52 Theory X in Antiquity, or the Bureaucratization of the Roman Army Michael J. Gent Michacl J. Gent, an Assistant Professor of Management at Canisius College in Buffalo, is conducting research in. em- ployee perceptions of climate. Once more, Roman history shows us our- selves. The Roman army went from a non- routine, flexible group to a bureaucracy. Its failures suggest the need for modern Theory Y remedies. oth classical and_contem- porary theory tell us that organizations grow and de velop elaborated structures.! Clas- sical theory states that the growth and development of organizations in modem societies has been in the direction of rational bureaucracy. The reason for this, according to Max Weber, is that bureaucratic structure maintains a “purely tech- nical superiority over any other form of organization.”? Associated with the modern trend toward bureaucracy is a fundamental change in management, from lead- ership based on a referent or re- ward power base to authority 1. See Charles Perrot, Ogonizational Anal sist" A Sociological View (Monterey, Ca Brooks/Cole. Publishing Co., 197 Scott, TR. Mitchell, and” PH. Bimbaum, Organization Theory: A Structural and. Be havior Analyet (Homewood: Ml: Richard D. Irwin, ne, 1981) 2.Mar Weber, “Bureauema.”. in D, Ganusky and G.A. Miler, eds, The Socolony of Orgeniations (New York? The Free Press, 1981): 18. Copyright © 2001 All Rights Reserved based on legitimate or expert power (what Weber calls “the routinization of charisma”). The lord of the manor gives way to the elected governor, the battlefield chieftain to the military strategist. ‘Contemporary theory empha- sizes the contingent nature of structure and leadership. The com plexity of work-flow technology and the volatility of environmental conditions are believed to have a major bearing on the way an or- ganization grows and develops. Bureaucracy and management by legitimate authority are predicted only under certain conditions. Recently, I stumbled upon the opportunity to try out the insights of organizational theory, both clas- sical and contemporary, on a case from antiquity: the Roman army. The opportunity came in the form of a book by Peter Connolly called The Roman Army, which provides a detailed description of the leg- endary military organization from the height of the Republic through ‘Business Horizons | January-Febraary 1984‘Theory X in Antiquity or the Buremucratization of the Roman Azmy ny ia Bes ODopoua - the Empire's first century.? While reading Connolly’s vivid account, it, became apparent to me that the ancient Roman legions evolved ac- cording to a pattem similar to those elaborated by modern-day organizational theorists. ‘The Citizen Army of the Republic uring the Republican era, Rome's military objectives were the defense of Rome proper and the expansion of Ro: man influence in the Mediterra nean basin. The environment in which the army operated at this time was volatile, with powerful and civilized foes in North Africa and the Balkans. The work-flow 8. Peter Connolly, The Roman Army (Mot ristown, NJj: Silver Burdett, 1979) 1 confers that T checked out this book from the library for my culdzen-i’s a bright, handsomely ‘Mustated, oversized volume, Whes I got home fand opencd the cover, however, T found I couldn't put the Book’ down til Kad con sumed it whole. If, besides eing a student of ‘rganizations, you area fan of movie spectacr lars (such as Bon Hur, Quo Vadir, Caligula) or am amateur antquarian, you won't want to ‘mis experiencing this book. (Nor, might add, will your children) technology it embraced under these conditions was not very row tine. The variety of disciplined, clever, and unpredictable foes pre sented the forces of Rome with “raw materials” to process which were neither standard nor well understood. That is, in its battles anything could happen, and it did, and the legions had to be ready for it. If we can accept the assump- tion that form follows function, the Roman army developed an organizational structure to match its envitonmental and tech- nological requirements. Each legion was made up of about 4,200 men, and was organized according to functional specialties and indi- vidual skills. There were light in fantry who could be used as scouts, pickets, or even dis mounted cavalry. There were heavy assault troops, the hastati, and the pride of the army, the principes. Finally, there were re- serves staffed by aging veterans. Within the ranks, armor and weapons were customized and tac tical maneuvers were varied. This Copyright © 2001 All Rights Reserved arrangement gave the army flexi- bility in response. For instance, the principes could close with the hastati to form a powerful pha- lanx. Or their columns could open up, as at Zama where they let Hannibal's elephants run through to the rear guard to be trapped and slaughtered. The authority structure of the Republican legion had a lean and flat configuration. There were only three hierarchical levels: the consul ‘on top, under him six tribunes, and on the battle line the centurions. As with every army from the be- sinning of time, there were also sergeants (called optiones). This structure allowed power to be de- centralized effectively, as it was at Pydna where the consul Paullus