ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND STAFF V. ATTY.

DELA CRUZ

Facts:

Disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the SLU-LHS against Atty. Dela Cruz, its principal, on
the ff grounds:

Gross Misconduct: there were pending cases filed against the respondent: criminal case for child abuse; admin case
for unethical acts of misappropriating money for teachers; and the labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty for illegal
deduction of salary.

Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. He
was married in 1982 and they separated in-fact a year after. 7 years after, he contracts another marriage, but this was
annulled for being bigamous.

Malpractice: respondent notarized documents (14 in total), from 88-97 despite the expiration of his notarial
commission in 87.

Respondent denied the charges in the cases pending against him, but admitted his second marriage and its
subsequent nullification. He also admitted having notarized documents when his notarial commission had already
expired. However, he offered defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the
complained acts.

IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Dela Cruz for 1 year for his bigamous marriage and 1 year also for notarizing without
commission (2 years total)

Held:

SC finds respondent guilty of immoral conduct, and suspended him from the practice of law for 2 years, and another
2 years for notarizing documents.

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous marriage. However, after his failed
first marriage, he remained celibate until the 2nd marriage, showed his good intentions by marrying the 2nd wife,
and he never absconded in his family duties. The SC finds that penalty of disbarment is too harsh.

As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized documents without the necessary commission, SC stresses
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. For doing such constitutes not only malpractice but also the
crime of falsification of public documents. Respondent also violated the Notarial Law for so doing, and this falls
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 and Canon 7.

The other cases against respondent are pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of
innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent
ADVINCULA V. MACABATA

FACTS

Atty. Macabata was the counsel of Cynthia Advincula. In two separate incidents, Atty. Macabata turnedthe head of
Advincula and kissed her on the lips. These kissing incidents occurred after meetings regarding a case that
Advincula was involved in. in both incidents, Atty. Macabata kissed Advincula inside the car, just before dropping
her off in a public street. Atty. Macabata apologized to Advincula via text messages immediately after the 2nd
kissing incident.

Advincula filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Macabata on the ground of grossly immoral character. Atty.
Macabata admitted that he did kiss Advincula, but that this was due to his feelings toward Advincula.

ISSUE

Is Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to merit his disbarment?

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly immoral character.

Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be

reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to show the
common sense of decency. To merit a disbarment, the act must be grossly immoral.

Atty. Macabatas act of kissing Advincula was not grossly immoral. The kiss was not motivated by malice. This was
proven by Atty. Macabatas immediate apology and the fact that it happened in a well-populated place. Advincula
failed to prove that Atty. Macabata lured her or took advantage of her.

While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty. Macabata was reprimanded and given a stern warning. The
court described his kissing of Advincula as distasteful.

(The Supreme Court also said that greetings like beso are ok.)

In the case of CONRADO QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR., Per Curiam, En Banc, A.C. No. 7054,
December 4, 2009, the Philippine Supreme Court disbarred from the practice of law for professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule
19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.

In a complaint for disbarment, Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of
committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court:

(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment
of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to
assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and RTC in the unlawful detainer
case rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer
case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of
the unlawful detainer case;

(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and
frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant
and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;

(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and
deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in
the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an
imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by
the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of
preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.

(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and
reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondents clients.

(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for annulment of
judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;

(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel for
the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.

Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-
48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.

The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762,
Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges
against the respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:

While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his client with all the
fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the
dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and
defend the cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage
multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.

The case posed to the Supreme Court core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed
unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.

The Court took take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the
respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and
Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. , the Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for
his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the
execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.

First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance
of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for
lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA held:

Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for
failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City over the ejectment case.

Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned the
MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment
(docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss
filed.

Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No.
Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The
records show that these petitions were both dismissed for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs to
file the petition.

Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of title, the
respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer
case. The respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part
of forest land.

Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in several
courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of
complainants title and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and
avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.

Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by
professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid
the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of
procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his actions, the respondent used procedural
rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning
parties in that case.

The Court added that the respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing
of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to
degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure; and add to the congestion of the
heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
It stated that while the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a
procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent petitions involving the
same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora,
but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful
detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment
and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this
decision had become final.

The records also revealed that the respondent committed willful,

intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.

First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited
extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph
of the petition, as follows:

In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then
available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly sold out the interest of the
petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false
pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived
with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein)

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for reconsideration or for
new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed that the decisions rendered both by the
MeTC and the RTC are null and void. These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the
purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the
reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below.

Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for annulment of
title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence
reversion proceedings of public lands on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a
private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be
represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in
the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he
alone stood as counsel for the plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the
Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.

Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition
for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired in the
hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:

Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the
aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing
distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE
MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE
COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD. [Underscoring and emphasis theirs]

The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the respondents
application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys motion to dismiss. The
records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents application for injunctive relief pending
the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party. As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of
RTC-Branch 101:

Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the
Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true.

how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases as
required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by
Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring
theirs]

The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took advantage
of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support,
through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing.

The Court found the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for
violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or
allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an
officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice, and that he is expected to
act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work. His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the
court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. In case of
conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.

In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which reads:

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW

Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and
honor. He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. The
recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually
committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.

