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 H hD ,u.°MWE 9811TH Nli UTR~Y uIVI3I ON

20 Decemaber 1945

HI TORICAT 4 ;,Tk§OR~T
THE 00 CUPATI ON OF J4 J'A3! N

Period 15 Augu: t 1945 to 30 November 1945

By

98 h IT SF U!TY DIVIS~ION

"{68xe.
x~eur
xwewe,.n
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 HEADQUARTERS 98 TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of te.. C.o.omanding General
APO 98 (Oaka, Honshu)

OREWO RD

This is a report of the part played by the 98th

Infantry Division in tho Occupation of Japan. It

covers the transition of the Division fron. prepara-

tion for combat to planning for occupation; the rapid

planning and execution of an overseas, movement and am-

phibious landing; and, finally, the ostablishnont of

control over the Osaka Area of Honshu, Japan,

A. MJRABA.RPW
Major Gon ral, UISA
C O.L:_. .n c ing

If:k1

7j;J>J)XJ I; i-- -~-

 IiI2D URT'F,,5
R 98THIN2Lh

22 Oc a:.b x i945

cti on 1 4aL INTRODUCTION

O I -L R
-
, T . - T 3 - O O l TcS 6
1. I fe rrces 6
2., Reporting Unit 6
3, Suibject of. Rucrt 6
4.. Period. Coy :r,3d 6
5 * Pu~rpos e of Thw .)ort 6
6.. PL.1i of h port 6
7. B ck grournc. - lL.tus of jivisimn~ bieiinia1 9
of7 p~rio~
80 Origii1L1. iissjon..altubstcuEnt Ci.,Igvs 9

Stiton II PLAN"-I .. £XCT{IVITIZ, 11

. IntExx litgrce1

b. Opera tions 13

c. ~j~l14.

d~. Lois tics '14,

e, Shore, P rty 15
f,, Personnel 1

h. SpccicJ pL:in 16

Section III OP . yNl ' 17

1. Logistica1 P'repwrutions LricL Loci.in g 17
 Pgo No
a. Geeal 17
b. Ordii.i-.noet. 17
C.Sgri&

d. Chemaical aro~ 19_

e. 1\id ical 20

f. Qt r tc.-ste.
rin 24
g. ~ngixieer 24
h±. lnfornotioi and Educa~tioii 26

i. -Tras port .tion ),u.Lte2iuster

30
2. L ovem: enu to Target
30
u. Embarkation of Troops
30
b. .. ,ctvities Durinig Voyage
C. 11~i 31.
di. Wvakayaia, Honshu, %6,puri 32
3* Landing and Movemne.t to lnitial Bivouac 34
a. Landing 34
b. Movument to i. itia1 bivouac 34
c. B3ech Op erati ons --Unloctilig 35
d,. Su.pply 39
4, Initial Bivouac lr,' 43
E4 . Description 43
b. Sanitation 43
c. Activities 44
5. Perm~anent Billeting .reas 47
a. 'Reconniaissance 47
be 1V .m~~e and ea5~ -47
N -
 S~ " * Page No
c. Rehabilitation
aio 48
d. Communications

e. Security -
6, Occupational Activities 51
a, General 51

bo Demobilization of Japanese 51

c. Civil Affairs 55

d. Morale 58

e. Sanitation, Health, and Housekeeping 60

f. Training 61

g. Summary 61

Section IV - JAPAITSi ATTITJDE TOWARD OCCUPATION 63

Section V - SUmMAIRY OF LESSSOiS LEARNED

1. General 66

2. Morale 66

3. Intelligence 66

4. Operat ions and Training 67

5. Sanitation 67

6. Supply 67

7. Civil Affairs 68

Inclosures - Supporting Documents- (Accoiqpany original

report only)

UNCLASSIFIED
 .
UNCLASS1BED
P S- .. .u ...........................
o i . .

LIST OF INOL OSUhES

Suport4 Q 90drilefts

Inci

1. Pictorial Supplenment to Occupation Report (1 copy)

2. Iield Order #2, G-3 Journal. for Period 15 hugust to
30 November 1945 (2 copies)

3. G-.3 Operations R eport for Period 29 S ptember to

30 Nov ember (2 c opios)

4. 98th Division SOP (1 copy)

a. G-2 Journal for Period 15 nugust to 30 November

(2 copies)

b. G-2 Periodic Report Nos 1 thru 63 (2 copies)

6. a. Station List Occup.. tio o J.pn (2 copies)
b. Roster of Officers of 98th Infantry Division
(2 copies)
c. G-l Journal for period 15 iaugust to 15 November
(2 copies)

d, General Orders No 12, 15, 16-2 3, 26, 29, 32, 33

S7. a. SOI 98th Infantry Division (2 copies)

b. Circuit Diagram as of 00011 20 October, 98th

Infantry Division (2 copies)

c. Circuit Diagram as of 00011 20 November, 98th

Infantry Division (2 copies)

a. Miedical Service 50 P (2 copies)

b. Sanitation SOP 4 -ugust 1945 (2 copies)

c, Sanitation SOP 27 October 1945 (2 copies)

9. a, G-4 Journal (2 copies)

t NCCSSWiED
 b.Mkminis trzive Ores 2 cdV3
dnance L j st of Msl . $Orr it e ms for
a
Co mib at ,' Rep1 ace
r~c -
ment (2 copies)
d. Choniic u1 Warfaire Unit of ii' ir e T2able (2 copies)
e. Medica1 SOP (2 copies)
f'. Thirty Day Medica1 Iaintnan~ce for R~einforced
~Infantry Division (2 copies)
g. Quartermiaster Supply Loading Report (2 copies)
h. Engineer Supply, Operation e~nd lMiaintenanc'e .- SoP.
(2 copies )
i. Engineer Plan (2 copi~es)
j. List of Equipment (2 copies)
k. s s ault c2nd(u Pioneer Supplies (2 c opies )
1. Operatioia1 bupplies (2 copie~s)

'a~. Ldditi ona1 Lis t of iEqui~pnent (2 copies')

ii. 'List of SpecilJ 'ter Equipmaent (2 copies)
o. Compilation of Specia1 VWcter Informaition
(2 copies)
p. $hipping Space Ll.1ocution (2 copies)
q. Engineer Plan for Disposition of Captured
Srrendered Supplies (2 copies)
r. Thirty DJy Class II Supplies (2 copies)
s. Acc uiu1-tivo Report of Ca~ptured or Surrendered
Supplies ared Equipmnirt
t. AccIradLtive Wbet r Report (2 copies)
u. T12' Shippin breakdowan of Sup~plies a~nd Equipment .
(4 F'ormas
10. 98th Infantry Division 1emorancti, Tr -.in.,. M~emorandumr,-
a.nd Stefi' iacor adu a (1 copy)
11. Taps Japain. 1/250,000 shee-ts 38. & 39, sho ,ing 98th Inf
Div unit loc tioxas a.s of 30 Nov 1945 (2 copies)

C~ I I
 9&TI
fT&y~ . .i ilY IVISE01

Ls:7. :ij;oe'
" L i". l vl A

a. Paraglat)h 10 MZA345-1O5 an~d changes 2 and 4

thereto.
b. Letter 6th A-.rmy, Subject,, rist. rioa1 I~~rs
AG. 370 .2c, dated 20 iYove,.:ber 1945, with lst Ind K.c I Corps
daEted~ 27 hI'ove ,iber 1945.
2. h:Leort:i Unit .9LCth In f&,Jtry Division
3. §ubject ofn yort - Occupation of\Japan.
4. ler iod Cove:Led 15 A.u ust 1945 to 30 Iyove : ber 1 45 .
3" . -uri)OSe of Re port - The <,uZ'Pose of this report is
to:
a. RecorL the activities of the 9L&th infutiy :Liv-
ision during Phase I, Baker Ten, O0 eration Blaclist.
b. ~.itout difficulties eiicounterec,, les oins
learae., anc. techniques' develo_)d In the :.roveaent to and
occupation of the 3 apai se ho:±eltawid
6. .Lian of eport
a. The report is cdivicded into five geiLeral. hed--
ings as fobois:
Introdiuction
?l11an ing A~ctivities
Op rations ~a friid Oat
Ja nese Attitude Towarct Tdhe O)ccupatiOfl
Eu uiary of L o;aons Learned
 b. 1 altexs ad iistrativo are explained in greater
deftail hoxocin. than nor:, 11y covorod in an "af'ter a~ction"t
report. The reason is obvious; thy; re~port' would. be incon .
plot e and inaccurate without such ciiphas is s in view of .the
fact that cA'nistrativoe prob~or_ (housekeeping, supply,
disposition of naotorials , procuroeriont , e) dexiand'ed
roughly sovonty percent of the tico and efforts of the Div,-
is ion,
UNIT LocArT1N5. 1I51AIMD OF OA'--U ,Ho
 7. Background. Status of Division at beginning of
;eriod.
During the summer of 1945, the 98th Infantry
Division, assigned to IX Corps, was stationed on the Island
of Oahu, T.H..

At the time of the sudden capitulation of Japan,

the Division was training and planning for the invasion of
the Japanese homeland as a participant in Olympic Operation.
Planning for this operation was discontinued on receipt
of the news that the Japanese Government had accepted the
Allied peace terms,

On 15 August, a radio message originating at Sixth

Army transferred the 98th Division and attachments to I
Corps, and alerted the Division for the Blacklist Operation.
(Phase I, Baker Ten). However, this order left the Division
under control of AFhIDPAC until departure from the mounting
area.

The mission assigned the Division wwas participation

in the occupation of Japan; however, due to Luncertainty as
to the attitude of the people, the real intentions of the
Japanese army, and the possibility of treachery or sabotage,
the Division was directed to be combat loaded and prepared
for any eventuality. Thus planning for the occupation of
Japan was based upon an assault landing rather than an
administrative mrovement.

As a result of the abrupt change of Pacific Oper-

ations from combat to occupation, information was necess-
arily meager and instructions from higher headquarters were
general in nature. The haste with which the Blacklist
Operation was ordered and executed, the consequent vagueness
as to actual conditions at the target, and the lack of a
positive mission are pointed out not in criticism, but as
factors which caused confusion and the eventual discard of
prior plans on arrival at the target. For example, directions
covering troop movements after landing were not received
until approximately two hours prior to landing.

8. OrCinal ission and Subsequent hanges.

The 98th Infantry Division, as part of the I Corps,

was initially assigned thi mission of landing .t Jakayama
Beach, Honshu, Japan and protecting the concentration of
the Corps. It was further directed to occupy and establish
control over the Osaka area (including the four prefectures
of Osaka, Nara, Jakayama, and iye), supervise the demiobil-
ization of Japanese forces, and exercise survei.llance over-
certain military and 'c.ilii f inst- ll tions ahd activities.

On errival at Wakayana, the mission dictated by

combat landing was altored and the Division was ordered to
move directly to the Osaka area into e temporary billet at
Taisho Airfield, east .of the city of Osaka.

It was at this time (shortly after arrival in

Japan) that'the specific nature of the occupation mission
becaie known. In acddition to the supervision of the dem.ob-
ilization of Ja anese aried forces, the Division was given
the further mission of seizure and dis.osition of all
supplies, equip ent, anic installations of the Japanese army
and navy w-ithin its one of res ,onsibility. This mission
involved both the destruction of the Japanese w.r potential
and the reallocation of suitable enemy military supplies
and property to the Japanese Home Linistry for civilian
use.

10
 SECTION II - PLANNING ACTIVITIES

1. General. The 98th Infantry Division actually start-

ed preparation for the invasion of Japan early in 1944,
but :ore specifically when it was concentrated on the Is-
land of Oahu in Nove:ber of that year. In the succeeding
ten months every phase of training fron individual marks-
anship to regi:ental combat tean firing problens was cov-
ered& Each conbat tea planned and executed aaphibious
operations; Staff-planning and training was conducted in
conjunction with those exercises. and in CPX's. Standard
Operating Procedures for Aiphibious Operations were pub-
lished, put into effect; a.di tested,

When the Division was alerted for the Olympic opera-

tion in the early sur:;.er of 1945, it had achieved the rnmx-
imun state of readiness for combat that could be reached
without the experience of conbat itself.

The plans for the occupation (Blacklist Operation) were

based on those already formulated by the Division for the
invasion of Japan (Olympic Operation).

a. Intellg enc Specific intelligence planning

accomplished for the 01 ynpic Operation was of only inci-
dental value in planning for occupation of Japan, since
the former mission dealt with the invasion of the southern
tip of Kyushu, while the occupation was to take place in
so:.thern Honshu,

A.ong rany early intelligence considerations was

the need for procurement of all available beach, tide, wea-
ther, and other necessary data to lay the groundwork for
planning of operations. I rxediate requests were nade to
higher headquarters to effect a flow of this information
to the Division.

A certain amount of difficulty and delay was ex-

perienced in planning whon it was learned that the ulti-
mate beaches could not be definitely designated by higher
headquarters. Mined areas in the waters adjacent to Sakai-
Osaka and Kobe denied an early anphibious entry, and ade-
quate beaches were sorewhat limited throughout the general
area allocated to the 98th Division. Studies were begun
ii.iediately of the coastal areas bounded by the cities of
Sakai and Wakayana, since it was indicated that the most
favorable locality within this area would be chosen for the
landing. Composition of the Intelligence Annex to the
Division's Field Order and a Geographical Study was start-
ed with the naterial ii.iaediately available. The basic
source of material for the study was the military study
JANIS 4,S,Southwest Japan, dated August 1944. The purpose
of this study was to present a :.xilum of useful facts about
terrain in the general area Wakayama-Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto and
Nagoya.
When orders were received that the Osaka and adjacent
areas were to be the Division's zone of responsibility,
information was collected on this area in detail and on
Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto-Nagoya in brief. The information prepared
included the major terrain features, such as the Osaka Plain
and adjacent areas; the linki T'ighlands, the Ise Plain and
adjacent areas; various basins, natural routes of commun-
ications, surrounding hills, lakes and bays; the principal
rivers, streams, prominent cities and towns including their
industries and background and the general physical character
of each. An effort was made to present data to comanders
that would facilitate thieir plans for bivouacing or quarter-
ing troops and for other functioning in connection with the
occupation mission. Although the military aspects of the
terrain for tactical purposes were confined to a geographical
study of a semi-military nature, enough tactical information
was included to meet a comfoat situation.

