Bar Matter No.

135, January 29, 1987

PETITION OF SOCORRO KE. LADRERA, 1954 SUCCESSFUL BAR EXAMINEE TO TAKE THE
LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Socorro Ke. Ladrera passed the 1954 bar examinations. Before he could participate in the scheduled
oath taking of successful bar examinees, an administrative complaint for immorality was filed against
him by Lucila C. Casas.

Lucila stated that she and Ladrera were married on May 23, 1944 and that when she married him, he
represented himself to be single. Sometime in 1948, Lucila learned that her husband had been
previously married on March 23, 1936 to Florencia Orticio by whom he had a child
called Monserrat. Lucila filed a case for annulment of her marriage to Ladrera on October 5, 1949. A
decision was rendered on February 13, 1950 annulling the marriage and ordering Ladrera to give
P40.00 a month for the support of his three minor children with Lucila.

In 1951, Socorro Ladrera filed a civil case to declare his first wife, Florencia Orticio as presumptively
dead. In a November 24, 1951 decision, the Court of First Instance of Davao stated
that Ladrera and Orticio were married on March 23, 1936 in the Roman Catholic church
of Capul, Samar. The couple had a daughter, Monserrat Ladrera, who lived with the petitioner from
birth up to the date of the decision. It appears that, while the couple were living
in Cebu, Florencia Orticio, eloped with a certain Ramon Esteban and left the conjugal home without the
petitioners knowledge. Inspite of allegedly determined searches by the petitioner
in Samar, Cebu, Bohol, and Manila, Florencia could not be located or her whereabouts
ascertained. The court therefore ruled that the petition to declare Florencia Orticio presumptively
dead for all intents and purposes of law has satisfactorily been established.

Petitioner Ladrera had three children with his second wife, Lucila C. Casas.

Sometime after the judicial declaration that his first wife was presumptively dead, Ladrera married his
third wife, Socorro Santos by whom he has five children. After Ladrera married a third time, his first
wife showed up and filed a bigamy case against him with the Court of First Instance
of Davao. According to the immorality complaint filed by Lucila, the second wife, this bigamy case was
later dismissed as a result of alleged monetary concessions which Ladrera made in favor
of Orticio. Incidentally, the latest information about Florencia Orticio is that she is quite well off, having
inherited properties from her parents and that she teaches Spanish at the University of Eastern
Philippines in Catarman, Samar.

On the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Ladrera, this Court suspended his oath
taking and directed him to file an answer to the complaint. In his Answer, Ladrera alleged that:

x x x [W]hen he married complainant, he honestly believed that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was
already dead; that complainant in fact knew that respondent was previously married because
respondents child with Florencia Orticio lived with respondent and complainant after the latters marriage
and until its annulment; that respondent has paid all the monthly pensions to complainants three minor
 children; that respondent later discovered that complainants motive in suing for annulment of her
marriage to respondent was to get a share of the properties acquired by respondent, and as a matter of
fact, complainant has squandered and sold the properties adjudicated to her in Civil Case No. 470, and the
money realized from the sales was not used for the benefit of their children; that the value of the
properties adjudicated to the complainant in the case for liquidation of conjugal properties was
approximately P37,000.00; that respondent married Socorro Santos and still lives with her in view of the
decision in Civil Case No. 501, dated November 24, 1951, declaring respondents first
wife, Florencia Orticio presumptively dead; that respondents admission in Civil Case No. 399 for
annulment of complainants marriage, that FlorenciaOrticio was alive and residing in Manila was made in
good faith, he having then received information from his brother, Fr. Emerardo Ladrera,
that Florencia Orticio was in Manila; that subsequent search and inquiries, however, led the respondent to
believe that Florencia Orticio was not alive and this resulted in the filing by respondent of the petition
in civil Case No. 501, praying that Florencia Orticio be declared presumptively dead; that Criminal Case
No. 1863, against the respondent for bigamy, was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Davao upon
motion of the City Attorney of Davao; that the mere filing of civil cases against respondent does not
necessarily reflect immorality on his part, not to mention the circumstances that said cases were settled
or otherwise dismissed; that complainants charges were motivated by hatred and revenge, intended as a
ruse to compel respondent to give to complainant another ten hectares of first class agricultural
land located in Monteverde, Calinan, Davao City, plus complainants desire to put respondent down
politically.

The then Supreme Court Clerk of Court, Jose S. de la Cruz, was ordered to investigate the
administrative charge and to submit his report.

On August 31, 1955, de la Cruz submitted his Report, the salient portion of which reads:

It is noteworthy that the complainant had chosen not to testify in the investigation, and that by merely
presenting documentary evidence consisting of copies of the complaint for annulment of marriage in Civil
Case No. 399; the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao in said case annulling the marriage
between complainant and respondent; the decision in Special Case No. 501 wherein the Court of First
Instance of Davao declared respondents first wife, Florencia Orticio, presumptively dead; the order of the
Court of First Instance of Davao in Criminal Case No. 1863 against respondent for bigamy, dismissing said
case, the complainant is basing her charges of immorality against respondent upon the latters bad faith
arising from the fact that, while in the annulment proceedings respondent and his attorney admitted
that Florencia Orticio was alive, in Special Case No. 501 filed in 1951 by respondent, the latter claimed
that said FlorenciaOrticio could not be located and was unheard from for several years, and from the fact
that he married for the third time Socorro Santos while respondents first wife was alive, and who, as a
matter of fact, filed a case for bigamy against respondent.

