ROEHR V RODRIGUEZ

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen

Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional
Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children
should be vested to Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had
already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC
Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for
the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the
properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous
order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for
reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in
the case at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even
after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or
requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final
and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction
as regards child custody and support.

Ruling: Yes.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are

recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the
award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of
their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was
the extent of Carmens participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records
remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the
trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING vs. CA

FACTS
In 1979 to 1981, Philippine International Shipping Corporation (PISC) leased from
Interpool Ltd. and its wholly owned subsidiary, the Container Trading Corporation,
several containers pursuant to the Membership Agreement and Hiring Conditions and the
Master Equipment Leasing Agreement both dated June 8, 1979. The other petitioners
Philippine Construction Consortium Corporation, Pacific Mills Inc. and Universal Steel
Smelting Company, guaranteed to pay the obligation due and any liability of the PISC
arising out of the leasing or purchasing of equipment.

In 1979 to 1981, PISC incurred outstanding and unpaid obligations with Interpool, in the
amount of $94,456.28, representing unpaid per diems, drop-off charges, interest and other
agreed charges, resulting in a case before the US District Court, Southern District of New
York wherein a default judgment against petitioners was rendered ordering the corp. to
pay in the amount of $80,779.33, as liquidated damages, together with interest in the
amount of $13,676.95 and costs in the amount of $80.00. or for a total judgment of
$94,456.28. To enforce the default judgment of the US District Court, a complaint was
instituted against PISC and other guarantors before the QC RTC. PISC failed to answer
the complaint and they were declared in default. The RTC ruled in favor of Interpool and
which was affirmed by the CA.

In the first instance, petitioners contend that the U.S. District Court never acquired
jurisdiction over their persons as they had not been served with summons and a copy of
the Complaint in 83 Civil 290 (EW). In the second instance, petitioners contend that such
jurisdictional infirmity effectively prevented the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
from taking cognizance of the Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-39927 and from enforcing
the U.S. District Court's Default Judgment against them. Petitioners contend, finally, that
assuming the validity of the disputed Default Judgment, the same may be enforced only
against petitioner PISC the 9 petitioners not having been impleaded originally in the case
filed in New York, U.S.A.

ISSUE
W/N the US District Court default judgment can be enforced and against the 9 other
petitioners? Yes.

RULING
To begin with, the evidence of record clearly shows that the U.S. District Court had
validly acquired jurisdiction over PISC under the procedural law applicable in that forum
i.e., the U.S. Federal Rules on Civil Procedure. Copies of the Summons and Complaint
which were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed with the SC, were stamped
"Received, 18 Jan 1983, PISC Manila." indicating that service thereof had been made
upon and acknowledged by the PISC office in Manila on, 18 January 1983 That foreign
judgment-which had become final and executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom
and perfected by petitioner PISC-is thus "presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." The SC note, further that
there has been in this case no showing by petitioners that the Default Judgment rendered
by the U.S. District Court was vitiated by "want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. " In other words, the Default Judgment imposing upon
petitioner PISC a liability of U.S.$94,456.28 in favor of respondent Interpool, is valid and
may be enforced in this jurisdiction.

The existence of liability on the part of petitioner PISC having been duly established in
the U.S. case, it was not improper for respondent Interpool, in seeking enforcement in
this jurisdiction of the foreign judgment imposing such liability, to have included the
other 9 petitioners herein (i.e., George Lim, Marcos Bautista, Carlos Laude,Tan Sing
Lim, Antonio Liu Lao, Ong Teh Philippine Consortium Construction Corporation, Pacific
Mills, Inc. and Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc.) as defendants in Civil Case No. Q-
39927, filed with Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The record
shows that said 9 petitioners had executed continuing guarantees" to secure performance
by petitioner PISC of its contractual obligations. As guarantors, they had held themselves
out as liable. "whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative," to respondent Interpool
under their separate "continuing guarantees" executed in the Philippines. The New York
award of U.S.$94,456.28 is precisely premised upon a breach by PISC of its own
obligations under those Agreements. The SC consider the 9 other petitioners as persons
against whom [a] right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions [has been] alleged to exist" and, consequently, properly impleaded
as defendants in Civil Case No. Q-39927. There was, in other words, no need at all, in
order that Civil Case No. Q-39927 would prosper, for respondent Interpool to have first
impleaded the 9 other petitioners in the New York case and there obtain judgment against
all 10 petitioners.
GORAYAB V HASHIM

Nature: Appeal by way of certiorari to the decision of Court of Appeals.

