G.R. No.

118861 April 27, 1995

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,

vs.
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issue of whether or not
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction In the split decision of 4 March 1992
in the consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections, 1 this Court ruled in the
negative because of the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the constitution or
by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary writs. It held that jurisdiction or the legal power
to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction is
original or appellate, and since these two classes of jursdiction are exclusive of each other, each must
expressly conferred by law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state
that in the Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred either by Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
implication. Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any
power to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case
of this Court which is specifically conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed
out that the doctrines laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC 2 that neither the Constitution nor any law has
conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs still finds application under the 1987
Constitution.

3
In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, this Court reiterated the Garcia and
Uy doctrine.

In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to the affirmative view of the issue,
citing as authority therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of
Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads:

Sec. 50. Definition.

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.

The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He contends that while the COMELEC's
position is inherently compelling, it deserves scant consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria and the
nature and purpose of B. P. Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May
1984; hence, it was a temporary statute which self-destructed after such election.

The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed.

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were
candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was
proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former.

Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.

On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin
of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the
protestant as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the

page 1/23
 Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11,
1992, the protestant having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the
protestee's votes.

Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private respondent on 1 July 1994.

On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal
and paying the appellate docket fees.

On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.

On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the
private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.

On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal. The
corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a
reconsideration of the order of execution and the sheriff held in abeyance the implementation of the writ.
This motion was denied on 5 August 1994.

The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid other of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution.
The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.

On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. 4 The dispositive portion
thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has

exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes
jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The
Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and
the Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.

Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as

Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of the
appeal before this Commission in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No.
108-94.

In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the respondent COMELEC
maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which
remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it
is not exactly correct that this law self-destructed after the May 1984 election. It further reasoned out that in
the performance of its judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction. It
ratiocinated as follows:

It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers jurisdiction to

issue the prerogative Writs, then the Commission has jurisdiction.

Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.

B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE
SELECTION OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides:

Sec. 50. Definition. Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any

question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board
of Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate, political
party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly
with the Commission.

The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.

page 2/23
 The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to
hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus involving election cases.(Emphasis supplied).

We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been
repealed. We have come to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The
repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3,
1985), provides:

Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. Presidential Decree No. 1296

otherwise known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is
hereby repealed. All other election Laws, decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with
the provisions of this Code is hereby repealed, except
Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20
governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang
Pampook of Regions IX and XII. (Emphasis supplied).

B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the
cited Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the Veloria case, the Supreme Court itself
said, reiterating previous cases, that implied repeal of statutes is frowned upon,
thus:

Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should

the grant of original jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-
judicial body be tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria Cases: Emphasis
supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify

or repeal, whether expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No.
1752. It is common place Learning that implied repeal are not
favored in Law and are not casually to be assumed. The first
effort of a court must always be to reconcile or adjust the
provisions of one statute with those of another so as to give
sensible effect to both provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55 SCRA
261 (1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971);
National Power Corporation vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S.
vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377(1965). Only
when there is clear inconsistency and conflict between the
provisions of two (2) statutes, may a court hold that the
provisions later in point of time have impliedly repealed the
earlier ones" that (Philippine American Management Co., Inc., vs.
Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49
SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971)
(Larga vs. Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164 SCRA 25).

It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the
Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title
and Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known and cited as "The Law
on the 1984 Batasang Pambansa Election." It shall govern the election for the
regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the
selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution.

While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for
the particular election (like election and campaign periods, voting constituency,
etc.) most if not all of the remaining provisions could be applicable to future
elections. It is not lost to the Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for
other purposes."

But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the Commission
under B.P. Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our election laws. It should be
mentioned that the provisions of Republic Act No. 6638 which governed the local
elections of January 18, 1988, as to the number of councilors in specified cities

page 3/23
(Sec. 3) and the number of Sangguniang members in different provinces and cities
(Sec. 4) are still applicable up to this day. In fact, it became one of the important
controlling provision which governed the May 11, 1992 elections. If provisions of
Republic Act No. 6636 which are not inconsistent with the present election laws did
not self-destruct, why should Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697?

Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that "any city
or municipal judge, who includes or excludes any voter without any legal basis in
inclusion and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty of an election offense,"
although this provision is found in Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134
supposedly with limited application as the enabling act for the elections for
Members of Congress on May 11, 1987 and for other purposes.

Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to the Commission
on Elections because the Pimentel case said there was none, to fill a void in the
law, and avoid an incongruous situation.

A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately

but in its relation to the statute's totality. Each statute must, in
fact, be construed as to "harmonized it with the pre-existing
body of laws." Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes
must be reconciled. . . . (Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO
Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113).

xxx xxx xxx

The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts

provision, it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter and that in the absence of
any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision
should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy
embodied in the prior statutes." (Legaspi vs. Executive
Secretary, L-36153, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253).

The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial functions to
take jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because it
has appellate jurisdiction in election cases granted by the Constitution itself. The
Court of Appeals has no more appellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the
case of the Supreme Court, Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in
his dissenting opinion that under the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in election cases should properly be limited to decisions, orders or
rulings of the Commission on Elections, not from lower courts.

It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388,
September 2, 1971) because the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals then
had appellate jurisdiction in election case decided by the lower courts.

In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the lower courts
because after reiterating the ruling in the Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court
said:

In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of

certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against a regional trial court
in an election contest may be filed only in the Court of Appeals
or in this Court being the only courts given such original
jurisdiction under the Constitution and the Law. (Emphasis
supplied).

While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the Constitution
and the law, it is most logical for the Commission whenever it performs judicial
functions to have the authority to issue these prerogative writs. . . .

...

page 4/23
 In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case of
Antonio Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco promulgated on July
29, 1993. In this case, the Commission en banc had occasion to rule on the
question of whether or not the Commission has the authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari in election cases.

The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner Regalado E.

Maambong, ruled that there is [a] law which grants the Commission, the exclusive
authority to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election
cases, and there are also Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact, which declare
that the Commission has no such authority precisely because; according to the
decisions, there is no law granting such authority, and without any hint
whatsoever of the existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs. Pambansa Blg. 697.

As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP
Blg. 697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3,
1985). Furthermore, in their answer, respondents cited Supreme Court decisions
where it was declared that, indeed, the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue
special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been
repealed.

As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts of
Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).

Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2),
Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power
includes the determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the
Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 5

It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order of execution pending
appeal and the writ of execution because

[a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994
the court a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early as July 8,
1994, it had already acknowledged through its order issued on that date, the
perfection of the appeal of petitioner as in fact it ordered the elevation of the
records of the case to this Honorable Commission. 6

Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action.