Appendix #2 to Field Order No. 2, entitled "Enemy Order

of Battle", was compiled by the 40th Order of Battle Team
from OB Files on hand at that time. Necessary changes in
this annex were effected on receipt of corrected Japanese
0B lists as they became available. It was interesting to
note that only minor changes were necessary.
Preliminary work was begun on Appendix#4, "Beach
Intelligence Wakayama" on or about 23 August, at which time
the Division received the first tangible evidence of its
proposed landing area in the form of vertical aerial photo-
graph coverage, scale 1/15,000 of the Wakayaia City and beach-
area, and a portion of the area to the North and Northwest
of the City. This coverage was immediately given inter-
pretation by the 155th Photo Interpreter Team. Shortly there
after, the information was disseminated in fragmentary form
to all staff sections and unit commanders in the Division,
However, on August 26 when this appendix was published,
the Division still had no definite assurance that Wakayama
would be the landing area for its troops.

Other data, primarily offshore studies, were received

and employed as supplementary rma terial to information al-
ready published. Appendices ?6 and r7, respectively, "Tide,
Daylight and Dark Tables" and "Weather Charts", were compiled
and published during the period 15 August to 26 August 1945.
Appendix #8, entitled "Sketch of Airfields and Allied P.W.
Camps" was published and disseminated on 26 August 1945.
This appendix was included in Annex Baker to afford a ready
record on all levels of the command to facilitate rapid
location of these installations.

12
 b. Operations. The operational planning for the
occupation of Japan was difficult, Flexibility was of prime
importance, in that any situation between the two extremes
of bloody conflict and administrative landing was to be
anticipated.

The Division was directed to be ready for combat;

therefore, plans were based on the execution of a combat
amphibious landing.

To expedite the detailed planning of subordinate

units, two general landing plans were prepared: Plan Able
directed the landing of two regiments abreast with two bat-
talions abreast (391st on the right, 389th on the left; and
the 390th in reserve); Plan Baker directed the landing of
regiments in column with two battalions abreast in the or-
der - 391st Infantry, 389th Infantry, 390th Infantry, A
detailed standard lanaing plan and wave diagram was prepared
for use by all infantry battalions.

Shipping was allocated to the units of the Division

generally as follows:
389th ROT - TransDiv 42
390th ROT - TransDiv 52
391st ROT - TransDiv 45
Light Artillery Battalions, Shore Party, Combat in-
gineers and Reconnaissance Troop - LST FLOT 13
767th Tank Battalion, Remainder of Shore Party -
L&! FLOT 15

Division Headquarters was divided into two tactical

groupings. The Commanding General and party were placed
aboard the APA Burleigh, the TransRon 18 Flagship, along with
the Commanding Officer, 390th Infantry.. The assistant Div-
ision Cormmander and arty were placed aboard the APA Logan;
flagship of TransDiv 45, along with the Commanding Officer,
391st Infantry. The remainder of Division Headquarters was
organized as the rear echelon and placed aboard the APA Cape
Johnson. Other units of the Division were broken down to
RCT's for shipping purposes.

To meet the combat requirements of the landing, light

artillery was loaded on dukws in LST's; taZnks were embarked
in LSM t s. Shore Party personnel were included in scheduled
landing waves: and tank and shore party LSM's were scheduled
to land immediately following the last scheduled wave,
Thus the landing of the troops as .guaranteed early fire
and logistical support,

All phases of operational planning were discussed and

disseminated in frequent staff and commanders conferences.
Rapid dissemination of information was mandatory in that

13
time was extremely short. FO r-2 , hq 98th .iv was issued
on 4 Sept 1945 (for planiOng purposes only). It wvs not
issued in final form until 20 Sept after 0O 31 his I Corps
had been received at baipan.
c. i edical, iMuch of the planning for medical service
had been reducea to Standing Operating Procedures during
the period in the Hawaiian Islands. Procedures had been
formulated, analyzed; practiced in field and amphibious
exercises, and altered as experience indicated. Medical
plans for evacuation were complete for the Olympic Operation
and only minor modifications were necessary to adapt these
plans to the Blacklist Operation. Likewise, supply and
resupply for amphibious operations were covered by existing
SOPs, and needed but few changes to fit them specifically
to the Blacklist Operation.

When the Division was ordered to prepare for the Olympic

Operation, a study was made of all data available having
to do with medical and sanitary problems prevalent in Japan.
From the information obtained it was concluded that the
principal health problems to be encountered would consist
of the control of intestinal, mosquito-borne, respiratory
and venereal diseases. Secondary to these.disease groups
schistosomiasis, typhus, scrub typhus and plague were
considered as diseases of potential, although not primary,
military importance It was felt that, for the purpose of
training, the greatest emphasis would have to be placed on:
water discipline and the purification of water; the dis-
posal of human wastes and ration wastes; individual pro-
tective measures against mosquitoes and group methods of
mosquito control; fly control and the prevention of fly
breeding; the use of DDT powder for protection against
louse and flea infestation; the avoidance of native foods;
the proper use of wet-cold clothing; the prophylactic
measures for control of venereal disease; and the main-
tenance of adequate personal hygiene by all individuals,

d. Logistics, In November. 1944, work was begun on a

Division SOP for amphibious wvarfare. Conferences were held
between various staff sections and conminders to evolve a
plan which would be sound and worKable. Detailea studies
were made of reports of operations both in the Pacific and
other theaters.

The personal combat experiences of many individuals

within the Division contributed to the development of pro-
cedures. The SOPs were kept up to date, being revised from
time to time as new and better methods were developed,
so that when the Division was alerted for the Olympic
Operation and later the Blacklist Operation, much of the
logistical planning had already been accomplished.

14
 Upon notification that the 98th Division would partici-
pate in Olympic Operation, a .meeting was called of the Div-
ision supply agencies to discuss plans for the equipping and
supply of Division and attached troops. ::ach supply branch
immediately determined from its respective supply agency in
the Central Pacific Base Command, the Division's supply -eche-
lon, the status of stocks of T/0 &e, SSLO , and special
mission equipment and supplies. At this particular time,
the Division was approzximately 60% equipped under MIDPAC
LSLO.]'s. By virtue of assignment to Sixth Army on 15 August,
AaFAC SSLOi'sbecare the applicable basis for equipment, how-
ever, in turn, AFPAC SSLO7's were rescinded by Sixth Army
Special T/O &: E changes, These changes necessitated a re-
study of the equipment and supplies needed by the Division
for accomplishment of its mission. In -certain instances,
because of the peculiarities of the assigned mission itself,
status of training of organic and assigned troops, and irmm-
ediate availability of equipment and supplies, requests were
made on CPBC, MI'DPAC, sixth Army, and then I Corps, upon
assignment thereto, for modifications between MID?AC SSLOE
and Sixth Army Special T/O &' chan:es. In most cases, auth-
ority was granted for these additions, deletions, and substi-
tutions, which, in no small way, accounted for the excellent,
and practically complete equipment status of the Division in
readiness for the mission.

e. Shore tarty. As a result of the lack of more

specific informat~on, "aore party plans prior to embarkation
were of a general nature. The Shore Party Task l-roup was
organized into ROCT landing forces with consolidation of
Shore Party functions to take place prior to the unloading
of bulk cargo.

f. Psnnel.
P. : .-Personnel plans made for the ~olym-
pic Opera-ion were easily adapted to the occupation opera-
tion. By using the average daily ineffective strength fig-
ure as a basis, anticipatory loss requisitions were made
for all personnel that could not rejoin the Division prior
to embarkation. Air priorities were established by higher
headquarters to fly officers frormthe mainland. The anti-
cipatory loss requisitions were filled by placing personnel
on detached service to the Division with assignments being
made as v.cancies actually occurred. This resulted in Div-
ision and attached units embarking at T/O strength.

g.. Military G-overnment. It was anticipated during

the preparatio*E- t -- iivision would participate
in the military government of Japan; and although informa-
tion in this field was limited, a Military - overnment team
was selected from Division officers and plans were made for it
operation. The assignment of a trained Military covernment
team to the area occupied by Division precluded the use of
this team.
 SGci 1 S rvic E
S. Re Cr.o~s awdr? ~cE .c:1 3.
Pium.i}i c by 5 e~
cI-K Servior:, R.I el Cross wA'. OhiuJL in cones~i.ted
Ir.1y +., Qbti ir Ax; u:._.ile s, fLr "oth sii...
rLecroaorLJ
b0 and use <nd a re ervo for recre;;tionj1 use in the tarxget.
aea. gil L_ jtV t- ilc y oIf ixteen ij-1.iieoter £iL±
^-
cuired f'or t t th trcoo; anud ac4 ;e..ente, v^ere
:.ace to 1-:ave t,:;e1 e izi~ow1i
f1 into the Divi a. . tarcot
±rin
S " Ge
:l. s c
AM.L
SC'i c
,
fina
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". Ur 1.. U. L
th
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. . :i Nt ? i£X.vi
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Estm ;:;~. 01U uO '3 a ILt inL u recreu tire. eru.r~r ;C:

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etearyi t is iblre all eu~
Q~;ouid haLl Nve a c ha- .in of e. ch f th.

16
 SECTION III - OPER-TIONS caRRIED OUT

1. Logistical preparations and loading

a. General. Preparations for the movement were

expedited due to the early departure datea

Showdown inspections based on CPBC POM, 1 Novem-

ber 1944, of all organic and, attached units were held be-
ginning 18 August 1945. By 22 Aiugust 1945, all inspections
were completed. Concurrently with equipment inspections,
the Division Inspector General conducted inspections of
all records.

Waterproofing materials, packing boxes, and crates

were made available and palletizing and supply concentrak
tion areas were established. Each of the supply agencies
carried out its preparation under the supervision of the
G-4 Section,

b. Ordnance, Based upon reports of combat exper-

iences of other units a careful study was nade of the com-
bat replacement factors of major items of ordnance equip-
ment, cleaning and preserving materials, spare parts, and
accessories. Requisitions were placed with appropriate
supply agencies, and a breakdown to units for shipment was
made. Inspection teams were organized to assist the units
on a combat serviceability check for weapons and vehicles.
These teams were drawn from qualified personnel of the Cen-
tral Pacific Base Command Ordnance companies. Replacement
of individual weapons and fire control instruments was great,
due to a strenuous training program just prior to receipt
of alert orders, and almost a complete replacement of vehi
cles was necessary due to the age of those then in the Div-
ision. All vehicles within the Division were processed with
an application of rust preventive on undercarriages and
likely moisture-accumulating areas. Compound Rust Prevent-
ive Thin Film (Tetrin) was used for this application.

A sixty-day supply of spare- partsaccessorio and

cleanin. and preserving materials was decided upon. A
thirty-day supply was to be taken in each unit with an addi
tional. thirty-day supply in Ordnance Reserve

The thirty-day supply of cleaning and preserving

materials taken by the units was boxed in quantities to
equal five days' supply for a company or battery.

After the supply of major items, spare parts, and

accessories were processed, they were crated according to
SNL type and each crate was stamped with the Voucher number up-
on which the items were receivod All the ordnance vouchers

17
were filed, wwith the Ordnance Company Supily Platoon.
Each box was given a number in addition to the voucher
number. This number was listed on a register showing
the items contained therein and what ship the box was
to be carried on. This system gcve a cross check on
items of reserve supply as to shipping

-fter the supplies were crated and marked they

were broken down to the three regimental combat teams
for shipping, as shipping space was not allocated to
the Ordnance Department. The supplies were divided
as nearly as possible into three equal parts.

The load of ammunition authorized was three

units of fire of small arms and artillery ammunition
for combat troops and one unit of fire for service
units. This ammunition was issued to each combat
team and service unit for shipping purposes,

c. Sgnal. With the assistance of personnel

from CPBC, inspection teams covered all units of the
Division and those attached to determine service-
ability of all signal equipment on hand and addition-
al equipment required.

Requisitions were p . epared for replacement

items, as authorized in the War De artment Catalog
Replacement Factors. A few exceptions to the list-
ed allowances based on the type of operation and on
past experiences of other divisions in the Pacific
Theater were made at the request of the Signal Of-
ficer. This included field wire, of which one thou-
sand (1,000) miles were taken, assault wire, totall-
ing 500 miles, t.en RepeatersE,-89, 150 extra Head-
sets H-30, and an equal number of microphones E-45,
for use in the event of a possible gas attack. The
levels of expendable items required for the opera-
tion called for the full allowance of items listed
in SIG 4-1 plus a ten-day combat supply of dry bat-
teries as per SIG 11-6 to be carried by the units.
.n equal amount of SIG 4-1 items plus a 20-day com-
bat allowance.of dry batteries was to be in the Div-
ision Signal Dump. ReqLuisitions or these items were
prepared. Requisitions were also prepared for a 100%
replacement on all types of tubes. The Division Sig-
nal Repair Section was well supplied with spare parts
as authorized in SIG 8, and also as determined by ex-
perience
 Issue of signal equipment and supplies by the
Signal Depot, MIDP.C, on Oahu, began about 12 ,ugust
1945, and was carried on with utmost cooperation of all
personnel. Although all requisitions were not completely
filled, there were no serious shortages of any important
items, with the possible exception of Batteries B.-2 and
Photographic supplies. The Division was well supplied
with radio equipment and was the first organization to
be equipped with radio sets SCh-619 in this theater.
These arrived from the States just two days prior to
sailing.

All equipment and supplies were transported to

an assembly area at Fort Kamehameha, where echn box was
marked with shipping code number. The total tonnage of
signal supplies in the Division Signal Dump amounted to
some 850 tons, none of which was palletized. The bulk
of the loading was aceomplished in about seven days with
the tonnage largely divided into three parts, one to
accompany each regiment.

d. Chemical arfare. In the summer of 1945 all

Division units received additional training in Defonse
Against Chemical Attack. During the same period, part-
icular emphasis was placed on the training of all squads
and platoons of the rifle companies in the use of the Port-
able Flame-thrower MI2-2'in the assault of fortified posi-
tions. The status of training of the Division was consid-
ered "Excellent" and all T/E and SSLO. Cnemical Warfare
Equipment was on hand.