The Court added that good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of
another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the
absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious." Bad faith, on the other
hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for
an ulterior purpose. As both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and,
more particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.

In this case, the Court found that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients. It drew
this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards
forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal
knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.

The Court added that while a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits
and probable results of his clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes,
and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission
to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within
the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client
does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.

The Court further stated that the sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the
complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to
determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of
justice an issue where the complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment
proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also
explained in the case In re: Almacen:

. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding
is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.

xxx

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as
an officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que and his counsel
to file the present disbarment case.
In fine, the Court said that given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and
the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the
orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the
respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice
which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor
and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything
else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor
tolerate.

Linsangan v. Tolentino
n 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging
that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, pirated a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said
client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangans allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labianos calling card which appears as follows:
FRONT

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

BACK

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of such
calling cards.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of Atty. Pedro
Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should not
steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result
or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangans clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an
unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he actually knew her later in the
proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law office. Through Labianos actions, Atty.
Tolentinos law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labianos word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more favorable result.
Labianos calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance legal actions for
the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he
has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of
his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
clients cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states w/ financial assistance, was clearly used to entice clients
(who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal
actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal and direct
hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At any rate, for al

HUYSSENvsGUTIERREZ
Topic:Canon6

Facts: Complainant alleged that in 1995, she and her three sons, all American citizens, applied for
PhilippineVisas.Respondenttoldcomplainantthatinorderthatgettheirvisaapplicationstheyneededto
deposit acertainsum of moneyforaperiodof one year whichcouldbewithdrawnafterone year.
Believingitwastrue,shepaidatotalof$20,000buttherespondentfailedtogiveherofficialreceipt
thereofupondemand.Afterayear,shedemandedreturnofsuchmoneybutAttyGutierrez,numerously,
failedtodoso.

Respondentdeniedtheallegationsinthecomplaintclaimingthathavingneverphysicallyreceivedthe
moneymentionedinthecomplaint,hecouldnothaveappropriatedorpocketedthesame.Hesaidthe
amountwasusedaspaymentforservicesrenderedforobtainingthepermanentvisasinthePhilippines.

Respondentdeniedhemisappropriatedthesaidamountandinterposedthedefensethathedeliveredittoa
certainAtty.MendozawhoassistedcomplainantandchildrenintheirapplicationforvisaintheBID.

Uponthecontinuousdemandofthepetitioner,therespondentpromisedtosendacheckaspaymentbut
all is dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered
stoppedbyrespondent.

Additionally,duringthecourseoftheinvestigation,respondentfailedmultipletimestoattendtohearings
withoutlegalcause.

Ruling: Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report recommending the
disbarmentofrespondent.SuchrulingisaffirmedbyIBP.
Issue:W/NAttyGutierrezshouldbedisbarredfor

Held:Yes,AttyGutierrezisdisbarred.
AccordingtoRule6.02ofCanon6oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitywhichreads:

"Alawyerinthegovernmentserviceshallnotusehispublicpositiontopromoteoradvancehisprivate
interests,norallowthelattertointerferewithhispublicduties.

Inthecaseabar,itshowsthatAttyGutierrezmakesitappearthatthemoneyinquestionwasofficially
depositedintheBureauofImmigrationandDeportationthroughtheletterssignedbyhim.

HealsodidnotpresentanyotherevidencethatAttyMendozaexistedandifreallydead,hemust ve
shownacopyofhisdeathcertificate.Worse,theactionofrespondentinshiftingtheblametosomeone
whohasbeennaturallysilencedbyfate,isnotonlyimpudentbutdownrightignominious.

Whenrespondentissuedthepostdatedchecksashismoralobligation,heindirectlyadmittedthechargeof
misconduct.

Whentheintegrityofamemberofthebarischallenged,itisnotenoughthathedenythechargesagainst
him;hemustmeettheissueandovercometheevidenceagainsthim.12Hemustshowproofthathestill
maintainsthatdegreeofmoralityandintegritywhichatalltimesisexpectedofhim.Inthecaseatbar,
respondentclearlyfellshortofhisduty.Recordsshowthateventhoughhewasgiventheopportunityto
answerthechargesandcontroverttheevidenceagainsthiminaformalinvestigation,hefailed,without
anyplausiblereason,toappearseveraltimeswheneverthecasewassetforreceptionofhisevidence
despiteduenotice.

Timeandagain,wehavedeclaredthatthepracticeoflawisanobleprofession.Itisaspecialprivilege
bestowedonlyuponthosewhoarecompetentintellectually,academicallyandmorally.Alawyermustat
alltimesconducthimself,especiallyinhisdealingswithhisclientsandthepublicatlarge,withhonesty
andintegrityinamannerbeyondreproach.Hemustfaithfullyperformhisdutiestosociety,tothebar,to
thecourtsandtohisclients.Aviolationofthehighstandardsofthelegalprofessionsubjectsthelawyer
toadministrativesanctionswhichincludessuspensionanddisbarment.Moreimportantly,possessionof
goodmoral character must becontinuous as arequirementtotheenjoyment oftheprivilege of law
practice;otherwise,thelossthereofisagroundfortherevocationofsuchprivilege.

