OZAETA VS.
PECSON probate of his will which was granted by Judge
FACTS:
Carlos Palanca died leaving a will, appointing
petitioner Ozaeta, being a former associate justice
of SC, a close friend of his wife and sponsor to
their marriage, as
hisexecutor should Gen. Roxas fails to !ualif" Since
Gen. Roxas already died, Ozaeta petition the court
for the probate of the will of Carlos and pray" he be
appointed as special administrator. The will was
allowed, but some of the heirs opposed. Thus
pendingappeal, the court appointed Phil. Trust Ban
k as special administrator but later on itwithdrew o
n ground of incompatibility of interest. Petitioner O
zaeta reiterate hisappointment as special
administrator but the court refused and instead
appoint one of the heirs and the BPI. Petitioner
then filed the present petition.
ISSUE: WON probate court committed grave abuse
of discretion when it appointed special
administrator other than the name executor, while
pending appeal.
HELD:
Court favor Ozaeta and held that while the rule
grant discretion to the probate court to appoint or
not a special administrator and the choice of
person lies within its power, such discretion
should not be whimsical and partial but one that is
reasonable, logical and in accordance with the
fundamental legal principle of justice.1 probate
court cannot make a personal likes and dislikes
prevail over his judgment 2. Since the choice of
executor is a precious prerogative of testator
according to his desire to appoint & of his
confidence who can he trust 2 carry out his
wishes, the appointment and issuance of letters
must be made as soon as practicable. In the case
at bar, since will has already been admitted to
probate and the only reason for suspending
petitioners appointment as executor and instead
appoint special administrator is a technical one,
unreasonable and would further delay the
disposition causing unnecessary" expense.
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE,
JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge
of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA
PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged
will of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, respondents.
Facts:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino
and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for
Fernando V. Gorospe on February 16, 1996. Since
he had no compulsory heirs, he named Arturo de
Santos Foundation, Inc. as the sole legatee and
devisee of all his properties amounting to not less
than 2 million pesos and named private
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Philips as the
executrix.
On February 26, 1996, Dr. Arturo de Santos died.
On April 3, 1996, the petitioner Octavio S. Maloles
II filed a motion for intervention. He claimed that,
as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators
sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole
full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. de
Santos and also alleged that he was a creditor of
the testator. He prayed for the reconsideration of
the order allowing the will and the issuance of
letters of administration in his name.
However, petitioners petition was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being a
creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a
right to intervene and oppose the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary filed by the
respondent.
HELD:
No. The petitioner herein is not an heir or legatee
under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos.
Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the
only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent,
he can inherit from the latter only in case of
intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which
has already been probated and disposes of all his
properties the petitioner can inherit only if the said
will is annulled. His interest in the decedents
estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. In
Ozaeta v. Pecson:
The choice of his executor is a precious
prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant
of his right to dispose of his property in the
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator
should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one
who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the
disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right
may be considered a curtailment of the right to
dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent,
refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the
court appoint other persons to administer the
estate. None of these circumstances is present in
this case.
Thus, petition was denied and the decision of the
Court of Appeals was affirmed.
------------------------------------------------------------
Victoria C. Tayag vs. Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor
FACTS :
Respondent, Tayag-Gallor or TG, filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over the
estate of Ismael Tayag. Claiming she is 1 of 3
illegitimate children of Ismael Tayag, Ismael Tayag
was married to Victoria Tayag, petitioner but they
didnt have any children of their own. Later on
Ismael died intestate, leaving behind 2 lots and one
motor vehicle, both in possession of petitioner. The
petitioner promised respondent and her brothers
100K each as their share in the proceeds of the
sale of the motor vehicle but she only gave half.
The respondent alleged that petitioner intends to
dispose of the properties of Ismael to the
respondents prejudice. Petitioner opposed this
petition of TG asserting that the properties were
purchased by her using her own money; she even
denied all petitioners allegation. The latter also
filed for dismissal for failure to state a cause of
action. Petitioner reiterated that she is the sole
owner of the properties by presenting TCTs. She
also averred that it was necessary for respondent
to show proof that she was acknowledged and
recognized by Ismael Tayag. There being no such
allegation, the action becomes one to compel
recognition.
CA ruled that the allegation, without the need to
state that she had been recognized or
acknowledged. Petitioner came to the SC and
asserts that respondent should not be allowed to
prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismaels
estate because the claim of filiation should not be
allowed to be proved in an action for settlement of
an estate.
ISSUE: Whether respondents petition for the
issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that she
merely alleged she is an illegitimate child?
RULING : YES.
Petition for issuance of letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person. An
interested party is one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest
must be material and direct.
The petition for the issuance is a suit for the
settlement of the intestate of Ismael Tayag. The
right of respondent to maintain such as a suit is
dependent on whether she is entitled to
successional rights as an illegitimate child which
may be established through voluntary or
compulsory recognition.
Petitioners ground is essentially based on her
contention that by Ismaels death, respondent can
no longer establish her filiation. However, petitioner
overlooked the fact that respondents successional
rights may be established not just by judicial
action to compel recognition but also by proof that
she had been voluntarily acknowledged.
