1. Enrico vs.

Heirs
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007

FACTS:

The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that
Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein respondents.
On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the
Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed
away six months later. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man
and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment
from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on
1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was
performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor.
As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUES:

Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Eulogio and Lolita

RULING:

No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of petitioner
to Eulogio was celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order. The
order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are
already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, LegalSeparation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding
for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

______________________________________________________________________________

ENRICO vs HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO & TRINIDAD MEDINACELI G.R. No. 173614
FACT:
It is petition assailing the RTCs reinstatement order on the formerly dismissed filed action for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between the petitioner and respondents father. Eulogio
Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, were married on June 14, 1962, begotten seven
children. Trinidad died on May 1, 2004; Eulogio married another woman named Lolita Enrico on
August 26, 2004. Six months later, Eulogio passed away.
Respondents filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage between Petitioner and the
respondents late father on two grounds: 1. that the marriage lacks the requisite of marriage
license, and; 2. the lack of marriage ceremony due to respondents father serious illness that
made its performance impossible.
Loleta, defend her stand by citing Article 34 of the family code arguing her exemption from
getting marriage license. She sought then the dismissal of the respondents filed action by citing
the AM-02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, par. (a) Rule of the family code.
Pursuant to AM-02-11-10-SC embodied the rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages RTC dismissed the respondents filed action.
Respondents filed motion for reconsideration invoking the ruling in the case of Nial v.
Bayadog, holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a voidable
marriage even after death of one of the spouses. RTC granted the motion and issued an order for
reinstatement of the case. Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration but denied, thereby
petitioner assailed a petition directly to Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of
Eulogio.

2.) Whether which of the two rule AM 02-11-10-SC or Nial v. Bayadog shall govern the
instant case
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Respondent/heirs have NO legal standing to assail the validity
of the second marriage after the death of their father; because the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC
shall govern the said petition, under the Family Code of the Philippines. Particularly Sec 2, par.
(a) Provides that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
Question: Why the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC should govern this case not the held decision on
Nial v. Bayadog case whereas the two cases expressed a common cause of issue?

Here the court resolved that; in Nial v. Bayadog case the heirs were allowed to file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of their fathers second marriage even after their fathers death because
the impugned marriage there was solemnized prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. Unlike
in this case Enrico v Heirs of Medinaceli where same holding cannot be applied because the
marriage here was celebrated in 2004 where the Family Code is already effective and under
family code is embodied the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC where this rule shall govern petitions
for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages.

Nonetheless, as the heirs major concern here, the court supplied; that the heirs have still remedy
to protect their successional rights not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.

2.

IGNACIO J. SALMINGO v. ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA

527 SCRA 1(2007)

In view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceeding, observance of due process,
as in other judicial determinations, is imperative along with a presumption of innocence in favor
of the lawyer.

Ignacio J. Salmingo (Salmingo), City Administrator of Silay, filed a disbarment complaint

against Atty. Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica) and a petition for setting aside of the decision
holding Liza Janes (Jane) marriage as annulled. Salmingo alleged that in prosecuting
an annulment case, Atty. Rubica deliberately concealed Liza Janes address so that she could not
be served with summons, thus enabling him to present evidence ex parte, and that Atty. Rubica
also caused the publication of summons only in a newspaper of local circulation. Salmingo also
contends that Atty Rubica did not serve a copy of his petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor; and that he did not cause the
registration of the decree of nullity in the Civil Registry. Salmingo contends that the conduct of
Atty. Rubica did not comply with the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) investigating commissioner recommended that Atty.
Rubica be suspended for three months for gross misconduct. The IBP Board of
Governors resolved to dismiss the case for lack of sufficient evidence. Salmingo, meanwhile, re-
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court through a letter he sent to the Chief Justice.
He avers that in prosecuting theannulment case, Atty. Rubica deliberately concealed Liza Janes
address so that she could not be served with summons, thus enabling him to present evidence ex
parte.

ISSUES :

Whether or not Atty Rubicas alleged non-compliance with the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is tantamount to gross
misconduct which warrants his disbarment

HELD:

The Court upholds the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

It is settled that in view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceeding, observance
of due process, as in other JUDICIAL determinations, is imperative along with a presumption of
innocence in favor of the lawyer. Consequently, the burden of proof is on the complainant to
overcome such presumption and establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence.