Asalawyer,whowasalsoapublicofficer,respondentmiserablyfailedtocopewiththestrictdemands
andhighstandardsofthelegalprofession.

Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standardsoftheBarandthuspreservethefaithofthepublicinthelegalprofession,respondentdeserves
theultimatepenaltyofexpulsionfromtheesteemedbrotherhoodoflawyers.

OlazovsTinga(A.M.No.1057SC)
Topic:Canon6
Facts:
ThisisadisbarmentcaseagainstretiredSupremeCourtAssociateJusticeDanteO.Tinga(respondent)
filedbyMr.JovitoS.Olazo(complainant).TherespondentischargedofviolatingRule6.02,Rule6.03
andRule1.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityforrepresentingconflictinginterests.
TheFirstCharge:ViolationofRule6.02Inthecomplaint,thecomplainantclaimedthattherespondent
abusedhispositionasCongressmanandasamemberoftheCommitteeonAwardswhenheunduly
interferedwiththecomplainantssalesapplicationbecauseofhispersonalinterestoverthesubjectland.
TheSecondCharge:ViolationofRule6.03Thesecondchargeinvolvesanotherparceloflandwithinthe
proclaimedareasbelongingtoManuelOlazo,thecomplainantsbrother.Thecomplainantallegedthatthe
respondentpersuadedMiguelOlazotodirectManueltoconveyhisrightsoverthelandtoJosephJeffrey
Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in
unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified
beneficiaryunderMemorandumNo.119.ThecomplainantaverredthatJosephJeffreyRodriguezisnota
bonafideresidentoftheproclaimedareasanddoesnotqualifyforanaward.Thecomplainantalsoalleged
thattherespondentviolatedSection7(b)(2)oftheCodeofConductandEthicalStandardsforPublic
OfficialsandEmployeesorRepublicAct(R.A.)No.6713sinceheengagedinthepracticeoflaw,within
the oneyear prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
RodriguezbeforetheCommitteeonAwards.

Issues:
W/Nrespondentwasengagedinthepracticeoflaw,andW/NrespondentisliableunderRules6.02,6.03
and1.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.

Held:No,casedismissed.

InCayetanov.Monsod,wedefinedthepracticeoflawasanyactivity,inandoutofcourt,thatrequires
theapplicationoflaw,legalprocedure,knowledge,trainingandexperience.Moreover,weruledthatto
engageinthepracticeoflawistoperformthoseactswhicharecharacteristicsoftheprofession;to
practicelawistogivenoticeorrenderanykindofservice,whichdeviceorservicerequirestheuseinany
degreeoflegalknowledgeorskill.

thecomplainant,too,failedtosufficientlyestablishthattherespondentwasengagedinthepracticeof
law.atfacevalue,thelegalservicerenderedbytherespondentwaslimitedonlyinthepreparationofa
singledocument. in borja,sr.v.sulyap,inc.,wespecificallydescribedprivatepracticeoflawasonethat
contemplatesasuccessionofactsofthesamenaturehabituallyorcustomarilyholdingone sselftothe
publicasalawyer.

Alltold,consideringtheseriousconsequencesofthepenaltyofdisbarmentorsuspensionofamemberof
theBar,theburdenrestsonthecomplainanttopresentclear,convincingandsatisfactoryproofforthe
Courttoexerciseitsdisciplinarypowers. Therespondentgenerallyisundernoobligationtoprovehis/her
defense,untiltheburdenshiftstohim/herbecauseofwhatthecomplainanthasproven.Wherenocase
hasinthefirstplacebeenproven,nothinghastoberebuttedindefense.

HUYSSENvsGUTIERREZ
Topic:Canon6

Facts: Complainant alleged that in 1995, she and her three sons, all American citizens, applied for
PhilippineVisas.Respondenttoldcomplainantthatinorderthatgettheirvisaapplicationstheyneededto
deposit acertainsum of moneyforaperiodof one year whichcouldbewithdrawnafterone year.
Believingitwastrue,shepaidatotalof$20,000buttherespondentfailedtogiveherofficialreceipt
thereofupondemand.Afterayear,shedemandedreturnofsuchmoneybutAttyGutierrez,numerously,
failedtodoso.

Respondentdeniedtheallegationsinthecomplaintclaimingthathavingneverphysicallyreceivedthe
moneymentionedinthecomplaint,hecouldnothaveappropriatedorpocketedthesame.Hesaidthe
amountwasusedaspaymentforservicesrenderedforobtainingthepermanentvisasinthePhilippines.

Respondentdeniedhemisappropriatedthesaidamountandinterposedthedefensethathedeliveredittoa
certainAtty.MendozawhoassistedcomplainantandchildrenintheirapplicationforvisaintheBID.

Uponthecontinuousdemandofthepetitioner,therespondentpromisedtosendacheckaspaymentbut
all is dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered
stoppedbyrespondent.

Additionally,duringthecourseoftheinvestigation,respondentfailedmultipletimestoattendtohearings
withoutlegalcause.

Ruling: Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report recommending the
disbarmentofrespondent.SuchrulingisaffirmedbyIBP.