Respondent was yet to show her proof of filiation
because of petitioners opposition. So there is no
way yet to determine if her petition is actually one
to compel recognition or whether she has a
material and direct interest to maintain the suit.
So, the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate
child suffices even without stating that she has
been recognized or acknowledged.
This petition by petitioner is DENIED.
[G.R. No. 39796. March 9, 1934.]
In the matter of the estate of the deceased
Francisco Varela Calderon. ANTONIO
GUTIERREZ DEL CAMPO, administrator-
appellee, v. MIGUEL VARELA CALDERON ET
AL., Oppositors-Appellants.
Avelino, Yatco & Samaniego for Appellants.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; RIGHT OF
TESTATOR WITHOUT FORCED HEIRS TO
DISPOSE FREELY OF HIS PROPERTY;
INTERVENTION BY THOSE WHO ARE NOT
FORCED HEIRS. The appellants in this case are
not forced heirs of the deceased and therefore have
no right to any part of the property left by the
testator, once he had disposed of the same by will.
If any of them were forced heirs they would be
entitled to intervene in this case and protect their
interest in so far as they may have been prejudiced
by the will. It is evident therefore that they have
not been injured or prejudiced in any manner
whatsoever. Only forced heirs whose rights have
been prejudiced have a right to intervene in a case
of this character.
DECISION
GODDARD, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila issued, in
this case, the following
orders:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Llamado a vista el proyecto de particion y
adjudicacion presentado pro el administrador
judicial, este, por medio de su abogado, se opuso a
que se considere la oposicion interpuesta por
Miguel Varela Calderon, Angel Varela Calderon,
Jesus Varela Calderon, Trinidad Varela Calderon,
Paula Varela Calderon, Pilar Valera Calderon y
Maria Valera Calderon, a la aprobacion de dicho
proyecto y a que se admita o reciba cualquiera
prueba que los mencionados opositores desearen
presentar en apoyo de su oposicion, bajo el
fundamento de que los mismos no son herederos
forzosos del finado Dr. Francisco Valera Calderon y
no tienen, por tal motivo, ningun interes o
participacion en los bienes dejados por dicho
finado y de los cuales este ha dispuesto por
testamento que ha sido legalizado y aprobado por
este Juzgado, cuya decision ha sido confirmada por
el Tribunal Supremo en apelacion.
"Habiendo la representacion tanto del
administrador judicial como de los opositores
admitido como hechos indiscutibles que el finado
Dr. Francisco Valera Calderon fallecio soltero y sin
dejar ningun ascendiente y que los opositores son
hermanos legitimos del mismo, es manifiesto que
los mencionados opositores no tienen la condicion
de herederos forzosos (art. 807, Codigo Civil) y, por
tanto, no tienen derecho a intervenir en la
consideracion de bienes, ni impugnar la institucion
de herederos hecha por el citado finado en su
testamento, toda vez que este, por ser soltero y no
tener herederos forzosos, podia disponer por
testamento de todos sus bienes o de parte de ellos
en favor de cualquiera persona que tenga
capacidad para adquirirlos (art. 763, Codigo Civil).
"Por tanto, SE DESESTIMA la oposicion
interpuesta por los mencionados opositores y se
declara que estos no tienen derecho a intervenir en
la consideracion del proyecto de particion y
adjudicacion de los bienes del finado Dr. Francisco
Valera Calderon, la cual queda aplazada para el dia
29 de noviembre de 1932, a las 8:30 a. m. Asi se
ordena.
"Asi se ordena.
"Manila, noviembre 17, 1932.
"E. P. REVILLA
"Juez"
"Visto el proyecto de particion y adjudicacion de
beines relictos del finado Don Francisco Valera
Calderon presentado por el administrador de esta
testamentaria el 10 de noviembre de 1932;
examinado el mismo y apareciendo que se halla de
acuerdo con las disposiciones contenidas en el
testamento otorgado por el finado y debidamente
legalizado por este Juzgado; y no existiendo
motivos ni razones que se opongan a su
aprobacion;
"Por la presente, se aprueba el referido proyecto de
particion y adjudicacion de bienes, el cual se hace
parte integrante de esta orden.
"Se requiere al administrador que, dentro del plazo
de diez dias a partir de la fecha en que fuere
notificado de esta orden, pague el correspondiente
impuesto sobre herencia y proceda a la entrega de
los bienes adjudicados a los herederos instituidos
en el testamento conforme al proyecto de particion
y adjudicacion de bienes aqui aprobado, dando
cuenta dentro del mismo plazo del cumplimiento
do los terminos de esta orden, a fin de que pueda
ordenarse el cierre y archivo definitivo de este
expediente. Asi se ordena.
"Manila, I. F., 29 de noviembre de 1932.
"E. P. REVILLA
"Juez"
The appellants duly excepted to both of these
orders and upon appeal to this court make the
following assignments of
error:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. The trial court erred in refusing to admit and to
consider the opposition filed by the oppositors-
appellants to the approval of the project of
partition, not being the forced heirs of the late
Francisco Varela Calderon, and refused them to
present their proofs in support of their contention.
