Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
problems. , . .
A m en tally ill person is n o t necessarily a g e n iu s, but it is well
known to p sy ch iatrists th a t som e m e n ta lly ill a re o fte n very cunning and
will outw it any doctor o r n u rse . A t p re se n t th e p eo p le of the world do
not realize th a t th ey are being tr a in e d in psychopathological uses of their
nervous system s, and a fu tu re g e n e ra tio n or tw o will becom e semantically
crippled because train ed in such d isto rtio n s.
The violation, thro u g h ig n o ra n c e a n d /o r -sa n ity , of the similarity
of stru c tu re in th e m a p -te rrito ry rela tio n sh ip (see p . 58 ff. and p. 750
ff.), a n d /o r deliberate, p ro fessio n ally p lan n ed d isto rtio n of it, abolishes
predictability, p ro p er evaluation, tr u s t, etc. T h is re s u lts only in breeding
fears, an x ieties, hates, etc., w h ic h d iso rg an ize in d iv id u a ls and even
nations. T h e re m ust be a c o rre sp o n d e n c e a n d sim ila rity of structure
between lan g u ag e and facts, a n d so co n seq u en t thalatno-cortical integra
tion, if w e a re to survive as a s a n e civilized race.
In a few y ears history will ju d g e th e se d y in g sp a sm s of the aristotelian
system, a system which w as th e b est of its k in d 2 ,3 0 0 y ears ago, as for
m ulated b y a g re a t m an u n d e r th e co n d itio n s of th e v ery few scientific
facts know n at th a t date. I t is n o t so today, 1941. M o st of the knowl
edge of scientific facts a n d m e th o d s of A risto tle are o b so lete today, and in
the m ain h arm fu l, like th e M a g in o t lin e o rien tatio n .
By n ecessity the a risto te lia n sy ste m w as based o n macroscopic or
animal sen se, levels, w hich e v e n n o w p re d o m in a n tly guide the masses.
t^ e 'n " deration sense' data, etc., but cannot deal adc-
S t d aS We" as sanky
conditions which, as we know
today are resultants of sub-microscopic, electro-colloidal processes.
the anim alrX 1St0te an S?S' em "'6 are stressi"S he differences between
flexibilitv r, WWCh
h u m an sy m b o l dreactio
^ inV0' Ve,,1ftheir
n s, with
hardly be c o ^ h aH '" f T *
T h e P sych o lo g y o f T o Z t l s tu d y,n g T h e K<>P* of the M u m ;
(Alliance Book C n L ! T ProPa9anda. by D r. Serge (Matin,
Book Corporat.on, N ew York, 1940). A former sh.dent of
INTRODUCTION TO TH E SECOND EDITION lxi
A IM S , M E A N S A N D C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F A
N O N -A R I S T O T E L IA N R E V IS IO N
tally ill. Hence m y secu rity , often blasphem ously cheerful, as one of
my friends calls it.
This general d e n ia l o f the is of id en tity gives the main funda
mental non-aristotelian prem ise, which necessitates a structural trea t
ment. The status o f negative prem ises is m uch more im portant and
secure to start w ith th a n th a t of th e positive is of identity, found in the
aristotelian system, b u t easily show n to b e false to fact, and involving
important delusional facto rs.
Any m ap or la n g u a g e , to be of m axim um usefulness, should, in
structure, be sim ilar to th e s tr u c tu r e ^ F th e empirical w orld. L ikew ise.
from the p o in t of v ie w o f a theory of sa n ity, any system or lan g u age
should, in stru c tu re, b e sim ilar to t he stru c tu re o f our nervous system .
It is easily shown th a t th e aristotelian system differs structurally from
these minimal req u irem en ts, and th a t the non-aristotelian system is in
accordance w ith th em .
