07B Process Risk Analysis Flue Gas Treatment

LAB GROUPE a
1 SIL classification 29/05/2009 PYK RB PMi
0 First emission 29/04/2009 PYK RB PMi
REV OBJET DATE Auteur Resp. DT CP
PROCESS RISK ANALYSIS

10892 EA 00 401
FLUE GAS TREATMENT
10892 HARLINGEN
25, rue Bossuet

69006 LYON
10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

Page 1 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. METHODOLOGY IMPLEMENTED 5
1.1. GRAVITY IMPACT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY 6
1.2. TYPE OF CONTROL REQUIRED 7
1.3. SIL CLASSIFICATION 8
1.3.1. ESP 9
1.3.2. Fabric Filter 10
1.3.3. SCR 11
1.3.4. ID FAN 12
1.3.5. Ammonia 13
1.3.6. BICAR 14
1.3.7. Activated Carbon 15
1.3.8. Spent sorbent 16
1.3.9. Heat Exchanger 17
2. ELECTROSTATIC PRECIPITATOR HDE10 18

2.1. DEDUSTING 18
2.1.1. Electrostatic precipitator 18
3. LAB LOOP HTD10 20

3.1. LAB LOOP 20
3.1.1. Analyser 20
3.1.2. LAB loop 22
4. FABRIC FILTER HTE10 24

4.1. DEDUSTING 24
4.1.1. Fabric filter 24
4.2. SPENT SORBENT EXTRACTION 30
4.2.1. Fabric filter hoppers 30
4.3. Preheating system 33
4.3.1. Preheating system 33
5. DENOX SCR HSB10 35

5.1. DIOXINS REMOVAL AND NOX REDUCTION 35
5.1.1. Reactor SCR 35
5.1.2. Gas-Gas Heat exchangers 40
5.1.3. Gas-Steam Heat exchangers 42
5.1.4. Fresh air damper 44
5.1.5. Preheating system 45
6. ID FAN HSC10 46
6.1. GAS EXTRACTION 46
6.1.1. ID Fan 46
7. ANALYSERS HNE10 48
7.1. GAS ANALYSING 48

Page 2 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
7.1.1. Analyser at the stack inlet 48
8. AMMONIA INJECTION HSJ10 50

8.1. AMMONIA UNLOADING 50
8.1.1. Ammonia unloading 50
8.2. AMMONIA STORAGE 54
8.2.1. Ammonia Tank 54
8.3. AMMONIA INJECTION 58
8.3.1. NH4OH Pumps 58
8.3.2. NH4OH injection circuit 59
9. BICAR TRANSPORT HTJ20 62

9.1. BICAR UNLOADING 62
9.1.1. Bicar unloading 62
9.2. BICAR STORAGE 64
9.2.1. Bicar Silo 64
9.3. BICAR SILO EXTRACTION 66
9.3.1. Silo extraction 66
9.3.2. Buffer tank 68
9.4. BICAR EXTRACTION AND INJECTION 69
9.4.1. Bicar buffer-tank extraction 69
9.4.2. Bicar injection 70
10. ACTIVATED CARBON TRANSPORT HTJ10 71

10.1. ACTIVATED CARBON UNLOADING 71
10.1.1. Activated carbon unloading 71
10.2. ACTIVATED CARBON STORAGE 73
10.2.1. Activated carbon Silo 73
10.3. ACTIVATED CARBON EXTRACTION 76
10.3.1. Silo extraction 76
10.3.2. Buffer tank 78
10.4. ACTIVATED CARBON EXTRACTION AND INJECTION 79
10.4.1. Activated carbon injection 79
11. ESP FLY ASH TRANSPORT AND STORAGE ETH10 82

11.1. ESP FLY ASH TRANSPORT 82
11.1.1. ESP fly ash extraction 82
11.1.2. ESP fly ash transport to big bag 85
11.1.3. ESP fly ash transport to silo 86
11.2. ASH STORAGE SILO 89
11.2.1. Ash storage Silo 89
11.3. ASH SILO EXTRACTION 90
11.3.1. Ash extraction from the silo 90
12. SPENT SORBENT TRANSPORT AND STORAGE HTP50 92

12.1. SPENT SORBENT TRANSPORT 92

Page 3 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
12.1.1. Spent sorbent transport under fabric filter 92

12.1.2. Spent sorbent transport to big bag 94
12.1.3. Spent sorbent transport to silo 95
12.2. SPENT SORBENT STORAGE SILO 99
12.2.1. Spent sorbent storage Silo 99
12.3. SPENT SORBENT SILO EXTRACTION 101
12.3.1. Spent sorbent extraction from the silo 101
13. HEAT EXCHANGER HSB30 103

13.1. GAS/WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 103
13.1.1. Gas/water heat exchanger (gas side) 103
13.1.2. Gas/water heat exchanger (water side) 105
13.2. CONDENSATE WATER/WATER HEAT EXCHANGER HE4 107
13.2.1. Condensate water-water heat exchanger HE4 (water side) 107
13.2.2. Condensate water-water heat exchanger HE4 (condensate water side) 109
13.3. CIRCULATION WATER PUMPS 110
13.3.1. Circulation Water pumps 110
APPENDIX 1 111

Page 4 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
1. METHODOLOGY IMPLEMENTED
Risk analysis aims to assess qualitatively if a hazard or an operational problem may arise
when deviations from the normal process design occur. It permits to know in detail
measures taken to control risks (preventive and protective measures) expected by the
designer.
The principle of the method implemented is based on impact on health and safety studies,
similarly to HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies).
This method examines and determines all the undesirable events defined during the
functional blocs division. As each undesirable event or deviation is considered its potential
causes and consequences are assessed. Consequences are quantified with a gravity
impact on health and safety, associated with a level control.
Risk analysis document is divided into clearly sections that follow the P&IDs on a line-by-
line basis.
The tables achieved are formed with the following columns:
Undesirable events or deviations: they represent the different situations able to cause
some risks. Product risks, process risks and operating errors risks identification allow to
list them.
Causes: conditions, errors, breakdown or failures that are the cause of the undesirable
event.
Consequences: this column lists every consequence that the undesirable event can lead
to (actions implemented being considered ineffectual or insufficient).
Gravity (G): it is a matter of the gravity of the consequence without considering actions
implemented. The gravity impacts classification is mentioned hereinafter.
Actions: this column lists every preventive and protective measures in order to avoid or
reduce causes and/or limit consequences, thus reducing the gravity of the situation.
Control (C): it is a matter of the control of the event by considering actions implemented.
The control levels classification is mentioned hereinafter.

Page 5 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
1.1. GRAVITY IMPACT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY
Gravity impact on health and safety (1) Minor effects

Body injuries: light
Environmental risk: none
Equipment deterioration: none
Gravity impact on health and safety (2) Significant effects

Body injuries: corporal injuries with temporary disablement
Environmental risk: limited to the plant
Equipment deterioration: unavailability of the plant limited to one day
Gravity impact on health and safety (3) Critical effects

Body injuries: significant corporal injuries for people inside the site
Environmental risk: minor pollution, limited on the site
Equipment deterioration: unavailability of the plant limited to two weeks
Gravity impact on health and safety (4) Disastrous effects

Body injuries: significant corporal injuries for people inside and outside the site
Environmental risk: major pollution
Equipment deterioration: unavailability of the plant (more than two weeks)

Page 6 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
1.2. TYPE OF CONTROL REQUIRED
Type of control required (1)

Human control.

Automatic control loop (control system) with alarm and information transmitted to the
control room.

a) 1 sensor connected to a safety system or hardwired cabinet OR
b) 2 sensors (1 on 2) or 2 actuators ( 1 in stand-by) connected to a control system OR
c) 1 sensor connected to the control system and 1 mechanical system (example : safety
valve)

2 sensors (1 on 2) or 3 sensors (2 on 3) connected to a safety system (safety PLC) or
hardwired cabinet

Page 7 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
1.3. SIL CLASSIFICATION
For the major risks, a SIL classification has been established, following the project calibration (see
Appendix 1)

Page 8 of 113
1.3.1. ESP
In i t i a t o r F u rn a c e C O m e a s u re m e n t V e ry h ig h t e m p e ra t u re a t V e ry h ig h t e m p e ra t u re o f V e ry h ig h o il le ve l in H ig h le ve l in E S P h o p p e r ID F a n n o t r u n n i n g o r
t h e fa b r i c fi l t e r i n l e t t r a n s fo r m e r t r a n s fo r m e r LS A H H R 1 H D E 11 C L 30 2 L o w fl u e g a s
te m p e ra tu re
F in a l E le m e n t T r ip h ig h vo lt a g e p r e c ip it a t o r S t o p w a s t e fe e d t o g r a t e S t o p t r a n s fo r m e r S t o p t r a n s fo r m e r S t o p h ig h vo lt a g e p re c ip it a t o r S t o p h ig h vo lt a g e
R 1 H D E 11 G U 0 01 p re c ip it a t o r
S t o p ra p p e rs R 1 H D E 1 1 A T 0 0 1
to A T 0 0 4
F u n c t io n P ro te c t E S P a g a in s t P ro te c t E S P a n d P r e ve n t s h o rt c irc u it in g P re ve n t s h o rt c irc u it in g
e x p lo s io n d o w n s t re a m e q u ip m e n t
a g a in s t e x c e e d a n c e o f
d e s ig n t e m p e ra t u re o f
e q u ip m e n t s
C aus e B a d c o m b u s t io n F a il u r e o f fl u e g a s E x c e s s iv e fly a s h p r o d u c e d i n F u r n a c e t ro u b le s
t e m p e r a t u r e c o n t r o l ( fu r n a c e fu r n a c e L in e s t a rt -u p
s id e ) B rid g in g in E S P
F a ilu re o f c h a in c o n ve y o r (o r
a n y d o w n s t r e a m fa i l u r e )
S c e n a rio E x p lo s io n d u e t o ve ry h ig h E x e e d a n c e o f d e s ig n S h o rt c irc u it in g o f h ig h S h o r t c ir c u it in g o f h ig h S h o r t c ir c u it in g o f h ig h vo lt a g e S h o r t c ir c u it in g o f h ig h
d e s c rip t io n o f F O D C O c o n c e n t ra t io n a n d h ig h t e m p e ra t u re e q u ip m e n t vo lt a g e p re c ip it a t o r vo lt a g e p re c ip it a t o r w h ic h p r e c ip it a t o r w h ic h is p r o t e c t e d vo lt a g e p r e c ip it a t o r
vo lt a g e in t e rn a ls o f E S P le a d in g t o w h ic h is p ro t e c t e d b y a n is p ro t e c t e d b y a n b y a n in d e p e n d e n t e le c t r ic a l w h ic h is p ro t e c t e d b y a n
e q u ip m e n t in t e rn a ls d a m a g e in d e p e n d e n t e le c t ric a l in d e p e n d e n t e le c t r ic a l p ro t e c t io n in d e p e n d e n t e le c t ric a l
a n d e q u ip m e n t a n d d u c t in g p ro t e c t io n p ro t e c t io n p ro t e c t io n
a ft e r E S P w h i c h h a s a
d e s ig n t e m p e ra t u re o f
3 2 0 C ( d u c t i n g m a y b e o v e r
s tre s s e d )
D e m a n d ra te E x p e c t e d d e m a n d ra t e le s s E x p e c t e d d e m a n d r a t e le s s E x p e c te d d e m a n d ra t e E x p e c t e d d e m a n d ra te B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e p e r B a s e d o n e x p e r ie n c e :
th a n o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs th a n o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs le s s t h a n o n c e p e r 1 0 le s s t h a n o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs on c e p er y ear - onc e pe r
y e a rs y e a rs 1 0 y e a rs
F = 1 1 1 1 2 2
S a fe t y m in o r in ju r y m a y b e e x p e c te d N o n e ( n o t e t h a t fl u e g a s N o ne N o ne N o ne N one
c o ns eq uen c e s s y s te m o p e ra te s a t s u b
p e o p le a t m . p re s s u re )
S = 1 0 0 0 0 0
T im e ly p re s e n c e
o f p e o p le
T= 1
A vo id a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
A =
S I L s a fe ty = 0 0 0 0 0 0
C ons eq ue nc es m in o r e n vir o n m e n t a l im p a c t N o n e ( n o t e t h a t fl u e g a s N o ne N o ne N o ne N one
e n viro n m e n t s y s te m o p e ra te s a t s u b
a t m . p re s s u re )
E = 1 0 1 1 1 1
A vo id a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
e n viro n m e n t
A =
S IL e n v iro n m e n t = 0 0 0 0 0 0
F in a n c ia l lo s s e s R e p a ir o f d a m a ge d E S P R e p a ir o f d a m a g e d E S P R e p a ir o f d a m a g e d E S P R e p a ir o f d a m a g e d E S P R e s o lvin g s h o rt c irc u it c a u s e R e s o lvin g s h o r t c ir c u it
in t e rn a ls is e x p e c te d to c o s t in t e rn a ls is e x p e c t e d t o in t e rn a ls is e x p e c t e d t o in t e rn a ls is e x p e c t e d t o ( t o o h i g h fl y a s h in E S P c a us e w ill c o s t s b e
100 k D ow n t im e c o s t s a re c o s t 1 0 0 k a n d re p a ir o f c os t 10 0k c os t 10 0k h o p p e r) w ill c o s ts b e 1 0 k - 1 0 k - 1 0 0 k . D o w n t im e
5 d a y s w h ic h e q u a ls 7 00 k . o ve rs t re s s e d d u c t in g 5 k . 1 0 0 k .D o w n t im e c o s t s a re 2 c o s t s a re lo w .
T o t a l fi n a n c i a l d a m a g e is D o w n t im e c o s t s a re 5 d a y s d a y s w h ic h e q u a ls 2 7 0 k .
th u s 8 0 0 k w h ic h e q u a ls 7 0 0 k . T o t a l T o t a l fi n a n c ia l d a m a g e is t h u s
fi n a n c ia l d a m a g e i s t h u s le s s t h a n 10 00 k
80 0k
L= 3 3 3 3 3 2
A vo id a n c e o f G ive n t h a t t h e in c re a s e o f It i s e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r
fi n a n c i a l l o s s e s fl u e g a s t e m p e r a t u r e i s a c t io n c a n a vo id t h e d a m a g e
s lo w , it is e x p e c t e d t h a t
o p e ra t o r a c t io n c a n a vo id
th e d a m a g e
A = 1 1 1 1 1 1
S IL fin a n c ia l = a a a a 1 a
S IL to ta l = a a a a 1 a