"II. The trial court erred in approving the partition
and adjudication of the properties of the late
Francisco Varela Calderon in favor of the supposed
heirs mentioned in the probated will Exhibit B,
disregarding completely the rights of the
oppositors-appellants to inherit all the said
properties."cralaw virtua1aw library
The judicial administrator of the estate of
Francisco Varela Calderon, deceased, submitted a
project of partition for the approval of the lower
court. The appellants filed an opposition to the
approval of said project. The administrator objected
to the intervention of the appellants in this case.
Qure: Did the trial court err in refusing to allow
the appellants to intervene? If this question is
answered in the affirmative there will be no
necessity for considering the second assignment of
error.
It is admitted that Francisco Varela Calderon was a
bachelor, a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and at
the time he made his will was residing temporarily
in France and that at the time of his death he left
no ascendants. The appellants are brothers and
sisters of full blood of the deceased and therefore
they are not his forced heirs. Article 763 of the
Civil Code reads: "Any person who has no forced
heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any
part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire
it. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The appellants contend that the beneficiaries
under the will of Francisco Varela Calderon are
illegitimate children and that they are not qualified
to inherit from the deceased. This court has held in
Barrios v. Enriquez (52 Phil., 509), that "while it is
true that article 845 of the Civil Code provides that
illegitimate children who have not the status of
natural children shall be entitled to support only.
and therefore cannot demand anything more of
those bound by law to support them, it does not
prohibit said illegitimate children from receiving,
nor their parents from giving them, something
more than support, so long as the legitimate
children are not prejudiced. If the law permits a
testator to dispose of the free third of his
hereditary estate in favor of a stranger (art. 808 of
the Civil Code), there is no legal, moral or social
reason to prevent him from making over that third
to his illegitimate son who has not the status of a
natural son. On the contrary, by reason of blood,
the son, although illegitimate, has a preferential
right over a stranger unless by his behavior he has
become unworthy of such consideration."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Manresa commenting on article 763 of the Civil
Code says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Como expusimos al comentar los articulos 752 al
754, discuten los autores si los hijos naturales no
reconocidos pueden ser instituidos herederos por
sus padres en el todo o parte de la herencia de
libre disposicion, por entender algunos que no
tienen capacidad para adquirir por testamento, y el
articulo 763 exige expresamente esa capacidad. No
creemos que exista fundamento alguno serio que
pueda motivar esa duda: los hijos naturales no
reconocidos, aun los adulterinos y sacrilegos, no
tienen incapacidad alguna para adquirir, ni puede
sealarse articulo alguno que la establezca; no
tienen derecho a legitima, segun el articulo 845,
esto es todo. En cuanto a su capacidad para
adquirir en general o por testamento la parte en su
caso, de libre disposicion, los hijos naturales no
reconocidos, no son ante la ley de peor condicion
que las personas extraas." (Comentarios al Codigo
Civil Espaol, por Manresa, Tomo 6, pag. 94,
edicion 5. a).
From the above citations it is apparent that the
beneficiaries under the will of Francisco Varela
Calderon, granting that they are illegitimate
children, are not incapacitated to take property
under the will of their father.
In a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
December 24, 1913, it was
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Que la facultad de impugnar la legitimacion y el
reconocimiento otorgados a favor de hijos que no
tengan la condicion legal de naturales, consignada
en los articulos 128 y 138 del Codigo Civil, de
modo claro y preciso se establece y confiere a los
que se crean perjudicados o realmente lo hayan
sido en sus derechos:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Que no asiste derecho para oponerse al
reconocimiento al que no tenga el caracter de
heredero forzoso de la persona que hizo aquel."
(Jurisprudencia Civil, Tomo 128, pags. 1087 y
1088.)
In that case the court commented as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Considerando que la facultad de impugnar la
legitimacion y el reconocimiento otorgados a favor
de hijos que no tengan la condicion legal de
naturales, consignada en los articulos 128 y 138
del Codigo Civil, de modo claro y preciso se
establece y confiere a los que se crean perjudicados
o realmente lo hayan sido en sus derechos, y
atendido que la actora asienta la accion ejercitada
y funda su demanda en el hecho de ser sobrina
carnal del difunto D. Anastasio Martin, basta
tomar en cuenta este parentesco, base primordial
de la presente litis, para diducir como indudable
consecuencia, que no siendo Doa Manuela de
Pablo Martin heredera forzosa de su citado tio el
testador fallecido, no la asiste derecho a oponerse a
lo por aquel dispuesto." (Jurisprudencia Civil,
Tomo 128, pags. 1094, 1095.)
Article 806 of the Civil Code reads: "The legitime is
that part of his property of which the testator can
not dispose because the law has reserved it for
certain heirs, called, on that account, force
heirs."cralaw virtua1aw library
As stated above the appellants in this case are not
forced heirs of the deceased and therefore have no
right to any part of the property left by the testator,
once he had disposed of the same by will. If any of
them were forced heirs they would be entitled to
intervene in this case and protect their interest in
so far as they may have been prejudiced by the
will. It is evident therefore that they have not been
injured or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever.
Only forced heirs whose rights have been
prejudiced have a right to intervene in a case of
this character.
For the foregoing reasons no error was committed
by the lower court in the orders appealed from.
Both orders are affirmed with costs against the
appellants.