Issue:W/NAttyGutierrezshouldbedisbarredfor

Held:Yes,AttyGutierrezisdisbarred.
AccordingtoRule6.02ofCanon6oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitywhichreads:

"Alawyerinthegovernmentserviceshallnotusehispublicpositiontopromoteoradvancehisprivate
interests,norallowthelattertointerferewithhispublicduties.

Inthecaseabar,itshowsthatAttyGutierrezmakesitappearthatthemoneyinquestionwasofficially
depositedintheBureauofImmigrationandDeportationthroughtheletterssignedbyhim.

HealsodidnotpresentanyotherevidencethatAttyMendozaexistedandifreallydead,hemust ve
shownacopyofhisdeathcertificate.Worse,theactionofrespondentinshiftingtheblametosomeone
whohasbeennaturallysilencedbyfate,isnotonlyimpudentbutdownrightignominious.

Whenrespondentissuedthepostdatedchecksashismoralobligation,heindirectlyadmittedthechargeof
misconduct.

Whentheintegrityofamemberofthebarischallenged,itisnotenoughthathedenythechargesagainst
him;hemustmeettheissueandovercometheevidenceagainsthim.12Hemustshowproofthathestill
maintainsthatdegreeofmoralityandintegritywhichatalltimesisexpectedofhim.Inthecaseatbar,
respondentclearlyfellshortofhisduty.Recordsshowthateventhoughhewasgiventheopportunityto
answerthechargesandcontroverttheevidenceagainsthiminaformalinvestigation,hefailed,without
anyplausiblereason,toappearseveraltimeswheneverthecasewassetforreceptionofhisevidence
despiteduenotice.

Timeandagain,wehavedeclaredthatthepracticeoflawisanobleprofession.Itisaspecialprivilege
bestowedonlyuponthosewhoarecompetentintellectually,academicallyandmorally.Alawyermustat
alltimesconducthimself,especiallyinhisdealingswithhisclientsandthepublicatlarge,withhonesty
andintegrityinamannerbeyondreproach.Hemustfaithfullyperformhisdutiestosociety,tothebar,to
thecourtsandtohisclients.Aviolationofthehighstandardsofthelegalprofessionsubjectsthelawyer
toadministrativesanctionswhichincludessuspensionanddisbarment.Moreimportantly,possessionof
goodmoral character must becontinuous as arequirementtotheenjoyment oftheprivilege of law
practice;otherwise,thelossthereofisagroundfortherevocationofsuchprivilege.

Asalawyer,whowasalsoapublicofficer,respondentmiserablyfailedtocopewiththestrictdemands
andhighstandardsofthelegalprofession.

Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standardsoftheBarandthuspreservethefaithofthepublicinthelegalprofession,respondentdeserves
theultimatepenaltyofexpulsionfromtheesteemedbrotherhoodoflawyers.

OlazovsTinga(A.M.No.1057SC)
Topic:Canon6

Facts:
ThisisadisbarmentcaseagainstretiredSupremeCourtAssociateJusticeDanteO.Tinga(respondent)
filedbyMr.JovitoS.Olazo(complainant).TherespondentischargedofviolatingRule6.02,Rule6.03
andRule1.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityforrepresentingconflictinginterests.
TheFirstCharge:ViolationofRule6.02Inthecomplaint,thecomplainantclaimedthattherespondent
abusedhispositionasCongressmanandasamemberoftheCommitteeonAwardswhenheunduly
interferedwiththecomplainantssalesapplicationbecauseofhispersonalinterestoverthesubjectland.
TheSecondCharge:ViolationofRule6.03Thesecondchargeinvolvesanotherparceloflandwithinthe
proclaimedareasbelongingtoManuelOlazo,thecomplainantsbrother.Thecomplainantallegedthatthe
respondentpersuadedMiguelOlazotodirectManueltoconveyhisrightsoverthelandtoJosephJeffrey
Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in
unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified
beneficiaryunderMemorandumNo.119.ThecomplainantaverredthatJosephJeffreyRodriguezisnota
bonafideresidentoftheproclaimedareasanddoesnotqualifyforanaward.Thecomplainantalsoalleged
thattherespondentviolatedSection7(b)(2)oftheCodeofConductandEthicalStandardsforPublic
OfficialsandEmployeesorRepublicAct(R.A.)No.6713sinceheengagedinthepracticeoflaw,within
the oneyear prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
RodriguezbeforetheCommitteeonAwards.

Issues:
W/Nrespondentwasengagedinthepracticeoflaw,andW/NrespondentisliableunderRules6.02,6.03
and1.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.

Held:No,casedismissed.

InCayetanov.Monsod,wedefinedthepracticeoflawasanyactivity,inandoutofcourt,thatrequires
theapplicationoflaw,legalprocedure,knowledge,trainingandexperience.Moreover,weruledthatto
engageinthepracticeoflawistoperformthoseactswhicharecharacteristicsoftheprofession;to
practicelawistogivenoticeorrenderanykindofservice,whichdeviceorservicerequirestheuseinany
degreeoflegalknowledgeorskill.

thecomplainant,too,failedtosufficientlyestablishthattherespondentwasengagedinthepracticeof
law.atfacevalue,thelegalservicerenderedbytherespondentwaslimitedonlyinthepreparationofa
singledocument. in borja,sr.v.sulyap,inc.,wespecificallydescribedprivatepracticeoflawasonethat
contemplatesasuccessionofactsofthesamenaturehabituallyorcustomarilyholdingone sselftothe
publicasalawyer.