Page 9 of 113
1.3.2. Fabric Filter
In i t i a t o r h ig h t e m p e ra t u re F a b ric V e ry lo w t e m p e ra t u re F a b ric V e ry h ig h t e m p e ra t u re F a b ric Low s u c t io n p re s s u re F a b ric V e ry h ig h t e m p e ra t u re F a b ric V e ry h ig h t e m p e ra t u re F a b ric
f i l t e r I n l e t T IS A H fil t e r In l e t f i l t e r In l e t T I S A H H fi l t e r o u t l e t P IS A L L fil t e r P r e h e a t i n g D u c t fi l t e r h o p p e r
R 1 H T A 1 0 C T 9 0 1 (2 o 3 w ith R 1 H T A 1 0 C T 9 0 1 (2 o 3 w it h R 1H T A 2 0 C P 9 0 1 (2 o 3 w it h
C T0 0 1 to C T0 0 3 ) C T0 0 1 to C T0 0 3 ) C P 0 0 1 to C P 0 0 3 )
F in a l E le m e n t S t o p a c t iva t e d c a rb o n O p e n in g b y -p a s s d a m p e r O p e n in g b y -p a s s d a m p e r T rip ID fa n R 1 H S C 1 0 A N 0 0 1 - S t o p p in g h e a t in g b a t t e ry C lo s in g c e ll a n d N 2 in je c t io n
in je c t io n R 1 H T K 1 2 A N 0 0 1 a n d c l o s in g flo w t h r o u g h a n d c l o s i n g fl o w t h r o u g h M 01 /M 0 2
and R 1H TK 17A N 001 f a b r i c fi l t e r fa b r i c fi lt e r R 1
H TA 1 0 /H TA 1 5 A A 0 5 1 a n d R 1
F u n c t io n P r e ve n t p o s t c o m b u s t io n ria k P r e ve n t b a g s d e t r io r a t io n P r e ve n t p o s t c o m b u s t io n r ia k P r e v e n t u n d e r p r e s s u r e i n fl u e P r e ve n t b a g s d e t e r io r a t io n P re ve n t b a g s d e t e r io r a t io n
g a s s y s te m
C ause C o m b u s tio n t ro u b le s C o m b u s t io n t ro u b le s C o m b u s t io n t ro u b le s C lo g g in g i n flu e g a s s t r e a m o r p re h e a t in g T e m p e ra t u re C o m b u s t io n t ro u b le s

L in e s t a rt -u p va lve s b e in g in c lo s e d p o s it io n C o n t ro l lo o p t ro u b le s d u rin g
lin e s t a rt u p
S c e n a rio D e s t r u c t i o n o f f a b r i c fi l t e r D e s t r u c t i o n o f fa b r i c f i l t e r U n d e r p r e s s u r e i n fl u e g a s D e s t r u c t i o n o f fa b r i c f i l t e r D e s t r u c t i o n o f fa b r i c f i l t e r
d e s c rip t io n o f bags bags s y s t e m e x c e e d in g d e s ig n bags bags
FO D p re s s u re . C ra c k a t w e a k e s t
p o in t (p ro b a b ly a d u c t ) le a d in g
t o in g re s s o f a ir
D e m a n d ra t e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e p e r B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e E x p e c te d d e m a n d ra t e le s s

p e r y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs per year p e r y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs p e r y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs t h a n o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs
F = 2 3 2 2 2 1
S a fe t y N one N one N one M in o r N one N one
cons equenc es
p e o p le
S = 0 0 0 1 0 0
o f p e o p le
T= 1
A vo id a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
A =
S IL s a fe ty= 0 0 0 0 0 0
C onsequenc es N one N one M in o r M in o r N one N one
e n vir o n m e n t
E = 0 0 1 1 0 0
A vo id a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
e n vir o n m e n t
A =
S IL en viro n m en t = 0 0 a a 0 1
F in a n c ia l lo s s e s R e p a ir o f d a m a g e d b a g s is C o s t fo r r e m p l a c e m e n t o f R e p a ir o f d a m a g e d b a g s is R e p a ir o f lo c a l e q u ip m e n t / d u c t R e s o lvin g s h o r t c irc u it c a u s e R e p a ir o f d a m a g e d b a g s is
e x p e c te d to c o s t 100k s o m e b a g s w ill b e le s s t h a n e x p e c te d to c o s t 100k d a m a g e le a d t o m in im a l d o w n ( t o o h i g h fl y a s h i n E S P e x p e c te d to c o s t 100k
D o w n t im e c o s t s a re 5 d a y s 10 k D o w n tim e c o s t s a re 5 d a y s t im e (b e c a u s e p ro d u c t io n m a y h o p p e r) w ill c o s t s b e 1 0 k - D o w n t im e c o s t s a re 5 d a y s
w h ic h e q u a ls 7 0 0 k . To ta l w h ic h e q u a ls 7 0 0 k . To ta l c o n t in u e t ill n e x t p la n n e d s t o p 1 0 0 k . D o w n t im e c o s t s a re w h ic h e q u a ls 7 0 0 k . To ta l
fi n a n c ia l d a m a g e is t h u s fin a n c i a l d a m a g e is t h u s w it h s o m e t e m p o ra ry re p a irs ). 2 d a y s w h ic h e q u a ls 2 7 0 k . fi n a n c i a l d a m a g e is t h u s
800k 800k T h u s e x p e c t e d d o w n t im e c o s t T o t a l fi n a n c i a l d a m a g e i s 800k
is le s s t h a n 1 0 0 0 k (5 d a y s ) t h u s le s s t h a n 1 0 0 0 k
L= 3 1 3 3 2 3
A vo id a n c e o f It is e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r It i s e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r It i s e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r It i s e x pe c te d th a t o p e ra t o r It i s e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r It i s e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r
fi n a n c i a l l o s s e s a c t io n c a n a vo id t h e d a m a g e a c t io n c a n a vo id t h e d a m a g e a c t io n c a n a vo id t h e d a m a g e a c t io n ca n a vo id t h e dam age a c t io n c a n a vo id t h e d a m a g e a c t io n c a n a vo id t h e d a m a g e
by bas ed o n va r io u s o th e r P ro d u c t io n c a n n c o n t in u e
p re s s u re m e a s u re m e n ts w it h 7 c e lls o n 8
A = 1 1 1 1 1 1
S IL fi n a n c ia l= 1 a 1 1 a a
S IL to ta l = 1 a 1 1 a a

Page 10 of 113
1.3.3. SCR
In it ia t o r V e r y lo w t e m pe r a tu r e V e r y L o w te m p e r a tu r e a t V e r y h ig h t e m p e r a t u r e L o w te m p e r a tu r e a t H ig h d i f f e r e n t ia l H ig h d u s t d o w n s t r e a m F a b r i c F ilt e r H ig h C O f r o m b o ile r A m m o n i a d e t e c t io n
F a b r ic f ilt e r In le t T IS A L L in le t D e N O x r e a c to r S C R in le t T IS A H H R 1 o u t le t D e N O x r e a c t o r te m p e r a tu r e o v e r D e N O x Q IS A H H R 1 H T A 2 0 C Q 0 0 1 H ig h C O f r o m s t a c k
R1HTA 10CT9 01 ( 2 o 3 w it h T IS A L L R 1 H S D 1 0CT901 H S D 1 0 C T 9 0 1 ( 1 o 2 w it h r e a c to r H ig h d u s t f r o m s t a c k a n a ly s e r a n a ly s e r
C T 0 0 1 to C T 0 03 ) ( 1 o 2 w it h C T 0 0 1 and C T001 and CT002) Q IS A H H R 1 H S A 5 0 C Q 0 2 0
CT002) F a b r ic f ilt e r b y - p a s s
F in a l E le m e n t O p e n in g b y - p a s s d a m p e r S t o p a m m o n ia in je c t io n : S t e a m f e e d in g s t o p R 1 O p e n in g b y - p a s s O p e n in g b y - p a s s d a m p e r O p e n in g b y - p a s s d a m p e r a n d O p e n in g b y - p a s s C l o s e a m m o n ia s u p p l y
a n d c lo s in g f lo w t h r o u g h c l o s e v a lv e R 1 LBG 21A A 0xx d a m p e r a n d c l o s in g a n d c lo s in g f lo w t h r o u g h c l o s in g f lo w t h r o u g h D e n o x d a m p e r a n d c lo s i n g v a lv e
D e n o x r e a c to r R 1 H T A 3 0 HSK13A A 051 f lo w t h r o u g h D e n o x D e n o x r e a c to r r e a c to r R 1 H T A 3 0 A A 0 5 1 /A A 0 5 2 f lo w t h r o u g h D e n o x
A A 0 5 1 /A A 0 5 2 a n d R 1 r e a c to r a n d R 1 H S A 1 0 /H S A 4 0 A A 0 5 1 r e a c to r
H S A 1 0 /H S A 4 0 A A 0 5 1
F u n c t io n T o p r e v e n t c o r r o s io n r i s k in T o p r e v e n t t o x if ic a t io n o f S C R e q u ip m e n t d a m a g e T o p r e v e n t c o r r o s io n P r e v e n t c o m b u s t io n o f T o p r e v e n t c lo g g in g o f D e N O x P r o t e c t S C R a g a in s t P r e v e n t c o n t in u o u s
DeNO x t h e D e N O x c a t a ly s t r is k r is k in D e N O x c a r b o n in D e N O x a n d c a t a ly s t w i t h d u s t e x p lo s io n r i s k r e le a s e o f A m m o n ia
( A m m o n ia is n o t r e a c t in g p o t e n t i a l e x c e e d in g d e s ig n
w it h N O x ) te m p e r a tu r e o f D e N O x
r e a c to r
Caus e L o w f lu e g a s t e m p e r a t u r e L o w f lu e g a s t e m p e r a t u r e S t e a m c o n t r o l lo o p In g r e s s o f f a ls e a ir V e r y h ig h C O i n f lu e g a s F a ilu r e o f E S P / e x c e s s iv e c a r r y B a d c o m b u s t io n L e a k a g e s a t f la n g e s
( e . g . d u r in g s t a r t - u p a n d ( e . g . d u r in g s t a r t - u p a n d t r o u b le s ( d u e f a ilu r e o f f u r n a c e C O o v e r o f d u s t fro m ES P f le x ib le s
s h u t- d o w n ) s h u t- d o w n ) c o n t r o l)
C o m b u s t io n t r o u b le s C o m b u s t io n t r o u b le s
S c e n a r io C o r r o s io n r is k i n D e N O x T o x if i c a t io n o f t h e D e N O x C o r r o s io n r is k in P o t e n t i a l m e c h a n ic a l C lo g g in g o f D e N O x c a t a ly s t w it h E x p lo s io n d u e t o v e r y P o t e n t ia l e x p o s u r e o f
d e s c r ip t io n o f c a t a ly s t ( A m m o n ia is n o t DeNO x e q u ip m e n t d a m a g e t o d u s t l e a d in g t o r e d u c e d f lu e g a s h ig h C O s ta f f /w o r k e r s to
FO D r e a c t in g w it h N O x ) D e N O x r e a c to r r a te ( a n d d u e to th e f u r n a c e c o n c e n t r a t io n a n d A m m o n ia
A m m o n ia w ill p a s s D e N O x p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l, t h e w a s t e f e e d h ig h t e m p e r a t u r e
a n d le a d t o A m m o n ia r a t e w ill b e r e d u c e d ) a n d
e m is s io n s ( e x c e e d in g in c r e a s e d p r e s s u r e d r o p o v e r
p e r m i t le v e ls ) DeNO x
D e m a n d r a te E x p e c t e d d e m a n d r a t e le s s E x p e c t e d d e m a n d r a t e le s s B a s e d o n e x p e r ie n c e : B a s e d o n e x p e r ie n c e B a s e d o n e x p e r ie n c e B a s e d o n e x p e r ie n c e e x p e c t e d B a s e d o n e x p e r ie n c e B a s e d o n e x p e r ie n c e :
th a n o n c e p e r 1 y e a r th a n o n c e p e r 1 y e a r once per year - onc e per e x p e c te d d e m a n d e x p e c t e d d e m a n d r a t e s is d e m a n d r a t e s i s le s s t h a n o n c e e x p e c te d d e m a n d onc e per year - onc e
1 0 y ea rs r a t e s i s le s s t h a n o n c e le s s t h a n o n c e p e r 1 0 pe r 10 y e ars r a t e s is le s s t h a n per 10 y ears
pe r 1 0 y ea rs y ea rs on c e pe r 10 y e ars
F= 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 2
S a f e ty None None None None None None m in o r in ju r y m a y b e E x p o s u r e c o u ld le a d t o
consequences e x p e c te d a s e r io u s in ju r y
p e o p le S= 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
T im e ly p r e s e n c e A r e a i s a t t e n d e d r a r e ly
o f p e o p le ( < 1 0 - 2 0 % ) p e r s h if t
T= 1 1
A v o id a n c e o f A m m o n i a s m e ll w ill
ex p os u re a la r m s t a f f / w o r k e r s a n d
s u f f ic ie n t ( 2 o r m o r e )
number of escape
r o u t e s a r e p r o v id e d
A = 1
S I L s a fe ty = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a
Cons equenc es None E x c e e d a n c e o f p e r m it None None None None m in o r e n v ir o n m e n t a l M in o r e n v ir o n m e n t a l
e n v ir o n m e n t le v e ls f o r a m m o n ia a n d im p a c t im p a c t
N O x ( d u r in g s t a r t - u p / s h u t
d o w n o n ly )
E= 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
A v o id a n c e o f
ex p os u re
e n v ir o n m e n t
A =
S I L e n v ir o n m e n t = 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 a
F in a n c i a l lo s s e s L if e t im e w ill b e s h o r t e n e d L i f e t i m e o f D e N O x c a t a ly s t M e c h a n ic a l e q u ip m e n t L if e t im e w il l b e M e c h a n ic a l e q u ip m e n t D u s t c le a n i n g o f c a t a ly s t m a y t a k e M e c h a n ic a l M in o r f in a n c ia l i m p a c t
d u e t o c o r r o s io n . E x p e c t e d w ill b e s h o r t e n e d . d a m a g e to r e a c to r c a n s h o r te n e d d u e to d a m a g e to r e a c to r c a n u p t o 1 d a y . T h is e q u a l s le s s t h a n e q u ip m e n t d a m a g e t o e x p e c te d
d a m a g e is l e s s t h a n 1 0 0 k E x p e c t e d d a m a g e i s le s s l e a d t o lo c a l r e a c t o r c o r r o s io n . Ex p e c te d le a d t o lo c a l r e a c t o r 100k r e a c t o r c a n le a d t o
th a n 1 0 k r e p a ir s a n d d o w n t im e o f d a m a g e is le s s t h a n r e p a ir s a n d d o w n t im e o f a lo c a l r e a c t o r r e p a ir s
a c o u p le o f d a y s 1 0 k c o u p le o f d a y s ( d a m a g e < a n d d o w n t im e o f a
(dam age < 1000k 1000k c o u p le o f d a y s
(d a m a g e < 1 0 0 0 k)
L= 2 1 3 1 3 2 3 1
A v o id a n c e o f It is e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r It is e x p e c t e d t h a t It is e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r It is e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r a c t io n It is e x p e c t e d t h a t
f in a n c ia l lo s s e s a c t io n c a n a v o id t h e o p e r a t o r a c t io n c a n a c t io n c a n a v o id t h e c a n a v o id t h e d a m a g e b y b a s e d o p e r a t o r a c t io n c a n
d a m a g e b y m a n u a ll y a v o id t h e d a m a g e b y d a m a g e d u e to p r e s e n c e o n S C R d e lt a P m e a s u r e m e n t a v o id t h e d a m a g e b y
o p e n in g t h e b y - p a s s m a n u a lly o p e n in g t h e o f d o w n s t r e a m T I' s based on CO
v a lv e s b y - p a s s v a lv e s m eas urem ent
A = 1 0 1 1 1
S IL =
fi n a n c i a l
1 a 1 0 a 1 a 0
S I L to ta l = 1 1 1 0 a 1 a a