------------------------------------------------------------
Vda. De Chua v. CA
FACTS:
Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private
respondent Florita Vallejo and out of this union the
couple begot 2 illegitimate children. Sometime
after, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
Private respondent Florita then filed with the RTC
of Cotabato a Petition for the Declaration of
Heirship, Guardianship over the Two Minors and
the Issuance of Letters Administration. The court
issued an order setting the hearing of the petition
and directed that notice thereof be published.
Petitioner Vda. De. Chua, representing herself to be
the surviving spouse of the deceased, moved to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Private
respondent Florita opposed and later amended her
petition in order that the case title can properly
capture the averments in the pleadings; hence the
petition title now includes Settlement of the
Intestate Estate of Deceased which contains
exactly the same prayers as the original petition.
Petitioner opposed this but was dismissed by the
trial court. Petitioner likewise moved that the
letters of administration issued to respondent
Florita be recalled and issued to her instead. RTC
denied. CA affirmed. Petitioner now argues that the
original petition failed to allege and state the
jurisdictional facts required under the Rules of
Court in petitions for administration of a
decedents estate.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petition failed to allege the
required jurisdictional facts.
(2) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to
oppose the petition.
RULING:
(1) NO. The title alone of the original petition
clearly shows that the petition is one which
includes the issuance of letters of administration.
The title of said petition reads: IN RE: PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS,
GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSON AND
PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO
AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
The original petition also contains the
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration under Section
2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdictional
facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of
administration are: (1) the death of the testator; (2)
residence at the time of death in the province
where the probate court is located; and (3) if the
decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a
resident of a foreign country and that the decedent
has left an estate in the province where the court is
sitting.
While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above
mentioned minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992
in Davao City. failed to indicate the residence of
the deceased at the time of his death, the omission
was cured by the amended petitions wherein the
same paragraph now reads: (4) That Roberto Lim
Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a
resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May
28, 1992 at Davao City. All told the original
petition alleged substantially all the facts required
to be stated in the petition for letters of
administration. Consequently, there was no need to
publish the amended petition as petitioner would
insist in her second assignment of errors.
(2) NO. Petitioner has no legal standing to file the
motion to dismiss as she is not related to the
deceased, nor does she have any interest in his
estate as creditor or otherwise. The Rules are
explicit on who may do so. Only an interested
person may oppose the petition for issuance of
letters of administration. An interested person is
one who would be benefited by the estate such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor; his interest is material and
direct, and not one that is only indirect or
contingent. Petitioner was not able to prove her
status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The
best proof of marriage between man and wife is a
marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to
produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the
photostat copy of the marriage certificate which
she presented, this being a violation of the best
evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces
of evidence.
VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and
GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO
NIERRAS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC
CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN
RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000,
private respondents Rogelo Lim Suga and Helen
Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children
of the decedent moved for the appointment of their
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as special
administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner
Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming
that none of the respondents can be appointed
since they are not residing in the country, that
Romualdo does not have the same competence as
Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto
administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of
kin, being the legitmate children, is preferred in
the choice of administrator (claiming that the
respondent were illegitmate children).
However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court
directive to account for the income of theestate, the
court granted Romualdo's appointment as special
administrator.Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection of a
special administrator.
RULING:
In the present case, the private respondents were
constrained to move for the appointment of a
special administrator due to the delay caused by
the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the
directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It
would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were
still appointed special administratix, when the
necessity of appointing one has been brought
about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the
RTC or its appointed officials
This Court has consistently ruled that the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in the afore-quoted
provision does not apply to the selection of a
special administrator The preference under Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin
refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator, and not of a special administrator,
as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the
discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the
appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was
what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals.
Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than
grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
OCAMPO v. OCAMPO
FACTS:
On January 23, 2004, Leonardo Ocampo died
intestate and was survived by his wife Dalisay and
children. The decedents parents, Spouses Vicente
and Maxima Ocampo, who died ahead of him, were
survived by Leonardos siblings, Renato and
Erlinda, who are all legitimate and only heirs of the
spouses, who left several properties in Binan,
Laguna with no will and no debts.
Subsequently, the heirs of Leonardo initiated twin
intestate estate proceedings of the estate of Sps.
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo and that of Leonardo
Ocampo before the RTC Laguna alleging among
others that Renato and Erlinda took possession
and control of the remaining properties to the
exclusion of the heirs of Leonardo with prayer for
the appointment of an administrator.
Renato and Erlinda filed an opposition contending
that the petition was defective not only because it
sought settlement of two estates but that the estate
of Leonardo has yet to be determined by the court.
In their counter-petition, they prayed that they be
both appointed as special joint administrators of
the estate of Sps. Vicente and Maxima.
Consequently, the court appointed the surviving
spouse Dalisay, and the brother of Leonardo,
Renato as special joint administrators of the estate
of the spouses.
After considering the MR of Renato and Erlinda, in
which they assailed the incompetence of Dalisay,
and raised the issue of being next of kin of the
decedents, the court substituted Dalisay with
Erlinda as administratrix together with Renato as
special co-administrator.