Upon the other hand, the respondent testified during the investigation and declared that he acted in
good faith, first, in marrying complainant; secondly, in instituting Special Case No. 501; and, thirdly, in
marrying Socorro Santos. He explained that when he married complainant in 1944, he honestly believed
that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was already dead; that he had to admit in the annulment proceedings,
Civil Case No. 399, that Florencia was alive because of a letter he received from his brother, Fr. Ladrera;
that he filed the subsequent Special Case No. 501 after suspecting that complainants purpose in
annulling her marriage to respondent was merely to obtain her share in the conjugal properties, and in
order also to establish definitely his civil status; and that he married his third wife, Socorro Santos, after
the decision in Special Case No. 501, declaring his first wife Florencia presumptively dead, had become
final.

While the complainants charges are based upon inferences or assumptions, the testimony of respondent
is unrefuted that he acted in good faith. In the first place, the fact that no annulment proceeding was
instituted by complainant until after three children were born to her marriage with respondent, at least
 shows that Florencia Orticio was not generally known to be alive. In the second place, the admission by
respondent and his counsel in the annulment proceeding that Florencia was alive, is explained by
respondents receipt of a letter from his brother, Fr. Ladrera, to the effect that she might still be living,
which at any rate was the very fact alleged in the complaint for annulment. In the third place, respondent
was constrained to file Special Case No. 501 because he subsequently realized that complainant annulled
her marriage to respondent mainly to get her share of their conjugal properties, and because he also
wanted to definitely settle his own civil status after failing to locate the whereabouts of his first
wife, Florencia Orticio; and the respondent undoubtedly had the right to look for Florencia after his
marriage to complainant was judicially set aside on the ground that Florencia was alive. It is very
significant that no opposition whatsoever was interposed in Special Case No. 501 either by complainant or
by Florencia inspite of due publication of the proceedings; and the final decision therein can be said to
have legally paved the way for respondents third marriage to Socorro Santos. As a matter of fact, in the
order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing the bigamy case against respondent, it was in
effect held that respondent married Socorro Santos without fraudulent intent, and said order
had become final.

Complainants allegation that respondent has failed to comply with his obligation to pay the monthly
support of his three children with complainant as ordered in the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Davao in Civil Case No. 399, is neither touched nor pressed in complainants memorandum. At any
rate, complainant may avail herself of any appropriate civil remedy for the collection or enforcement (or
even increase) of said support; and respondent has presented evidence to show that he had complied
with his obligation at least to the date of this investigation in March, 1955. The claim that respondent is
immoral because of the filing against him of several civil cases, deserves no serious consideration since,
according to respondents evidence, said cases, aside from having been dismissed or otherwise settled,
do not necessarily imply moral perversity.

WHEREFORE, it is recommended that respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera be allowed to take the lawyers
oath.

The favorable recommendation, notwithstanding, this Court, on September 7, 1955 issued a resolution
disqualifying Ladrera from taking the lawyers oath, to wit:

Acting upon the complaint for immorality filed by Lucila Casas against Socorro Ke. Ladrera, 1954
successful bar candidate; the answer filed by the latter; the evidence taken during the investigation; the
report of the investigator; as well as all the circumstances surrounding the case, the Court RESOLVED to
disqualify respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera from taking the lawyers oath.

A motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution was denied in another resolution issued
on October 11, 1955.

Up to now or more than thirty-one years after he passed the bar examinations, Ladrera has not been
allowed to take the lawyers oath. Al
l his motions to allow him to take the oath filed every year without fail beginning on May 23, 1956 up
to September 7, 1982 have been denied. Before us, now is Ladreras April 15, 1985 urgent motion, to
wit:

NOW COMES your petitioner, by and for himself and unto this Honorable Supreme Tribunal most
respectfully stated:

That your petitioner has been deprived from taking his Lawyers Oath as member of the Philippine Bar
since January 20, 1955, because of a petition of Lucila C. Casas who has long ago withdrawn her
complaint and has in fact attested to the good reputation and character of the herein respondent;
 That considering the time that has elapsed which is already more than thirty (30) years is more than
sufficient punishment, your respondent now prays this Honorable Tribunal to grant him the privilege to
take the Lawyers Oath together with the new successful candidates scheduled to take their oath on April
25, 1985 at the Philippine Convention Center, Manila.

On October 4, 1986, he wrote another letter, this time to the Court Administrator asking for the
approval of his petition of nearly 32 years.

An applicant for admission to the bar must be of good moral character. (Rule 138, Sec. 2). What
constitutes good moral character within the meaning of the rule has been elucidated in precedent
cases.