Alltold,consideringtheseriousconsequencesofthepenaltyofdisbarmentorsuspensionofamemberof
theBar,theburdenrestsonthecomplainanttopresentclear,convincingandsatisfactoryproofforthe
Courttoexerciseitsdisciplinarypowers. Therespondentgenerallyisundernoobligationtoprovehis/her
defense,untiltheburdenshiftstohim/herbecauseofwhatthecomplainanthasproven.Wherenocase
hasinthefirstplacebeenproven,nothinghastoberebuttedindefense.

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, VS. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO

A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006

Facts:

Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat,
knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore,
complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed
and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the
complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

 Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice
of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to
prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months of January and
February 1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for
the month of April 1996.

Issue:

whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondents role as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor

Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:

1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). However, the Court finds respondent
liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
against unlawful conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713).

Canon 6 provides that the Code shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties. A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition
not [to] represent conflicting interests. However, this rule is subject to certain
limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no
conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in unlawful x
x x conduct. Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a
government employee to engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with [his] official functions.

2. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature

habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently

and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This
argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy
services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are
usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within
the ambit of the term practice of law.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY

INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A. M. No. 491
October 6, 1989

FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center, the newly-
elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4,1989 before the Supreme
Court en banc. However, disturbed by the widespread reports received by some
members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the
proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers
about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo
Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes,
and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of
which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the
Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar,
resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports. Media reports done by Mr.Jurado, Mr. Mauricio and Mr. Locsin in
the newspapers opened the avenue for investigation on the anomalies in the IBP
Elections. The following violations are, Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes
by the candidates for president, executive vice-president, the officers or candidates for
the House of Delegates and Board of Governors, Use of PNB plane in the campaign,
Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates, Formation of tickets
and single slates, Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, and entertainment to
delegates, Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon, Paying the dues or
other indebtedness of any member (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws), Distribution of materials
other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a],
IBP By-Laws), Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws) and
Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a
candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws). The prohibited acts are against the IBP By-Laws
more specifically Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-
political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Sec. 14. Prohibited acts and
practices relative to elections and Section 12[d] of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for
violations of the above rules: Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 [Prohibited
Acts and Practices Relative to Elections) of the By-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected,
without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the
By-laws of the Integrated Bar.

ISSUE: Is the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar
conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section
14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political"
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

DECISION: It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987
Constitution [See. 8, Art. VIII] providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of
seven [7] members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to
participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much
interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be
inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. The
decision are:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates
[approved by this Court in its Resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287] of the
following national officers:

[a] the officers of the House of Delegates;

[b] the IBP president; and

[c] the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of
the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected
by the Board of Governors [composed of the governors of the nine (9) IBP regions] from
among themselves [as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws] should be
restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term [which was abolished by this
Court's Resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287] should be as it is hereby
restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of President. The incoming Board of Governors shall
then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of
Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine [9] IBP regions. One who has
served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine [9] regions
shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine [9] regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The
governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There shall also
be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33[b], Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
[b] The President and Executive Vice-President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and
Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of
Delegates.'
7. Section 33[g] of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
Secretary, Treasurer and Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Delegates, is hereby
repealed.
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine [9] Governors from the nine [9]
regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of
one [1] Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of
Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the
different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V, is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one [1] month before the
national convention. - The delegates from each region shall elect the Governor for their
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in
the region.
10. Section33 [a], Article V, is hereby amended by adding the following provision as part
of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held
prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39 [a], [b], [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], and [7] of Article VI should be, as they are
hereby, deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws, including its amendment by the Resolution en banc
of this Court of July 9, 1985 [Bar Matter No. 287] that are inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine [9] IBP regions
within three [3] months, after the promulgation of the Court's Resolution in this case.
Within thirty [30] days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central
Office in Manila to elect from among themselves, the IBP National President and
Executive Vice-President. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of
the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this
Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates", as well as those identified
in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that
election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidates for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker Board shall be appointed by the Court
to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here
made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other
measures as are warranted in the premises.
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN, vs. BENEDICTO
M. BALAJADIA
G.R. No. 169517
March 14, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against
them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority,
grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of
parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit,
respondent asserted that he is a practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office
address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. However,
certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines showed that respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine
Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the

complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that
the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was
patterned after Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had
previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject
matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same

secretary; one for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 oclock in the morning and
another for the parking incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00 oclock in
the afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00
oclock parking incident correctly alleged that he is a businessman with office address at
Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. However, the complaint-
affidavit regarding the 10:00 oclock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant
petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquinos
secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. Hence, it
was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a practicing lawyer based
in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session
Road, Baguio City, which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law
office address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, executed an affidavit admitting the

mistake in the preparation of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not
read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits
contained the same allegations with respect to his occupation and office
address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a
practicing lawyer.

Petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt
for having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift
the blame to Atty. Aquinos secretary.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

Held:
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and

hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given
to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed
by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any
of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting

as such without authority;

x x x x.

