Contents

Valenzuela v. CA case................................................................................................. 1
Marikina vs People.................................................................................................... 18
Delsan Transport vs C and A.................................................................................... 34
McKee vs IAC............................................................................................................ 40
Manila Electric v Remoquillo..................................................................................... 66
Astudillo vs Manila Electric....................................................................................... 73

Valenzuela v. CA case
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996

MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x

G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996

RICHARD LI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages by
petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

1
City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the early
morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the trial court are
succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals below:

This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for

serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.

Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in

the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from
her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street,
Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of
Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something
wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there
were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit
help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her
rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in
that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2
feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car,
and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the
left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who
will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a
1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield
of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to
the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car.
Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with
only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She
was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she
was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal
thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty
(20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The
expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the

2
cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants
from the car insurance.

In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the

amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting
to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.

Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his

way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining,
visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He
testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right
lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue,
when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake
Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction,
travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded,
he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the
oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not
see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights
or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He
alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car
was protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the
outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18,
Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that
after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right
and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants
counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless
or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.

The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the

vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars
involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiff's car was "near
the sidewalk"; this witness did not remember whether the hazard
lights of plaintiff's car were on, and did not notice if there was an
early warning device; there was a street light at the corner of

3
 Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not
mostly dark, i.e. "things can be seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).

A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after

plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk
compartment, defendant's car came approaching very fast ten
meters from the scene; the car was "zigzagging". The rear left
side of plaintiff's car was bumped by the front right portion of
defendant's car; as a consequence, the plaintiff's car swerved to
the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was
thrown to the windshield of defendant's car, which was
destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that defendant
was under the influence of liquor as he could "smell it very well"
(pp. 43, 79, tsn, June 17, 1991).

After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and
found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise
held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally
liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the defendants
to jointly and severally pay the following amounts:

1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the

miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her severed
left leg;

2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because

of the stoppage of plaintiff's Bistro La Conga restaurant three (3)
weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a
month, as unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga
restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment
and (c) P30,000.00, a month for unrealized profits in plaintiff's
two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of this
decision;

3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;

4
 4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;

5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and

6. Costs.

As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus

Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in
Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to
show that the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of
glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the center of the
right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of
Appeals. In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals
found that there was "ample basis from the evidence of record for the
trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at the
right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's
car."1 Dismissing the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was
improperly parked, almost at the center of the road, the respondent
court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car
was at or near center of the right lane was never presented during the
trial of the case.2 The respondent court furthermore observed that:

Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of

55 km./hour is self serving; it was not corroborated. It was in
fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he
was outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A.
Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990 when his
attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the
plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trunk
compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li "approaching very
fast ten (10) meters away from the scene"; defendant's car was
zigzagging", although there were no holes and hazards on the
street, and "bumped the leg of the plaintiff" who was thrown
against the windshield of defendant's care, causing its
destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was

5
 pulled out from under defendant's car and was able to say
"hurting words" to Richard Li because he noticed that the latter
was under the influence of liquor, because he "could smell it very
well" (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He knew that plaintiff
owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970's, but did not know
either plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident.

In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision,
however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from
any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the
amount of moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding justification for
exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award of
P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorney's fees and the
other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the
defendants' counterclaims.3

Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by

filing two separate petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No.
117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages
because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event
that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to be
mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails
the respondent court's decision insofar as it absolves Alexander
Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by
Richard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral
damages awarded by the trial court.4

As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby

consolidated.

It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944
raises no substantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to

6
have this Court review are factual findings of the trial court, as
sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent
in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early
morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a general rule,
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive
upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such factual findings
unless the findings of fact of the said court are palpably unsupported
by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.5

In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully

corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the
owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of
the accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a car being driven
at a "very fast" speed, racing towards the general direction of Araneta
Avenue.6 Rodriguez further added that he was standing in front of his
establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of the
accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the
windshield of the defendant's Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she
eventually fell under the defendant's car. Spontaneously reacting to
the incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man reeking with the
smell of liquor had alighted from the offending vehicle in order to
survey the incident.7 Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he
observed Valenzuela's car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk,8 contrary to Li's allegation that Valenzuela's car was close to
the center of the right lane. We agree that as between Li's "self-
serving" asseverations and the observations of a witness who did not
even know the accident victim personally and who immediately gave a
statement of the incident similar to his testimony to the investigator
immediately after the incident, the latter's testimony deserves greater
weight. As the court emphasized:

The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of

the transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial court's
reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating defendant's
assertion that he was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez

7
drives only a motorcycle, his perception of speed is not
necessarily impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination and
no attempt was made to question .his competence or the
accuracy of his statement that defendant was driving "very fast".
This was the same statement he gave to the police investigator
after the incident, as told to a newspaper report (Exh. "P"). We
see no compelling basis for disregarding his testimony.

The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez' testimony are not borne

out by an examination of the testimony. Rodriguez testified that
the scene of the accident was across the street where his
beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36,
tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the accident transpired
immediately in front of his establishment. The ownership of the
Lambingan se Kambingan is not material; the business is
registered in the name of his mother, but he explained that he
owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn, June 20, 1991). Moreover, the
testimony that the streetlights on his side of Aurora Boulevard
were on the night the accident transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily
contradictory to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was a
streetlight at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street
(p. 45, tsn, Oct. 20, 1991).

With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that

there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has
stopped and he was outside his establishment at the time the
accident transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn, June 17, 1991). This was
consistent with plaintiff's testimony that it was no longer raining
when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn, April 29, 1991). It
was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the way in an
attempt to explain why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p.
11, tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it
was raining, he arrived at the scene only in response to a
telephone call after the accident had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn,
Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial inconsistencies in
Rodriguez's testimony that would impair the essential integrity of

8
 his testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to
affirm the trial court's acceptance of the testimony of said
eyewitness.

Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that

Li's testimony was peppered with so many inconsistencies leading us
to conclude that his version of the accident was merely adroitly crafted
to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him
from any and all liability in the incident. Against Valenzuela's
corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up by other
witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the course of trial. He
claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph. when "out of
nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him, which was
(the) plaintiff's car". He alleged that upon seeing this sudden
"apparition" he put on his brakes to no avail as the road was slippery.9

One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's

disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The average
motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the
brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light
rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a
principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would
have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if
he were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Driving
exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or
flight" 10 mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not
dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. 11 Li's failure to
react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could
therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1)
that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by Rodriguez;
and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol.12 Either factor
working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to
road conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to
reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with
approval by respondent court):

9
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan
Police immediately after the incident, he said that while driving
along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer
right in front of him which was plaintiff's car, indicating, again,
thereby that, indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious of his
surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he was not,
then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance the
parked car of the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk
which had its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully
bumping at the plaintiff who was then standing at the left rear
edge of her car.

Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police,

he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiff's car in front of
him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this goes
to show again, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed,
running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could have easily
completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the
plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery.
Verily, since, if, indeed, he was running slow, as he claimed, at
only about 55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the wet and
slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the plaintiff by the
mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and
distance.

It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his

testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police
immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more believable,
that he did not actually step on his brakes but simply swerved a
little to the right when he saw the on-coming car with glaring
headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it.

For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the
car of the plaintiff which was properly parked at the right beside
the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to swerve a
little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-

10
 coming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenue
separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and there is
plenty of space for both cars, since her car was running at the
right lane going towards Manila on the on-coming car was also on
its right lane going to Cubao.13

Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his

company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to
determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of
contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard,
which entire area Li points out, is a no parking zone.

We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of
contributory negligence.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.14 Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to
which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed
for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.

Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor

who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the
standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such
situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in
threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same
standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by
unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.15

Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of
Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and

11
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.17

Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular

accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two children
suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,18 that the driver therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best
means possible in the given situation" to avoid hitting the children.
Using the "emergency rule" the Court concluded that Koh, in spite of
the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with an
oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence. 19

While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective

thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening
situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in
such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event
which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature
of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by
a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point
which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to
other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in
search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she
would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not
to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of
Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle
would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the
instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora
Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid
putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did what was best
under the situation. As narrated by respondent court: "She stopped at
a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a
flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people
present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her
home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a
Toyota Corona Car."20 In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix
Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that

12
Valenzuela's car was parked very close to the sidewalk. 21 The sketch
which he prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela's car partly
straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from
motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was
itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.22

Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the

standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The
emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora
Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions.

Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the
negligence of Li on the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is
commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm
to others."23It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.24 We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila
Railroad Company,25 that negligence is the want of care required by
the circumstances.

The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court

below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his
Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast
speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a
drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial
evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor.
Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with
changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Presser
and Keaton emphasize:

[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an

automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of
obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at

13
 intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may be
required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his
failure to act properly when they appear may be found to amount
to negligence.26

Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him

on the night of the accident was clearly of his own making.

We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander Commercial,

Inc. Li's employer. In denying liability on the part of Alexander
Commercial, the respondent court held that:

There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the

visit was in connection with official matters. His functions as
assistant manager sometimes required him to perform work
outside the office as he has to visit buyers and company clients,
but he admitted that on the night of the accident he came from
BF Homes Paranaque he did not have "business from the
company" (pp. 25-26, ten, Sept. 23, 1991). The use of the
company car was partly required by the nature of his work, but
the privilege of using it for non-official business is a "benefit",
apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to his
position.

Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their respective duties, the basis of
which liability is not respondeat superior, but the relationship
of pater familias, which theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant
(Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee,
the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred
while an employee was in the actual performance of his assigned
tasks or duties (Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194
SCRA 341). In defining an employer's liability for the acts done
within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme

14
 Court has held that this includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of
the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage
(Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 212
SCRA 637). An employer is expected to impose upon its
employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance
of any act "indispensable to the business and beneficial to their
employer" (at p. 645).

In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's

finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the company to
use the company car "either officially or socially or even bring it
home", he can be considered as using the company car in the
service of his employer or on the occasion of his functions.
Driving the company car was not among his functions as
assistant manager; using it for non-official purposes would
appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks attached to his
position. But to impose liability upon the employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a showing
that the damage was caused by their employees in the service of
the employer or on the occasion of their functions. There is no
evidence that Richard Li was at the time of the accident
performing any act in furtherance of the company's business or
its interests, or at least for its benefit. The imposition of solidary
liability against defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation
must therefore fail.27

We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is

not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the
master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in
which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point, however, that
our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus
pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander

15
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused
by the accident of June 24, 1990.

First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals29 upon
which respondent court has placed undue reliance, dealt with the
subject of a school and its teacher's supervision of students during an
extracurricular activity. These cases now fall under the provision on
special parental authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code which
generally encompasses all authorized school activities, whether inside
or outside school premises.

Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater

familias embodied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil
Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved
on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence
is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required
amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's
burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however,
depends on the circumstances of employment.

Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised

diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the
latter's assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability
imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the
employee's private activities or during the performance of tasks either
unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee's tasks. The
case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a
practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of
managerial rank or their representatives.

It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their

employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either
wholly owned and maintained by the company itself or are subject to
various plans through which employees eventually acquire their

16
vehicles after a given period of service, or after paying a token
amount. Many companies provide liberal "car plans" to enable their
managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given
the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able to
purchase on their own.

Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the
car up to the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the
second example, the car is really owned and maintained by the
employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are
companies totally absolved of responsibility when an accident involving
a company-issued car occurs during private use after normal office
hours?

Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars

under the first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from
their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of company
maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good
father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are
satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of
the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a
threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When a
company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its
employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father,
satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and
responsively.

In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are

given the privilege of using a company-issued car. For large companies
other than those cited in the example of the preceding paragraph, the
privilege serves important business purposes either related to the
image of success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the
public in general, or - for practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable
its managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to reach
clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car serves
both purposes. Since important business transactions and decisions

17
may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of
guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car
therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company
and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who
actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales
agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or
for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other
employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company
issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.

In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander

Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted
that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to
scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often
to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and
contacting and meeting with company clients. 30 These meetings,
clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a
managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company
with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-
related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander
Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation
- to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's
goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and
its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.

Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of

the accident because he was coming from a social visit with an
officemate in Paranaque was a bare allegation which was never
corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving.
Assuming he really came from his officemate's place, the same could
give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from
a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and
other work related strategies.

18
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our
satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were
made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to
determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to
whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.31 Not having
been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company,
based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded

by the respondent court, except as to the amount of moral damages.
In the case of moral damages, while the said damages are not
intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the
award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted.
In the instant case we are of the opinion that the reduction in moral
damages from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P800,000,00 by the
Court of Appeals was not justified considering the nature of the
resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.

As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a

traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh
just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be
deprived of the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even
with the use of state of the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the
period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be required
to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the shrinkage
of the stump from the process of healing.

These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months

of physical and occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During her
lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and re-adjusted
to changes in the size of her lower limb effected by the biological
changes of middle-age, menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches

19
menopause, for example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to
respond to the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease
in calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-menopausal women.
In other words, the damage done to her would not only be permanent
and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to
the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo
through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will
require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All
of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.

The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the
nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly speculative
to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury
which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human
body. A prosthetic device, however technologically advanced, will only
allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor
functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The
resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and
physical pain are inestimable.

As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court's discretion,

we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by
the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the
injury - physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result
of Li's grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early
morning hours of the accident.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of

Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

20
Marikina vs People
FIRST DIVISION

MARIKINA AUTO LINE G.R. No. 152040

TRANSPORT CORPORATION
and FREDDIE L. SUELTO, Present:
Petitioners,
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Promulgated:

and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON,
Respondents. March 31, 2006

x------------------------------------ -------
-------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 16739
affirming the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. Q-93-42629 and Civil Case No. Q-93-16051, where
Freddie Suelto was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
damages to property.

Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment

located at No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line
Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger
bus with Plate Number NCV-849.Suelto, its employee, was assigned as
the regular driver of the bus.[2]

21
At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the
aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon
City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus
suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial
apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road.[3] Upon
Valdellons request, the court ordered Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior
Building Inspection Officer of the City Engineers Office, to inspect the
damaged terrace. Pontiveros submitted a report enumerating and
describing the damages:

(1) The front exterior and the right side concrete columns
of the covered terrace were vertically displaced from its
original position causing exposure of the vertical
reinforcement.

(2) The beams supporting the roof and parapet walls are
found with cracks on top of the displaced columns.

(3) The 6 CHB walls at [the] right side of the covered

terrace were found with cracks caused by this accident.

(4) The front iron grills and concrete balusters were found
totally damaged and the later [sic] beyond repair.[4]

He recommended that since the structural members made of concrete

had been displaced, the terrace would have to be demolished to keep
its monolithicness, and to insure the safety and stability of the
building.[5]

Photographs[6] of the damaged terrace were taken. Valdellon

commissioned Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. to estimate the cost of repairs,
inclusive of labor and painting, and the latter pegged the cost
at P171,088.46.[7]

In a letter dated October 19, 1992 addressed to the bus company and
Suelto, Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00, within 10 days

22
from receipt thereof, to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace.
[8]
The bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which
Valdellon refused.[9]

Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in

damage to property against Suelto. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, an Information was filed with the RTC of Quezon
City. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 3rd day of October 1992, in Quezon

City, Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver
and/or person in charge of a Marikina Auto Line bus bearing
Plate No. NVC-849, did then and there unlawfully, and
feloniously drive, manage, and operate the same along
Kamias Road, in said City, in a careless, reckless, negligent,
and imprudent manner, by then and there making the said
vehicle run at a speed greater than was reasonable and
proper without taking the necessary precaution to avoid
accident to person/s and damage to property, and
considering the condition of the traffic at said place at the
time, causing as a consequence of his said carelessness,
negligence, imprudence and lack of precaution, the said
vehicle so driven, managed and operated by him to hit and
bump, as in fact it hit and bump a commercial apartment
belonging to ERLINDA V. VALDELLON located at No. 31
Kamias Road, this City, thereby causing damages to said
apartment in the total amount of P171,088.46, Philippine
Currency, to her damage and prejudice in the total amount
aforementioned.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]

Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the
bus company for damages. She prayed that after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Court to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the
defendants upon approval of plaintiffs bond, and after trial

23
 on the merits, to render a decision in favor of the plaintiff,
ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay

a) the total sum of P171,088.46 constituting the expenses

for the repair of the damaged apartment of plaintiff, with
interests to be charged thereon at the legal rate from the
date of the formal demand until the whole obligation is fully
paid;

b) the sum of not less than P20,000.00 each as

compensatory and exemplary damages;

c) the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the sum

of P1,000.00 for each appearance of plaintiffs counsel; and
costs of suit;

PLAINTIFF further prays for such other reliefs as may be

just and equitable in the premises.[11]
A joint trial of the two cases was ordered by the trial court. [12]

The trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the damaged terrace,

where defendants offered to have it repaired and restored to its
original state. Valdellon, however, disagreed because she wanted the
building demolished to give way for the construction of a new one.[13]

During the trial, Valdellon testified on the damage caused to the

terrace of her apartment, and, in support thereof, adduced in evidence
a receipt for P35,000.00, dated October 20, 1993, issued by the BB
Construction and Steel Fabricator for carpentry, masonry, welding job
and electrical [work].[14]

Pontiveros of the Office of the City Engineer testified that there was a
need to change the column of the terrace, but that the building should
also be demolished because if concrete is destroyed, [one] cannot
have it restored to its original position.[15]

24
 Engr. Jesus Regal, Jr., the proprietor of the SSP Construction,
declared that he inspected the terrace and estimated the cost of
repairs, including labor, at P171,088.46.

Suelto testified that at 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, he was

driving the bus on its way to Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila. When he reached the corner of K-H Street at Kamias
Road, Quezon City, a passenger jeepney suddenly crossed from EDSA
going to V. Luna and swerved to the lane occupied by the bus. Suelto
had to swerve the bus to the right upon which it hit the side front of
the terrace of Valdellons two-door apartment. [16] Based on his
estimate, the cost to the damage on the terrace of the apartment
amounted to P40,000.00.[17] On cross-examination, Suelto declared
that he saw the passenger jeepney when it was a meter away from the
bus. Before then, he had seen some passenger jeepneys on the right
trying to overtake one another.[18]

Architect Arnulfo Galapate testified that the cost of the repair of

the damaged terrace amounted to P55,000.00.[19]

On April 28, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment finding

Suelto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property, and ordered MALTC and Suelto to pay,
jointly and severally, P150,000.00 to Valdellon, by way of actual and
compensatory damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs of
suit. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused FREDDIE SUELTO Y

LIWAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ONE
(1) YEAR.

With respect to the civil liability, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of plaintiff Erlinda Valdellon and against

25
 defendant Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation and
accused Freddie Suelto, where both are ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff:

a. the sum of P150,000.00, as reasonable compensation

sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment;
b. the sum of P20,000.00, as compensatory and exemplary
damages;

c. the sum of P20,000.00, as attorneys fees; and,

d. the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[20]

MALTC and Suelto, now appellants, appealed the decision to the CA,
alleging that the prosecution failed to prove Sueltos guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. They averred that the prosecution merely relied on
Valdellon, who testified only on the damage caused to the terrace of
her apartment which appellants also alleged was excessive. Appellant
Suelto further alleged that he should be acquitted in the criminal case
for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law,
negligent. Even if the appellate court affirmed his conviction, the
penalty of imprisonment imposed on him by the trial court is contrary
to law.

In its Brief for the People of the Philippines, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) submitted that the appealed decision should
be affirmed with modification. On Sueltos claim that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property, the OSG contended that, applying the principle
of res ipsa loquitur, the prosecution was able to prove that he drove
the bus with negligence and recklessness. The OSG averred that the
prosecution was able to prove that Sueltos act of swerving the bus to
the right was the cause of damage to the terrace of Valdellons
apartment, and in the absence of an explanation to the contrary, the

26
accident was evidently due to appellants want of care.Consequently,
the OSG posited, the burden was on the appellant to prove that, in
swerving the bus to the right, he acted on an emergency, and failed to
discharge this burden. However, the OSG averred that the trial court
erred in sentencing appellant to a straight penalty of one year, and
recommended a penalty of fine.

On June 20, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of

the trial court, but the award for actual damages was reduced
to P100,000.00. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated April

28, 1994, rendered by the court a quo is AFFIRMED with
the modification that the sum of P150,000.00 as
compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her
damaged apartment be reduced to P100,000.00 without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the

same.[22]

MALTC and Suelto, now petitioners, filed the instant petition reiterating
its submissions in the CA: (a) the prosecution failed to prove the crime
charged against petitioner Suelto; (b) the prosecution failed to adduce
evidence to prove that respondent suffered actual damages in the
amount of P100,000.00; and (c) the trial court erred in sentencing
petitioner Suelto to one (1) year prison term.

On the first issue, petitioners aver that the prosecution was mandated
to prove that petitioner Suelto acted with recklessness in swerving the
bus to the right thereby hitting the terrace of private respondents
apartment. However, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden. On
the other hand, petitioner Suelto was able to prove that he acted in an
emergency when a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA towards the

27
direction of the bus overtook another vehicle and, in the process,
intruded into the lane of the bus.

On the second issue, petitioners insist that private respondent

was able to prove only the amount of P35,000.00 by way of actual
damages; hence, the award of P100,000.00 is barren of factual basis.
On the third issue, petitioner Suelto posits that the straight
penalty of imprisonment recommended by the trial court, and affirmed
by the CA, is contrary to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petition is partially granted.

On the first issue, we find and so resolve that respondent People of the
Philippines was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
Suelto swerved the bus to the right with recklessness, thereby causing
damage to the terrace of private respondents apartment. Although she
did not testify to seeing the incident as it happened, petitioner Suelto
himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-93-16051, and when he testified in the trial court.

Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right of

the road causing it to hit the column of the terrace of private
respondent. Petitioners were burdened to prove that the damage to
the terrace of private respondent was not the fault of petitioner Suelto.

We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that, as ruled by

the trial court and the appellate court, petitioners failed to prove that
petitioner acted on an emergency caused by the sudden intrusion of a
passenger jeepney into the lane of the bus he was driving.

It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Sueltos

defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the
bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from
EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of
the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court
in Gan v. Court of Appeals,[23] thus:
28
 [O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and
is required to act without time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended,

otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the right side
of the road or highway:

SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. Unless a different

course of action is required in the interest of the safety and
the security of life, person or property, or because of
unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith,
every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn
vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting
persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left
when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same
direction, and when turning to the left in going from one
highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the
right of the center of the intersection of the highway.

Section 35 of the law provides, thus:

Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a

motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful
and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable
and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of
the highway, and of any other condition then and there
existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon
a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and
property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will
permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured
clear distance ahead (emphasis supplied).

29
 In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides
that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. By his own admission, petitioner
Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he
suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the
property of private respondent.

However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Sueltos

defense, in light of his contradictory testimony vis--vis his Counter-
Affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation:

It is clear from the photographs submitted by the

prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the commercial
apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused
by the bus being driven by Suelto. It seems highly
improbable that the said damages were not caused by a
strong impact. And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that,
at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high
speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger
jeepney. Such a conclusion finds support in the decision of
the Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA 118,
where the Court stated that physical evidence is of the
highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses. The pictures submitted do not lie, having been
taken immediately after the incident. The damages could
not have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the
accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced
his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the
jeep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have
avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the
incident, the damages would have been less severe.