gave orders for the centurions to mancuver their troops indepen- dently. As a result, the Roman army decimated the legendary Macedonian phalanx. Finally, and perhaps most im- portantly, the Army of the Repub- lic was a citizen army, made up of landowners from Rome proper. They were called up in a yearly“The Army of the Empire displayed many of the symptoms of the big, routine, mechanistic syndrome so familiar to observers of contemporary organizational life.” levy, at which time they demo- cratically elected their most impor- tant military leaders: the consul of the legion and the principal centu- rion of each maniple (a regiment of about 200 troops). Service was temporary, and the citizen legionaries were always ‘eager to get back to hearth and home. While on duty, however, they were intrinsically’ motivated to perform. Their morale rested on civic values, common goals, jobs matched to men, and the naturally emergent character of democratic leadership. They made a good anny and were successful in sub- duing the civilized west under the Roman eagle. ‘The Change to Bureaucracy he legions of the Republic may have been too success ful. Their conquests were partly to blame for the bureaucrar tization of the army, which began at the end of the second century, B.C. Because of the expansion, war had become big business with multinational flavoring. Protracted campaigns a long way from home became the staple. The environ ment was, in a sense, more stable. Te consisted of clearly identified peripheral frontiers to be pacified and maintained. Weber recognized the impact this would have on Roman institutions. He claimed that “bureaucratization advanced with the transition from a coastal to a_continental ring of fron- tiers. Under these conditions, the legions adopted 2 more routine work-flow technology. The army was now trying to tum out a uniform product on a grand scale. It felt that it knew exactly what had to be done to handle its “raw material”: it had to oppose forces made up of rag-tag hordes of undis- ciplined, uncivilized barbarians (or of other Roman legions). What was happening is best described by Charles Perrow: “Even those or- ganizations which do start out as adaptive and innovative strive to rationalize and routinize.” If they are successful they “grow in size and stability; introduce economies of scale and complex control de- vices; reduce the skill level; and attempt to stabilize their environ- ment.”= In a word, they become bureaucratic. ‘The Henry Ford of the Roman army at this juncture in history was the consul Marius. He opened up the legions to poor Romans who flocked to the calling of per- manent, professional soldiers. ‘Again, to quote Weber, “The bureatcratization of the army has everywhere been realized along with the transfer of army service from the propertied to the prop ertyless. Until this transfer occurs, Copyright © 2001 All Rights Reserved military service is an honorific privilege of propertied men. Such a transfer was made to the native: born unpropertied, for instance, in the armies of the generals of the late Roman republic and the em- pire.”* In this new army, func- tional specialties were soon done away with. Equipment, training, and tactical maneuvers were stan- dardized, All infantry legionaires now possessed the same few low- level skills which were, however, highly developed. At the dawn of the Empire, the army had grown from an average strength of eight legions to twenty-eight legions. Each legion ‘was also enlarged by about 1,000 troops. The authority structure ‘was made taller, from three hierar- chical levels to five. In each legion the thirty maniples were slotted into ten homogenized cohorts. The elected consul gave way to a legate appointed by the Senate (later by the emperor). ‘The _second-in- command was an aristocratic tri- bune. The other tribunes were young politicians going through the motions of military service as a step in their careers. They were assigned staff jobs—the army’s first purely bureaucratic functionaries. A new, critical office was estab- lished, that of camp prefect. This was usually occupied by an older man, a veteran who had_risen through the centurial ranks. Centu- 6. Weber: 22.Theory Xin Antiquity or the Boreaueratization of the Reman Army ions, too, were no longer elected. They were appointed by the legate. Those of the first cohort had high- er rank, In fact the principal centu- tion of the first cohort was con- sidered a member of “upper man- agement.” Decision making in the Im- perial Army was highly centralized and standardized. Apart from the invasion of Britain, the whole first century A.D. was dedicated to the dull, unimaginative task of con- solidating frontiers. Generals and their commanders had a few patent strategies and tactical options to choose from. As Connolly remarks, “Romans were not great tacticians but relied mainly on the discipline and superior skills of the legion- aries Even bad generals could win battles.” This state of affairs was the dream come true of Weberian bureaucratic efficiency. ‘The Dominance of Theory X [: this big organization with its routine technology and mecha- nistic structure to match, Theory X management practices came to. predominate.