Facts: Plaintiff Gorayeb and defendant Hashim were married in Syria. They were
separated in fact for more than twelve years. The Plaintiff instituted civil case No. 19115
in the CFI to compel the defendant to pay her alimony.

The Court of First Instance on December 24, 1923 decided in favour of the Plaintiff
awarding her alimony of P500.00 per month.

While the decision of the plaintiffs claim of support was still undetermined, the
defendant went to the United States where he was able to procure a divorce decree from
the State of Nevada. He went back to the Philippines and the plaintiff filed a motion in
civil case No. 19115, alleging that the defendant had failed to pay the pension of P500 per
month, which had been awarded toher in the decision of December 24, 1923, and praying
that he be adjudged to be in contempt of court and that he be fined and sentenced to
imprisonment for six months and until he should comply with the order. As defense , the
defendant pleaded the divorce decree from Nevada, asserting that because of the such
decree his marriage to the plaintiff was already dissolved therefore releasing him from
the judgment of the lower court . The Court of appeals decided that despite the divorce
decree the defendant should continue paying the plaintiff P100 per month.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the foreign decree of divorce should be recognized by Philippine court.

2. Whether or not there is still a need of an affirmative action or a special proceeding in

order for our courts to recognize a foreign decree of divorce.

Ruling:

Issue #1.

No.

In Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855) xxx. the court of a country in which neither of the
spousesis domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a
divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary
appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with
jurisdiction. In the same case this court went on to say: "It follows that, to give a court
jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial
forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to
another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of
remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that
State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws
of the State of his own domicile.

Issue # 2. No

Section 309 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, declaring that a judgment obtained in an
American court shall have the same effect in the Philippine Islands as in the place where
such judgment was obtained, contains a qualification expressed in the following words:
"except that itcan only be enforce here by an action or special proceeding."

In the case at bar,xxx.. it will be remembered that the defendant pleaded the decree of
divorce by way of defense in his answer; and if the decree of divorce had been such as to
have entitled it to recognition here, the defendant could in our opinion have obtained the
benefit of it in this action. The provision in question no doubt contemplates primarily the
situation where affirmativeaction has to be taken in the Philippine Islands to give effect to
the foreign judgment as where the plaintiff desires to obtain execution upon property in
these Islands to satisty a judgment obtained abroad. But a decree of divorce operates on
the marriage status; and if effective at all, it dissolves the marriage tie, without the
necessity of any affirmative proceeding in any other court. At any rate, all that was
intended to be secured by the provision requiring an action or proceeding here was that
the courts of this country should have an opportunity to pass judiciallyupon the efficacy
of the judgment. This purpose is accomplished as well where the foreign judgment is
relied upon in an answer and duly proved, as where the original action is actually brought
by the holder of the judgment. It could not have been intended by the authors of
section309 that the holder of the foreign judgment must be deprived of the benefit of it
merely because he happens to be defendant rather than plaintiff in an action brought in
our courts.
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining, 93 Phil. 1034 (1954)

Facts: Perkins filed an action for recovery of dividends due her as a stockholder of
Benguet Consolidated Mining (BCM). BCM has been carrying on in Ohio a
continuous and systematic but limited part of its general business. Its president, while
engaged in doing such business in Ohio, has been served with summons in this
proceeding. The cause of action did not arise in
Ohio and does not relate to the corporations activities there. Thus, the trial court
sustained a
motion to quash service of summons on BCM.