In Carmen E. Bacarro v. Ruben M. Pinatacan (127 SCRA 218), this Court cited various precedent cases
and ruled:

One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of
good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the
dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this
noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral
character. (Martin, Ruperto G., Legal & Judicial Ethics, 5th ed., p. 15, citing In Re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230) As
a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen.
(Planza v. Arcangel, 21 SCRA 1, 4). He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for
the law, but also for his clean living. (Martin, supra, p. 36) Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just
going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of
becoming a member of the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and
duty to pass upon the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for admission to the Bar,
that he has measured up to that rigid and ideal standard of moral fitness required by his
chosen vocation.

The Court, in the past, consistently denied the annual petitions of Ladrera that he be allowed to take
the lawyers oath. He claimed that when he married his second wife, he sincerely believed that his
first wife was already dead. He married his third wife only after the first wife had been declared
presumptively dead and after his second marriage had been annulled. There may have been
compliance with a strict or narrow interpretation of the letter of the law but the Court was of the view
that Ladrera had failed to live up to the high moral standards required for membership in the Bar.

All of that, however, is in the past. Ladrera now states that if he has committed an act which justified
the suspension from taking the lawyers oath, the time that has elapsed is more than sufficient
punishment. He submits that he humbly believes with all candor and sincerity that he has more than
atoned for it by living a very moral and exemplary life since then.

Apart from his marital misadventures, there is nothing in the records to warrant a permanent denial
of Ladreras petition. He worked as a janitor-messenger in Cebu City while pursuing his college
education at night. He has also served in fairly important positions in the government such as
Technical Assistant to President Ramon Magsaysay, Special Assistant to President Carlos P. Garcia, and
member and later Chairman of the Board of Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation. He has
served as Treasurer of the Escolta Walking Corporation and Director of the Foreign Affairs Association
of the Philippines.

As early as 1960, then Senator Quintin Paredes endorsed Ladreras petition stating that the latter was
honest, dependable, and trustworthy and followed this up with another endorsement in 1966.
In July 13, 1966, Lucila Casas filed a motion for the withdrawal or dismissal of her
complaint. Casas stated as her considered opinion that Ladrera has been sufficiently punished by
the then 12-year suspension of his oathtaking as a lawyer. Casas stated that her children
by Ladrera Teresita, graduating with AB and BSC degrees; Belen, preparatory medicine student; and
Socorro, Jr. an engineering student were suffering from the stigma of the punishment which arose
from her complaint. Casas observed that Ladrera was behaving well and leading an exemplary life.

The records show various indorsements of good character from lawyers, a law professor in Davao City,
a congressman, and others. A priest, Fr. Emiliano Sabandal attested that Ladrera is a man of high
moral chracter, humble and possessed with an innate religious quality; as a consequence thereof he is
a daily communicant of the blessed sacrament.

In the 32 years since Ladrera passed the bar examinations, he has supported and sent through college
all his children by the three wo
men he married a daughter by Florencia Orticio, three children by Lucila Casas, and five children by
Socorro Santos. Some of the children have joined their father in his many petitions asking for the
privilege of taking his lawyers oath.

Ladrera was a guerrilla officer during World War II in Bohol and Mindanao. After the war, he was
elected head of the Davao War Veterans Association and led the veterans movement to acquire some
of the lands left by Japanese-owners. He became a successful businessman in Davao, acquiring a
gasoline station, three corn and rice mills, and a transportation line called Ladrera Overland Transit.

There was moral delinquency in Mr. Ladreras younger days but he has made up for it by observing a
respectable, useful, and religious life since then. Thirty-two years of rejecting his petitions are enough
for chastisement and retribution. Considering that the respondent has realized the wrongfulness of his
past conduct and demonstrated a sincere willingness to make up for that moral lapse, the Court has
decided to admit him to membership in the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION of Mr. Socorro Ke. Ladrera to be allowed to take the lawyers oath is
hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 545-SBC December 26, 1974

PURISIMA BARBA, complainant,

vs.
HECTOR S. PEDRO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:p

Hector S. Pedro, a successful bar candidate in the 1956 examinations, having obtained an average
of 81.16%, but thus far unsuccessful in his efforts to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which had
to be deferred because of a complaint for immorality filed against him by Purisima Barba, reiterates
his plea for admission to the bar. It is unquestioned that he had amorous relations with the
complainant resulting in the birth of a child. He failed, however, to marry her, having thereafter
chosen another woman for his bride. After the lapse of eighteen years, and considering that his
conduct in the meanwhile has not on the whole shown to be blameworthy, this Court feels that he
has sufficiently atoned for that youthful indiscretion, having in mind likewise, that people of
prominence in the municipality where he resides, did intercede on his behalf. Accordingly the long-
sought privilege of membership in the bar will not be denied him any longer, but with this caveat. He
must comply with his moral and legal obligation to his child born out of wedlock with complainant
Purisima Barba.