In several cases, the Supreme Court have ruled that the unauthorized practice of
law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes
indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for
the unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in
the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are an affront
to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of
justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is
a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear
that he intended to commit it.

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondents claim that he
never intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence
on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the
circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit
conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances
show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed,
the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing

lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make
him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the
unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court
pleadings on behalf of his client; appearing before court hearings as an
attorney; manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being previously
denied admission to the bar; or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out
himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do
so.

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as
an attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable
for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondents deliberate

intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as such without authority, he is
hereby warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more

careful and circumspect in his future actions.

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO

A.C. No. 6317, August 31, 2006
FACTS:
Sometime in January 2001, Luzviminda C. Lijauco engaged the services of Atty. Rogelio
P. Terrado for P 70,000 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development
Bank in the amount of P180,000 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located
in Calamba, Laguna. The said foreclosed house and lot is the subject of a petition for
the issuance of writ of possession then pending before the RTC of Binan Laguna
docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.Ms. Lijauco alleged that Atty. Terrado failed to
appear in the hearing for the issuance of Writ of Possession and did not protect her
interest in allowing her to participate in a Compromise Agreement in order to end the
LRC Case No. B-2610. She filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Terrado for
gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. In his
defense, Atty. Terrado claims that the P 70,000 legal fees he received is purely and
solely for the recovery of the P 180,000 savings account. The complaint was then
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding Atty.
Terrado guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating
commissioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors is proper?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP. The records show that
Atty.Terrado acted as complainants counsel in the drafting of the compromise
agreement between Ms. Lijauco and the bank regarding LRC Case No. B-2610. He
lured Ms. Lijauco to participate in a compromise agreement with a false and misleading
assurance that the latter can still recover her foreclosed property even after three years
from foreclosure. Atty. Terrado violated Rule1.01 Canon 1 of the CPR which says that
a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
. Furthermore, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P 70,000 for
legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P 180,000 is unreasonable
and is violative of Canon 20 of the CPR. Atty. Terrada was also found guilty of violating
Rule 9.02 of the CPR by openly admitting that he divided the legal fees with two other
people as a referral fee.

PLUS BUILDERS, INC. and E. C. GARCIA,

vs.
ATTY. A. E. REVILLA, JR.,
A.C. No. 7056September 13, 2006
FACTS
Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. with committing a willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial
Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD)rendered
a consolidated Decision in favor of petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and
against[tenants/farmers]. Tenants/farmers filed several verified pleadings as part of the records of
DARAB cases above-mentioned alleging under oath that they were 'MAGSASAKANG
NAMUMUWISAN' or mere tenants of subject properties, acknowledging the rights of the registered
owners at that time, even before the ownership and title were transferred to Petitioner/ Complainant
Plus Builders, Inc. On Dec[ember] 17, 1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was
Atty. Damian S. J. Vellaseca, filed a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As
a result, PARAD did not give due course to the same. Another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by
the name of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who represented himself as counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed
a manifestation stating that he is representing TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were 'bona
fide' members of the [Kalayaan Development Cooperative] (KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of
Appeal on March 27,2000 stating that they received the Decision on March 14, 2000 and alleged that
the Decision is against the law and jurisprudence. On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla
Jr., knowing that there was a monetary judgment by way of Disturbance Compensation granted to
Tenants/Farmers, filed a 'Motion for Leave of Court to Allow Correction of Caption and Amendment of
Judgment' After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD
judgment, a Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution with Demolition plus Damages dated July 18, 2001 was filed by
Respondent before the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, notwithstanding the fact that this instant
case was appealed by another lawyer.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
Investigating Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty of violating the attorney's
oath and theCode of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously concealed
the defeat of his clients in the case before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts," in order to
secure a temporary restraining order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay
the execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision dated November 15, 1999.Moreover,
Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that respondent had been engaged in the unlawful
practice of law was neither satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the latter. The failure of
respondent to do so led to the presumption that the allegation was true.
HELD:
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice.
They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule
of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the
courts. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing
or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any
artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.

Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus
:"Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law. 'Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.'

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, vs. MARCELINO ADORABLE, ET

AL., (claimants); MIGUEL PEARANDA, (claimant-appellant); PURIFICACION
SOLINAP ET AL., (claimants-appellees).

A.C. No. 8197

October 2, 1946

Facts:

Claimant-appellant presented copies of several papers, exhibits, pleadings, motions and

orders, including copy of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, record on
appeal, and the printed brief of said claimant-appellant who, at the time he filed his
motion for reconstitution on February 26, 1946, was under the impression that the case,
which was pending decision in the Court of Appeals when the war broke out, remained
unacted upon by said court until the motion for reconstitution was filed.

On June 25, 1946, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, for the claimants and appellees, acting
under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes a
deserving member of the bar, instead of taking advantage of claimant-appellant's
ignorance of what really happened in the Court of Appeals, informed this court that the
case had been decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals,
filing to said effect the copy of the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to
him by said court, to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution of
this case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case already decided.