Held: Ohio court has jurisdiction. The service of summons is valid. If an authorized
representative of a foreign corporation is physically present in the state of forum and be
there engaged in activities appropriate to accepting service or receiving notice on its
behalf, there is no unfairness in subjecting the corporation to the jurisdiction of courts of
that state through such service of process upon the representative. This has been squarely
held to be so in a proceeding
in personam
against such a corporation, at least in relation to a cause of action arising out of the
corporations activities within the state of the forum. The amount and kind of activities,
however,
which must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum so as to
make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that state are
to be determined in each case

NAGARMULL V BINALBAGAN-ISABELA

Facts:

Under a Contract dated May 6, 1949, plaintiff, a foreign corporation with offices at
Calcutta, India, agreed to sell to defendant, a domestic corporation with offices at the
Manila, 1,700,000 pieces of Hessian bags at $26.20 per 100 bags, C.I.F. Iloilo. Shipment
of these bags was to be made in equal installments of 425,000 pcs. or 425 bales during
each of the months of July, August, September and October, 1949.

On September 8, 1949, plaintiff advised defendant that of the 850 bales scheduled for
shipment in July and August, the former was able to ship only 310 bales owing to the
alleged failure of the Adamjee Jute Mills to supply the goods in due time. In a letter dated
September 29, 1949, defendant requested plaintiff to ship 100 bales of the 540 bales
defaulted from the July and August shipments. In this connection, it may also be
mentioned that of the 425 bales scheduled for shipment in September, 54 bales were
likewise defaulted resulting in a total of 154 bales which is now the object of the
controversy.

Meanwhile, on October 1, 1949, the Government of India increased the export duty of
jute bags from 80 to 350 rupees per ton. On October 27, 1949, plaintiff wrote to
defendant for an increase of $4,000.00 in its letter of credit to cover the shipment of 154
bales which under the contract should have been included in the July, August and
September shipments.

On February 6, 1951, defendant received notification from the Bengal Chamber of

Commerce Tribunal of Arbitration in Calcutta, India, advising it that on December 28,
1950, Plaintiff applied to said Tribunal for arbitration regarding their claim. The Tribunal
requested the defendant to send them its version of the case. This, defendant did on
March 1, 1951, thru the then Government Corporate Counsel, former Justice Pompeyo
Diaz.

The Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal of Arbitration, refused to sustain

defendants contention and decided in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of 18,562 rupees and 8 annas. This award was thereafter referred
to the Calcutta High Court which issued a decree affirming the award.

Issue: WON the decision of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of
Commerce, as affirmed by the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta, is enforceable in the
Philippines.

Held:

Under the Rules, a judgment for a sum of money rendered by a foreign court is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title, but when suit for its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, said
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact

There is no question at all that appellee was guilty of a breach of contract when it failed
to deliver one-hundred fifty-four Hessian bales which, according to the contract entered
into with appellant, should have been delivered to the latter in the months of July, August
and September, all of the year 1949. It is equally clear beyond doubt that had these one-
hundred fifty-four bales been delivered in accordance with the contract aforesaid, the
increase in the export tax due upon them would not have been imposed because said
increased export tax became effective only on October 1, 1949.

To the extent, therefore, that the decisions of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce and of the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta fail to apply to
the facts of this case fundamental principles of contract, the same may be impeached, as
they have been sufficiently impeached by appellant, on the ground of clear mistake of
law. We can not sanction a clear mistake of law that would work an obvious injustice
upon appellant.
BOUDARD vs. TAIT

FACTS
[Emilie Renee Boudard, as widow of Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard and as guardian of
their children, obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of First Instance of Hanoi,
French Indo-China, for the sum of 40,000 piastras, against Stewart Eddie Tait who had
been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial. Said judgment was based on
the fact that Mr. Boudard, who was an employee of Tait, was killed in Hanoi by co-
employees although outside the fulfillment of a duty.

Emilie Bouderd filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for the execution of the Hanoi
judgment but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the Hanoi Court, Tait not being a resident of that country.