Meanwhile, the heirs of Leonardo filed a motion for
an inventory and accounting. On the other hand,
Renato and Erlinda filed a motion for exemption to
file administrators bond. Subsequently, the heirs
of Leonardo filed a motion to revoke the special
administration and to proceed to judicial partition
or appointment of regular administrator. The
court, without resolving first on the said motion of
the special administrators, ruled in favor of the
heirs of Leonardo when it issued an order revoking
the joint special administration of Renato and
Erlinda on the ground of their failure to post the
required bond, and the lack of submission of
inventory and accounting of the estate.
Finally, Renato and Erlinda filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the court in declaring them to have failed in
their obligation as special administrators, when in
truth they are still waiting for resolution of their
motion for exemption of bond, and in appointing
Melinda, a mere granddaughter of the deceased
spouses, as regular administratrix instead of them
as children and next of kin of the decedents.
ISSUES: (1) WON the court is justified to appoint
joint special administrators.
(2) WON a special administrator is an
agent of the party suggesting the appointment.
(3) WON the appointment or removal of
special administrator is an interlocutory order.
HELD: (1) Yes. Inasmuch as there was a
disagreement as to who should be appointed as
administrator of the estate of Vicente and Maxima,
the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise
to appoint joint special administrators pending the
determination of the person or persons to whom
letters of administration may be issued. The RTC
was justified in doing so considering that such
disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance
of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1
of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
(2) No. When a special administrator is
appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or
representative of the parties suggesting the
appointment. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to
preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of
a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section
2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, which provides,
to wit:
SEC. 2. Powers and duties of special admi
administrator shall take possession and ch
rights, credits, and estate of the deceased a
the executor or administrator afterwards
purpose may commence and maintain suits
sell only such perishable and other property
A special administrator shall not be liable
deceased unless so ordered by
 (3) Yes. The appointment or removal of
special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
interlocutory and may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
DIOSDADO MANUNGAS VS. MARGRITA AVILA
LORETO AND FLORENCIA AVILA PARREO
FACTS:
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino
Manungas. They had no children. Instead, they
adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila). Florentino
Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977,
while Samuel Avila predeceased his adoptive
mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah
Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for
Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, of which she was the administratrix.
There, she stated that there are no other legal and
compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except
for herself, Samuel Avila and a Ramon Manungas
whom she acknowledged as the natural son of
Florentino Manungas. There was no mention about
Diosdado, being the illegitimate son of Florentino.
Meanwhile, Samuel Avilas widow, Sarah executed a
Waiver of Rights and Participation, renouncing her
rights over the separate property of her husband in
favor of Engracia Manungas.
Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was
issued in the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to
Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the
surviving heirs. A certain Diosdado Manungas
appeared claiming that he is an illegitimate heir of
Florentino.
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4
in Panabo City, appointed Florencia Avila Parreo,
the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial
Guardian of the properties and person of her
incompetent aunt. Engracia died and eventually
the subject of the intestate proceedings is her
estate o was in question.
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. In his motion, Diosdado
argued that Parreos appointment as special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by
virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the
latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia
Manungas death, concluding that her appointment
as special administrator was without basis. He
added that Parreo was not fit to become a special
administrator having already been fined by the
court for failing to render a timely accounting of
Engracia Manungas property as her judicial
guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that Parreo is a
mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia
Manungas, while he is the illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas.
ISSUE:
W/N Diosdado has the right to be appointed as
Special Administrator of the Estate of Engracia
Manungas.
HELD:
It must be remembered that the estate of
Florentino Manungas was already the subject of
intestate proceedings that have long been
terminated with the proceeds distributed to the
heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final
Distribution. With the termination of the intestate
estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas,
Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino
Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia
Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of
the Estate of Manungas.
The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of
the Estate of Engracia Manungas. The CA correctly
set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
Consequently, with the setting aside of the
November 4, 2002 Order of the trial court,
reversing its May 15, 2002 Order and appointing
Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia
Manungas estate, the May 15, 2002 Order is
necessarily reinstated and Parreos appointment as
special administrator is revived.
PACUDAN
9. Pijuan v. Vda. De Guvera, GR L-21917, nov 29,
1966
HEIRS OF BELINDA DAHLIA G.R. No. 162934
A. CASTILLO, namely, BENA
JEAN, DANIEL, MELCHOR, Present:
MICHAEL and DANIBEL, all
surnamed CASTILLO, PUNO, J., Chairman,
Petitioners, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
FACTS
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B.
Almoradie, died in Malabon City, Metro Manila,
died and left a sizeable property.
Crisantas mother, Crisanta Santiago Vda. de
Yanga, commenced an intestate proceeding in
(RTC) of Malabon City, Branch 72, docketed as
Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN alleging that her daughter
died intestate and that such estate was being
managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-
law, Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent
persons. She prayed that letters of administration
be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the
brother of the deceased, and that she be awarded
her share of the estate. However, the RTC
appointed Lorenzo as administrator.
The marriage between Crisanta and Lorenzo was
declared void for being bigamous. Lorenzo was as
administrator and Mariano, Jr. was appointed.
One Belinda Castillo, claimed to be Lorenzo and
Crisantas only legitimate child and filed a motion
for intervention resolution of which was held
abeyance due to some incidents in CA.