In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting

statements in his counter-affidavit and his testimony in
court. In the former, he stated that the reason why he
swerved to the right was because he wanted to avoid the
passenger jeepney in front of him that made a sudden
stop. But, in his testimony in court, he said that it was to

30
 avoid a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA that was
overtaking by occupying his lane. Such glaring
inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of
the witness doubtful and shatter his credibility.Furthermore,
the variance between testimony and prior statements
renders the witness unreliable. Such inconsistency results in
the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony
as to his prudence and diligence.

As already maintained and concluded, the severe

damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused
acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused
was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable
is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the
commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not
make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually
crowded street.[24]

Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a
third-party complaint against the driver of the offending passenger
jeepney and the owner/operator thereof.

Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape

conviction for the crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon
is, thus, futile.

On the second issue, we agree with the contention of petitioners that

respondents failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by
the
incident amounted to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by
respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent
were the summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R.
Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB
Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent for P35,000.00
representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical
works. Respondents failed to present Regal to testify on his
estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial court
awarded P150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but
31
failed to state the factual basis for such award. Indeed, the trial court
merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the sum
of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for
her damaged apartment. The appellate court, for its part, failed to
explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00 in its three-page
decision. Thus, the appellate court merely declared:

With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they

contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely
demolish the apartment in question considering the nature
of the damages sustained as a result of the
accident. Consequently, appellants continue, the award
of P150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-
appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable
amount.

The damaged portions of the apartment in question are not

disputed.

Considering the aforesaid damages which are the direct

result of the accident, the reasonable, and adequate
compensation due is hereby fixed at P100,000.00.[25]

Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include
all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of, classified as one for the loss of what a person already
possesses (dao emergente) and the other, for the failure to receive, as
a benefit, that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). As
expostulated by the Court in PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals:[26]

Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or

compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction
of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They
proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to
repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the
injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions
based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all
32
 the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or
compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person
already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the
failure to receive as a benefit that which would have
pertained to him (lucro cesante).[27]

The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no

evidence would be presented on either side. The burden is to establish
ones case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the
evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is superior to that of the
other. Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant must prove the
actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised
upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. Specific
facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory
or actual damages are borne must be pointed out. Actual damages
cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures. As
the Court declared:

As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to

recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to
prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence available. The burden of proof is on the party who
would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on
either side. He must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole,
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In
other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in
making an award, must point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or
actual damages are borne.[28]

The Court further declared that where goods are destroyed by the
wrongful act of defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the
time of the destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he
would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar

33
goods, plus in a proper case, damages for the loss of the use during
the period before replacement.[29]

While claimants bare testimonial assertions in support of their claims

for damages should not be discarded altogether, however, the same
should be admitted with extreme caution. Their testimonies should be
viewed in light of claimants self-interest, hence, should not be taken as
gospel truth. Such assertion should be buttressed by independent
evidence. In the language of the Court:

For this reason, Del Rosarios claim that private respondent

incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should
be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because
it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by
independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner
of private respondent corporation whatever testimony he
would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its
equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his
self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that his testimony as to the equipment installed and the
cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given credence
considering his familiarity thereto. However, we do not
subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such
equipment, cargo, and the vessel itself should be accepted
as gospel truth. We must, therefore, examine the
documentary evidence presented to support Del Rosarios
claim as regards the amount of losses.[30]

An estimate of the damage cost will not suffice:

Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and

competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually
incurred. It is not enough that the damage be capable of
proof but must be actually proved with a reasonable degree
of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory damages are
borne. Private respondents merely sustained an estimated
amount needed for the repair of the roof of their subject
building. What is more, whether the necessary repairs were

34
 caused only by petitioners alleged negligence in the
maintenance of its school building, or included the ordinary
wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential question
that remains indeterminable.[31]

We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their

view, the cost of the damage to the terrace of private respondent
would amount to P55,000.00.[32] Accordingly, private respondent is
entitled to P55,000.00 actual damages.

We also agree with petitioner Sueltos contention that the trial

court erred in sentencing him to suffer a straight penalty of one (1)
year. This is so because under the third paragraph of Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offender must be sentenced to pay a fine
when the execution of the act shall have only resulted in damage to
property. The said provision reads in full:

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by

reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period,
to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall

commit an act which would, otherwise, constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted
a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article

shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said

35
 damages to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall

be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall

exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article 64 (Emphasis supplied).

In the present case, the only damage caused by petitioner Sueltos act
was to the terrace of private respondents apartment,
costing P55,000.00. Consequently, petitioners contention that the CA
erred in awarding P100,000.00 by way of actual damages to private
respondent is correct. We agree that private respondent is entitled to
exemplary damages, and find that the award given by the trial court,
as affirmed by the CA, is reasonable. Considering the attendant
circumstances, we rule that private respondent Valdellon is entitled to
only P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition

is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The joint decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that
petitioner Suelto is sentenced to pay a fine of P55,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioners
are ORDERED to pay to Erlinda V. Valdellon, jointly and severally, the
total amount of P55,000.00 by way of actual damages,
and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

36
Delsan Transport vs C and A
G.R. No. 156034 October 1, 2003

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
C & A construction, inc., respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court are the June 14, 2002 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59034, which reversed the decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 46, in Civil Case No. 95-75565, and its
November 7, 2002 resolution3 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The undisputed facts reveal that respondent C & A Construction, Inc.

was engaged by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to construct a
deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo,
Manila.4 The project was completed in 1994 but it was not formally
turned over to NHA.

On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated

by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas
Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the
cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain
Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his
radio head operator in Japan5 that a typhoon was going to hit
Manila6 in about eight (8) hours.7 At approximately 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the
North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already
congested.8 At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the
vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At
that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt.
Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was

37
dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision,
Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. 9 He succeeded in avoiding
the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was
maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by
respondent.10 The damage caused by the incident amounted to
P456,198.24.11

Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the

latter refused to pay. Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75565. In its answer, petitioner claimed
that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event.12

On February 13, 1998, the complaint filed by respondent was

dismissed. The trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of
negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid
the accident. Applying the "emergency rule", it absolved petitioner of
liability because the latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the
best solution to a threatening situation. It further held that even if the
maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot be held
liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was
typhoon "Katring", which is an act of God.13

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was
reversed and set aside.14 It found Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence in
deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of
October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner liable for damages.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that Capt. Jusep
was not negligent in waiting until 8:35 in the morning of October 21,
1994 before transferring the vessel to the North Harbor inasmuch as it
was not shown that had the transfer been made earlier, the vessel
could have sought shelter.15 It further claimed that it cannot be held
vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because
respondent failed to allege in the complaint that petitioner was
negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. 16 Granting

38
that Capt. Jusep was indeed guilty of negligence, petitioner is not
liable because it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep
who is a duly licensed and competent Master Mariner.17

The issues to be resolved in this petition are as follows (1) Whether

or not Capt. Jusep was negligent; (2) If yes, whether or not petitioner
is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the quasi-
delict committed by Capt. Jusep?

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.18

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that
Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at
8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00 midnight
of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator
in Japan19 that a typhoon was going to hit Manila20 after 8
hours.21 This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the
North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The finding
of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not
have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done
earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that
determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but the
failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the
circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was
to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more
than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction. 22 He
cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the

39
vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of
the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past
sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose
because, according to him, it was not very cloudy 23 and there was no
weather disturbance yet.24

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable

foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the
same situation.25 Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had
greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that
the Navotas Port where they docked was very near North
Harbor.26 Even if the latter was already congested, he would still have
time to seek refuge in other ports.

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule,
one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been
a better method, unless the danger in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.27 Clearly, the emergency rule is
not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt.
Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.

Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously liable for the
negligent act of Capt. Jusep.1awphi1.nt Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent
act of his employee. Thus

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not

only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.

xxxxxxxxx

40
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxxxxxxxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to

another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection
(culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting
convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 28

There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V

Delsan Express, is also the employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of
the incident acted within the scope of his duty. The defense raised by
petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt.
Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It
should be stressed, however, that the required diligence of a good
father of a family pertains not only to the selection, but also to the
supervision of employees. It is not enough that the employees chosen
be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required
to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees.

In Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,29 it was held that due diligence in

supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the
guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well
as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with
the rules. Corollarily, in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court
stressed that once negligence on the part of the employees is shown,

41
the burden of proving that he observed the diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees shifts to the employer.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it

formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance of functions of
its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored
compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner
should therefore be held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.

So also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondents

failure to allege in its complaint that the former did not exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. In Viron
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos,31 it was held that it is not
necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or
selection of its employees, inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by
operation of law. Allegations of negligence against the employee and
that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to
make out a case of quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.32

Considering that petitioner did not assail the damages awarded by the
trial court, we find no reason to alter the same. The interest imposed
should, however, be modified. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,33it was held that the rate of interest on obligations not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) per
annum. If the purchase price can be established with certainty at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should
be computed from the date the complaint was filed until finality of the
decision. After the judgment becomes final and executory until the
obligation is satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per
year, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.34

Accordingly, the amount of P456,198.27 due the respondent shall earn

6% interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until the finality of this
decision. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part
thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve

42
percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment
becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is

DENIED.1awphi1.nt The June 14, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034 ordering petitioner Delsan Transport
Lines, Inc., to pay respondent C & A Construction, Inc., damages in the
amount of P456,198.27, plus P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of P456,198.27
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from October 3, 1995,
until finality of this decision, and 12% per annum thereafter on the
principal and interest (or any part thereof) until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

McKee vs IAC
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992

GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992

CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO,

ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH
TURLA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

43
Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3
April 1984, which set aside its previous Decision dated 29 November
1983 reversing the Decision of the trial court which dismissed
petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478
of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pampanga entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh
Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag
and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee vs.
Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and granted the
private respondents' counterclaim for moral damages, attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.

The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a
result of a vehicular accident which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim
Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to George
Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh

McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee,
were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen
Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife
and children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the other hand, private respondents are the
owners of the cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben
Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the accident.

The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in

Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City
and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between
an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T
Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben
Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76
driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh,

44
Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers
of the Ford Escort.

Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of
minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the
other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the
time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who
was at the front passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two
(2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded
with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos,
was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other
hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the
northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right
side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving
back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other
side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the
left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to
return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the
truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the
opposite lane, on the said bridge.

The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles

City; consequently, a team of police officers was forthwith dispatched
to conduct an on the spot investigation. In the sketch 1 prepared by
the investigating officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60)
"footsteps" long and fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide seven (7)
"footsteps" from the center line to the inner edge of the side walk on
both sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of
concrete with soft shoulders and concrete railings on both sides about
three (3) feet high.

45
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear
portion of the cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of the
right sidewalk, while its left front portion was touching the center line
of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its
front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away from
the northern end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36)
"footsteps" from the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right
front tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps", while skid marks
produced by the left front tire measured five (5) "footsteps." The two
(2) rear tires of the truck, however, produced no skid marks.

In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after

the accident, Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30)
miles (48 kilometers) per hour.

As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477
and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of
First Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and Branch
V of the said court, respectively. In the first, herein petitioners in G.R.
No. 68103 prayed for the award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for
burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00 for the
tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the second case, petitioners in G.R.
No. 68102 prayed for the following: (a) in connection with the death of
Kim McKee, the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for
funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the
tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of
Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious physical injuries
suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for
the hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of the
complaint; and (c) with respect to George McKee, Jr., in connection
with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following

46
medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00
payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable to the
Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to
P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's fees amounting to
25% of the total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4

On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the

crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial
court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and was raffled to
Branch V of the court, the same Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was
assigned. 5

In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private

respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded
and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as
counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees,
P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No. 4478,
private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of
pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to
implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they
also filed a motion to consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477
pending before Branch III of the same court, which was opposed by
the plaintiffs. 7 Both motions were denied by Branch V, then presided
over by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed
their Answer with Counter-claim 8 wherein they alleged that Jose Koh
was the person "at fault having approached the lane of the truck
driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the right lane going
towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic rules and
regulations applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;" in
their counterclaim, they prayed for an award of damages as may be
determined by the court after due hearing, and the sums of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation.

Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases.

47
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478 filed
on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the testimonies of witnesses
taken during the hearing of Criminal Case No. 3751, which private
respondents opposed and which the court denied. 9 Petitioners
subsequently moved to reconsider the order denying the motion for
consolidation, 10 which Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5
September 1978; he then directed that Civil Case No. 4478 be
consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of the court then
presided over by Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr.

Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751.

In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh

McKee, Fernando Nuag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel,
Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh, 11 and offered
several documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private
respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida Soliman,
Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit. 12

In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs.

Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio,
Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector, Ulanday, Pfc.
Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito
Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered several documentary
exhibits. 13 Upon the other hand, the defense presented the accused
Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit,
and offered documentary exhibits. 14

On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the

accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information
and after applying the provisions of Article 365 of the

48
 Revised Penal Code and indeterminate sentence law, this
Court, imposes upon said accused Ruben Galang the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as maximum; the accused is further sentenced
to pay and indemnify the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount
of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her death; to reimburse the
heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P2,000.00
representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida
Bondoc the amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss of
income; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased
Jose Koh the value of the car in the amount of P53,910.95,
and to pay the costs. 15

The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980;

on the same day, counsel for petitioners filed with Branch III of the
court where the two (2) civil cases were pending a manifestation
to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the decision. 16

Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2)
civil cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the private respondents
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 17 The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be

in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, these
cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against the
plaintiffs. The defendants had proven their counter-claim,
thru evidences (sic) presented and unrebutted. Hence, they
are hereby awarded moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of P15,000.00
and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual
damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby
dismissing for lack of proof to that effect (sic). 18

49
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners on
28 November 1980 and was received on 2 December 1980. 19

Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the

Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR
and was assigned to the court's Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases
Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12 November
1980 decision to the appellate court. The appeals were docketed as
C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and
were assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.

On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its

decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction of
Galang. 21 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay

Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan. Ang naghahabol
pa rin ang pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.

A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the

respondent Court in its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25 November
1982. 22 A petition for its review 23 was filed with this Court; said
petition was subsequently denied. A motion for its reconsideration was
denied with finality in the Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24

On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the

Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in
A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041, 25 the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed

and set aside and another one is rendered, ordering
defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as follows:

For the death of Jose Koh:

50
 P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and
U-1)
P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9,
tsn April 19, 1979)
P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)
P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)

For the death of Kim Koh McKee:

P 50,000.00 as moral damages

P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot
(Exh. M)
P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)
P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)

For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:

P 25,000.00 as moral damages

P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs.
D, D-1 and
D-2)
P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center
(Exhs. B and B-1)

For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:

P 25,000.00 as moral damages

P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center
(Exhs. G and
G-1)
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs.
G-2 and G-3)

51
 P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)
P 114.20 to Muoz Clinic (Exh. MM)

For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:

P 10,000.00 as moral damages

P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L
and L-1)
P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)

In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in

Civil Case No. 4477 and another P10,000.00; as counsel
(sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4478.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 26

The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings

that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence
which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the
law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private
respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision
of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not
allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee. 27 This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based on the
following findings of fact:

In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions,

the determinative issue in this appeal is posited in the
fourth assigned error as follows:

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER

OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN

52
 SWITCHED ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE
TO THE RIGHT.

Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee

testified thus:

Q What happened after that, as you approached

the bridge?

A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2)

boys tried to cross the right lane on the right
side of the highway going to San Fernando. My
father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to
avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he
blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid
hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck,
he switched on the headlights to warn the truck
driver, to slow down to give us the right of way
to come back to our right lane.

Q Did the truck slow down?

A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its

way.

Q What happened after that?

A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried

to go back to the right lane since the truck is
(sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes
and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact
(sic), sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22, 1977); or
(Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases).

xxx xxx xxx

53
 Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven
by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not
reduce its speed before the actual impact of
collision (sic) as you narrated in this Exhibit "1,"
how did you know (sic)?