RULING
". ..It is said that the French law regarding summons, according to its English translation
presented by the appellants, is of the following tenor:
"SEC. 69 (par. 8). Those who have no known residence in France, in the place of their
present residence; if the place is unknown, the writ shall be posted at the main door of the
hall of the court where the Complaint has been filed; a second copy shall be given to the
Attorney-General of the Republic who shall visae the origilLal." But then, Exhibits E, E-
1, F and F-1 show that the summons alleged to have been addressed to the appellee, was
delivered in Manila on September 18, 1933, to J.M. Shotwell, a representative or agent of
Churchill & Tait, Inc., which is an entity entirely different from the appellee.

Moreover, the evidence of record shows that the appellee was not in Hanoi during the
time mentioned in the complaint of the appellants, nor were his employees or
representatives. The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign
country, regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is
duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.

"The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam, over nonresidents, so as to sustain

a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders
the judgment.

It can not be said that the decision rendered by the Court of Hanoi should be conclusive
to such an extent that it cannot be contested, for it merely constitutes, from the viewpoint
of our laws, prima facie evidence of the justness of appellants' claim, and, as such,
naturally admits proof to the contrary...

In view of the foregoing considerations, our conclusion is that we find no merit in the
errors assigned to the lower court and the appealed judgment is in accordance with the
law."
PILAPIL V IBAY-SOMERA

PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
Short summary: After obtaining a divorce decree in Germany, German ex-husband of
Filipina wife sued the latter for adultery. The court held that since they were already
divorced, there's no marital relationship to protect and the ex-husband has no COA.

Facts:
-IMELDA MANALAYSAY-PILAPIL (fil) and ERICH GEILING (german) were
married in Germany, stayed in RP
-marital discord >>> separation de facto
-GEILING initiated divorce proceedings in GERMANY. Pending decision of German
courts, Imelda filed action for legal separation, support and separation of property.
-GERMAN COURT granted DIVORCE.
-Afterwards, GEILING sued IMELDA for ADULTERY
Imelda had affairs w/ 2 other men during their marriage
>>>initially dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence
>>>Reconsidered, refiled
-IMELDA filed MOTION TO QUASH: no jurisdiction, as the complainant is not the
"OFFENDED SPOUSE" there being a final decree of divorce already
>>denied. This case is the special civil action for the annulment of the order denying the
motion to quash.

WON COURT HAS JURIDICTION OF THE ADULTERY CASE, IT BEING THAT

FOREIGNER EX-HUSBAND ALREADY OBTAINED A FINAL DECREE IN HIS
COUNTRY GRANTING THEIR DIVORCE? NO
-in adultery charge, status of the complainant as the "OFFENDED SPOUSE" important
-offended spouse: still married to accused at the time of filing of complaint
-since here, already divorced, then not the offended spouse which the law requires
-ON ALLEGATION THAT HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE AFFAIRS WHEN
THEY WERE STILL MARRIED SO HE COULD NOT HAVE FILED IT THEN: no
matter.
>No longer a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of marriage is
decreed.
>No danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family (rationale for adultery law)
-ON ARGUMENT THAT RPC INTENDED TO PUNISH ADULTERY ALTHOUGH
THE MARRIAGE IS AFTERWARDS DECLARED VOID: can't file adultery charge
after divorce, which declares the marriage void ab initio. The case used to support such
argument contemplated a situation when the adultery charge was filed before a judicial
declaration for nullity ab inition of the marriage was rendered (or in this case, if it was
filed before the judicial decree of divorce was final).

Another digest:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was
born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony
eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner
in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC
Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with
William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery
even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already
issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody
else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the
latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is
concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Hang Lung Bank v. Saulog,

FACTS Hang Lung Bank (HLB), foreign corp not doing business in the Phils, entered
into 2 continuingguarantee agreements with Cordova Chin San (CCS) in HK whereby
CCS agreed to pay on demand allsums of money which may be due the bank from
Worlder Enterprises (WE). WE having defaulted in its payment, HLB filed acollection
suit against WE and CCS in the HK SC.Thereafter, HLB sent a demand letter to CCS at
his Phils address but again, no response was madethereto. Hence HLB instituted in the
Makati RTC an action seeking enforcement of its just and validclaims. CCS raised in his
answer to the complaint the affirmative defenses of; lack of cause of action,incapacity to
sue, and improper venue. A day before pre-trial, CCS filed MtD on grounds that HLB
had no legal capacity to sue and that venue isimproper. RTC granted the MtD. HLB filed
MfR but was denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorariseeking reversal of said
orders.