To prove that Atty. Rubica knew Liza Janes true whereabouts all along, complainant alleged that
Atty. Rubica had been sending allowances to Liza Jane and their children at her residence. Atty.
Rubica countered, however, that he had been sending allowances by depositing the same in a
bank in Bacolod City through an automated teller machine (ATM) account, which deposit could
be withdrawn at any ATM machine within the Philippines. This complainant failed to controvert.

On Atty. Rubicas alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which took effect on
March 15, 2003 xxx that the petitioner should serve copies of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and that of the Public Prosecutor; that service of summons by publication on a
respondent whose whereabouts are unknown be in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and that the prevailing party cause the registration and publication of the decree took
effect only May 15, 2003, after respondent filed the declaration of nullity case on January 9,
2003.

At the time respondent filed his petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage,
what applied was the Rules of Court under which he was not required to file his petition in six
copies and to serve copies on the Office of the Solicitor General and that of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor. Neither was he required to cause the registration and publication of the
decree of nullity.

Atty. Rubica did comply with the procedure in the Rules of Court on service by publication on a
respondent whose whereabouts are unknown, which procedure requires only publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order, as
opposed to a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the
court may order required by the above-quoted Section 6 (1) of the Rule On Declaration Of
Absolute Nullity Of Void Marriages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages.

The requirement that the trial court order the prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists in
case the defendant in the declaration of nullity case files no answer is addressed to the said court,
not to the parties to the case nor to their counsel, absent any showing of respondents
involvement in the lapse in the prescribed procedure, he cannot be faulted therefor.

___________________________________________________________

SALMINGO VS. RUBICA

FACTS:
On Jan. 9, 2003 Atty. Rubica filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Liza Jane
Estao.
Liza Jane's given address was at Blk. 25, Lot 36 Josefina St., Eroreco Subd., Bacolod City. But,
the summons delivered to her was returned unserved because noone was allegedly found in the
address. The court granted the respondent's Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Service by
Publication and he was able to publish his summons in the Visayan Post, a weekly newspaper os
general circulation in Negros Occidental.

When nothing was heard from Liza Jane, Atty. Rubica presented his evidence ex parte at Branch
40 of Silay RTC without the City Prosecutor's participation. On May 23, 2003, the trial court
declared the respondent's and Liza Jane's marriage as null and void because it was shown
through the presented evidence that Liza Jane had a previous valid and existing marriage with
another man named Rene T. Mojica. The judgment was rendered final on July 17, 2003.
Ignacio Salmingo complained that Atty. Rubica intentionally hid Liza Jane's address so she could
not receive the summons and that this enabled him to present evidence ex parte. He also alleged
that the respondent only published the summons in a newspaper of local circulation and that he
also did not serve a copy of his petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and Office of the
City Prosecutor; hence, the petition for Atty. Rubica's disbarment.

ISSUE: Whether Salmingo's complaint of non-service of summons could have merit in Atty.
Rubica's disbarment.

RULING: No. As with other judicial determinations, the Court upheld the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors, where it was presumed that the lawyer being complained about is innocent
until the complainant's proof overcomes the presumption and that the latter's clear evidence
could establish his charges ( Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1, 15).

To prove that Atty. Rubica knew Liza Jane's address, Salmingo argued that he was sending
allowances to his ex-wife and children at her residence. The respondent countered that he sent
his allowances through ATM, which could enable Liza Jane to withdraw the money from
anywhere in the country.

The complainant also alleged that Atty. Rubica did not follow the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages in terms of submitting
six copies to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor and that he did not publish his summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.

The Court held that the first complaint did not apply to Atty. Rubica at the time of his filling for
the declaration of his marriage as null and void. So, he was not obliged to submit six copies of
his petition. He was also found to comply with the rules on publishing summons as provided for
in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, wherein he was able to post the summons in publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order.

Because of insufficient evidence, weak argument, and absence of direct claim to the situation
being complained about, the Court denied Salmingo's petition for Atty. Rubica's disbarment.

______________________________________________________________________________

3.

Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Valdes vs. RTC

Art. 52. The judgement of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons.