In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing is
challenged resolution.

As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the petition by invoking the very
arguments adduced by the respondent COMELEC in its challenged the resolution and the dissenting opinion
in the Garcia and Uy cases.

In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent COMELEC postulates that it issued
the said resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appeal interposed by the private respondent from the
RTC decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases, and therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
thus:

it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employ means

necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6, Rule
135 of the Revised Rules of Court) and verily, there was no need for any statutory
grant for that purpose. Indeed, in annulling the Order of Execution of the Regional

page 5/23
 Trial Court, public respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction since its action in this
regard was necessary to preserve the subject of the appeal and to maintain the
status quo of the parties pending the final outcome of its review of the correctness
of the appealed decision. 7

It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over the cases unlike in the
instant case where the trial court had already given due course to the appeal and elevated the records of the
case to the COMELEC which had taken cognizance of the appeal.

This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits.

The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General is
unacceptable. It goes against its theory in the assailed resolution and is not supported by the facts. The
challenged resolution involves a case which the COMELEC docketed as a special relief case (SPR. No. 1-94).
Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the special relief cases are petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, and contempt proceedings. The ordinary appeal from the RTC decision was, as disclosed in the
challenged resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94. 8 Clearly then, the COMELEC had recognized and taken
cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the RTC decision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the
special civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No. 1-94. The two cases were not consolidated. The
dissimilarities between them need no further elaboration. Since it issued the challenged resolution under the
latter case, it cannot now be heard to state that it issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinary appeal.
This erroneous contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor General notwithstanding, the position taken by
the COMELEC in its resolution now in question paves the way for a re-examination of this Court's
pronouncement in the Garcia and Uy cases.

As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific
constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.

The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such
jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern
the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of
sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in view of the passage of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted
with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election of
members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the
latest, and whether it was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.

The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime go
beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral representatives. In fact, by the very
wording of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:

Sec. 50. Definition.

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
(Emphasis supplied).

it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period of time. Taken in the
context of the conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 12 it
seems quite obvious that the grant was intended as a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming
incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice
De Castro in the said case.

But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing clause of the latter
reads as follows:

Sec. 282. Repealing clause. Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise known as
The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with
the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No.
1618 .and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the
Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.

page 6/23
The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been said:

An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments
are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed
or result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an
express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is
included and as indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general
repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or
designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal
for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of
the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical
verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal,
for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent
acts. 13

This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or
codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are
deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14

By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the Batasang Pambansa
had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace them with the new Code. It made, in fact, by
the second sentence, a reservation that all prior election statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any
provisions of the Code shall remain in force. That sentence

predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must
be found on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the
case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule on strict construction
regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed
to know the existing laws so that, if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is
intended, the proper step is to express it. The failure to add a specific repealing
clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent
was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws. 15

This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the
Omnibus Election Code to determine if the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter, It
found none.

In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and
Uy and Veloria cases, We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the substance of the
challenged resolution.

That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner's motion
for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner
and the private respondent received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed
within five days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal
must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of
Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of
the parties to appeal, 17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal
and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the
elevation of the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
divested of its jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on
12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could
have been otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the
respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and

page 7/23
mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal
and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9 February 1995 of the
Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos, et al. " is
AFFIRMED.

The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.

No pronouncemnt as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and WILLIAM SAMARA, respondents.

Agcaoili & Associates for petitioner.

Romeo G. Carlos for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The Court is beset with the issue involving two defendants in a case for recovery of a sum of money where
the trial court adjudged them to be jointly and severally liable as judgment debtors to pay the plaintiff but
who are now required, as a result of a modification on appeal by only one of them, to pay substantially
different amounts while being solidarity liable.

As a prefatory note, this is the second time the petitioner has gone to this Court but the issues raised at the
first instance are distinct from the one at bar.

The case arose from a complaint filed by private respondent William Samara, an American who does business
in the Philippines, against petitioner Citytrust Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Citytrust) and a
foreign bank, Marine Midland Bank, N.A. (hereinafter referred to as Marine Midland).

The facts as established by the trial court show that plaintiff-private respondent Samara purchased on
December 10, 1980 from defendant petitioner Citytrust Bank Draft Number 23681 for US $40,000.00, the
payee being Thai International Airways and the corresponding bank in the United States or the drawee,
defendant Marine Midland. On December 23, 1980, Samara executed a stop-payment order of the bank draft
instructing Citytrust to inform Marine Midland about the order through telex. Citytrust transmitted the
message to Marine Midland the next day and followed it up with a cable, which the latter bank acknowledged
to have received on January 14, 1981 stating in its receipt that it has noted the stop-payment order and has
not paid the bank draft. Citytrust credited back Samara's account for U.S. $40,000.00 due to the non-
payment. After seven months or on July 3, 1981, Citytrust re-debited Samara's account for U.S. $40,000.00
upon discovering that Marine Midland had already debited Citytrust's own account for the same amount
allegedly on December 22, 1980, Despite the alleged discovery, however, there is evidence to show that
Marine Midland informed Citytrust through a letter of the non-payment or non-encashment of the bank draft
as of August 4, 1981. It is also shown that Marine Midland even confirmed in a telex letter dated August 31,
1981 that the bank draft had not been paid as of that date.

Based on the above findings, the trial court brushed aside Marine Midland's contention that it had already
paid the bank draft of Samara on December 22, 1980 or before it received the stop payment order. The trial
court was not convinced regarding the denial of the confirmation made as to the non-payment of the bank
draft since the time it received the stop payment order. Marine Midland was held bound by its letters
admitting knowledge of the stop payment order and compliance with it. The trial court also overruled the
ground relied on by Citytrust in re-debiting Samara's dollar account, i.e., the discovery that Marine Midland
debited Citytrust's account before the stop payment order was given by Samara, this being unjustifiable.
Hence, a decision was rendered on March 4, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

page 8/23
 1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of US
$40,000.00, plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from July 3, 1981, until full
payment is made, and the further interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the
accrued interest from December 23, 1980 up to the filing of the complaint on October 4,
1983, inclusive; Exemplary damages in the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) and the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as and for attorney's fees,
and costs;

2. Dismissing the defendant's counter-claims for lack of merit;

3. Ordering defendant Marine Midland to reimburse defendant Citytrust of whatever

amount the latter will be made to pay the plaintiff by reason of this judgment and costs.
(Rollo, pp. 29-30)

Only Marine Midland filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. It was denied. The petitioner did not
do anything except to move for a reconsideration of an order of execution of the judgment against it which
was granted. The petitioner and Marine Midland filed separate appeals.