Since it was felt that the possibility of a gas

attack was remote, all Chemical Jarfare protective equip-
ment except Gas Masks, .ye Shields, and Protective Oint-
ment was turned in to the Chemical Depot at Oahu. The Gas
Masks, containing the eye shields and protective ointment,
were packed in standard size boxes (12" x 18" x 36") and
carried in unit supply as directed in administrative Order
No. 21, Head Ruarters I Corps.

At this time the 767th Tank Battalion (attachod)

was equipped with eighteen Periscope iModel (auxiliary
armament type) iFlamethrowers mounted on Ii-4 tanks on the
basis of two per platoon in each of the three medium
companies. The Battalion vwas to be equipped with M-26
tanks, ten of these mounting L2R1 (min armamont)
Flamethrowers before mounting for the Olympic operation.

When the readiness date for the new mission was ad-
vanced several weeks; it became evident that iv-26 Tanks and
12R1 Flamethrowers for the 767th Tank Battalion would
not be available in time. The Battalion was therefore
equipped with iA43 Tanks which were available on Oahu,

19
and arrangments were mide with Central Pacific Base
Command to divert ten P0A model Flamethrowere and one
ES Service Unit from the Sarines to the 767th Tank
Battalion. These Flamethrowers are similar to the E12R1
model, have a fuel capacity of 300 gallons, maximumi
effective range of 150 to 175 yards, and approximately
120 second duration of fire. They were manufactured by
the P0A Flamethrower Group on Oahu.

The 767th Tank Battalion departed for the opera-

tion wvith ten POA model Flanmethrowers, mounted on M11A2
Tanks with 105imm Howitzers and eighteen (18) periscope
model Flamethrowers mounted on MA3 Tanks with 76mm guns.

The Division departed for the operation with

one hundred and seventeen M2-2 Portable Flamethrowers and
three 7 cu ft air compressors. The breakdown within the
Division was as follows:

3 per Rifle Company

2 per Battalion Headquarters Company (spares)
11 per Battalion
6 per Regimental Service Coipany (spares)
39 per Regiment
1 ea 7 cu ft Air Compressor per Regimental
Service Company

Three units of fire of Chemical Warfare ammunition for

all organic and attached combat troops and one unit of
fire for all service troops was carried.

e. Medical. : hen the Division was alerted for

Operation Olympic, it was decided that Division Miedical
Supply personnel would remain intact and not be broken
down to each provisional collecting platoon as stated in
the medical SOP.

The 98th Field Hospital and the 86th Evacuation

Hospital were attached to the Division. Each was to
pack and carry as organizational equipment a Medical Main-
tenance Unit for 10,000 rmen for 30 days. This was to
augment their 15 day T/E supply, giving them a total of
thirty days' supply.

Two days before embarkation, I Corps requested

that the Division bring two Medical Maintenance Units
for them. By this time all cargo space had been allocated.
Since the 86th Evacuation Hospital was not to depart on
the initial shipping, they were charged with the responsi-
bility of transporting the Medical Mlaintenance Units.

20
 A careful study was made of the 30-day Medical
maintenance and it was decided to be adequate,

Military Government supplies were met by taking

a 6,000 man maintenance unit. Amounts of blood plasma
were reduced and prophylexis supplies were doubled.

The 323d Engineer Battalion, Division Special

Troops, and each BLT were supplied with one medical pallet.
This pallet was designed to supply them with medical
material for the first ten days of combat. Each ROT would
be supplied with three medical pallets for the second ten-
day period. Supplies for the remaining days of the thirty-
day period for the above units and the remainder of the
Division for the full thirty-day period were carried in
ten-day bulk units. These were to accompany each platoon
of the Clearing Company, 323d Medical Battalion. Packboard
resupply would not be carried.

The BLT and ROT supplies were packed and crated

first. There was insufficient time to palletize all of the
thirty-day medical maintenance. It was desirable, however,
to palletize the BLT and ROT supplies.

Each BLT and RCT pallet consisted of sixteen

standard boxes (12" x 18" x 36"). When these were packed
they were transported to a storage area at Fort Kamiehameha
adjacent to the palletizing area. At that location the
pallets were formed. The sixteen boxes of each unit were
placed on a standard pallet (.' x 6'). The entire pallet
was waterproofed, strapped, and mrarked. A finished pallet
was 88 cubic feet and weighed 2,075 pounds. Twenty.identi-
cal pallets were constructed..

As fast as the remaining bulk of the thirty-day

maintenance was packed, it was sent to the storage area
to await shipment to the piers. This wes accomplished by
rail and truck transportation. Security cargo end refriger-
ated items were hauled (on call from. t'u Post Conbrol
Office) from the 5th -Medical Depot to t ic ships, A Guard
accompanied all security cargo and vitnejsed. the securing
of the cargo aboard ships. Refrigerated items were taken
aboard ships immediately and stored in the reefers.
 A re re se it itivtf of Divis ioni Medical Su pyly
was loci~ated ix± the Port Con.trol Officesi He inforited
personnel at the sto r
e area, Fort K iehai:.ehat, when
each shipg wsaa ready to receive its cargo. He then- follovwed
throug~h to asoerta.iiL tb t eu.cLi of the nnainy desigimated
ships received the proper iedioal su~1,ies.
Two uiiht-oot r fr i ;urator,- were procured
eaid loaded abodrd an APA. It vial aitici
that they :ated
0ould be brouw;h~t to the beach to receive the refrigerated
iteitis fr'og, the sh.~re s A blood reriL, er tion
unit roa takers by the Cle slily Qow-uny, 323ad I\Iecuicl
Battalion for this purpose lso.
Concur gently vvjt
iihae vrre ja tion of he thirty-
day iiiedijc:l sU~pj)Ly , u~iinai~nce tei; from MIDPAOI inspcted
the Division's eju.ip et for conibtt serviceakbility. Uu..
servie-biae j.teidis vvere~ turni i n pad r:tl oe1.? tt get.u~i
ti oned .
To Prevent :water-bornie diseases, it ans decided
to mo~dify the techniq~ue for field water prif icatiuni so
ds to provide i. .ethod Lvich wtould destroy the resistant
cysts of "endaioeba histoly tica"t as w~ell u~i the co~i.iaun
baoterit-d atbgu To l.l eiient tihee e tech .ical miodjr-
fic:1tions in the wai~ter prifioetionf proctedure, the Division
Medical Inspector an~d enlisted personnel from~ the En ;ineer
Water Su pply ,Section er-e placed on deta.ched service with
the la'th Medical
evteh i General
s Laboratory
ro e md for
cl theofw purpiose ofn study-ik
.d
ical djpcrtj:.ie t enlisted m~an fromu each of the re iiental and
separate battalion medical sections were given a course of
instruction ut the lvth General Medical Laboratory. The
techniqu~e for v ter purific tion thus evolved consisted of
a ;period of atleast one h-,our of coagulation and sedi .enta-
tion at a 1.H below 7.0 with a free chilorine residue of
2.0 parts per .aillion, followed by f iltr tiony through rapid
sand filters a t a rate less thanh 10 gallons per Miinute ,
finally followed 'Lyr rec hloriniation so that wmater delivered
would carryr a free chlorine residue of at least 2.0 parts
per miillion. This method avds adou tad as Standard Procedure
for all water purificatio.n tuniits opervtin ; under Division
control .
Details for the control of ti llaria aid: insect--
borne. disease were reorMna: e 4 rd augm.ented tso that each
coijpay-, battteryrnd detachmient b-ca provided wvith u itail
of o~ne. rfnnGcoi issl.ieC offiacer and two o ttr enili bttd
to carry out dl d supervise iu~rsres four insect control
m~en
witin the ;nii.n .a .ra Tese deta.ils weee.or eeac
.gven one week of inten ;ive trainingt_ v.;ith the assistance
of the 604th Malaria Survey Detachmaent and 527th Malaria
Control Detachm~ent under the genera.]. supervisioL of the
Malariologist, USAFPOA, and the Division Medical In-
spector. Training included a brief series of lectures
and demonstrations on the major insect-borne diseases
and their control, together with practical field work on
insect surveys and insect control methods, to which the
majority of training time was devoted. Ebiphasis was
placed on the control of man-made mosquito and fly breed-
ing, methods for stream control of mosquito breeding,
methods for the application of residual-effect DiDT by a
variety of techniques, methods for the application of
diesel oil and other larvicides, and 'the maintenance of
individual protective equipment.

Additional instruction was given to all line

personnel in personal hygiene, the control of malaria
and other insect-borne diseases, the prevention of fly
breeding, the use of wet-cold clothing, and in venereal
diseases and the prophylactic measures applicable to these
diseases. Medical Miemoranda, published by this headquarters,
were used as the basic references for this instruction.
Instruction was given emphasis by frequent inspections of
units holding maneuvers in the field to determine compli-
ance of individuals and organizations with requirements for
sanitation and personal hygiene. Instruction in sanitation
and sanitary appliances was supplemented by the construc-
tion of model sanitary areas by each unit. All personnel
were indoctrinated with the principle that the success or
failure of future military operations would be materially
influenced by the degree of understanding and the degree
of application of these principles by every individual.

As a result of information gained from the study

of medical and sanitary problems in Japan, the pre-
existing Division sanitation SOP was rescinded and a new
sanitation SOP was published. This sanitation SOP was
designed to cover the health problems which would be en-
countered during the landing and combat phases of an
amphibious operation so the entire stress was placed on
sanitary measures to be followed under the most arduous
field conditions. In addition, all medical personnel
were indoctrinated with problems of sanitation to be en-
countered at the target and in Division policies and pro-
cedures to control or overcome these problems°

Conferences were held with the Division uarter-

master, the Division Engineer and the Division Chemical
Officer relative to the provision of adequate supplies for
insect and rodent control. The levels of allowances pro-
vided by Section II, FD Circular No, 163, dated 4 June
1945, were made the basis for recommendation for quantities
of these supplies to be taken. Full 30-day allowances
were carried by each unit and a 30-day resupply of

23
all expendable items were carried by the Division quarter-
master. Chemical and prophylactic supplies were taken on
the basis of twice the normal supply requirements for these
items for a 60-day period.

f. Quartermaster. The Division 'uartermaster

worked as a supervisor on all classes of supply. The sup-
ply officer worked Class I, the Executive and Supply Of-
ficer worked Class II, and the Transportation Officer
worked Class III. Logistics 'ere completed early in
August 1945.

Combat serviceability inspections were made in

all units of the Division by inspection teams from tho
Quatorm:ster of CPBC. Re'luisitions for shortages and
replacements of quartermaster supplies and equipment for
the Division and attached units were consolidated by the
Division &uartermaster and submitted to CPBC 4uartermster
and to the 51st Depot on the Island of O)ehu, T,H. The
Division uartermnaster received the first su, plies erly
in August 1945 and was able to get T/. e uipment into the
hands of all units and troops before the departure date.

Ivaintcnance supplies carried by the Division 4u.art-

ermaster were loaded on several ships. Class I loaded, was
based on twenty thousand (20,000) troops

Class II supplies wvre baed on thirty-day main-

tenance requirements per instructions, hiieadurters Sixth
army. These supplies were loaded on two ,-l's and three
AP's. The Division and attached units were not equipped
with wet-cold clothing before their departure. Requisi-
tions for wet-cold clothing were submitted to the 51st
Quartermaster Base Depot, Oahu, T. H,, but the shipment
did not arrive from the United States in time to equip
the Division. rrangements were made with the Director
of Supply, 51st "uartermaster Base Depot, to divert this
shipment upon arrival, to .quartormaster, 98th Infantry
Division, APO 98, at destination.

Class III supplies, based on Maintenance Re-

quirements per HeEdquarters Sixth Army, were fifteen days
fuel and thirty days other petroleum products (lubricants).
These supplies were loaded on combined Division shipping.

g. Engineer. Since most of the equipment author-

ized by the POA SSLOE had already been drawn at the time the
movement orders were received, it wMs decided to retain that
equipment subject to the ataildbility df shipping. This
authority was granted by Sixth Army.
 Assault and Pioneer Supplies had been requisi-
tioned for the Olympic operation. With some modifications
the supplies as thus set up,? were shipped with the
Division. One group 'of items which was changed appreci-
ably from the Sixth Army lists was bridging timbers. It
was felt that the size called for by the Sixth Army list
was too small to carry division loads, in view of the
fact that the Division was assigned the 1M-26 Tank, which
weighs forty-three tons (combat loaded forty-five tons).

Additional water equipment was provided for the

Engineer Battalion, Each water set in the Battalion was
increased by certain items of equipment for protection
against "endamoeba histolytica" and "schistosomata" by
chemical treatment (an improvisation to substitute for
the diatomaceous earth set, designed by the Corps of
Engineers, but never issued) and for increased flow up
to 35 GPM,.. Each line company (A, B, and C) was given an
augmented water set, making a total of seven. All were
to be operated under the control of the Division,
Engineer Supply Officer or his designated assistant, at
such time as all Engineer elements reverted to Division
Engineer control. Great flexibility in water support
to the Division was also assured, A sixty-day level of
water supply expendables was also taken.

A thirty-day level of Class II maintenance

supply was requisitioned from and packed by' the Central
Pacific Base Command Engineer Depot on the basis of a
100% replacement of expendable items and certain non-
expendable items as indicated by the Class II list of the
Sixth Army dated 16 March 1945.

A sixty-day level of spare parts was packed by

the Central Pacific Base Command Engineer Spare Parts
Depot, based on the type and number of each kind of
equipment on hand in the Division and from the Depot's
table of experience built up over a period of three years'
operations of supplying forward areas.

One unit of Bailey Bridge was carried.