COMMENT:

Who are not affected?

Under the Rule provided for under Article 52, third parties shall NOT be affected.

Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

*Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage ,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.( As
amended by E.O. No.227, dated July 17, 1987)

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

*prima facie- based on the first impression; accepted as correct until proved otherwise

Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In
1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage
null and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code
contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage.

In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that
Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that:
(1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the
spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with
Article 129.
Issues:

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.

Held:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not
live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract
is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95)
of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to
void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. (Valdes vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996).

______________________________________________________________________________

4.

G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993

Domingo vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina
dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been
working in Saudi Arabia, for support and subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy
in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Roberto and separation of property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If
in affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purpose of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected marriage be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void,
marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage,
the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for
purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of other instances other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required by law to show proof that the
previous one was an absolute nullity.

Marriage is an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family; as such,

it shall be protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final
judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself or
herself whether or not the marriage is void
______________________________________________________________________________

Domingo vs CA
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know
that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She
came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy
against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-
month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another
woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by
Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the
declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other
hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for
purposes of remarriage.

HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of

remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent
spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully
married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being
charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will
simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their
properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing them.
______________________________________________________________________________
5.

337 SCRA 122 (391 Phil. 809) Civil Law Family Code Void Marriages Need for
Judicial Declaration of Nullity Before Remarriage
Criminal Law Bigamy Elements

In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991, Mercado
married a second time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan.

In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.

In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).

In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy against Mercado.

In May 1993, Mercados marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado now
sought the dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him. He contended that since his first
marriage was declared void ab initio, there was no first marriage to speak of, hence, his
second marriage with Tan was actually his first marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is correct.

HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity

All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his first
marriage was still subsisting and was not declared void. In fact, Mercado only filed an action
to declare his first marriage void after Tan filed the bigamy case. By then, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that
declaration a person who marries a second time shall be guilty of bigamy.

______________________________________________________________________________

Mercado vs Tan
Mercado vs. Tan
337 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he
contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did
not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993
declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of

nullity of the former marriage.

HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as
void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had
already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the
judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
______________________________________________________________________________

6. Republic vs CA and Molina

Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father
preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money,
depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and
as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to
live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological

incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties
must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital
responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action
at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel
merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and
had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as
psychological incapacity.
 The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity
laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying
with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic
Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to
act on behalf of the state.
______________________________________________________________________________

REPUBLIC v. MOLINA
268 SCRA 198

FACTS:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 in Manila and bore a son. A
year after the marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility.
In October 1986, the couple had a very intense fight which estranged their
relationship. On August 16, 1990, Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Reynaldo contending that the latter is psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations. Petitioner argues that opposing and
conflicting personalities is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

ISSUE;
Does opposing or conflicting personalities constitute to or is equivalent to
psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code?

HELD:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and
her husband could not get along with each other. There was no showing of the
gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
court further laid down the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code:

1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;

2) The root cause psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint and proven by experts;
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration;
4) The incapacity must be incurable or permanent;
5) Such illness must be grave enough;
6) The essential marital obligations are those embraced by Articles 68-71 and
Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code;
7) The interpretations given by the National Appellate of Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines should be given great respect by our courts; and
8) The court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the State and the Solicitor General must issue a certification stating his reasons
for his agreement or opposition

On these grounds, the decision of RTC and CA declaring the marriage null and void
ab initio is reversed and set aside.

______________________________________________________________________________

7.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of
their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no
sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing
happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a
private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again,
there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long
walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May
1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves
for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The
result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the
husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his
residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi
Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is
physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young,
they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to
another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of
impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife
constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the
Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under
the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
______________________________________________________________________________

CHI MING TSOI V. CA

FACTS
Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married on May 22, 1988. According to Gina, since the
time of their marriage, they never had a sexual intercourse. They underwent
medical examinations. She was found healthy & normal. Chi Ming underwent
medication which was confidential.
She claims that her husbands a homosexual who married her to maintain his
residency status and to prove that he is really a man. Chi Ming claims that it is Gina
who refuses to have sexual intercourse. Gina filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of Chi Mings psychological incapacity. New medical
examination proved that Chi Ming is capable of having sexual intercourse. Lower
court & CA declared Alfonso as psychologically incapacitated to discharge essential
marital obligations due to his reluctance or unwillingness to consummate marriage.