The petitioner's appeal was, however, dismissed on December 15, 1987 for having been filed out of time or
fifty-one (51) days after (i.e., May 7, 1986) it received a copy of the trial court decision on March 17, 1986. A
motion to reconsider the dismissal was denied by the Court of Appeals.

On February 26, 1988, the petitioner questioned before the Supreme Court the dismissal of its appeal. That
case was docketed as G.R. No. 82009 where the petitioner raised the following issues: (1) whether or not the
timely appeal of Marine Midland inured to petitioner's benefit; and (2) whether or not plaintiff-private
respondent Samara was entitled to immediate execution even assuming the petitioner's appeal was indeed
filed out of time.

While the petition for certiorari to review the dismissal of the appeal was still pending before this Court, the
Court of Appeals on February 23, 1989 affirmed the trial court decision with modification consisting of a
reduction of the rate of interest and attorney's fees, as well as the exclusion of exemplary damages. Thus,
the dispositive portion of the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 14128 reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the Decision appealed from except
paragraph 1 thereof which is hereby modified to read as follows:

1. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of US
$40,000.00, plus six percent (6%) interest per annum from July 3, 1981 until full payment is
made, and the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorney's fees. (Rollo,
pp. 45-46)

About a month and a half later or on April 10, 1989, this Court, through its First Division, denied the petition
in G.R. No. 82009 for lack of merit. In response to the allegation that the prescriptive period for filing an
appeal was also suspended as to the petitioner when co-defendant Marine Midland filed a motion for
reconsideration, the Court ruled that the rights and liabilities of the two defendants are not so interwoven as
to show similarity in defenses and warrant reversal of the judgment as to both. This Court stressed
specifically the finding of the appellate court that although the petitioner and Marine Midland were solidarily
liable, only the latter was ultimately held responsible for damages because it was the one ordered to
reimburse the petitioner for "whatever amount" the petitioner will be made to pay the plaintiff by reason of
the judgment. (See Citytrust Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 758 [1989]). Moreover, in filing a
motion for reconsideration, Marine Midland was in fact acting only for itself. Regarding the second issue, we
held that respondent Samara is entitled to immediate execution when the trial court decision became final
and executory as to the petitioner. In overcoming the petitioner's argument that execution pending appeal of
its co-defendant should not be allowed to prevent an absurd result in case of possible reversal, we held that
the law is clear that a final judgment must be executed against a defeated party. Since both defendants are
jointly and severally liable, it is irrelevant whether or not the co-defendant would be absolved.

Some four months later or on August 7, 1989, the Supreme Court declared the decision in G.R. No. 82009 to
be final and executory. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

On September 28, 1989, Samara filed a motion for execution which the trial court granted on October 23,
1989. The petitioner assailed the Order of Execution before the Court of Appeals on November 6, 1989 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 19176. The trial court was upheld and subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.

page 9/23
Hence, the instant petition was filed on March 29, 1990 which raises the main issue of whether or not the
respondent appellate court committed reversible error in ruling that the liability of the petitioner should be
based on the original decision of the trial court and not the modified one.

The private respondent contends that the petition is barred by res judicata alleging that the issue in the case
at bar had already been raised, passed upon, and judicially determined by this Court in G.R. No. 82009.

It is our considered opinion that the issue here is distinct from the ones raised earlier. In the present petition,
the Court is faced with the issue of the propriety of the execution of judgments in favor of private respondent
Samara who is entitled to recover on execution: against the petitioner, the amount of US $40,000.00 plus
12% compounded interest per annum, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 attorney's fees of P50,000.00 and
costs; and as against Marine Midland, the amount of US $40,000.00 plus 6% simple interest per annum, and
attorney's fees of only P10,000.00.

We are less concerned now with the issues of whether or not a co-defendant's appeal inures to the benefit of
another who failed to appeal on time and on the right of a judgment creditor to immediate execution of a
final and executory judgment since such issues have become moot and academic.

It is worthy to note that the Court was not apprised of the February 23, 1989 decision of the Court of Appeals
until after we had promulgated a decision denying Citytrust's petition for certiorari to review the dismissal of
its own appeal. We were so notified through Citytrust's motion for reconsideration of our decision n in G.R.
No. 82009. It is a sad fact, however, that the motion did not present sufficiently compelling grounds to
convince the Court to rule otherwise on the issues presented in G.R. No. 82009 which pertain to the validity
of the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal.

The present petition was given due course in line with our settled rule that while a decision has already
become final and executory and can no longer be challenged, the manner of its execution can be reviewed by
proper appeal (Abbot v. National Labor Relations Commission, 145 SCRA 206 [1986]). It is not only the
difference in the issue raised that makes us allow this petition. It is also because of a different Court of
Appeals decision (this time in CA- G.R. SP No. 19176) that is the subject of our review. The petitioner now
assails the affirmation of the order of execution based on the trial court judgment in spite of the modified
judgment which reduced the liability of co-defendants to pay private respondent. What bothers the private
respondent is the similarity of the arguments used by the petitioner in all the pleadings filed with this Court in
G.R. No. 82009 and in the present petition.

The Court reiterates what it has held in the Abbot case:

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, however, what is sought to be reviewed is not the decision itself but the
manner of its execution. There is a big difference. While it is true that the decision itself has
become final and executory and so can no longer be challenged, there is no question either
that it must be enforced in accordance with its terms and conditions. Any deviation
therefrom can be the subject of a proper appeal. (pp. 209-210)

The petitioner alleges that the appellate court decision dated February 23, 1989 has superseded and
rendered functus oficio the March 4, 1986 decision of the trial court invoked by the private respondent and is
applicable not only to Marine Midland but also to the petitioner.

The Court does not agree with this allegation which hinges on the petitioner's insistence that it can benefit
from a reversal or modification of a judgment even if it has lost its own appeal. We do not depart from our
earlier analysis in G.R. No. 82009 that the rights and liabilities of the petitioner and Marine Midland are not so
interwoven in such a manner that their defenses are similar as to readily warrant an operative effect upon a
party who failed to appeal.