HELD License as a requirement for a foreign corporation to sue applies only to foreign
corporations doingbusiness in the Philippines. Isolated Transaction Rule unlicensed
foreign corporation not doingbusiness may sue on an isolated transaction. RTC orders set
aside. Case reinstated and RTC isdirected to proceed with the disposition of the case
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES INC. vs. CA

FACTS
[In 1974, an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement was entered into by
plaintiff Northwest Orient Airlines (Northwest) and defendant C.F. Sharp & Co. (Sharp),
through its Japan branch, whereby Northwest authorized Sharp to sell the former's
airlines tickets. Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales it made on behalf of
Northwest under the agreement which led the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the
unremitted amount, with claim for damages.
The Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of summons against Sharp at its office in
Yokohama, Japan but the bailiff failed twice to serve the writs. Finally, the Tokyo District
Court decided to have the writs of summons served at Sharp's head office in Manila.
Sharp accepted the writs but despite such receipt, it failed to appear at the hearings. The
District Court proceeded to hear the complaint and rendered judgment ordering Sharp to
pay Northwest the sum of 83,158,195 Yen plus damages. Sharp failed to appeal and the
judgment became final and executory.

Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan, hence, it filed a suit for enforcement of
the judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Sharp filed its answer averring
that the judgment of the Japanese court is null and void and unenforceable in this
jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper notice to Sharp.

The case for enforcement of judgment was tried on the merits. Sharp filed a Motion for
Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence. The trial court granted the demurrer motion, hold-
ing that the foreign judgment in the Japanese court sought to be enforced is null and void
for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Northwest appealed but the
Court of Appeals sustained the trial court, holding that the process of the court has no
extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction was acquired over the person of the defendant by
serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. Hence, this appeal by Northwest.]

RULING
"A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of
a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere,
enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
regularly performed its official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the
Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In
an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of sum-
mons effected as its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void,
and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In
this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the extraterritorial service'of process on SHARP. As to what
this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must
be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or
authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to
what that Japanese procedural law is and to show taat under it, the assailed extraterritorial
service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of
the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must
stand.

Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption
of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumpcion may be invoked.
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine
law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business ir, the
Philippines. Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: 1) on its resident
agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or 2) if there is no such resident
agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or 3) on any of its
officers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is
exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction
unless made upon him.

Where the corporation has no such great agent, service shall be made on the government
official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner, in the case of a foreign
insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking
corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other
foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of
process is so made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy
of the summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office.
The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service.

xxx

Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to
receive court processes in Japan. This silence could only mean, or at least create an
impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the designated government official or any
of its officers or agents in Japan could be availed of.
 xxx

As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that
summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the Philippines after the two attempts
of service had failed. The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to
cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting
on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other
legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which in turn, forwarded the
same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were delivered
to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines then to the
Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who
forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its
principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper government
official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the
Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not valid
under Philippine law holds no water.

xxx

Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four registered
branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the
processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of JAPAN, and, as such, was
amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to
the said courts' lawful methods of serving process.

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was

valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty.

xxx

Wherefore, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is
AFFIRMED insofar as it denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and exemplary damages but REVERSED insofar as it sustained the trial court's
dismissal of NORTHWEST's complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of Branch 54 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING
private respondent C.F. SHARP & COMPANY, INC. to pay NORTHWEST the amounts
adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said case, with interest thereon at the legal
rate from the filing of the complaint therein until the said foreign judgment is fully
satisfied."