ISSUE
WON Chi Ming is psychologically incapable?

HELD
Yes. Granted. Marriage void.

RATIO:
No intercourse since marriage. Chi Ming should have discussed the problem with his
wife if she indeed refused to have sexual intercourse with him. Or he could have
resorted to the court if she still resisted.

1. Senseless & protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

2. Procreation is one of the essential marital obligations and constant non-fulfillment
of such will destroy marriage.
3. Filipinas are modest, Leni would have not subjected herself to such public
scrutiny if she was just making this up.
Chi Mings reluctance & unwillingness to perform sexual acts with a wife he claims
he loves dearly, proves that this is a hopeless situation & of his serious personality
disorder. Grave enough

______________________________________________________________________________

8.
Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
FACTS: Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They later on became
sweethearts and got married and had 5 children. After the EDSA revolution, both of
them sought a discharge from the military service. He engaged to different business
ventures but failed. She always urged him to look for work so that their children
would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to
his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with
him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a
slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were
already living separately. She did not want him to stay in their house anymore so
when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He
then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who
came to her aid. She sought for nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Brenda submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.
Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation. The court a quo found Wilson to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of
his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda
and their children. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: W/N there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove
psychological incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case
show psychological incapacity
HELD: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality
of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. Although SC is
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of these acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely
no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.

______________________________________________________________________________

MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children.
Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of
the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and
void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.

Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a
physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.

Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however
that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted
to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing
that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged
psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this
Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline
in Republic v. CA and Molina.

______________________________________________________________________________

9.
REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425
FACTS:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan
Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The
birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the
wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear
for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During
the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends
and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from
him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he
escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the
RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons
was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general
circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her
counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only
witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2,
1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence,
and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and
found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of

evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial
court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The
investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the
Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the
ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the
trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to
the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag
is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties
and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.

ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity,
as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive
from justice?

HELD:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the
case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in
the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply
with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with
guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical
doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further,
the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven.
In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating
prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

______________________________________________________________________________

Case Digest: G.R. No. 109975. February 9, 2001

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, respondent.

_______________________________________________________________________

Facts: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two children. Avelino would
disappear for months without explanation and attend to drinking sprees with friends and return
home drunk when with the family; forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and if she resisted,
would inflict injure to the latter. He left his family again and never heard of him. Erlinda was
constrained to look for a job to fend for themselves. Erlinda then learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at date.Erlinda
filed for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void
under Artcile 36 of the Family Code. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals
raising that the lower court erred in declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino Dagdag null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, the psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated by the law not having been
proven to exist. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court

Issue: Whether or not immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from
justice constitutes psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code to declare the
marriage null and void.

Ruling: No. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina case is reiterated herein in
which the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.

______________________________________________________________________________
10.
BARCELONA V CA 412 SCRA 41 SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
FACTS: Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision as well as
the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Order dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial
Court refused to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for
failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
March 29, 1995 Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment against Diana
Barcelona (petitioner). On May 9, 1995, Tadeo filed a motion to withdraw
petition which the RTC granted on June 7, 1995
July 21, 1995 Tadeo filed annulment again but petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on two grounds: no cause of action and violates SC administrative
circular 04-94 on forum shopping
Ground for dismissal of the petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner
(against deferring resolution) was the complainants failure to state a cause
of action but according to Judge Pison, petitioner was shown to have violated
the complainants right so there is cause of action.
RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order denying petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence. It held that "[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that
the [petitioner] must controvert." After her Motion for Reconsideration 11 was
denied in the March 22, 1999 Order, petitioner elevated the case to the CA by
way of a Petition for Certiorari,13 docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

ISSUE: Whether evidences presented are sufficient to invoke psychological

incapacity in annulling said marriage

HELD: A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of

the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or
sustain the issue." The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs
evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised
in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent
or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support

any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of
the parties marriage.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and
his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the
gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their
marital union. Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not
show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the
incapacity adequately. Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by
respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
PETITION GRANTED. ANNULMENT CASE WAS DISMISSED

______________________________________________________________________________

11.