He has in his favor a resolution of this Court that dates back to January 15, 1969: "In the matter of
the petition of Hector S. Pedro to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar, alleging that while
he passed the bar examinations given by this Court in 1956 with an average of 81.16%, he was not
permitted to take his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar by reason of an administrative
complaint against him filed with this Court be a Miss Purisima Barba of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
the complaint alleging immorality in that petitioner, sometime in July, 1953, came to her house and
with lewd designs succeeded in gratifying his carnal desires, an act repeated thereafter on three
different occasions accompanied by pledges to marry, as a result of which a child was born on April
23, 1954, a matter which when investigated resulted in a report that the complaint was well-
grounded, petitioner being prevented thus from taking his oath; the present petition alleging further
that petitioner is now married to Mrs. Estela U. Pedro, a public school teacher of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, and that from January 4, 1960 up to the present, he has been employed as community
development worker with the Presidential Arm on Community Development (PACD) that he has
since then conducted himself well in his relations with the community as well as in the performance
of his duties as such official, attaching to his petition certifications of his good behavior from the
Municipal Mayor of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the Provincial Development Officer of the PACD, the
President of the San Nicolas Bar Association, and the Grand Knight of the Knights of Columbus of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and a resolution of the Ilocos Norte Bar Association and likewise
enclosing an affidavit of complainant Miss Purisima Barba attesting to petitioner's good conduct and
behavior and expressing that she no longer has any opposition to his taking his oath as a lawyer this
Court resolved to defer action on such petition until petitioner has given satisfactory proof to this
Court as to the action subsequently pursued by him with reference to the child who was born out of
his relations with complainant Miss Purisima Barba." 1 Thereafter came this resolution of February 26,
1969: "Hector S. Pedro having offered proof as to the action subsequently pursued by him with reference
to the child who was born out of his relations with complainant Purisima Barba, in compliance with the
resolution of January 15, 1969, [the Court resolved] to allow respondent Hector S. Pedro to take the
lawyer's oath." 2 Unfortunately, before he could do so in accordance with the above resolution, there was a
letter from the aforesaid complainant Purisima Barba objecting to his taking his oath as a lawyer,
premised on the fact that the affidavit submitted by him as to her withdrawal of her opposition to his
membership in the bar did not represent her true feelings.

Thereafter, on March 6, 1969, this Court suspended the effectivity of its previous resolution of
February 26, 1969, which would have allowed him to take the lawyer's oath. Moreover, he was
required to comment. This he did in a pleading submitted on March 28, 1969. He denied the
allegation of falsity concerning the affidavit of complainant. This Court then, in another resolution of
April 8, 1969, referred the matter to its Legal Officer, Ricardo Paras Jr., for investigation and report. A
report was submitted on August 26, 1969. It stated that after a careful evaluation of the testimony
given by the complainant and the respondent, the conclusion is warranted that complainant "had all
along thought that the document Exhibit "A" was an affidavit of recognition of their daughter, Imelda,
and definitely not an affidavit of withdrawal of her opposition to Mr. Pedro's admission to the
Philippine Bar." 3 The parties were heard on the matter on January 19, 1970, with the complainant
standing fast on her firm resolve to prevent respondent from taking the lawyer's oath. That attitude she
has maintained all this while. It remains her deep conviction that respondent lacks good moral character,
as proven by his failure to marry her "after having carnal knowledge of her." As she pointed out in her last
pleading dated July 5, 1972: "The respondent was twenty seven years old when he committed the acts
complained of and he was very much qualified to marry the complainant herein, but he did not comply
with his promise to march her to the altar. Instead he married another
woman." 4

It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired. He had committed a
transgression, if not against the law, against the high moral standard requisite for membership in the
bar. He had proven false to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side. On
the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations. He was a
successful bar candidate but because of this lapse from moral propriety, he has not been allowed to
take the lawyer's oath. It likewise appears, from the testimonials submitted, that he has behaved
rather well. At least, no other misdeed has been attributed to him. There is no affront to reason then
in ruling that the punishment, while deserved, has lasted long enough. He has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself. Retribution has been exacted, He has expiated for his offense. It is
understandable that the bitterness in the heart of complainant cannot easily be erased, but that
should not prove decisive. Even the most heinous of crimes prescribe after a certain
period. 5 Moreover, as the transgression resulted from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring
to it as "so powerful an appetite," an imperative of life closely associated with the "recklessness and the
caprice of desire," 6this Court feels that all the years he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer
would satisfy the requirement that failure to live up to the requisite moral standard is not to be taken
lightly. It could also be said that in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone. 7
It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro, however, that while his plea to take the
lawyer's oath is to be granted, it is indispensable, if he expects to be a member of the bar in good
standing, that he complies with the moral and legal obligation incumbent upon him as the father of
the child born out of wedlock as a result of his relationship with complainant Purisima Barba.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of March 6, 1969, suspending a previous resolution of February 26,
1969, is set aside and in accordance therewith, respondent Hector S. Pedro is allowed to take the
lawyer's oath as was provided in the February 26, 1969 resolution.
 EN BANC

[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs.SIMEON BARRANCO,

JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had
passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in
1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the
instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out
of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
marry her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in
June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent
even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in
1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. It [1]

was after the child was born, complainant alleged,that respondent first promised he
would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and
respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave
only P10.00 for the child on the latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship
ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this
petition.

Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of

witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to comment on
the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had
justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains
interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondents motion to dismiss.
 On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground
of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979. Respondents third
[2]

motion to dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982. In [3]

1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this
case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. [4]

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees. [5]

Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On
June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and
that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the
charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an
illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not
fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful
moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral
conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained
of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a
[6]

moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. [7]

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite relevant because mere intimacy
[8]

between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,

voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so
corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against
him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.[9]
 Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were
evidently consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had been forced
into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondents girlfriend
even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of
amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have
sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively
pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led
astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another
woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love,
not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman

scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer
severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be
admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six
years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be
[10]

allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon

Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper
fees.

SO ORDERED.

ROSARIO DELOS REYES vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR (A.M.

No. 1334 November 28, 1989)
FACTS:

Complainant is a second year medical student of the Southwestern

University in which respondent Atty. Aznar is the then Chairman of the College of
Medicine. Complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent for three
days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat of
respondent that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would flunk in all
her subjects and she would never become a medical intern. After due investigation,
the Solicitor General found the respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and
recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with
respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with
children, a rich man and is not practicing his profession before the court, he should
merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper.

HELD: NO.

The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as
a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of
good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the
practice of law.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
grounds for disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, among others, by
grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent to have

taken advantage of his position in asking complainant to go with him under the
threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

Respondent Jose B. Aznar is DISBARRED.

Figueroa vs. Barranco

Facts: Figueroa and Barranco were sweethearts since
their teens. Their intimacy eventually resulted to a son
born out of wedlock. At this point (1964) Barranco
promised Figueroa that he would marry her when he
passes the bar examinations. After four takes, he finally
passed but did not hold true to his promise of marriage.
In 1971, their relationship ended. Years later, he married
another woman. When Barranco was about to take his
oath to enter the legal profession, Figueroa filed a
complaint relaying to the court what happened between
her and Barranco. Until 1988, Barranco has filed three
motions to dismiss because Figueroa still would not
persecute and because for the past years, he has become
elected in the Sangguniang Bayan, has actively
participated in various civic organizations and has
acquired a good standing within his community while the
case was pending. The court sought the opinion of the
IBP which recommended that Barranco be allowed to
take his oath. Figueroa reappeared and intercepted the
scheduled oath-taking of Barranco which led to its delay.

Issue: Whether or not Barranco should be allowed to take

his oath despite the accusations of Figueroa.

Held: Yes. The maintenance of an intimate relationship

between a man and a woman, both of whom had no
impediment to marry and voluntarily carried on with the
affair, does not amount to a grossly immoral conduct
even if a child was born out of the relationship. His
previous acts may be said to be a question to his moral
character but none of these are so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Her
allegations that she was forced to have sexual relations
with him cannot lie as evidenced by her continued
cohabitation with him even after their child was born in
1964. The ignobleness of his treatment of Figueroa is
sufficiently punished by the 26 years that he has been
prevented from entering the profession he has worked so
hard for.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 1377 : July 31, 1981.]
DORIS R. RADAZA, Complainant, vs. ROBERTO T. TEJANO, Respondent.

DECISION

BARREDO, J.:

Disbarment case on the ground of immorality, respondent having had sexual intercourse
with complainant resulting in her giving birth to a child, whom respondent readily
recognized, both complainant and he being free to marry, she being about 30 years of age
and he 28. Subsequently, however, respondent married complainants cousin, whom
complainant knew respondent had been courting. Hereunder is the report and
recommendation of the Solicitor General to whom the case was referred for investigation:
Complainant Doris R. Radazas testimony as well as the documentary evidence she
presented tend to show that she and respondent were sweethearts (tsn. May 20,
cranad

1975; Exh. G to AAAA, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 11-116). This started when they met
at respondents residence in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte during its town fiesta on
February 1, 1973 (tsn. ibid, p. 24). Respondent began courting complainant on
cranad

February 10, 1973. (tsn. pp. 25, 27, 30)

cranad
 Complainant was then single, 30 years old and a physical education teacher at the
Butuan City Central Elementary School, while respondent was also single, 28 years
old, and the private secretary to the Mayor of Butuan City.
On February 24, 1973 complainant accepted respondents love (tsn id, p. 26), and
cranad

thus marked the beginning of their intimate relationship. On March 11, 1973,
complainant and respondent had their first sexual intercourse at the latters boarding
house. (tsn. pp. 29-30, 82-85). On several occasions after that, complainant visited
cranad

respondent at the same boarding house, and there they savored the sweetness of
connubial bliss. As a consequence, complainant became pregnant, and on December
16, 1973, she delivered a baby-boy. Respondent readily acknowledged being the
father of the baby whom he named after him (tsn, ibid, pp. 29-32). Respondent paid
cranad

the medical and hospital expenses of complainant (Exhs. D & E, Folder of Exhibits,
cranad

pp. 8-9), and supported the baby financially.