This fact tu rn s o u t to be of psychophysiological importance. T he
above considerations, an d others im possible to mention in this chapter,
have suggested to m e th e fo rm and stru c tu re of th e whole work. I have
spared no effort to m ak e th e presentation as connected, simple, and,
particularly, as w o rk a b le as I could. A s I deal w ith structure, and sim i
larity of structure, o f languages and the em pirical world, a definite selec
tion of topics is im m ed iately suggested. I m u st give enough structural
data about languages in general, and enough structural data about the
empirical w orld, a n d th e n select, or, if necessary, build, my term inology
and system of sim ilar stru c tu re .
The read er sh o u ld n o t be afraid if som e p a rts of the book look
technical and m athem atical. In reality, they a re not so. Speaking o f the
language called m ath em atics, from a stru ctu ral point of view, I have had
to illustrate w hat w a s said, and the few sym bols o r diagrams are used
only for th a t p u rp o se. M an y of th e stru ctu ral points are of genuine
importance and in te re st to professional scientists, teachers, and others,
who seldom, if ever, deal w ith such stru ctu ral, linguistic, and sem antic
problems as are h e re analysed. T h e laym an wfio will read the book
diligently an d repeated ly , w ithout skipping any p a rt of it, will get at
least a feeling or v a g u e n o tio n that such p roblem s do exist, w hich will
produce a very im p o rta n t psycho-logical effect or release from th e old
animalistic u n co n d itio n ality o f responses, w hether o r not he feels that
he has understood th e m fu lly .
My earnest su g g estio n , backed by experience, to the reader is to
read the book th ro u g h several tim es, but n o t to dwell on points which
are not clear to him . A t each reading the issues will become clearer,
14 x. P R E L I M I N A R I E S
the only possible content o f know ledge and o f m eanings. O n the low est
level of our analysis, w h e n w e explore the objective level (the u n
speakable feelings in th is c a s e ), w e m ust try to define every m eaning as
a conscious feeling of a c tu a l, o r assum ed, o r w is h e d ., relations w hich
pertain to first o rd e r o b je c tiv e entities, psycho-logical included, and w hich
can be evaluated by p e rso n a l, varied, an d racial again un-speakable first
orderpsychophysiological effects. Because relatio n s can be defined as
multi-dimensional o rd e r, b o th o f w hich term s a re non-el, applying to
senses and m ind , a f te r n a m in g the u n -speakable entities, all experience
can be described in te rm s o f relations o r m ulti-dim ensional order. T h e
meanings of m eanings, in a g iv en case, in a g iv e n individual at a given
moment., represent com posite, affective psycho-logical configurations of
all relations pertaining to th e case, coloured by p a st experiences, state of
health, mood of th e m o m en t, a n d other contingencies.
If we consistently a p p ly th e organism -as-a-w hole principle to any
psycho-logical analysis, w e m u s t conjointly co ntem plate at least both
aspects, the em otional a n d th e intellectual, a n d so deliberately ascribe
emotional factors to a n y intellectual m an ifestation, and intellectual
factors to any em otional o ccurrence. T h a t is w hy, on human levels, th e
el term psychological m u s t be abolished and a new term psycho-logical
introduced, in o rd er th a t w e m ay construct a science.
From what has been said , w e see th a t not only th e structure of th e
world is such th a t it is m a d e u p o f absolute in d iv id u als, but that m ean
ings in general, and th e m e a n in g s of m eanings in particularthe last
representing probably th e u n -speakable first o rd e r effectsalso share, in
common with ordinary o b je c ts, th e absolute indiv iduality of the objective
level.
The above explains w h y , b y the in h eren t stru c tu re of the w orld,
life, and the hum an n e rv o u s system , h um an relatio n s are so enorm ously
complex and difficult; a n d w h y w e should leave no stone unturned to
discover beneath th e v a ry in g phenom ena m ore and m ore general and
invariant foundations o n w h ich hum an u n d e rsta n d in g and agreem ent
may be based. I n m a th e m a tic s w e find th e only m odel in which we can
study the invariance o f re la tio n s under tra n sfo rm a tio n s, and hence th e
need for future p sy cho-logicians to stu d y m athem atics.