Art 46 compared with PI

In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had four children since then. David
then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the
marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one
Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim.
David averred that Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings
of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan
declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.
HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to
the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of performing
the essential marital obligations. Sharons sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it
constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in law. Until further statutory or
jurisprudential parameters are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the
dissolution of marriage.
______________________________________________________________________________

12.
CO- OWNERSHIP
Buenaventura VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449
March 31, 2005

Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and
violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general
rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA,
to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No
fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution.

______________________________________________________________________________

13.
Paras vs Paras
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy,
Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose
(deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27,
1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a
complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of the Family
Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the
following circumstances: (a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her
signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with a concubine and sired a
child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d) he has
been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. She met Justo in 1961
in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted
her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in1964 convinced that he
loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most
celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was
afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984,
their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his
"barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as
the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the
children, the entire family went to the United States. However, after three months,
Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the
Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in
debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At other times,
he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free
of charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the
last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving
their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation
resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa)
and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained
that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally
signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the banks authorized employee. He
did not abandon his family in the United States. For his part, he was granted only
three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately
returned to the Philippines. He spent for his childrens education. At first, he
resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides,
their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He
admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial support
because of his lack of income. What caused the inevitable family break-out was
Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not
prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to
do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was further
aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down
in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged
that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was
impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching
Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the
validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home
as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house; (b)
the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no
need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; and (c) the charge of infidelity is
unsubstantiated. The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties
started well, negating the existence of psychological
incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage. And
lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought
the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying
Rosas signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He
was suspended from the practice of law, thus: the respondent is suspended from
the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wifes
signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1)
YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his
own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be
spread in respondents record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the
plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of
marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged defects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently
explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C.
No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that
she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the
present case;
2) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on
the root cause of Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
3) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on
the part of Justo
Held:
1) A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no reason to feel
aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true,"
but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground
of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and
alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best
indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by
themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an
incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not
manifest that he was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must
assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity"
of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show incurability,
such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily
show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity
which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologist
\3) ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability
______________________________________________________________________________

14.
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO
FACTS
Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique a petition for the
declarationof the presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article
41 of the Family Code. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor
General in the case. During trial, Nolasco testified that he was seaman and that he
had first met Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ships
port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Parker lived with Nolasco on his ship
for six months until they returned to Nolascos hometown of San Jose, Antique in
1980 after his seamans contract expired. On January 1982, NOlasco married Parker
in San Jose, Antique. After the marriage celebration, Nolasco obtained another
employment as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique. Sometime in
1983, while working overseas, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing
him that Parker had left Antique. Nolasco claimed he asked permission to leave the
ship and return home to look for his wife. He testified that his efforts to look for her
whenever their ship docked in England were fruitless, that the letters he sent to
Parkers address in England were all returned to him, and that their friends received
no news from Parker. He testified that he had no knowledge of her family
background even after the marriage and did not report the disappearance to the
authorities. The petition was granted by lower court and was also affirmed by the
appellate court. As such, the republic appealed to the SC.

Issue
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Held
The respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by
law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court
order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. In the case at bar, the
Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he
arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another
seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants,
to look for her there. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica
declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had
married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her.
The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost
these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

______________________________________________________________________________

G.R. NO. 94053 March 17, 1993

Republic of the Philippines vs. Nolasco

FACTS:

Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived with
him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his
hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982.
After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province. In
January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to
their son, she left. He cut short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.

He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote several
letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he
inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before
the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.

RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA,
contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had
failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the trial
court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the Article 41
of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years;
however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive
death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before
a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's
whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead.

Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of
the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any
information about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not
explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his
captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked
Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London,
he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.

The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.

______________________________________________________________________________

15.

[No. 5986. March 18, 1941]

JOSE RUIZ, plaintiff and appellant,
vs. PELAGIA ATIENZA, defendant and appellee.