* Super visory style was characterized: by close, brutal control. All centu tions carried a vine cane (swagger stick?) and many _legionaries carried marks on their backs from its use. Besides the stick of harsh discipline, motivation and morale in the legions became dependent on the carrot of extrinsic rewards, mainly pay and bonuses. Thus, the Army of the Empire displayed many of the symptoms of the big, routine, mechanistic syndrome so familiar to observers of contem- porary organizational life. The im- plicit organizational objective of this cumbersome institution was maximum efficiency and effective- ness—in other words, a mass-pro- duced military product. ‘Then, as 7. Connolly: 17. 8, Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York! McGraw-Hill Book Con 1860). now, onganizing principles based on an understanding of human needs were violated. This led to some predictable, if unintended, human consequences. First, the Theory X emphasis financial rewards caused a major shift in the legionary’s moti vation. As Herbert Meyer (reflect: ing on Deci’s work) has pointed out, “When pay becomes the im- portant goal, the individual's in- terest tends to focus on that goal . ~ . « Many of us have seen this principle operate to our chagrin when we fall into the trap of paying our children for chores they should be expected to perform without pay.’® The chagrin of the Roman people became extreme when the soldiers’ greed expanded to the point that the legions stationed in Rome actually auc- tioned off the Empire to the highest bidder! Second, labor-management conflict developed. Common sol- Giers, inspired by the spirits of their legions (the genii), formed highly cohesive rank-and-file groups. This “informal” group structure had goals that often were at odds with management. In one extreme case of consequent labor strife, four Gallic legions rose up and put their officers in chain: Finally, interdepartmental con- flict became endemic. The Civil War sparked by Caesar’s death was but a mild precursor of bitter and chronic interlegion rivalries that persisted until the dissolution of Rome in the fifth century A.D. Were there no attempts to solve these horrendous personnel prob- lems? There were sporadic reforms such as those undertaken by em- perors Vespasian, Aurelian, and Diocletian. But these consisted largely of downsizing and cosmetic restructuring accompanied by purges of rebellious units and com- 9. Hesbert H, Meyer, “The Pay for Perfor mance Dilemma,” i WP. Ghieck ed, Perso rns A Book of Readings (Dales Business Publications, Inc 1979): 261, Copyright © 2001 All Rights Reserved manders. “Quality of work life” issues were not addressed. That is, no attempt was made to reinte- grate the needs and values of indi- vidual soldier-citizens with the legitimate overarching objectives of the organization. ‘ appears that the growth and development of structure in the Roman army conformed in good measure to the tenets of organizational theory. The “in- ternal dynamic” of classical theory can be seen clearly: the army's almost inevitable march toward bureaucracy and Theory X man- agement. The contingency notions ‘of contemporary theory scem equally applicable: the more stable environment of the frontiers and the more routine technology of garrison duty supported an in- creasingly mechanistic structure. As the army evolved in this way, the problems encountered by man: agement likewise have a familiar ring to them. Today’s large firm with its simplified jobs, extrinsic rewards structure, and macho ap- proach to discipline and control also faces declining morale, severe intra-organizational conflict, and sagging productivity. Does history repeat itself, and is there a lesson to be learned from the Roman army's experiences in antiquity? Roman military leaders were never able to solve the army’s problems; bureaucratic structure and Theory X management style seem to have taken on a func- tionally autonomous life of the own.'® And eventually the army 101m one area only did upper manage ment ranks in the Romas military estab ‘ment have an edge on their corporate conte: porarer, and that was in operational decison making. For the leaders in antiquity used ‘onrulfants who calmed to have ditece access to divine guidance. Conucly report tht ome ‘conn, eager for battle, ealed for the augers (seers) and war told that the sacred chickens ‘would mot eat. The constl .. ondeted the ‘augers to ry agin. When this was to no aval he grabbed the squawking birds and threw ‘them into the sea with the famous lst words, 4H the sacred chickens won't caty let thes uink.” Naturally he was defeated” (20).56 became a juggernaut which con- a mightily to social disinte- mn and the final dissolution of Rome. Let us hope the prognosis for similar modem organizations is not nearly as bleak, Although the final verdict is not in, attempts at restructuring, conversions to Theory Y manage ment, and quality of work life programs hold out promise as means for solving some of the nagging personnel problems of to- day's organizations. And, who Copyright © 2001 All Rights Reserved knows, perhaps these same tech- niques applied in antiquity could have changed the Roman army and made it a productive, progressive force in the development of West-