Page 11 of 113
1.3.4. ID FAN
In it ia t o r L o w s u c tio n p re s s u re U p s tre a m H ig h v i b r a t i o n ID F a n b e a r i n g Y IA H H ig h t e m p e r a t u r e ID F a n b e a r i n g H ig h t e m p e r a t u re ID F a n H ig h t e m p e r a t u r e ID F a n
ID F A N P IS A L L R 1 H S C 1 0 C Y 3 0 1 a n d C Y 3 0 2 T IA H R 1 H S C 1 0 C T 0 0 1 a n d C T 0 0 2 m o to r b e a rin g m o to r w i n d in g s T IA H
R 1 H S A 4 0 C P 9 0 1 ( 2 o 3 w it h R 1 H S C 1 0 C T 0 0 3 a n d C T 0 0 4
C P 0 0 1 to C P 0 0 3 ) a n d C T 0 0 5
F in a l E le m e n t T r i p ID fa n R 1 H S C 1 0 A N 0 0 1 - T rip ID fa n R 1 H S C 1 0 A N 0 0 1 -M 0 1 / M 0 2 T r ip ID fa n R 1 H S C 1 0 A N 0 0 1 -M 0 1 /M 0 2 T r ip ID fa n T r i p ID fa n R 1 H S C 1 0 A N 0 0 1 -
M 0 1 /M 0 2 M 0 1 /M 0 2
F u n c t io n P re ve n t u n d e r p re s s u re in fl u e P re ve n t e x c e s s i v e d a m a g e t o ID fa n P re ve n t e x c e s s ive d a m a g e t o ID fa n P re ve n t e x c e s s ive d a m a g e P re ve n t e x c e s s ive d a m a g e

g a s s y s t e m b e a rin g s a n d p o s s ib le ro t o r d a m a g e b e a rin g s a n d p o s s ib le ro to r d a m a g e t o ID fa n b e a r i n g t o ID fa n m o t o r
(n o te th a t m in o r b e a rin g d a m a g e is n o t (n o te th a t m in o r b e a rin g d a m a g e is
p re ve n te d b y t h e t rip ) n o t p re ve n te d b y th e tr ip )
C a u s e C lo g g in g in fl u e g a s s t r e a m o r W e a r a n d te a r to th e b e a rin g , W e a r a n d t e a r t o t h e b e a rin g , W e a r a n d te a r F a ilu re o f m o t o r c o o lin g

va lve s b e in g in c lo s e d p o s it io n c o rro s io n o f ro t o r (lo s s o f b a la n c e o f c o rro s io n o f ro to r (lo s s o f b a la n c e o f
ro to r) ro to r)
S c e n a rio U n d e r p r e s s u r e in flu e g a s E x c e s s iv e d a m a g e t o ID fa n b e a r in g s E x c e s s iv e d a m a g e t o ID fa n b e a r i n g s E x c e s s ive d a m a g e to ID fa n E x c e s s ive d a m a g e to ID fa n

d e s c rip t io n o f s y s t e m e x c e e d in g m in im u m a n d p o s s ib le ro t o r d a m a g e (p o s s ib le a n d p o s s ib le ro t o r d a m a g e (p o s s ib le m o to r b e a rin g m o to r
F O D d e s ig n p re s s u re . P o s s ib le r o t o r d is e n g a g e m e n t ) ro to r d is e n g a g e m e n t)
c ra c k a t w e a k e s t p o in t
(p r o b a b ly a d u c t ) le a d in g t o
in g r e s s o f fa ls e a ir
D e m a n d ra te B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e p e r B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e t h e t rip is B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e th e trip is B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e le s s B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e le s s

y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs e x p e c te d o n c e p e r 1 - 1 0 y e a rs e x p e c te d o n c e p e r 1 - 1 0 y e a rs th a n o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs th a n o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs
F = 2 2 2 1 1
S a fe t y M in o r R o t o r d is e n g a g e m e n t m a y le a d to R o to r d is e n g a g e m e n t m a y le a d t o N o n e N o n e
c o n s e q u e n c e s s e rio u s in ju ry s e rio u s in ju ry
p e o p le
S = 1 2 2
T im e ly p r e s e n c e A re a is a tte n d e d r a re ly (< 1 0 - 2 0 % ) A re a is a tt e n d e d ra re ly (< 1 0 - 2 0 % )
o f p e o p le p e r s h ift p e r s h i ft
T = 1 1 1
A vo id a n c e o f In c a s e o f h ig h v ib r a t io n , it is e x p e c te d In c a s e o f h i g h t e m p e r a t u r e i t is
e x p o s u re t h a t o p e ra t o r s w ill b e a b le t o a vo id e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e ra t o rs w ill b e a b le t o
e x p o s u re a vo id e x p o s u re
A = 1 1
S IL s a f e ty = 0 a a 0 0
C o n s e q u e n c e s M in o r N o n e N o n e N o n e N o n e
e n viro n m e n t
E = 1 0 0 0 0
A vo id a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
e n viro n m e n t
A =
S IL e n v iro n m e n t = a 0 0 0 0
F in a n c ia l lo s s e s R e p a ir o f lo c a l e q u ip m e n t / d u c t E x c e s s iv e d a m a g e t o ID fa n b e a r in g s E x c e s s iv e d a m a g e t o ID fa n b e a r i n g s R e p a ir o f m o t o r b e a rin g m a y R e p a ir o f m o t o r w in d in g s
d a m a g e le a d t o m in im a l d o w n a n d p o s s ib le ro t o r d a m a g e (p o s s ib le a n d p o s s ib le ro t o r d a m a g e (p o s s ib le ta k e m o re th a n a w e e k a n d m a y ta k e m o n th s a n d
t im e (b e c a u s e p ro d u c t io n m a y r o t o r d is e n g a g e m e n t ) re p a ir c a n b e ro to r d is e n g a g e m e n t) re p a ir c a n b e a s s o c ia t e d d o w n t im e c o s t s a s s o c ia t e d d o w n tim e c o s ts
c o n t in u e t ill n e x t p la n n e d s t o p r e a lis e d w it h in 3 d a y s (b e c a u s e s p a r e re a lis e d w it h in 3 d a y s (b e c a u s e s p a re w ill b e lim it e d t o 1 0 0 k m a x w ill e x c e e d 1 0 0 0 k
w it h s o m e t e m p o ra r y r e p a irs ) . p a rt s a re a va ila b le o n s t o c k ) . H o w e ve r p a rt s a re a va ila b le o n s t o c k ). H o w e ve r (d u e to o n s to c k s p a re m o to r C o n s id e r t o m a in t a in a n
T h u s e x p e c t e d d o w n t im e c o s t in c a s e o f th e e x tre m e e ve n t (ro to r in c a s e o f t h e e x t re m e e ve n t (ro t o r b e a rin g ) s p a re (o n s to c k ) m o to r
is le s s t h a n 1 0 0 0 k (5 d a y s ) d is e n g a g e m e n t ) t h e d a m a g e a n d d o w n d is e n g a g e m e n t) t h e d a m a g e a n d
t im e w ill b e s ig n ifi c a n t ly m o r e d o w n t im e w ill b e s ig n ific a n t ly m o r e
L = 3 3 3 2 4
A vo id a n c e o f It i s e x p e c te d th a t o p e ra t o r It is e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r a c t io n c a n It is e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r a c t io n c a n It is e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r O ve rh e a tin g is p ro b a b ly
fin a n c ia l lo s s e s a c t io n c a n a vo id t h e d a m a g e b y a vo id t h e d a m a g e b y b a s e d o n b e a rin g a vo id t h e d a m a g e b y b a s e d o n b e a rin g a c t io n c a n a vo id t h e d a m a g e a vo id e d b y o ve r d im e n s io n in g
b a s e d o n va rio u s o t h e r p re s s u re t e m p e ra tu re vib ra t io n b y b a s e d o n b e a r in g vib ra t io n th e m o to r
m e a s u re m e n ts
A = 1 1 1 1 1
S IL fi n a n c i a l = 1 1 1 0 1
S IL t o t a l = 1 1 1 0 1

Page 12 of 113
1.3.5. Ammonia
In i t ia t o r A m m o n ia d e t e c t io n A m m o n ia d e t e c t io n Q S A H H A m m o n ia lo o p ve ry h ig h A m m o n ia d e t e c t io n in
R 1 H S J 1 0 C Q 3 0 2 o r C Q 3 0 4 o r p re s s u re in je c t io n a re a
C Q 3 0 6
F in a l E le m e n t S t o p a m m o n ia u n lo a d in g C lo s e " re t e n t io n t o s e w e r" C lo s e a m m o n ia s u p p ly va lve C lo s e a m m o n ia s u p p ly v a lv e
p u m p v a lv e s R 1 in c a s e o f a m m o n ia le a k a g e in c a s e o f a m m o n ia le a k a g e
H S J 3 0 A A 0 5 1 / A A 0 5 2 d e t e c t io n d e t e c t io n
F u n c t io n P re ve n t c o n t in u o u s re le a s e P re ve n t A m m o n ia c a l w a t e r P re ve n t a m m o n ia le a k a g e P re ve n t c o n t in u o u s re le a s e
o f A m m o n ia d is p e rs io n d u e t o t o o h ig h p re s s u re o f A m m o n ia
C a u s e L e a k a g e s a t fla n g e s fle x ib le s L e a k a g e s a t fl a n g e s fl e x i b le s L e a k a g e s a t fla n g e s fle x ib le s L e a k a g e s a t fl a n g e s fl e x i b le s

T a n k o v e r fi l li n g T a n k o v e r fillin g
S c e n a r io P o t e n t ia l e x p o s u re o f P o t e n t ia l p o llu t io n P o t e n t ia l e x p o s u re o f P o t e n t ia l p o llu t io n
d e s c rip t io n o f s t a ff/ w o r k e r s t o A m m o n ia s t a ff/ w o r k e r s t o A m m o n ia
F O D
D e m a n d ra t e B a s e d o n e x p e r ie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e

p e r y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs p e r y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs p e r y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs p e r y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs
F = 2 2 2 2
S a fe t y E x p o s u r e c o u ld le a d t o a E x p o s u re c o u ld le a d t o a E x p o s u re c o u ld le a d t o a E x p o s u re c o u ld le a d t o a
c o n s e q u e n c e s s e r io u s in ju ry s e rio u s in ju ry s e r io u s in ju ry s e rio u s in ju ry
p e o p le
S = 2 2 2 2
T im e ly p re s e n c e A re a is a t t e n d e d ra re ly (< 1 0 A re a is a t t e n d e d ra re ly (< 1 0 A re a is a t t e n d e d ra re ly (< 1 0 A re a is a t t e n d e d ra re ly (< 1 0
o f p e o p le - 2 0 % ) p e r s h ift - 2 0 % ) p e r s h i ft - 2 0 % ) p e r s h ift - 2 0 % ) p e r s h i ft
T = 1 1 1 1
A v o id a n c e o f A m m o n ia s m e ll w ill a la rm A m m o n ia s m e ll w ill a la rm
e x p o s u re s t a ff/ w o r k e r s a n d s u ffi c ie n t ( 2 s t a ff/ w o r k e r s a n d s u ffic i e n t ( 2
o r m o r e ) n u m b e r o f e s c a p e o r m o r e ) n u m b e r o f e s c a p e
A = ro u t e s a re p ro vid e d 1 1 1 ro u t e s a re p ro vid e d 1
S I L s a f e ty = a a a a
C o n s e q u e n c e s M in o r e n viro n m e n t a l im p a c t t e m p o ra ry e n v ir o n m e n t a l M in o r e n viro n m e n t a l im p a c t M in o r e n viro n m e n t a l im p a c t
e n v ir o n m e n t im p a c t
E = 1 3 1 1
A v o id a n c e o f ra in w a t e r n e t p o llu t io n
e x p o s u re
e n v ir o n m e n t
A =
S I L e n v ir o n m e n t = a 2 a a
F in a n c ia l lo s s e s M in o r fin a n c ia l im p a c t M i n o r fi n a n c ia l i m p a c t M in o r fin a n c ia l im p a c t M i n o r fi n a n c i a l i m p a c t
e x p e c t e d e x p e c t e d e x p e c t e d e x p e c t e d
L = 1 1 1 1
A v o id a n c e o f
fi n a n c ia l l o s s e s
A =
S I L f i n a n c i a l = 0 0 0 0
S I L t o t a l= a 2 a a

