[G.R. No. 160544.

February 21, 2005] petitioner's mind, is an explicit waiver of any right to claim indemnity for the loss
of the car; and that De Asis knowingly assumed the risk of loss when she
TRIPLE-V vs. FILIPINO MERCHANTS allowed petitioner to park her vehicle, adding that its valet parking service did
not include extending a contract of insurance or warranty for the loss of the
THIRD DIVISION vehicle.

Gentlemen: During trial, petitioner challenged FMICI's subrogation to Crispa's right to file a
claim for the loss of the car, arguing that theft is not a risk insured against under
FMICI's Insurance Policy No. PC-5975 for the subject vehicle.
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB
21 2005.
In a decision dated June 22, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment for
respondent FMICI, thus:
G.R. No. 160544 (Triple-V Food Services, Inc. vs. Filipino Merchants Insurance
Company, Inc.)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff (FMICI) and against the defendant Triple V (herein petitioner) and the
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision
[1]
dated October
latter is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the following:
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21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71223, affirming an earlier
1. The amount of P669,500.00, representing actual damages plus compounded
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Makati City, Branch 148, in its Civil Case
(sic);
No. 98-838, an action for damages thereat filed by respondent Filipino Merchants
2. The amount of P30,000.00 as acceptance fee plus the amount equal to 25%
Insurance, Company, Inc., against the herein petitioner, Triple-V Food Services,
of the total amount due as attorney's fees;
Inc.
3. The amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. Plus, cost of suit.
On March 2, 1997, at around 2:15 o'clock in the afternoon, a certain Mary Jo-
Anne De Asis (De Asis) dined at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant at 15 West
Defendant Triple V is not therefore precluded from taking appropriate action
Avenue, Quezon City. De Asis was using a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon Model
against defendant Armando Madridano.
1995 with plate number UBU 955, assigned to her by her employer Crispa Textile
Inc. (Crispa). On said date, De Asis availed of the valet parking service of
petitioner and entrusted her car key to petitioner's valet counter. A SO ORDERED.
corresponding parking ticket was issued as receipt for the car. The car was then
parked by petitioner's valet attendant, a certain Madridano, at the designated Obviously displeased, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating its
parking area. Few minutes later, Madridano noticed that the car was not in its argument that it was not a depositary of the subject car and that it exercised
parking slot and its key no longer in the box where valet attendants usually keep due diligence and prudence in the safe keeping of the vehicle, in handling the
the keys of cars entrusted to them. The car was never recovered. Thereafter, car-napping incident and in the supervision of its employees. It further argued
Crispa filed a claim against its insurer, herein respondent Filipino Merchants that there was no valid subrogation of rights between Crispa and respondent
Insurance Company, Inc. (FMICI). Having indemnified Crispa in the amount of FMICI.
P669.500 for the loss of the subject vehicle, FMICI, as subrogee to Crispa's
rights, filed with the RTC at Makati City an action for damages against petitioner In a decision dated October 21, 2003,[2] the Court of Appeals dismissed
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Triple-V Food Services, Inc., thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 98-838 which was
raffled to Branch 148.
In its answer, petitioner argued that the complaint failed to aver facts to support
the allegations of recklessness and negligence committed in the safekeeping
and custody of the subject vehicle, claiming that it and its employees wasted no
time in ascertaining the loss of the car and in informing De Asis of the discovery
of the loss. Petitioner further argued that in accepting the complimentary valet
parking service, De Asis received a parking ticket whereunder it is so provided
that "[Management and staff will not be responsible for any loss of or damage
incurred on the vehicle nor of valuables contained therein", a provision which, to
petitioner's appeal and affirmed the appealed decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed June 22, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
Makati City - Branch 148 in Civil Case No. 98-838 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
In so dismissing the appeal and affirming the appealed decision, the appellate
court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the trial court that: (a)
petitioner was a depositary of the subject vehicle; (b) petitioner was negligent in
its duties as a depositary thereof and as an employer of the valet attendant; and
(c) there was a valid subrogation of rights between Crispa and respondent FMICI.
Hence, petitioner's present recourse.
We agree with the two (2) courts below.
Petitioner's argument that there was no valid subrogation of rights between
Crispa and FMICI because theft was not a risk insured against under FMICI's
Insurance Policy No. PC-5975 holds no water.
Insurance Policy No. PC-5975 which respondent FMICI issued to Crispa contains,
among others things, the following item: "Insured's Estimate of Value of
Scheduled Vehicle- P800.000".[5] On the basis of such item, the trial court
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When De Asis entrusted the car in question to petitioners valet attendant while
eating at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant, the former expected the car's safe
return at the end of her meal. Thus, petitioner was constituted as a depositary of
the same car. Petitioner cannot evade liability by arguing that neither a contract
concluded that the coverage includes a full comprehensive insurance of the
vehicle in case of damage or loss. Besides, Crispa paid a premium of P10,304 to
cover theft. This is clearly shown in the breakdown of premiums in the same
policy.[6] Thus, having indemnified CRISPA for the stolen car, FMICI, as correctly
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of deposit nor that of insurance, guaranty or surety for the loss of the car was
constituted when De Asis availed of its free valet parking service.
In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another with
the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. [3] A deposit may be
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constituted even without any consideration. It is not necessary that the
depositary receives a fee before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted
for safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor.
Specious is petitioner's insistence that the valet parking claim stub it issued to
ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, was properly subrogated to
Crispa's rights against petitioner, pursuant to Article 2207 of the New Civil
Code[7].
Anent the trial court's findings of negligence on the part of the petitioner, which
findings were affirmed by the appellate court, we have consistently ruled that
findings of facts of trial courts, more so when affirmed, as here, by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the trial court itself ignored,
overlooked or misconstrued facts and circumstances which, if considered,
warrant a reversal of the outcome of the case.[8] This is not so in the case at
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bar. For, we have ourselves reviewed the records and find no justification to
De Asis contains a clear exclusion of its liability and operates as an explicit
deviate from the trial court's findings.
waiver by the customer of any right to claim indemnity for any loss of or damage
to the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE.
The parking claim stub embodying the terms and conditions of the parking,
including that of relieving petitioner from any loss or damage to the car, is SO ORDERED.
essentially a contract of adhesion, drafted and prepared as it is by the petitioner
alone with no participation whatsoever on the part of the customers, like De Very truly yours,
Asis, who merely adheres to the printed stipulations therein appearing. While
contracts of adhesion are not void in themselves, yet this Court will not hesitate (Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
to rule out blind adherence thereto if they prove to be one-sided under the Clerk of Court
attendant facts and circumstances.[4] cralaw