ENGZON, J.:

DOCTRINE: The provision of the Marriage Law (Sec. 30, Act No. 3613) referring to
"force" or "violence" as ground of annulment of marriage, does not seem to include
mere intimidation, at least where it does not in legal effect amount to force or
violence.

FACTS:
1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Manila Court of First Instance denying
plaintiff's demand for the annulment of his marriage with defendant contracted
on November 14, 1938, with all the outward legal formalities.
2. Previous to February, 1938, Jose Ruiz and Pelagia Atienza, both single, were
sweethearts.
3. Loving perhaps too well, she allowed him, in a moment of weakness, to have his
way, with the result that nine months later she became an unmarried mother.
4. After the baby's birth, i. e., on November 14, 1938, Pelagia's father Jose Atienza,
Atty. Villavicencio (her cousin-in-law), and three other persons visited Jose Ruiz at
the boarding house where he lived, in Oregon street.
5. They requested, and after some discussion, convinced him to marry Pelagia.
6. With his cousin Alfredo Asuncion, he went with Jose Atienza and companions to
Tanduay street, where Pelagia was living;
7. from there the party, joined by Pelagia and others, went to the Aglipayan church
at Maria Clara street, Manila, then proceeded to secure a marriage license,
and later returned to the same Aglipayan church where the marriage
was celebrated in the evening.
8. Four days later, alleging that he had been forced into wedlock, Jose Ruiz brought
this suit to secure its avoidance.
9. His counsel has 'dramatized the visit of Jose Atienza and companions, and the
"plans" drawn to force Jose Ruiz into the marriage, Jose's passive and downcast
attitude, all in an effort to maintain the proposition that Jose Ruiz went with them
that afternoon "convinced" by the following "arguments":
a. the threats of the father supported by his "balisong";
b. the unveiled intimidation by Atty.Villavicencio that if he would not marry
Pelagia Atienza, he would have difficulty when he would take the bar
examinations because, as he said, many have been rejected admission to
the bar on the ground of immorality; and
c. the promise of Atty. Villavicencio that Ruiz would be physically "safe" if he
would go with them.

ISSUE:
W/N Jose Ruiz was intimidated into marrying Pelagia Atienza?

HELD: No!
1. As to the first, it appears that in the course of the conversation during the visit,
Ruiz made the statement that he could not marry Pelagia because he was
already a married man.
2. This so aroused Jose Atienza that he grabbed Ruiz' necktie, exclaiming: "So you
mean to fool my daughter!"
3. Those present intervened quickly, and the dispute stopped.
4. The flare of anger is easily understandable.
5. But it is not sufficiently established that Jose Atienza displayed any
"balisong", or made any threat against the life of Ruiz.
6. In fact, only a one-and-a-half-inch knife was found in his possession by the
policeman whom the companions of Ruiz called upon seeing what they believed
to be the beginning of trouble.
7. As to the threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar, by filing charges
against him for immorality, the authorities are unanimous that it is not
such a duress as to constitute a reason for annuling the marriage.
8. * * * and where a man marries under the threat of, or constraint from, a lawful
prosecution for seduction or bastardy, he cannot avoid the marriage on the
ground of duress; * * *.
9. As to the promise by Atty. Villavicencio, it is apparent that when
defendant was invited to go with them and marry Pelagia, he had some
fears that he might be subjected to bodily harm in retaliation for the
dishonor inflicted upon her family.
10.For this reason, he had to be assured by Villavicencio that he would be safe if he
went with them.
11.From this statement, we cannot infer what appellants attorney would cleverly
infer, i.e., that Ruiz would not be safe if he did not follow them.
12.Appellant would make it appear that that afternoon Ruiz was practically
kidnapped by Pelagia's relatives until after the marriage ceremony.
a. That cannot be true.
b. He had many occasions to escape, as pointed out in appellee's brief.
c. He had companions in the house whom he could have asked for help.
d. There was even the policeman.
13.Now, considering that the law presumes strongly the validity of marriage once
the formal ceremonies have been completed, we are led to the conclusion that
although plaintiff may not have looked upon the ceremony as the happy
culmination of youthful romance, still the evidence does not warrant a
pronouncement that his consent to it was obtained through force or intimidation.
14.Indeed, we may advert to the provision of the Marriage Law which, referring to
"force" or "violence", does not seem to include mere intimidation, at least where
it does not in legal effect amount to force or violence.
15.At any rate, it is unnecessary to pass on the effect of this legal distinction.
16.For even though appellant has presented his case in the best possible light, yet
appellee's attorney has successfully met the issues, upholding the judge's
conclusion of fact that neither violence nor duress attended the marriage
celebration.

