City of Manila vs Chinese Community of
Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a
petition praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement
namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue,
Manila and claiming that such expropriation
was necessary. Herein defendants, on the
other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity
existed for said expropriation and (b) that
the land in question was a cemetery,
which had been used as such for many
years, and was covered with sepulchers
and monuments, and that the same
should not be converted into a street for
public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no
necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the
lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the
authority to expropriate any land it may desire;
that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the
land in question; that neither the court nor the
owners of the land can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask
any questions concerning the necessities
therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of
the land involved in expropriation proceedings,
and, when the value of the land is fixed by the
method adopted by the law, to render a
judgment in favor of the defendant for its
value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and
hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a
public character. The ascertainment of the
necessity must precede or accompany,
and not follow, the taking of the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co.,
166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281;
Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co.,
72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of
eminent domain must not be confused with the
right to exercise it in a particular case. The
power of the legislature to confer, upon
municipal corporations and other entities
within the State, general authority to exercise
the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts, but that general
authority of municipalities or entities must not
be confused with the right to exercise it in
particular instances. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must
comply with the conditions accompanying the
authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case
under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question which the
courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the
question whether the necessity for the exercise
of the right of eminent domain is purely
legislative and not judicial, arises generally in
the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in
authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent
domain instead of in the question of the right
to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston
Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have
the power of restricting the exercise of
eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law.
(Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No.
L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the
subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to
be constructed. Private respondent San
Antonio Development Corporation (San
Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the government without them
reaching the agreement as to the
compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then
issued an order for the appointment of the
commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the
payment of the government to San Antonio
would be P15 per square meter, which was
objected to by the latter contending that under
PD 1533, the basis of just compensation
shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated,
or by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Such objection and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration were denied and hearing was
set for the reception of the commissioners
report. EPZA then filed this petition for
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the
respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and
mandatory mode of determining just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode
of determination of just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just
compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It
tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in
which under the Constitution is reserved to it
for financial determination. The valuation in the
decree may only serve as guiding principle or
one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the
courts own judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determination but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the
Bill of Rights that the private party may not be
taken for public use without just compensation,
no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the courts findings. Much less can
the courts be precluded from looking into the
justness of the decreed compensation.
Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty
G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998
Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality
of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a
Complaint for expropriation against Private
Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The
city previously negotiated for the sale of the
property but VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February
4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon
deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market
value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint
failed to state a cause of action because
it was filed pursuant to a resolution and
not to an ordinance as required by RA
7160 (the Local Government Code); and
(b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by
a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner
claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The
petitioners MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the
municipal council has the same force and
effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an
expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a
ground for dismissal of case is not applicable
when public interest is primarily involved.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution
approved by the municipal council for the
purpose of initiating an expropriation case
substantially complies with the requirements
of the law because the terms ordinance and
resolution are synonymous for the purpose
of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to
initiate the expropriation proceedings in court
in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise
eminent domain through a mere resolution, it
would have simply adopted the language of the
previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. In a clear divergence from
the previous Local Government Code, Section
19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the
local chief executive act pursuant to an
ordinance.

To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited
Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code,
which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a
private property for public use, purpose, or
welfare through purchase, the LGU may
expropriate said property through a resolution
of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief
executive to initiate expropriation
proceedings.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to
LGUs, other public entities and public utilities.
An LGU may therefore exercise the power
to expropriate private property only when
authorized by Congress and subject to the
latters control and restraints, imposed
through the law conferring the power or
in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise
eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear
letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by a mere administrative rule issued
for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain
delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent
but inferior domain, since it must conform to
the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals
and the trial court, all the requisites for the
application of res judicata are present in this
case. There is a previous final judgment on the
merits in a prior expropriation case involving
identical interests, subject matter and cause of
action, which has been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the
principle of res judicata, which finds application
in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot
bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of
property which the State might need for public
use whenever they need it.

We are not convinced by petitioners insistence
that the terms resolution and ordinance are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance
is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of
a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
While the principle of res judicata does not
denigrate the right of the State to exercise
eminent domain, it does apply to specific
issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that
the power of the State or its agent to exercise
eminent domain is not diminished by the mere
fact that a prior final judgment over the
property to be expropriated has become the
law of the case as to the parties. The State or
its authorized agent may still subsequently
exercise its right to expropriate the same
property, once all legal requirements are
complied with.
RP vs Heirs of Borbon
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is
a government-owned and -controlled
corporation vested with authority under
Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, to
undertake the development of hydro-electric
generation of power, production of electricity
from any and all sources, construction,
operation and maintenance of power plants,
auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, main
transmission lines, power stations and
substations, and other works for the purpose of
developing hydraulic power from any river,
lake, creek, spring and waterfalls in the
Philippines and to supply such power to the
inhabitants thereof.
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in
the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC),
seeking the acquisition of an easement of right
of way over a portion of the property involving
an area of only 6,326 square meters, more or
less, alleging that it had negotiated with the
respondents for the acquisition of the
easement but they had failed to reach any
agreement. It prayed for the issuance of a writ
of possession upon deposit to enable it to enter
and take possession and control of the affected
portion of the property; to demolish all
improvements existing thereon; and to
commence construction of the transmission
line project. It likewise prayed for the
appointment of three commissioners to
determine the just compensation to be paid.