Benjamin D. Adapon. Upon their
demise, Spouses Pedro and Severina Adapon left a parcel of land . Private respondent,
Sales represented by Jericho Sales filed a complaint against her siblings, including
herein petitioners for nullification of various certificates of title and recovery of properties
covered by the void certificates. Private respondent alleged that during her absence and
without her knowledge and consent, the subject property was subdivided several times
and most of it were parceled out among the defendants in varying areas and registered
in their names. Private respondent also averred that she never agreed to an
arrangement for the subdivision of the subject property in the manner made by the
defendants, neither did she recall any extra-judicial settlement of the estate of her
parents, much less a judicial partition.Private respondent executed an affidavit
subscribed and sworn to before Vice-Consul Maria Lourdes C. Legaspi in New York
City, USA, claiming that the deed of extra-judicial settlement attached to the motion to
dismiss is a falsified document. Code. Prosecutor Cuevas recommended the dismissal
albeit without prejudice of the instant complaint on the ground that the affidavit was not
sworn to by the private respondent before a fiscal, state prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath as required by Rule 112, Sec. 3, par. 2 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Prosecutor Cuevas issued a Resolution dismissing the instant
complaint on the ground that it is impossible for him to proceed with the preliminary
investigation without the appearance of private respondent who will be subjected to
some clarificatory questions on certain matters. Respondent filed an Appeal or Petition
for Review before the Department of Justice. Public respondent issued the assailed
Resolution which reversed and set aside the March 27, 2003 Resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the corresponding information against
herein petitioners. The CA promulgated the assailed decision granting the petition for
certiorari. Citing Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, it declared that the DOJ was
guilty of grave abuse of discretion because the investigating prosecutor was bound to
personally examine the petitioner as the complainant and her witnesses; and that the
continuous absence of the complainant from the clarificatory hearing had effectively
prevented the investigating prosecutor from determining the existence of probable
cause against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the criminal complaint was warranted because the
investigating prosecutor had not personally examined the petitioner as the complainant
due to her failure to attend the clarificatory hearing.
HELD: No. She was represented in the proceedings by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales,
whom she had constituted as her agent for purposes of pursuing the criminal case
against the respondents. Being her agent expressly authorized for that special purpose,
Jerico could competently respond to the investigating prosecutor's clarificatory
questions in a manner legally binding on her part. The investigating prosecutor's
requiring her personal presence at the clarificatory hearing was probably unnecessary
and superfluous in view of his failure to specify the matters still needing to be clarified.
The documents submitted by both parties in the proceedings were already sufficient for
the determination of whether or not probable cause existed against the respondents. If
the clarificatory hearing was geared towards the determination of the existence of
probable cause, the non specification of the matters to be inquired into during the
clarificatory hearing indicated that no more matters needed to be clarified from the
petitioner herself. Although it was concededly discretionary on the part of the
investigating prosecutor to call for the clarificatory hearing considering that Section 4(e)
of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court has used the word may in assigning such prerogative
to him, the discretion was not unbounded because the rule precisely stated that the
clarificatory hearing was to be set only "if there are such facts and issues to be clarified
from a party or a witness."