On the other hand, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally
adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed a petition
for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance
of letters testamentary in his favor docketed as
Spec. Proc. No. 211-MN. He alleged that he
discovered his mothers will in which he was
instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and
designated as alternate executor for the named
executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of
Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter sometime
in 1985 or 1986.
Belinda Castillo died.
The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated.
Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN was dismissed. Mariano
Yanga, Jr. questioned the dismissal before the CA.
The probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as
special administrator of his mothers estate.
The heirs of Belinda, namely, Bena Jean, Daniel,
Melchor, Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed
Castillo, filed a Motionpraying that they be
substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their late
mother Belinda..
Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores, filed a
Manifestation and Motion where she informed
the probate court of her husbands death and
prayed that she be admitted as substitute of her
husband, and be appointed as administratrix of
the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well. She alleged
that she had a bachelors degree in law and had
worked for several years in a law office.
The heirs of Belinda opposed and averred that
Dolores was not Crisanta Gabriels next of kin, let
alone the lawful wife of the late Roberto which was
refuted by Dolores.
Bena Jean filed a Motion for Appointment as
Administrator of the Estate of Crisanta Y. Gabrie
praying that she be appointed administratrix of the
estate of her grandmother Crisanta.
This was opposed by Dolores claiming that Bena
has neither proven her kinship with Crisanta
Gabriel nor shown any particular qualification to
act as administratrix of the estate.
Mariano Yanga, Jr.s appeal was dismissed and
Dolores was appointed as special administratrix
upon a bond ofP200,000.00. The probate court
merely noted the motion for substitution filed by
the heirs of Belinda, stating that they were mere
strangers to the case and that their cause could
better be ventilated in a separate proceeding.
According to the trial court, even assuming that
movant Dolores L. Gabriels lawful relationship with
petitioner, and corollarily with the decedent, was
not proven, the stringent rules regarding the order
of preference in the appointment of an
Administrator does not find application in the
instant case for what is at stake here is the
appointment of a Special Administrator, the reason
for the relaxation of the rules regarding the
appointment of a Special Administrator is the
nature of its position, being merely temporary and
will subsist only until a regular administrator or
executor is appointed.
The heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider which
was denied. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision,
hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of
Dolores as special administratrix was proper?
The petition is without merit.
The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has
repeatedly held that the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
probate court. A special administrator is a
representative of a decedent appointed by the
probate court to care for and preserve his estate
until an executor or general administrator is
appointed. When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded not as a representative of
the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment, but as the administrator in charge of
the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court.
As such officer, he is subject to the supervision
and control of the probate court and is expected to
work for the best interests of the entire estate,
especially its smooth administration and earliest
settlement. The principal object of appointment of
temporary administrator is to preserve the estate
until it can pass into hands of person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs. In many instances, the
appointment of administrators for the estates of
decedents frequently become involved in protracted
litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great
waste and losses unless an authorized agent to
collect the debts and preserve the assets in the
interim is appointed. The occasion for such an
appointment, likewise, arises where, for some
cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the
proof of the will, regular administration is delayed.
Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Section 1. Appointment of
Special Administrator. When there is
delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by
any cause including an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a
will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession
and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators
appointed.
The new Rules have broadened the basis for the
appointment of an administrator, and such
appointment is allowed when there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or administration by
any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint
a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court.[33] In De Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr.,[34] the Court
further elucidated
Under the above rule, the
probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a
delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration
occasioned by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will. Subject to
this qualification, the appointment
of a special administrator lies in the
discretion of the Court. This
discretion, however, must be sound,
that is, not whimsical, or contrary to
reason, justice, equity or legal
principle.
The basis for appointing a
special administrator under the
Rules is broad enough to include
any cause or reason for the delay in
granting letters testamentary or of
administration as where a contest as
to the will is being carried on in the
same or in another court, or where
there is an appeal pending as to the
proceeding on the removal of an
executor or administrator, or in
cases where the parties cannot
agree among themselves. Likewise,
when from any cause general
administration cannot be
immediately granted, a special
administrator may be appointed to
collect and preserve the property of
the deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase
by any cause includes those
incidents which transpired in the
instant case clearly showing that
there is a delay in the probate of the
will and that the granting of letters
testamentary will consequently be
prolonged necessitating the
immediate appointment of a special
administrator.[35]
As enunciated above, the probate court has ample
jurisdiction to appoint respondent as special
administratrix. The deceased Crisanta Yanga-
Gabriel left a document purporting to be her will
where her adopted son, Roberto, was named as the
sole heir of all her properties. However, pending
probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow,
the respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the
respondent has much stake in Crisantas estate in
case the latters will is allowed probate. It needs to
be emphasized that in the appointment of a special
administrator (which is but temporary and subsists
only until a regular administrator is appointed),
the probate court does not determine the shares in
the decedents estate, but merely appoints who is
entitled to administer the estate. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on
therelationship of the parties in the administration
as to be the basis of distribution. [36] Thus, the
preference of respondent is sound, that is, not
whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or
legal principle.
The petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. The
rule refers to the appointment of regular
administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the
other hand, applies to the appointment of a special
administrator. It has long been settled that the
appointment of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the appointment of
regular administrators.[37] Thus, in Roxas v. Pecson,
[38]
this Court ruled:
It is well settled that the
statutory provisions as to the prior
or preferred right of certain persons
to the appointment of administrator
under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as
the statutory provisions as to causes
for removal of an executor or
administrator under section 653 of
Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83,
do not apply to the selection or
removal of special administrator. ...
As the law does not say who shall be
appointed as special administrator
and the qualifications the appointee
must have, the judge or court has
 discretion in the selection of the
person to be appointed, discretion
which must be sound, that is, not
whimsical or contrary to reason,
justice or equity.
On the plea of the petitioners for this Court to
appoint their co-petitioner, Bena Jean Castillo, as
the regular administratrix of the estate of Crisanta
Yanga-Gabriel, the matter should be addressed to
the probate court for its consideration. It is not for
this Court to preempt the discretion of the probate
court and appoint a regular administrator in the
present action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
70645, dated October 30, 2003, and its Resolution
of March 26, 2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988
PEDRO DE GUZMAN vs. THE HONORABLE
JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC BRANCH 58,
MAKATI, METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS
JOSE B. FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS and
ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN
FACTS
Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of her husband,
Manolito de Guzman, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings .No. M-1436.
The petition alleges that:
(1) on March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in
Makati, Metro Manila;
(2) at the time of his death, the decedent was a
resident of Makati, Metro Manila;
(3) decedent left personal and real properties as
part of his estate, listed in Annexes "A," "B," "C"
and "D;"
(4) the properties were acquired after the marriage
of the petitioner to the decedent and therefore are
included in their conjugal partnership;
(5) the estate of -the decedent has a probable net
value which may be provisionally assessed at
P4,000,000.00 more or less;
(6) the possible creditors of the estate, who have
accounts payable. and existing claims against the
firm C. SANTOS Construction are listed in
Annex "E;"
(7) the compulsory heirs of the decedent are the as
the surviving spouse (her) and their two (2) minor
children namely: Charmane Rose de Guzman 11
years and Peter Brian de Guzman, 9 years old;
(8) after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain
whether the decedent left a last will and testament,
none has been found and according to the best
knowledge information and belief of the petitioner,
Manolito de Guzman died intestate; and
(9) the petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of
the decedent, is most qualified and entitled to the
grant of letters of administration.
She also filed a motion for writ of possession over
five (5) vehicles registered under the name of
Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal
properties of the de Guzman's but which are at
present in the possession of the private
respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro
de Guzman.
Elaine G. de Guzman, petitioner-movant, was
appointed as Special Administratrix of the Estate of
the deceased Manolito de Guzman, pending
appointment of a regular administrator.
Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to
enforce the above order. The Pedro de Guzman
resisted. The petitioner then filed a manifestation
listing properties which he claimed to be his own.
The petitioner contends that the June 5, 1987
order is a patent nullity, the respondent court not
having acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special
administratrix because the petition for the
settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman
was not yet set for hearing and published for three
consecutive weeks, as mandated by the Rules of
Court. The petitioner also stresses that the
appointment of a special administratrix constitutes
an abuse of discretion for having been made
without giving petitioner and other parties an
opportunity to oppose said appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a probate court may appoint a
special administratrix AND issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of a decedent for
the preservation of the estate in a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate.
RULLING:
Yes, it should go through the process.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the
respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the
settlement of an intestate estate by the private
respondent since the petition had alleged all the
jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased
person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased
Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule
79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We must, however, differentiate between the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the
proceedings for the administration of an estate and
its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested
in the settlement of the estate of the deceased
person. The court may also have jurisdiction over
the "estate" of the deceased person but the
determination of the properties comprising that
estate must follow established rules.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof.
When a petition for letters of administration is filed
in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall
fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and
shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known
heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any
other persons believed to have an interest in the
estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4
of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate
court must cause notice through publication of the
petition after it receives the same. The purpose of
this notice is to bring all the interested persons
within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment
therein becomes binding on all the world.
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by
section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
was caused to be given by the probate court before
it acted on the motions of the private respondent to
be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a
writ of possession of alleged properties of the
deceased person in the widow's favor, and to grant
her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of
Manolito de Guzman.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 58 of Makati are hereby set aside. The case
is ordered remanded to the lower court for the
hearing of the petition with previous notice to all
interested parties as required by law. In view of the
voluntary inhibition of the respondent Judge, the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati is directed to re-raffle the case to another
branch of the court. The Temporary Restraining
Order dated June 10, 1987 is made permanent.
Fule vs CA
FACTS:
Virginia G. Fule was appointed as special
administratrix of the estate of Amado Garcia. The
said appointment was opposed by Preciosa B.
Garcia, spouse of Amado Garcia contending that
the appointment was issued without jurisdiction,
since no notice of the petition for letters of
administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate. As the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the
appointment of a special administratrix; and,
Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado
G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed
that she be appointed special administratrix of the
estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular
administratrix after due hearing. While this
reconsideration motion was pending resolution
before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a motion
to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
alleging that her appointment was obtained
through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations
The notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the
original and supplemental petitions for letters of
administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction,
venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of
Virginia G Fule as special administratrix. An
omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule
praying for authority to take possession of
properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of
third persons as well as to secure cash advances
from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia
opposed the motion, calling attention to the
limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of
the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties
making up the state of the deceased." Judge
Malvar and already issued an order denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the
order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, and admitting the supplementation
petition. the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A.