It follows fro m th e se con sid eratio n s that a n y psycho-logical occur
rence has a num ber o f a sp e c ts, an affective , a n d an intellectual, a
physiological, a colloidal, a n d w h a t not. F o r the science o f psychophysiol
ogy, resulting in a th e o ry o f san ity , th e above f o u r aspects are of m ost
importance. As o u r a c tu a l lives are lived on objective, un-speakable
levels, and not on verbal levels, it appears, as a problem of evaluation,
I. P R E L I M I N A R I E S
24
ates and m an y others. A ll d ata ta k e n fro m science are selected, and onlj
those which d irectly enter as fa c to rs in s .r are given m an elementary
outline. T h e m eanings to th e in d iv id u a l are d e p en d en t, through the
influence of th e environm ent, ed u catio n , languages and th e ir structure,
and other facto rs, on racial m e a n in g s called science, w h ich , to a large
extent, because o f th e stru ctu ral a n d relational c h a ra c te r of science,
become physiological sem antic fa c to rs o f th e reactions. I n fact, science,
mathematics, logic. , may be c o n sid ered fro m a non-elem entalistic point
of view as g eneralised results o f s.r ac cep tab le to th e m a jo rity of informed
and not heavily pathological individuals.
T o facilitate th e w riting and th e rea d in g o f the w o rk , I am com
pelled to use definite devices. A s in ca se o f stru c tu re , m u ltio rd in al terms,
so in th e case o f s.r, I often em ploy a n o rd in ary fo rm of expression and
use th e w ords stru c tu ra /, m u ltio rd in a i, sem antic, as adjectives, or
structurally, sem antically. , as ad v e rb s, alw ays im plying th e full mean
ings, th a t u n d e r such and such co n d itions o f a given stim ulus, the given
s.r would be su c h an d such. In m a n y instances, th e lette rs s.r o r (s.r)
will be inserted to rem ind th e read er th a t w e deal w ith sem antic reactions
o r the psycho-logical reactions in co n n ec tio n w ith the m eanings of the
problems analysed. I t is not only u se fu l, b u t perhaps essential, that the
reader should sto p in such places and tr y to evoke in him self th e given s.r.
The present w o rk leads to new s.r w h ic h a re beneficial to e v e ry one of us
and fundam ental fo r sanity. T h e c asu a l read in g o f the p re se n t book is
not enough. A n y one who w ants th e fu ll o r partial benefit o f the joint
labours of the a u th o r an d th e read er m u st, even in th e read in g , begin to
re-train his s.r.
A s the o rg an ism w orks as-a-w hole, a n d as th e tra in in g is psycho
physiological in te rm s o f order, re v e rsin g the reversed pathological o rd e r.,
organism -as-a-w hole m eans m u s t be em ployed. F o r this purpose, the
S tructural D ifferential has been developed. T h e re ad er will la te r under
stand th a t it is practically im possible to achieve, w ithout its help, the
m axim um beneficial sem antic results.
F rom a n on-el point of view , w hich m a k es illegitim ate a n y el verbal
sp itting of em otions and intellect. , th ese processes m ust b e analysed
in ^ ri^ s o rd er, indicating th e stages o f th e psycho-neural process-as-
a w o e. E m pirically, there is a difference betw een an em otion which
becomes rationalized and em otions invoked or produced by ideas,
e or e r is d ifferen t in each instance, a n d if, in a given nervous system,
a g n e n m om ent, o r und er som e special conditions, the low er or higher
nerve centres w o rk defectively, the n e rv o u s reactions are n o t well bal
anced and the m anifestatio n s acquire a one-sided character. T h e other
TE RM IN O LO G Y AND MEANINGS
:;*3i
. x ; : Jt* v't.i- ,
*' * .mVrlU
. M * >.iv..f;'C'-; :.
cat!, i . :k. c>Ki lan^vfa;.-- \- r-:.^tfv-s?* ^
; Tijr- tfifc a *.:-. v>. *. '. ...
^v* cs.