As found by this Court in G.R. No. 82009:

It must be noted that two defendants, Marine Midland and Citytrust, filed cross claims
against each other in their answer. Citytrust alleged that the proximate cause of the injury
should be attributed to co-defendant Marine Midland when the latter failed to promptly
inform Citytrust that the demand draft Citytrust issued was really paid by Marine Midland
on December 22, 1980. For its part, Marine Midland alleged that Citytrust did not properly
advise it of the actual circumstances relating to the dates of payment of the draft and of
the receipt by the latter of the stop-payment instructions. The rights and liabilities of both
parties concerned are not so interwoven in such a manner that their defenses are similar

page 10/23
 and that a reversal of the judgment as to one should operate as a reversal to the other.
Furthermore, a perusal of the decision appealed from shows that Marine Midland, though
jointly and severally liable with petitioner, is the one ultimately held responsible for the
damages incurred by the private respondent inasmuch as the trial court ordered
"defendant Marine Midland to reimburse defendant Citytrust of whatever amount the latter
will be made to pay the plaintiff by reason of this judgment and costs." (Citytrust Banking
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra at page 765)

The Court is of the considered view that it was the trial court judgment that created a joint and several
obligation to pay the private respondent certain sums. No solidary liability as between them existed from the
drawer-drawee relationship in the draft transaction.

The joint and several obligation imposed by the lower court had a three-fold purpose: (1) to declare the
prevailing party to be entitled to recover damages on account of the prejudice which resulted from the acts of
the co-defendants; (2) to give the prevailing party the right to proceed against either one of them to recover
the amounts awarded to him; and (3) to impress upon Marine Midland its ultimate liability to fully reimburse
the petitioner Citytrust consistent with the finding that the proximate cause of the injury to the private
respondent was the wrongful deed of Marine Midland.

The trial court judgment, however, does not alter the fact that the respective defenses of the co-defendants
are distinct on trial and even on appeal. Citytrust and Marine Midland were not in privity with each other in a
transaction involving payment through a bank draft. A bank draft is a "bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon
its correspondent bank, . . . issued at the solicitation of a stranger who purchases and pays therefor" (Kohler
v. First National Bank, 289 P 47, 49, 157 Wash. 417 [1930]). It is also defined as an "order for payment of
money." (Polotsky v. Artisans Savings Bank, Del. 180 A. 791, 792, 7 WW. Harr 142 [1935]). In the case at bar,
Citytrust from which the private respondent purchased the bank draft, was the drawer of the draft through
which it ordered Marine Midland, the drawee bank, to pay the amount of US $40,000.00 in favor of Thai
International Airways, the payee. The drawee bank acting as a "payor" bank is solely liable for acts not done
in accordance with the instructions of the drawer bank or of the purchaser of the draft. The drawee bank has
the burden of proving that it did not violate. Meanwhile, the drawer, if sued by the purchaser of the draft is
liable for the act of debiting the customer's account despite an instruction to stop payment. The drawer has
the duty to prove that he complied with the order to inform the drawee.

The fact that the petitioner previously filed a cross-claim against Marine Midland does not make the former a
party in the latter's appeal where all reliefs granted to the plaintiff and/or to the petitioner who was a co-
defendant are up for review. The rights and liabilities of Citytrust as a defensive cross-claimant, which alleged
that the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff was the wrongful action of Marine Midland, have already
been litigated before the trial court which ordered full reimbursement in favor of Citytrust. Until petitioner
Citytrust appeals for the review of the trial court decision either in part or in toto, its rights and obligations as
pre-determined cannot generally be affected by an appeal of a co-defendant. The respondent appellate court
made this clear in its decision dated February 23, 1989, when it stated that even assuming that the petitioner
may be considered an appellee, "such a standing was only with respect to the cross-claim against (appellant
Marine Midland) and not with respect to its (petitioner's) liability in favor or private respondent Samara", the
judgment on which had already become final and executory as to the Petitioner. The petitioner cannot now
present a subverted interpretation of what the appellate court meant.

The Court examines the execution of judgment rendered in favor of private respondent Samara from a
perspective which shows a glaring disparity between the amounts which each of the two judgment debtors
are bound to pay despite: (1) their being held jointly and severally liable, and (2) the right of one of them to
be reimbursed for the whole amount of whatever it is obliged to pay.

A judgment may determine the ultimate rights of the parties on the same side as between themselves such
that questions of primary and secondary liability between joint tort-feasors may be determined. (Montgomery
v. Blades, 9 SE 2d 397, 217 NC 654 [1940]). This rule reaffirms that principles of joint and several liability
have survived so that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the entire judgment from a single defendant even
though the responsibility of that defendant for personal injury is of a lesser extent. (Gorelick v. Department of
State Highways, 339 NW 2d. 635,127 Mich. App. 324 [1983])

A review of the trial court judgment and the appellate court judgment here shows that the only difference is
the amount of damages in paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the March 4, 1986 decision as restated
and reduced in the February 23, 1989 decision. All other orders of the trial court were affirmed by the
respondent appellate court. The joint and several obligation to pay the private respondent and the right of
the petitioner to be reimbursed are retained. The problem now lies in interpreting the said modification as
likewise reducing the total amount which can be executed against the petitioner.

If we go by a literal procedure, execution against petitioner Citytrust would be based on the March 4, 1986
decision. However, the Court can not close its eyes to the inexplicable situation where private respondent

page 11/23
Samara would be given a choice of executing his claim for US $40,000.00 plus bigger interest (compounded),
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees from petitioner Citytrust, or US $40,000.00 plus a smaller sum
inclusive of simple interest and reduced attorney's fees from Marine Midland. Even if it is admitted that
Citytrust would anyway be reimbursed for the whole amount which Citytrust may be ordered to pay, such
reimbursement would be a circumvention of the appellate court's judgment that Marine Midland is liable only
for the modified sum.

There are two final judgments arising from one and the same basic claim of Mr. Samara. The obligations
arising from the same stop payment order on the same U.S. $40,000.00 bank draft are sought to be enforced
by the two conflicting final and executory judgments. We cannot enforce one judgment while allowing a
violation of the other. We apply basic principles of justice and equity.

It is clear from the records that "the draft was not paid or cashed before the receipt of the stop payment
order by the appellant (Marine Midland)" but was certainly paid at some other date as evidenced by a
reconciliation entry showing a debit of the corresponding amount in the books of Marine Midland. (See Rollo,
pp. 40 and 42). Furthermore, there was substantial evidence to show that Marine Midland is the one actually
responsible for the personal injury to the private respondent. The respondent court made the following
findings, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

It must be noted that it was the appellant's certifications and repeated reaffimation of non-
payment of the bank draft that led defendant Citytrust to re-credit appellee's account. Also,
the appellant negligently failed to implement the stop payment order upon receipt. It
tarried in actually executing it until January 13, 1981. Furthermore, it was the appellant's
debiting of the account of the defendant-Citytrust which also led the defendant Citytrust to
again debit the appellee's dollar account despite prior acknowledgment of the non-payment
of the draft. No doubt, it was the appellant's actuations that triggered the whole mess.
Therefore, the lower court correctly ordered the appellant to reimburse defendant Citytrust
of whatever amount the latter may pay the appellee by virtue of its judgment. (Rollo, p. 44)

Considering the above circumstances, the Court will not allow the absurd situation where a co-defendant who
is adjudged to be primarily liable for sums of money and for tort would be charged for an amount lesser than
what its co-defendant is bound to pay to the common creditor and allowed to collect from the first co-
defendant. Such a situation runs counter to the principle of solidarity in obligations as between co-defendants
established by a judgment for recovery of sum of money and damages. Substantial justice shall not allow
Marine Midland, which is the source of the injury afflicted, to be unjustly enriched either by the direct
execution against him of the judgment for the reduced amount or by the indirect execution by way of
reimbursement at a later time.