Upon being informed of the statements of Attorney Zamora, claimant-appellant's

attorneys filed a petition with the commissioner for reconstitution to make a report to this
Court that the records be declared reconstituted, together with the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated September 9, 1942, and that said records be remanded to the lower
court for execution of the decision.lwphi1.net

The court resolved to declare that the case is reconstituted and to order that copy of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on September 9, 1942, be sent to the
lower court for execution. This resolution is being adopted not without making of record
that the considered as an example worthy to be remembered by all members of the bar.

Legal Ethics Concept

ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW ; STANDARDS OF TRUTHFULNESS, FAIR PLAY AND

NOBILITY; CASE AT BAR, AN EXAMPLE TO BE REMEMBERED.In this case the
attorney for the claimants and appellees, acting under the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes a deserving member of the bar,
instead of taking advantage of claimant and appellant's ignorance of what really
happened in the Court of Appeals, informed this court that the case had been
decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to said
effect the copy of the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to him by
said court, to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution of this
case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case already decided. This is an
example worth remembering by all members of the bar.

CARLET vs CA

Facts: On 1917, a Transfer Certificate No. 1599 was issued in Jose Sevillas name after payment of the
full purchase price of Lot 981 of the BianEstate in Laguna, with an area of 864 square meters.

In 1949, Pablo Sevillo, one of Joses four sons with a wife and four children of his own, declared the lot
for taxation purposes even if the property was still in Jose Sevillos name.

In 1955, Pablo, by then a widower, married Candida Baylo who had a previous daughter already married
named Cirila Baylo Carolasan. The union produced no offspring.

In 1965, Pablo Sevillo, with Candida Baylo, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance for
reconstitution of title. Reconstitution was allowed and a TCT was issued in the name of Pablo Sevillo,
married to Candida Baylo. Pablo Sevillo and his wife died in 1967 and in 1974, respectively.

Before dying, Candida Baylo executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Pablos former children in his previous
marriage.

In 1980, the heirs of Cirila Baylo Carolasan, all surnamed Zarate and herein private respondents, filed a
case for annulment of the said Deed of Sale. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1656 before the
Court of First Instance of Bian, Laguna.

The Deed of Sale was rendered as null and void and of no force and effect, and the representative of the
estate of the plaintiff Cirila Baylo Carolasan and the defendants Gregorio Sevillo, Samero Sevillo, Maltin
Sevillo, Andrea Sevillo and Isidro Zamora, as the surviving spouse of Consolacion Sevillo, are hereby
ordered to partition Lot No. 981.
The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued on November 10, 1982.
Lot 981 was surveyed and subdivided into six lots, one lot having an area of 452.04 square meters, four
lots with 86.49 square meters each and one lot with 66 square meters as footpath or concession to a right
of way.[2] By virtue of this adjudication, private respondents Zarate procured TCT Nos. T-163388 and T-
163393 over their share in the property.

The losing party, the Sevillos then filed several cases to annul the decision to the IAC and the SC, all of
which were denied.

On July 10, 1991, petitioner Iigo F. Carlet, as special administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia
Sevillo, filed the case at bar, an action for reconveyance of property, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3582,
against the heirs of Cirila.

Defendants Zarate moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. The Defendants won and now
Carlet has appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the lower court.

Issue: WON the act of petitioners counsel in filing a relitigation of cases which were already final and
executory violates Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling: Clearly, despite knowledge of final judgments in Civil Case No. B-1656, CA-G.R. CV No.
07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505, as well as in G.R. No. 94382 (the ejectment case), counsel persisted in
filing the case at bar for reconveyance. Since this case is barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. B-
1656, there was no other pending case to speak of when it was filed in July 1991. Thus, the non-forum-
shopping rule is not violated.

What counsel for petitioners did, however, in filing this present action to relitigate the title to and partition
over Lot No. 981, violates Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers which states
that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 of the same Canon states that
(a) lawyer shall not do any falsehood x x x nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice. Counsels act of filing a new case involving essentially the same cause of action is likewise
abusive of the courts processes and may be viewed as improper conduct tending to directly impede,
obstruct and degrade the administration of justice.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU VS. THE
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,

Background: The Union declared a strike against the company for the alleged unfair labor practice.

Facts: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU
(hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW),
entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the
FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).Two of the lawyers of the Unions then
were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and
acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association.
Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the
members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU), to no avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant
corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a
month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19,
1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel
for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.

In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a
modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on
September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon
retroactively effective October 1, 1957.

However, there was no satisfactory result to the negotiation which led the Union to hold a strike and
picketed the office of the Insular Life. They then filed a case for unfair labor practice to the CIA but Judge
Arsenio dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

Thus, they ask this Court to cite for contempt Judge Arsenio for misquoting a jurisprudence and
attempting to mislead them in not citing a jurisprudence word-per-word.
Issue: WON the act of Judge Arsenio in knowingly misquoting his decision is a violation of Rule 10.02
of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which states that: Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Ruling: No. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding
Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents,
on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the instant petition
for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .

... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:

In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or not the acts
of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them,
the mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the
same acts, does not erase or neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it
is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the
employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged
was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of the
employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for
dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81,
December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied)

The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored portions of
the above citation read however as follows:

Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to uphold
the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly
caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion
of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the
non-filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of
Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report of some acts and
omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away with
the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have
been viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We
are not here to determine whether the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find
out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them.
This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the
assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily
erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary
measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges
against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon
which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's
interest.