Page 13 of 113
1.3.6. BICAR
In it ia t o r H ig h le ve l in B ic a r S ilo O ve rp re s s u re in B ic a r S ilo V e ry h ig h t e m p e ra t u re fo r t h e
g rin d e r m o t o r
F in a l E le m e n t C lo s in g fillin g va lve C lo s in g fillin g v a lve S t o p p in g m o t o r
F u n c t io n P r e v e n t o v e r fillin g o f t h e P re v e n t re le a s e o f B ic a r t o p re ve n t m o t o r d a m a g e
B ic a r S ilo e n v ir o n m e n t in c a s e o f filt e r
c lo g g in g o r o v e r fillin g
C a u s e O p e ra t o r e rro r O p e ra t o r e rro r
S c e n a rio R e le a s e o f B ic a r t o R e le a s e o f B ic a r t o
d e s c rip t io n o f e n viro n m e n t e n viro n m e n t
F O D
D e m a n d ra t e G iv e n t h a t t h e s ilo is fille d G iv e n t h a t t h e s ilo is fille d B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e

o n ly a c o u p le o f t im e s p e r o n ly a c o u p le o f t im e s p e r p e r y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs
m o n t h t h e e x p e c t e d d e m a n d m o n t h t h e e x p e c t e d d e m a n d
F = ra t e is ve ry lo w 1 ra t e is ve ry lo w 1 2
S a fe t y E x p o s u re o f o p e ra t o r t o E x p o s u re o f o p e ra t o r t o N o n e
c o n s e q u e n c e s B ic a r B ic a r
p e o p le
S = 1 1 1
T im e ly p re s e n c e O p e ra t o r is a lw a y s p re s e n t O p e ra t o r is a lw a y s p re s e n t
o f p e o p le a t fillin g w h ic h is o u t s id e t h e a t fillin g w h ic h is o u t s id e t h e
b u ild in g . b u ild in g .
T = 1 1 1
A vo id a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
A =
S I L s a f e t y = 0 0 0
C o n s e q u e n c e s T h e re le a s e h a s m in o r T h e re le a s e h a s m in o r N o n e
e n viro n m e n t e n v iro n m e n t a l im p a c t e n viro n m e n t a l im p a c t
E = 1 1 1
A vo id a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
e n viro n m e n t
A =
S I L e n v ir o n m e n t = 0 0 0
F in a n c ia l lo s s e s R e le a s e o f B ic a r w ill re q u ir e R e le a s e o f B ic a r w ill re q u ire E s t im a t e d c o s t s 1 0 - 1 0 0 k
s ig n ific a n t c le a n in g a c t iv it ie s . s ig n ific a n t c le a n in g a c t iv it ie s .
E s t im a t e d c o s t s 1 0 - 1 0 0 k E s t im a t e d c o s t s 1 0 - 1 0 0 k
L = 2 2 2
A vo id a n c e o f D u e t o t h e s t a n d b y lin e , t h e
fin a n c ia l lo s s e s p ro d u c t io n c a n c o n t in u e in
n o m in a l c o n d it io n s
A = 1 1 1
S I L f i n a n c i a l = 0 0 a
S I L t o t a l = 0 0 a

Page 14 of 113
1.3.7. Activated Carbon
In it ia t o r H ig h le ve l in A c t iva t e d C a rb o n S ilo O ve rp re s s u re in A c t iva t e d C a rb o n H ig h t e m p e ra t u re in A c t iva t e d
S ilo C a rb o n S ilo
F in a l E le m e n t C lo s in g fi l l i n g va lve C lo s in g fi l l i n g va lve R e le a s e o f n it ro g e n
F u n c t io n P r e v e n t o v e r fillin g o f t h e A c t iv a t e d P re ve n t re le a s e o f A c t iva t e d C a rb o n E x t in g u is h a n a c t iva t e d c a rb o n

C a rb o n S ilo w it h a c t iva t e d c a rb o n t o e n v ir o n m e n t in c a s e o f filt e r fir e in t h e s ilo
c lo g g in g o r o v e r fillin g
C a u s e O p e ra to r e rro r O p e ra to r e rro r H o t s p o t in s ilo
S c e n a rio R e le a s e o f a c t iva t e d c a rb o n to R e le a s e o f A c t iva t e d C a rb o n to F ire in s ilo w h ic h m a y a ffe c t th e

d e s c rip t io n o f e n viro n m e n t e n viro n m e n t s ilo in t e g r it y
F O D
D e m a n d ra t e G i v e n t h a t t h e s i l o i s fi l l e d o n l y a G i v e n t h a t t h e s i l o i s fi l l e d o n l y a V e ry ve ry lo w
c o u p le o f t im e s p e r y e a r, t h e c o u p le o f t im e s p e r y e a r, t h e
e x p e c t e d d e m a n d ra t e is ve ry lo w e x p e c t e d d e m a n d ra t e is ve ry lo w
F = 1 1 1
S a fe t y E x p o s u re o f o p e ra to r to a c t iva t e d E x p o s u re o f o p e ra to r to A c t iva t e d P o s s ib le s e rio u s in ju ry
c o n s e q u e n c e s c a rb o n C a rb o n
p e o p le
S = 1 1 2
T im e ly p re s e n c e O p e r a t o r is a lw a y s p r e s e n t a t fillin g O p e ra t o r is a lw a y s p re s e n t a t fillin g S ilo a re a is ra re ly a tt e n d e d
o f p e o p le w h ic h is o u t s id e t h e b u ild in g . T h e w h ic h is o u t s id e t h e b u ild in g .
a c t u a l re le a s e p o in t in c a s e o f
o v e r fillin g is in t h e b u ild in g w h ic h is
r a re ly o c c u p ie d
T = 1 1 1
A vo id a n c e o f P e rs o n s c a n a v o id t h e e x p o s u r e
e x p o s u re b e c a u s e t h e t im e b e tw e e n t h e
in it ia l fir e a n d lo s s o f in t e g rit y o f
t h e s ilo is s u ffic ie n t t o a vo id
e x p o s u re
A = 1
S I L s a fe ty = 0 0 0
C o n s e q u e n c e s T h e r e le a s e h a s m in o r e n viro n m e n t a l T h e r e le a s e h a s m in o r T h e re le a s e h a s m in o r
e n viro n m e n t im p a c t e n viro n m e n t a l im p a c t e n viro n m e n t a l im p a c t
E = 1 1 1
A vo id a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
e n viro n m e n t
A =
S I L e n v ir o n m e n t = 0 0 0
F in a n c ia l lo s s e s R e le a s e o f a c t iv a t e d c a r b o n w ill R e le a s e o f A c t iva t e d C a rb o n w ill R e le a s e o f a c t iva t e d c a rb o n w ill
r e q u ir e s ig n ific a n t c le a n in g a c t iv it ie s . r e q u ir e s ig n ific a n t c le a n in g r e q u ir e s ig n ific a n t c le a n in g
E s t im a t e d c o s t s 1 0 - 1 0 0 k a c t ivit ie s . E s t im a t e d c o s t s 1 0 - a c t ivit ie s a n d s ilo m a y h a ve to
1 0 0 k b e re p la c e d . E s t im a t e d c o s ts
1 0 - 1 0 0 k
L = 2 2 2
A vo id a n c e o f G ive n t h a t t h e t ru c k u n lo a d in g p o in t is G ive n t h a t t h e t ru c k u n lo a d in g p o in t It is e x p e c t e d t h a t if t h e fir e
fin a n c ia l lo s s e s lo c a t e d o u t s id e t h e b u ild in g a n d t h e is lo c a t e d o u t s id e t h e b u ild in g a n d w o u ld o c c u r, t h e o p e ra t o r c a n
s ilo is in s id e t h e b u ild in g , it is t h e s ilo is in s id e t h e b u ild in g , it is n o t a vo id t h e d a m a g e (n o o t h e r
e x p e c te d t h a t t h e fin a n c ia l lo s s e s c a n e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e fin a n c ia l lo s s e s m e a n s fo r d e t e c t io n o f a n
p ro b a b ly n o t b e a vo id e d c a n p ro b a b ly n o t b e a vo id e d i n t e r n a l fi r e a v a i l a b l e )
A = 2 2 2
S I L fi n a n c i a l = 0 0 0
S I L to ta l = 0 0 0

Page 15 of 113
1.3.8. Spent sorbent
In i t i a t o r H ig h t e m p e ra t u re in S p e n t s o rb e n t
S ilo
F in a l E le m e n t R e le a s e o f n it ro g e n
F u n c tio n E x t i n g u i s h a n s p e n t s io r b e n t fi r e i n
t h e s ilo
Cause H o t s p o t in s ilo
S c e n a rio F i r e i n s i l o w h i c h m a y a ff e c t t h e s i l o
d e s c rip t io n o f in t e g rit y
FO D
D e m a n d ra te V e r y ve r y lo w
F= 1
S a fe t y P o s s ib le s e rio u s in ju ry
consequences
p e o p le
S = 2
T im e ly p re s e n c e S ilo a re a is ra re ly a t t e n d e d
o f p e o p le
T= 1
A vo id a n c e o f P e r s o n s c a n a vo id t h e e x p o s u r e
e x p o s u re b e c a u s e t h e t im e b e t w e e n t h e in it ia l
fi r e a n d l o s s o f i n t e g r i t y o f t h e s i l o i s
s u f fi c i e n t t o a v o i d e x p o s u r e
A = 1
S IL =
s a fe ty 0
Consequences T h e r e le a s e h a s m in o r e n vir o n m e n t a l
e n vir o n m e n t im p a c t
E = 1
A vo id a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
e n vir o n m e n t
A =
S IL en viro n m en t = 0
F in a n c ia l lo s s e s R e le a s e o f s p e n t s o rb e n t w ill re q u ire
s ig n ific a n t c le a n i n g a c t ivi t ie s a n d s il o
m a y h a ve t o b e r e p la c e d . E s t im a t e d
c o s ts 1 0 - 1 0 0 k
L= 2
A vo id a n c e o f It i s e x p e c t e d t h a t i f t h e f i r e w o u l d
fi n a n c i a l l o s s e s o c c u r , t h e o p e r a t o r c a n n o t a vo id t h e
d a m a g e ( n o o t h e r m e a n s fo r d e t e c t i o n
o f a n i n t e r n a l fir e a va i l a b l e )
A = 2
S I L fin a n c ia l 0
S I L to ta l = 0

Page 16 of 113
1.3.9. Heat Exchanger
In i t i a t o r L o w g a s t e m p e ra t u re G / W L o w w a t e r t e m p e ra t u re G / W H E
H E o u t le t i n l e t T IS A L L R 1 N D A 1 3 C T 0 0 1
F in a l E le m e n t S t o p p in g c irc u la t io n p u m p s S t o p p in g c irc u la t io n p u m p s R 1
N D A 1 1 / N D A 1 2 A P 0 0 1 if 3 w a y s
va l ve n o t i n b y - p a s s ( R 1
N D B 1 0 A A 3 5 1 p o s it io n s w it c h )
F u n c t io n p ro t e c t t h e d o w n s t re a m p ro t e c t t h e H E a n d t h e
e q u ip m e n t s a g a in s t t h e d o w n s t re a m e q u ip m e n t s a g a i n s t
c o rro s io n ris k t h e c o rro s io n ris k
C ause H i g h h e a t r e c o ve r y w i t h l o w w a t e r c o n t r o l l o o p fa i l u r e o r
lo a d a n d n o S C R b y -p a s s fu r n a c e t r o u b l e s o r l i n e s t a r t - u p
S c e n a rio
d e s c ri p t io n o f
FOD
D e m a n d ra t e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e E x p e c t e d d e m a n d ra t e le s s t h a n
p e r y e a r - o n c e p e r 1 0 y e a rs once per 1 year
F= 2 1
S a fe t y N one None
cons equences
p e o p le
S =
o f p e o p le
T=
A vo i d a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
A =
S IL s a fe ty = 0 0
C onsequenc es N one None
e n vi r o n m e n t
E =
A vo i d a n c e o f
e x p o s u re
e n vi r o n m e n t
A =
S IL e n v ir o n m e n t = 0 0
F in a n c ia l lo s s e s L i fe t i m e w i l l b e s h o r t e n e d L i fe t i m e w i l l b e s h o r t e n e d d u e t o
d u e t o c o rro s io n . E x p e c t e d c o rro s io n . E x p e c t e d d a m a g e is
d a m a g e is le s s t h a n 1 0 0 k le s s t h a n 1 0 0 k
L= 2 2
A vo i d a n c e o f It i s e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r It i s e x p e c t e d t h a t o p e r a t o r
fi n a n c i a l l o s s e s a c t i o n c a n a vo i d t h e d a m a g e a c t i o n c a n a vo i d t h e d a m a g e b y
b y m a n u a l a c t io n m a n u a l a c t io n
A =
S IL fi n a n c i a l= a 1
S IL to ta l = a 1

Page 17 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
2. ELECTROSTATIC PRECIPITATOR OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:

HDE10
2.1. DEDUSTING 2.1.1. Electrostatic precipitator
PID 002
Undesirable Events or deviations Causes Consequences G Actions C

2.1.1.1.ESP Explosion Entry of non desired ESP damaged 4 Co measurement (stack and 3
explosive gas furnace) with high and very high
alarm
ESP HV stopped in case of very
high CO alarm in the furnace
2.1.1.2.Very high temperature inlet ESP Fire in the furnace, boiler Internal system 3 3 analogical temperature sensors 3
or in the building deterioration risk at the fabric filter inlet with high
ESP deterioration risk and very high alarm
The fabric filter is automatically
by-passed and the waste
incineration is stopped if very high
temperature alarm is reached
2.1.1.3.Very high temperature of Transformer troubles Dedusting function 2 Internal stop by the HV system 2
transformer troubles
Alarm in control rrom
2.1.1.4.Very high oil level in transformer Transformer troubles Dedusting function 2 Internal stop by the HV system 2
troubles
Alarm in control rrom

Page 18 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

2.1.1.5.Ashes extraction fault See 11.1.1.1 ESP hopper
blocked
2.1.1.6.Combustion of ashes accumulation of Blazing fire, explosion 2 Level sensors to avoid too many 2
Incandescent ashes in the flue gas incandescent ashes and ashes be concerned by burning
non burned gases
Electrostatic precipitator high
voltage and rappers automatically
stopped if high level in the hopper
is obtained
2.1.1.7.Depression of flue gases Global or partial plugging No consequence on 2 1 pressure sensor downstream 2
increases upstream of ESP ESP ESP with very low alarm

2.1.1.8.Air intake The manholes are not Corrosion 1 Technology choice : double flap 1
correctly closed
Check there is no leak at doors
Air intake through ashes
Operating manual instructions
circuit: evacuation
system
2.1.1.9.Low temperature hopper heating Hopper heating fault Ash plugging risk in the 2 Low temperature switch in the 2
hopper hopper with alarm
Operator checking
2.1.1.10.Electrical troubles with HV (high Operation at too low Disruptive breakdown 2 ID Fan running signal is a 2
voltage system) temperature or at too low of insulator necessary condition to run the HV
gases flowrate
Correct temperature at the ESP
inlet and at the ESP outlet is a
necessary condition to run the HV

Page 19 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
3. LAB LOOP HTD10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 003 3.1. LAB LOOP 3.1.1. Analyser

3.1.1.1.Very high HCl/SO2/NOx content Bad quality of waste Risk to obtain 2 1 flue gas analyser at the ESP 2
in flue gas Emission outlet for information and
Bad waste mixing
measurement higher optimisation of reagent injection
than guaranteed
Improve waste mixing to reduce
values
average pollutants contents in flue
gas
1 flue gas analyser at the stack for
emission control and reagent
dosing optimisation
3.1.1.2.Analyser deviation Calibration fault Gas measurements 2 Automatic calibration 2
fault
Analyser frequent maintenance
Operator manual calibration
The bicar injection is corrected by
downstream HCl/SO2
measurements

Page 20 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

3.1.1.3.Analyser fault Analyser out of order No gas measurements 2 Analyser fault alarm 2
The bicar injection is corrected by
downstream HCl/SO2
measurements
Operator checking