Additionally, the Court notes the modification made by the respondent court which ordered not only Marine
Midland (the appellant therein) but both "defendants jointly and severally" to pay the new amount. Though,
as a matter of procedure, the modification shall be applied only to the appellant, substantial justice and
equity also demand that we re-interpret the decision to refer to petitioner Citytrust as well. There exists a
strong and compelling reason to warrant an exception to the rule that a judgment creditor is entitled to
execution of a final and executory judgment against a party especially if that party failed to appeal. (Olacao
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38 [1989]; Quigui v. Boncaros 151 SCRA 416 [1987]; Orata
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 148 [1990])

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 19176 dated January 18, 1990 as well as
the resolution denying reconsideration are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ordered to
effect execution of its judgment subject to the modifications supplied by the Court of Appeals in its judgment
on February 23, 1989.
SO ORDERED.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AND
BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking
to reverse and set aside the September 30, 1999 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
49183, which affirmed the June 13, 1997 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in

page 12/23
NLRC Case No. 012311-97 remanding the complaint of respondent Aricayos to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings, and the February 11, 2000 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.4

The instant petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment
of back wages, and damages filed by private respondent Aricayos against petitioner. The initiatory pleading
was filed before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. III in San Fernando, Pampanga and docketed
as RAB III-05-7022-96.

The facts culled from the records are:

The owner of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Homes, Inc. (St. Martin) is Amelita Malabed. Prior to January 1996,
Amelita's mother managed the funeral parlor; respondent Aricayos, on the other hand, was formerly an
overseas contract worker. Sometime in 1995, Aricayos was granted financial assistance by Amelita's mother.
As a sign of appreciation, respondent extended assistance to Amelita's mother in managing St. Martin
without compensation. There was no written employment contract between Amelita's mother and respondent
Aricayos; furthermore, respondent Aricayos was not even listed as an employee in the Company's payroll.

When Amelita's mother died in January 1996, Amelita took over as manager of St. Martin. Much to her
chagrin, she found out that St. Martin had arrearages in the payment of BIR taxes and other fees owing to the
government, but company records tended to show that payments were made thereon. As a result, Amelita
removed the authority from respondent Aricayos and his wife from taking part in managing St. Martin's
operations.

Aggrieved, respondent Aricayos accused St. Martin of his illegal dismissal as Operations Manager of the
company. He believed that the cause of his termination was Amelita's suspicion that he pocketed PhP
38,000.00 which was set aside for payment to the BIR of St. Martin's valued added taxes.

On October 25, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, in favor of petitioner declaring that his office had
no jurisdiction over the case, in this wise:

We rule in favor of the respondent since this office has no jurisdiction over the instant complaint, because as
held in Dela Salle University v. NLRC, 135 SCR 674, 677 (1988) where the existence of an employer-employee
relationship is disputed and not assumed, as in these cases, the determination of that question should be
handled by the regular courts after full dress trial and not by the Labor Arbiter. The Supreme Court ruled:

We hold that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over the case. It was properly brought to the
Civil Court. The issue was the existence of the employer-employee relationship between Lao and the
University. Under Article 265 (5) - The existence of employer-employee relations is assumed - not disputed.

In this case, it is necessary to determine whether Lao became a permanent employee after she was hired as
a probationary employee. The determination of the question could be more competently handled by the court
after a full dress trial and not by the Labor Arbiter by means of position paper procedure followed by him. 5

Aggrieved, respondent Aricayos appealed the Labor Arbiter's adverse ruling to the NLRC. On June 13, 1997,
the NLRC issued a Resolution annulling the Arbiter's Decision and remanded the case to him for appropriate
proceedings, to determine the factual issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship between the
parties, ratiocinating this way:

Considering the diametrically opposing contentions of the parties herein on the issue of employer-employee
relationship, it was imperative on the Labor Arbiter to have threshed out the issue in further appropriate
proceedings. The Labor Arbiter is so authorized under our Rules when the facts are not too clear. As it is, the
conclusions herein are not well substantiated.

Indeed, the ends of justice would better be served if both parties are given further opportunity to ventilate
their respective positions on issues at hand. 6

When its motion for reconsideration was rejected by the NLRC, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 130866.

On September 16, 1998, this Court through Justice Jose Vitug, rendered the landmark Decision in this case
then docketed as G.R. No. 130866, holding for the first time that all petitions for certiorari under Rule 65
assailing the decisions of the NLRC should henceforth be filed with the CA, thus:

page 13/23
Therefore, all references in the amended section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Thus, the petition was remanded to the CA and redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49183.

Subsequently, the CA rendered the assailed September 30, 1999 Decision, dismissing petitioner's appeal for
lack of merit with the finding that respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in its
pronouncement that the Labor Arbiter did not make any finding on the alleged employer-employee
relationship between the parties, reasoning this way:

Actually the Labor Arbiter did not determine whether there is an employer-employee relation between the
parties because according to him, such issue should be resolved by the regular court pursuant to the ruling of
the Supreme Court in De la Salle University v. NLRC (135 SCRA 674, 677 (1988)).

For its part, respondent NLRC, is remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter, reminded the latter that he is
authorized by the NLRC Rules to determine, in an appropriate proceeding the existence of an employer-
employee relationship.7

In its February 11, 2000 Resolution, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Thus, the
instant petition.

Petitioner insists that, contrary to the findings of the NLRC as affirmed by the CA, the Labor Arbiter actually
concluded that there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties considering the
memoranda, position papers, and the documentary evidence presented in support of their respective
positions. St. Martin asserts that the Labor Arbiter already undertook the "appropriate proceeding" referred to
by the NLRC and the CA and therefore, the NLRC and the CA decided the case contrary to the evidence
presented, the applicable laws, and jurisprudence.

The petition must fail.