But, all the while that complainant and respondent were having their relationship,
respondent was also engaged to one Florminda Buque, complainants cousin. This
relationship was known to complainant. In fact, Complainant, at one time (May cranad

1973) confronted Florminda Buque, and told the latter to put an end to her
relationship with respondent, otherwise, complainant will never stop running after
them no matter how even if she will lose in the case. Complainant further threatened
Florminda with injuries the moment she would meet her any place. (tsn cralaw cranad

September 6, 1975, p. 14). On September 21, 1974, respondent married Florminda

Buque. Hence, this complaint for disbarment.
ISSUE
The only issue raised in the instant case is:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SEXUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN COMPLAINANT AND
RESPONDENT, BOTH UNMARRIED AT THE TIME, RESULTING IN HER PREGNANCY
AND SUBSEQUENT DELIVERY, AND THE MARRIAGE OF RESPONDENT TO ANOTHER
WOMAN CONSTITUTE GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT AS TO WARRANT DISBARMENT
OR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENT AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR.
DISCUSSION
Complainant contends in her testimony that she accepted respondents love and
submitted to his importunings to have sexual relations due to the latters promise to
marry her. On the other hand, respondent, while not denying their intimate
relationship, disclaimed having promised to marry her, and alleged that their sexual
intimacies were motivated by their mutual attraction and desire for each other.
After a judicious assessment of the evidence on record, we find for the respondent.
This Honorable Court, in Soberano v. Villanueva, 6 SCRA, 811, 895, ruled that:
Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married . . is neither so corrupt
cra

as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or

disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar.
In the case at bar, respondent denied having promised marriage to complainant. In
fact, complainant knew before hand that respondent was also engaged to her cousin,
Florminda Buque, whom he eventually married. Besides, even if marriage had
entered into the plans of complainant and respondent, we could not believe that the
various occasions in which the parties engaged in sexual relations were prompted
solely by the expectancy on her part that before long the marital knot would be tied.
At that time, complainant was already 30 years old and a public school teacher while
respondent was 28 years old and a private secretary to the City Mayor. Thus,
complainant was mature enough to realize the folly of her acts. She could not have
been so naive as to be deceived by such promise. As aptly observed by this
Honorable Court in Montana v. Ruado, 62 SCRA 382, which facts are similar to those
of the case at bar, thus:
. . They were both mature, no longer in the first blush of youth, impelled to
cra

act thus because of the strong physical attraction that each had for the other
and the force of a deeply rooted desire too difficult to resist.
The evidence discloses that complainant voluntarily yielded to the respondent, and
that whatever injury thus inflicted to the good name and reputation of
complainant . . arose from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it
cra

as so powerful an appetite, an imperative of life closely associated with the

recklessness and the caprice of desire. (Montana v. Ruado, supra, pp. 385-386,
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

citing Barba v. Pedro, Administrative Case No. 545-SBC, Dec. 26, 1974). It may well
be pointed out also that the boarding house of respondent had always been the mute
witness to the sexual encounters between complainant and respondent. On March
11, 1973, the time that they had their first sexual encounter, complainant went
voluntarily to respondents boarding house (tsn. May 22, 1975, p. 38). She testified,
cranad

thus:
ATTY. FAMADOR:
Q . . When you arrived in the house of the Egpalinas which you said is about 3 to 4
cra

oclock in the afternoon, am I right? . .

cra

A. 2 to 3 oclock.
Q Now, you did not stay in the sala of the residence of the Egpalinas when arrived?
A. I stayed in the sala but I was met by respondent Tejano.
Q And then what happened, you went inside the bedroom of respondent Atty.
Tejano, am I right?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx
Q. So after you agreed you went inside the bedroom, the two of you, am I right?
A. After he pulled me, sure we already went inside the room.
xxx
Q. Now, did you shout when he forced you or you just keep quiet?
A. No.
Q. What did you mean no?
A. Its my answer no.
Q. You did not shout? . .cra

A. No sir.
 xxx
Q. You did not shout?
A. I did not shout, Your Honor.
Q. Alright, you did not resist also?
A. No sir.
(tsn., May 22, 1975, pp. 40-42)
Undoubtedly, the cohabition of respondent with petitioner is immoral for lack
of a valid marriage. But to be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must
not merely be immoral; it must be grossly immoral it must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. (Section 27, Rule 138, New Rules of Court;
cralaw cranad

Soberano vs. Villanueva, 6 SCRA 893, 895; Mortel vs. Aspiras, December 28,
1956, 100 Phil. 587, 591-593; Royong vs. Oblena, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA
869-870; Bolivar vs. Simbol, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 623, 630; and Quingwa
vs. Puno, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439-440, 444-445). And the same
must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a case that is
free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power (Co vs. Candoy, October 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439, 442). Likewise, the
cranad

dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be
clearly demonstrated (Co vs. Candoy, supra). The evidence adduced by
cranad

petitioner lacks the quantity and quality required by the foregoing criteria.
All told, because of petitioners active and voluntary participation in her illicit
relationship with respondent, the latters act are not grossly immoral nor
highly reprehensible. (Wong v. Reyes, 63 SCRA 667)
cralaw cranad