Judgment affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered

______________________________________________________________________________

16.
424 SCRA 42 Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Disbarment Case is Sui Generis
Immoral and Deceitful Conduct
In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career as a
lawyer. However in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with
Esparza was subsisting. In June 2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against
Macarrubo. Teves alleged that Macarrubo made her believe that his marriage with Esparza
was void; that Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but later on left her and then
Macarrubo subsequently married another woman named Josephine Constantino whom he
subsequently abandoned. Teves presented as evidence documents proving Macarubbos
marriages as well as photos of him and his wife as a family. Macarrubo was initially
declared in default for failing to appear multiple times but was subsequently given the
opportunity to defend himself. In his defense, Macarrubo avers that he was only coerced to
marry Teves in order to save her face because at that time she was already pregnant; that
Teves sent some strangers to pick Macarrubo up wherever he goes. He presented a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Teves; that the marriage was void for being a
sham. He also averred that the ruling in the said case serves as res judicata on the
disbarment case because Teves failed to appear in the annulment case. He also avers that
his third marriage, with Constantino, is currently being annulled due to similar
circumstances.
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss in
supporting Teves and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with her is
void, recommended a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law for grave
misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first one is
subsisting shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently
declared void.
HELD: Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared void, it is
still undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since the
second marriage is void, he is then liable for concubinage for living with another woman
while his first marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give credit to his defense
that both second and third marriages are shot gun marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely
to be coerced. One incident of a shotgun marriage is believable, but two such in
succession would tax ones credulity. Macarrubos actions show a blatant disregard to the
institution of marriage and family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a public assault
upon the basic social institution of marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of
a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community. Macarrubo violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui generis
cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in
a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit
of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course. In this case, the annulment of
Macarrubos second marriage will not work to remove such second marriage as a ground
for disbarment.
______________________________________________________________________________

17.
Sarao vs. Guevarra
( 1940)G.R. No. 47063; 40 OG 263
FACTS:
-Felix Sarao (plaintiff) and Pilar Guevarra (defendant) were married in Manila on June
3, 1936.
-In the afternoon of the same day, Sarao tried to have carnal knowledge of
Guevarra, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him to wait untilevening.
-When night came, the plaintiff again approached the defendant and tried to have
carnal act with her, but she complained of pains in her privateparts and he noticed
some purulent matter offensive to the smell coming out from her genital.
-Every attempt on plaintiffs part to have carnal act with his wife failed because she
would complain of pains in her genital organs, and he did notwant her to suffer.
-Upon the advice of a physician, defendant submitted to an operation on Aug. 7,
1936, and as her uterus and ovaries were affected with the tumor,these organs
were removed with the consent of the plaintiff.
-The removal of said organs rendered defendant incapable of procreation, but not of
copulation.
-Plaintiff, however, declared that from the time he witnessed the operation he lost
all desire to have carnal act with her, and has tried not to do itsince then.
ISSUE(S):
-W/N incapacity to procreate can be construed as physically incapable of entering
into the married state, and is a valid ground for annulment.
HELD/RATIO:
-No. Under the marriage law at that time, and as consistently applied in the
provision in Art. 45 (5) of the Family Code, marriage may be annulled if either party
was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state,
and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable. It is held that the test
of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. In this case,
the defendant was notimpotent at the time the marriage was celebrated, as
supported by the opinion of the doctor that the existence of fibrous tumor in the
ovaries didnot necessarily render her incapable of copulation or even procreation.
The removal of her uterus and ovaries rendered her sterile but did not make her
unfit for sexual intercourse. Thus, the defendants sterility cannot be a ground for
annulment since what the law provides as a ground forannulment is the incapacity
to copulate, and not to procreate

______________________________________________________________________________
18.
Impotency
Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that
Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was
already existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the
complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no collusion between
the parties notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was
ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too
small for copulation. Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely
on Joels complaint. The marriage was later annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Remedios impotency has been established.
HELD: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the
sole testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent
cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from
taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country are
by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless
compelled to by competent authority. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of Joel that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.
______________________________________________________________________________

19. Buccat v Buccat (1941)

Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in
September, and got married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a
son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed
to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida
concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which
the State is interested and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting
fraud as a ground forannulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not
suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.