A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced

his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our
right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn.
pp. 33-34 July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these
Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief).

Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction by

the following facts and circumstances:

1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio

Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped only when it had
already collided with the car:

xxx xxx xxx

Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing

in the criminal case:

xxx xxx xxx

Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation

witness because he was one of the first to arrive at the
scene of the accident. As a matter of fact, he brought one
of the injured passengers to the hospital.

We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to

defendants' witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of the
truck, and Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived across the
street.

54
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the
ordinary course of events people usually take the side of
the person with whom they are associated at the time of
the accident, because, as a general rule, they do not wish
to be identified with the person who was at fault. Thus an
imaginary bond is unconsciously created among the several
persons within the same group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-
G.R. No. 00310-CR, Jan. 31, 1962).

With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic)

that he is an accommodation witness. He did not go to the
succor of the injured persons. He said he wanted to call the
police authorities about the mishap, but his phone had no
dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the trial court in the
criminal case acted correctly in refusing to believe Dayrit.

2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the

claim that Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance from
the car, according to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief).
This contention of appellants was completely passed sub-
silencio or was not refuted by appellees in their brief.
Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits not included in the record.
According to the Table of Contents submitted by the court
below, said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants-
appellees. In this light, it is not far-fetched to surmise that
Galang's claim that he stopped was an eleventh-hour
desperate attempt to exculpate himself from imprisonment
and damages.

3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car

about 10 meters away:

ATTY. SOTTO:

Q Do I understand from your testimony that

inspite of the fact that you admitted that the

55
 road is straight and you may be able to (sic) see
500-1000 meters away from you any vehicle,
you first saw that car only about ten (10) meters
away from you for the first time?

xxx xxx xxx

A I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10)

meters away.

ATTY. SOTTO:

Q So, for clarification, you clarify and state under

your oath that you have (sic) not noticed it
before that ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5, Sept.
18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)

Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement

that Galang stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10)
meters away, with the truck running at 30 miles per hour,
as revealed in Galang's affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants'
brief), it is well-nigh impossible to avoid a collision on a
bridge.

5. Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, and not

because he waited for Jose Koh to return to his proper lane.
The police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuag, stated that
he found skid marks under the truck but there were not
(sic) skid marks behind the truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3,
1978). The presence of skid marks show (sic) that the truck
was speeding. Since the skid marks were found under the
truck and none were found at the rear of the truck, the
reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under the
truck were caused by the truck's front wheels when the
trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds before the mishap in
an endeavor to avoid the same. But, as aforesaid, Galang
saw the car at barely 10 meters away, a very short distance

56
 to avoid a collision, and in his futile endeavor to avoid the
collision he abruptly stepped on his brakes but the smashup
happened just the same.

For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang,

the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants
in the selection of their driver or in the supervision over
him. Appellees did not allege such defense of having
exercised the duties of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees in their
answers. They did not even adduce evidence that they did
in fact have methods of selection and programs of
supervision. The inattentiveness or negligence of Galang
was the proximate cause of the mishap. If Galang's
attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the
car earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters.
He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a
collision was already inevitable, because at the time that he
entered the bridge his attention was not riveted to the road
in front of him.

On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were

amply proven, but the items must be reduced. 28

A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the

facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of
which the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April
1984, 29 reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision
and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment of 12 November 1980. A
motion to reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent
Court on 4 July 1984. 30

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners allege that respondent Court:

57
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR
WHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY
BASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER'S
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY
COMMITTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
(sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE,
RESPONDENT COURT'S RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B,
PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON
SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT SURE
FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.

II

. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN

IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT
CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF GUILT
IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE
TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.

III

. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AND MADE A MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT
HELD: "IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE
RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE
NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.

IV

. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR;

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED

58
 ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO
THESE CASES.

. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS,
SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED
FACTS AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.

VI

. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN
THE RECORDS, AND SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY
LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.

VII

. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING
DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES. 31

In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private

respondents to Comment on the petition. 32 After the said
Comment 33 was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply 34 thereto; this

59
Court then gave due course to the instant petitions and required
petitioners to file their Brief, 35 which they accordingly complied with.

There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of

dissecting the arguments and counter-arguments, some observations
on the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are in order.

Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil
liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of Criminal Case No.
3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil Case
No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III of the trial court. The records do
not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may
therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to consolidate
Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-versa. The parties
may have then believed, and understandably so, since by then no
specific provision of law or ruling of this Court expressly allowed such a
consolidation, that an independent civil action, authorized under Article
33 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such as the civil cases
in this case, cannot be consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed,
such consolidation could have been farthest from their minds as Article
33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." Be that as it may, there was then no legal
impediment against such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules
of Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to
simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the
least expense to the parties litigants, 36 would have easily sustained a
consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous,
spectacle of two (2) judges appreciating, according to their respective
orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same
facts differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. Such
was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen
anymore. In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or Appeals, 37 this
Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules

60
of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for the
recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176
of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the
condition that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal
case.

Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No.

3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence, although already
final by virtue of the denial by no less than this Court of his last
attempt to set aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict
of conviction, has no relevance or importance to this case.

As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility arising from

fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new
Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action." 39 In Salta
vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima, 40 this Court stated:

. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil

actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same
manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may
proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal
case.

Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a

criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed
independently even during the pendency of the latter case,
the intention is patent to make the court's disposition of the
criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil
case. This must be so because the offenses specified in
Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not
mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a

61
 separate civil action because of the distinct separability of
their respective juridical cause or basis of action . . . .

What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the

decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is
the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would
have been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action was for
damages arising from a delict, in which case private respondents'
liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of
conviction in the criminal case against Galang would have been
conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private
respondents. 41

And now to the merits of the petition.

It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised
in this petition is whether or not respondent Court's findings in its
challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere
speculations, conjectures and presumptions.

The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts.

Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on
these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on
this Court. 42

The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of

facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside
when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the
trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to
a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment. 43The
same is true where the appellate court's conclusions are grounded
entirely on conjectures, speculations and surmises 44 or where the

62
conclusions of the lower courts are based on a misapprehension of
facts. 45

It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one
of the aforementioned exceptions as the findings and conclusions of
the trial court and the respondent Court in its challenged resolution are
not supported by the evidence, are based on an misapprehension of
facts and the inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The
respondent Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct
findings of fact.

In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that
the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision
occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of
the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed
negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose
Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the
petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's
lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two (2)
boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of
the car. As testified to by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:

Q What happened after that, as you approached

the bridge?

A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2)

boys tried to cross the right lane on the right
side of the highway going to San Fernando. My
father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to
avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he
blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid
hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck,
he switched on the headlights to warn the truck
driver, to slow down to give us the right of way
to come back to our right lane.

63
 Q Did the truck slow down?

A No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its

way.

Q What happened after that?

A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried

to go back to the right lane since the truck is
(sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes
and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact
(sic), sir. 46

Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross

examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary
in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril
death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified
as negligent.

Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 thus:

. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which a

reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do,
or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition,
930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury." (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol.
3, 265)

In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than
seventy years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:

64
 The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that (reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation?) If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
law. . . .

In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48

We held:

. . . Negligence is want of the care required by the

circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance
which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the
failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances. (citing Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35
Pac. 549 (1894).

On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the
facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be
imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car
away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural
course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would
be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the
side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under
what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself
in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not

65
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." 49

Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of
the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the
given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test,
therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot

be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause has been defined as:

. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom. 50

Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of
Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it
cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the
tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have

66
resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals
given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to
go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to
the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed
towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent
in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car
measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This
would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a
clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a
level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any
reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried
to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.

The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself

said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour
along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give
credence to private respondents' claim that there was an error in the
translation by the investigating officer of the truck driver's response in
Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or
miles per hour. The law presumes that official duty has been regularly
performed; 53 unless there is proof to the contrary, this presumption
holds. In the instant case, private respondents' claim is based on mere
conjecture.

