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Socrates engages Euthyphro in a discussion about the nature of piety. Euthyphro defines piety as what is loved by the gods, but Socrates questions this definition. He argues that for something to truly define piety, it must explain why it is pious, not just what the gods think of it. Socrates then helps Euthyphro refine his definition by considering whether acts are pious because the gods love them, or if the gods love them because they are inherently pious. The discussion aims to uncover the essence or true nature of piety, rather than just what opinions the gods happen to hold.
Socrates engages Euthyphro in a discussion about the nature of piety. Euthyphro defines piety as what is loved by the gods, but Socrates questions this definition. He argues that for something to truly define piety, it must explain why it is pious, not just what the gods think of it. Socrates then helps Euthyphro refine his definition by considering whether acts are pious because the gods love them, or if the gods love them because they are inherently pious. The discussion aims to uncover the essence or true nature of piety, rather than just what opinions the gods happen to hold.
Socrates engages Euthyphro in a discussion about the nature of piety. Euthyphro defines piety as what is loved by the gods, but Socrates questions this definition. He argues that for something to truly define piety, it must explain why it is pious, not just what the gods think of it. Socrates then helps Euthyphro refine his definition by considering whether acts are pious because the gods love them, or if the gods love them because they are inherently pious. The discussion aims to uncover the essence or true nature of piety, rather than just what opinions the gods happen to hold.
- Casted our votes like Athenians o Do the gods tell us to do good because it is good for us to do? Or are they good because the gods tell us to do them? o Three baskets of Plato/Socrates, Xenophanes, and Our answer to the question - Result o Mix of answers in Xenophanes o All of us doodled in the left side of our basket and Platos basket, which means that our answer is gods tell us to do good because it is good for us to do - Reflection Paper o A good paper would not be based on agreement with sir, but with how you substantiate your claims o The paper has no minimum and no maximum required length but we do have to give an answer to each and give reasons to our answers o It is better to give an answer which argues with sirs point of view but has good points rather than agreeing and providing lousy arguments Discussion of the mixed answers in Xenophanes basket a) The gods tell us to do good because it is good for us to do Xenophanean language there is utility or usefulness to doing it 7.3 Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all deeds which among [mortals] are a reproach and a disgrace: thieving, adultery, and deceiving one another Xenophanes is disagreeing with the practice of people attributing things I wouldnt even accept of my neighbor to gods Xenophanes knows these behaviors of wrong, so hes reluctant to accept them of the divine Xenophanes thinking moves from what I know from the good because theyre good to what I dont know about the gods because theyre gods It takes investigation, rationalization, process, to learn about the absolute but what is important is that it begins with what I actually know 7.21 By no means did the gods reveal all things to mortals from the beginning, but in time, by searing, they discover better. If we have to discover and actively search for the truth as stated in the fragment then the gods do not tell us to do it. The direction of Xenophanes argument seems to be from the good we know toward the divine revelation which we dont know. 7.21 shows us from the beginning we dont know what the gods are telling us to do but rather we have to find that out as a result of an ongoing search. We do not know from the beginning what were supposed to do. But in time, by searching we discover better and better. While the other is the revelation answer, this is the research answer Scriptural reference: Gallatians Paul says even if an angel of God were to preach a gospel other than the one you have heard from me, they should be accursed. This means that this angel is not an angel. You already know the truth and received the gospel, if someone preaches something different (even if they sound or look authoritative that you may normally respect in a creature), its nonsense. b) The good is good because gods tell us to do them The good is beyond my knowing so I need an authority to reify it for me 7.8 It is unholy for any of the gods to have a master If we put God and reason on a scale, God wins because he can do what he wants to do If he wants to do something which is unreasonable, who are we to argue? We cant win an argument against something perfect. 7.10 God is one, greatest among gods and humans, not at all like mortals in body or thought God is the omnipotent, most complete, most perfect, the superlative If God would tell us that a thing is good then we would have no means to argue because we are far below his level His thinking is also different from our thinking our comprehension of the truth is nothing compared to his 7.11 All of him sees, all of him thinks, all of him hears We are dealing with an omniscient, omnipresent, being. Compared to us having no power so God knows better for us 7.19 No one has seen nor will anyone know the truth about the gods and all the things I speak of. For even if a person should in fact say what is absolutely the case, nevertheless they themselves do not know but belief is fashioned over all things This notion of the absolute case is not known by man and so it has to be granted to me from the outside. The only way I can understand what is absolutely the case would be to put it into practice. In practicing the good, we are going to come to value it (Brushing teeth example) 7.20 Let things be believed as resembling the truth Implies that there is a standard that we dont know 7.22 If god had not created yellow honey, they would say that figs are far sweeter Our notion of the good may be like the fig where it is diluted as compared to the honey or absolute and complete good Everything is subjective unless it comes from a standard and this standard is given by God
Reading Platos Answer:
- The gods tell us to do good because it is good for us to do But we have to find out why he says that so that we know if we should agree with him or not We have to evaluate the basis for Platos claim o Euthyphros third definition of piety comes from Socrates - SOCRATES: They will listen if they think you show them well. But this thought came to me as you were speaking, and I am examining it, saying to myself: If Euthyphro shows me conclusively that all the gods consider such a death unjust, to what greater extent have I learned from him the nature of piety and impiety? This action would then, it seems, be hated by the gods, but the pious and the impious were not thereby now defined, for what is hated by the gods has also been shown to be loved by them. So I will not insist on this point; let us assume, if you wish, that all the gods consider this unjust and that they all hate it. However, is this the correction we are making in our discussion, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they all love is pious, and that what some gods love and others hate is neither or both? Is that how you now wish us to define piety and impiety? When you are arguing with a person you should be doing your best to make their argument as strong as you possibly can You dont win the argument because youre smarter, that doesnt matter This is not the interest of a genuine argument. A genuine argument seeks to find the truth. If you want to move toward the truth, we do not weaken a persons argument to the point that he feels shamed because its a lose-lose situation where both of us do not learn anything. You just picked on somebody If you care about the truth, this is how we proceed, we take an argument that we disagree with and we reconstruct it Socrates supplies for Euthyphro a better definition of his own position because what Socrates is interested in is pursuing the truth. He isnt necessarily agreeing with him and in fact will disagree with him There is no value in winning an argument versus a straw man, but arguments which are won versus strong men, lead to the truth Together you work toward a better perspective, the truth o Euthyphro agrees and Socrates puts the question out there: Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods? o Balloon something being carried, being led, being seen or passiveness. Different from us, active carrying, leading, and seeing. o We talked about essences and attributes o Is the balloon, a balloon because it is being is there another reason? and is sir, sir because he carries the balloon? Socrates asks a similar question and Euthyphro says there is no other reason but he is wrong o The balloon which is being carried is different from Sir who is carrying it. And both the balloon and sir retain their essence whether or not they are carrying something or are being carried by someone o For example if the balloon were to be set down on the table and not be carried, is it not a balloon anymore? It still is because being carried is just an attribute while the things essence is still remains unchanged. It is still a balloon even if it is held, or set down. So gods loving things and the gods hating things doesnt make any difference or affect pietys essence. It is pious because it is inherently good. o Socrates then proposes that: It is being loved then, because it is pious, but not the other way around Socrates shares the same answer as Xenophanes where we use our rationality to find the truth, which has its own essence whether or not it is liked, disliked, etc. End of lesson
Michael S. Heiser (2001) - The Mythological Provenance of Isaiah 14,12-15. A Reconsideration of The Ugaritic Material. LBTS Faculty Publications and Presentations 280, Pp. 354-369