In addition to the ordinary supply of drafting

and duplicating expendable supplies in the authorized
sets of equipment, it was felt that certain additional
items were needed, such as grease pencils, ucette, tracing
paper, and ink, These were requisitioned and broken down
to the Division.,
 In addition thereto, special consideration was
given to increasing certain critical items which were known
to become worn out during early stages of operation. There
was a small reduction in certain spare parts which are
normally critical but which were not particularly so in this
case, since all of the Division Engineer equipment was new,
As an example, only four spare sets of tracks for D-7 tractor
doze s were brought, whereas if all that was authorized had
been supplied, there would have been thirty-three such sets.

In order to give some type of third echelon support

in the maintenance of Engineer equipment within the Division,
Engineer Bettalion Maintenance Section was increased by ten
additional mechanics.

It was planned to concentrate the assault and

pioneer supplies in the Fort 'amehaeha Staging Area and
have the organizations of the Division draw their alloca-
tions from there. The space allocated the Engineer Supplies
was too small to low for proper stacking and expeditious
issuing. Another difficulty encountered was that the date
of completion of loading was moved up so that supplies were
still being hauled from the Engineer Depot as they were being
loaded on the ships. The result was considerable confusion
in attempting to get the materials allocated to proper piers
for loadi g.

The t ime between the receipt of the movement orders

and the time to begin loa:ding was too short. It is true
that the Division was getting ready for the Olympic operation
but many of the supplies were not scheduled to arrive in the
Central Pacific Base Command until 1 September. A large
amount of the Class II Maintenance Supplies was packed by
the Bese Commend, and it was not until the Division reached
Japan that it was possible to determine exactly whet supplies
were on hand. It was also difficult to give an accurate
estimate of the amount of shipping required for the Division
reserve. The units and supply branches constantly had to
shift plans because the materials were not ready w ien needed
for loading on the ships.

h. InformAtion and Education. Since it wCas expect:

that the Divsio, Tefter arriving in Japan, would have few,
if any, sources from which to draw materials for the infor-
mation and education program, it was necessary to augment
their facilities considerably. Through the W'elfare Fund, a
multilith press and a considerable supply of ink, paper,
mats, etc., were purchased. A skeleton newspaper staff was
set up to experiment with the equipment and four experimental
issues of the Division news pa per (the Iroquois) were publisher
prior to departure. Units were equipped with mimeo-
graph machines, paper, and ink for local Information-
Education activities; Nearly 400 National Geographic
maps of China, Japan, and Southeast Asia were purchased
and distributed-to all companies. Textbooks on the
Orient, atlases, etc., were purchased for-Information-
Education libraries. In addition-to this, such stocks
as plywood, chalk, pencils, paper, ink, erasers, etc,
were-requisitioned, and through Information-Education,
CPBC, 5,000 textbooks were requisitioned and arrangements
made for continuation of information services with priority
air lift. Approximately 300 R-100 radios were issued to
units in accordance with WD Cir 424, 1944. One hundred
fifty Japanese Information Training Kits were prepared
by the Information-Education Section. These contained maps
and printed matter on Japan and the Japanese. These were
distributed so that there would be a minimum of one kit
per ship. 15,000 Jepanese language guides were distributed
to all units.

i. Transortation uartermaster, The 2219th

TQY Team consisting of 13 off cers and 1l enlisted men
was organized into separate teams to work with each of
the RCT's, Division Artillery, and Speical Troops.
Loading plans for the group of ships under TransRon 22
were almost complete when the Olympic Operation was
canceled and the Blacklist set up along with a change in
ships assigned. The naval group headquarters which was
temporarily assigned to assist the Division in planning
until the staff of TransRon 18 arrived, did not have ad-
equate information nor complete characteristics of the ships.
This caused much difficulty and confusion. Paper loading
plans were started but in several instances the ships
arrived in port the day prior to loading and many last
minute changes 'had to be made.

Lt Col'Koch and his staff in the AdCoirPhibsPac

office at Pearl Earbor gave invaluable assistance in the
loading and, though the time allotted for loading was very
short, all sailing schedules were met. A regulating office
was established in the Army Port and Service TQM Office at
the Harbor with a representative from the TQv Team, each
unit, and liaison personnel from the various supply agen-
cies. This group regulated the flow of supplies, person-
nel, and vehicles to the piers. Piers were stocked 24
hours prior to loading time for each ship. All AP's,
APA' s, and ATIA's were loaded in Honolulu Harbor while the
LST's and LSM's were loaded at Iroquois Point and Kewalo
Basin. The AKA's began loading with a 72 hour limit to
be completed and the APA's loaded as they became available
with a 48. hour time limit. Wjith two exceptions on AKA's
this schedule was met and in several cases loading was
completed in half the time allotted. Complete loading of
supplies and vehicles w -s accomplished by 3 September. Six
of the LT's which were bottom loaded -with supplies before
the vehicles were loadea were not available until 30 August
at iKewala Basin with a sailing time of dawn 31 ugust. One
of these did not beach until 1700, 30 }ugust. Much con-
fusion was caused due to the limited area in which to work
and the speed with whieh loadin; h...d to be done-. The load-
ing of six ships at one tiam taxed the facilities of the
Basin personnel and equipment beyond that which should
normally be expected. Due to errors made in computing cubic
footage sp,.:o required for various types of supplies, some
readjustment between ships had to bu m:de during loading,
but all supplies and equipment scheduled for shipment were
lifted. ill ships were combat-loade., modifieu som ewhat
by the addition of such items as reefeis, ice fi:cch.ines, etc.,
which were not originally included in loading plans for
Olympic. Tent stoves, not uvailable on Oahu, were lifted
in follow-up shipping. Logistics on shipping ar e contained
in supporting documents.

;s is common in any troop movement, the biggest bottle

neck was lack of trucks. 'The trucks of the Jiviioin Quarter-
master Company were use., wit.hin the Division for or rmal duties
such as ClasS I Truckhead operations, tr.ash and clean-up de-
tails, etc. Trucks for loading operations were obti.ied from
the armn Port and Sarvice Coni~in and Central Pcific Base
Command. Good communications did much to guarantee the smooth
flow of supplies from staging careas, CPDC ;ar ehouses, -. d dumaps
to the assigned docks and loading points- The Division Signal
Offices installed direct wire from the Regul ting Office to
G-4 at Ft Hase. In turn, G-4 had direct wire to the Special
Staff Supply Officers. Much credit is due the .rs my ort and
Se vice Command for the complete cooperation and assistance
in making available its personnel and equipment to the Div-
ision in its loading.

28
 ISL-AND OF OAHU

2, Movemnent to T .. t

OA4-4U TA-4

f. PA ~TuP _
D~ATES OF- 98 h INF ~T.Y DIV SN1PPING
QER~~.C,-$L O LIFTED OAHU, Tf~tb 16Ocr 1+5
I29 I
 2. Movement to Target.

a. EmbarStion of Troos. Those elements of the

Division assigned to the LJTs nd LMs embarked for te
target on 31 August and 4 .oeptember respectively. The re-
mainder of the. Division reinforced, - barked at Pearl
Harbor on 5 and 6 September. The Division CP closed out
at Ft .Taso Ochu, on 6 Scptcmbor and opened that day aboard
the APA BTRLEIGTT. The m.ain convoy deopa rted for J pan on
the m.orning of the 7th.

TransRon 16, which lifted the 9)th Division, con-

sisted of 12 APA's, 4 AKA's, 1.6 LSTs, and 15 LSMs.
b. Activities Durin:g Voree:_ . The iuovomont from
Pearl Harbor to J'pan wcs witJo.,ut unuTsual incidont and
accomplished according to schedule. There owere no blackouts
during the voyage and the showing of imotion pictures on
dock aided materially in re:olving the monotony of the voy-
ageo Reading material :and ascucs hhd been well distributed
to all ships and unit papers or news bulletins wore published
daily. Religious services *.:ere conducted weekly for officers
and enlisted men of all faiths on each ship, Jewish ser-
vices for the High I.ol Days, as prepared by the Division
Jewish Chaplain, were used by other chaplains and designated
enlisted main the ob servc ace of these Holy Days wiile in
transit. Since the convoys moved with cand at tne same speed
as the .prevailing trade winds, the heat v s oppressive dur-
ing almost the entire voyage.

A daily training program was. conducted consisting

principally of physical training, orientation, and military
police duties. For Signal personnel, training with the
M-209 converter and practice in copying code in ship's
radio rooms were accomplished. Permission was secured from
the Navy for troops to practice "'blinker" signaling between
ships. All troops were given lectures on health ;nd sani-
tation with particular emphasis being placed on the problem
of venereal disease and its control. Debarkation drills
were held regularly. Further definitve planning was for
the most part confined to intra-Divisional functions, since
additional information regarding tii target aitr mission was
not forthcoming.

The Shore Party Commander and part of his staff

sailed with the Division Command group. Since much of the
data for planning of the unloading was not available at
the time of sailing, those plans wore, consequently, made
enroute. During the voyago, statistics on the loads Eboard
each ship become aevilrble and complete tonnage tables were
compiled. Rough plans were made for the unloading phase and
beach operations. Troop units were designated to furnish
dump labor. Consolid..ted Division durmps were planned, but
due to the misleading nature of maps and photographs of
the beach then available, it <.s impossible to spot exact
proposed locutions of dumps It had been i±ntended to dis-
cuss shore party plans with all officers concurned in a
conference t Saipan; howve;r, since the LT convoy departed
prior to the time set for the confea ence, most of the Shore
Party were uninformed of the final organization of the beach
until after the actual landing was made.

The inability of higher headquarters to furnish

clear aerial photos, overlays with allotted yrmy, Corps,
and Division area s, priorities for the movement of units
from the beach to permanent loc tios', expected beach
conditions and underwater gradients, rendered advance pluan-
ing difficult and prep..ration of aaequate orders impossible.

c, Saiyan. The principal convoy carrying the

Division anchored at baipdn on 19 Sepjtember for c layover
of three days, during which time the training program was
suspended and troops were permitted to go ashor . While
here, supplies of whole blood were procured through the
Surgeon, AF.P.C and were shipped in reefer space to the
target area for possible need in the landing opor(tion
Also, copies of the bOI ana crystals were distributed to
units which had left Oahu before these had become available
a test was made of the va:rious radio nets using ships'
radios; 'ihe first incoming rma.il aelivery after embarkation
was made at Saipanr It was expected that during the layover,
additional photo coverage of the landing area would be
disseminted by higher headquarters; however, such data
were not received.

During the layover, the I Corps Field Order cover-

ing the operation was received. In a letter from I Corps
received on 20 September covering G-3 Op-rati:ons fReports,
it was st. tcd that the possibility of enemy resistance in
the operation was considered to be remote, Orders were
received that invasion currency would not be used by
invasion troops, and that bank of, Japan notes would be
issued in exchange. It was becoming apparent th. t the
occujation of Japan would be accomplished without resist-
ance :.

The Division depa.rted from Suipan on 22 September

and resumed its voyage to the t(argt.

On 25 September Divis.Lon issued orders to all troops

covering uniform to be worn by laning forces and types
and quantities of ammunition for Cech weaponi. The order
also directed that flamethrowers, rock:,-t ammunition, and

31
demolitions were not to be carribd. Raaio silence was
broken at 2300, 26b eptombr.
cl.*%J ya r ons
hi u J r. On 27 eptember,
the date of arrival :t the objective, a message ;vas received
from I Corps thc.t their representatives would board the
98th Division Comnnd Ship at 0630 of the 27th for the
purpose of furnishing latest details regarding deb_.rketion,
including beach conditions, road net, and location of
initial bivouac areas. The Division was ordered to have an
advance billeting party roedy to go ashore at 0700 in order
to prepare for the billeting of the Division,

While troops w ere completing preparations for an

assault landing, a conference was held aboard the flagship.
Col Wells, Deputy Chief of Staff, I Corps, delivered the
Corps Coraandei's directive that landing be conmmuenced as
scheduled, but that the Division would procede immediately
by rail to Taisho Lirfild, in the vicinity of Osaka. He
further stated that the Japanese were fully cooperating,
had already gathered their aris and aumunition into
assembly areas, and were waiting for the allied forces to
take them over. The Division was directed, however, not to
take ov;r any stores of weapons or equipment until' irected
by the Corps Commander.

By radio and messenger all units of the Division

were immediately notified of the change of plans, An
advance billeting party, previously asscmbled from the
ships of the convoy departed fr4 shore.

0830, 27 Sept was confirmed as H-Hour, and last

minute preparations for the landing of the Division with
two regiments abreast (Plan Able) continued.
HAR1ZtM -N U

1~~

D° SAY Q-Dryt I

\AN~btNCi DIALRAV

33,
 3, Landing and Movement to Initial Bivouac.

a. Landing. Although it was definitely known at

the time of the landing that no opposition would be met,
the most expeditious method by which troops could be put
ashore, was if accordance with the plans mde for the as-
sault landing. Conseqjuently, the 389th and 391st Infantry
Regiments landed abreast in accordance with Plan Able of
the 98th Infantry Division Field Order Number Two. The
first wave hit the beach at 0829 and the assault regiments
were completely ashore by 1030.

The landing was made under miserable weather con-

ditions. It was rainy, dismal, nd cold. Troops were thor-
oughly chilled by the time they reached the shore. Beach
conditions were unfavorable and personnel carriers were un-
able to get close enough to the beach. The combination of
rain and wading ashore insured that all men were soaked
c omple t ely.

Immediately upon landing, troops were assembled

and marched to the Wakayama Railroad Station from which
they entrained for their temporary billetingarea previous-
ly selected by I Corps, at Taisho Airport, approximately
35 miles from the beach. No resistance of any nature was
met. The advance party, under the comwmrland of the Assistant
Division Commander proceeded to the billeting area by motor
convoy,

The 390th Infantry Regim.ent was completely landed

at 0814, 28 September, and the Division Artillery and all
other Divisional troops with the exception of unloading de-
tails were ashore by noon of the same day.