CONRADO HABAA and ROSARIO R. HABAA, petitioners, vs.HON. CIPRIANO

VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, JOSE T. IMBO
and CONCEPCION TEVES, Co-Administrators of the Estates of PEDRO TEVES and
MARIA PASTOR, and MARIANO TEVES, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of
PEDRO TEVES, respondents.
Nature: Original action for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, prohibition and/or
mandamus for annulment of the questioned orders of CFI Negros Oriental
Facts: This case is a sequel of Habaa vs. Imbo, 1 decided by the Court on March 31,
1964. In the first case, the court upheld the sale of 2 parcels of land to spouses Habana
on June 28, 1955. The new action seeks to question again the validity of the sale
previously made.
Pedro Teves and Maria Pastor were husband and wife, residing in Dumaguete City,
Negros Oriental. When Maria Pastor died, she was survived by her husband Pedro and
three children, namely: Concepcion, Jose (deceased) and Asuncion, (also deceased), who
was survived by her husband Luciano Imbo and her children named Jesusa, Jose, Maria,
Remedios, Corazon, Mariano, and Luciano, Jr.
Pedro Concepcion were co-administrator of the estate.
Pedro Teves died, leaving a will, which was admitted to probate. In his will, he
partitioned and divided in his will most of the real properties among his heirs, giving the
two lots in question to Concepcion as her share. Concepcion sold the 2 lots to spouses
Habana. The sale was questioned Imbo, but SC upheld the sale.
Same respondent Jose T. Imbo and his six brothers and sisters, joined by Ariston Teves
and others, alleging themselves to be "legitimated children of Pedro Teves filed an
entirely new and separate complaint against petitioners and Concepcion Teves as
defendants, likewise questioning anew the validity of the sale. This action was taken
cognizance of by the same respondent court. Petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint
for being barred by res judicata and the conclusiveness of this Court's judgment of March
31, 1964 and for lack of cause of action was denied by respondent court.
Issue: WON the court may take cognizance of the new action filed by respondents
Held: No
1. Respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of its jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of the new and separate complaint filed by respondents seeking
anew to nullify the sale of the two lots in question notwithstanding that a re-litigation of
the same question is already barred by this Court's judgment of March 31, 1964. There
could be no such further proceedings. This Court, in upholding the validity of the sale of
the said lots to petitioners, remanded the case to respondent court, with express
instructions "to sell other undisposed or unencumbered properties of any of the heirs,
should there be any obligation of the estate still unpaid."
This Court then unequivocably ruled that "(T)he executor of the will and all other heirs of
the late Pedro Teves should be precluded from questioning the validity of the sale of the
lots in question in favor of (petitioners); rather, they should comply with the lawful
provisions of the will of the testator.
Also since the lots in question were partitioned by will to Concepcion Teves, she became
the absolute owner thereof by operation of law from the death of her parents, free to sell
the same to petitioners, more so, when the sale was expressly recognized by herself and
her co-heirs, as held by this Court in the 1964 judgment.
All these allegations and contentions of respondents and the co-plaintiffs are now barred
by res judicata which has set the controversy at rest. A party cannot be permitted to urge
one ground at a time and indulge in "piece-meal and endless litigation", and "by varying
the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated between the same parties and their privies."

ACCORDINGLY, the writs prayed for are hereby granted. The writ of certiorari is
granted and the questioned orders of respondent court of the petition are annulled and set
aside;
The writ of prohibition is granted, hereby perpetually enjoining respondent court from
further taking cognizance of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4390 of said court and from
further taking any proceedings in connection therewith, other than to dismiss the
complaint, except that it may proceed to try and decide on the merits the counterclaim
and cross-claim for actual and exemplary damages and attorneys' fees and costs filed by
petitioners in their answer as defendants therein; and
The writ of mandamus is likewise granted and respondent court is directed to forthwith
issue the writ of execution and corresponding orders in implementation of this Court's
judgment of March 31, 1964 in Habaa vs. Imbo, G.R. Nos. L-15598 and L-15726, as
prayed for in the petitioners' motion dated August 19, 1964.

