Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2, June 2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1573-7861.2010.01182.x
There is rarely an introductory text in sociology that does not begin with C. Wright Mills’s (1967)
distinction between personal troubles and structural or public issues. To lack sociological imagination
is to confuse between these two levels of analysis in trying to explain public issues in terms of per-
sonal troubles, or history in terms of the individual’s biography. ‘‘Troubles occur within the character
of the individual and within the range of his immediate relations with others; Issues have to do with
matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life’’
(Mills, 1967:8). Issues are generated in response to the dynamics of the social system and unfold
within the larger structural and historical contexts where the character of the individual takes shape.
Yet, the most popular explanation of the contemporary financial crisis with its disastrous social and
economic consequences is personal greed. It is the greedy investment bankers, corrupt politicians, and
unscrupulous lobbyists who are to take the brunt of the current economic meltdown in the United
States. A few bad apples on Wall Street have created havoc on Main Street. Here, one may argue
that greed that—if not kept in check—which seems to afflict almost everyone, transcending social
class and status boundaries, may be a public issue—a structural problem—rather than a problem
within the character of the individual. Not to be greedy within the contemporary social and economic
system may be considered pathological, an instance of personal trouble.
367
4
As the cost to investors and as the price of Western Union plummeted under the cry of monop-
oly, ‘‘Gould and his short-selling colleagues reputedly made a million dollars each when they
covered their positions’’ in the face of a bear run on the stock (Geisst, 1997:95).
5
Ironically, Stephen Greenspan, a psychologist and author of Annals of Gullibility: Why We Get
Duped and How to Avoid It (2008), fell victim to Madoff’s scheme (Here and Now, WUBR,
1 ⁄ 13 ⁄ 09).
6
As noted by Pierre Bezard, the COB [Commission des Operations de Bourse], France’s
counterpart to the SEC, had been in operation for 22 years and had ruled on fewer than 30
insider-trading cases (Los Angeles Times, 1 ⁄ 18 ⁄ 89).
The Myth of Individual Greed 369
and the architect of the Reagan and Bush policy of deregulation, the ongoing
economic disaster has nothing to do with the right-wing political economy of
a free market. He blames the whole fiasco on a few incompetent bureaucrats
and some technical screwups.7
In his inauguration speech on January 20, 2009, President Obama raised a
number of questions about the structure of government and the economy. Being
an ardent critic of deregulation, he called for a new era of responsibility under a
watchful eye. Martin Feldstein agrees with President Obama about the need for
a watchful eye. However, to Feldstein, ‘‘a watchful eye’’ is a matter of personal
trouble rather than a structural issue. He hears through his ideological ear that
President Obama is advocating elimination of too many watchful eyes (deregula-
tion) in favor of only one eye! ‘‘I think it was right for him to use the watchful
eye, this goes back to what I was saying a minute ago about too many watchful
eyes who didn’t do their jobs’’ (National Public Radio On Point hosted by Tom
Ashbrook, Monday, January 26, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. EST). In response to a ques-
tion by the frustrated Tom Ashbrook: ‘‘[H]as this terrible economic crisis not
given you a pause that there is something in the ethos of economics that you
have championed that leads to nobody minding the store?’’ Feldstein responds:
you said the right words—nobody minding the store. We had in the financial sector
three people minding the store and each saying I am not the guy with the bottom line
responsibility … what I hope to come out of this is to have only one single supervisor
for the entire financial institutions …. (National Public Radio On Point hosted by Tom
Ashbrook, Monday, January 26, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. EST)
Here, one may argue that greed—if not kept in check—which seems to
afflict almost everyone and transcend social class and status boundaries, may
be a public issue—a structural problem—rather than a problem within the
character of the individual. No to be greedy within a particular social and
economic system, say, capitalism, may be a pathological manifestation, an
instance of personal trouble.
Greed, as the egoistic pursuit of self-interest, reminds us of Durkheim’s
structural analysis of anomie. Anomie is a social structural condition, a condi-
tion that allows the individual’s insatiable passions and appetites to operate
with little external limits or regulation to harness them. In such condition,
‘‘greed is aroused,’’ according to Durkheim (1951:256), ‘‘without knowing
where to find ultimate foothold.’’ Although the recent deregulation legislated
in the name of the ‘‘free market’’ may have contributed to the weakening of
structural constraints on people’s insatiable appetites, the ‘‘boundless greed
after riches,’’ as noted by Marx, is the defining feature of the current economic
system and is by no means irrational or pathological.