The Commanding General assumed comm iand ashore and

the new CP was opened at 1200, 28 September, at Taisho Air-
port.

b. Movement to Initial Bivouac., A transportatioi.±

officer from the Divi sion was located at the railroad sta-
tion in Wakayama and coordinated all troop movements to the
detraining point at Yao, One train per hour was available
and approximately one battalion was loaded euch trip.. This
coordination resulted in efficient and rapid movement of
the troops to the billeting area. As vehicles became avail-
able, convoys were forned and troops were transported to
the airport b y motor. Some units of the 33d Division were
still in the Wakayama area; and since they controlled all
main routes from the beach, traffic coordination was made
through the 1Military Police of that Division. 98th Div-
ision Military Police had posted road signs over the truck-
ing route shortly after the convoy had arrived at the
billeting area and all future notor convoys were escorted
to the airport by Division iP's.

The lack of 8CR 399's was keenly felt as the Div-

ision forward CF moved rapidly to the billeting are .. The
distance which developed between the forward &nd re-r CP's
caused a temporary failure in comunica.tions. However,
contact was reestablished by improvising long wire antenna
for the SC 193's.

The medical clearing station landed on the secoand

day. One platoon set up near the beach, while the other
proceeded to Taisho Airfield to operate at the Division
camp site. Casualties resulting from injuries received
during the landing were negligible and were evacuated at
the beach area to the clearing ylatoon located there. All
patients were soon moved to the clearing station at Taisho,
at which time the second clearing platoon closed its in-
stallation at Vakayamaa and moved to Taiso. Casualties at
the beach were then received by the Snore Party LMedical
Section and the 323d Engineer Battalion Aid Station and
were further hospitalized at the 54th Evacuation Hospital,
under control of 'Kobe Base.

c. Beach Operations - Unloading, The 98th Div-

ision had' been allotted 1000 yards of Blue Beaches One and
Two, and the hinterland extending to the railroad behind
the beach. This limited the Division beach to a 10i00 yard
frontage and an 800 to 900 yard depth with only one egress
road from the beach; however, upon landing, it was discov-
ered that the Division beach could not extend back to the
railroad because of low, soft, cultivated gardens, steep,
heavily wooded dunes, and the town of Matsue with no streets
wide enough to accomodate military vehicles. These fac-
tors limited dumps to the area of the immediate beach.
Offshore 80 to 100 yards was a sandbar which LST's could
traverse only at high tide and the gradient of the beach
was such that they could unload only at low tide, a sit-
uation that caused much delay at the beach.

The 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment which

joined the Division prior to leaving Oahu, landed its
reconnai-ssance party at 0730, 27 September, to initiate
preparations for the beach organization. It was soon
learned that the ponton causeways carried on the 98th Div-
ision LST's would not be made available. LST's therefore
could not land on Blue Beach due to the.barrier caused by
the sandbar and the shallow gradient of the beach. Accord-
ing to I Corps plan, the L;5T's were to be uniloaded over
the existing ponton causeway dock between Yellow and Blue
Beaches.
 it
r-
.
I -o
t:
i
If
i
i- ~21~
L s
._
1
V
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36
--
A
 At 0910 vehicles were landed but rmny of these
had to be towed ashore by the Shore Party dozers that were
landed froi LCM's. A vehicle asseimbly area was established
at the extre:ie right flcnk of the beach near the only
egress road. The Division was unable to rove its vehicles
to forward points and consequently all vehicles except
tho se brought ashore in troop landing waves remained in
the assembly area on the beach until 0900 on the second day.
These vehicles blocked nearly one-third of the suitable
beach dump area and contributed to considerable confusion
on the first night. The LSMs beached at 0940 but were
unable to discharge any c rgo until 1430 vhen the tide
started to recede. At this time the first 18 Shore Party
trucks, 6 cranes, and 8 ior©"dozers became available and
so the Shore Party equipienb, two hours after the general
bulk unloading co±ienced consisted of a mere 18 trucks,
6 cranes, and 12 dozers.

After a conference with the Navy Group Beachmas-

ter, the Shore Party Coimmander was able to get a priority
for 3 Shore Party LST's. Two high priority Shore Party
LST s were brought to the ponton dock at 1745, but the
third one had to be postponed until the next day when it
was landed at Yellow Beach and discharged during after-
noon low tide. Meanwhile Shore Party troops wore lifted
from the LST's in small craft and brought ashore at 1200.
The labor units on the transports came ashore the sane time
and all available labor was put to work handling bulk car-
go from the small boats to the beach and passing it by
hand to piles directly above the high water line.

At 1300, one platoon (13) dukws arrived ashore

and came under Shore Party control as soon as the artil-
lery pieces were removed. The balance of the dukws came
ashore during the evening and wore put to work.' At 1500
cranes, which had been unloaded from the ISM's, were.
handling net loads of cargo from the simall boats and-ex-
cept for the congestion in the vehicle assembly area,
the beach did take on soLme semblance of orderliness.
Despite difficulties encountered throughout the first day,
the Division had brought ashore all of the' vehicles ex-
cept those on IST's, discharged all Lei's, and bad unload-
ed 25% of all bulk cargo. At 1130 on this day the Shore
Party Co:oander was notified by a Sixth Army Staff Officer
that the 533d EB&SR less Boat Battalion must be prepared
to roenbark on 2 October and move to Kure to unload the
41st. Infantry Division on 3 October. This was the first
notice of this move given the regiment.
 On the morning of the second day, 28 September,
the labor available vas divided into 12-hour shifts, after
working straight through the previous 18 hours. The con-
gestion in the vehicle assembly area was relieved by the
dispatch of convoys to forward points, and the individual
piles of supplies that had been manhandled from the landing
craft to the beach were segregated into oonsolidated duaps.
During this period unloading progressed very slowly - only
22 trucks and 36 dukws worked the beach, and the inability
of the landing craft to get into the beach made it almost
impossible to use the cranos on the beech efficiently
except around high tide. .t 1600 the Shore Party was noti-
fie dof a possible typhoon approaching the area. This
necessitated the removal of supplies to higher ground and
meant that the signal, medical, organizational, nd part
of the quartermaster dumps had to be relocated. It was
impossible to move all supplies at once due to the shortage
of trucks, but some supplies were moved to the rail sidings
to be loaded on cars for ship.ment to Taisho. The rail move-
ment of supplies to the forward area consisted of three
trains daily of ten 30-ton fl. t cars each.

at the end of the first 48 hours, the Pai-'s and

P's w~ere completely unloa.ded, but approximately 3,500
tons of the cargo was afloat in small boats because of the
lack of trucks on the shore and the inability of light-
ering craft to beach at all tides. On 29 September the
supplies continued to move to the freight c4rs ind almost
all miscellaneous cargo on the beach vws collected into
appropriate dumps. Tvo more Shore Party LST's and one
carrying Division Engineers were discharged during this per-
iod and this materially eased the truck shortage. Duvs
wore then used to discharge light eugo that could nbt get
all the way to the beach.

%t 1500, 29 September, the Shore Party Commander

was notified by idmiral Noble that the allotted shipping
for the movement of the 533d to Kure would be spotted on
the beach during the evening high tide of that day (ap-
proximately 2200) and th.t these craft must retract as soon
as possible thereafter because the 12 LCT's were to sail
at 0500, 30 September, and the 5 LSiv's were to sail at
0500, 1 October.

The Commanding Officer of the 259th ngineer Com-

bat Battalion, was appointed Beachmaster of Blue Beach, and
the 533d EB&S less Bo-t Battalion loaded and emburked for
the Baker-6 Operation during the night and morning of 29-30
September. ill Division supplies and equipment were un-
loaded and cleared from the bc-ch by 7 October,
 d. Supply. -fter the conference with Corps
liaison officers on board the Burleigh, the division G-4
went ashore with the Syore Party Comnander. The Assist-
ant G-4 remained aboard ship and was in constant contact
with G-4 and Shore Party Commander by radio,. Regimental
and Division Artillery S-4's were tied into this net.
This was an immeasurable aid in permitting necessary se-
lective unloading.

The Assistant G.-4 and FPrty came ashore the after-

noon of 28 September and proceeded to Taisho Jirport to
establish a functional headquarters and prepare plans for
the receipt of supplies and equipment from the beachhead
via rail transportation.

The Division G-4 with an enlisted staff set up

a CP on the beach andcoordinated with the Shore Party Com-
mander in the unloading of supplies, and the establishment
of dumps on the beach.. Due to high surf and unfavorable
beach conditions, the unloading was delayed from time to
time.

Three railheads were established in Wakayama and

vicinity and all trucking facilities were utilized to re-
move supplies from the beach dumps to the railheads where
Japanese labor was used to load the equipment in cars for
shipment to Taisho Airport. For railhead operation, 800
to 1600 Japanese were employed per day, being broken down
into three 8-hour shifts with the work being supervised
by Division troops and officers. ohere supplies required
sorting, Japanese were used for the manual labor only.
Ammunition was hauled direct to the Corps ammunition dump.
When the ammunition had been completely unloaded and
sorted, two units of fire were turned over to I Corps Ord-
nance, one unit being retained by the Division for guard
purposes.,

'Due to a delay in landing of refrigerators or

reefers., a temporary loan was made from the Engineer Boat
and Shore Regiment of a trailer-mounted reefer so that
refrigerated medical supplies needed on the beach could
be brought ashore.

The most critical deficiency which developed in

the early stages of the landing phase was water short-
age. Only the one ponton causeway capable of handling four
LST's at a time was available, and there were other ships
in the harbor with higeor pxiority than the LST's contain-
ing the Engineer 'ratcr Supply Equipment.. After I Corps
was contacted, the LST having the majority of the water
equipment aboard was allowed to come in. However, this
was a day and a half after the first troops were ashore.
Troops and organizations were carrying only two days' sup-
ply of water. Within eight hours after landing of equip-
ment, there was an adequate quantity of treated water av~4l-

39
able at Taisho Airport, vwere the bulk of the troops were
concentrated.

A water point was located in the beachhead area.

WVhcn a storn arose during the third day of operations, it
washed salt water back into the source of watery necessi-
tating the establish.ont of a new point.

Due to inclorient weather an the type of roads

in the not frea the beach to the Division concentrction
area, it was alluost iapossiblo to support the Division ade-
quately, Rail transportation was used to the :axinuti ex-
tent.

At Taisho Airport the Assistant G-4 supervisod the

organization and operation of a railhead to receive the
supplies being shipped fro. the beach A reconnaissance
was ade of all available warohousing and space was alloc-
ated to the various supply agencies so =.hen the trains ar-
rived fron the beach, supplies wore received and noved
without delay. The first supply trains arrived the night
of 30 Septeober.

When the Assistent Division Coeiander arrived at

Taisho Airport and found the buildings vwhich were to be
occupied in an indescribable state of filth and dirt and
conplotely ridden with lice, an ia.L diate call to the beach
was nado for tentageo brooms, pails, nops, DDT, and kero-
sene, These denands we re oiet by using trucks to haul dir-
ect from the beach to the airport. DDT reained critical-
ly short for some time because of the great doeand, s-id
was rigidly controlled by the G-4 Section and the Division
Surgeon. Early calls were also received for prophylaxis
and were net. Issue of Class I and III 4uarter aster sup-
plies were made fron the dumps the first day and troops
wore eating "B" rations by D plus 5.

A quarternaster officer had been placed with the

Division Base Echelon on Oahu for the purpose of handling
the procureo.ent and shipment of all additional supplies
procured-by the Division. The -supplies included winter
clothing, tent stoves, rations, andiiscellaneous quarter-
master equipage.. The clothing and stoves arrived at Oahu
between 1 Septem er and 10 September on two victory ships.
A third ship, the Brown Victor_ , was diverted to the tar-
get area and arrived at Wakayana Beach 30 October. The
other two ships wero unloaded at Oahu and the quarter aster
supplies were taken over by the 51st quartor aster Depot
to be transshipped by the Base Echelon as. soon as shipping
was available. Ships for this novement were requisitioned

40
through Joint Overseas Shipping Control Office and the
first became available 27 September, The ship was loaded
with clothing, stoves, and vehicles. It sailed 5 October,
arriving at «-akayama Beach 30 October,

On 10 October, three LSTs arrived at Oahu loaded

with the remainder of the wet-cold clothing, stoves, and
other supplies, The ISTs sailed 16 October via Okinawa
and arrived at Wakayama Beach 8 November. The cargo was
loaded on trains and shipped to the Quartermaster railhead
at Taisho airport (Yamatogawa Siding) The shipment of
these supplies was completed by 12 November 1945 and the
Division Quartermaster began immediately to place them into
the hands of the troops.

41
 Kic~wij
r1

I.~ I

<IA

-.. ma

1,F G

I UITw LOCAToNS bu&wa( Tf-r EA-cr. (

98ri" IKAt Xf )t5 ON
 4. Initial Bivouac Area.
a. Description, Taisho airport, the initial biv-
ouac area for the major part of the Division, is situated
on a broad flat plain, adjacent to the Yamato River, along
the course of which are dike-like embankments, erected for
the purpose of flood control. Due to the height of sur-
rounding mountains, and the lack of adequate natural drain-
age, the water table is but a few inches below the surface
of the earth.

The airfield was found in a state of deterioration.

It had not been used for approximately a month prior to
the occupation, and in many places the concrete runways
were pitted. In the airfield area, buildings and hangars
had been neglected and were in various stages of disrepair.

According to American standards, the building area

was untenable. Debris of all kinds had been scattered
promiscuously about the area by evacuating Japanese troops.
Latrines, consisting of open concrete vaults, were filled
with feces and urine and had remained unemptied for weeks.
Kitchens were foul with the stench of garbage which lit-
tered the floors. all buildings without exception were in-
fested with vermin, and the area was swarming with rats,
flies, and mosquitoes.

The area throughout was encumbered with numerous

earth-covered bomb shelters and revetments for sheltering
planes. Wherever earth had been used in construction,
large craters remained in the ground, all of which were
partially filled with water. Existing drainage ditches
were choked and overgrown with weeds and contained stag-
nant water. Because of these conditions, immediate occup-
ancy of buildings was impossible.

b. Sanitation. The problem of sanitation was

enormous. It became an imrmediate task of the Division to
accomplish a rapid and effective cleaning.