Page 21 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
3 LAB LOOP HTD10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 003 3.1 LAB LOOP 3.1.2. LAB loop

3.1.2.1.Very low temperature at the Lab Furnace at the minimum Reagents efficiency 2 1 temperature sensor at the LAB 2
loop inlet load decreasing risk : loop inlet with low alarm
injected quantity of
bicar increases
3.1.2.2.Very high temperature at the Lab Furnace or boiler Activated carbon 2 1 temperature sensor at the LAB 2
loop inlet troubles post-combustion risk loop inlet with very high alarm
in the fabric filter
Activated carbon injection stopped
Damage to filter bags in case of very high temperature
in case of excessive at the fabric filter inlet
temperature

Page 22 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

3.1.2.3.High pressure drop in lab loop Solid settling Electrical 3 2 Pressure sensors (one inlet and 4
consumption one outlet)
Global or partial plugging
increases
Pressure drop calculated with high
Very low pressure in and very high alarm
the flue gas
3 analogical pressure sensors at
downstream the lab
the fabric filter outlet. Calculated
loop
very low pressure: 2 on 3
Equipments damages detection on very low alarm
risk
Emergency stop required in case
Reduction of furnace of calculated very low pressure in
loading the flue gas
Reagents injection automatically
stops in case of very low flue gas
flowrate
2 Manholes for operator
maintenance for cleaning in case
of plugging

Page 23 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
4. FABRIC FILTER HTE10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 004.1 4.1. DEDUSTING 4.1.1. Fabric filter

4.1.1.1.Flue gases very low temperature Furnace at the minimum reagents efficiency 3 3 analogical temperature sensors 4
load decreasing risk and at the fabric filter inlet with low and
injected quantity of bicar very low alarm
increasing
2 temperature sensors in the
Gas temperature lower
fabric filter with low and very low
than the acid dew point :
bags damages risk alarm
Corrosion risk The fabric filter is automatically

by-passed if very low temperature
alarm is reached:
If 2 very low alarms at the fabric
filter inlet are reached (2/3
security)
Preheating system to heat the

fabric filter before receiving flue
gas
Precoating : Bicar injection before
the start up to protect the bags

Page 24 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

4.1.1.2.Flue gases high temperature Furnace or boiler Activ carbon 3 3 analogical temperature sensors 4
troubles combustion risk at the fabric filter inlet with high
alarm
fabric filter with high alarm
Activ carbon injection stop
Operator checking
4.1.1.3.Flue gases very high temperature Furnace or boiler Bags damages risk 3 3 analogical temperature sensors 4
troubles at the fabric filter inlet with very
high alarm
fabric filter with very high alarm
The fabric filter is automatically
by-passed if very high
If 2 very high alarms at the
fabric filter inlet are reached
(2/3 security)

Page 25 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

4.1.1.4.High pressure drop in the fabric Bags clogging Very low pressure at 2 1 global fabric filter pressure drop 3
filter the bag house outlet: sensor with high and very high
One or several filter cells
are isolated emergency stop risk alarm
ID fan electrical Pressure drop sensor measuring
consumption in 2 cells (cells 1 and 8) with high
increases and very high alarm
Automatic declogging to maintain
pressure drop between two values
Local pressure drop on each cell
to be checked once every shift
Check if cells are isolated
Check compressed air pressure
once every shift

Page 26 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

4.1.1.5.Declogging fault Compressed air low Bags are not cleaned 2 1 Compressed air pressure sensor 3
pressure with low alarm
Fabric filter pressure
Declogging sequencer fault drop increases 1 global fabric filter pressure drop
sensor with high and very high
alarm
Pressure drop sensor measuring
in 2 cells (cells 1 and 8) with high
and very high alarm
1 local pressure control valve
1 air pressure sensor on each cell
, connected to the declogging
sequencer
Declogging sequencer alarm
Check compressed air pressure
once every shift
4.1.1.6.Low pressure drop in the fabric Bags cleaning troubles Bags damages risk 2 1 global fabric filter pressure drop 2
filter (excess of compressed sensor with low alarm
Flue gas treatment
air)
efficiency decreases Pressure drop sensor measuring
Declogging sequencer in 2 cells (cells 1 and 8) with low
fault alarm
1 local pressure control valve
1 air pressure sensor on each cell
, connected to the declogging
sequencer

Page 27 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

4.1.1.7.Bags damage Bags cleaning fault Dust leakage 2 1 global fabric filter pressure drop 3
sensor
Incandescent
particulates Pressure drop sensor measuring
in 2 cells (cells 1 and 8)
Hot spot
2 Dust emission sensor at the
fabric filter outlet and at the stack
with alarm
The operator can change or blind
the bags when the corresponding
cell has been isolated.
Operator checking in case of
declogging sequencer fault
Safety relief valve in case of high
pressure
4.1.1.8.Very low pressure at the fabric Fabric filter or upstream Fabric filter damage 4 3 analogical pressure sensors at 4
filter outlet equipment clogging the fabric filter outlet. Calculated
pressure ( 2 on 3 ) with low and
Fabric filter damper fault
very low alarm
Emergency stop in case of
calculated very low alarm
Limit switches on the isolating
dampers
Operator checking

Page 28 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

4.1.1.9.Bags damage with acid gas Acid gas in contact with Bags damage risk 2 Bicar injection sequence 2
during the start up bags (precoating) available before the
start up to protect the bags ,with
an automatic suggestion for the
operator , at each ID Fan start-up
Operator checking
4.1.1.10.Flue gas is cooled around the Cold air in by-pass duct Duct corrosion around 2 Hot sealing air injected in the by- 2
by-pass dampers during normal the by-pass dampers pass duct
operation
Air temperature sensor at the air
heating battery outlet with low and
very low alarm
Operator checking.
4.1.1.11. Flue gas flow through by-pass By-pass dampers not tight Pollutants level 2 Limit switch on the by-pass 2
duct during normal operation increasing at the stack dampers with discrepancy control
Overpressure in the by-pass duct
with sealing air injection
1 local overpressure sensor to be
checked every shift by the
operator

Page 29 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

4.1.1.12.Fabric filter inlet or outlet damper fault Underpressure at the 2 Limit switches open / close on 2
damper closed fabric filter outlet dampers
the fabric filter outlet with
emergency stop in case of very
low underpressure
WHAT IF
4 FABRIC FILTER HTE10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 004.2 4.2. SPENT SORBENT EXTRACTION 4.2.1. Fabric filter hoppers

Page 30 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

4.2.1.1.Spent sorbent clogging into the Spent sorbent extraction Bags damages risk 2 Hopper equipped with heat tracing 2
hopper equipment stopped with fault alarm
Flue gas treatment
Air tightness fault efficiency decreases 1 High level sensor and 1 very
high level sensor in the hopper
Dust arch in the hopper Risk of hot spot with
with alarm
active carbon
1 temperature sensor in the
hopper with alarms
Low speed detection on the spent
sorbent extraction equipments
with alarm
One cell of the fabric filter can be
isolated for maintenance
Operator checking

Page 31 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

4.2.1.2.Very high temperature in the Activated carbon auto- Bags damages risk 2 1 temperature sensor (1 2
hopper. ignition condition analogical) in each hopper with
high and very high alarm
The cell is automatically isolated
from flue gas if very high
temperature alarm is reached in
order to stop oxygen feeding
Nitrogen station connected to
each hopper
Automatic Nitrogen injection in the
hopper of the cell if very high
temperature alarm appears after
having isolated the cell
By-pass valve on each Nitrogen
injection automatic valve, for
manual injection
Limit switches on the cells
isolating dampers
4.2.1.3.Low temperature heating hopper Hopper heating fault Spent sorbent plugging 2 Heating Temperature sensor 2
risk in the hopper
Operator checking

Page 32 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
4 FABRIC FILTER HTE10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 004.1 4.3. Preheating system 4.3.1. Preheating system

4.3.1.1.High temperature in the electrical Electrical battery fault Bags damage risks 2 1 high temperature sensor (1 3a
battery binary) in the electrical battery
Electrical coils
destruction risk with trip
1 temperature sensor (1
analogical) with high and very high
alarm which stop the battery
4.3.1.2.Preheating dampers discrepancy Preheating dampers fault 2 Limit switch on the preheating 2
dampers
Preheating sequence stopped in
case of dampers discrepancy
Operator checking

Page 33 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

4.3.1.3.Preheating fan stopped during the Preheating fan fault Electrical battery 2 Electrical battery automatically 2
preheating sequence damage stops if preheating fan running
feed back is lost
1 high temperature sensor (1
binary) in the electrical battery
with alarm
1 temperature sensor (1
analogical) with high and very high
alarm
4.3.1.4.Flue gas is cooled around the Cold air in pre-heating duct Duct corrosion around 2 Hot sealing air injected in the pre- 2
pre-heating dampers during normal the pre-heating heating duct
operation dampers
Battery corrosion heating battery outlet with low and
Pre heating fan very low alarm
corrosion
Operator checking.
4.3.1.5. Flue gas flow through pre- Pre-heating dampers not Pollutants level 2 Limit switch on the pre-heating 2
heating duct during normal operation tight increasing at the stack dampers with discrepancy control
Overpressure in the pre-heating
duct with sealing air injection
operator

Page 34 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
5. DENOX SCR HSB10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 005 5.1. DIOXINS REMOVAL AND NOX 5.1.1. Reactor SCR
REDUCTION

5.1.1.1.Very low temperature at the Furnace stopped Gas temperature lower 3 2 temperature sensors in the 3
DeNOx SCR inlet than the acid dew point : fabric filter (DeNOx SCR inlet)
Furnace at the minimum
DeNOx SCR damages with low and very low alarm
load
risk
Fabric filter (and then SCR) by-
Ambiant air entrance
pass in case of Fabric filter
(Manholes open or not
upstream very low temperature
tight)
5.1.1.2.Catalytic reactor pressure drop Catalytic reactor plugging ID fan electrical 2 1 pressure drop sensor with high 2
increases with dust and/or salts consumption increases alarm and very high alarm
Reduction of NOx 1 local pressure drop sensor on
removal efficiency the catalytic reactor layer.
Operator checking
NOx measurement at the stack

Page 35 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

5.1.1.3.Very low temperature at the Steam not available SCR catalyst clogging 3 2 temperature sensors at the 3
Catalytic reactor inlet (salt deposit) and Catalytic reactor inlet with low and
damages risk very low alarm
Ammonia injection stops in case
of very low temperature
5.1.1.4.Very high temperature at the Furnace or boiler fault SCR equipment 2 2 temperature sensors at the 3
Catalytic reactor inlet damages risk DeNOx SCR reactor inlet with
Steam control loop failure
Steam feeding stops in case of
very high temperature
2 temperature sensors at the
DeNOx SCR reactor outlet with
Fabric filter (and then SCR) by-
pass in case of Fabric filter
upstream very high temperature
5.1.1.5.Very low temperature at the SCR Steam not available SCR corrosion risk 3 2 temperature sensors at the SCR 3
reactor outlet reactor outlet with low and very
Very low temperature at the
gas-gas Heat exchanger low alarm
SCR is by-passed in case of very
low temperature

Page 36 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

5.1.1.6.Very high temperature at the Very high temperature at SCR equipment 2 2 temperature sensors at the 3
Catalytic reactor outlet the Catalytic reactor inlet damages risk DeNOx SCR reactor outlet with
Steam feeding stops in case of
very high temperature at the
Catalytic reactor inlet
5.1.1.7.Very high delta temperature Catalytic reactor fault SCR catalyst damages 3 2 x 2 temperature sensors 3
across the SCR reactor risk
Delta temperature calculation
across the catalyst with high and
very high alarm
high delta temperature

5.1.1.8.Very High dust concentration in Fabric filter by-passed SCR catalyst clogging 3 Dust concentration analyser at the 3
the flue gas risk fabric filter outlet with high and
very high alarm.
Dust concentration analyser at the
stack inlet with high and very high
alarm
high dust concentration during a
time period or in case of fabric
filter by-pass


Page 37 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

5.1.1.9.Very high CO concentration Combustion fault SCR catalyst 3 CO concentration analyser at the 3
damages risk if very stack inlet and boiler outlet with
high delta high and very high alarm
temperature across
the SCR reactor
high CO concentration during a
time period
high delta temperature across the
SCR reactor
5.1.1.10.Very high SO2 concentration Flue gas treatment fault SCR catalyst 2 SO2 concentration analyser at the 2
clogging risk stack inlet with high and very
alarm
high SO2 concentration
5.1.1.11.SCR damper closed damper fault Underpressure on 3 Limit switches open / close on 3a
the SCR downstream dampers
side
SCR is by-passed if SCR isolating
dampers limit switches open are
lost
the ID Fan inlet with emergency
stop in case of very low
underpressure

Page 38 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

5.1.1.12.NH4OH leakage Flange broken or leakage Operator injury by 3 Ammonia detection sensor with 3a
NH4OH high and very high alarm
Ammonia injection stops in case
of very high alarm
Safety shower and eye-washers
Protection clothes
5.1.1.13.Flue gas is cooled around the Cold air in the SCR by-pass Duct corrosion around 2 Hot sealing air injected in the SCR 2
SCR by-pass dampers during normal duct the SCR by-pass by-pass duct
operation dampers
very low alarm
Operator checking..
5.1.1.14. Flue gas flow through SCR by- SCR by-pass dampers not Pollutants level 2 Limit switch on the SCR by-pass 2
pass duct during normal operation tight increasing at the stack dampers with discrepancy control
Overpressure in the SCR by-pass
operator

Page 39 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
5 DENOX SCR HSB10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 005 5.1 DIOXINS REMOVAL AND NOX 5.1.2. Gas-Gas Heat exchangers
REDUCTION

5.1.2.1.Gas-Gas heat exchanger clogging High dust concentration Equipments 2 Pressure drop sensors across the 2
in the flue gas damages risks heat exchanger
Fabric filter by-passed Gas-Gas heat Temperature sensors at the inlets
exchanger efficiency and outlets of the heat exchanger
decreases
Dust analyser at the fabric filter
outlet with high and very high
alarm.
Dust analyser at the stack inlet
with high and very high alarm:
DeNOx by passed in case of High
dust concentration at the fabric
filter outlet or at the stack inlet
during a time period
Operator checking
Underpressure sensors at the inlet
ID fan

Page 40 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

5.1.2.2.Very low temperature at the gas- Very low temperature Gas temperature lower 3 1 temperature sensor at the gas- 3a
gas heat exchanger inlet alarm at the DeNOx SCR than the acid dew point : gas heat exchanger inlet with low
inlet DeNOx SCR damages and very low alarm
risk
Fresh air damper not The DeNOx SCR is automatically
closed by-passed if very low temperature
alarm at the DeNOx SCR inlet is
reached
Limit switches on the isolating
dampers

Page 41 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
PID 005 5.1 DIOXINS REMOVAL AND NOX 5.1.3. Gas-Steam Heat exchangers
REDUCTION

5.1.3.1.Steam-Gas heat exchanger High dust concentration Equipments damages 2 Pressure drop sensor across the 2
clogging in the flue gas risks heat exchanger
Fabric filter by-passed Temperature sensor at the inlet
and outlet of the heat exchanger
Dust analyser at the fabric filter
outlet with high and very high
alarm.
Operator checking

Page 42 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

5.1.3.2.Lack of steam Automatic valve fault DeNOx SCR 2 1 Temperature sensor at the heat 2
efficiency decreases exchanger inlet
Very low gas 1 Temperature sensor at the heat
temperature risk exchanger outlet
2 Temperature sensors at the
catalytic reactor inlet with low and
very low alarm
Steam automatic valve with
position feedback

Page 43 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
PID 005 5.1 DIOXINS REMOVAL AND NOX 5.1.4. Fresh air damper
REDUCTION

5.1.4.1.Flue gas is cooled around the Cold air outside the fresh air Duct corrosion 2 Hot sealing air injected in the fresh 2
fresh air damper during normal operation duct around the fresh air air damper
damper
very low alarm
Gas temperature sensor at the
outlet of the fresh air damper with
low and very low alarm
Limit switches on the fresh air
damper
Operator checking..