The main issue is whether the Labor Arbiter made a determination of the presence of an employer-employee
relationship between St. Martin and respondent Aricayos based on the evidence on record.

Petitioner St. Martin contends that the Labor Arbiter indeed made a finding of the non-existence of any
relationship between respondent Aricayos and the company based on the position papers and memoranda of
the parties. In addition, petitioner claims several affidavits of its employees were attached to its position
paper whereby they attested under oath that respondent Aricayos was never an employee of St. Martin. It
concludes that the Arbiter made the determination of the absence of an employer-employee relationship only
after considering the documentary evidence on record and hence, substantial evidence supports such
finding.

On the other hand, respondent Aricayos supports the pronouncement of the NLRC as affirmed by the CA that
there was no determination whether he was an employee of St. Martin and the main basis for the dismissal of
his complaint was the reliance of the Labor Arbiter on the cited case of De La Salle University v. NLRC that it
should be the regular court which should make such finding.

We rule for respondent Aricayos.

At the outset, it is clear that the issue submitted for resolution is a question of fact which is proscribed by the
rule disallowing factual issues in appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. This is explicit in
Rule 45, Section 1 that petitions of this nature "shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth." Petitioner St. Martin would like the Court to examine the pleadings and documentary evidence extant
on the records of the Labor Arbiter to determine if said official indeed made a finding on the existence of the
alleged employer-employee nexus between the parties based on the facts contained in said pleadings and
evidence. Evidently this issue is embraced by the circumscription.

Even if we would like to relax the rule and allow the examination of the documentary evidence as an
exception to the general rule, we are precluded by the abject failure of petitioner to attach to the petition
important and material portions of the records as would support the petition prescribed by Rule 45, Section 4.
St. Martin asks us to find out if the Labor Arbiter was correct in concluding that respondent Aricayos was not
in its employ; but committed the blunder of not attaching to the petition even the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter sought to be reviewed, the NLRC Decision, the position papers and memoranda of the parties filed
with the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of petitioner's employees, and other pieces of evidence that we can

page 14/23
consider in resolving the factual issue on employment. Without these vital documents, petitioner cannot be
given the relief prayed for.

Even with the inadequate information and few documents on hand, one thing is clear that the Labor Arbiter
did not set the labor case for hearing to be able to determine the veracity of the conflicting positions of the
parties. On this point alone, a remand is needed.

We held in a catena of cases that while a formal trial or hearing is discretionary on the part of the Labor
Arbiter, when there are factual issues that require a formal presentation of evidence in a hearing, the Labor
Arbiter cannot simply rely on the position papers, more so, on mere unsubstantiated claims of
parties.rbl r l l lbrr

In Batongbacal v. Associated Bank, we remanded the case for further proceedings as "equity and justice
demand that not only the factual issue of whether or not an assistant vice-president is a managerial
employee, but also whether petitioner is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages, should be
considered."8 In Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. NLRC,9 we also put to task the Labor Arbiter
for issuing an order submitting the case for decision without conducting a hearing. As such, the Labor
Arbiter's Decision was rendered merely upon his reliance on the bare allegations of the parties in their
position papers. While the parties submitted documentary evidence in Progress Homes v. NLRC10 it was clear
that a hearing was still required in order to ventilate the factual issues.rbl r l l
lbrr

In the case at bar, there are certain admissions by petitioner St. Martin that should have prodded the Labor
Arbiter to conduct a hearing for a more in-depth examination of the contrasting positions of the parties,
namely; that respondent helped Amelita's mother manage the funeral parlor business by running errands for
her,11 overseeing the business from 1995 up to January 1996 when the mother died, and that after Amelita
made changes in the business operation, private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management of St. Martin.12 These facts, as admitted by the petitioner and the affidavits of
St. Martin's witnesses, could have been examined more in detail by the Labor Arbiter in a hearing to convince
himself that there was indeed no employment relationship between the parties as he originally found.

In the light of these premises, we find no reason to disturb the assailed judgment of the CA.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the September 30, 1999 Decision and the
February 11, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49183 are hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

CU-UNJIENG VS CA

GARCIA, J.:

By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Charles Cu-Unjieng seeks the reversal of the
following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 8177-B-UDK, entitled Charles Cu-Unjieng,
plaintiff-appellant vs. Union Bank of the Philippines, et al., defendants-appellees, to wit:

1. Resolution[1] dated May 10,1999, dismissing, for non-payment of

docket and other lawful fees, petitioners appeal from an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan which dismissed his complaint for specific
performance and damages against respondent Union Bank of the Philippines and
others; and
2. Resolution[2] dated July 30, 1999 which denied petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration and ordered expunged the appeal brief thereto attached.

The facts:

Respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) is the owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an
area of 218,769 square meters situated in Barangay Sta. Maria, San Miguel, Bulacan and registered in its
name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. TC-1062 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.

Sometime in January 1994, UBP caused the posting on the bulletin boards of its branch offices of a
three-page list of acquired realty assets available for sale to interested parties. Included in said list was the
aforementioned parcel of land, offered to be sold for P2,200,000.00.

page 15/23
 Petitioner, through a letter[3] dated April 11, 1994 and addressed to Joselito P. Valera, manager of
UBPs Acquired Assets Department, offered to buy the subject property for a lesser amount of P2,078,305.50,
payable as follows: 50% as down payment with the balance to be paid in equal monthly installments over a
period of two (2) years. Petitioner explained that his offer for an amount lesser than UBPs asking price was on
account of five (5) tenants occupying the subject land who were allegedly demanding P500,000.00 to
voluntarily vacate the same.

As proof of his interest to buy the property, petitioner tendered PCIB Check No. 565827 for
P103,915.27, purportedly representing 10% of the 50% down payment as earnest money or deposit. UBP
acknowledged receipt thereof by way of Union Bank Receipt No. 495081 dated April 11, 1994.

On August 30, 1994, petitioner wrote a follow-up letter to UBP inquiring on the status of his offer to
buy the subject premises.[4]

Via a reply-letter dated August 31, 1994, the manager of UBPs Acquired Assets Department advised
petitioner that his offer to purchase is yet to be acted upon because the bank was still awaiting the opinion of
its legal division regarding the sale of CARPable agricultural assets acquired by the bank. [5]

As it turned out, UBP rejected petitioners offer as shown by the fact that in another letter [6] dated December
19, 1994, the bank informed petitioner that his offer could not be favorably acted upon on account of the
legal divisions opinion that sales of lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law without prior
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approval are considered null and void. Accordingly, UBP advised
petitioner to pick up the refund of his P103,915.27 earnest money at the banks disbursing unit.