The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the
earlier quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was
duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial
eyewitness to the mishap.

Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

67
 Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven
by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not
reduce its speed before the actual impact of
collision as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how
did you know?

A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced

his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our
right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn,
pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in
these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants'
Brief) 54

while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:

Q When you saw the truck, how was it moving?

A It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour,

sir.

Q Immediately after you saw this truck, do you

know what happened?

A I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and

I went to the place to help the victims. (tsn. 28,
April 19, 1979)

xxx xxx xxx

Q From the time you saw the truck to the time of

the impact, will you tell us if the said truck ever
stopped?

A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already

collided with the car and it was already
motionless. (tsn. 31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis
Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' Brief). 55

68
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in
failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to
avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting
accident.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law
of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.
In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
thereof. 56

In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57

We held:

The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear

chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence
of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words,
the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him in a position of
peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a person
who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent
or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986,
p. 165).

69
 The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent
defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a
plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in
peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to
some authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity
later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am.
Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).

In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58

We ruled:

The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court

in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil.
397 (1958), in this wise:

The doctrine of the last clear chance simply,

means that the negligence of a claimant does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence.

The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff

was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all
the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809
(1918); Glan People's Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo,
et al., G.R. No. 70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent
negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary
care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or
proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between
the accident and the more remote negligence of the

70
 plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff
[Picart v. Smith, supra].

Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the

purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may
also be raised as a defense to defeat claim (sic) for
damages.

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now

rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert
ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate
cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and
primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they
are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de
jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Article
2180 reads as follows:

The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not

only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when

the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all

71
 the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.

The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the

selection and supervision of employees. 60The answers of the private
respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this
defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.

The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November

1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil
Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984
finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.

In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death
must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution

of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision
of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED,
subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased
from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and
Kim Koh McKee.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Manila Electric v Remoquillo

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO
REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors
MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON,
CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO,
and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.

72
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of
Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street,
Manila, to repair a media agua said to be in a leaking condition. The
media agua was just below the window of the third story. Standing
on said media agua, Magno received from his son thru that window a
3 X 6 galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned
around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into
contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later
referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the media
agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. His
widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor
P10,000 as compensatory damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP784
as actual damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000 as moral and
exemplary damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand P3,000 as
attorneys fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
latter affirmed the judgment with slight modification by reducing the
attorneys fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. The electric company
has appealed said decision to us.
The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are conclusive
are stated in the following portions of its decision which we reproduce
below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary
wire stretched between poles on the street and carrying a charge of
3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before Pealozas
house was constructed. The record shows that during the construction
of said house a similar incident took place, although fortunate]y with
much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood which a carpenter was
holding happened to come in contact with the same wire, producing
some sparks. The owner of the house forthwith complained
to Defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and as a
result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by
means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.
At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises
ordered by the trial court, the distance from the electric wire to the
edge of the media agua on which the deceased was making repairs
was only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila
73
required that all wires be kept three feet from the
building. Appellant contends that in applying said regulations to the
case at bar the reckoning should not be from the edge of the media
agua but from the side of the house and that, thus measured, the
distance was almost 7 feet, or more then the minimum prescribed.
This contention is manifestly groundless, for not only is a media agua
an integral part of the building to which it is attached but to exclude it
in measuring the distance would defeat the purpose of the
regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even assuming that
the distance, within the meaning of the city regulations, should be
measured from the edge of the media agua, the fact that in the case
of the house involved herein such distance was actually less than 3
feet was due to the fault of the owner of said house, because the city
authorities gave him a permit to construct a media agua only one
meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but instead he built one having a width of
65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width permitted by the
authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the electric wire to less
than the prescribed minimum of 3 feet.
It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the
permit given to him by the city authorities for the construction of the
media agua, and that if he had not done so Appellants wire would
have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required distance of three
feet from the edge of the media agua. It is also a fact, however, that
after the media agua was constructed the owner was given a final
permit of occupancy of the house cralaw .
cralaw The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of
3,600 volts. There was, according to Appellant, no insulation that could
have rendered it safe, first, because there is no insulation material in
commercial use for such kind of wire; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
secondly, because the only insulation material that may be effective is
still in the experimental stage of development and, anyway, its costs
would be prohibitive
The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the Plaintiff is
that although the owner of the house in constructing the media agua
in question exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still, after making
that media agua, its construction though illegal, was finally approved
because he was given a final permit to occupy the house; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat it was the company that was at fault and
was guilty of negligence because although the electric wire in question

74
had been installed long before the construction of the house and in
accordance with the ordinance fixing a minimum of 3 feet, mere
compliance with the regulations does not satisfy the requirement of
due diligence nor avoid the need for adopting such other precautionary
measures as may be warranted; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
negligence cannot be determined by a simple matter of inches; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat all that the city did was to prescribe certain
minimum conditions and that just because the ordinance required that
primary electric wires should be not less than 3 feet from any house,
the obligation of due diligence is not fulfilled by placing such wires at a
distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of other factors. The
appellate court, however, refrained from stating or suggesting what
other precautionary measures could and should have been adopted.
After a careful study and discussion of the case and the circumstances
surrounding the same, we are inclined to agree to the contention
of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was primarily caused
by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity
of the media agua or rather its edge to the electric wire of the
company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the
city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the
media agua. We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of
negligence or as lacking in due diligence. Although the city ordinance
called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there was
actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the
side of the house of Pealoza. Even considering said regulation
distance of 3 feet as referring not to the side of a building, but to any
projecting part thereof, such as a media agua, had the house owner
followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the
construction of his media agua, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches
wide, the distance from the wires to the edge of said media agua
would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter
width for the media agua the city authorities must have wanted to
preserve the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any
portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner
disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by
17 3/8 inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the
Media agua as illegally constructed and the electric wires. And added
to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was its approval by
the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot lay
these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit at the door of

75
the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or regulation. The
Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any
illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and
said construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had
been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as
to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or
rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its
ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or
disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the present case, the
violation of the permit for the construction of the media agua was
not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had
said media agua been only one meter wide as allowed by the permit,
Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or
hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe margin between
the edge of the media agua and the yawning 2-story distance or
height from the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the fatal
contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires.
We realize that the presence of the wires in question quite close to the
house or its media agua was always a source of danger considering
their high voltage and uninsulated as they were, but the claim of the
company and the reasons given by it for not insulating said wires were
unrefuted as we gather from the findings of the Court of Appeals, and
so we have to accept them as satisfactory. Consequently, we may not
hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due diligence
in failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is
to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe
by the technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer. Of
course, a greater distance of say 6 feet or 12 feet would have
increased the margin of safety but other factors had to be considered
such as that the wires could not be strung or the posts supporting
them could not be located too far toward the middle of the street.
Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or
negligent act of Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother
to repair the media agua just below the third story window, it is to
be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do
so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and
experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger
to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in
the instant care, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting
where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands

76
and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all
prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his
arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own
electrocution.
In support of its theory and holding that Defendant-Appellant was
liable for damages the Court of Appeals cites the case of Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think the case is exactly
applicable. There, the premises involved was that elevated portion or
top of the walls of Intramuros, Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate.
In the words of the Court, it was a public place where persons come
to stroll, to rest and to enjoy themselves. The electric company was
clearly negligent in placing its wires so near the place that without
much difficulty or exertion, a person by stretching his hand out could
touch them. A boy named Astudillo, placing one foot on a projection,
reached out and actually grasped the electric wire and was
electrocuted. The person electrocuted in said case was a boy who was
in no position to realize the danger. In the present case, however, the
wires were well high over the street where there was no possible
danger to pedestrians. The only possible danger was to persons
standing on the media agua, but a media agua can hardly be
considered a public place where persons usually gather. Moreover, a
person standing on the media agua could not have reached the wires
with his hands alone. It was necessary as was done by Magno to hold
something long enough to reach the wire. Furthermore, Magno was
not a boy or a person immature but the father of a family, supposedly
a tinsmith trained and experienced in the repair of galvanized iron
roofs and media agua. Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric Co., supra, the court said that although it is a well-
established rule that the liability of electric companies for damages or
personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless
such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public.
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present
case the Defendant electric company could be considered negligent in
installing its electric wires so close to the house and media agua in
question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires (although
according to the unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to
make the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold
the Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such
supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate
and principal cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in