In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which actually amounts
to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some
legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation,
can be nothing but an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in
the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the
ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or
behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is
a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)

It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent
Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first
underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it
must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the
quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's
decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.

This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent
Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of
clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully
realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine
that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice.
Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it
appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief.
Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is
substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that
"[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's
right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges were based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest."

We must articulate our firm view that in citing this Courts decisions and rulings, it is the bounden
duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation
mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this.
Only from this Tribunals decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants,
take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which
reads, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines, are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said
in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that [O]nly the decisions
of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction. Thus, ever
present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this
Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the
public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously
discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this
Courts decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions
down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on
misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.

DEL ROSARIO vs CHINGCUANGCO

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction principally assailing an order of the
Court of Agrarian Relations denying a motion to stay execution of its judgment dispossessing the tenant
until he is indemnified for alleged expenses and improvements.

As leasehold tenant, petitioner, Leon del Rosario, occupied a parcel of land owned by respondent Tomas
Imperio, situated in Cabocbocan Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Said land became the subject matter of litigation
between said parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fourth regional district, in CAR Cases Nos.
2652-NE '61 and 2902-NE '62. And on July 12, 1963, a decision was rendered therein, the dispositive
portion running as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) ordering the ejectment of Leon del Rosario
from the landholding in question subject to Section 43 and Section 50, paragraph (a), R.A. No. 1199, as
amended by R.A. No. 2263; and(2) ordering Tomas Imperio to pay Leon del Rosario the value of the
excess rentals received by him for the agricultural years 1961-62 and 1962-63.

Said judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on March 26, 1965.

Subsequently, on October 26, 1965, Imperio filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations a motion for
execution of the aforestated judgment. Del Rosario however opposed it, on the ground that he has a right
of retention over the land until he is indemnified for expenses and improvements, alleging that in the
present case he is entitled thereto. Acting thereon, the Court of Agrarian Relations, on November 18,
1965, issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution, stating that the judgment had become final
and executory, and that Del Rosario's claim for indemnity, if any, should be filed with said court for
determination, but cannot stop execution of said judgment. Del Rosario filed a motion for reconsideration
but this was denied by the same court on December 14, 1965. And on December 16, 1965, the
corresponding writ of execution was issued.

On January 20, 1966, respondents filed their answer. Further developments came by way of two petitions
for contempt: First, a petition filed by respondent Imperio dated February 5, 1966, to declare petitioner's
counsel in direct contempt, on the alleged ground that in his petition herein said lawyer cited a fictitious
authority. It appears that the petitioners counsel cited a non-existent and fictitious ruling
(explanation: but in truth and in fact, it was only a typographical error).
Issue: WON a mere clerical or typographical error is a violation of Rule 10.02 of the CPR, and if it is, is
it sufficient to hold him liable for contempt.

Ruling: No. The petition for contempt filed by respondent Imperio charges petitioner's
counsel of having cited a fictitious case and a non-existing ruling. The record bears
out that petitioner's counsel alleged in page 5 of the petition for certiorari herein,
thus:

Section 1, Rule 15, Rules of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, predicated on Section 43 of
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, supra, has been upheld to be valid by this Honorable Tribunal so that
now no writ of execution can be issued unless it is complied with first (Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino
Abad, et al., G.R. No. L-121447). This ruling, in effect, created and established or confirmed the prior
substantial right of a tenant to indemnification before he is finally ejected from his holding.

Petitioner's counsel obviously had in mind this Court's decision in Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino
Abad, L-12147, July 30, 1957. Although he cites as docket number L-121447 instead of L-12147, the
same is plainly but a slight typographical mistake not sufficient to place him in contempt, especially
because the names of the parties were given correctly. As to said counsel's interpretation of this Court's
decision in said case, or of what the ruling therein "in effect" created, established or confirmed, the same
are mere arguments fully within the bounds of earnest debate, rather than a deception urged upon this
Court. The first petition for contempt is therefore without merit.
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION vs CLORIBEL

In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano
C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads

Facts: In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24 SCRA 491; G.R. No. L-27072)
which was not favorable to MacArthur International Minerals Co. The latters lawyer, Atty. Vicente
Santiago then filed a motion for reconsideration. Eventually, a third motion for reconsideration was
submitted by him where the following paragraph was stated:

6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the
chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be
constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product
of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent
absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court
seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved and also
of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is
also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our
government officials are just amoral?

Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked the 1968 decision of the Supreme Court
as false, erroneous, and illegal.

In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two Justices: Justice Fred Castro, because
allegedly, he is the brother of the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion because immediately after the 1968 decision, his son was appointed to a significant position
in the government. (Here Atty. Santiago implied that the justices were not fair and that their decision was
influenced).

In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the above paragraph and was only included
due to inadvertence. But that any rate, he averred that the language he used was necessary to defend his
client.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not
to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients success is
wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
Thus, Santiagos defense is not tenable.

A lawyer must avoid language that tends to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief in the judicial
system. A lawyers duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any
valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.

Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: To observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.

Atty. Santiago was fined for his infractions.