Page 44 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
PID 005 5.1 DIOXINS REMOVAL AND NOX 5.1.5. Preheating system
REDUCTION

5.1.5.1.Flue gas is cooled around the Cold air in pre-heating duct Duct corrosion 2 Hot sealing air injected in the pre-
pre-heating dampers during normal around the preheating duct 2
operation heating dampers
Pre heating SCR heating battery outlet with low and
fan corrosion
very low alarm
Operator checking.
5.1.5.2. Flue gas flow through pre- Pre-heating dampers not tight Pollutants level 2 Limit switch on the pre-heating 2
heating duct during normal operation increasing at the dampers with discrepancy control
stack
Overpressure in the pre-heating
operator

Page 45 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
6. ID FAN HSC10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 006 6.1. GAS EXTRACTION 6.1.1. ID Fan

6.1.1.1.very low pressure Upstream ID Upstream equipment Flue gas equipments 3 3 analogical pressure sensors at 4
Fan clogging or obstruction damage the ID Fan inlet. Calculated
very low alarm
the fabric filter outlet. Calculated
very low alarm
:

6.1.1.2.ID Fan bearing : Very High ID Fan balance fault ID Fan bearing damage 3 Vibrations sensor with high and 3a
vibrations very high alarm
Operator checking
ID fan motor is stopped in case of
very high alarm

Page 46 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

6.1.1.3.ID Fan bearing: Very High ID Fan bearing fault ID Fan bearing damage 3 Temperature sensor with high and 3a
temperature very high alarm
Operator checking
very high alarm
6.1.1.4.ID Fan motor bearing Very High ID Fan motor bearing fault ID Fan motor bearing 3 Temperature sensor with high and 3a
temperature damage very high alarm
Operator checking
very high alarm
6.1.1.5.ID Fan motor :Very High Motor trouble ID Fan motor damage 3 3 Temperature sensors with high 3a
temperature and very high alarm
Operator checking
very high alarm

Page 47 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
7. ANALYSERS HNE10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 007 7.1. GAS ANALYSING 7.1.1. Analyser at the stack inlet

7.1.1.1.Very high HCl/SO2 content in flue Bad quality of waste Emission 2 1 bicar injection control loop to 2
gas measurement higher maintain the HCl/SO2 content to
Waste mixing treatment
fault than guaranteed the guaranteed value
values
HCl/SO2 contents with high and
very high alarm
7.1.1.2.Very high NOx content in flue gas Combustion troubles Emission 2 1 ammonia injection control loop 2
Flue gas treatment fault measurement higher to maintain the NOx content to the
than guaranteed guaranteed value
values
NOx contents with high and very
high alarm
7.1.1.3.Very high Hg content in flue gas Bad quality of waste Emission 2 1 activatd carbon injection control 2
Waste mixing treatment measurement higher loop to maintain the Hg content to
fault than guaranteed the guaranteed value
values
Hg contents with high and very
high alarm

Page 48 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

7.1.1.4.Analyser deviation Calibration fault Gas emission 2 Automatic calibration 2
concentration fault
Analyser frequent maintenance
Emission
Operator manual calibration
measurement for
guarantees not
available
7.1.1.5.Analyser fault Analyser out of order Emission measurement 2 Analyser fault alarm 2
for guarantees not
available Operator checking

Page 49 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
8. AMMONIA INJECTION HSJ10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 010 8.1. AMMONIA UNLOADING 8.1.1. Ammonia unloading

8.1.1.1.Ammonia unloading valve closed Ammonia unloading Unloading troubles 2 Limit switch open of the unloading 2
during unloading instructions not respected valve to be checked
Ammonia unloading
pump damage risk Unloading general fault alarm
obtained if limit switch open is lost
Unloading stopped if unloading
general fault is obtained
Unloading emergency stop button
Unloading instructions

Page 50 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

8.1.1.2.Valve on pressure balance pipe Ammonia unloading Unloading troubles 2 Limit switch open of the valve to 3
connected to truck closed instructions not respected be checked
Ammonia leakage
risk Pressure sensor in the silo with
Unloading general fault alarm
obtained if limit switch open is lost
or in case of very high pressure
alarm in the tank
Ammonia detection in the
unloading area with high alarm
(flashing light) and very high alarm
(klaxon)
Unloading area connected to the
retention
retention with high and very high
alarm
Ammonia detection in the storage
area with high and very high alarm
1 overpressure safety switch and
1 overpressure rupture disk on the
tank
Protection clothes and eye-
washers
10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc Operator checking
Page 51 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

8.1.1.3.Ammonia leakage during the Disconnection of Operator injury by 3 Ammonia detection in the 3a
unloading unloading pipe NH4OH unloading area with high alarm
Flange broken or
(klaxon)
leakage
Unloading stopped if ammonia
detection high alarm is reached
detection very high alarm is
reached
Automatic truck spraying in case
of very high alarm
retention
alarm
washers
Operator checking

Page 52 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

8.1.1.4.Loss of unloading ammonia Unloading pump Tank filling troubles 2 1 local flowrate sensor with low 2
flowrate electrical or hydraulic alarm
troubles
Unloading valves limit switches
Wrong valve manoeuvre checking
No return valve troubles Unloading stopped if limit switches
are lost or if low flowrate alarm is
obtained
Ammonia flowrate presence
checked with a sight glass , by the
operator
8.1.1.5.Ammonia flowrate too high Wrong valve manoeuvre Pump damage or 2 1 local flowrate sensor 2
dysfunction
(cavitation)

Page 53 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
8 AMMONIA INJECTION HSJ10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 010 8.2. AMMONIA STORAGE 8.2.1. Ammonia Tank

8.2.1.1.Ammonia tank temperature Heat source close to the Ammonia tank 2 Pressure resistant tank 2
increases tank pressure increasing
Safety valve on the top of the tank
risk
Ammonia storage area to prevent excessive pressure
temperature increases increasing
Temperature sensor with high
and very high alarm

Page 54 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

8.2.1.2.Tank pressure increases Temperature increasing Tank damage risk 3 Pressure sensor with high and 3
very high alarm
obtained in case of pressure high
alarm
Unloading stopped (unloading
valve closes) if unloading general
fault is obtained
1 overpressure safety valve and 1
overpressure rupture disk on the
silo
washers
Operator checking
8.2.1.3.Lack of Ammonia in the tank Tank empty No more NOx 2 1 level sensor (analogical) with 3
removal low and very low alarm
Ammonia injection 1 binary very low level sensor
pumps damage risk
The ammonia injection stops if
calculated very low level (1/2
security) is reached
Operator orders a new ammonia
delivery when low level is reached

Page 55 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

8.2.1.4.Ammonia leakage risks Very high level in the Tank pressure 3 2 sensors (1 analogical et 1binary) 3a
storage tank during increasing risk with very high level alarm(1 / 2 )
unloading
Tank overflowing risk Unloading stopped in case of very
Flange broken or high level obtained
Personnel injury risk
leakage
High level tank indication (lamp)
on the unloading box
unloading area with high alarm
(klaxon)
detection high alarm is reached
retention
alarm
washers
Operator checking
Closing order for the automatic
valve retention to sewer in case
of ammonia detection

Page 56 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

Page 57 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
8 AMMONIA INJECTION HSK10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 010 & 011 8.3. AMMONIA INJECTION 8.3.1. NH4OH Pumps

8.3.1.1.Pump stopped Pump electrical or DeNox efficiency 2 Two pumps (one in operation, one 3
hydraulic troubles decreases in stand-by with local selector)
1 local pressure sensor checked
once every shift
1 analogical injection pressure
sensor with low alarm
1 analogical flowrate sensor with
low and very low alarms
8.3.1.2.Filter pump very high pressure Filter clogging Ammonia pump 2 Two pumps (one in operation, one 2
drop damage risk in stand-by with local selector)
2 filters (1 in operation, on in
stand-by) upstream the pumps
Ammonia filter local pressure drop
sensor to be checked once every
shift

Page 58 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
8 AMMONIA INJECTION HSK10 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 010 & 011 8.3 AMMONIA INJECTION 8.3.2. NH4OH injection circuit

8.3.2.1.Ammonia very low flowrate Ammonia injection fault Denox efficiency 2 1 analogical flowrate sensor with 2
decreases low and very low alarms
Ammonia filter clogging
Coherence test : Ammonia pump
Manual adjusting valves
set point higher than 95% and
too much closed
ammonia injection valve open and
ammonia flowrate
Ammonia pump stop order in case
of very low alarm
Limit switches open/close on
ammonia injection valve
Ammonia filter local pressure drop
sensor to be checked once every
shift

Page 59 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

8.3.2.2.Ammonia high pressure Ammonia injection fault Denox efficiency 1 1 analogical pressure sensor with 2
decreasing risk high and very high alarms
Operator injury by Limit switches open/close on
NH4OH ammonia injection valve
Operator checking
Pump safety valve to limit the
pressure increasing
8.3.2.3.Ammonia very high pressure Ammonia injection fault Denox efficiency 2 1 analogical pressure sensor with 2
decreases high and very high alarms
Pump safety valve
troubles Operator injury by Limit switches open/close on
NH4OH ammonia injection valve
Ammonia injection stops if very
high pressure alarm is reached
Operator checking

Page 60 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

8.3.2.4.NH4OH leakage Flange broken or leakage Operator injury by 3 Ammonia detection sensor with 3a
NH4OH high and very high alarm
Ammonia injection stops if the
very high alarm is reached
Safety shower and eye-washers
Protection clothes
Operator checking
1 analogical pressure sensor with
low alarm
1 analogical flowrate sensor with
high and low alarms
8.3.2.5.Injection air very low pressure Compressed air not Ammonia injection 2 1 injection air pressure sensor 3
available or air injection fault with low and very low alarm
valve not opened
Denox efficiency Nox measurement at the stack,
decreases with high and very high alarm
NOx level increasing Ammonia injection stops in case
at the stack of injection air very low pressure
1 local pressure sensor by nozzle
checked once every shift
1 local air flowrate sensor
Limit switches open/close on
injection air valve
Ammonia injection stops if limit
switch open is lost

Page 61 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
9. BICAR TRANSPORT HTJ20 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 008 9.1. BICAR UNLOADING 9.1.1. Bicar unloading

9.1.1.1.Bicar unloading valve closed Bicar unloading valve fault Unloading troubles 2 Limit switch open on the automatic 2
during unloading valve
Bicar leakage risk
obtained in case of unloading
valve discrepancy
Klaxon horns if unloading general
fault is reached
washers
Operator checking

Page 62 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

9.1.1.2.Bicar leakage during the High pressure : safety Bicar overflowing 2 1 high pressure sensor in the silo 2
unloading valve opens from the top of the with alarm
silo
1 very high level sensor and 1
analogical weight sensor with very
high alarm,
Bicar silo filter with fault alarm
obtained in case of 1 on 2 very
high alarm or silo filter fault alarm
is reached or high pressure alarm
in the silo
fault is obtained
fault is reached
High level silo indication (lamp) on
the unloading box
1 Safety valve on the silo
washers
Operator checking

Page 63 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
9 BICAR TRANSPORT HTJ20 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 008 9.2. BICAR STORAGE 9.2.1. Bicar Silo

9.2.1.1.Lack of Bicar Silo empty HCl/SO2 removal 2 1 weight sensor (analogical) with 2
efficiency decreasing low and very low alarm
risk
1 very low level sensor
The Bicar extraction and injection
stops if very low level is reached
Operator orders a new bicar
delivery when low weight is
reached

Page 64 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

9.2.1.2.Silo pressure increases during Silo filter clogged Silo damage risk 2 1 high pressure sensor in the silo 2
unloading with alarm
Bicar silo filter with fault alarm
obtained in case of silo filter fault
alarm is reached or high pressure
in the silo
fault is obtained
fault is reached
1 safety valve on the silo
Protection clothes
Operator checking

Page 65 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
9 BICAR TRANSPORT HTJ20 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 008 9.3. BICAR SILO EXTRACTION 9.3.1. Silo extraction

9.3.1.1.Bicar extraction fault Arching in the silo Bicar extraction 2 Very low level sensor in the 3
stopping risk bottom of the silo
Vibrating bottom used during silo
extraction
Alarm if low level in buffer tank
abnormally maintained
Instrument air injection in the
bottom of the silo to avoid
excessive humidity
9.3.1.2.Bicar extraction fault Vibrating bottom fault Bicar extraction 2 Alarm if low level in buffer tank 2
stopping risk abnormally maintained
Risk of extraction malfunction

Page 66 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

9.3.1.3.Bicar extraction fault Silo transfer valve fault Bicar extraction 2 Alarm if low level in buffer tank 3
stopping risk abnormally maintained
Limit switches open/close on silo
transfer valve
Bicar extraction system stopped if
silo transfer valve discrepancy is
obtained
9.3.1.4.Buffer tank pressure increases Air accumulation in the Buffer tank damage 1 1 pressure balance pipe between 1
during silo extraction buffer tank risk buffer-tank and silo
Leakage risk

Page 67 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
9 BICAR TRANSPORT HTK20 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 008 9.3 BICAR SILO EXTRACTION 9.3.2. Buffer tank