Hence, and as aptly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner must not be
allowed to use its parking claim stub's exclusionary stipulation as a shield from Endnotes:
any responsibility for any loss or damage to vehicles or to the valuables [1]
Penned by Associale Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion and concurred in by
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contained therein. Here, it is evident that De Asis deposited the car in question Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Lucas P. Bersamin of the Special
with the petitioner as part of the latter's enticement for customers by providing Fourth Division.
them a safe parking space within the vicinity of its restaurant. In a very real [2]
Rollo, pp. 52-58.
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sense, a safe parking space is an added attraction to petitioner's restaurant [3]

Calibo vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 427 [2001] citing Article 1962 of the
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business because customers are thereby somehow assured that their vehicle are New Civil Code.
safely kept, rather than parking them elsewhere at their own risk. Having [4]
Ermitano vs. Court of Appeals, 306 SCRA 218 [ 1999].
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entrusted the subject car to petitioner's valet attendant, customer De Asis, like [5]
Rollo, p. 633.
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all of petitioner's customers, fully expects the security of her car while at [6]
Ibid
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petitioner's premises/designated parking areas and its safe return at the end of [7]
Article 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received
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her visit at petitioner's restaurant. indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the
wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who [8]
C & S Fishfarm Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al, 394 SCRA 82
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has violated the contract. xxx [2002]; Pealosa vs. Santos, 363 SCRA 545 [2001]; Marvin Mercado vs. People
of the Philippines, 392 SCRA 687 [2002].