7
In a recent interview on BBC at 2100 BST on September 10, 17, and 24, (2009, rebroadcasted)
Alan Greenspan said he had changed his mind about deregulation. He blamed the crisis on the
financial industry’s inability to monitor itself, but he added that ‘‘speculative excesses’’ are a
normal function of capitalism. Yet, he attributed much of the problem to human nature: ‘‘It’s
human nature, unless somebody can find a way to change human nature, we will have more cri-
ses and none of them will look like this because no two crises have anything in common, except
human nature.’’
370 Hansen and Movahedi
This boundless greed after riches, this passionate chase after exchange
value, is common to the capitalist and the miser; but while the miser is merely
a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist is a rational miser (Marx, 1967:153).
In fact, as Zakaria (2009) writes in his Newsweek article, ‘‘The Capitalist
Manifesto,’’ market behaviors are not about morality. They are a manifesta-
tion of complex economic systems, and as such some greed is a necessary part
of capitalism. Ironically, ‘‘Greed is Good’’ was the arbitrageur Ivan Boesky’s
(the convicted insider-trading felon) encapsulated message of his May 18, 1986
commencement address to the UC Berkeley’s School of Business Administra-
tion. Boesky’s exploits were later fictionalized in the Hollywood movie Wall
Street, which included a speech given by a Boesky-like character on the virtues
of greed similar to that given in the commencement address.
Greed in the early years of Wall Street and banking in the United States
was attributed to the lack of a central bank, allowing more opportunity for
devious investments. Banks and bankers, like the Robber Barons, earned less
than stellar reputations. As World War I approached, bankers were accused
of being plunderers and noncontributors to the building of the U.S. economy.
As Geisst (1997:124) noted, ‘‘it was the combination of wealth and concen-
trated economic and political power that eventually made them such a vilified
group.’’ In spite of the animosity exhibited toward the banking community,
and Congress’s push for a new central bank in response to public pressure
(actualized in 1913), banking continued to flourish through the 1920s, enjoying
a relatively friendly regulatory atmosphere.
The question of structural determinants of behavior—here, economic
behavior leading to scandals on Wall Street—needs much more unpacking
than what we typically do in most sociological analyses. Social structure by
itself is not causally efficacious. Intervening variables and processes that need
clear articulation are usually taken for granted. Speaking on the importance
of communication in forming people’s political consciousness within a particu-
lar mode of production, Mills (1951:333) writes:
If the consciousness of men does not determine their existence, neither does their mate-
rial existence determine their consciousness. Between consciousness and existence stand
communications, which influence such consciousness as men have of their existence.
Men do ‘‘enter into definite, necessary relations which are independent of their will,’’
but communications enter to slant the meanings of these relations for those variously
involved in them.
In sum, the environmental pressures and competition, the culture and ide-
ology of Wall Street, the formal and informal structure of corporations, the
executive and employee compensation structures, all operating within the
broader regulatory system, are responsible for some of the scandals we are
witnessing. Any analysis of the present condition from the standpoint of
explanation, prediction, or prevention should be focused on the macro- and
micro-structural condition. Psychological explanations in terms of character,
personality, or traits such as greed are totally inadequate.
The problem with occupational crime is that it is committed within the
confines of positions of trust and in organizations, which prohibits surveil-
lance and accountability. More importantly, work performance is evaluated
by nonperformance criteria and evaluations are ceremonially executed, partic-
ularly, as previously stated, in the case of professionals who are technically
trained beyond the education and practical knowledge of management (Col-
lins, 1975; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As such, the explanations for occupa-
tional crime are structural rather than social-psychological, as the
organizational apparatus creates an atmosphere conducive to occupational
crime. One theory that supports a structural model is that of Billingham
(1990), who proposed that criminality among elites may be part of ‘‘doing
business as usual.’’ As previously noted, the potential for the deviant behav-
ior of insider trading has been found to have its roots in business schools,
where students are more materialistically minded, particularly in U.S. univer-
sities (Billingham, 1990). A code of ethics does not necessarily prevent uneth-
ical behavior within organizations but, as Cressey and Moore (1980)
concluded, ‘‘[a] demonstration of deeds, not nice words, is necessary to cor-
rect unethical corporate behavior’’ (Clinard and Yeager, 1980:302). Corpora-
tions rarely make apologies for their bad behavior, except when pushed to
do so for public relations purposes.
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