9.3.2.1.Low level abnormally maintained Silo extraction fault Bicar injection 2 Low level sensor in buffer tank 2
in buffer tank stopping risk with calculated alarm
Checking by the operator of the
good operation of the silo
extraction equipments
9.3.2.2.High level abnormally maintained Bicar injection troubles Bicar injection fault 2 High level sensor in buffer tank 2
in buffer tank risk with calculated alarm
Silo extraction stopped in case of
high level
extraction and the injection
equipments

Page 68 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
PID 008 9.4. BICAR EXTRACTION AND 9.4.1. Bicar buffer-tank extraction
INJECTION

9.4.1.1.No Bicar available Manual gate guillotine HCl/SO2 removal 2 Alarm in case of no buffer tank 2
valve not opened efficiency decreasing emptying after a time period
risk
Buffer-tank extraction stopped
Automatic switch on the stand-by
grinder
Operator checking
9.4.1.2.No Bicar available Dosing screw fault HCl/SO2 removal 2 Extraction screw low speed 3
efficiency decreasing detection with alarm
Dosing screw clogged risk
Extraction screw stops if the low
speed is reached
Alarm in case of no buffer tank
emptying after a time period
Buffer-tank extraction stopped
grinder
Operator checking

Page 69 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
PID 008 9.4 BICAR EXTRACTION AND INJECTION 9.4.2. Bicar injection

9.4.2.1.No Bicar available Dosing screw fault HCl/SO2 removal 2 Grinder low speed detection with 3
efficiency decreases alarm
Dosing screw clogged
Grinder stops if the low speed is
Grinder fault
reached
Grinder clogged
Bicar injection system stopped
Transportation fan fault
HCl measurement at the stack,
Transportation fan with high and very high alarm
clogged
High level sensor in buffer tank
with alarm
grinder in case of fault
Operator checking
9.4.2.2.Grinder motor :Very High Motor trouble Grinder motor damage 3 3 PTC sensors with one high 3a
temperature alarm
Operator checking
Grinder motor is stopped in case
of high alarm

Page 70 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
10. ACTIVATED CARBON TRANSPORT OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:

HTJ10
10.1. ACTIVATED CARBON UNLOADING 10.1.1. Activated carbon unloading
PID 009

10.1.1.1.Activated carbon unloading Activated carbon unloading Unloading troubles 2 Limit switch open on the automatic 2
valve closed during unloading valve fault valve
Activated carbon
leakage risk Unloading stopped (unloading
valve closes) when limit switch
open is lost
obtained in case of unloading
valve discrepancy
fault is reached
washers
Operator checking

Page 71 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
10.1.1.2.Activated carbon leakage during Activated carbon Activated carbon in the 2 1 high pressure sensor in the silo 2
the unloading overflowing from the top atmosphere and/or on with alarm
of the silo the floor
1 very high level sensor and 1
High pressure : safety analogical weight sensor with high
valve opens and very high alarm,
Activated carbon silo filter with
fault alarm
obtained in case of 1 on 2 very
high alarm or silo filter fault alarm
is reached or high pressure alarm
in the silo
fault is obtained
fault is reached
High level silo indication (lamp) on
the unloading box
1 Safety valve connected on the
silo
washers
Operator checking

Page 72 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
10 ACTIVATED CARBON TRANSPORT OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
HTJ10 10.2. ACTIVATED CARBON STORAGE 10.2.1. Activated carbon Silo
PID 009

10.2.1.1.Lack of activated carbon Silo empty Dioxins removal and 2 1 weight sensor (analogical) with 3
heavy metals removal low and very low alarm
efficiency decreases
1 very low level sensor with alarm
The activated carbon extraction
and injection stops if very low level
is reached
Operator orders a new Activated
carbon delivery when low weight
is reached

Page 73 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

10.2.1.2.Silo pressure increases during Silo filter clogged Silo damage risk 3 1 high pressure sensor in the silo 3
unloading with alarm
Activated carbon silo filter with
fault alarm
obtained in case of silo filter fault
alarm is reached or high pressure
alarm in the silo
fault is obtained
fault is reached
1 Safety valve on the silo
washers
Operator checking

Page 74 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

10.2.1.3.Activated carbon combustion in Static electricity and auto- Silo damage risk 3 2 Temperature sensors in the silo 3
the silo ignition condition with high and very high alarms
Nitrogen station connected to the
silo
Nitrogen automatic valves open in
case of very high temperature
The unloading valve closes in
The activated carbon extraction
valve closes in case of very high
temperature
bottom of the silo stops in case of

Page 75 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
HTJ10 10.3. ACTIVATED CARBON 10.3.1. Silo extraction

PID 009 EXTRACTION

10.3.1.1.Activated carbon fault Arching in the silo Activated carbon 2 Very low level sensor in the 3
extraction stopping risk bottom of the silo
Fluidisation air injection used
during silo extraction
Alarm if low level in buffer tank
abnormally maintained

10.3.1.2.Activated carbon not available Fluidisation air injection Activated carbon 2 Alarm if low level in buffer tank 2
for extraction fault extraction stopping risk abnormally maintained
extraction equipment

Page 76 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

10.3.1.3.Activated carbon not available Silo transfer valve fault Activated carbon 2 Alarm if low level in buffer tank 2
for extraction extraction stopping risk abnormally maintained
Limit switches open/close on silo
transfer valve
Activated carbon extraction
system stopped if silo transfer
valve discrepancy is obtained
10.3.1.4.Buffer tank pressure increases Air accumulation in the Buffer tank damage 1 1 pressure balance pipe between 1
during silo extraction buffer tank risk buffer-tank and silo
Leakage risk

Page 77 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
HTK10 10.3 ACTIVATED CARBON EXTRACTION 10.3.2. Buffer tank

PID 009

10.3.2.1.Low level abnormally maintained Silo extraction fault Activated carbon 2 Low level sensor in buffer tank 2
in buffer tank injection stopping risk with calculated alarm
extraction equipment
10.3.2.2.High level abnormally Activated carbon Activated carbon 2 High level sensor in buffer tank 2
maintained in buffer tank injection troubles injection risk with calculated alarm
Silo extraction stopped in case of
high level alarm
1 weight sensor in buffer tank
extraction and the injection
equipment

Page 78 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
HTK10 10.4. ACTIVATED CARBON 10.4.1. Activated carbon injection
PID 009 EXTRACTION AND INJECTION

10.4.1.1.No Activated carbon available Dosing screw fault Dioxins removal 2 Dosing screw low speed detection 3
efficiency decreases with alarm
Dosing screw clogged
Screw clogging detection with
alarm
Dosing screw stops if the low
speed is reached
Alarm in case of no buffer tank
emptying
Activated carbon injection system
stopped
Operator checking
injection system in case of fault


Page 79 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

10.4.1.2.Venturi clogged Clogging Dioxins removal 2 1 clogging detection in the venturi 3
efficiency decreasing feeding pipe with alarm
Transport air fault risk
Screw clogging detection with
alarm
Dosing screw stops if the high
pressure is reached
High pressure sensor on transport
air
1 local pressure sensor on
transport air
Operator checking

10.4.1.3.No Activated carbon available Fan fault Dioxins removal 2 Low pressure sensor on transport 2
efficiency decreases air pipe
Reagent injection pipe
broken or open Activated carbon extraction
system stops in case of low
pressure
Operator checking


Page 80 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

10.4.1.4.Fan stopped Fan fault Reagent clogging 2 Activated carbon injection system 3
stops if fan running feed back is
lost


Page 81 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
11. ESP FLY ASH TRANSPORT AND OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:

STORAGE ETH10
11.1. ESP FLY ASH TRANSPORT 11.1.1. ESP fly ash extraction
PID 013

11.1.1.1.ESP hopper blocked Ash arching in the ESP Ash level increases in 2 Hopper walls insulation, electrical 2
hoppers the ESP hopper tracing with fault alarm
Sticking on walls 1 High level and 1 very high level
Hopper outlet clogging sensors in the ESP hopper with
alarm
ESP HV stopped in case of very
high level alarm reached during a
time period
Checking the good operation of
the mechanical conveyors
Plant inspection : check there is
no opened door and well closed
door

Page 82 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

11.1.1.2.Extraction screw blocked (to Screw troubles Ash level increases 2 Screw low speed rotation sensor 2
silo) in the ESP hopper with alarm
Motor failure
Ash extraction Limit switches open/close on the
The valve at the outlet of
stopped valve at the outlet of the screw
the screw is not opened
Screw stops if the low speed is
Downstream double flap
reached or if no limit switch open
stopped
is obtained
Heat tracing with fault alarm
11.1.1.3.Extraction screw blocked (to big Screw troubles Ash level increases 2 Screw low speed rotation sensor 2
bag) in the ESP hopper with alarm
Motor failure
Ash extraction 1 binary high level sensor on the
High level in the big bag
stopped top of the big bag with high alarm
The valve at the outlet of
Limit switches open/close on the
the screw is not opened
valve at the outlet of the screw
Screw stops if the low speed or if
the big bag high level alarm is
reached or if no limit switch open
is obtained

Page 83 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

11.1.1.4.Double flap blocked Double flap troubles Extraction screw 2 Double flap low speed rotation 2
troubles risk sensor with alarm
Motor failure
High level in the ESP Downstream clogging detector
Downstream screw
hopper with alarm
stopped or clogged
Ash extraction Double flap stops if the low speed
stopped is reached or if the downstream
screw is stopped or in case of
clogging detection
Extraction screw (Upstream
screw) automatically stopped if
the double flap is stopped

Page 84 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
11 ESP FLY ASH TRANSPORT AND OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:

STORAGE ETH10
11.1 ESP FLY ASH TRANSPORT 11.1.2. ESP fly ash transport to big bag
PID 013

Page 85 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF

STORAGE ETH10
11.1 ESP FLY ASH TRANSPORT 11.1.3. ESP fly ash transport to silo
PID 013

11.1.3.1.Screw conveyor blocked (to silo) Screw conveyor troubles Ash extraction 2 Screw conveyor low speed 2
stopped rotation sensor with alarm
Motor failure
Downstream clogging detector
Downstream reddler
with alarm
stopped or clogged
Screw conveyor stops if the low
speed is reached or in case of
clogging detection
Upstream double flap
automatically stopped
Possibility to use big bag
extraction under ESP screw
conveyor

Page 86 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

11.1.3.2.Reddler blocked Reddler troubles Ash extraction 2 Reddler low speed rotation sensor 2
stopped with alarm
Motor failure
Clogging detector in the elevator
Downstream bucket
feeding pipe with alarm
elevator stopped or
clogged Reddler stops if the low speed is
reached or in case of clogging
detection
Upstream screw conveyor
automatically stopped (except if
big bag used)
extraction under extraction screw
conveyor

Page 87 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

11.1.3.3.Bucket elevator blocked Bucket elevator troubles Ash extraction 2 Bucket elevator low speed rotation 2
stopped sensor with alarm
Motor failure
Downstream screw
with alarm
conveyor stopped or
clogged Bucket elevator stops if the low
speed is reached or in case of
clogging detection
Upstream reddler automatically
stopped
extraction under screw conveyor
11.1.3.4.Screw conveyor blocked Screw conveyor troubles Ash extraction 2 Screw conveyor low speed 2
stopped rotation sensor with alarm
Motor failure
Screw conveyor stops if the low
speed is reached
Upstream elevator automatically
stopped
Possibility to use big bag under
extraction screw conveyor

Page 88 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF

STORAGE ETH10
11.2. ASH STORAGE SILO 11.2.1. Ash storage Silo
PID 013

11.2.1.1.Very high level in the silo Ash silo extraction fault Ash extraction stopped 2 1 very high level sensor and 1 3
analogical weight sensor with high
Ash silo overflowing
and very high alarm
1 on 2 very high alarm stops the
ash feeding

11.2.1.2.Ash silo filter clogged Ash silo filter cleaning fault Ash extraction troubles 1 Check the ash silo filter 1
11.2.1.3.Ash clogging in the silo Moisture in ashes Ash silo extraction fault 2 Heat tracing with fault alarm 2
risk
bottom of the silo to dry ashes
Operator checking
11.2.1.4.Very high ash temperature Electrical heating too strong Unloading design 2 1 Temperature sensor in the silo 2
temperature for truck with high and very high alarm
ESP ash too hot
exceeded
The truck loading sequence stops
in case of high temperature
Operator checking

Page 89 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF

STORAGE ETH10
11.3. ASH SILO EXTRACTION 11.3.1. Ash extraction from the silo
PID 013

11.3.1.1.Planetary extraction plugged or Extractor troubles Extractor damages 2 Extraction sequence stopped in 2
blocked risk case of planetary extractor
Motor failure
general fault
Operator checking
11.3.1.2.Isolating valve discrepancy Isolating valve fault Extractor damages 2 Isolating valve with limit switch 2
risk open and close
Truck loading sequence stopped if
limit switch open is lost
Operator checking
11.3.1.3.Ash overflowing during the truck The truck is full Ash leakage 2 High level sensor located at the 2
loading bottom of the truck loading device.
high level sensor is obtained
Operator checking during the truck
loading
Protection clothes

Page 90 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

11.3.1.4.Truck loading device connection The truck is moved by the Ash leakage 2 Connection sensor located at the 2
lost driver during the truck bottom of the truck loading device.
loading
connection with the truck is lost
loading
Protection clothes
11.3.1.5.Fly ash leakage during the truck Leakage from the loading Fly ash leakage 2 Loading device equipped with air 2
loading device extraction fan and filter
Filter with fault alarm
filter fault or fan fault is obtained

Page 91 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
12. SPENT SORBENT TRANSPORT OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:

AND STORAGE HTP50
12.1. SPENT SORBENT TRANSPORT 12.1.1. Spent sorbent transport under fabric filter
PID 014

12.1.1.1.Upstream Screw conveyors Screw troubles High level in the 2 Screw low speed rotation sensor 2
under fabric filter blocked Fabric filter cell with alarm
Motor failure
Spent sorbent Screw stops if the low speed is
Downstream equipment
extraction stopped reached or if downstream
stopped
equipment is stopped
12.1.1.2.Downstream Screw conveyors Screw troubles High level in the 2 Screw low speed rotation sensor 2
under fabric filter blocked Fabric filter cell with alarm
Motor failure
Spent sorbent Limit switches open/close on the
The valves at the outlet
extraction stopped valves at the outlet of the screw
of the screw not opened
Screw stops if the low speed is
reached or if limit switch open is
not obtained

Page 92 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

12.1.1.3.Double flap blocked Double flap troubles Screw conveyor 2 Double flap low speed rotation 2
troubles risk sensor with alarm
Motor failure
High level in the Downstream clogging detector
Common screw conveyor
fabric filter cell with alarm
stopped or clogged
Spent sorbent Double flap stops if the low speed
extraction stopped is reached or if the common
conveyor is stopped or in case of
clogging detection
Upstream screw automatically
stopped
Possibility to use big-bag under
screw

Page 93 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
12 SPENT SORBENT TRANSPORT OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:

AND STORAGE HTP50
12.1SPENT SORBENT TRANSPORT 12.1.2. Spent sorbent transport to big bag
PID 014

12.1.2.1.Common conveyor blocked (to Conveyor troubles Spent sorbent 2 Conveyor low speed rotation 2
big bag) extraction stopped sensor with alarm
Motor failure
1 binary high level sensor on the
Big bag full
top of the big bag with alarm
Conveyor stops if the low speed or
the high level alarm is reached
Upstream double flaps

Page 94 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF

AND STORAGE HTP50
12.1SPENT SORBENT TRANSPORT 12.1.3. Spent sorbent transport to silo
PID 014

12.1.3.1.Common conveyor blocked (to Conveyor troubles Spent sorbent 2 Conveyor low speed rotation 2
silo) extraction stopped sensor with alarm
Motor failure
Conveyor stops if the low speed is
Downstream screw
reached or if the downstream
stopped
screw is stopped
Upstream double flap

Page 95 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

12.1.3.2.Screw conveyor blocked Screw conveyor troubles Spent sorbent 2 Conveyor low speed rotation 2
extraction stopped sensor with alarm
Motor failure
Clogging detector in the elevator
Elevator stopped or
feeding pipe with alarm
clogged
reached or if the elevator is
stopped or in case of clogging
detection
Upstream common screw
automatically stopped (except if
big bag used)
common screw

Page 96 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

12.1.3.3.Bucket elevator blocked Elevator troubles Spent sorbent 2 Elevator low speed rotation sensor 2
extraction stopped with alarm
Motor failure
Silo screw conveyor
with alarm
stopped or clogged
Elevator stops if the low speed is
reached or if the screw conveyor
is stopped or in case of clogging
detection
Upstream common screw
common screw

Page 97 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

12.1.3.4.Silo screw conveyor blocked Conveyor troubles Spent sorbent 2 Conveyor low speed rotation 2
extraction stopped sensor with alarm
Motor failure
reached
Upstream elevator automatically
stopped
common screw

Page 98 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF

AND STORAGE HTP50
12.2. SPENT SORBENT STORAGE SILO 12.2.1. Spent sorbent storage Silo
PID 014

12.2.1.1.Very high level in the silo Spent sorbent silo Spent sorbent 2 1 very high level sensor and 1 3
extraction fault extraction stopped analogical weight sensor with high
and very high alarm
Spent sorbent silo
overflowing 1 on 2 very high alarm stops the
spent sorbent feeding
12.2.1.2.Silo filter clogged Silo filter cleaning fault Spent sorbent 1 Check the silo filter 1
extraction troubles
12.2.1.3.Spent sorbent clogging in the Moisture in spent sorbent Spent sorbent silo 2 Heat tracing with fault alarm 2
silo extraction fault risk
bottom of the silo to dry spent
sorbent
Operator checking

Page 99 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

12.2.1.4.Spent sorbent combustion in the Static electricity or auto- Silo damage risk 2 1 Temperature sensor in the silo 2
silo ignition condition with high (H3) and very high (H4)
alarms
Nitrogen station connected to the
silo
Nitrogen automatic valves open in
The loading sequence stops in
bottom of the silo stops in case of
12.2.1.5.Very high spent sorbent Electrical heating too strong Unloading design 2 1 Temperature sensor in the silo 2
temperature temperature for truck with high (H1) and very high (H2)
exceeded alarms
The truck loading sequence stops
in case of very high (H2)
temperature
Operator checking

Page 100 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF

AND STORAGE HTP50
12.3. SPENT SORBENT SILO 12.3.1. Spent sorbent extraction from the silo
PID 014 EXTRACTION

12.3.1.1.Planetary extraction plugged or Extractor troubles Extractor damages 2 Extraction sequence stopped if 2
blocked risk planetary extractor general fault is
Motor failure
reached
Operator checking
12.3.1.2.Isolating valve discrepancy Isolating valve fault Extractor damages 2 Isolating valve with limit switch 2
risk open and close
Extraction sequence stopped if
limit switch open is lost
Operator checking
12.3.1.3.Spent sorbent overflowing The truck is full Spent sorbent leakage 2 High level sensor located at the 2
during the truck loading bottom of the truck loading device.
high level sensor is obtained
loading
Protection clothes

Page 101 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

12.3.1.4.Truck loading device connection The truck is moved by the Spent sorbent leakage 2 Connection sensor located at the 2
lost driver during the truck bottom of the truck loading device.
loading
connection with the truck is lost
loading
Protection clothes
12.3.1.5.Spent sorbent leakage during Leakage from the loading Spent sorbent leakage 2 Loading device equipped with air 2
the truck loading device extraction fan and filter
Filter with fault alarm
filter fault or fan fault is obtained

Page 102 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
13. HEAT EXCHANGER HSB30 OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:
PID 012 13.1. GAS/WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 13.1.1. Gas/water heat exchanger (gas side)

13.1.1.1.Very low gas temperature at the Very low gas Gas temperature 3 2 gas temperature sensors at the 3
gas-water heat exchanger inlet temperature at the lower than the acid dew SCR catalysts outlet with low and
DeNOx SCR inlet point : DeNOx SCR very low alarm
equipment corrosion risk
SCR in preheating mode The DeNOx SCR is automatically
by-passed if very low gas
One manhole open or
not tight
1 gas temperature sensor at the
Heat exchanger outlet with low
and very low alarm
13.1.1.2.Very high gas temperature at the Very high gas Increase of the SCR 2 1 gas temperature sensor at the 2
gas-water heat exchanger inlet temperature alarm at the gas outlet temperature Heat exchanger inlet and outlet
SCR outlet to maximal steam with high and very high alarm
supply temperature and
Failure of SCR gas Heat exchanger is designed for
possible exceeding the
temperature control loop all the gas temperature conditions
design temperature of
(or operating the steam according to the contract
the Heat exchanger
supply over the by pass if
ON/OFF steam valve
available)

Page 103 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

13.1.1.3.Very low gas temperature at the Temperature control loop Gas temperature 3 1 gas temperature sensor at the 3a
gas-water heat exchanger outlet failure lower than the acid dew Heat exchanger outlet with low
point : downstream SCR and very low alarm
SCR in preheating mode
Heat exchanger system designed
to obtain a temperature higher
than dew point at nominal load.
Circulation pumps stop if SCR on
line and very low gas temperature
13.1.1.4.Gas--water heat exchanger High dust concentration Equipment damages 2 Pressure drop sensors across the 2
clogging in the flue gas risks heat exchanger
fabric filter by-passed Gas-Gas heat Dust analyser at the fabric filter
exchanger efficiency outlet with high and very high
decreases alarm.
Operator checking

Page 104 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
PID 012 13.1 GAS/WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 13.1.2. Gas/water heat exchanger (water side)

13.1.2.1.Very low water temperature at Failure of water Gas temperature 3 1 gas temperature sensor at the 3a
the gas-water heat exchanger inlet temperature control loop lower than the acid dew Heat exchanger inlet with low and
point : downstream SCR very low alarm
Very low gas
temperature at the gas- In case of very low water
water heat exchanger Heat exchanger temperature, the circulations
inlet (during line start up corrosion risk (due to pumps stop, except if the 3 ways
or in case of furnace tube surface valve is in by-pass (no heat
troubles) temperature) exchange)
13.1.2.2.Very high water temperature at Very high gas Increase of the water 2 Heat exchanger is designed for 2
the gas-water heat exchanger temperature alarm at the temperature to maximal all the water temperature
gas-water heat gas temperature and conditions , according to the
exchanger inlet possible exceeding the contract
Failure of water 1 safety valve on the water pipe
the Heat exchanger
temperature control loop set below the heat exchanger
pressure design
water pump not in
operation
condensate system not

in operation

Page 105 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

13.1.2.3.Very high water pressure Very high water Increase of the water 3 Local manometer at each pump 3
temperature alarm due to a pressure, possible outlet
failure of the circulation exceeding the design
1 safety valve on the water pipe
pump or condensate system pressure of the Heat
set below the heat exchanger
not in operation exchanger
pressure design
No flow (hand valve
Water pressure local control loop
closed)
with alarm to the control room
Water pressure system
Discharge valve on each Booster
malfunction
pump


Page 106 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
PID 012 13.2. CONDENSATE WATER/WATER 13.2.1. Condensate water-water heat exchanger
HEAT EXCHANGER HE4 HE4 (water side)

13.2.1.1.Very high water temperature at Very high gas Increase of the water 3 1 gas temperature sensor at the 3
the condensate water-water heat temperature alarm at the temperature to maximal Heat exchanger HE4 inlet and
exchanger HE4 gas-water heat gas temperature and outlet with high and very high
exchanger inlet possible exceeding the alarm
Failure of condensate Heat exchanger HE4 is designed
the Heat exchanger
water temperature for all the inlet water temperature
HE4
control loop conditions, according to the
contract
condensate system not
in operation 1 safety valve on the water pipe
pressure design


Page 107 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

13.2.1.2.Very high water pressure Very high water Increase of the water 3 Local manometer at each pump 3
temperature due to a failure pressure, possible outlet
of the circulation pump or exceeding the design
Water pressure local control loop
condensate system not in pressure of the Heat
with alarm to the control room
operation exchanger HE4
1 safety valve on the water pipe
pressure design

Page 108 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
PID 012 13.2 CONDENSATE WATER/WATER 13.2.2. Condensate water-water heat exchanger
HEAT EXCHANGER HE4 HE4 (condensate water side)
Not in LAB scope Refer to client documentation

Page 109 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
WHAT IF
PID 012 13.3. CIRCULATION WATER PUMPS 13.3.1. Circulation Water pumps

13.3.1.1.Loss of water flow Upstream valve closed Pump damages, 2 Limit switch on upstream manual 2
cavitations valve
No water flowrate : Pump stops if limit switch open is
Increase of the water lost
temperature
13.3.1.2.Loss of water flow Downstream valve closed Pump damages risk 2 Limit switch on downstream 2
manual valve
No water flowrate :
Increase of the water Pump stops if limit switch open is
temperature lost
13.3.1.3.Pump in operation stopped Electrical failure, operator No water flowrate : 2 Two pumps (one in operation, one 2
choice Increase of the water in stand-by). Each pump is
temperature sufficient to maintain the heat
exchange efficiency

Page 110 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
APPENDIX 1
SIL Project Calibration

Page 111 of 113
LAB GROUPE a

Page 112 of 113
LAB GROUPE a
Remark : 1 shut down day cost is evaluated at 130 k

Page 113 of 113

07B Process Risk Analysis Flue Gas Treatment

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

07B Process Risk Analysis Flue Gas Treatment

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

LAB GROUPE a

1 SIL classification 29/05/2009 PYK RB PMi

0 First emission 29/04/2009 PYK RB PMi

REV OBJET DATE Auteur Resp. DT CP

PROCESS RISK ANALYSIS

25, rue Bossuet

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

2. ELECTROSTATIC PRECIPITATOR HDE10 18

3. LAB LOOP HTD10 20

4. FABRIC FILTER HTE10 24

5. DENOX SCR HSB10 35

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

7.1.1. Analyser at the stack inlet 48

8. AMMONIA INJECTION HSJ10 50

9. BICAR TRANSPORT HTJ20 62

10. ACTIVATED CARBON TRANSPORT HTJ10 71

11. ESP FLY ASH TRANSPORT AND STORAGE ETH10 82

12. SPENT SORBENT TRANSPORT AND STORAGE HTP50 92

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

12.1.1. Spent sorbent transport under fabric filter 92

13. HEAT EXCHANGER HSB30 103

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

1.1. GRAVITY IMPACT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY

Gravity impact on health and safety (1) Minor effects

Gravity impact on health and safety (2) Significant effects

Gravity impact on health and safety (3) Critical effects

Gravity impact on health and safety (4) Disastrous effects

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

1.2. TYPE OF CONTROL REQUIRED

Type of control required (1)

Type of control required (2)

Type of control required (3)

Type of control required (4)

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

1.3. SIL CLASSIFICATION

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

C ause C o m b u s tio n t ro u b le s C o m b u s t io n t ro u b le s C o m b u s t io n t ro u b le s C lo g g in g i n flu e g a s s t r e a m o r p re h e a t in g T e m p e ra t u re C o m b u s t io n t ro u b le s

D e m a n d ra t e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e p e r B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e E x p e c te d d e m a n d ra t e le s s

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

F u n c t io n P re ve n t u n d e r p re s s u re in fl u e P re ve n t e x c e s s i v e d a m a g e t o ID fa n P re ve n t e x c e s s ive d a m a g e t o ID fa n P re ve n t e x c e s s ive d a m a g e P re ve n t e x c e s s ive d a m a g e

C a u s e C lo g g in g in fl u e g a s s t r e a m o r W e a r a n d te a r to th e b e a rin g , W e a r a n d t e a r t o t h e b e a rin g , W e a r a n d te a r F a ilu re o f m o t o r c o o lin g

S c e n a rio U n d e r p r e s s u r e in flu e g a s E x c e s s iv e d a m a g e t o ID fa n b e a r in g s E x c e s s iv e d a m a g e t o ID fa n b e a r i n g s E x c e s s ive d a m a g e to ID fa n E x c e s s ive d a m a g e to ID fa n

D e m a n d ra te B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e p e r B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e t h e t rip is B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e th e trip is B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e le s s B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e le s s

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

C a u s e L e a k a g e s a t fla n g e s fle x ib le s L e a k a g e s a t fl a n g e s fl e x i b le s L e a k a g e s a t fla n g e s fle x ib le s L e a k a g e s a t fl a n g e s fl e x i b le s

D e m a n d ra t e B a s e d o n e x p e r ie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

F in a l E le m e n t C lo s in g fillin g va lve C lo s in g fillin g v a lve S t o p p in g m o t o r

D e m a n d ra t e G iv e n t h a t t h e s ilo is fille d G iv e n t h a t t h e s ilo is fille d B a s e d o n e x p e rie n c e : o n c e

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

F u n c t io n P r e v e n t o v e r fillin g o f t h e A c t iv a t e d P re ve n t re le a s e o f A c t iva t e d C a rb o n E x t in g u is h a n a c t iva t e d c a rb o n

C a u s e O p e ra to r e rro r O p e ra to r e rro r H o t s p o t in s ilo

S c e n a rio R e le a s e o f a c t iva t e d c a rb o n to R e le a s e o f A c t iva t e d C a rb o n to F ire in s ilo w h ic h m a y a ffe c t th e

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

2. ELECTROSTATIC PRECIPITATOR OPERATION: EQUIPMENT:

Undesirable Events or deviations Causes Consequences G Actions C

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc

Undesirable Events or deviations Causes Consequences G Actions C

10892EA00401-1 Harlingen Risk Analysis.doc