77
turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands
was the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, then his
heirs may not recover. Such was the holding of this Court in the case
of Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil., 8. In
that case, the electric company was found negligent in leaving
scattered on its premises fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15- year old
boy found and carried home. In the course of experimenting with said
fulminating caps, he opened one of them, held it out with his hands
while another boy applied a lighted match to it, causing it to explode
and injure one of his eyes eventually causing blindness in said eye.
Said this Tribunal in denying recovery for the
injury:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not
have been incurred but for the negligent act of the Defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless Plaintiffs own
act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but
rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such
as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its
contacting said iron sheet, considering the latters length of 6 feet. For
a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with
respect to injuries, we find the following citation
helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give
rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if
an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
(45 C.J. pp. 931-332.).

78
We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600
volts), uninsulated and so close to houses is a constant source of
danger, even death, especially to persons who having occasion to be
near said wires, do not adopt the necessary precautions. But may be,
the City of Manila authorities and the electric company could get
together and devise means of minimizing this danger to the public.
Just as the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughfares
may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because drivers of motor
vehicles may expect danger and slow down or even stop and take
other necessary precaution upon approaching said lanes, so, a similar
way may possibly be found. Since these high voltage wires cannot be
properly insulated and at reasonable cost, they might perhaps be
strung only up to the outskirts of the city where there are few houses
and few pedestrians and there step-down to a voltage where the wires
carrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for the better
protection of the public.
In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby reversed and the complaint filed against the
Company is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Astudillo vs Manila Electric

G.R. No. L-33380 December 17, 1930

TEODORA ASTUDILLO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr. for appellant.
Vicente Sotto and Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Diaz Astudillo met
his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a

79
wire connected with an electric light pole situated near Santa Lucia
Gate, Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother
of the deceased instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to secure from the Manila Electric Company damages in the
amount of P30,000. The answer of the company set up as special
defenses that the death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due solely to his
negligence and lack of care, and that the company had employed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the injury. After trial,
which included an ocular inspection of the place where the fatality
occurred, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant for the sum of P15,000, and costs.

As is well known, a wall surrounds the District of Intramuros, in the

City of Manila. At intervals, gates for the ingress and egress of
pedestrians and vehicles penetrate the wall. One of these openings
toward Manila Bay is known as the Santa Lucia Gate. Above this gate
and between the wall and a street of Intramuros is a considerable
space sodded with grass with the portion directly over the gate paved
with stone. Adjoining this place in Intramuros are the buildings of the
Ateneo de Manila, the Agustinian Convent, the Bureau of Public Works,
and the Santa Lucia Barracks. The proximity to these structures and to
the congested district in the Walled City has made this a public place
where persons come to stroll, to rest, and to enjoy themselves. An
employee of the City of Manila, a number of years ago, put up some
wire to keep persons from dirtying the premises, but this wire has
fallen down and is no obstacle to those desiring to make use of the
place. No prohibitory signs have been posted.

Near this place in the street of Intramuros is an electric light pole with
the corresponding wires. The pole presumably was located by the
municipal authorities and conforms in height to the requirements of
the franchise of the Manila Electric Company. The feeder wires are of
the insulated type, known as triple braid weather proof, required by
the franchise. The pole, with its wires, was erected in 1920. It was last
inspected by the City Electrician in 1923 or 1924. The pole was located
close enough to the public place here described, so that a person, by

80
reaching his arm out the full length, would be able to take hold of one
of the wires. It would appear, according to the City Electrician, that
even a wire of the triple braid weather proof type, if touched by a
person, would endanger the life of that person by electrocution.

About 6 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1928, a group of boys or

young men came to this public place. Two of them named Juan Diaz
Astudillo and Alejo Ponsoy sauntered over to where the electric post
was situated. They were there looking out towards Intramuros. For
exactly what reason, no one will ever know, but Juan Diaz Astudillo,
placing one foot on a projection, reached out and grasped a charged
electric wire. Death resulted almost instantly.

The matter principally discussed is the question of the defendant

company's liability under the circumstances stated. It is well
established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for
personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such
companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But
considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the
measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons
have a right to be. The poles must be so erected and the wires and
appliances must be so located the persons rightfully near the place will
not be injured. Particularly must there be proper insulation of the wires
and appliances in places where there is probable likelihood of human
contact therewith. (20 C. J., pp. 320 et seq.; San Juan Light & Transit
Co. vs. Requena [1912], 224 U. S., 89.)

We cannot agree with the defense of the Manila Electric Company in

the lower court to the effect that the death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was
due exclusively to his negligence. He only did the natural thing to be
expected of one not familiar with the danger arising from touching an
electric wire, and was wholly unconscious of his peril. Had not the wire
caused the death of this young man, it would undoubtedly have been
only a question of time when someone else, like a playful boy, would

81
have been induced to take hold of the wire, with fatal results. The
cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and
guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the Manila
Electric Company in so placing its pole and wires as to be within
proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility
ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a
highly charged and defectively insulated wire.

As we understand the position of the Manila Electric Company on

appeal, its principal defense now is that it has fully complied with the
provisions of its franchise and of the ordinances of the City of Manila.
It is undeniable that the violation of franchise, an ordinance, or a
statute might constitute negligence. But the converse is not
necessarily true, and compliance with a franchise, an ordinance, or a
statute is not conclusive proof that there was no negligence. The
franchise, ordinance, or statute merely states the minimum conditions.
The fulfillment of these conditions does not render unnecessary other
precautions required by ordinary care. (Moore vs. Hart [1916], 171
Ky., 725; Oliver vs. Weaver [1923], 72 Colo., 540; Caldwell vs. New
Jersey Steamboat Co. [1872], 47 N. Y., 282; Consolidated Electric
Light & Power Co. vs. Healy [1902], 65 Kan., 798.)

The company further defends in this court on the ground that it has
not been proven that the deceased is an acknowledged natural child of
the plaintiff mother. Technically this is correct. (Civil Code, art. 944).
At the same time, it should first of all be mentioned that, so far as we
know, this point was not raised in the lower court. Further, while the
mother may thus be precluded from succeeding to the estate of the
son, yet we know of no reason why she cannot be permitted to secure
damages from the company when the negligence of this company
resulted in the death of her child.lawphi1>net

We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to damages. But

the evidence indicative of the true measure of those damages is sadly
deficient. All that we know certainly is that the deceased was less than
20 years of age, a student, and working in the Ateneo de Manila, but

82
at what wages we are not told. We are also shown that approximately
P200 was needed to defray the travel and funeral expenses. As would
happen in the case of a jury who have before them one of the parents,
her position to life, and the age and sex of the child, varying opinions,
have been disclosed in the court regarding the estimate of the
damages with reference to the next of kin. Various sums have been
suggested, beginning as low as P1,000 and extending as high as
P5,000. A majority of the court finally arrived at the sum of P1,500 as
appropriate damages in this case. The basis of this award would be the
P1,000 which have been allowed in other cases for the death of young
children without there having been tendered any special proof of the
amount of damages suffered, in connection with which should be taken
into account the more mature age of the boy in the case at bar,
together with the particular expenses caused by his death.
(Manzanares vs Moreta [1918], 38 Phil., 821; Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant [1930], 54 Phil.,
327; Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co. [1930], p. 18, ante.)

In the light of the foregoing, the various errors assigned by the

appellant will in the main be overruled, but as above indicated, the
judgment will be modified by allowing the plaintiff to recover from the
defendant the sum of P1,500, and the costs of both instances.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ.,

concur.

83