Decision:
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant

___________________________________________________________________________
Buccat v Buccat de Mangonon GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941
FACTS:
1.It was established before the trial court:a. The Plaintiff met the defendant in
March 1938b.After several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of
that yearc.On November 26 the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in
aCatholic Cathedral in Baguiod.They, then, cohabited for about eighty-
nine dayse.Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23,
1939f.Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated.
2.On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of marriage before
theCFI of Baguio City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage
becausethe defendant assured him that she was virgin.
3.The trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.BASICALLY: Godofredo
Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got married onNovember 26,
1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo filedfor
annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led to believe by Luida that
shewas a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of Plaintiff to the
marriage?
DECISION: There is no fraud because: The Supreme Court states that: We see
no reason to overturn the ruling appealed. It isunlikely that the
plaintiff, Godofredo, had not suspected that the defendant, Luida, waspregnant. (As
she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she must havelooked very
pregnant even before they were married.) Since Godofredo must have knownthat
she was not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled. The Sacred Marriage is an
institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To cancel it,reliable evidence
is necessary.*Consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC

______________________________________________________________________________

20.

Aquino vs Delizo
Aquino vs. Delizo
109 Phil 21

FACTS:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud

against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on
December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and
sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a
child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the
proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only
documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the
parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was

affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does

not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.

HELD:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a
ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than
four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say
that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally
plump or fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of
the womans abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and
decision complained is set aside.
______________________________________________________________________________

21. Anaya vs Palaroan

Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an
action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent
was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and
upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim. While
the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that
several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-
marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the
annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-
marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman
was not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for
annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an action
to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and
therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.
______________________________________________________________________________

Anaya vs Palaroan
G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya filed a complaint for annulment of marriage against Fernando
Palaroan wherein she alleged the following: she and Fernando were married
in 1953; after one month of their marriage, Fernando filed an action for
annulment against her; the trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding
the validity of their marriage and granting her counterclaim; while the
amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged that
several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a
close relative of his; and the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned
pre-marital secret constituted fraud that would have precluded her from
going through the marriage. Aurora prayed for the annulment of the
marriage and for moral damages. Fernando denied having had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative and having committed any fraud against
Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal
with respect to moral damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint,
holding that Auroras allegation of fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate
her marriage. Aurora appealed.

ISSUE:
Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman a ground for annulment of marriage?
HELD:
No. Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another
woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a
ground for annulment (Art. 85, Civil Code; Art. 45, Family Code); and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph of the article (Art. 86, Civil Code; Art.
46, Family Code), providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a
woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having
been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless
the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for
upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmakers intent being plain, the Courts
duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or
not. (Anaya vs Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970)
______________________________________________________________________________

22.

Article 45

In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November
1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced
him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that
Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him.
Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he
married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on
the other hand denied Orlys allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her
after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection and care towards
her.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its
face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the
pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of
the case, Orlys allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove
that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by
the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security
guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described done
against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be
raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual
intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part
of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings
merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

______________________________________________________________________________

23.
ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, vs LUCITA ONG,
FACTS
William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union wasblessed with 3
children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legalseparation under Art
55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical violence, threats,intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer for legalseparation. CA upheld
RTCs decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion forReconsideration (MR). The
climax of the couples drama was on December 14, 1995when the respondent
asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back fromBacolod which turned into a
violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting therespondent on the head, left
cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing agun at respondents head
asking her to leave the conjugal house.
ISSUES:
Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTCs decision granting legalseparation to
Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation whenabandoned her
family.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted whenboth parties
have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, theabandonment
referred to in the Familu Code is abandonment without justifiablecause for more
than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due tohis abusive
conduct which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated inthe said
provision.
DISPOSITION:
Petition denied for lack of merit