BOOK II
A GENERAL INTRODUCTION
TO NON-ARISTOTELIAN SYSTEMS
AND GENERAL SEMANTICS
Of all men, A ris to tle is th e one of w hom h is follow ers have w orshipped
his defects as w ell a s his excellencies: w hich is w h a t he him self never d id
to any m an liv in g o r d e a d ; indeed, he h a s b e e n accused of th e c o n tra ry
fault. (354) AUG U STUS D E M ORGAN
369
C H A PT E R X X IV
O N A B S T R A C T IN G
o f an extrem ely fine s tru c tu re , w hich n either lig h t, n o r the nerve centres
affected by light, can re g iste r.
W h a t we see is s tru c tu ra lly only a specific statistical mass-effect of
h ap p en in g s on a m uch finer g rain ed level. W e see w hat we see because
w e m iss all th e finer d e ta ils. F o r o u r pu rp o se, it is usually enough to
d eal only w ith s ig h t; th is sim plifies w ritin g , and th e comments made
a p p ly to all oth er se n se s, th o u g h perhaps in d iffe re n t degrees.
In 1933, in o u r h u m a n econom y, we h a v e to take into account at
le a st th re e levels. T h e o ne is th e sub-m icroscopic level of science, what
science know s about i t . T h e second is th e g ross macroscopic, daily
ex p erien ce level o f ro u g h objects. T h e th ird is th e verbal level.
W e m ust also ev alu a te a n im portant se m an tic issue; namely, the
re la tiv e im portance o f th ese three levels. W e know already that to
becom e acquainted w ith an object, w e m ust n o t only explore it from all
possible points o f view a n d p u t it in contact w ith as many nerve centres
a s we can, as th is is a n essential condition o f know ing, but we must
also n o t forget th a t o u r n e rv e centres m ust su m m arize the different par
tia l, abstracted, specific p ic tu re s. In th e h u m a n class of life, we find a
n ew facto r, n o n -ex isten t in an y other form o f lif e ; namely, that we have
a capacity to collect all k n o w n experiences o f d iffe re n t individuals. Such
a capacity increases en o rm o u sly the nu m b er o f observations a single
in d iv id u al can handle, a n d so o u r ac q u ain tan ce w ith the world around,
a n d in, us becomes m u c h m o re refined and e x ac t. T his capacity, which
_^I call th e tim e-binding capacity, is only possible because, in distinction
fro m Ure^imtfnaTs, w e~haW 5volved, o r p erfec ted , extra-neural means by
w hich, w ithout alte rin g o u r nervous system , w e can refine its operation
a n d expand its scope. O u r scientific in stru m e n ts record what ordinarily
w e cannot see, h e a r ,. O u r n eu ral verbal c e n tre s allow us to exchange
a n d accum ulate experiences, although no on e could live through all of
t h e m ; an d they w ould b e soon fo rg o tten if w e had no neural and extra-
n e u ra l m eans to record th em .
A g ain the o rg an ism w o rk s as-a-w hole. A ll form s of h u m a n activi
tie s are interconnected. I t is im possible to select a special characteristic
a n d tre a t it in a d elu sional el isolation as th e m ost important. Science
becom es an e x tra -n e u ral ex ten sio n o f th e h u m a n nervous system.
m ig h t expect th e s tru c tu re o f th e nervous system to throw some light on
th e stru ctu re o f sc ie n c e; a n d , vice versa, the stru c tu re of science might
elucidate the w orking o f th e h u m an nervous system .
T h is fact is very im p o rta n t, sem antically, and usually is not suffi
ciently em phasized or a n a ly se d enough. W h e n we take these u n d e n ia b le
fa c ts into account, we fin d th e resu lts already reached to be quite n atu ral
ON ABSTRACTING 377
o f an extrem ely fine s tru c tu re , w hich n eith er lig h t, n o r the nerve centres
affected by light, can re g iste r. _
W h a t we see is s tru c tu ra lly only a specific statistical nmss-effect of
h appenings on a m uch fin er g rain ed level. W e see w hat we see because
w e m iss all the finer d etails. F o r o u r p u rp o se, it is usually enough to
deal only w ith s ig h t; th is sim plifies w ritin g , an d th e comments made
ap p ly to all other se n se s, th o u g h perhaps in d iffe re n t degrees.