SUCCESSION CASES

MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses
states that the law of the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his
nationality, and that legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing
to them shall be annulled. By virtue of such condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an
instituted heir was thus excluded because, by his action of having opposed the partition
scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the conditions are void
being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be probated according to the laws
of the nationality of the decedent.

ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?

HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern. Said condition then, in the light of the legal
provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will
is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. v. BOHANAN

Topic: Succession and Administration

Date: January 30, 1960
Labrador, J.
DOCTRINE:
The validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the
testator, provided that the law must be proved in courts.

QUICK FACTS:
Decedent Bohanan was a US citizen. Nevada law allows a testator to dispose of all his
property according to his will. His ex-wife and children oppose the project of partition
filed by the executor-petitioner, saying they were deprived of their legitimes. According
to them, Philippine law must prevail, requiring decedent to reserve the legitime for
surviving spouse and children.

CONFLICT LAWS:
Old CC Art. 10(2), now NCC Art. 16(2)
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the extent of the successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question.

Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925, Sec. 9905

Every person over the age of 18 years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all
his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the
testators debts.

FACTS:
Testator Bohanan was born in Nebraska and was a US citizen. He has some properties in
California. Despite his long residence in the Philippines, his stay was found by the CFI to
be merely temporary, and he remained to be a US citizen. The CFI declared his will as
fully in accordance with the laws of Nevada and admitted it to probate. The Philippine
Trust Co. was named executor of the will.

A project of partition was filed by Phil Trust which distributed the residuary estate into 3:
1) to his grandson, 2) to his brother and sister, to be distributed equally, 3) legacies
of P6,000 each to his son and daughter, and 4) legacies to other people.

Respondent Magdalena Bohanan, his ex-wife, questions the validity of the partition,
claiming that she and her children were deprived of their legitimes. (It must be noted that
Magdalena and decedent C.O. Bohanan were married in 1909 but he divorced her in
1922. She re-married in 1925 and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of
decedent.)

ISSUE 1: W/N Magdalena is entitled to legitime as surviving spouse

HELD: NO.
There is no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife in the State of
Nevada. There is also no conjugal property between her and decedent.
Moreover, during the proceedings of the case, Magdalena filed a motion to withdraw
P20,000 from the estate funds, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property. But
the Court found that there is no community property.

ISSUE 2: W/N the children are entitled to their legitime

HELD: NO.
1) The CFI has correctly held that the law to be applied is Nevada law, because the
decedent was a US citizen.
2) The children do not dispute the provision.
3) While Sec. 9905 was not introduced as evidence in the hearing of the project of
partition, it was introduced during the hearing of the motion to withdraw filed by
Magdalena. The Court took judicial notice of the law and deemed it unnecessary to prove
the law at the hearing of the project of partition.

DISPOSITIVE:
As in accordance with Art. 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary
dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been
decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of
Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property
according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of
partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellants.

BELLIS v. BELLIS

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, a native of Texas and US national, executed a will in the
Philippines that specifies legacies for his first wife and three illegitimate children, and the
residue estate be divided among his legitimate children. When he died, the executor
administered the will but his illegitimate children opposed the partition claiming that
aside from the legacies, they should still have a share from the legitime as complusory
heirs of the decedent. Texas law, however, does not provide for the legitime.

ISSUE: Are the decedent's illegitimate children entitled to such portion of the legitime?
What law shall govern the decendent's will?

HELD: No. The parties admit that the decedent was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Hence, the illegitimate children of the
decedent has no claim to the inheritance aside from those expressly provided legacies.

TAYAG V CONSOLIDATED

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the

corporation
SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper,
whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property
to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or
to be distributed among his heirs.
SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the
ancillary administrators right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares
of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others,
two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the
Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins estate in the Philippines, Tayag now
wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of New
York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of
the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and
ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins
shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are
not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company
of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all
assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an
earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than
one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the
country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both
countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed
the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary
administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex
proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines].
The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other
than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the
deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrators right
to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary
administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in
her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is
equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance
and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot
therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds
application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable
proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it
successfully do so even if it were so minded.