First priority was given to the removal of or-

ganic wastes and. the elimination of fleas in buildings.
Waste removal was accomplished during the first two days,
utilizing Japanese labor. Flea control was quickly gained
by thorough spraying of all buildings with 5o DDT in kero-
sene, To facilitate this work, power sprayers were used,
supplemented by knapsack sprayers,

43
 Concurrently with this work, latrines were dug.
During the first two or three days, straddle trench lat-
rines wore used as an expedient measure. Because the wat-
er table was so close to ground surface, it was found im-
practical to dig pit latrines by usual miethods To over-
come this, existing air raid shelters, which consisted of
mounds of earth and stone ten to fourteen feet high, were
sealed at the doors and openings made through the roofs,
Those openings were then covered with standard quarter-
master latrine boxes. This expedient in latrine construc-
tion proved to be highly satisfactory, and no further
difficulty was experienced with this matter.

Fly br.:ding Twas exteonive, not only in the piles

of organic wastes left by the evacuating Japanese garri-
son, but also in all of the Tapanese latrines, none of
which were fly-proofed. Larvae of both culecine and ano-
pheline mosquitoes were found in all the drainage ditches
and in the nuimerous oth.r collections of stagnant water.
There re, iny adult moscuitoes.

Itediate steps were taken t. oliminato vermin

and to level earth;works in order to reduce :aosquito
breeding and destroy rat harborages. The banks of drain-
age ditches were cleared of vegetation and debris. Water
in these ditches and in stagnant pools which co:.ld not be
eliinated, was oiled, Areas about all buildings were
thoroughly sprayed with DDT for residual effect. Within
a few days after arrival, there was a spectacular decrease
in the number of adult flies and mosquitoes in the area;
and, within E w eek, no adult flies or moscqitoes were ob-
served. Although extensive measures were taken to elimi-
nate breeding places, it is believed tha.t these accoplish-
nents were due largely to the effectiveness of the wide-
spread use of DDT.

c, Activities. Directly after airival at Taisho,

reconnaissance was co menced by the Deputy Chief of Staff,
Assist:ant G-l Division Engineer, and other personnel, to
locate suitable per-.ianent billets for all Divisional and
attached units. As areas were located, they .ere assigned
to units for cleaning, developent, and renovation.

Water for the troops bivouaced at Taisho Airport

was provided from a water point established by the 323d
Engineer Battalion at one of the mains of the Osaka city
water supply systen in a nearby suburb.

The Division Clearing Station established a hos-

pital under canvas on the airstrip . This hospital re-
ceived all casualties fron the Taisho area and provided
medical care for all troops except those requiring pro-
44
longed hospitalization or major surgery. The latter were
evacuated to the 23d Field Hospital in Osaik. VWile the
bulk of the Division made its initial bivouac it Taisho,
the 767th Tank Battalion and the 323d Engineer Battalion,
together with miscellaneous troops to operate supply dumps,
were left at the _ikayama beachhead. Those units set up
temporary tent camps.

Due to adverse weather conditions it was impera-

tive that troops be placed under shelter; and, initially, one
regiment was billeted in airplane hingars witn concrete
floors.

. large school building in the village of Yuo

was appropriated for a period of 48 hours to billet other
incoming troops. On the second day after arrival, 'areas
were allotted to.units and establishmnent of a tent cap
began.

Incessant rains over a period of several days and

the inadequate drainage system on the airfield caused one
portion of the field to become completely flooded and made
it necessary for troops to seek shelter in the hangars and
a tiled roadway tunnel under the airstrip. The improvement
of the drainage system would have been a major engineer-
ing project requiring a considerable period of time and a
great expenditure of labor. Because iniediate improvement
of drainage was impracticable and because conditions on
the airfield rendered the greater portion of the airstrip
unsuitable for use as a bivouac areu, movement of the bulk
of the troops to other, more suita.ble areas was expedited,

Shortly after arrival at the initial bivouac urea,

the Division assumed its duties in connection with admin-
istration of the occupation.
14r'
 5. Pernanent illeting Areas,

a. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance conducted for

the purpose of locating permrnent billets revealed that the
condition of filth found at Taisho Airport W s generally
prevalent throughout the Osaka aree, and that prior to oc-
cup-tion b, our troops, all areas and b-..1 dings 'vould re-
quire extensive cleaning and in ect e:termin.tior.

b, 'bovement and A-eas. Data on t'he .aoveimen t of

various units of the Division to permanent billets is con-
tained in the table below:

Permanent Dill.ets

Unit Date : ovement Remar ks

Comoleted

390th Infantry 6 Oct 1945 Billeted in former ra-

dio factory near village
of Shioo

3S9th Infantry 10 Oct 1945 Located in Kanaoka Bar-

racks in Sakai City
323d Engineer 3n 13 Oct 1945 Located in Shinodayama
Army Barracks South of
Sakai City
391st Infantry 18 Oct 1945 Occupied Osaka Commer-
cial College, Osaka
98th Division 22 Oct 1945 Three battalions, and re-
Artillery connaissance troop, at-
98th Cavalry Re- tached to Div "rty, were
connaissance Trp housed in Japanese Mili-
tary BarracKs; one bat-
talion in former: factory.
All located in vicinity
of city of iNara.
323Medical 3n 26 Oct 1945 Located in office build-
ing, Osaka-
98th Division 28 Oct 1945 OF located in Nippon Life
Headquarters Insurance Building -with
other local buildings be-
ing utilized for quarters
and additional office
space.
767th Tank Bn 1 Nov 1945 Road conditions rendered
movement of this battalion
to Osaka impracticable.
Housed temporarily in for-
mer factory. Perma.nent
billet in Japanese Com -
mercial School in aka.-
yama.

47
 c. Rehabilitation. Before occupancy, all build-
ings were scrubbed, sprayed with DDT ,.a the surrounding
grounds thoroughly policed, A program was instituted con-
sisting of additional construction and renovation, internal
revision of buildings for use as quarte"rs, erection of
mess halls and installation of plumbing. Pit latrines
were constructed where water-borne sewage systems did not
exist, and an intensive insect control program was init-
iated. The complete lack in most Japanese structures of
adequate latrines, heating, washing, and other comfort
facilities made the task of rehabilitation an extremely
burdensome one. T e preparation
4 of living quarters and
areas for the occupancy of Troops
ovision required over
a month of the combined efforts of all troops not en-
gaged in necessary military duties and the services of
large groups of Japanese labor.

The 323d Engineer Battalion established water

points in close proximity to all new billeting areas,
Only water purified at engineer water points was used
for drinking and food preparation. Later it was possible
to approve for washing,, bathing, laundering, and general
maintenance purposes existing piped water supplies in
each of the new areas. This greatly decreased the load
on engineer water purification units, From the standpoint
of sanitation, the process of renovation and reconstruction
was carried out in an entirely satisfactory manner. Prior-
ity was given to such basic matters as waste disposal and
construction of adequate messing facilities.

d. C om mnuni,'ations, Prior to moving units to per-

manent billeting areas, cable facilities were placed in op-
eration between Division Headquarters and all Regimental
and Division Artillery Areas, A commercial dial telephone
system was adapted for use by Division Headquarters and
Special Troops in Osaka. A radio station was established
to provide remote radio-telephone service with each reg-
iment, Division artillery, and the Engineer Battalion in
the event of wire failure. modified field wire line to
each regiment and lateral field wire lines were installed.
A teletype net including each regiment and Division Artil-
lery was established,

e S2ecurity0 In order to provide for local se-

curity., defens
'e o bill'eting areas against possible attack,
and the svift quelling of any civil disturbances, each unit
established an interior guard system and made detailed plans
for the defense of its areao Alert forces organized by inf-
antry regiments were maintained in a condition of readiness
for movement on short notice. Division artillery maintained
three alert squads in each battalion for the same purpose.
A riot squad composed of personnel of the Military Police
Platoon v"-s m&uintrainca in thy: DLivision. Hudurt rs ;.
..
-d1 In trnty, rti11ery, "4x6d C v~tJry troops vvcre train ;d
of~ quelling~ civil disorders.
ISLAND
 6, Occupational Activities.

a, General. The major problem with which the

Division was faced in Japan was the execution of the as-
signed mission of occupation. How;ever, concurrently with
this, there were other tasks of large proportion which re-
quired imnmediate action. There was the problem of morale
brought on by the let-down following peace and the strong
desire to return home. The sanitation, health, and house-
keeping problem required much effort to solve, There were
in addition, the tasks of maintenance, military training,
and the training of replacements for departing key person-
nel . Multiple duty, aggravated by departure of many offic-
ers, in itself required careful organization,

b. Demobilization Of Japanese. Paradoxically,

the problem of occupation was both greatly simplified and,.
at the same time rendered complex by the decision to
operate through the existing Japanese government. It was
simplified because the vast task of establishing an en-
tirely new government and the administration of laws and
regulations to millions of people of a hungry bewildered
nation were not necessary. At the same time,.. the problem
of thorough Japanese demobilization was complicated by the
fact that it was done with the least possible disturbance
to the Japanese economy and the fact that upon arriving in
Japan the machinery for the task had not been established,
nor even planned. The immensity of the task soon became
apparent. Not only did it include the demobilization of
the Japanese Army, but also the location, seizure and dis-
position of every material thing of a military nature..
Japanese troops were scattered in groups of varying size
throughout the entire area of the Division's zone of re-
sponsibility, and there were hundreds upon hundreds of in-
stallations to be seized. These included factories, depots,
supply dumps, warehouses, banks, precious metals, ordnance,
barracks, naval installations , airports, fortified areas,
and scientific equipment having a military value. Such in-
stallations and areas were designated as "Targets".

The Division's zone of responsibility embraced the

four Prefectures of Osaka, Wakayama, Nara, LMiye, and the
Island of Awaji Shima,. The three Infantry Regiments and
Division Artillery were each assigned the responsibility
of one prefecture., The Island of Awaji Shima was assigned
with Wakayama Prefecture.

Since the problem of demobilization directly

affected the operations and Intelligence sections as well
as each of the supply branches under G-4, it was decided
to establish a "Target Center" composed of representatives
from each section concerned to facilitate and expedite
demobilization.
The Target Center was organized so that all matters
pertaining to this type of work could be handled directly
by it and only decisions on major policy were referred to
the "G", or higher authority concerned.

Within the target center, intelligence personnel

were responsible for locating and securing information
on installations to be seized. Information was obtained
from such sources as higher headcuarters, Japanese military
representatives, reconnaissance parties, discovery of branch-
es to installations seized, Japanese police, and representa-
tives of the Prefectural Headquarters, Occasionally, a Jap-
anese Officer anxious to be done with the army personally re-
quested that his installation be seized. On the whole, the
Japanese were cooperative in rendering assistance. However,
in some cases records were lost or destroyed and it was found
that the Japanese in charge were seldom familiar with the
full extent of the sprawling dumps. There were but few at-
tempts noted of deliberate efforts to conceal property which
was to be seized.

Representatives of the G-3 Section were concerned

with the operations and plans for seizure of installations.
As installations to be seized were located, each was given a
number and assigned as a target to one of the troop units.
The unit receiving the assignment made an immediate recon-
naissance to determine the number of men required to process
and guard the target, and to determine what arrangements
were necessary for the proper billeting of troops. Such in-
stallations as were not located, or were found to be burned
or bombed out, or were not of a military nature were class-
ified as "No Target". With this information in hand, the
target was seized, Japanese troops relieved, and an inventory
of material was made. A target was designated as "secured"
when the inventory had been made and the last of the Japanese
relieved. (Until the inventory had been completed, necessary
Japanese were retained to assist). A target was "Completed"
when final disposition of the installation or material had
been made and the installation returned to the Japanese., (Ex-
cept areas retained for Allied use),

Progress on processing of installations was reported

by the units to Division Headquarters by means of daily
occupation reports. This report included data concerning
all targets assigned to that unit. In addition to this
record, a brief summary was forwarded immediately after an
installation was seized and placed under guard. To supple,

52
ment these reports, units also submitted an occupation
schedule listing proposed target activity for the next
24-hour period, All data pertaining to each target was
assembled and maintained by a jacket file system so that
any information relativo to the target was readily available
in one place, Data in the file for completed targets
included a complete history from date of assignment to
final disposition, together with a record of all property
and specific disposition of each item. Daily periodic
reports to higher headquarters kept them apprised of the
progress in this activity within the Division,

The supply branches including Quarter.aster,

Ordnance, Si.-inal, Engineer, Tedical, and Chemical Tarfare,
were charged iw;ith staff supervision of the disposition of
materiel.

A system was established whereby information

would be available at all times as to the location, quan-
tities, and type of Japanese property on hand. Any units
requiring such materials procured the same by requisition
through the Disposition Section of the Target Center,;

Equipment, supplies, or property not required by

the occupation troops and which had no value of a military
nature were promptly returned to the Japanese for local
consumuption0 Military equipment which could not be con-
verted to civilian uses was destroyed under the general
direction of the Disposition Section.

The 172d and 173d Bomb Disposal Squads (Sep),

which joined the Division after landing, worked under the
Ordnance Disposition Officer In addition to disposing
of a number of unexploded bombs found within the Division
area, these squads supervised and instructed the officers
and troops of the Division in the destruction of captured
Japane so ordnance.

Progress, as indicated below, was rapid in the

seizure and disposition of tare3ts This information is
presented graphically in the accompanying chart.

Targets on which
Total Disposition is
Date Taget s Asgd Complete

13 October -206 12
20 October 453 93
27 October 542 102
3 November 629 173
10 November 791 351
17 November 865 524
24 Novomber 1039 610
30 November 1146 703
PROGESS OF TA (TT ASSIG NT 00.
C!TL I RT
130 ACO T0 30 NO1T ER

2100

100

90
8004

7000

4054

Soo
 It is estirmted that the Division will have com-
pleted the disposition of all targ..ts by the first of
February 1946.

co Civil affairs. On 28 September, a Military

Government team joined the Division and was integrated into
the Stuff as the G-5 Section. Although: a military goverment
in the strict sense was not to be established, the G-5
immediately set about to organize his section to carry out
the terms of surrender, allied policies, and the necessary
Division liaison pertaining to the Japanese civilian
society. The functions of this suction were of great scope
and complexity.