Unable to accept UBPs rejection of his offer, petitioner, through counsel, made a formal demand [7] for the
bank to comply with its obligation to transfer and deliver the title of the subject property to him by executing
the proper deed of conveyance, under the terms and conditions set forth in his April 11, 1994 offer.

Responding thereto, UBP, thru its counsel, Atty. Luzano, in a letter [8] dated July 19, 1995, reiterated the banks
rejection of petitioners offer as the land being carpable could only be disposed of by the bank either thru
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) or compulsory acquisition, the procedure of which is outlined in Sec. 16 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.

It was against the foregoing backdrop of events that, on February 6, 1997, in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner filed his complaint [9] in this case for Specific Performance and Damages
against UBP, impleading as co-defendant in the suit the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Docketed as Civil Case
No. 80-M-97 and raffled to Branch 9 of the court, the complaint principally sought UBPs compliance with an
alleged perfected contract of sale between it and petitioner relative to the parcel of land in question. More
specifically, the complaint prays for a judgment ordering UBP to:

a) accept payments from the plaintiff [petitioner] for the sale of the Property in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the letter dated 11 April 1994;

b) execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the Property covered by TCT No. TC 1062 of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan upon the plaintiffs full payment of the
amount of Two Million Seventy Eight Thousand Three Hundred Five & 50/100
(P2,078,305.50), failing in which, the deputy sheriff should be ordered to execute
such deed and the Registry of Deeds to cancel the title of the Bank and issue a
new one in favor of the plaintiff;

c) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages;

d) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary
damages;

e) pay plaintiff the sum of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) as attorneys fees;
and

f) pay the costs of the suit.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise respectfully
prayed for.

After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated September 1, 1998, [10] upon a finding that
no perfected contract of sale transpired between the parties, dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of
sufficient cause of action, thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the laws/jurisprudence
applicable thereon, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in the above
entitled case for want of sufficient cause of action as well as the defendants counterclaim
for damages and attorneys fees for lack of proof to warrant the same.

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 However, defendant Union Bank of the Philippines is ordered to reimburse plaintiff
Charles Cu-Unjieng the amount of P103,915.27 representing the face value of PCIBank
Check No. 565827 tendered by the latter to the former as purported earnest money, with
interest thereon at the prevailing rates of interest periodically bestowed by UBP to its
savings depositors from April 11, 1994, through the succeeding years, and until the full
amount thereof shall have been delivered to the plaintiff.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of
Appeal[11] therein making known that he is taking an appeal from the adverse decision to the CA. Acting
thereon, the trial court issued an Order [12] directing the elevation of the records of the case to the CA, whereat
petitioners appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 8177-B-UDK.

As things would have it, in the herein first assailed Resolution dated May 10, 1999, the CA dismissed
petitioners appeal for nonpayment of the required docket and other lawful appeal fees, to wit:

For failure of the appellant [petitioner] to pay the docket and other lawful fees
(Sec. 4, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the Court Resolved to DISMISS the appeal
pursuant to Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of the same Rule.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto his appellants brief. However, in a
subsequent Resolution dated July 30, 1999,[14] the appellate court denied the motion and even expunged
from the record the appellants brief thereto attached:

Acting on the motion of the plaintiff-appellant [petitioner] for a reconsideration of

the Resolution of May 10, 1999, which dismissed the appeal for the reason stated therein,
and considering the opposition interposed thereto by defendant-appellee [respondent]
Union Bank of the Philippines and it appearing that the filing of the notice of appeal of
November 5, 1988, was not accompanied by the full and correct payment of the
corresponding appellate court docket and other lawful fees, and for such tardiness of more
than four (4) months, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration and the
attached brief thereto ordered EXPUNGED.

In Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, the Supreme Court, citing Rodillas vs.
Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 702 aptly said:

xxx the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It
should be accompanied by the payment of the correct amount of appeal
fee. In other words, the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and
appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees. Well-rooted is the principle
that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the
questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court
or body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain
the appeal. This requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without
which the decision appealed from would become final and executory, as if
no appeal was filed at all.

SO ORDERED.

Undaunted, petitioner is now with us via the present recourse seeking a relaxation of procedural
rules and ultimately the reversal and setting aside of the assailed twin resolutions of the appellate court.

Petitioner would have the Court view his failure to pay the appeal docket fees on time as a non-fatal
lapse, or a non-jurisdictional defect which the CA should have ignored in order to attain substantial justice.
Further, petitioner passes the blame to the RTC clerk of court who allegedly made the erroneous computation
of docket fees.

We are not persuaded.

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 Doctrinally entrenched is the pronouncement that the right to appeal is merely statutory and a party
seeking to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules. [15]

Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or the record on appeal.
Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is
both mandatory and jurisdictional,[16] noncompliance with which is fatal to an appeal. For, to stress, appeal is
not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege. [17]

An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within fifteen
(15) days from notice.[18] And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from.

Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not
perfected and the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby rendering the
decision sought to be appealed final and executory. [19]

For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period as provided under Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal under Section
1(c) of Rule 50, to wit:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in
section 4 of Rule 41; xxx

This Court has invariably sustained the CAs dismissal on technical grounds under the aforequoted
provision unless considerations of equity and substantial justice present cogent reasons to hold otherwise.
True, the rules may be relaxed but only for persuasive and weighty reasons, to relieve a litigant of an injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. [20] So it is that in La Salette College
vs. Victor Pilotin,[21] we held:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate
docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first,
failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not
automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with
its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well
as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances

Then, too, in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs. Mangubat,[22] we held that late
payment of docket fees may be admitted when the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by
immediately paying the required fees. Mactan, however, cannot be a source of comfort for herein petitioner.
For there, the appellate docket fees were paid six (6) days after the timely filing of the notice of appeal.
Unlike in Mactan, payment of the appellate docket fees in this case was effected by petitioner only after four
(4) months following the expiration of the reglementary period to take an appeal.

With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate docket fees was belatedly made
four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that the CA did not acquire
jurisdiction over petitioners appeal except to order its dismissal, [23] as it rightfully did. Thus, the September 1,
1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the realm of finality and became executory by operation of law.

We must emphasize that invocation of substantial justice is not a magical incantation that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of procedure are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed. So it must be here.

WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed resolutions dated May 10,1999 and July 30, 1999
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

page 18/23
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC December 4, 2007

AMENDMENTS TO RULES 41, 45, 58 AND 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT

RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and Members of the Subcommittee on the
Revision of Rule 65 submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the proposed
amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the
same.

This Resolution shall take effect on December 27. 2007 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.