In the case of Abaigar vs. David Paz, 93 SCRA 91, this Honorable Court exonerated
respondent, a married man, who had an immoral affair, also with a married woman,
but done under discreet circumstances. Thus, this Court said:
From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed this disbarment case
not in redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act
of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully aware of the
consequence of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own
private consciences.
RECOMMENDATION
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Roberto T. Tejano, be dismissed, with a stern warning,
however, that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely by
this Honorable Court. It must likewise be impressed on him that he should comply
with the moral and legal obligations incumbent upon him as the father of the child
born out of wedlock, the result of his relationship with Miss Doris R. Radaza.
Manila, April 29, 1981.
We have reviewed the record and We find the foregoing report sufficiently borne thereby.
While We hold that respondents conduct complained of does not warrant drastic disciplinary
sanction, this is far from saying that it conforms with the highest standard of morality and
propriety or decorum that every lawyer is expected to maintain. More than an ordinary
individual, a lawyer must, in the exercise of his rights and the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Article 19,
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

Civil Code)
Accordingly, the instant complaint against respondent is hereby DISMISSED, but he is
sternly admonished that any other misconduct on his part which might reflect unfavorably
on the moral norms of the profession will be dealt with accordingly.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant

vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of
the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her
by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of
jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition
that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez
on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the
unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks:
(a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February
1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of
P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3)
checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to
Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In
due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
 (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and
sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in
Criminal Case No. 8538359;

to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to

indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and

to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion
of the decision read as follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar,
and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is
hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her
profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections
27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.

SO ORDERED. 1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised
her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1
February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of
Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and
executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December
1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal
by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.

In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty
aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's
action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been
 motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of
the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.

We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she
did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon
respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court
explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public
order.

xxx xxx xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. 3(Italics supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics
supplied)
 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of
her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound
to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the
instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent
shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this
Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
spread on the record of respondent.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4431. June 19, 1997]

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, vs. JUSTICE

ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the

present case where the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely
protagonists are in incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary.

In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995,
complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A.
Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave
misconduct. [1]
 After an answer and a reply were respectively filed by respondent and
[2] [3]

complainant, the Court, in its Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the
administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the
following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid
Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent,
former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation
of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension of attorneys, and
therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, commencing
from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or any
other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized
the antecedent facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced
hereunder so that his disposition of this case may be duly appreciated:

Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while
respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime
Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.

Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special
Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares
presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years.

Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their
marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when
respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying
a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a
close family friend of complainant ( TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996 ). After the wedding, they
received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s)
resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day,
respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the
condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the
other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated,
complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked
it would have been just a call at the wrong number. What followed was a heated exchange of
harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when respondent called complainant a nagger,
saying Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawat gusto ko. Get
that marriage contract and have it burned. Such unbearable utterances of respondent left
complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then,
the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized,
contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to
apologized for what happened ( TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996 ).

Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the
complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group,
that he ( Judge Makasiar ) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz
and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant
lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the
instant Complaint for Disbarment against him ( Exh. A ).

On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the
complainant executed against respondent her Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification
( Exhs. D and D-1 ).

Exhibit C, marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered
by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and
to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when he
married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He
resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented.Also presented for complainant
were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent ( Exh. B ); Order declaring her first
husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead ( Exh. E ); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim
Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. F and F-
1).

Respondent gave a different version.According to him, what he inked with the complainant on
January 7, 1994 was merely but a sham marriage. He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he
voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. B, in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the
administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph
Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with
complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Pea, his first
wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet
become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as required
by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Pea having been made by publication, and
subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B.
Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ( Exh.
4 ).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the
findings and recommendation of Justice Purisima.Herein respondent is undeniably
guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which
is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. He himself asserts that at the
[4]
time of his marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his
marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months
after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in
Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his
previous marriage had been annulled.

Respondents subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a sham marriage
will not justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad
taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak
well of respondents sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by
the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of
the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot
but have been fully aware of the consequence of a marriage celebrated with all the
necessary legal requisites. [5]

On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of
Investigating Justice Purisima which we quote with approval:

That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into andsigned a
Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnized a
civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, he could not be
forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).

That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and
the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles
2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male
and a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the
solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were
satisfied and complied with.

The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a sham
marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered
into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against
her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying I do with complainant
before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent
thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the civil
marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage.

Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the
criminal case for Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument
that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between
respondent and Librada Pea had not attained complete finality due to non publication of said
judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone, only made subject
marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and
respondent void.

Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with
Librada Pea had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia
Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of
estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by second marriage,
his first marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled.