In 1933, in o u r h u m a n econom y, we h a v e to take into account at
least th ree levels. T h e o n e is th e sub-m icroscopic level of science, what
science know s about i t . T h e second is th e g ross macroscopic, daily
experience level of ro u g h objects. T h e th ird is th e verbal level.
W e m ust also e v a lu ate an im portant sem a n tic issue; namely, the
relativ e im portance o f th ese three levels. W e know already that to
becom e acquainted w ith an object, w e m ust n o t only explore it from all
possible points o f view a n d p u t it in contact w ith as many nerve centres
a s w e can, as this is a n essential condition o f know ing, but we must
also not forget th at o u r n e rv e centres m ust su m m arize the different par
tial, abstracted, specific p ic tu re s. In th e h u m a n class of life, we find a
new facto r, n o n -ex isten t in an y other form o f l i f e ; namely, that we have
a capacity to collect all k n o w n experiences o f d ifferen t individuals. Such
a capacity increases en o rm o u sly th e n u m b er o f observations a single
in d iv id u al can handle, a n d so o u r acq u ain ta n ce w ith the wrorld around,
a n d in, us becomes m u ch m o re refined and ex a ct. T his capacity, which
I call th e tim e-binding capacity, is only possible because, in distinction
fro m the^animaTs, we~have"~evWed, o r p e rfe c te d , extra-neural means by
w hich, w ithout a lte rin g o u r nervous system , w e can refine its operation
a n d expand its scope. O u r scientific in stru m e n ts record what o rd in a rily
w e cannot see, h e a r ,. O u r neu ral verbal c e n tre s allow us to exchange
a n d accum ulate ex periences, although no o n e could live through all of
t h e m ; an d they w ould b e soon fo rg o tten if w e had no neural and extra-
n e u ra l m eans to record them .
A gain the o rg an ism w o rk s as-a-w hole. A ll form s of h u m a n activi
tie s are interconnected. I t is im possible to select a special characteristic
a n d tre a t it in a delu sional el isolation as th e m ost important. Science
becom es an e x tra -n e u ra l ex tension o f the h u m a n nervous system.
m ig h t expect th e s tru c tu re o f th e nervous sy stem to throw some light on
th e stru ctu re o f s c ie n c e ; an d , vice versa, th e stru ctu re of science might
elucidate the w orking o f th e h um an nervous system .
T h is fact is very im p o rta n t, sem antically, and usually is not suffi
ciently em phasized or an a ly se d enough. W h e n we take these u n d en iab le
fa c ts in to account, we fin d th e resu lts already reached to be quite natural
ON a b s t r a c t i n g 377
and necessary, and w e u n d e rsta n d b e tte r w h y a n individual cannot be
considered entirely sa n e if h e is w holly ig n o ra n t o f scientific m eth o d and
structure, and so re ta in s p rim itiv e s.r.
For a theory o f san ity , all th re e levels a re im portant. O u r senses
react as they do b ecau se th e y are united a s-a-w h o le in one living struc
ture, which has p o te n tia litie s o r capacities fo r language and science.
If we enquire w h a t w e do in science, we find th a t we observe*
silently and then re c o rd o u r observations verb a lly. From a neurological
point of view, we a b s tra c t w hatev er we a n d the instrum ents c a n ; then
we summarize; a n d , finally, w e generalize, by which we m ean the
processes of a b stractin g carried fu rth e r.
In our acquaintance w ith daily o b jects, w e do substantially a sim ilar
thing. W e abstract w h a te v e r we can, a n d , according to the degree of
intelligence and in fo rm a tio n we have, w e sum m arize and generalize.