Malvar. Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed a
petition for letters of administration before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch over the same intestate estate of Amado G.
Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her
appointment as special administratrix of the
estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion
and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special
administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Judge
Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings
before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the
court of the final outcome of the case pending
before the Court of Appeals.
Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the
grounds stated in the previous special appearance
of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been
appealed to this Court; that the parties had
already filed their respective briefs; and that the
case is still pending before the Court.
Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge
Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B.
Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" in that the payments were for the
benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud
of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.
VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted a petition for
certiorari with temporary restraining order, to
annul the proceedings and to restrain Judge
Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not CFI of Laguna has
Jurisdiction to appoint administratix of the
estate of Amado Garcia
2 Whether or not Court erred in appointing
Preciosa Garcia as administratrix of the
estate of Amado Garcia?
HELD:
1 With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court demands that the
petition therefor should affirmatively show
the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all
the necessary facts, such as death, the
name and last residence of the decedent,
the existence, and situs if need be, of
assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon,
and the right of the person who seeks
administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed.
We rule that the last place of residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna.
A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of
his death. As it is, the death certificate of
Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in
evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and
also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his
last place of residence was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative
that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition
for letters of administration was improperly
laid in the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-
settled rule is that objection to improper
venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When
improper venue is not objected to in a
motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In
the case before Us the Court of Appeals had
reason to hold that in asking to substitute
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive
her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere
practical resort to alternative remedy to
assert her rights as surviving spouse, while
insisting on the enforcement of the Rule
fixing the proper venue of the proceedings
at the last residence of the decedent.
2 Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia
G. Fule's appointment as special
 administratrix is another
perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia
preference to the appointment as surviving
spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that
"(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal
allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator
to take possession and charge of the estate
of the deceased until the questions causing
the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the
appointment of a special administrator was
only proper when the allowance
disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis
for appointment and such appointment is
now allowed when there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or administration by
any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion
to appoint a special administrator or not
lies in the probate court. 15 That, however,
is no authority for the judge to become
partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule,
his judgment. Exercise of that discretion
must be based on reason, equity, justice
and legal principle. Under the law, the
widow would have the
succession over a portion
exclusive property of the
besides her share in the
partnership. For such reason, she would
have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly
than any other next of kin.
MAGDALENA COBARRUBIAS vs Arsenio Dizon
FACTS:
The petitioner Magdalena Cobarrubias filed an
urgent motion, alleging that the funeral Pilar Leyba
had deposited sys alhajas Are worth P4,500 in
security section of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands; That said bank notified all interested
parties that they withdraw the contents of their
section within the shortest possible time, so she
asked to be appointed special administrator and
issue of that she was authorized to withdraw said jewelry
claims from the bank. In her application Magdalena
Cobarrubias stated that she was the only forced
heiress of the late Pilar Leyba. Accepting as good
these allegations, the Honorable Judge Dizon on
the same date, July 5, 1945, appointed Magdalena
Cobarrubias special administrator on bail of P200.
from the
On July 19, the petitioner filed a brief alleging that
since the Court "has rescinded its order dated 5 of
said month and year," requested that the Court
order the cancellation of the bond of P200 and its
return to the lawyer of The applicant
ISSUE: Whether or not appointed special
administrator can be revoked?
or
HELD:
Yes.Revoking the appointment of the appellant as
special administrator and revoking the order
authorizing her to withdraw the deposited jewels,
the Court does not abuse its discretion, nor work
outside its jurisdiction. The power of the Court of
First Instance to render ineffective the appointment
of an administrator, when the appointment has
been obtained through false or incorrect
representations, is indisputable. When the Court
appointed the appellant special administrator with
authorization to withdraw from the bank jewels
valued at P4,500 under a P200 bond, it took into
account its essential claim that "it was the sole
forced heiress of the deceased." There was no
danger of possible embezzlement; They could even
right of
name it without bail. But upon receiving a report
of the that this allegation was inaccurate. Which was
decedent, confirmed by the motion of the same petitioner
conjugal who requested the "suspension of publication and
postponement of the hearing" because he wished to
"have time to arrange an extrajudicial partition
with his co-heirs," the court had ample grounds to
revoke those orders even Without notification to
the administrator: the intestate is not initiated for
the benefit of the administrators but of the
heirs. The court should act immediately and not
put in danger. With his indifference, the jewels. If
he allowed a few hours to pass, without taking
drastic action, the jewels valued at P4,500 could be
withdrawn by the special administrator who was
only secured in P200 to the detriment of the
interests of the minors. The zeal shown by the
court was well founded. The position of special
administrator is one of trust. As soon as it lost its
confidence in the integrity of the applicant, the
Court was fully justified in revoking its
appointment as special administrator and
withdrawing its authorization to remove the jewels
from the bank.