RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations
ults of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother
and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after
he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved
in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar
of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La
Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at
the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated September 1998, he was
allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must
submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November
1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La Union
showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E. Cerezo,
showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the
successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of
the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his
oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's
petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his
Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the
"legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenshipi[1] in strict
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship
shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG
adds that (w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine
citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of
majority."ii[2] In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must
concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective,
namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of
the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made 'upon reaching the age of
majority.iii[3] The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching
the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted
by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing
Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s.
1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an
election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable
time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable
time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar
circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation
of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase reasonable period" and
the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A.
No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit
of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15
July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1.I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in
my school records and other official document;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for
Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to
vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me
before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to
(sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the
question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a
"reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. iv[4] This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided
that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines.v[5] Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January
17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority" are Philippine citizens. vi[6] It should be noted, however, that
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution.vii[7] If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under
the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if
the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution.viii[8]
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to
made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof,
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be
filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The
1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching
the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching
twenty-one (21) years.ix[9] In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the
election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority.x[10] The phrase reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that
the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.xi[11] However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, xii[12] that
the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that
three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino.xiii[13]
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16,1944. His election of citizenship was made on
May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven
(7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election
has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority.xiv[14]
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already
thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age
of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of
majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick,
the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated,
in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching
erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a
refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,xv[15] the pertinent portion of
which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an
alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he cane of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928,
and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was
already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s].
These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. xvi[16]
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances
obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A.
No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him.
Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by
the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine
citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a
Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights
and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil.
332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. xvii[17]
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives,xviii[18] where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court we held:
Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a
positive act of Philippine citizenship (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He
has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected
to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply
the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those
who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less
binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office
where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an
alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There
is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-
one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have bean superfluous but would also have resulted
in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? xix[19]
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even
if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived
in the Philippines, all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino,
controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the
recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from
the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention
to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching
has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file the same with
the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in
making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. xx[20] One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from
his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's
application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and
January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-
336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner,
Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May
1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and
native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949,
at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the
Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated
in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She
served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao
Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her
election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo
warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged
Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had
renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc
dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution
shows that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino
citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and
filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the
petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . .
no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of
petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under
Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequence. The evidence adduced by
petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated
renunciation of her Filipino citizenship. xxi[1]
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-
election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a
petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC,
First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was
likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC
92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when
she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles,
in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution
dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the
instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows
that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution
of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the
same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just
in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having
put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in
character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions,
the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues
tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb
and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and
SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS
the present petition.
SO ORDERED.xxii[2]
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution
but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc
Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition;
questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office
because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of
the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987
Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her
also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3)
and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian
Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in
EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly
qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an
Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the
private respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in
her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of
residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a
citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine
citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport
cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here
in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the
status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for
the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply
with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and
the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration
of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally
repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship,
private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is
disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying
the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in
Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,xxiii[3] that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again
as the occasion may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier
Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into
effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were
the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act
of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the
Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and
except such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced
by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to
wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973xxiv[4] and
1987xxv[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of
dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private
respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine
citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondents
application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her
of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws
of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign
country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon
or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the
laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must
be express. Petitioners contention that the application of private respondent
for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of
merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELECxxvi[6] and in
the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.xxvii[7]
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent
Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not
mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that
respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April
22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor
of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a
holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are
not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in
the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. xxviii[8] As held by this court in
the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones
citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the
case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian
citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most,
private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino,
as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino
parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for
losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or
renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go
through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private
respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of
Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified dual
citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same
with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. xxix[9]
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any
act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual
citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The
Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No.
7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it
was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.xxx[10] The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. xxxi[11] This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent
executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly
registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on
May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport
of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary
Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by
the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged
dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective,
petitioners claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in
judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding
challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.xxxii[12] He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be
threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of
res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,xxxiii[13] an exception to
this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that
the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the
following must be present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where
said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case
did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that
reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though
not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. xxxiv[14] Indeed, there
appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of
citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by
petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior
cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to
warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue
notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No.
98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run
for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC,
FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential
elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes)
certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite
his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that
Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec,
contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the
case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding
qualification of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a
Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are
"those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced
by the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His
citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at
the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any
other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to
his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an
American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced
by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of
the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House
of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen."xxxv[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental
law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.xxxvi[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took
an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision
of law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance
of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of
an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of
alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino
citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he
does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And
provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to
participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the
period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country.
Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be
automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection
with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.xxxvii[3] He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.xxxviii[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision xxxix[5] dismissing the petition
for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections.
The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.xl[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's
decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased
being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a
citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the
fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his
natural-born status.xli[7]
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino
who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-
born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to
the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He
insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that
natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a
natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in
Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of
being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. xlii[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds
of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who
at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born
citizen thereof.xliii[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship."xliv[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. xlv[11] To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualificationsxlvi[12] and none of the disqualificationsxlvii[13] provided by law to
become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is
satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated
rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.xlviii[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63),
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3)
by direct act of Congress.xlix[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization
is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.l[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who
wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualificationsli[17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of
C.A. 473.lii[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; liii[19] (2)
service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;liv[20] (3) service
in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;lv[21] (4) marriage
of a Filipino woman to an alien;lvi[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.lvii
[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,lviii[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630],
the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines. [Italics in the original.]lix[25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.lx
[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same
with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.lxi[27] It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen
since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As
correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen"
was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any
act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,lxii[28] of Filipino
mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship.
Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously
because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they
also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After
defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence:
"Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2)
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The
reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born
or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the
"sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the House.lxiii[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is
merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. lxiv[30] In
the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the
office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.lxv[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
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