One of the first tasks of the G-5 was the procuring

of Japanese labor for the use of the uivision and I Corps.
ll requisitions for labor and services of Japanese civilians
were submitted to the lubor OfJ.ice of the G-5 .Sction, where
they were sifted and approved in accordance with avail-
ability of labor and importance of request with relation
to overall demand The Japanfse Prefectural L.bor Depart-
ment, in turn, was charged with the responsibility of
filling requisitions submitted to it by G-5. .ny failure
to comply, or any friction arising between using units and
labor, or the Labor Department wts referred to the Division
labor officer for settlement. At the date of this report,
6,000 persons employing 50 differant types of skills are.
employed daily. Th Japanese Labor Depart ment hs been
99% successful in fulfilling labor requirenmnts despite a
shortage of skilled labor and the wide gap between wages
for l1bor and the cost of living. However, the effici-
ency and standards of such labor have generally been far
below iaerican standards.

Procurement of real estLa.te, supplies, equipment,

and services required by the Divis ion for the proper housing
and comfort of troops were initia:ted immediately. In order
to facilitate this work, prompt action was taken to esta-
blish liaison with various civilian agencies in the several
Prefectures under jurisdiction of the Division.

Under authority of Letter Directive, He.dquarters

Sixth Army, tentative, dated 31 £ugust 1945, the 98th
Infantry Division Procurement Board was created for the
purpose of assisting units in securing needed items from
the Japanese, The Board received requests for supplies,
equipment, services, and real estate, and filed its req-
isitions with appropriate Japanese agency. Constant
liaison was maintained with these agencies in order to
expedite delivery and insure proper receipt to the supplier.
The Board also appraised the value of procured items, and
rend.red such reports as were required to higher head-
quarters.

In accordance with existing policy, the G-5 was

also concerned with the repatriation of foreign mationals
and became responsible for assisting such persons in the
procurement of food, clothing, and other essentials as
were necessary for their welfare. 'In the Osaka Prefecture
alone tharo were approximately 300,000 Koreans, 12;348
Chinese, and 40,persons of French, German, Russian, Indo-
nesian, and Hindustan nationality. Investigations on the
matter of repatriation revealed that this activity was not
taking place in accordance with directives of higher
authorities, and that in-many instances transportation,
particularly for Koreans, had been arranged illegally
through the port of Sakai. It was discovered that these
people had been excessively charged for transportation and
had been crowded into small, unsafe, overloaded vessels
for the voyage. Immediate action was instituted and this
situation corrected.

In accordance with the policy of reestablishing

Japanese industry on a peace-time basis, procedlures wore
instituted whereby this matter could be expedited.

Upon receipt of an ap plication from a concern

requesting reconversion, a co.ploto inspection and survey
was made of the factory and facilities, Usually, during
the course of the inspection the president or the general
manager was interviewed and all matters pertaining to the
reconversion were checked and carefully examined before
approval or rejection of applications was made, Informa-
tion required at the time of inspection included a list
of all stockholders having a minimum of 10% interest in
the company, the amount of money received as a subsidiary
from the Japanese Gcovernment, ownership of equipment, raw
materials, and finished products. All inventories were
spot checked and all equipment listed was checked for
possibilities of conversion. If machinery had boon-dis-
persed and concentration of the factory was desired, speci-
fic requests for such concentration were required, and
requests granted only after nature of the machinery had
been determined and location of concentration approved.

In the course of this work every effort has been

made to place all possible equipment, machinery, and
materials into channels where they will become useful for
civilian and domestic production.

Factories were given specific instructions on the

disposition of finished and somii-finished war materials on
hand. Reports of such dispositions were made to the
Division G-3 and Ordnance Officer for their information and
any further action required. Such installations on the pre-
mises of a factory as underground air-raid shelters, pill
boxes, gun emplacements, and caves built for war purposes
must be removed or destroyed by the company.

The G-5 was also made responsible for the super-

vision of the liquidation of the Osaka Branches of the Bank
of Taiwan, Bank of Chosen, and Colonization Bank of Chosen.
Liquidation proceedings involved the reinstatement of
officials for the purpose of liquidation, supervision of
personnel, and the preparation of all reports, statements,
and inventories necessary to the final liquidation.

In addition to the reconversion of industry, steps

were taken to improve the condition of agriculture. To
this end, an intensive survey was made of the agriculture
situation within the -ivision's zone of responsibility
in order to determine what measures were being taken by
the Prefectural Government efficiently to utilize the bombed-
out areas for the raising of crops, and if proper steps
had been taken to convert to agriculture former Japanese
Army and Navy installations not required by the occupying
forces, The Survey further included data on the availa-
bility of seed for war stricken areas, the problem of supply
and demand as regards farm labor, tools, equipment, seeds,
fertilizers, insecticides, government personnel utilized
in agricultural administration, the food collection system,
and the distribution system for seeds, fertilizers, tools,
and insecticides,

These data were submitted to higher headquarters for

further study. In the meantime, instructions were issued
to the Japanese to intensify the utilization of all available
areas for the planting of crops, and all army and naval
areas not needed by the occupation troops were turned over
to the home ministry for this purpose.

The problem of distribution of sufficient food,

clothing, and building materials to prevent starvation and
death from cold or exposure has been most difficult to
surmount.

In order to alleviate this condition, the matter of

the distribution of food from the farmer to the ultimate con-
sumer was subjected to study. As a result of this study, it
was found that much of the difficulty in feeding the native
population resulted from the inefficiency of the Japanese
distribution system. It therefore became necessary to
institute supervision over the activities of food distribut-
ing-agencies in order to minimize breakdowns in the system

57
and to facilitate the flow of commodities to consumers,

In order to augment the normal sources of civilian

supply such commodities that were found on military targets
which could be utilized for civilian production and normal
civilian needs were returned to the Japanese Home Ministry
for further distribution. These items included all types
of foodstuffs, clothing, and building materials that for-
merly were the property of the Japanese Army and Navy.

In furtherance of the readjustment of Japanese

economy, studies have also been instituted of staple
food, basic clothing, and miscellaneous items necessary
for the welfare of the Japanese. Complaints of the viola-
tion of established prices were investigated in conjunction
with the survey of the prices of cornodities. A survey of
labor was started in order to determine the present relation-
ship between the cost of living and the price of labor.
It has become obvious that the cost of labor as well as the
cost of commodities is not in line with the prices estab-
lished as of 14 august 1945,

In order to keep higher authorities apprised of the

situation with regard to civil affairs, the G-5 has to date
prepared and submitted reports or surveys covering such
important matters as welfare, fishing, banking, agriculture,
hospitals, police organization, food, labor, housing, and
price control.

d. Morale. Gutted cities and universal poverty are

cheerless companions for a soldier off duty, and the Japan-
ese had little to offer in the way of diversion except
prostitution.

In addition, military duties at times were more

irksome because of the feeling that since the war was won
the task was not as important as before. Most soldiers
were anxiously and impatiently awaiting the day- they would
return to their homes. Consequently, the problem of morale
was greater than under normal garrison conditions.

Although billeting and processing of personnel

under the army readjustment program were given high priority;
immediate attention was also given to the matter of recrea-
tion for the occupation forces. At an Enlisted Men's Trans-
ient Center, established in Osaka, recreational facilities
were placed at the disposal of men who were on pass. Here
soldiers could enjoy the services of the Red Cross Canteen,
the use of the pool tables, a limited library, and write
letters in comfortable surroundings° For men on overnight
pass five hundred bunks are available.

58
 In Nara, the 98th Division Recreation Center was
established as a l.:st cente for offiders and ernlisted meh
who are sent there on iJtached orvice for rest aro. reotea-
tion. The NdCai Hotel is located amL.idsdt boeutiful surround-
ings id a city untouched by bombing. The hotel is one of
the best in the Pa:cific. T.here are aocomodations for
seventy-six men. Rooris are wvo~ furnished anad stma heated,
The lounges re, comfort.:ble. The large dining room is of
typical TWestorn style.

The Special Service Office in coordination with the Red

Cross has established a complete recre tion center for the
men of the Division. Three floors of a dow ntown Osauka
c: partnrlnt store have been utilized in establishing fucil-
ities to meet practically every intcrest of the men i iaong
the facilities are a library coostrLining recent ne spapers
and books, oard and music roor.s. There men zmy play bill-
iards, pool, an: take classes in judo. miotion pictures are
scheduled daily.

In addition to these facilities, an Officers'

Transient Center has been set up wi;hich provies overnight.
aoconoda tions for a maximum of one hundred fifty (150)
officers who are in need of lodging w;hile in Osaka. Plains
L ve been made to provide for fishing, boy ting, andc duck
hinting at a centor to be established at Lako Biwa North of
Kyoto. also for the troops o the ivision, conducted
tours of Iyoto nda Nara were arranged Yith Sixth rmy and
Division trtillory, respectively.

An extensive athletic program was in gu rated. It

was designed not only to insure maxirmum p.articipations of
all troo s but also to foster i competitive spirit and to
provido games having wide spectator interest. Eixtensive
reconnaissance was made for the purpose of locating athletic
facilities; Land stadiums, gymnasiums, bill fields, and
swimnming pools were mad.e availLable for the use of Division
troops. 'ith the exception of football, .ll tea ms were
organized in echelons below Division in order to provide
opportunity for greater 1participation.: Plans were ma1.de to
engage in the Pacifit Airmy Olympics end contestants were
given every assistance in preparation for this cQropetition.
The athletic program was organized under the direction of
an athletic section in Division Headquarters and each unit
appointed officers whose specific job it was to foster
athl eticos.

Unuerx the supervision of the Information and Auuca-

tion Officer, the Jrmy Educ._tion Program was established
and Lducotion O.i'icers appointed. Si. scnools were establi-
shed within the Division, one in each of th'e major units.
The Educ.ution program not only provided a means for troops
to occupy themselves in a useful pursuit which would fit
them better for civili.n life, but in addition, served to
ease the problem of training key personnel. In the curr-
iculu ?were included such subjects as stenography, automo-
bile mechanics and tho like*

Every offort was made to provide troops with com-

fortabl qua.rters, hot showewors, oecollont food, .nd other
facilities which would help to improve onviromint wvithin the
billeting arroas.

Constant attontion to i,oralo i.. s kept deliinqiun-

cios to . miniimumi; uiad althoiigh v enoroal diseaso reiains
a problem, the io raleo progr-a h s boon highly successful
in cdinistering to the neds of the troops.

o, Sanitat io _ elth aend Housoi . The

Division's oedical Service dovoted a grot deal of tio. to
the probleoi of health no sInitation.

The chief problem of communicablo disease control

at this time wr:s tr:: t of venereal disease. Very shortly
after arrival at the tcl:porrry bivouac site at Taisho
Airport, a full time Venereal Disease Control Officer was
appointed and prophylactic stations were established at
or near all recognized cont rs of prostitution. In addition,
every aid station and dispen sary operated as a prophylactic
station. Though the plans for the Blacklist oper.tion pro-
vided for whct was believed to be cdequate supplics of vener-
eal prophylaxis i< aterials, it ~s soon discovered that sup-
plies of protrgol cE d meiourous chloride oint.me;int were not
sufficient for sustained operation:s at present needs. Addi-
tional caloel powder was located at form er Japanese riy
medical supply arehiouses and oibint- e w.lms iate in the Clear-
ing Station phari cy. Also, it ;was ccessary, for a brief
time, to resort to the e1xpedient of .si.n cheiiccal prophy-
laxis kits for prophylaxis at the stations. W
JiU adiditional
supplies did arrive through the 9th Hedical apply DOpot and
from reserves brought b: thie 86th Evacuation Hospital, stan-
dard operation of the prophylaxis stctions was resume-d.

For control of cormmunicable disease which -light spread

to troops, close contact was established withi J.paneose pub"
Sie health authorities, and tile ndical service in cooper-
Stion with the Asst Chief of Staff, G-5, maintained contin-
uing charts and statistics which ireveailed the comaunicable
disease situation ameng the civilian population T thin the
Division area of responsibility. No alarming incidence
of communicable disease were reported, and weekly reports from
Public Health officials were constantly checked and supple-
mented by inspections of communicable disease hospitals in
order to remain constantly apprised of any increase in inci-
dence of communibable disease.

In order to provide for a closer supervision of

health, sanitation, housekeeping, and the maintenance of
high standards of appearance, a group was organized under
the direction of the Assistant Division Commander for the
purpose of inspecting these conditions within the targets
occupied by Division troops. These inspections were also
made for the purpose of submitting recommendations for the
more efficient administration of occupational duties.

A series of command inspections covering each echelon

of the command was instituted for the purpose of maintaining
additional supervision over the progress in the development
of permanent billeting areas,

f. Training. One of the primary requisites of the

occupation troops was at all times to present to the Japanese
a smart, soldierly appearance. To this end, as well as for
the purpose of maintaining high standards for our own benefit,
it was necessary to institute a military training program
in addition to the other activities in which the troops
were engaged. This program was necessarily of a limited
nature. It included training in military police duties, riot
control, and emphasized drills, ceremonies, health, and
sanitation. Training was also given in map reading and
intelligence subjects directly concerned with occupational
duties.

During this period, programs were established within

the units to train "low-point" men to assume key positions
as they were vacated. Later, when replacements began to
arrive, it became necessary to establish separate schools
within the units to accomplish this training.

g. Summary. Intelligence activity during the period

of occupation concerned itself with investigations, counter-
intelligence, translations of local Japanese publications
and allied functions. "Leads" on war criminals were investi-
gated for substantiation. A survey of demobilized Japanese
service men was made to, determine if they still retained
weapons in their possession. Public schools and police
stations were investigated for unauthorized weapons and to
assure that persons of undesirable background were not still
in their employ. Searches were made to locate quanti-
ties of silver, gold, and platinum bullion which was

61
believed yet undeclared by military and naval authorr
fQ4
Investigations were made to discover stocks of napgjiep
believed to be in the possession not only of the Army and
Navy but civilians as well, The investigation on precious
metals continues as of the close of this reLort.