From the psychophysiological point of view , th e ignorant is neurologically
deficient. But to k n o w o r to believe so m eth in g which is false to facts
is still more d an g ero u s a n d akin to delusions, as psychiatry a n d daily
experience teach u s .1 I t is a neurological fallacy to tre a t science in
isolation and d isre g a rd its psychophysiological role.
In the building of o u r language, a sim ilar neurological process
becomes evident. I f we w ere to see a se rie s o f different individuals,
whom we might call S m ith , B row n, J o n e s . , w e could, by a process of
abstracting the c h aracteristics, segregate th e individuals by sizes o r
colours.; then, by concentration on one characteristic and disregarding
the others, we could build classes o r hig h er abstractions, such as w hites,
blacks, . A bstracting again, writh rejection o f the colour d ifferen ce., we
would finally reach th e te rm m an. T his p ro c e d u re is general.
Anthropological stu d ies show clearly how th e degree of culture
among primitive peoples can be m easured by the orders of the abstrac
tions they have p ro d u ced . P rim itive languages are characterized p articu
larly by an enorm ous num ber of names fo r individual objects. Some
savage races have nam es fo r a pine o r an o a k ., b u t have no tree , which
is a higher abstraction fro m pines, oaks, . Som e other t.ibes have the
term tree, but d o n o t hav e a still higher abstraction woods. I t does
not need much em phasis to see th a t h ig h er abstractions are extrem ely
expedient devices. T h e re is an enorm ous economy which facilitates
mutual u n derstanding in being able to be b rief in a statem ent a n d yet
cover wider subjects.
Let us consider a prim itive statem ent I have seen tree!, follow ed
by a description o f the individual characteristics I have seen tree 2\ with
minute individual d e sc rip tio n ., w here tre e i, tree 2 . , stand for nam es of
VII. TH E M ECHANISM OF TIME-BINDING
first, simple, a n d obvious sem antic obstacle. If the simple rules and
conditions given in th e present system fo r abolishing identification are
followed persisten tly in the tra in in g w ith th e Differential, a complete
and very beneficial stru ctu ral and sem antic change in the character and
mental capacities of a given individual occurs, seemingly all out of pro
portion w'ith th e sim plicity of the train in g . B u t if we consider the con
tent of all know ledge as uniquely structural, and if the m ajority of us
are semantically tied up, blocked, w ith antiquated, animalistic, primitive,
infant-like, m en tally -ill and A stru c tu re and identity-reactions, owing
to the lack o f consciousness o f abstracting, which we renounce in toto
by acquiring th e consciousness of ab stractin g , such rem arkable tran s
formation becom es intelligible.
T he publication o f the S tru c tu ra l Differential in separate, con
veniently large copies has been forced upon me by experience and by
various difficulties fo u n d in th e re-educating o f our s.r, w ithout which
a/1-system, a d ju stm e n t, sanity, and all th e desirable results which depend
on them, are im possible.
V II. T H E M E C H A N IS M O F TIME-BIXDING
first, simple, an d obvious sem antic obstacle. If the simple rules and
conditions given in th e present system fo r abolishing identification are
followed persistently in the train in g w ith the Differential, a complete
and very beneficial stru ctu ral and sem antic change in the character and
mental capacities of a given individual occurs, seemingly all out of pro
portion with th e sim plicity o f the train in g . B u t if we consider the con
tent of all know ledge as uniquely structural, and if the m ajority of us
are semantically tied up, blocked, w ith antiquated, animalistic, primitive,
infant-like, m en tally -ill and A stru c tu re and identity-reactions, owing
to the lack o f consciousness o f abstracting, which we renounce in toto
by acquiring th e consciousness of ab stractin g , such rem arkable trans
formation becom es intelligible.
The publication of the S tru c tu ra l D ifferential in separate, con
veniently large copies has been forced upon me by experience and by
various difficulties fo u n d in the re-educating of our s.r, w ithout which
a ^[-system, a d ju stm e n t, sanity, and all th e desirable results which depend
on them, are im possible.