December 4, 2007.

RENATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL- ANTONIO T. CARPIO

GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

Associate Justice CASTRO

page 19/23
 Associate Justice

AMENDMENTS TO RULES 41, 45, 58 AND 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT

RULE 41

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

a. An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief
from judgment;

b. An interlocutory order;

c. An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

d. An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,

confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or
any other ground vitiating consent;

e. An order of execution;

f. A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or

in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an
appeal therefrom; and

g. An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action as provided in Rule 65.

RULE 45

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by
verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.

RULE 58

SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No preliminary injunction
shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or persons sought to be enjoined. If it
shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which
the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining
order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the twenty-day period, the court must
order said party or person to show cause at a specified time and place, why the injunction should
not be granted. The court shall also determine, within the same period, whether or not the

page 20/23
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.

However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency
and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the
documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the
judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether
the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction
can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said
period, the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a
temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect,
and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it
was issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order
shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A
restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further
orders.

The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbyan or the Court of Tax Appeals that issued a
writ of preliminary injunction against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall
decide the main case or petition within six (6) months from the issuance of the writ.

RULE 65

Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board,
an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or
with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If
the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from
further proceeding with the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a
petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.

Sec. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. After the comment or other pleadings required by the
court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require
the parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or upon the
expiration of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall
render judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.

However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or

page 21/23
 prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily
against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions
under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.

The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or
measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 99-2-01-SC February 9, 1999

IN RE: DISMISSAL OF SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS IN NLRC CASES

In light of the decision in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC (G.R. No. 130866, 16 September 1998), all special
civil actions arising out of any decision or final resolution or order of the National Labor Relations Commission
filed with the Court after 01 June 1999 shall no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but shall forthwith
be DISMISSED.

Let this resolution be published in two newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and copies thereof
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the National Labor Relations Commission.
Promulgated this 9th day of February 1999.

1 WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF RESIDUAL POWERS?

> They are powers which the trial court retains even after the perfection of the appeal
> For example: X was charged and convicted with a crime so he filed a notice of appeal. If he wants
to put up bail, where should he file his application? If the records of the case have not been
transmitted to the appellate court, X can file the application with the trial court. However, once the records
have been transmitted to the appellate court, the trial court loses his jurisdiction over the bail application.

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

5:12 AM

A h i g h e r c o u r t wi l l n o t en t er ta i n d irec t re s o r t to i t u n le s s th e red re s s c a n n o t b e o b t a in ed
in th e a p p ro p r ia t e c o u r t s .

T h i s i s an o rd a in ed s eq u en c e o f re c o u r s e to c o u r t s v es t ed wi t h c o n c u rre n t j u r is d ic t io n ,
b e g in n i n g f ro m t h e lo w es t , o n t o t h e n ex t h i g h e s t , a n d u l ti m a t el y t o t h e h i g h e s t . T h i s

page 22/23
h i er arch y is d et e rm in a t i v e o f th e ve n u e o f a p p e a l s , a n d i s li ke wi s e d e te rm in a t i ve o f t h e
p ro p e r fo r u m f o r p et i ti o n s fo r ex tr a o rd in a r y w r i t s . T h i s i s a n es ta b l is h e d p o l ic y n ec es s a r y
to av o i d in o rd in a t e d em a n d s u p o n t h e C o u r t s t im e a n d a t t en ti o n wh ic h a re b et t er d e vo t ed
to th o s e m a t t er s w i th in it s exc l u s iv e ju r i s d i c t i o n , a n d t o p re c l u d e t h e fu r t h e r c lo g g in g o f
th e C o u r t s d o c ke t .

T h e S C i s a c o u r t o f la s t res o r t . I t c a n n o t a n d s h o u l d n o t b e b u rd en ed w it h t h e t a s k o f
d e ci d i n g ca s es i n th e fi r s t i n s t a n c e s . I ts ju r i s d i c ti o n t o is s u e ex t r a o rd in a r y w r i ts s h o u l d b e
exe rc i s e d o n ly w h e re a b s o lu te l y n e c es s a r y o r wh ere s er io u s a n d i m p o r t a n t re a s o n s ex i s t .

Pe t i t io n s f o r th e i s s u a n c e o f ex t r a o rd in a r y wr it s a g a in s t fi r s t l e ve l c o u r ts s h o u l d b e fi l e d
wi t h th e RTC a n d th o s e a g a in s t t h e l a tt e r w it h t h e C A. A d irec t i n v o c a t i o n o f th e S C s
o r ig in al ju r is d i c t i o n to is s u e th es e w r i t s s h o u l d b e a l lo w e d o n ly w h e re t h e re a re s p ec ia l
an d im p o r ta n t rea s o n s th ere fo re , c le a r l y a n d s p ec i fi c a l l y s et o u t i n t h e p e t it i o n .

T h e d o ct r i n e o f h i er a rc h y o f c o u r t s m a y b e d is re g a rd ed if w a rr a n te d b y th e n a tu re a n d
im p o r t an ce o f th e i s s u es r a i s e d i n t h e in te res t o f s p ee d y j u s t i c e a n d t o a vo id fu tu re
li t ig at i o n s , o r in c a s es o f n a t io n a l i n t ere s t a n d o f s e r i o u s im p l ic a t i o n s .

S e c. 9 [ 1 ] , B P 1 2 9 ; S e c . 5 [ 1 ] , A r t . V I I I , C o n s t i tu ti o n o f th e Ph il i p p in es , B y h ie r a rc h y o f
co u r t s is m e a n t t h a t wh il e th e S u p rem e C o u r t, th e C o u r t o f A p p ea ls , a n d th e Re g i o n al
Tr ia l C o u r ts h a ve c o n c u rre n t o r ig in a l ju r i s d i c ti o n to is s u e wr i ts o f c e r t i o r a r i , p ro h ib it i o n ,
man d a mu s , q u o w a rr a n to a n d h a b ea s c o r p u s , s u c h o c c u rre n c e d o e s n o t a c c o rd li t ig a n ts
u n res tr ai n e d f re ed o m o f c h o i c e o f th e c o u r t to w h i c h a p p l ic a t io n t h e re fo re m a y b e d irec t ed .
T h e ap p li ca t i o n s h o u l d b e fi l e d w i th th e c o u r t o f lo w er l ev e l u n l es s th e im p o r ta n c e o f t h e
is s u e in vo lv e d d es er ve s t h e a c t io n o f t h e c o u r t o f h i g h e r l e v el . ( U y vs . C o n t rer a s , 2 3 7
S C RA 1 6 7 )

page 23/23