The Medical Service performed its mission of general

medical support to the Division. During the period at
Taisho Airfield evacuation was to the Clearing Station,
which was the sole Division unit for hospitalization until
the 98th Field Hospital began operations at the site of a
gelatin factory in Kashihara on 10 October 1945. Patients
requiring - more definitive treatment than was afforded by
these installations were admitted to the 23d Field Hospital
in Osaka, where further evacuation was by air to a general
hospital in Tokyo. The 54th Evacuation Hospital continues
to support troops in the Wakayama area, consisting at
present of the 767th Tank Battalion. The 98th Field Hospital
moved to Osaka on 2 November 1945 and relieved the 23d Field
Hospital as the primary unit for hospitalization in the Osaka
area.. Troops stationed at Nara and in outlying districts from
the city of Osaka are provided ambulance service to the
clearing station, which moved on 29 October 1945 to the
Nippon-Sho-Ken Building in Osaka.

Since arrival in Japan, all supply agencies have

carried out their normal supply functions with the additional
duty of supervising the destruction and other disposition of
captured Japanese equipment..

Having shipped from Hawaii where supply stocks were

ample, the Division was able to meet its own supply demands
and in many instances assisted other units which were not
so well equipped.,

Housing for troops and headquarters offices,.

setting up and supplying an officers and enlisted men's
transient center and Recreation Center placed a heavy
demand on the engineers and quartermaster supplies for build-
ing materials and housekeeping equipment. MIuch of the demand
for building materials and supplies needed for the comfort
and welfare of the troops was met by utilizing captured
enemy stocks and by the placing of procurement demands
on the Japanese Government through the G-5 Section of the
Division. The fact that the Division is separated, with
units dispersed over a wide area has meant a big increase
in the problem to be met in the supply field.

62
 QlCTION IV

JAP NSL ..TTITUD Thh2 TEL OUCIUP..TION

Liuch has been written concerning ~ne ferocity of the
Japanese. The uncertainty as to their reaction -o the ar-
rival of American troops was great.

Bearing in mind this uncertai.nty and their savagery

in war, it was all but incredible to see the Japanese
people line the streets of their villoges and small agrar-
ian towns to greet the Lerican
i troops as they moved in-
land from the beach. The general impression of t aeir att-
itude at this time was tLat of gjnuine relief at the war's
end. Their greeting seemed sincere and spontaneous.

A.mong individuals there were variations in the re-

action. For the most p:rt, children wave , shouted and
smiled in a spirit of friendliness; old men frequently
removed their caps and bowed, their heads. The Japanese
women were more reserved. dome smiled, a few withdrew
into their homes and hustled their children indoors, ap-
paruntly influenced by wartime propaganda to the effect
that .,mericans would ruthlessly kill their children.

Their attitude throughout has been docile and dis-

respect the exception. As is to be expected, the urban
population has been more sodhisticated han n he rural, and
the former seemed least impressed or interested in tne
presence of American troops. s the occupation continued,
if the children were fearful of he aericans, they prompt-
ly discarded their fears and became avidly curious. They
seemed to be interested in everything 1Amxerican.

There has been little apparent resentment on the part

of the Japanese as a whole, and there have been no vio-
lent countermeasures to the occupation. Japanese newspa-
pers, released from the oppression of heir own government,
have frequently attacked that government for inefficiency
and waste. Their editorials usually express liberal views.
Vhether or not large numbers of the people accept such
views is not known. But the people are certainly influenced
by these writings. Apparently, the outcropping of liberal-
ism is the natural result of the removal of restraints from
the press. Japanese editorials have also pointedly ex-
pressed the degree of orderliness with which the occupation
troops have dispensed their daily activities. The appear-
ance of Ameirican troops and their qualities of friendliness
have been given much attention by the press, ,ihether these
expressions be false adulation or entirely sincere, such
are the opinions with which the newspapers have confronted
the people.
 There appeared to be much hope on the part of the Jap-
anese that the Americans would aid them in establishing a
better government and achieving more freedom. They have
been fearful of their own police, Again in their newspa-
pers they have repeatedly referred to the quality of fair-
ness in the Americans and h..ve expressed the hope that the
occupation forces would exercise this attitude in their
favor when dealing with Japanese public officials whom
they have repeatedly assailed for incompetence.

In the Division's official association with the

Japanese, the latter have courteously coope:rated. Com-
pliance with orders has usually been complete; and when
otherwise there have usually been legitimate reasons
for such failures. Delays in the execution of orders
have sotietimes been expe ienced. These have usually
been due to the low standards of Japanese efficiency and
not to resistance. However, in some cases Japanese have
violated orders, and when censorea for the inlfraction,
have feigned misunderstandin>. ach time this occured,
the offender was above average intelligence ai-d inherent-
ly capable of complying with the orders as they were is-
sued, regardless of the language barrier, especially when
the transaction was enhanced by the presence of a Nisei
interpreter. Such instances were dealt with forcibly
with the desired results obtained.

Fraternization has been extensive. There is evidence

in their expressions, thnt the conquest of Japanese women
has created resentment on the part of tie men. This situ-
ation has a particular significance in Japan, since accord-
ing to Japanese standards, the wolman hve beun relegated to
a minor place in society. To allow a womrn to precede a man or
to walk arm in arm down a street was previously unthinkable.

The women have enjoyed the open attention, the ele-

vation of position. Consequently, resentment on the part
of the men has a social significance in adc ition to that
of seeing their women receiving attentions from a conquer-
or.

The Japanese pedestrian traffic has created a con-

siderable problem. Thousands of people daily crowd the
highways. Japanese traffic frequently has been quite
indifferent to the approach of Americcn vehicles. It is
not known if this indifference is delioerate resistance.
or ignorance, or a wartime practice which, probably, out
of necessity paid particular deference to pedestrians who
were so numerous due to the scarcity of transportation.

64
 On the wnjolc the at bitu .e oV x. eXaj&)an use~ has bee .
favorablte toward t.Li cc.>tion troopjs. Kq vevur it has
been fully r ;alizd. that t e comrbina.tio1 of ',,.parwnt in-
ternal political unrest, the food s ortage, inadieLlacy of
s h lt r, utisuing cold wathuir, def2ua:ted aind ru~rning de-
mobilized Japsnreso i-1.rmfy and Navyr personnel s ull. citficui-
ties whico might vvel1l burst into violent rcac on. iLucs
urus have been ta ken to meet such and;vntuality.
 SECTION V - ST ARY OF L$SOiI$
O AipID

1. GoLnral. The occupation of Japan becam! an ad-

ministrative .meoveont y and generally, was marked by no un-
toward incident. Consoquently.,' many of the lessons learned
Owre concerned vith the execution of new tasks and not im-
proved nothods of accomplishing old ones,

2. Morale. Morale, always of great importance, as-

sumes diffEtron aspects in an occupation. With the war at
an end,, theore was a marked unwillingness on the part of
occupation troops to endure hardships and inconveniences,
and it was found necessary to devote great energy and at-
tention to the naintonance of high norale.

Under these circu-stances, it is essential to estab-

lish confortable and sanitary living quarters and to pro-
vide the troops with every convenience possible. The ir-
portance of adequate recroation facilities to provide max-
imum relaxation and enjoyment dur ing off-duty hours rust
be emphasized.

There are three staff sections which particularly need

to be augmented in preparation for an occupation,

The Special Service, the Ai.:rican Red Cross, and the

Information and Education Sections :ust be raterially in-
creased, both in personnel and equipment, In an occupation,
these agencies which are norimally of an admiinistrative and
advisory nature, are transposed into active, aggressive
operating agencies.. In order to accomplish their mission
properly, these sections should be reinforced with trained
specialists in their respective fields and amply provided
with necessary supplies prior to the embarkation of the
Force from its base.

The prompt delivery of both incoming and outgoing

nail is a large factor in the maintenance of high morale.

3. Intelligence. The pressing time elements and the

sudden change in plans emphasized again th.e necessity for
the rapid procurement and dissemination of intelligence.
This must not be subordinated to other "two" functions.
Timely frageontary dissenination is a "must". Lack of time
was a factor necessitating piecemeal dissemination to the
lower units with the follow-up confirmation in the form of
completed annexes forwarded at a later date.

As a means of obtaining information and aid in other

forms from higher and adjacent headquarters, it was found
that a system of routine calls, either in person (prefer-
ably) or by telephone, produced excellent results.

66
 Constant observance of the value of a well monitored
classified documents file facilitated lapid disposition
of superfluous data when pr parations were made for the
movement to Japan.

k. Operations and Training. The uncertainty with

which the operation was ra-ught estdblishea th necessity
of formulation of general basic policies and deoisions
which could be followed under varying circuristanices.

Jespite the lack of specific knowledge of the beach,

the preparation and subsequent use of st andai lncaina
diagrams proved highly successful.
The organization of a sep rte unit, the "target cen-
ter", to direct and supervise demiobilization and disposi-
tion of Japanese military property was found to be effio-
lent and greatly expedited this vwork.

Loss of personnel under the readjustment system made

it necessary to emphasize to the fullest extent the train-
ing of lare numbers of specialists to fill key vacancies.

The maintenance of high military standards is of para-

mount importance for occupation troops. Under the condi-
tions of the occupation, this matter required ore than the
normal command supervision and war<ntea increased atcten-
tion.

5. Sanitation. The careful studies of diseases c.nd

sanitation conditions in the targt area and the exten-
sive plans prepared for the rnintenance of health werb in-
valuable during thie.occupation

Special attention must be given to the rmtter of quan-

tities of the various medical supplies needed to surmount
the problems of sanitation and health*

Uuxing training, emphasis must be given to the in-

doctrination of troops with a full conscousness o:f ob-
servance of basic rules of hiulthful livingo

6. upply. Ii any landing operation, it is impera-

tive that a radio net containing G-4, regi ental s-4's,
and the Division Artillery -4, be establisnea. The G-4
or his representative from the beach must, through this
moans ol communiocation, control the flow of supplies from
ship to shore. -nytLing short of this vill result. in ,un-
necessary confusion and the landing of supplies which Lrc
not essential to the immediate operation.

67
 Wheore loading is. done at a port, little or no use
should be . ac o of civilian personnel They vork certain
hours and tiake full tilo off for .ioa.ls .and other rest por-
iods:, W1hon loading is done on a twenty-four hour basis,
this causes long dola ys particularly hicr heavy equip-
ent is involoved. Not boing :ilitary personnel, they are
difficult to control and do not in.e:,diately obey all in-
struct ions

Schools for training TQi's similar to the Arty Port

and Service School in Honolulu wv7;re found to be of great
value., A per2Mnently attached Ti Tean ;ith each Division
is of great assistance, but it is believed tha:t the perna-
nent sot-up should be s-allor, operating only as a Divis-
ion T'S, and in a supervisory capacity, 3LT Tq~S should
be furnished fro: the units thensolvos. Only line officers
of tactical units should be used for TQM. Officers fron
service or tr.ns portation units do not understand tactical
euploy::.ent. It is nuch easior to train line officers in
shipping than service officers in tactical. e-.ploy.ent.

7, Civil Affairs, .The functions of nilitry govern-

nent personn.l are of extr.e i.po
Lortnce, aind, consoquont
ly, it is felt that this section shold be on the general
staff level. It is believe, t'ha it i;. ild be of great
benefit fro.. the standpoint :2f planning. nd. ortniz- -
tional purposes to include the duties of the civil affairs
section (not to be confused v.ith normal .. iiitacry g ern-
meit) in the Staff Officers' Field nual (F:' 101-5).

In the field of :.ilitary government, trained special-

ists are needed to supervise civilian activities. The
criterions for the selection of corsonnel should be based
on experienco, education, and ability. Duo to the suddon
capitulation of Japan and a lack of an adequate plan to
noet this situation, .:ilitary govern eont officers wore not
assigno,. in the specialities nor area in which their linr-
inun training of 7 .,onths best qualified the:.

govern.io nt is a co:i pe
.Military echanis,. wich re-
quires the best .iinds in the fields of economics, educa-
tion, public health and welfare, public utilities, com-
noero, industry, price control, rationing, and the innu:-
erablo co.::lexities of :.odorn civil governmrnt. Per sonnel
expert in these fields should be available to supervise,
to advise, and to investigate all a.tters as necessary
in connection with thi s ork. They ::ust be able to.collect
data in order to check the infor.nation being subritted by
Ja- cnese Govern2e nt authorities as well as to supply in-
fornation necessary for the preparation of future policies
and directives on civil affairs, Sufficient personnel with
necessary training has not been available for the task.
 Imn
occuipation a definite civil atlraaire policy
is a Lust, as variety in application or interpretation oZf
e is tii dreotives is a source of ebarras sraent to
commanders in their cdealir ;s t;-ith the civili.an populL.tion.

FOl TELC
I OI 't1 ND G h1ikL~

C.,' EUV LT
i3L
Lt Col, TIf
-4ctg %dj Gen
iTI L
.I, LD.ISTRIBTJ TI U),:

The hdj utant General, -,.ashin -

tonl, D.C., through channels
with all supportin:- documients 1

CG, Sixth sLrray -r

CG, I Corps -1
CG, 9{8th Inf Div -3

69
FINAL DISTRIBUTION:
CG AFPAC 1 ANIY S Ci LEGE
CG AGF 1 CG 98TH INF DIV
CG MIDPAC 1 ASST DIV COMDR
CG EIGHTH ARMY 1 C/S
CG USASCOM 1 G-
CG FMFPAC 1 G-2
CG I CORPS 1 G-3
CG XI CORPS 1 G-4
CG XXIV CORPS 1 389TH INF
CG 6TH INF DIV 1 390TH INF
CG 7TH INF DIV 1 391ST INF
CG 1ST CAV DIV 1 CG 98TH DIV ARTY
CG 11TH AB DIV 1 367TH .
CG 24TH INF DIV 1 368TH PA
CG 25TH INF DIV 1 369T1 FA.
CG 2D MARINE DIV i 923D P-.
CG 33D INF DIV 1 323D ENGR BN
COM TRANS RO 18 1 3 23D MED BN
COM AND GEN STAFF SCHOOL 1 767TH TNK BN
THE INFANTRY SCHOOL 1- CO SP TRPS
FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL 1 AG FILES

i 2
"i i]

I ~ ; -~

70
COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY

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