But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive finding as to whether or not respondent
can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue
pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional
Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with complainant on
January 7, 1994 was a sham marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is that what
respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar and
as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge against herein
complainant in the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr.,
is unfounded, respondent was not justified in resorting to a sham marriage to protect her
(complainant) from said immorality charge.Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant
with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong.If he never had any
immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty
bound to help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have
testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph
Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal
basis.

In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of
marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery thereof
and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of
marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent
that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a sham
marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross misconduct, nay
sacrilege.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard
of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the
office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
[6]
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly
immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers. [7]

However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his
impulsive conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant
reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he
has rendered some years of commendable service in the judiciary, the Court feels that
disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of
two years, as recommended, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary
measure.

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz,

GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective
upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be
imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO SORIANO
v. ATTY MANUEL DI
ZON
AC no. 6792 | Jan
uary 25, 2006
FACTS
Atty Manuel Dizon
was driving under
the influence of al
cohol along Abana
o st. in Baguio city
when a taxi overto
ok him. Enraged, D
izon tailed the tax
i, pulled it over an
d berated and thr
eatenedRoberto S
oriano, the taxi dr
iver. To stop the a
ggression, Soriano
opened his door w
hich caused Dizon
tofall to the pave
ment. Soriano trie
d to help Dizon up
but had to punch
Dizon because he
was going topunch
him. Soriano preve
nted another atte
mpt by Dizon to hi
t him. Dizon went
back to his car to
get hisgun, the ha
ndle wrapped in ha
ndkerchief. Dizon
shot Soriano who
was then picking u
p Dizonseyeglas
ses to return it to
him. After shootin
g Soriano, Dizon s
ped off with his c
ar and left him to
die onthe street.
The bullet hit Sor
iano in the neck an
d lacerated his ca
rotid artery. Acco
rding to the docto
rswho treated So
riano, he would ha
ve easily died if n
ot for the timely
medical assistance
. Nevertheless,th
e left side of Sori
anos body was p
aralyzed, leaving h
im unable to drive
anymore.A complai
nt for Frustrated
Homicide was file
d against Dizon by
Soriano. Dizon was
eventuallyfound g
uilty but was allow
ed probation. One
of the conditions
of the probation i
s the payment of
thecivil liabilities.
Four years after t
he judgment was r
endered, Dizon ha
s not yet fulfilled
his civil obligation
to Soriano.A Comp
lain-Affidavit for
disbarment was fil
ed by Soriano bef
ore the Commissio
n on BarDiscipline
(CBD) of the Inte
grated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
Dizon was declare
d in default and an
ex-parte hearing
was held. The Com
missioner of the C
BD recommended
to the IBP the dis
barment of Dizonf
or violation of Can
on 1, Rule 1.01 of t
he Code of Profes
sional Responsibili
ty and for convicti
on of acrime invol
ving moral turpitu
de. The IBP adopt
ed the recommend
ation of the Comm
issioner and sent i
tsresolution to th
e Supreme Court.
ISSUES

1.

Whether the crim

e committed by A
tty Dizon involved
moral turpitude.2.
Whether Atty Diz
on violated the Co
de of Professional
Responsibility, wa
rranting his disba
rment.
RULING
The Supreme Cour
t approved the Re
solution of the In
tegrated Bar of t
he Philippines and
ordered the disba
rment of Atty Ma
nuel Dizon.
1
st

Issue
The Supreme Cour
t affirmed the fin
dings of the Comm
issioner that the f
rustrated homicid
ecommitted by At
ty Dizon was atte
nded by moral tur
pitude. The Court
defined moral tur
pitude aseverythi
ng which is done c
ontrary to justice,
modesty, or good
morals; an act of
baseness, vileness
ordepravity in the
private and social
duties which a ma
n owes his fellowm
en, or to society i
n general,contrary
to justice, honest
y, modesty, or goo
d morals.Atty Diz
on exhibited mora
l turpitude when h
e shot a taxi drive
r for no valid reas
on. His act didnot
constitute self-
defense. In fact,
he was the aggres
sor. It was him wh
o first tried to pu
nch the other.Sori
ano was merely de
fending himself an
d fending off the
aggression when h
e counterpunched
Dizon.Furthermor
e, the trial court a
lso ruled that the
crime was commit
ted with treacher
y. Dizon shot Sori
anowhen he was no
t in a position to d
efend himself. So
riano was picking u
p Dizons eyeglas
ses which fell ont
he road when Dizo
n fell to return it
to him when he wa
s shot. Furthermo
re, Dizon tried to
escapepunishment
by wrapping the h
andle of his gun in
handkerchief. He i
ntended not to lea
ve fingerprints on
the gun he used.
2
nd

Issue
The Supreme Cour
t also ruled that t
here was indeed a
violation of Canon
1 of the Code of P
rofessional Respo
nsibility. Canon 1 p
rovides that lawye
rs must obey the l
aws of the land an
d promoterespect
or law and legal pr
ocesses. Atty Diz
on was in violation
of the law becaus
e he was in illegal